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Formulaic Language in Byzantine Book Epigrams: A Typology Grounded in Ritually-Charged Pragmatic Functions

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Abstract: *This study examines the formulaic language of Byzantine book epigrams inscribed by scribes in manuscript margins, texts that combine poetic expression with the documentation of manuscript production. While formulaicity in Greek historical texts has been theorised primarily in oral and administrative contexts, the nature of other texts like Byzantine book epigrams remains largely underexplored. Focusing on the most formulaic subset in the Database of Byzantine Book Epigrams (DBBE), namely scribe-related epigrams, the study proposes a typological framework which classifies formulaic sequences by pragmatic function: address, request, thanksgiving, representation of individuals or the community, and recording of practical information. Beyond models grounded in orality, cognitive processing, or epistolary convention, the analysis conceptualises these formulae as ritualised communicative acts embedded in Byzantine manuscript culture, demonstrating how they mediated human-divine relations, reinforced communal identity, and functioned as a performative medium of piety and scribal agency, capturing both formulaic constraint and creative flexibility.*

The epigrams presented herein exemplify an understudied facet of Byzantine manuscript culture: the composition, adaptation, and transcription of book epigrams in manuscript margins by scribes. They constitute concise poetic compositions and function as *paratexts*[1]—inscribed on manuscripts, they simultaneously engage with their production and consumption context. Occupying a liminal space between literary expression and

[1] G. Genette, *Seuils*. (Paris 1987).

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practical documentation, they record in verse details such as the scribe's name, the patron's identity, the completion date, and the place of production. Thus, their significance extends beyond mere literary value; offering insights into the materiality of the book and its social function, they also reveal the interconnectedness of its various agents, and their community's with God, constituting poetic records of their social and religious milieu.

(1) Type 6977: [2]

Τῷ συντελεστῇ τῶν καλῶν Θεῷ χάρις·
Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον καὶ πόνος Γεωργίου
τοὐπίκλην Καρυκᾶ· ἐγράφη ἡ βίβλος
αὕτη διὰ χειρὸς ἐμοῦ τοῦ χωρικοῦ
γραφέως Γεωργίου Καρυκᾶ τοῦ Ἀργυροῦ
ἐν ἔτει τρέχοντος, χιλιάδας ἓξ [...]
ὀκτὼ καὶ ἐπιφέροντα ἑκατοντάδας
δεκάδαν μίαν, πρὸ τῆς τετάρτης
ἴνδικτον καὶ ἄγοντος δ' [...]
Τὸν ἀναγινώσκοντα σὺν π[ροθυμίᾳ / ολλῷ πόθῳ][3],
τὸν δακτύλοις γράψαντα, τὸν κεκτημένον,
φύλαττε τοὺς τρεῖς, ὦ Τριάς, τρισολβίως.

transl.:[4]

Grace to God, the bestower of all good things.
(This is) a gift from God and the labour of Georgios,
also called Karykas; this book here
was written by the hand of me, the humble
scribe Georgios Karykas of Argyros
in the present year, six thousand (…)
eight hundred and
ten, before the fourth

[2] The material discussed is available in the Database of Byzantine Book Epigrams. Each record name links to its corresponding entry. For further information on the database, see Section 2.

[3] Respecting the meter and comparing similar epigrams, I propose two options for reconstructing the missing text.

[4] All translations are the author's, unless stated otherwise.

indiction and during (…).
The one reading this with (eagerness / much yearning),
the one who wrote it with his fingers, and the owner—
guard these three, O Trinity, in threefold bliss.

(2) Type 6894:

Τὸν δακτύλοις γράψαντα, τὸν κεκτημένον,
τὸν δὲ ἀναγινώσκοντα μετ' εὐλαβείας,
φύλαττε τοὺς τρεῖς, ὦ Τριὰς παναγία.
Ὡς ἱππεὺς ταχυδρόμος, ἡ χεὶρ ἐνταῦθα,
διαδραμοῦσα βυθὸν γραμμάτων τόσον,
ἧκ' οὖν πνευστιῶν εἰς τέλος τῆς πυξίδος
ἐπευχαριστῶν τὸν συντελεστὴν πάντα.

The one who wrote this with his fingers, the owner,
and the one reading it with reverence—
guard these three, O most holy Trinity.
Like a swift courier on horseback, the hand here
swiftly traversed this sea of letters;
and so, breathless, has reached the end of the book
giving thanks to the bestower of all things.

(3) Occurrence 24022:

+ Θ(εο)ῦ τό δῶρον καὶ Μανουήλ πόνος.

A gift of God, the labour of Manouel.

In (1), the scribe invokes divine grace for himself, the reader, and the patron. A similar supplication in (2) introduces a key linguistic feature of these epigrams—formulaicity, the focus of this study. Recurring patterns within these texts signal shared conventions within the scribal community, manifesting in various forms. In some instances, we observe the reproduction of nearly fixed formulae (as in (1) vv.10–12 and (2) vv.1–3), while other patterns are more abstract (as in (1) v.1 and (2) v.8). Nevertheless, this does not preclude creativity, as demonstrated in (2) (vv.5–7), where novel elements appear amid formulaic material. Adaptation is also common; certain formulae present slots for context-specific information, such as the

scribe's name, though this may occasionally disrupt the metre, as seen in (3) compared to the formula as in (1) (v.2).[5] This dynamic blend of fixed expressions, variation, and creative additions renders Byzantine epigrams a compelling corpus for advancing the study of formulaicity in the Byzantine historical context.

This study does not focus on the epigrams as individual texts but rather on the recurring formulaic elements they incorporate, linking the former in complex ways. At the phrase level, I explore how these formulae function across epigrams. While the linguistic feature of formulaicity is central, these texts cannot be studied in isolation from their cultural and religious context. By classifying formulaic elements, I aim to identify their communicative purposes within the Byzantine communities which produce, copy, and consume book epigrams. Beyond the individual epigrams, these sequences—repetitive and standardised to varying extents—reflect a set of embedded conventions serving communicative and ritualistic functions within the Byzantine 'text community' (the historical equivalent of a 'speech community').[6] By adopting a corpus-driven approach, I categorise formulaic elements according to their pragmatic functions, elucidating their connection to broader religious and social practices.

To begin, I present the corpus of this study (Section 2). I then assert the necessity of a corpus-specific typology in lieu of pre-existing models for classifying formulaic sequences (Section 3). Subsequently, I outline a conceptual framework, and situate Byzantine

[5] The formula in (3) presents 11 syllables, deviating from the expected 12-syllable structure of e.g. (1), v.2. This discrepancy arises from the scribe's name, which counts three syllables in the former and four in the latter. Though, formulaic elements tend to be the most metrically consistent parts of book epigrams; cf. the non-formulaic parts of (1) (ll.3-9): lines 3 and 4 present 12 syllables, but with a *caesura* at the 6th rather than the more typical 5th syllable; lines 4 and 5 exhibit the less common oxytonic ending instead of the expected paroxytonic; line 5 counts 12 syllables if Γεωργίου is read with the vernacular/modern Greek pronunciation [ˌjor·ɣu] instead of [je·or·ˌji·u].

[6] M. Stenroos, "From Scribal Repertoire to Text Community: The Challenge of Variable Writing Systems," in J. Cromwell and E. Grossman (eds.), *Scribal repertoires in Egypt from the New Kingdom to the early Islamic period*. (Oxford 2018) 20–40.

book epigrams within their historical and cultural milieu, with particular emphasis on the Christian framework shaping their production (Section 4). In this context, I briefly discuss manuscript copying and epigram composition as rituals in their own right. Following this, I present the methodology (Section 5), before I define the formulaic material under study and present the typology of formulae, organised by pragmatic functions and illustrated with representative examples of their use in epigram composition (Section 6). The outcome of this paper is a typology of formulaic material in book epigrams stored in the Database of Byzantine Epigrams (DBBE), categorised by communicative and ritual purposes. This study thereby seeks to deepen our understanding of the role of formulaic language in shaping communication interwoven with literary expression within a deeply religious cultural tradition.

1. Corpus: 'Scribe-related' Byzantine book epigrams

This study utilises data from the Database of Byzantine Book Epigrams (DBBE), a digital repository that collects, transcribes, standardises, contextualises and presents Byzantine book epigrams.[7] The DBBE distinguishes between 'Occurrences'—specific instances of epigrams as they appear in manuscripts, preserving original scribal choices—and 'Types', which consolidate similar 'Occurrences' into standardised versions.[8] While 'Occurrences' retain orthographic, morphological and specific contextual nuances, 'Types' streamline comparative study, making them optimal for efficiently identifying formulaic patterns across different epigrams.

[7] The digitisation of Byzantine book epigrams, with encoded metadata, renders them well-suited to digitally driven research. This distinguishes them from other, closely related corpora—such as epigrams on various writing media (see A. Rhoby, *Byzantinische Epigramme*, Vols. 1–3 (Vienna 2009, 2010, 2014)), and metrical legends on lead seals (see A.K. Wassiliou-Seibt, *Corpus der byzantinischen Siegel mit metrischen Legenden*, Tle. 1–2)—which are not yet available in comparably structured digital format. Comparative analysis between the material examined hereby and the corpus compiled by A. Rhoby is currently underway.

[8] R. Ricceri et al. "The Database of Byzantine Book Epigrams project: Principles, challenges, opportunities," *JDMDH* (2023) 7–8.

This analysis focuses on the 'Types' within the 'Scribe-related' genre,[9] comprising 1,849 entries representing 3,866 out of a grand total of 12,297 'Occurrences'.[10] The decision to work with 'Types' is both practical and strategic. The standardisation of 'Types' eliminates variation irrelevant to this study's scope, such as orthographic inconsistencies or contextual additions in predetermined slots of formulae.[11] Thus, the standardisation of 'Types' enables an efficient analysis of formulaic sequences in use by the scribal community, in their most generalised form, unencumbered by idiosyncratic deviations per occasion.

'Scribe-related' epigrams,[12] centred on scribes, scribal activity and the context of manuscript production, serve both literary and practical functions by recording names, dates, and places.[13] Their utilitarian purpose particularly fosters formulaicity, as recurring documentation needs are efficiently addressed through pre-established expressions which remain adaptable to specific contexts. Despite their formulaic core, epigrams also accommodate creativity, as scribes integrate personal choices within conventionalised frames, exemplifying a dynamic interplay between standardisation and innovation. This duality makes 'Scribe-related' epigrams the most formulaic genre in the DBBE corpus[14] while still reflecting individ-

[9] For the concept of (sub)genre as used in the DBBE, see K. Demoen, "Reading: Book Epigrams: Introduction," in F. Spingou (ed.), *The Visual Culture of Later Byzantium (1081-c.1350): Vol. 3.II.* (Cambridge 2022) 1369–1380, at 1374ff.

[10] This study is based on annotations made on data exported from the Database of Byzantine Book Epigrams as of November 2024. The database is being continuously updated and enriched with new material, reflecting ongoing scholarly efforts of the DBBE Team.

[11] K. Giannikou et al., "Decoding Byzantine Book Epigrams: An Exploration of Machine-Assisted Extraction of Formulaic Material," in C. Swaelens et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the First Workshop on Data-Driven Approaches to Ancient Languages (DAAL 2024)*. (Ghent 2024) 22–32, at 25.

[12] Epigrams can simultaneously belong to multiple (sub)genres. 'Scribe-related' epigrams partially overlap with 'colophons' in M.D. Lauxtermann, *Byzantine Poetry from Pisides to Geometres: Texts and Contexts*. Vol. 1 (Vienna 2003), at 200-201.

[13] Demoen, in The Visual Culture of Later Byzantium 1374.

[14] Demoen, in *The Visual Culture of Later Byzantium* 1374; F. Bernard and K.

ual expression. Their content also reveals insights into the social and cultural practices embedded in Byzantine manuscript production, shedding light into the function of these patterns. It therefore presents an optimal subset for the examination of (textual) community-specific employment of formulaic language.

By focusing on this subset, I aim to establish a typology of formulaic sequences that reveals their deeper ritualised communicative functions within the Byzantine scribal community.

2. Reviewing approaches in formulaicity research

A substantial body of linguistic scholarship has examined the phenomenon of formulaicity, understood as the repetitive use of linguistic expressions that may be either fixed or variable, yet retain a recognisable structure within a given context. Central to this research are efforts of classification of formulaic sequences, with scholars emphasising that formulaicity is "not a single and unified phenomenon."[15] The prevailing consensus holds that formulaicity operates along a continuum shaped by degrees of fixedness, semantic transparency, and other variables.[16] The conceptual and terminological diversity within the field further underscores the complexity of the phenomenon.[17]

2.1. Formulaicity in spoken language

Most theoretical frameworks addressing formulaicity are geared towards spoken material. Wray identifies the reduction of processing effort for both speaker and listener—alongside discourse structuring and listener manipulation—as key functions of formulaic se-

Demoen, "Byzantine Book Epigrams," in W. Hörandner, A. Rhoby, and N. Zagklas (eds.), *A Companion to Byzantine Poetry* (Leiden 2019) 404–429, at 420.

[15] A. Wray, *Formulaic Language and the Lexicon* (Cambridge 2002) 66.

[16] Wray, *Formulaic Language* 62–65; D. Wood, "Classifying and Identifying Formulaic Language," in S. Webb (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Vocabulary Studies* (New York 2019) 30–45.

[17] A. Wray and M. R. Perkins, "The Functions of Formulaic Language: An Integrated Model," *Lang Commun.* 20 (2000) 1–28, at 3.

quences.[18] Processed holistically rather than analytically, they help alleviate cognitive load.[19] Linguistic research often relies on phonological and performance-based cues—such as intonation, fluency, and speed of articulation—to identify formulaicity.[20] Such markers, however, are not available for ancient written corpora. While palaeographic evidence may provide indirect clues—such as 'chunking' of formulaic sequences as semantic units within metrical patterns, often marked by punctuation[21]—the reliability of such markers remains debatable.

In studies of earlier phases of Greek, formulaicity has been interpreted as a response to the demands of oral performance, particularly of lengthy epic poetry.[22] Even in this tradition, scholarly classifications of formula types vary considerably,[23] complicating the establishment of a unified framework potentially applicable to later corpora. In Byzantine texts, further complications arise from the contested extent of orality and the shifting nature of metre, which increasingly diverged from ancient prosodic systems as accentual patterns started shaping poetic practice. Research on Byzantine popular poetry also invokes orality to explain formulaicity, even when a performance context is neither certain nor particularly plausible.[24]

[18] Wray, *Formulaic Language* 93–102.

[19] K. Kuiper, *Smooth Talkers: The Linguistic Performance of Auctioneers and Sportscasters* (Mahwah 1996) 3; Wray, *Formulaic Language*; A. Wray, *Formulaic Language: Pushing the Boundaries* (Oxford–New York 2008).

[20] Wray, *Formulaic Language* 35-39.

[21] J. Boeten et al., *Byzantine Metre from the Margins: A Corpus-Based, Pragmatic Analysis of Medieval Book Epigrams* [PhD dissertation] (UGhent 2021) 179–193; C. M. Mazzucchi, "Per una Punteggiatura Non Anacronistica, e Più Efficace, dei Testi Greci," *BBGG* 51 (1997) 129–143, punctuation different from modern conventions.

[22] A. B. Lord, *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge 1960).

[23] C. Bozzone, *Homer's Living Language: Formularity, Dialect, and Creativity in Oral-Traditional Poetry* (Cambridge 2024) 6–20.

[24] R. Beaton, "Orality and the Reception of Late Byzantine Vernacular Literature," *BMGS* 14(1) (1990) 174–184; F. H. Bäuml, "Medieval Texts and the Two Theories of Oral-Formulaic Composition: A Proposal for a Third Theory," *New Lit.Hist.* 16(1) (1984) 31–49, beyond Greek.

Crucially, as Wray[25] notes, this function of reducing cognitive effort is less applicable to written corpora, where pressures of production and comprehension speed are typically absent. While formulaic expressions may streamline writing in administrative or epistolary settings, this context differs from that of the epigrams under study. Unlike the former, epigrams exhibit distinct literary and stylistic features (e.g. metrical structure, use of Homeric or elevated register, and creative elaboration), suggesting that their formulaicity serves purposes beyond compositional convenience. Therefore, conceptualising them solely as cognitive load reducing devices oversimplifies their function.

2.2. Detecting formulaicity: native speaker intuition

Another major theoretical approach to formulaicity relies on native speaker intuition. Wray acknowledges the value of intuitive judgement in identifying formulaic language.[26] However, this resource is unavailable when working with historical corpora; the analysis of ancient texts is limited to a frequency-based form of intuitive bias, derived from the specific set of texts to which researchers have been exposed.

2.3. Formulaicity in written historical corpora

Rutten and van der Wal[27] have proposed an alternative to the processing effort model, shifting the focus to writing experience in historical corpora. They argue that less experienced letter writers rely on formulaic expressions to produce appropriate and effective letters. However, applying this to the corpus of Byzantine book epigrams presents challenges. If epigrams followed the same logic, one would expect skilled epigram composers to avoid formulaic material. Yet, formulae remain pervasive even in epigrams marked by elevated linguistic sophistication and stylistic creativity. Learned

[25] Wray, *Formulaic Language* 84.

[26] Wray, *Pushing the Boundaries* 114ff.

[27] G. Rutten and M. van der Wal, "Functions of Epistolary Formulae in Dutch Letters from the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *J.Hist.Pragmat.* 13(2) (2012) 173–201.

scribes frequently employ multiple formulae—sometimes in basic form, sometimes expanded—to craft elaborate and intricate epigrams.[28]

Formulaicity in Greek historical corpora has also been studied outside the context of orality, especially in documentary texts. While some research on legal formulae exists,[29] it remains sporadic and lacks comprehensive coverage. A more systematic approach has been applied to post-classical letter writing, where scholars categorise formulaic elements in the opening and closing sections according to their pragmatic functions.[30] While this functional approach offers valuable insights for the analysis of epigrams, the communicative dynamics differ: whereas letter writing aims at direct interpersonal exchange, epigrams—though often framed as if addressing a recipient—transcend that (see Section 4.1).

As has been shown, attributing the formulaicity of epigrams to a purely oral performance context proves unreliable. This approach overlooks the distinctive characteristics of written composition, particularly in a context where literary and stylistic considerations are central. Furthermore, applying theoretical frameworks and analytical tools developed for modern oral interactions to this corpus is problematic, as is supplementing frequency-based analysis with intuitive judgements, given the absence of native speaker input for historical texts. Moreover, the corpus exists within the literary and poetic tradition while also serving communicative and documentation purposes. These diverse roles are unified by an omnipresent layer of Christian piety expression (see Section 4.1), which binds the various functions of book epigrams. This interplay of factors necessitates a distinct analytical approach—one capable of addressing the multifaceted roles of formulaic sequences in this corpus, while

[28] E.g. Type 4345.

[29] H. Saradi, "A History of the Greek Notarial System," in S. Schmoeckel and W. Schubert (eds.), *Handbuch zur Geschichte des Notariats der Europäischen Traditionen* (2009) 523–557.

[30] D. Nachtergaele, *The Formulaic Language of the Greek Private Papyrus Letters* (Leuven 2023); K. Bentein, "A Typology of Variations in the Ancient Greek Epistolary Frame (I–III AD)," in G. K. Giannakis et al. (eds.), Classical Philology and Linguistics: Old Themes and New Perspectives (Berlin–Boston 2023) 429–472, at 440–446.

appropriately considering its cultural, religious and stylistic dimensions. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to develop a typology that accounts for the literary, pragmatic, and ritualised dimensions of the epigrams, offering a framework that reflects the corpus's complexity and its embedded cultural and religious significance.

3. Conceptual framework

This study approaches formulaicity in Byzantine book epigrams primarily through a ritual lens, supplemented by insights from speech act theory. Within this framework, formulaic language is interpreted as a vehicle of ritualised communication, embodying tradition, structuring devotional expression, and reinforcing collective religious identity.

3.1 Ritual and Ritual pragmatics: a multi-layered ritual context

Unlike approaches that reduce ritual to mere rote or meaningless repetition, this study adopts a view of ritual as a structured and symbolically charged practice. Drawing on Tambiah's definition of ritual as "a culturally constructed system of symbolic communication,"[31] formulaic expressions in these epigrams are conceptualised as integral to rites of exchange, fostering human-divine interaction and communal cohesion. Ritualisation, as theorised by Bell,[32] further elucidates how formulaic expressions acquire symbolic weight, contributing to the cohesion of Byzantine scribal and devotional communities.

Ritual pragmatics complements this perspective by attending to the conventions, rights, and obligations governing interactions within prescribed social frameworks.[33] Formulaic patterns are understood not merely as lexical strings but as pragmatic acts shaped by collective expectations. Their meaning derives from their function within the 'ritual frame',[34] fulfilling both spiritual and social purposes—whether as rites of exchange between humans and the

[31] S.J. Tambiah, *A Performative Approach to Ritual* (Oxford 1979) 119.
[32] C.M. Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* (Oxford 2009) 221–222.
[33] D.Z. Kádár, *Ritual and Language* (Cambridge 2024) 15.
[34] Kádár, *Ritual and Language* 32–35.

divine or by reaffirming communal memory and performing socially consequential work through ritualised deployment.

The production of Byzantine manuscripts exemplifies this dual-layered ritual context. On one level, it was embedded within Christian ritual life: the act of copying carried spiritual significance as participation in a ritual—in the anthropological sense of communal religious activities—and materially realised in the creation of valuable artefacts, manuscripts.[35] On another level, manuscript production was governed by conventions[36] and shared expectations fulfilled through repetitive procedures, rendering it a pragmatic ritual: structured, repetitive, and communally oriented. This duality highlights manuscript production as not mechanical reproduction but a symbolically charged act situated within a broader socio-religious framework.

The convergence of these dimensions is particularly evident in the inscription of self-referential epigrams in the margins. Like manuscript copying, it simultaneously expressed Christian piety—embedding spiritual meaning into the material object—and conformed to established conventions, thus functioning as a structured, repetitive act governed by communal expectations. In this way, epigram composition reinforced the same spiritual and pragmatic dimensions that characterised manuscript production itself.

The role of formulaic language is central to this process of ritualisation. Formulae served as the primary vehicles through which both levels are enacted. Firstly, the vast majority of formulaic material is explicitly religious in content, reflecting Christian devotion and aligning with broader communal practices of worship. Secondly, formulaic language is inherently conventional: it is standardised, recognisable, and communally validated. Its employment ensures fulfilment of the community's expectations.

As Riehle has shown for Byzantine epistolary practices, such patterned interactions were structured and symbolic, reflecting sociocultural and religious imperatives and reinforcing social identities

[35] B. Crostini, "Byzantium," in J. Raven (ed.), *The Oxford History of the Book* (Oxford 2023) 54–83, at 80.

[36] Specific procedures though varied by location; see Crostini, in *The Oxford History of the Book.*

within elite communities.[37] Similarly, Byzantine book epigrams function as sites where formulaic language not only conveys meaning but also enacts ritualised interactions reflective of the broader cultural and religious milieu. By participating in a shared repertoire, both scribes and readers engage in a performative reaffirmation of communal identities, ensuring the continuity of ritualised practices through the symbolic and pragmatic force of formulaic language.

3.2. Speech act theory

Building on the ritual-pragmatic framework outlined above, speech act theory provides a complementary linguistic perspective by foregrounding the performativity of formulaic expressions. Rather than analysing language solely in terms of semantic content, this model conceptualises utterances as forms of action, distinguishing between the locutionary act (the utterance and its propositional content), the illocutionary act (the function this utterance performs), and the perlocutionary act (its intended/actual effect on the recipient).[38] Although devised in relation to modern, secular speech contexts, their broader theoretical premises remain applicable to the premodern, religious, and highly conventionalised texts examined hereby.

This study takes the illocutionary dimension of speech act theory as a primary point of reference for constructing a functional typology of formulaic expressions in Byzantine book epigrams. Formulae, far from being ornamental, redundant, or passively employed relics of tradition, are here examined as intentional and functionally significant performative utterances employed within the ritualised context of manuscript production.

Accordingly, this study proposes a functional typology of formulaic expressions in Byzantine book epigrams, grounded in a func-

[37] Riehle, *Funktionen der Byzantinischen Epistolographie* 2–3; A. Riehle, "Rhetorik, Ritual Und Repräsentation. Zur Briefliteratur Gebildeter Eliten Im Spätbyzantinischen Konstantinopel (1261–1328)," *FMSt* 45 (2011) 259–276. On formulaicity in Byzantine letter writing, see also M. Grünbart, "Aus der Formularsammlung eines königlichen Sekretärs auf Zypern: Ein Fall typischer Mimesis oder Alltag in einer Kanzlei?," *MEG* 16 (2016) 113–117.

[38] J.L. Austin, *How to do things with words* (Oxford 1962).

tional perspective inspired by speech act theory and attuned to the ritual pragmatics of manuscript culture. By interpreting these formulae through their illocutionary force, it becomes possible to uncover the underlying logic of their deployment and to situate them within the broader pragmatic and symbolic economy of their Byzantine socio-religious context.

4. Method: annotation parameters & the centrality of Function

This section delineates the methodology employed in the construction of the typology of formulaic material within the 'Scribe-related' sub-corpus of the DBBE, with particular emphasis on the annotation parameter of *Function*, which emerged as the central criterion for an effective categorisation process. A preliminary study utilised a machine-assisted approach to identify recurring formulaic sequences, offering initial insights into their Christian-religious character, potential alignment with metrical units, and the notable flexibility of the patterns.[39] The present paper builds on this groundwork and aims at capturing further characteristics of the material and organising it into a typology.

Although all parameters (*Length*, *Position in Metre*, *Function*, *Semantic Transparency*, *Lexical Fixedness*, *Syntax*) provided valuable insights into the nature of the formulaic material, some proved non-suitable for the development of the typology, and, thus, will not be discussed in detail herein. *Length* and *Position in Metre* were of limited relevance, as most formulaic expressions span multiple units or verses, and their alignment with metrical units proved highly inconsistent due to creative elaborations. Similarly, *Semantic Transparency*,[40] did not yield meaningful distinctions for this corpus, given that almost all formulae were semantically transparent. *Lexical Fixedness* and

[39] Giannikou, in *Proceedings of DAAL 2024*.

[40] *Semantic transparency* refers to the degree to which the meaning of a phrase can be deduced from the individual meanings of its constituent words, with higher transparency indicating a more compositional and literal interpretation, and lower transparency suggesting a non-compositional, idiomatic or opaque meaning that cannot be (easily) inferred from its parts (Skandera 2007; Wood 2015; Wood 2019: 32–33).

Syntax[41] were also examined in terms of variation across patterns; however, the degree of flexibility individual pattern employments exhibit in these areas did not substantively contribute to the formation of a well-defined typology of types of formulaic material.

Function proved to be the decisive factor in the classification of formulaic expressions. Drawing on Wray's conception, formulaic sequences are seen as "linguistic solutions to a single, non-linguistic problem": the manipulation of the hearer.[42] Initial analysis of the corpus' formulaic material revealed that its function not only pertains to the hearer—in this context, the reader of the text—but also, significantly, to God,[43] an observation which aligns with findings of Rutten and van der Wal.[44] There are formulae which engage the implied reader to fulfil diverse communicative purposes, such as seeking spiritual aid or recognition, conveying the author's identity, fostering appreciation of the book, or establishing a personal rapport, while others make more abstract or collective appeals.[45] Equally, a substantial part of the formulaic material addresses God, aiming to seek divine support and protection, express praise, or offer gratitude. However, a binary distinction between reader- and divine-directed formulae proved overly simplistic and insufficiently descriptive, especially given the diversity. Consequently, the *Function* parameter was transformed into a dynamic criterion, incorporating categories based on both semantic purpose and intended addressee, thus allowing for a nuanced classification of the material.

In conclusion, while several annotation parameters were considered during the typology's construction, it was *Function* that emerged as the most effective criterion for categorising the formulaic material. This approach aims towards a better understanding of the

[41] *Lexical fixedness* tracks the degree to which formulaic sequences allow for substitutions of words, morphological variations, or insertions of additional elements, while *Syntax* assesses structural consistency (Wood 2019: 33; Wray 2002: 34).

[42] Wray, *Formulaic Language* 93–95.

[43] Giannikou, in *Proceedings of DAAL 2024* 29.

[44] Rutten and van der Wal, *J.Hist.Pragmat.* 13(2) 181ff.

[45] K. Bentein and K. Demoen, "The Reader in Eleventh-Century Book Epigrams," in F. Bernard and K. Demoen (eds.), *Poetry and its Contexts in Eleventh-Century Byzantium* (Burlington 2012) 69–88, at 87.

role of formulaic language in Byzantine manuscript production, recognising the varied communicative functions these expressions served in reinforcing social, religious, and personal identities. The typology, as presented below, encapsulates the relationship between formulaic language and the ritualised practices of manuscript production, providing a tool for interpreting them as part of the broader context of Byzantine book epigrams.

5. A typology of formulaic material based on ritually-charged pragmatic functions

The typology of formulaic sequences developed in this study is grounded in the 'Scribe-related' Byzantine book epigrams (Section 2), embedded within a dual-layered ritual framework consisting of the ritualised nature of 'communication' and the pervasive expression of Christian piety (Section 4.1). Together, these elements contribute to high frequency of formulaic language in these texts. The formulaic sequences identified serve pragmatic functions, systematically annotated via the Function parameter (Section 5).

Although Byzantine book epigrams do not conform to conventional interpersonal communication—addressing either God or an abstract audience of future readers—their formulaic sequences do exhibit characteristics akin to pragmatic formulae.[46] By fulfilling specific functions within discourse, they parallel pragmatic formulae in spoken language, which maintain coherence and social order, yet operate within a framework shaped by the dual influences of Christian piety and Byzantine scribal tradition. To this end, the typology is designed to categorise formulaic patterns based on their communicative functions rather than on formal features, since formulae exhibit considerable formal variation across their individual instances.

5.1. An updated definition of the DBBE formula

Before proceeding to delineate the categories of the developed typology, it is necessary to offer a precise definition of what is hereby

[46] Wood, in *The Routledge Handbook of Vocabulary Studies* 35.

considered a formulaic sequence within the Database of Byzantine Book Epigrams (DBBE), grounded in observations drawn from the annotation of its most formulaic sub-corpus, that of 'Scribe-related' epigrams.[47]

Formulaic sequences in the DBBE are defined as recurring linguistic units that are integral to the ritual practices of the Byzantine scribal 'text community'.[48] These sequences fulfil pragmatic functions within a ritualised communicative framework shaped by the omnipresent influence of Christian ritual and theological discourse. Their primary purpose lies in reinforcing communal identity and ensuring the continuity of the scribal tradition, functioning as indispensable linguistic tools through which scribes actively engage with their socio-religious milieu.

Central to this definition is the criterion of *Function*, which serves as the principal parameter for categorisation. Formulaic sequences are evaluated in terms of their pragmatic roles within ritualised discourse, while their formal features remain to be systematically explored in a separate study. This methodological stance emerges from the observation that no consistent correlation can be drawn between specific formal structures and pragmatic functions across the corpus; rather, the material exhibits a notable degree of formal flexibility. This absence of a rigid form-function mapping underscores the adaptive and context-dependent nature of formulaic expressions, and has prompted the construction of the typology on functional grounds.

To qualify as formulaic within this context, sequences must meet the following criteria, aside from frequent recurrence. First, they should exhibit a level of **specificity**, marking them as belonging to the shared repertoire of the scribal community, thus distinguishing them from generic collocations—recurrent word pairings—of

[47] Note that metrical dates are here excluded; they often appear in lines with metrical difficulties, while most appear in prose, following book epigrams, and are thus not included in the Database. On metrical dates in similar material, see A. Rhoby, ""When the year ran through six times of thousands…": The Date in (Inscriptional) Byzantine Epigrams," in St. Efthymiadis et al. (eds.), *"Pour une poétique de Byzance". Hommage à Vassilis Katsaros*. (Paris 2015) 223-242.

[48] Text community as defined in Stenroos, in *Scribal Repertoires* 25.

the ancient Greek language at large (e.g. the collocation βίβλος + λαμβάνω + τέλος[49]). Furthermore, formulaic sequences must display a degree of **recognisability**, such that they can be identified across attestations despite different degrees of variation in form. Additionally, such sequences must demonstrate **adaptability** within the scribal communicative framework. Epigrams or elements that recur unaltered, without signs of adaptation, modification, or integration into new contexts, are regarded as cases of simple reproduction and therefore lack the dynamic engagement with communal identity that defines formulaic material herein. Lastly, formulaic sequences must show **functional autonomy**, operating as self-sufficient pragmatic units, without this criterion necessarily implying monofunctionality.

A further specification is required regarding the scope of what counts as functional and functionally autonomous. While the last criterion and the functional perspective adopted here is inspired by speech-act theory, the definition of DBBE formulae is not restricted to expressions that realise a full speech act in the strict sense. Independent pragmatic modifiers are also included, provided they occur as self-contained units that adjust or index the illocutionary force of a speech act (e.g. in (18), v.1 σὺν Θεῷ, which implicitly conveys acknowledgement and gratitude to the divine (category 2)). By contrast, sequences that fulfil the other criteria but occur only as fully embedded, often parenthetical elements (e.g. invocations to the divine; see discussion under category 1.2) or only in relation to another formulaic sequence (e.g. formulaic addresses to the reader within requests; see discussion of category 1.2) lack functional autonomy; these are here termed, at most, sub-formulaic elements, and are not treated as independent entries within the typology.

By foregrounding their functional dimension, this definition emphasises the dynamic, context-dependent, and inherently participatory nature of formulaic sequences. It conceptualises them as essential to the scribes' active role in constructing and perpetuating

[49] The collocation is cited in its lemmatised form. Within the corpus of 1,849 Scribe-related Types, it occurs over 100 times, exhibiting variation in morphological features, word order, and lexical choice with βίβλος occasionally substituted by a set of synonyms.

a shared communal identity, proposing a systematic, functionally grounded typological framework for the categorisation of such formulaic material without separating it from its broader ritual and socio-religious context in which they operate.

5.2. Presenting the typology: a formulaic language how-to for the Byzantine scribe

The typology outlined below classifies formulaic sequences found in 'Scribe-related' Byzantine book epigrams based on their pragmatic functions. These functions reflect the practical, communal, and spiritual dimensions of scribal activity, encapsulating the broader ritual framework within which such texts were produced and used. The typology identifies three main categories: supplicatory formulae directed toward the divine or appeals to the reader; gratitude expressions to the divine; formulae presenting individual identities, shared experiences, and contextual information pertinent to book production and consumption.

Category 1. *Requests*

This category comprises formulaic sequences fulfilling one of two request functions: (1.1) supplication to the divine or (1.2) appeal to the reader. Beyond serving as communicative tools, they reflect the scribe's dual audience—divine and human—and embody the devotional and interactive dimensions of the material. In terms of prevalence, this category constitutes the second-richest group within the typology, surpassed only by formulae of gratitude for the divine. Its prominence underscores the standardised need in 'Scribe-related' Byzantine book epigrams to petition either divine favour or human response.

1.1. Supplication to the divine

Supplications to the divine align closely with Christian ritual practices, as scribes articulate prayers to God seeking divine intervention, guidance, or mercy. Situated within the religious framework, these formulae transcend expression of personal piety; they also reflect the communal religious identity embedded in the scribal tra-

dition.

A prominent example of a supplicatory formulae, introduced earlier, spans three verses ((1), vv.10–12; (2), vv.1–3), invoking divine protection for the three principal agents involved in manuscript production and consumption: the scribe, the patron, and the reader. An altered variant of this formula, below:

(4) Type 2733:

> Τὸν συντεθέντα Φιλαδελφείας πόθῳ
> Μακάριον, ταπεινὸν ἐν τοῖς σοῖς θύταις,
> φύλαττε Τριὰς ἁγία τρισολβίως.
>
> The one who composed this with yearning, Makarios (metropolitan) of Philadelpheia, humble among your servants, protect him, o holy Trinity, in threefold bliss.

Here, the standard formula typically seeking protection for "all three"—scribe, patron, and reader—is reconfigured into a single-person supplicatory formula; Makarios Chrysokephalos, metropolitan of Philadelpheia, is simultaneously the scribe, patron, and primary reader of the manuscript. The reduction in referents is offset by expansion through the addition of modifiers. Instead of the conventional [δακτύλοις] γράψαντα (*the one who wrote this [with his fingers]*) the formula presents τὸν συντεθέντα (*the composer*), accompanied by an adverb of manner (*with yearning*), the scribe's name, his office, and a self-representational epithet (*humble among your servants*)—all elements commonly used by scribes to signal their identity (category 3.1), with regional references (here, office; in other cases, origin) being optional.

The supplication itself ((4), v.3) is also adapted to align with the reduced number of referents. The typical τοὺς τρεῖς, ὦ (*these three, o*) is replaced by a three-syllable modifier (ἁγία, *holy*) of Τριὰς (*Trinity*), adapting to the altered structure.[50]

Beyond flexible adaptations, supplicatory formulae demonstrate a broad spectrum of lexical fixedness. For instance, the following

[50] A similar alteration occurs in Type 5212 (two referents); two extra verses of modifiers with identification details are observed in Type 6774.

example includes a markedly fixed formula:

(5) Type 4015:

Ἐπληρώθη σὺν Θεῷ τὸ μηνολόγιον.
Χριστέ, προηγοῦ τῶν ἐμῶν πονημάτων,
Θεοδώρου ταπεινοῦ τοῦ Ῥαιδεστίνου,
τοῦ ταύτης χθονὸς ξένου.

With the help of God, the Menologion was completed.
Christ, guide the labours of mine,
of Theodoros, the humble one from Rhaidestos,
a stranger to this earth.

This example is one of only three instances where this formula—or a close variant—appears as part of a longer composition rather than as independent, single-verse epigram, functioning as an autonomous supplicatory expression.[51]

This subcategory of supplicatory formulae ranks as the second most frequently attested function, underscoring its centrality in 'Scribe-related' Byzantine book epigrams. Its prominence attests to the ritualised and spiritual dimensions of manuscript culture, where the invocations for divine guidance or mercy constitute not only personal expressions of faith but also as manifestations of participation in ritual and communal identity. In Christian liturgical and devotional contexts, supplications as prayers for divine intervention, forgiveness, or support are fundamental elements of worship. This spiritual significance is mirrored in the epigrams, where formulaic supplications, integral to the ritualised framework, bind scribes, patrons, and readers to a shared spiritual experience.

1.2. Appeal to the reader

Appeals to the reader form a subset of the first category, encompassing formulaic sequences as appeals to an abstract, timeless au-

[51] Three at the level of 'Types' (normalised representations of—one or more—epigrams), but also three at the level of 'Occurrences' (original, non-normalised epigrams); Type 4015 (Occurrence 20062), Type 4324 (Occurrence 20638), Type 4273 (Occurrence 20505).

dience of Byzantine book epigrams. These formulae bridge the gap between scribe and expected audience and transform the act of writing into a ritualised interaction, serving two principal objectives: memorialisation (securing the scribe's remembrance) and solicitation of divine intercession (mediation on the scribe's behalf through prayer).

Memorialisation formulae are the most prevalent within this category, typically featuring the imperatives μέμνησο or μίμνησκε (*remember*) as their core, accompanied by a vocative or nominative address to the reader,[52] and an object in genitive referencing the scribe. Central to these patterns is a nominalised participle or epithet in the genitive case ((6), τοῦ ξένου; (7), τοῦ γεγραφότος). Optional elements, like pronouns (personal in (6), κἀμοῦ; deictic in (9), τινός), and names, ((7), Ἰωάννου; (8), Θεοδώρου; (9), Βασιλείου) may further elaborate on the identity of the pleading individual. Further expansion frequently involves adverbial phrases clarifying the purpose or condition of remembrance, such as subordinate clauses of purpose (ὅπως, ἵνα, *so that*) or temporal-conditional clauses (ὅταν, ἐπάν, *whenever*). Altogether, these elements reflect the scribe's aspiration for enduring remembrance in the reader's mind and the broader community consciousness. Despite this aspiration, scribes sometimes adopt anonymity as an expression of humility (e.g. (6), using the self-representation formula (category 3.1) κἀμοῦ τοῦ ξένου), while others personalise their appeal through the inclusion of their names and attributes ((7)–(9)).

Memorialisation formulae often appear as independent epigrams:

(6) Type 2682:

Οἱ τυχόντες μέμνησθε κἀμοῦ τοῦ ξένου.

You, readers, remember me as well, the wanderer.

[52] Often a sub-formulaic pragmatic modifier, discussed further below.

(7) Type 2619:

Ἰωάννου μέμνησο τοῦ γεγραφότος.

Remember Ioannes, the one who wrote this.

Such formulae can also appear in the form of longer compositions, often coalescing with other types of formulae. In (8), a self-representation formula (category 3.1) forms the object (v.3) of the memorialisation formulae core, μέμνησο:

(8) Type 2725:

Θεὸν ἱλεούμενος, τίμιε πάτερ,
Θεοδώρου μέμνησο τοῦ καλλιγράφου,
ἐπίκλην δ' ἔχοντα Ἁγιοπετρίτης.

Seeking God's favour, honourable Father,
remember Theodoros, the calligrapher,
also bearing the name Hagiopetrites.

Elaborations within these formulae often take the form of modifiers of one or more elements:[53]

(9) Type 4399:

Οἱ φιλόχριστοι καὶ φιλόψυχοι πάντες
καὶ τὸν Θεὸν φέροντες ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ,
μέμνησθε τινός, πλὴν πάθους,[54] Βασιλείου,
τῷ πόθῳ κτησαμένου τὴν δέλτον ταύτην
εἰς λύτρον, εἰς ἄμειψιν ἁμαρτημάτων,
εἰς ἀποτροπὴν πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων·

[53] Note that elaboration can be quite extensive. For instance, in Type 2905, following the core structure of the memorialisation formula—comprising {μιμνήσκω} (OBJ: participle + name) (SUBJ: parenthetical element > vocative) (OBJ2: adjectives + name) in verses 1 and 3—there are 23 additional lines containing various adjectives and participles that further modify the name of the patron (Γερασίμου, OBJ2).

[54] It is not unlikely that the scribe intended to write τληπαθοῦς, a frequently attested epithet (cf. Types 4480, 2976). However, πλὴν πάθους is still plausible and thus retained.

ἐτελέσθη γὰρ τῷ ὄντι μεγαλεῖον
ἔτους πέλουσα ἑξάκις χιλιάδος
νῦν καὶ πεντακόσ' ἑξήκοντα καὶ θῆτα,
ἰνδικτιῶνος δὲ τεσσαρακαιδεκάτης,
βασιλεύοντος Δουκὸς τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου
καὶ Εὐδοκίας τῆς τούτου γὰρ συνεύνου,
παῖδα ἔχοντες Κωνστάντιον τὸν μέγαν.

All who love Christ and cherish the soul,
and who bear God within their hearts,
remember a certain—apart from his suffering—Basil who
acquired this book with yearning,
for atonement, for the recompense of sins,
and to avert all adversities.
For, indeed, this magnificent work was completed
in the year six thousand
five hundred sixty-nine,
in the fourteenth indiction,
during the reign of Constantine Doukas
and his consort Eudokia,
parents of great Constantius.

Memorialisation formulae occasionally function as supplications to the divine, aligning with category 1.1. For example, (15) illustrates an instance where a supplication formula requests God's remembrance (vv.1–4), followed by a plea for redemption of sins (v.6). Nevertheless, their use in appeals to the reader remains significantly more prevalent. Conversely, formulae explicitly requesting redemption are more commonly directly directed to the divine and rarely appear as appeals to the reader; when they do, they are typically framed as prayer-pleading formulae:

(10) Type 3646:

Εὔχεσθε τῷ γράψαντι πάντες ὁρῶντες,
ὅπως ἱλασμὸν πλημμελημάτων λάβοι.

Pray for the scribe, all who behold this,
so that he may receive atonement for his transgressions.

Prayer-pleading formulae, while less frequent, explicitly invite

the reader to act as an intermediary, petitioning the divine on the scribe's behalf. They typically revolve around εὔχομαι (*pray*), sometimes dependent on another verb ((12), λιπαρῶ) or complemented by one ((11), αἰτῶ) and include a nominalised adjective or participle identifying the subject of the prayer—most often the scribe, though occasionally the patron (e.g. Types 2855, 6129). Optional elements frequently enrich these formulae: vocatives addressing the audience expected to perform the prayer ((12), πανάγιε πάτερ), sometimes with modifiers ((12), v.1-5); a pronoun, usually personal ((15), κἀμοῖ); a prepositional phrase (Type 5761, ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ); or additional modifiers to the nominalised adjective or participle. In rare instances, prayer-pleading formulae are expanded with a substantive (Type 2826, v.25, χάριτι; Type 2931, v.4, τοῦ τυχεῖν σωτηρίας; Type 2955, v.1, Θεοῦ δόσις) or, more commonly, with a subordinate clause—adverbial, of purpose ((10), v.2).

(11) Type 2366:[55]

Εὔχεσθε, αἰτῶ, κἀμοῖ τῷ κακιγράφῳ.

Pray, I beg, for me as well, the poorly-skilled scribe.

(12) Type 5816:

Κορωνὶς πέλων τῶν θεοπνεύστων βίβλων,
ὕφανας πάντας θεοχαράκτους λόγους,
ῥήσεις ἀφρόνων αἱρετικῶν ἐγξέσας,
ἰχνηλατήσας τοὺς σοφοὺς Ἀποστόλους,
λαμπρῶς μαρμαίρων τῇ οἰκουμένῃ πάσῃ·
λιπαρῶ σε τοίνυν, πανάγιε πάτερ,
ὁ τὴν βίβλον ταύτην ἀγροίκως χαράξας,
ὑπερεύχεσθαι μάλα τῷ ἐμῷ ὕθλῳ.[56]

[55] See Bentein and Demoen 2012:81 for a comment on the specific word choice and content of the epigram.

[56] One would typically expect a genitive rather than a dative here; however, I retain the manuscript reading, as case usage in Medieval Greek is often flexible (cf. also (21)). Given the gradual disappearance of the dative and its replacement by the genitive or accusative (see A. Cooper and E. Georgala, "Dative loss and its replacement in the history of Greek," in A. van Keme-

You who are the coronis of the God-inspired books,
having woven together all the divinely inscribed words,
having expunged the sayings of foolish heretics,
and traced the footsteps of the wise Apostles,
shining brilliantly throughout the entire world—
you—most holy father, I therefore entreat,
I, who have unskilfully inscribed this book,
pray with great fervour for my nonsensicalities.

Overall, reader-appealing formulae are not directly interpersonal in the sense of addressing a specific reader with the expectation of response. The 'reader' in this context need not be a reader in the strict sense, or even solely a reader: in (12), the appeal is directed toward the author of the book. Rather, these formulae operate within a ritualised communicative framework that transcends temporal boundaries and fixed roles. Whether invoking passive remembrance or active prayer, these formulae position the text as a medium of enduring spiritual and communal interaction.

Sub-formulaic pragmatic modifiers: Address to the reader

In example (8), the address to the reader (v.1) and subject of the formulaic memorialisation appeal, constitutes an adaptable—and thus variable[57]—but recognisably recurring community-specific linguistic unit. Functionally, this address neither constitutes an independent speech act[58] nor appears outside of memorialisation appeals in the material, thus it is not granted the status of a category of the typology but rather a sub-formulaic element operating as an intensifying pragmatic modifier of the request it exclusively

nade and N. de Haas (eds.), *Historical Linguistics 2009. Selected Papers from the 19th International Conference on Historical Linguistics*. (Amsterdam 2012) 275–292), this unexpected dative may reflect hypercorrection, an attempt by the scribe to mark his register as 'learned' (cf. D. Holton, G. C. Horrocks, M. Janssen, T. Lendari, I. Manolessou, and N. Toufexis, *The Cambridge grammar of medieval and early modern Greek. Vol. 4. Syntax*. (Cambridge 2019), at 1961).

[57] Its adaptability and variability is exemplified below.

[58] This alone is not enough to justify exclusion from the typology; the framework is grounded in patterns of communicative function rather than strict speech-act theory. See Section 6.1.

accompanies.

Such address elements serve as pragmatic modifiers of the Request-type formulaic appeal to the reader, shaping how that act is performed by cueing reader involvement and anchoring the epigram within a shared communicative frame. While relatively infrequent in the 'Scribe-related' sub-corpus,[59] they explicitly target the human audience, inviting their participation in the epigram's ritual and communal context. By employing them, even within texts primarily devoted to the scribe's self-representation, the scribe creates a quasi-interactive experience,[60] fostering immediacy and anticipatory reader involvement.

In (13), another characteristic example:

(13) Type 2562:

Μέμνησο τοίνυν | **ταῖν χεροῖν ὅστις φέρεις**
ῥακενδυτοῦντος γραφέως Νικηφόρου,
Ἐξαπτερύγων ἐκ γένους κατηγμένου,
σώσαι Θεὸς, λέγων περ, αὐτὸν ἐν κρίσει.

Remember then, **you who hold this in your hands**,
the rag-clad scribe, Nikephoros,
who descends from the line of the Hexapterygoi,
and say "may God save him in Judgement."

Idiosyncrasies are not absent in the employment of these sub-formulaic elements either:

(14) Type 5139:

Τὴν βίβλον ἥνπερ | εἰς χεῖρας φέρεις, φίλος, (14a)
κτῆμα πέφυκεν Ἰωσὴφ ῥακενδύτου.
Μέμνησο, φίλος, **ταῖν χεροῖν ὅστις φέρεις** (14b)
ῥακενδυτοῦντος Ἰωσὴφ μονοτρόπου.

The book which you hold in your hands, friend,

[59] It is anticipated that they would feature more prominently within the 'Reader-related' genre.

[60] Bentein and Demoen, in *Poetry and its Contexts*.

is a possession of Ioseph the rag-clad.
Remember, friend, **you who hold this in your hands,**
Ioseph, the monk clad in rags.

In (14), the address appears twice within a single epigram (vv.1, 3), serving as an emphatic attention-grabbing device, directing focus to the individual associated with the manuscript (vv.2, 4), the second in direct combination with the formulaic appeal. Notably, the repetition employs distinct syntactic structures while retaining semantic similarity.

A particular type of adaptation of the same sub-formulaic element appears in (15). The first hemistich of (14a) is combined with the second hemistich of (14b). However, the pronoun ὅστις (*you who*, the reader) is replaced by μου νῦν (*my [hands] now*, the scribe's), shifting the formula's focus from the reader to the scribe, depriving it from the pragmatic modifier's usual function and unexpectedly reconfiguring its purpose. This reconfiguration removes the reader from the interaction, aligning instead with the surrounding supplicatory appeals for divine remembrance (vv.1–2) and redemption (vv.5–6), reinforcing the scribe's introspective narrative in the place of the expected remembrance appeal to the epigram's readership. Thus, here, the same sub-formulaic pragmatic modifier of address appears exceptionally as supporting the request sub-category of Supplication to the divine (1.1), nevertheless in conjunction with the same μέμνησο core of the formula, as observed before.

(15) Type 2963:

Μνήσθητι, Σῶτερ, δημιουργὲ τῶν ὅλων,
ταῖς τῆς ἀχράντου εὐκτίαις Θεοτόκου,
τοῦ ἐμπόνως γράψαντος Ἀναστασίου
τὴν βίβλον ἥνπερ | ταῖν χεροῖν μου νῦν φέρω
καὶ τάξον αὐτὸν ἐν δικαίων τῇ στάσει
πολλῶν παρασχὼν ἀμπλακημάτων λύτρον.

Remember, Saviour, Creator of everything,
through the prayers of the Immaculate Mother of God,
Anastasios, who laboriously wrote
the book I am now holding in my hands,
and place him among the assembly of the righteous,

granting redemption from his many sins.[61]

Having shifted the focus to the divine, it should be noted that addresses to the divine—invocations—appear with exceptional frequency within the corpus. Nevertheless, they lack defining characteristics to be treated either as formulaic sequences within the scope of this study, or as sub-formulaic pragmatic modifiers analogous to readership addresses.

These invocations are clearly community-specific, given that they pertain to the Christian God and that Byzantine scribal activity is inextricably bound to the religious milieu. Like readership addresses, they lack functional autonomy as pragmatic modifiers; structurally, they appear within broader formulaic constructions and enhance the supplicatory or commemorative force of adjacent material. However, what differentiates them is the lack of recognisability as patterns. These invocations manifest as concise, parenthetical expressions—not more specific than basic (ADJ) NOUN constructions in vocative or nominative—and are seldom followed by multiverse elaborations. Such minimal frames could only be treated as formulaic if exhibiting high degree of fixedness; instead, they display very considerable variation, likely reflecting the influence of a vast and diverse liturgical repertoire. Thus, while divine invocations occur frequently and operate as pragmatic modifiers, their status as highly variable instances of a minimal and abstract linguistic frame precludes their inclusion in the typology as formulaic sequences, as well as their consideration as dependent, sub-formulaic elements.

Category 2. *Gratitude to the divine*

This third category is concerned solely with expressions of gratitude directed to the divine. It is the most frequently occurring category in the material under analysis and consists of formulaic sequences that convey reverence, thanksgiving, and acknowledgment of divine grace and support. Given the religion-shaped ritual environment in which these texts were produced, this prevalence is,

[61] This translation is informed by that of Lauxtermann, *Byzantine Poetry* Vol.1, 201.

again, unsurprising. Within this category, two main subtypes can be identified: expressions of praise directed to God in the form of doxologies, and acknowledgments of divine assistance in the various stages of manuscript production. These subtypes are not rigidly separated, however, as individual cases frequently exhibit overlapping characteristics.

Formulaic doxologies are the most common expressions of gratitude in this corpus. They are typically centred on the noun δόξα (*glory*) or semantic equivalents, such as χάρις (grace), the most frequent variant. Example (16) exemplifies a highly fixed formulaic doxology:

(16) Type 2110:

Τῷ συντελεστῇ τῶν καλῶν Θεῷ χάρις.

Grace be to God, the accomplisher of all good.

While some doxologies, like (16), exhibit a high degree of lexical fixedness, most are flexible in form. The most frequently attested pattern omits the verb and relies on a doxological noun, often accompanied by the personal pronoun σοι (*to you*) (17a), a dative or vocative addressing the divine figure, and other modifiers in the same case (17b, ὁμοούσιε). Additional elements, such as verbal or prepositional phrases (17c, v.5, 17a, v.2 respectively) may further expand the formula. In rare cases, the doxological noun is replaced by a doxological verb, as in (17c), where δοξολογοῦμεν (*we praise*) is used:

(17) Type 2073:

Σοὶ πρέπει δόξα, τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Λόγῳ,
σὺν τῷ συσθένῳ πνεύματι καὶ συμμόρφῳ. (17a)
Θεὲ τοῦ παντός, ὁμοούσιε, δόξα· (17b)
ἓν προσκύνημα καὶ λατρεία ἡ μία,
ἕνεκεν πάντων ὧν τε ἴσμεν κοὐκ ἴσμεν,
εὐχαριστοῦμεν, δοξολογοῦμεν φόβῳ. (17c)

To You belongs glory, to the Father and the Word,
along with the Spirit, similar in power and form.

O God of everything, consubstantial one, glory to You.
A single act of veneration and one worship,
on account of all things we know and do not know,
we offer thanks and praise You in awe.

Formulae of gratitude acknowledging divine support, while less common, are often—but not exclusively, see (18)—found in single-verse epigrams marking specific stages of the manuscript's creation, such as its commencement or completion. They frequently are pragmatic modifiers in the form of prepositional phrases introduced by σὺν (*with*):

(18) Type 4264.

Θεῷ κατάρξας **σὺν Θεῷ** τέλος ἔσχον.
Δώρημα Θεοῦ καὶ πόνος τῶν χειρῶν μου.
Χεὶρ Ματθαίου τάλανος, σφόδρα ἡμαρτηκότος,
θύτου ταπεινοῦ καὶ λίαν ταλαιπώρου.

Beginning with God, **with God** I reached the end.
A gift from God and the labour of my hands.
The hand of Matthew, a wretched, habitual sinner,
a humble and greatly afflicted supplicant.

Less frequent but noteworthy examples employ the adjective συνεργός (*collaborator*), participles of συνεργέω (συνεργῶν, συνεργήσας), or nouns like συνεργία (*collaboration*) and σύναρσις (*assistance*) to express acknowledgement of divine aid. These forms often appear in combination with doxologies, sometimes in conjunction with declarations marking the completion of the book:

(19) Type 4428:

Ἡ δόξα **Χριστῷ τῷ συνεργῷ** τοῦ τέλους.

Glory to **Christ, who collaborated** in the completion.

Beyond these explicit expressions of gratitude and acknowledgement, another prominent formula in this category celebrates the all-encompassing nature of God or Christ. It occurs both as standalone epigram and within longer compositions:

(20) Type 2422:

Ὁ Χριστὸς αὐτός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος.

Christ himself is the beginning and the end.

In sum, gratitude formulae in Byzantine book epigrams encompass praise and acknowledgment, employing a range of formulaic constructions to articulate the scribe's reverence, thanksgiving, and recognition of divine assistance. Whether through rigidly fixed doxologies or more flexible acknowledgments of support, these expressions underscore the profoundly religious context of this epigrammatic tradition. They constitute, if not the primary purpose of the epigrams, at least their most frequent and emblematic feature.

Category 3. *(Re)presentation*

The final category of this typology includes formulae which introduce or highlight individuals, collective identities, or practical aspects of manuscript production. These formulae serve as contextualising devices within the ritualised communicative framework, offering insight into the processes and individuals involved. This category is divided into three subcategories: (3.1) presentation of oneself or others, (3.2) communal identity, and (3.3) practical details.

3.1. Representation - presentation of oneself or others involved

Representation formulae are a hallmark of 'Scribe-related' epigrams, foregrounding individuals—mostly scribes in this subgenre—central to manuscript production. These formulae encapsulate the ritualised practice of self-identification within the scribal tradition, portraying the scribe as both a devout servant and a skilled artisan.

The most prevalent representation formula centres on the dative χειρὶ (*by the hand of*), occasionally appearing in its plural form χερσὶ(ν). This construction typically identifies the individual responsible for producing the manuscript as a tangible artefact. Adjectives modify-

ing χειρὶ are rare but sometimes occur (21b, τλήμονι καὶ ἀμαθῇ, *patient and unlearned*). More frequently, the formula includes participles referring to the manuscript, such as γραφὲν or γραφεῖσα (*written*), and the scribe's name is almost invariably recorded in the genitive case, sometimes with additional attributes (21b, l.8). In instances where a verb replaces the participle, the scribe's name appears in the nominative case as the subject.

(21) Type 6848:[62]

Πεπλήρωται δ' ἐν ἔτεσι ἓξ χιλίοις
σὺν ἐννακοσίοις τε τρισκαιδεκάτοις,
ἰνδικτιῶνος ὁμοῦ τρισκαιδεκάτης·
συνδρομῇ, ἐξόδῳ τε καὶ τ' ἄλλα πάντα
φιλευσεβεῖ ἱερεῖ[63] **ὄνομα Μιχαήλ τε**
οὗ καὶ τὸ παρώνυμον αὐτοῦ Ἀμαρουκάεις. (21a)
Γραφὲν χειρὶ τλήμονι καὶ ἀμαθεῖ τε,
Γεωργίῳ ὄνομα τάχα καὶ ἀναγνώστῃ.[64] (21b)
Καὶ οἱ ἐντυχάνοντες ταύτῃ τῇ βίβλῳ
εὔχεσθε τῷ γράψαντι καὶ μὴ ἀρᾶσθε.

It was completed in the year six thousand
nine hundred and thirteen,
the indiction being the thirteenth as well.
Through collaboration, expense, and all else,
by the pious priest named Michael,
whose surname is Amaroukaeis.
Handwritten by the wretched and unlearned
one named George, also an *anagnostes*.
And those who encounter this book,

[62] Lines 5, 6 and 8 (each 14 syllables) diverge from the dodecasyllabic metre of the rest of the epigram. Once again, we observe that these longer lines are those containing names—adapted per occasion by inserting the relevant names, often without adjusting the formulation. However, 14-syllable lines (comprising two 7-syllable *cola*) are generally not uncommon; see Lauxtermann, *Byzantine Poetry* Vol.2, 370–371.

[63] As in (12), a genitive would be expected here; see the corresponding footnote for discussion.

[64] As above and in (12), a genitive would be expected here; see the corresponding footnote for discussion.

pray for the one who wrote it and do not imprecate him.

Self-representation dominates this subcategory, reflecting the genre's primary focus on the scribe. However, representation formulae occasionally introduce other contributors significant to the manuscript's creation. While formulae referencing patrons or other figures are less frequent than acknowledgments of divine aid (category 2), they provide insight into dynamics in manuscript production.

The most common constructions referencing contributors involve the term συνδρομή (*contribution*), appearing in the dative case (συνδρομῇ, *by means of*, (21a)) or as a prepositional phrase (διὰ συνδρομῆς or, rarely, ἐκ συνδρομῆς in (22), *through contribution*). These formulae generally denote sponsorship or financial support rather than direct involvement in copying, aligning them more closely with 'Patron-related' book epigrams, whereas their appearance ratio in 'Scribe-related' is only 1 out of 143.

(22) Type 2360:

Καὶ τῆσδε γραφεὺς Μανουὴλ πέλει τάλας·
ἔχει δ' εἰς κτῆμα τήνδε τὴν θείαν βίβλον
ἡ λαμπρὰ μονὴ τῶν θείων Ἀναργύρων,
ἧτινι κλῆσις ἀρχῆθεν Κοσμιδίου,
ἐκ συνδρομῆς τε καὶ θεαρέστου πόθου
θύτου Γερμανοῦ καὶ ἡγουμένου τῆσδε.

And the scribe here is Manuel the wretched;
This divine book is held in possession
by the illustrious monastery of the Holy Anargyroi,
whose name has been 'of Kosmidion' since the beginning,
through the contribution and God-pleasing zeal
of Germanos, abbot of this monastery.

Uncommon alternative constructions present the term συνεργία (*collaboration*) or the prepositional phrase σὺν with the dative, both frequently used in references to divine assistance (e.g. (5), (18)), the latter appearing only once in the context of non-divine support.

All things considered, representation formulae as parts of book epigrams situate the manuscript within the broader context of the

scribal and book production milieu, serving as a personal testament to the scribe's labour and creative ingenuity.

3.2. Presentation of the communal experience

Formulae highlighting the communal experience underscore shared identities and collective practices within the Byzantine scribal tradition, reflecting the interconnectedness of the community. These expressions often adopt a more poetic and literary style, while maintaining a degree of standardisation which highlights their ritualistic and communal resonance. By doing so, they present, for instance, the act of writing not as a purely personal endeavour but as an alignment with a broader, shared tradition. Standardisation highlights the continuity and the collective nature of scribal labour, situating the work of individual scribes within a larger religious and cultural framework.

One of the most evocative examples is the ὥσπερ ξένοι (*as wanderers...*) formula (see Type 2148, text and metadata), which articulates the relief experienced by scribes upon completing a manuscript. This formula encapsulates the connection between individual effort and common purpose, emphasising the scribe's role within the broader scribal community. Similarly, the formula ἡ χεὶρ ἡ μὲν γράψασα (*the hand that wrote...*) (see Type 1974, text and metadata) juxtaposes the ephemeral nature of the scribe's human life with the enduring legacy of their written texts. By invoking the hand—the primary instrument of scribal labour—this formula captures the tension between mortality and the permanence of the written word, a sentiment resonating deeply with the shared experiences of the scribal community.

Instead of revisiting these well-studied examples, I present two additional communal experience formulae. The first offers a succinct reflection on the relationship between human effort and divine will:

(23) Type 2297:

Θεοῦ διδόντος, οὐδὲν ἰσχύει φθόνος·
καὶ μὴ διδόντος, οὐδὲν ἀνύει πόνος.

When God bestows, envy has no power;
and when He does not, toil accomplishes nothing.

This formula encapsulates the idea that scribal effort, while vital, ultimately depends on divine grace, a notion that would resonate with members of the scribal community. The inclusion of God as the ultimate arbiter frames Byzantine scribal labour as an activity inextricably linked to the Christian faith which transcends individual achievement. The employment of a standardised and impersonal phrasing points to the universal experience of scribes as instruments of divine will, reinforcing the communal scribal and Christian identity.

The second example also provides a communal perspective:

(24) Type 5261:

Παύθητι χείρ μου τοῦ πονεῖν εἰς τὸ γράφειν,
ἄρθητι χείρ μου πρὸς τὸ ὑψοῦν δεσπότην·
ὡς δ' ἑσπερινὰς θυσίας τούτῳ δίδου
πληρωτικῇ δὲ ὡς ἐν εὐχαριστίᾳ.
Πολύστιχον γάρ, Χριστέ μου, τὸ βιβλίον
οὗπερ γραφεὺς πέφυκα κἂν φαυλογράφος·
ἀλλ' ἡ βίβλος μου τῶν βδελυρῶν πρακτέων
μείζων τε τούτων καὶ πολυστιχοτέρα,
γραφεῖσα μου, φεῦ τῆς πονηρογραφίας,
κινοῦντος χεῖρας πρὸς κακὰς ἐργασίας,
αἷς ἀπαλεῖψαι ῥυπτικῶν με δακρύων
ταῦτα προχέων δαψιλεῖ μοι πλημμύρᾳ.
Γράψαις δέ, Σῶτερ, εἰς τὸ σόν με βιβλίον,
κλήσεις ὅπου σὺ τῶν σεσωσμένων γράφεις.

Cease, my hand, from labouring in writing;
Lift, my hand, to exalt the Lord.
Offer (these words) to Him as evening offerings,
and as in full thanksgiving.
For the book is of many lines, O my Christ,
of which I have been the scribe, though a bad one;
yet my book of abhorrent deeds
is greater than this one and more manyfold in lines,
written by me—alas, for my wicked writings—
moving my hands to perform evil deeds.

From these, deliver me, for I shed cleansing tears,
pouring them forth in an abundant flood.
Write me, O Saviour, in Your book,
where You inscribe the names of the saved ones.

This communal experience formula highlights the physical exertion inherent in the act of writing—a familiar and relatable aspect of scribal work frequently acknowledged in book epigrams. Here, the formula is also situated within a broader spiritual framework. The epigram progresses from this initial formula presenting the experience of finishing scribal labour, to further expand upon the communal dimension, linking the scribe's personal toil to a higher, divine purpose. By invoking the lifting of the hand in a gesture of devotion, the text elevates scribal labour from a purely physical or intellectual activity to one imbued with profound spiritual significance. In this context, the communal experience formula—again—intertwines the experience of scribal labour with the shared Christian identity of the community.

Such formulae transcend specific context, contrasting with the personal focus of self-representation formulae. By linking individual labour to the shared experiences of the Byzantine scribal community, they imbue the act of manuscript production with a collective and religious significance. The standardised nature of these expressions underscores their communal and ritualistic importance, affirming that the labour of one scribe is inextricably linked to the legacy of many.

3.3. Presentation of practicalities

The final subcategory of this typology comprises formulae dedicated to recording the practical aspects of manuscript production, such as marking its completion, specifying significant dates, or documenting ownership by a particular monastery. These formulae serve as markers of a manuscript's contextual framework while remaining firmly embedded within the poetic—most evident in the use of metre—and ritualised—through standardised formulations—tradition of Byzantine book epigrams.

Among the most common patterns in this subcategory are formulae denoting a manuscript's ownership by a monastery:

(25) Type 32496:

Ἡ βίβλος αὕτη τῆς μονῆς Περιβλέπτου
τῆς κειμένης ἔγγιστα τῆς Ψαμαθείου·
ἀρχαϊκὴ δὲ τῆς μονῆς κλῆσις Προῦσα.

This book belongs to the Monastery of Peribleptos,
located very close to (the gate/district) of Psamathos.
The earlier name of the monastery was Prousa.

The core structure of this practicalities formula revolves around the genitive τῆς μονῆς (*of the monastery*) and the monastery's name ((25), Περιβλέπτου). The subject of the sentence is almost invariably explicit, most commonly ἡ βίβλος (*the book*), as in (25), or one of its lexical variants, such as τὸ βιβλίον. This is often accompanied by an emphatic element, typically a demonstrative pronoun ((25), αὕτη) or, less frequently, the adverbial dative τῇδε (*here*). Additional modifiers of the subject or the monastery are rare, as is the inclusion of a verb. When a verb is employed, πέφυκε (*came to be*) is the most common choice, sometimes appearing as part of a predicate with κτῆμα (*possession*).

The second and third verses of (25) illustrate optional expansions. Verse 2 specifies the monastery's location, with roughly half of its attestations employing phrasing identical to that of (25), though referencing other sites. Verse 3 identifies alternative names for the monastery, typically adopting the precise construction observed in (25) to reference its earlier appellation. Both sub-formulaic components occur rarely, the former more often than the latter.

Formulae addressing practicalities exemplify the seamless fusion of functionality and ritualisation within Byzantine epigrams. Although these expressions primarily serve practical objectives, their formulaic and metrical nature simultaneously reflects the ritualistic ethos of Byzantine scribal culture. By adhering to standardised patterns, these formulae not only fulfil their utilitarian role but also evoke a sense of continuity in collective tradition and identity. Consequently, this subcategory epitomises the hybrid nature of book epigrams, wherein practical necessity intertwines with poetic expression and communal significance, endowing the manuscript with both functional and symbolic resonance.

6. Discussion

This study emerges from examination and annotation of a representative corpus of 'Types'—normalised texts that consolidate multiple, nearly identical textual 'Occurrences.' This choice has facilitated the identification and classification of recurring formulaic patterns, leading to the development of a typology of formulaic material within Byzantine epigrams, organised by pragmatic function. While the typology proposed provides a stable framework, it is necessarily grounded in the particular subset of data analysed here. Transitioning from individual epigram 'Occurrences' to the 'Types' representing them, their core pragmatic purpose is expected to remain unchanged despite lexical and structural flexibility.

This research does not provide specific statistics of formula frequency or distribution, as such an undertaking would require a comprehensive view of the vast and continuously expanding DBBE 'Occurrences' corpus. However, this limitation does not detract from the value of the study, which lays the theoretical groundwork for further inquiries into case studies. Instead, it highlights the scope for intended future exploration of formulaic language within Byzantine scribal culture.

Moreover, it should be noted that a strict typology cannot fully capture the complexities of the material. While categories provide useful conceptual boundaries, certain formulae resist singular classification. The formula below (v.2) exemplifies dual categorisation:

(26) Type 5036:

Τῆς Ὀκτωήχου τῆς νέας θεῖον τέλος·
Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον καὶ Θεοκτίστου πόνος.
Καὶ τοῦτο ῥευστὸν προσδόκα τὸ μὴ ῥέον.

The divine end of the New Octoechos;
the gift of God and the labour of Theoktistos.
And even this, though motionless, expect it to be fleeting.

This formula typically appears as a single-verse epigram (see Type 3805), demonstrating remarkable lexical and structural consistency. Lexical substitutions are rare, while minor variation in word order

occasionally occurs. In terms of pragmatic function, it simultaneously acknowledges divine contribution (category 2) and represents Theoktistos' labour (category 3.1). Importantly, these two elements are not separate formulae combined but rather a recurring cohesive unit performing overlapping roles.

Such examples underscore the fluidity and interconnectedness of the personal, communal, and religious dimensions—and thus of the categories within the typology. Formulae often serve layered purposes, seamlessly interlacing individual, collective, and spiritual elements. This fluidity vividly illustrates the dynamic nature of formulaic language in Byzantine book epigrams, which resists rigid classification: variation in form proved too extant to serve as basis for typology, while even pragmatic functions, though way more consistent, do not always yield clear-cut categorisation.

7. Conclusion

This study has brought forth the formulaic material of Byzantine book epigrams as an intricate reflection of the cultural, social, and religious dimensions of Byzantine scribal culture. By focusing on the heavily formulaic 'Scribe-related' epigrams within the DBBE corpus, the research underscores the dual nature of these texts, which, while poetic and highly formulaic, allow for individual creativity and reflect the utilitarian and social functions of manuscript production. Exploration of existing models of formulaicity has highlighted the need for a distinct analytical framework that considers the literary, pragmatic, and ritual roles of these epigrams, rooted in their cultural and religious milieu.

This study has demonstrated how formulaic language served as a dynamic tool for ritualised communication, fostering community identity and religious participation. The centrality of formulaic sequences in the Byzantine scribal tradition reveals their role in multi-layered rituals, blending personal devotion with pragmatic conventions to reinforce both spiritual and communal dimensions.

The typology, based on functional categorisation, provides a nuanced understanding of formulaic material by reflecting the communicative and ritual needs of scribes. Formulaic reader appeals, supplications, and expressions of gratitude demonstrate how epi-

grams foster interaction with two audiences—divine and human—emphasising piety, communal identity, and the ritualised nature of manuscript culture. Representation and communal experience formulae situate the individual scribe within the broader scribal community, while formulae addressing practicalities weave utilitarian details into the fabric of epigram composition. Moreover, the interconnectedness and multifunctionality of formulae within Byzantine book epigrams highlight their fluidity, with multiple functions sometimes entwined. This dynamic framework underscores that formulaic language was not merely a tool of communication but a recognised medium of cultural, religious, and communal expression.

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Taming Passion: Plutarch's Dialectical Use of Metaphors in *De virtute morali*

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Abstract: *This paper examines the metaphors employed in Plutarch's* De virtute morali *to critique Stoic and Platonic models of passion. It is argued that Plutarch's metaphors reflect his anti-Stoic polemic and serve an educational agenda, advancing increasingly complex conceptualizations of passion—from inert matter, to vegetal growth, to the cognitively richer animal model. Section 1 contrasts Stoic suppression of passion with Plutarch's artisanal metaphors, which relocate* μέτρον *in a Peripatetic framework inspired by the* Timaeus. *Section 2 examines agricultural metaphors, highlighting Plutarch's preference for the symbiotic models of reason and passion. Section 3 explores the subtle influence of the* Phaedrus *on Stoic definitions of passion. Section 4 highlights how Plutarch's zoological metaphors diverge from Stoic views on animal nature, aligning ethical moderation with humane treatment of animals. While Plutarch and the Stoics employ similar imagery, their conceptualizations of passion diverge fundamentally, reflecting broader differences in their ethics and psychology.*

Keywords: *Animals, Metaphor,* De virtute morali, *Passion, Plutarch*

Recent scholarship has witnessed several attempts at foregrounding and elucidating the Plutarchan concept of πάθος: Plutarch's position is customarily construed as a response to concerns that were current in his intellectual environment and sought to clarify the role of reason and passion.[1] At one

[1] For the debate on μετριοπάθεια and ἀπάθεια, see R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind* (New York 2000) 194-210. See also D. Babut, "Ἱστορία οἷον ὕλη φιλοσοφίας: histoire et réflexion morale dans l'oeuvre de Plutarque." *Revue des Études Grecques* 88 (1975) 206-219, at 217, who argues that μετριοπάθεια

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extreme were the Stoics, who advocated for a life free of passions (ἀπάθεια) and propped up this exhortation through the twin theses that the soul is a unitary entity and that emotions are distortions of reason to be avoided.[2] Proposing an alternative and earthy *modus vivendi* that reserves room even for emotions popularly conceived as negative, Plutarch stresses the abnormality of a passionless life.[3] Instead, he forwards in *De virtute morali* a doctrine which borrows elements from the Aristotelian theory of the mean but stems equally from the main principles of Platonic psychology and the ensuing rejection of the Stoic psychological and ethical models.[4] His approach, however, is not straightforward; for, despite acknowledging the positive contribution of passion to the virtuous life, Plutarch at times seems to imply that ἀπάθεια is key for the development of virtuous disposition.[5] This ambiguity may be owed to Platon-

is not opposed to ἀπάθεια here. J.M. Dillon, "Metriopatheia and Apatheia: Some Reflections on a Controversy in Later Greek Ethics," in J.P. Anton and A. Preus (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy II* (New York 1983) 508-517 argues that Plutarch is unable or unwilling to understand the Stoic position, which he combats on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the obvious truth that the soul has parts; other interpretations are briefly presented in Ch. Gill, *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* (New York 2006) 230.

[2] See the illuminating discussion in M. Nussbaum, "The Stoics on the Extirpation of Passions." *Apeiron* 20.2 (1987) 129-177.

[3] On Plutarch's therapeutic model of moderating passions rather than eliminating them, see H.G. Ingenkamp, *Plutarchs Schriften über die Heilung der Seele* (Göttingen 1972). For an analysis of Plutarch's constructive psychology of virtue, emphasizing the positive role of passions, see B. Castelnérac, "Plutarch's Psychology of Moral Virtue: 'Pathos', 'Logos', and the Unity of the Soul." *Ancient Philosophy* 27 (2007) 141-163.

[4] On the polemical character of the treatise, see D. Babut, *Plutarque, De La Vertu Éthique: introduction, texte, traduction et commentaire* (Paris 1969) 51-52; J. Opsomer, "L'âme du monde et l'âme de l'homme chez Plutarque," in M. Garcia Valdés (ed.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: ideas religiosas*. Actas del III Simposio Internacional sobre Plutarco, Oviedo 30 de abril a 2 de mayo de 1992 (Madrid 1994) 33-49, at 33; G. Roskam, *Plutarch* (Cambridge 2021) 62.

[5] See, e.g., 444c9-d9. For the view that Plutarch evokes both the ideal of μετριοπάθεια for bodily passions regulated by practical reason, and that of ἀπάθεια for the mind and abstract thought, see D. Babut, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme* (Paris 1969) 321-333; cf. Gill, *Structured Self* 237-238. According to F. Becchi, "The Virtues and the Intelligence of Animals in Plutarch," in D.F. Leão and

ic influences, especially in light of the fact that Plato's dialogues similarly seem to offer conflicting accounts on the proper relation of reason to passion.[6] Others have argued that Plutarch's ambivalence on the issue results from a muddled notion of πάθος, which is conceived both as constructive force in engendering virtue and as mental disease.[7]

Rather than giving up hope for the reconstruction of a Plutarchan account of passion, on the disheartening impression that it is vitiated by such overriding contradictions, a fruitful alternative has been pursued recently by D. Machek, who sought to understand the role of passion in Plutarch by analyzing metaphors that relate to reason and passion. His strategy, namely, to discuss three types of metaphor, termed artisanal, zoological, and botanic, while in-

L.R. Lanzillotta (eds.), *A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic* (Leiden 2012) 138-171, Plutarch distinguishes between natural passions housed in the body and passions stemming from mental weakness; ignorance turns natural passions to vice, a mental disease that needs to be eradicated. E. Alexiou, "On ΑΠΑΘΕΙΑ in Plutarch's *Lives*," in M. Baumbach, H. Köhler, and A.-M. Ritter (eds.), *Mousopolos Stephanos* (Heidelberg 1998) 380-389 examines all the occurrences of the term ἀπάθεια in the *Lives* and concludes that it has negative connotations when used in "normal parlance" (389), but is positively evaluated when associated with abstract values.

[6] Dillon, *Metriopatheia and Apatheia* 508.

[7] Babut, *De La Vertu Éthique* 50 suggests that the two almost contradictory accounts of the passions may be owed to the two themes of the treatise, namely, moral virtue itself and the refutation of the Stoic theory, while he (*Plutarque et le stoïcisme* 322) posits that Plutarch's negative assessment of emotions at *De sup.* 165c might be a result of Stoic influence; cf. D. Machek, "Carving, Taming or Gardening? Plutarch on Emotions, Reason and Virtue." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 26.2 (2018) 255-275, at 260. A more charitable explanation would take into account the specific argumentative context of each passage: a typical example would be Plutarch's dealing with anger, and the different positions in *De coh. ira* and in the fragment from *On anger* (fr. 148 Sandbach = Stob. 3.20.70); cf. G. Roskam, "Being the Physician of One's Own Soul: on a Plutarchean Fragment on Anger (fr. 148 Sandbach)," in J.R. Ferreira and D.F. Leão (eds.), *Os fragmentos de Plutarco e a recepção da sua obra* (Coimbra 2003) 41-62. In a psychotherapeutic context, the emphasis is more on the total extinction of anger; this is not surprising, and need not reflect a Stoic point of view. For the Hellenistic trope of philosophy as therapy (the complementary of the idea that vice is a disease), see Nussbaum, *Apeiron* 20.2 (1987) 129-130.

genious and conveniently schematic, can still be enriched by considering both Plutarch's broader philosophic milieu as well as authorial intentions that may motivate the adoption of such tropes. Regarding the former, Plutarch's choice of metaphors about passion cannot be fully appreciated, unless viewed as fueled by his polemic intentions against the Stoa, in particular, Chrysippus' theory of passion as judgment, which was expounded in a four-book opus *Περὶ παθῶν* (*SVF* 3.458). Plutarch's conceptualizations of passion, as will become evident below, can be understood as a response to Stoic definitions that preserve semantic cues evoking Plato's works while activating the metaphors mentioned above: Plutarch not only counters his opponents by endorsing and expanding these tropes but also reclaims Platonic material that had been co-opted into their arsenal. At the same time, divorced from its pedagogical perspectives, Plutarch's metaphorics might appear as inane rhetorical whim; instead, we need to bear in mind that, especially in his ethical works, Plutarch sets his sights on educating his audience, and it is for this purpose that he invariably employs figurative language.[8]

All three types of metaphor are fairly represented in *De virtute morali*, a seminal work that lends itself for study not merely on its own right, but also as material that serves as a blueprint for Plutarch's use of metaphor. The metaphysical origins of artisanal metaphors are found already in the opening of the treatise, where Plutarch affirms that moral virtue has passion as its matter and reason as its form (440d1-4).[9] When describing the way in which

[8] See, e.g., 441e6-7 where education is envisaged as molding and taming (πλάσεως καὶ τιθασεύσεως). On Plutarch's imagery, see F. Fuhrmann, *Les images de Plutarque* (Paris 1964), who argues, at 16, that Plutarch was aware of the importance of comparisons as a means of demonstration, and R. Hirsch-Luipold, *Plutarchs Denken in Bildern* (Tübingen 2002). For Plutarch's use of comparison as a hallmark of his style, see J.G. López, "La naturaleza en las comparaciones de Plutarco," in J.G. López and E.C. Dorda (eds.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Paisaje y naturalezza* (Madrid 1991) 203-220, who demonstrates that such comparisons—especially those drawing from the animal, vegetal, and mineral worlds—are not merely ornamental but serve as cognitive tools to render moral doctrines more intelligible to his audience.

[9] I refer to Plutarch's works in their traditional Latin titles and employ the abbreviations established in Plutarchan studies. For Plutarch's text, I am using

moderation is implanted in passion by reason, Plutarch combines the Aristotelian trappings of μετριοπάθεια with the creation imagery of Plato's *Timaeus*: the demiurgical aspects of the creator god of the *Timaeus* are therefore assimilated into reason, with passions corresponding to the created artifacts. As for botanic metaphors, in presenting reason as gardener and passion as plant, they invite us to grasp the abstract occurrence of affective experience through the concrete and straightforward practice of cultivating or pruning: envy, for instance, is likened to an offshoot that reason—figured as knife—must cut back (*De vit. pud*. 529b6-c4). This imagery consistently casts reason as a gardener who manages the soul's growth. More important for the purposes of this paper is the group of zoological metaphors which enable the direct association of mental events with human-animal interaction: Plutarch endorses the image of Plato's *Phaedrus*, where the soul is likened to a winged pair of horses and a charioteer (246a7), and develops it further to envisage moral virtue as a state that comes about when reason has tamed the non-rational part of the soul.[10] The control of emotion is thus consistently portrayed as animal domestication, with reason depicted as a charioteer and passions as spirited horses.

The metaphors Plutarch employs to describe the soul and its non-rational parts do not stand in isolation: they form a conceptual progression that moves from the shaping of passive material (artisanal), to the cultivation of organic life (agricultural), and culminates in the dynamic interaction with sentient, trainable creatures (zoological).[11] This progression is not merely rhetorical: it mirrors

the editions of W.R. Paton *et al*., *Plutarchi Moralia* I, III (Teubner 1974, 1972); for Plato, I have used J. Burnet, *Platonis Opera* I, IV (New York 1900, 1902); for Galen's *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* (*PHP*), the edition of Ph.H. De Lacy, *Galen. On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, vol. I, second edition (Berlin 1981). Unless otherwise indicated, translations are from the Loeb Classical Library series.

[10] For the *Nachleben* of the *Phaedrus*' charioteer and its influence on imperial literature, see M.B. Trapp, "Plato's *Phaedrus* in Second-Century Greek Literature," in D.A. Russell (ed.), *Antonine Literature* (New York 1990) 141-174; on its use by Philo, see L. Kerns, *Platonic and Stoic Passions in Philo of Alexandria* (diss. King's College London 2013) 164-173.

[11] In a similar vein, S. Xenophontos, "Imagery and Education in Plutarch."

Plutarch's deepening concern with the autonomy of passion and its place in moral development, leading to an ethical vision wherein both animals and their metaphorical counterparts—the passions—are owed gentleness and guidance, not eradication. In addition, the fact that Plato, Plutarch, and (at least some of) the Stoics employ the metaphor that likens passions to horses may lead to facile inferences regarding its function, especially because linguistic usage obscures the different outlook they hold on the status and cognitive abilities of animals. It should be kept in mind that Plutarch's zoological metaphors, especially those involving the taming of animals, do more than illustrate psychological dynamics: they encode a polemical stance against Stoic ethics and Stoic views on animals. As will become evident, Plutarch aligns his conception of μετριοπάθεια with a broader critique of Stoic ἀπάθεια by drawing on imagery that implicitly affirms the educability, kinship, and ethical relevance of both animals and passions.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 deals with an aspect of the Stoic conception of passion that highlights the significance of measure and limit for the development of virtuous disposition. I argue that Plutarch critiques this conception through artisanal metaphors, redirecting the notion of μέτρον to its Peripatetic environment by invoking imagery reminiscent of the Timaean Demiurge. Section 2 traces the origins of Plutarch's agricultural metaphors which, I contend, must be viewed as influenced by the tensions inherent in the Platonic background regarding ἀπάθεια and μετριοπάθεια. Arguing that the Stoic exhortation to extirpate the passions is modeled after an apparent reading of *Republic* Book 9, which similarly presupposes the expulsion of passion for the sustenance of reason, I turn to Plutarch's limited use of such imagery and demonstrate his preference for symbiotic models of reason and passion as exhibited in the Platonic trope of the charioteer. Section 3 revisits the Stoic definition of passion vis-à-vis their doctrine on the nature of animals, arguing that the Phaedran metaphor is present in in-

Classical Philology 108.2 (2013) 126-138 shows that Plutarch reuses bee imagery across several pedagogical works, not only adapting it to each rhetorical context but also developing it cumulatively, building upon his earlier treatment.

choate form in their definition and conceptualization of passion. In Section 4, I analyze the zoological metaphors of *De virtute morali*, claiming that Plutarch's endorsement of μετριοπάθεια parallels his benevolent attitude toward animals. It is concluded that, while both Plutarch and the Stoics employ similar or identical linguistic expressions to describe passion, their underlying conceptualizations are ultimately opposed.

Section 1. Passion Within Bounds: Chrysippus, Plutarch, and Artisanal Metaphors

I begin with Plutarch's use of artisanal metaphors in *De virtute morali*. Machek rightly identifies the origin of the concept of imposing structure on disorderly matter primarily in Plato's *Timaeus* and *Philebus*, while tracing the notion of μέτρον as a specific form of proportion to the *Statesman*, the *Laws*, and the *Republic*.[12] My analysis will show that Plutarch does not merely adopt these Platonic ideas; rather, he engages with them dialectically and polemically, reclaiming familiar Platonic tropes from the Stoics and repositioning them within a Peripatetic framework.

The idea that passion is a form of excess, commonly described as ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα, features prominently in Stoic definitions of passion (*SVF* 3.377, 378). This suggests that impulse—the innate, universal drive of living organisms—must become excessive or overflowing for passion to occur. While the notion of πλεονεξία introduces a metaphorical framework for understanding passion, it does not clarify what the impulse exceeds. Clemens of Alexandria offers a useful distinction that addresses this gap: passion is an excessive impulse or one stretching beyond the measures set by reason (πλεονάζουσα ὁρμὴ ἢ ὑπερτείνουσα τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον μέτρα, *Strom*. 2.13.59.6 = *SVF* 3.377). Chrysippus, in a fragment preserved by Galen, elaborates on this idea by defining excess in terms of a lack of symmetry between impulse and reason (Gal. *PHP* 4.2.15 = *SVF* 3.462 part):

> Κατὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ὁ πλεονασμὸς τῆς ὁρμῆς εἴρηται, διὰ τὸ τὴν καθ' αὑτοὺς καὶ φυσικὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν συμμετρίαν ὑπερβαίνειν.

[12] Machek, *BJHP* 26.2 (2018) 261-264.

> In this context, we have spoken also of excess of impulse, because their impulses exceed the measure that accords with themselves and with nature. (trans. De Lacy, modified)

To illustrate this, Chrysippus compares the walker, whose movements remain under control and can stop at will, to the runner, whose momentum exceeds the natural limits of impulse, rendering him unable to stop willingly. This analogy underscores the importance of συμμετρία—the proportional relation that obtains between natural impulse and reason (*PHP* 4.2.18 = *SVF* 3.462). Finally, Epictetus echoes the same idea, describing a striving ὄρεξις as symmetrical when directed at what is good, while irrational drives surpass measure (*Diss*. 4.1.84).[13]

In what way does reason set the boundaries that properly enclose impulse? A close reading might question whether the metaphorical hint present in Galen's quotation from Chrysippus reflects the influence of the *Timaeus* on the Stoic theory of passion:[14] the concept of συμμετρία plays a central role in Plato's account of both the Demiurge's creation of the living world and the function of perception, which relies on an analogy between the external world and the perceiver.[15] Significantly, Lactantius reports that Zeno named as λόγος the one who brought order in nature and crafted the universe (*Zeno rerum naturae dispositorem atque artificem universitatis* λόγον *praedicat*, *SVF* 1.160). The explicit ascription of Timaean vocabulary to Stoic λόγος encourages the inference that reason is here envisaged as a

[13] See the analysis in B. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (New York 1987) 157-158.

[14] The Stoics simplified the Platonic model of the *Timaeus* to just two forces, namely, the active principle of λόγος and the passive principle of matter: see G. Reydams-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence. Stoic and Platonist Readings of Plato's Timaeus* (Turnhout 1999) 43, 71-73.

[15] For the role of συμμετρία in the senses of smell and sight, see *Timaeus* 66d and 67c, respectively. Its significance in shaping the living world is emphasized at 69b, where the Demiurge brings symmetry both within individual entities and between them, transforming what was previously disorderly. Similarly, at 73c, the Demiurge selects the most isomorphic triangles from those used to form the elements and combines them symmetrically to create the marrow. Finally, at 87c, the normative role of symmetry is highlighted, as it is linked to what is good and deemed essential for any creature destined to be good and beautiful.

creator god who ordered the universe by structuring passive matter according to rational proportions. To revert to the excessiveness of passion and the boundaries of reason, an artisanal metaphor lies at the core of Stoic metaphysics and entails that the cosmos has been brought forth as an artifact by personified reason: according to Chrysippus, not only is the cosmos itself a living organism, but nature is rational (… φυσιολογεῖται ὁ κόσμος καὶ φύσις λογική, *SVF* 2.618). It is through this metaphor that impulse is described as having a "natural symmetry": human beings should strive to imitate the ideal, cosmic model, also a living organism that has impulses, which, however, cannot exceed the limit—that is, the natural laws—imposed by its creator.

Enter Plutarch: the prominent Platonist, not only embraced the cosmogony of the *Timaeus* but also developed an interpretation of his own.[16] Since he fully accepts the role of reason as the creator god who imposes order on the amorphous and unqualified precosmic matter, it is unsurprising that he adopts artisanal metaphors inspired by the Timaean model. From the very opening of *De virtute morali*, Plutarch describes moral virtue as having passion as its matter and reason as its form, incorporating imagery of mixing (μεμιγμένα at 440d7, ἄκρατος at 440e1), while he further elaborates on this mixture with a more detailed account (443c5-d1):

> Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ὠνόμασται τὸ ἦθος. ἔστι μὲν γάρ, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ποιότης τοῦ ἀλόγου τὸ ἦθος, ὠνόμασται δ' ὅτι τὴν ποιότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔθει λαμβάνει τὸ ἄλογον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πλαττόμενον, οὐ βουλομένου τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατὸν οὔτ' ἄμεινον), ἀλλ' ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν ἐπιτιθέντος αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς, οὐκ ἀπαθείας οὔσας ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας παθῶν καὶ μεσότητας, ἐμποιοῦντος· ἐμποιεῖ δὲ τῇ φρονήσει τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ δύναμιν εἰς ἕξιν ἀστείαν καθιστάς.
>
> Therefore, also, ethical, or moral, virtue is well named, for ethical virtue is, to but sketch the subject, a quality of the irrational, and it is so named because the irrational, being formed by reason, acquires this quality and differentiation by habit, since reason

[16] See, in this regard, J. Opsomer, "Plutarch's *De animae procreatione in Timaeo*: Manipulation or Search for Consistency?" In P. Adamson, H. Baltussen and M.W.F. Stone (eds.), *Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries*, vol. I (London 2004) 137-162.

> does not wish to eradicate passion completely (for that would be neither possible nor expedient), but puts upon it some limitation and order and implants the ethical virtues, which are not the absence of passion but a due proportion and measure therein; and reason implants them by using prudence to develop the capacity for passion into a good acquired disposition.

This passage directly challenges the Stoic thesis that passions must be entirely eradicated. It is no coincidence that Plutarch pairs the term συμμετρία with μεσότης to counter the Stoic technical term ἀπάθεια. Demonstrating his acute reading, he draws on Chrysippus' use of συμμετρία to describe the nature of impulse under ideal conditions. However, Plutarch reclaims the term, rooted in Platonic thought, and aligns it with the Peripatetic notion of virtue as a mean: the artisanal metaphor is introduced through the participle πλαττόμενον, immediately framing reason as the craftsman who shapes the cosmos; this idea is reinforced by the sequence of participles (βουλομένου, ἐπιτιθέντος, ἐμποιοῦντος), which attribute to reason the qualities of an active and deliberate agent; ultimately, the last clause solidifies reason's role as the grammatical subject and active force, while συμμετρία and μεσότης are embedded within the irrational part of the soul as distinct dispositions representing limit and order.[17]

Plutarch also addresses the Stoic notion of passion as an excessive force. Rather than delving into complexities arising from equating passion with reason gone astray, he offers an Aristotelian analysis of virtue based on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which give rise to two types of virtue: wisdom (σοφία) and prudence (φρόνησις) (443e9). The key difference lies in their objects: wisdom, focused on stable and unchanging truths, requires no deliberation (βουλή) to achieve its goals, as its conclusions are certain. For example, a geometer does not need to deliberate whether the sum of a triangle's angles equals two right angles; it is

[17] Some additional parallels with the *Timaeus*: order is what the demiurge brings to disorder (εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, 30a5), while he delegates to the lesser gods the task of molding mortal bodies (τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὸν σπόρον τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκεν θεοῖς σώματα πλάττειν θνητά, 42d5-7). Plutarch similarly traces the origin of the non-rational to the body (τοῦ ἀλόγου τὴν γένεσιν αὐτόθεν ἔχοντος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, 450e7-8).

simply known (443f2-444a6). Prudence, however, deals with matters subject to variability and uncertainty: it must engage (notice the mixture metaphor: ἐπιμίγνυσθαι, 444a7) with contingencies and deliberate whenever judgments are influenced by the irrational part of the soul (444a9-b1). Plutarch then proceeds to discuss the role of ὁρμή (444b1-8):

> ὁρμῆς γὰρ δέονται· τὴν δ' ὁρμὴν τῷ πάθει ποιεῖ τὸ ἦθος, λόγου δεομένην ὁρίζοντος, ὅπως μετρία παρῇ καὶ μήθ' ὑπερβάλλῃ μήτ' ἐγκαταλείπῃ τὸν καιρόν. τὸ γὰρ δὴ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον κινήσεσι χρῆται ταῖς μὲν ἄγαν σφοδραῖς καὶ ὀξείαις ταῖς δὲ μαλακωτέραις ἢ προσήκει καὶ ἀργοτέραις.
>
> For they [sc. the judgments], as a matter of fact, need its impulse. The impulsion of passion springs from moral virtue; but it needs reason to keep it within moderate bounds and to prevent its exceeding or falling short of its proper season. For it is indeed true that the passionate and irrational moves sometimes too violently and swiftly, at other times more weakly and slothfully than the case demands. (trans. Babbitt, modified)

Impulse is depicted as an essential element of passion, but it must be regulated by reason to ensure it is present in the right measure, avoiding both excess and deficiency. The use of ὑπερβάλλειν here clearly recalls the terms ὑπερτείνουσα and ὑπερβαίνειν found in the Stoic accounts of passion. Plutarch explicitly draws on the Timaean metaphor of the creator god to frame his argument. Furthermore, his account appears more intuitive, as it emphasizes the kinetic aspect of passion, aligning with its phenomenological experience—often described as an extrarational force that "moves" or "overwhelms" us into action.[18] The natural role of practical reason is ultimately described as correcting the deficiencies and excesses of passion (444c1-2). This is further illustrated through metaphors reminiscent of two Empedoclean elements (441c2-9): when impulse is lacking, reason rekindles it (depicting impulse as fire that is

[18] M. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions* (New York 2001) 44 identifies the "kinetic or affective" aspect of emotion as the adversary's main objection to the neo-Stoic account that passions are judgments. I concur with R.C. Solomon, "Review of M. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions*." *Mind* 111.444 (2002) 897-901, at 899 that it is precisely in this regard that her otherwise brilliant account is found wanting.

about to be extinguished); conversely, when impulse surges excessively and threatens to exceed its bounds, reason curbs its intensity (portraying ὁρμή as water flowing uncontrollably).[19] These metaphors build on the creative imagery introduced earlier, reinforcing the idea that the aim is moderation, not the eradication, of passion: just as both water and fire are essential elements in practical life—serving not only as foundational components for creating artifacts but also as indispensable tools in any artisanal process—so too are passions seen as integral to human experience when properly managed by reason.

To sum up, this section examined two key Stoic texts on the conception of passion as excessive force, uncovering references to the *Timaeus*, particularly Chrysippus' use of συμμετρία to describe the measure reason imposes on impulse under ideal conditions. I concluded with Plutarch's rejection of the Stoic model and his reappropriation of the Timaean creator god: his use of συμμετρία and frequent reliance on artisanal metaphors highlight a polemical engagement with Stoic thought. Yet while artisanal metaphors convey the need for rational measure and control, they still conceptualize the passions as passive materials or mixtures to be managed. The next set of metaphors—agricultural—begins to shift the terms of Plutarch's polemic, treating passion not as inert matter but as something that can grow and flourish. This marks a departure from both Platonic and Stoic models, and the following section explores how Plutarch mobilizes this imagery to challenge their underlying assumptions.

Section 2. Revisiting Platonic Ambivalence: Domestication Over Extirpation

Plato's dialogues offer varied approaches to the relation between reason and passion, wavering between suppression and moderation.[20] This duality is captured in two tropes: the mythological beast (*Republic* Book 9) and the charioteer and horses (*Phaedrus*). The former casts passions as adversarial, requiring suppression to ensure

[19] For Plutarch's comparisons involving the four elements, see López, *Comparaciones* 209.

[20] Sorabji, *Emotion* 201.

the soul's integrity, while the latter suggests a more symbiotic dynamic, where passions, like horses, are essential but must be guided by reason. Plutarch largely ignores the combative model, focusing instead on the charioteer metaphor to define a balanced relationship between reason and passion. This section examines Plato's stance on grief in the *Republic*, arguing that it leans toward suppression as the virtuous response. I then contrast this with Plutarch's rejection of such suppressive attitudes, which he reserves only for envy.

The discussion of grief in the *Republic* highlights the difficulty of extracting a consistent view of Plato's attitude toward passion. At first blush, the dialogue seems to advocate moderation: in Book 10, Socrates and his interlocutors agree that a virtuous person would feel grief at the loss of a son (603e). The phrase μετριάσει δέ πως indicates that, while insensitivity is unattainable, moderation is the appropriate response.[21] Yet the mere acknowledgment of insensitivity as an ideal suggests that the passionless life, though unrealistic, remains a goal. The virtuous person, distinguished by bearing misfortunes more easily, is expected to grieve the least at the loss of a son or a brother (387d11-e8). Furthermore, grief is deemed an obstacle (ἐμποδών, 604e), hindering clarity of thought much like the body and passions in the *Phaedo*. This view aligns with the image of the self as a mythological beast in Book 9, where Socrates describes the human soul as comprising a multicolored beast, a lion, and a human, sewn together into the form of a single being (588c5-e1). Injustice empowers the beastly elements (588e3-589a3), while justice strengthens the inner human, enabling it to tend to the beast like a farmer, cultivating the gentle heads and restraining the wild ones (τοῦ πολυκεφάλου θρέμματος ἐπιμελήσεται ὥσπερ γεωργός, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα τρέφων καὶ τιθασεύων, τὰ δὲ ἄγρια ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι, 589b1-3).[22] Similarly, in Book 10, yielding to grief nourishes the inferi-

[21] See *Plt.* 284e-285c, which seems to foreshadow Aristotle's view of virtue as a mean (Dillon, *Metriopatheia and Apatheia* 508). For Plato's *Republic* Book 4 as a precursor of the theory, see D.R. Morphew, *Passionate Platonism: Plutarch on the Positive Role of Non-Rational Affects in the Good Life* (diss. Univ. of Michigan 2018) 21 n. 78.

[22] The metaphor has becomes a mixed one by drawing on terms from the

or part of the soul at the expense of reason, which is weakened and disrupted (τοῦτο ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, 605b3-5). The overarching message seems clear: grief, like the wild offshoots of the beast, must be controlled or uprooted.[23]

Plutarch is unhappy with the limitations such an idealization entails for our emotional life since it involves suppressing an essential component of human life. There are instances of emotions though for which he seems to subscribe to this agricultural model, which he introduces through the story of Lycurgus of Thrace (*De virt. mor.* 451c5-10):[24]

> ὅθεν οὐ Θρᾴκιον οὐδὲ Λυκούργειον τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἔργον ἐστί, συνεκκόπτειν καὶ συνδιαφθείρειν τὰ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς βλαβεροῖς τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' ἥπερ ὁ φυτάλμιος θεὸς καὶ ἡμερίδης, τὸ ἄγριον κολοῦσαι καὶ ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀμετρίαν, εἶτα τιθασεύειν καὶ

domain of agriculture to describe animal control. For mixed metaphors, see M. Zawisławska, *Metaphor and Senses. The Synamet Corpus: A Polish Resource for Synesthetic Metaphors* (Berlin 2019) 50. Perhaps the conflation is owed to the term τιθασεύω which can be applied both to cultivating the land and taming an animal. Grube and Reeve thus translate "… he should take care of the many-headed beast as a farmer does *his animals* […]." However, that the imagery is not about husbandry but farming can be established through *Euthphr.* 2d1-4: ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως ἔσονται ὅτι ἄριστοι, ὥσπερ γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Cf. *Tht.* 167b-c.

[23] In Book 3, the self-sufficiency of the virtuous person is portrayed as making them less vulnerable to feelings of loss, as they would have no need for friends (387d4-6). For such a person, grief would either be absent or seen as unnatural, opposing the ideal of self-sufficiency. If grief does arise, the *Republic* suggests it should be suppressed as much as possible. Given that the dialogue begins with Socrates' account of justice as inherently choiceworthy and positions the analysis of grief within the framework of a self-sufficient city, grief appears incompatible with this ideal, for it undermines the notion of self-sufficiency at both individual and civic levels. This sentiment is metaphorically expressed in the image of the mythological beast in Book 9, which implies that, under ideal conditions, negative emotions should be entirely suppressed.

[24] On botanic imagery in Plutarch, see Machek, *BJHP* 26.2 (2018) 268-273. Cf. also *De vit. pud.* 528c1-d5, 529a10-c2; *De genio Socr.* 584e8-f1; *De aud.* 39d8-13.

παριστάναι τὸ χρήσιμον.

> Therefore the work of reason is not Thracian, not like that of Lycurgus—to cut down and destroy the helpful elements of emotion together with the harmful, but to do as the god who watches over crops and the god who guards the vine do—to lop off the wild growth and to clip away excessive luxuriance, and then to cultivate and to dispose for use the serviceable remainder.

Consider envy (φθόνος), for instance: this emotion never contributes positively to our well-being and can therefore be justifiably eradicated (cf. *De aud*. 39d8-13). Yet, Plutarch advises against lumping together indiscriminately all emotions so that we fail to differentiate between harmful and beneficial ones, for otherwise one runs the risk of being misguided by a theory that deprives the self of the full range of human experience which accommodates both the cognitive and the affective element. Insisting that the relation obtaining between the two parts of the soul is not exhausted to an outright dismissal of passion as a cognitive hurdle, he traces a common heritage between them which enables the development of a symbiotic and synergistic relationship: reason is σύμφυτος with passion and as such is incapable of independent existence (σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀρχήν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιον ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν, 451c2-4).[25] Were passions completely eradicated, reason would falter, much like a ship's captain left to navigate without wind (452b1-4): passion, in this image, is the wind in our sails, but its general association with ὁρμή suggests that it is conceived as a vehicle that facilitates our transportation (καθάπερ ὅρμημα τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ὄχημα τὸ πάθος, 452c6).[26] For Plutarch, the goal is not to eliminate passion, as the Stoics propose, but to channel it harmoniously under reason's control (443c).

Plutarch rejects the view that passions are obstacles, instead highlighting their positive and necessary role in human life. In the *Con-*

[25] For the metaphysical counterpart of this claim, again occurring within the context of criticizing Stoic metaphysics, see *De an. procr*. 1015b3-6 with Babut, *De La Vertu Éthique* 42.

[26] On the symbolic use of wind imagery in Plutarch, see Fuhrmann, *Images* 98 n. 1.

solatio ad Apollonium,[27] it is argued that grief, though painful and beyond our control, is natural, whereas insensitivity is both unnatural and harmful, leading to a brutalized soul (102c5-e1).[28] Plutarch reverses the common view of grief as a soul's disease, instead framing lack of emotion as pathological (cf. *De frat. am.* 497c9-d8). To the Stoic claim that all passions must be uprooted because they cannot be selectively retained, he counters that we must allow space for negative emotions to preserve positive ones: "Lack of emotion," he argues in the *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, "will deprive us of the benevolence of being loved and loving, which we must preserve more than anything" (ἀφαιρήσεται γὰρ ἡμῶν αὕτη τὴν ἐκ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν εὔνοιαν, ἣν παντὸς μᾶλλον διασῴζειν ἀναγκαῖον, 102c10-d2).[29]

[27] Let me here anticipate the possible objection that I am extrapolating Plutarch's own views from a work of disputed authenticity. This line of argument loses its force as soon as we consider that Plutarch follows a similar reasoning in a work of unquestioned authenticity: in the *Consolatio ad uxorem*—a text Plutarch wrote to his wife, Timoxena, after the death of their daughter—the philosopher advises his wife against shying away from painful thoughts lest she completely abolish the memory of their daughter (608d9-f5). The bibliography on the problem of authenticity of the *Cons. ad Apoll.* is summarized conveniently in L. van der Wiel, *An Opaque Mirror for Trajan. A Literary Analysis and Interpretation of Plutarch's 'Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata'* (Leuven 2024) 315 n. 983, 316 n. 985.

[28] Brutus, one of the first two consuls of the Roman Republic, is described in the life of *Publicola* as unmoved by the execution of his sons in his presence: ἢ γὰρ ἀρετῆς ὕψος εἰς ἀπάθειαν ἐξέστησεν <αὐτοῦ> τὴν ψυχήν, ἢ πάθους μέγεθος εἰς ἀναλγησίαν. οὐδέτερον δὲ μικρὸν οὐδ' ἀνθρώπινον, ἀλλ' ἢ θεῖον ἢ θηριῶδες ("For either the loftiness of his virtue made his spirit incapable of suffering, or else the magnitude of his suffering made it insensible to pain. In neither case was his act a trivial one, or natural to a man, but either god-like or brutish," *Publ.* 6.5). Plutarch appears to admire ἀπάθεια here, yet he explicitly states that insensitivity arising from virtue is neither common nor characteristic of human nature: it is a heroic quality that inspires wonder, but heroism is not always the ideal. Cf. Epictetus' remark at *Encheiridion* 3 that one should not be more vexed at the death of one's son than at the breaking of a favorite mug (Ch. Gill, *Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance* [New York 2023] 242-246 argues, however, that the passage, when read along with its longer version at *Discourses* 3.24, aims at illustrating the universality of impermanence, without intending to undermine one's feeling of φιλοστοργία).

[29] As he is often wont to do, Plutarch may be arguing here from a Stoic thesis against it, since the Stoics claim that emotions form a unity: you cannot

Following Crantor, who likened losing all emotions to giving up sentience to avoid illness (102d7-10), Plutarch concludes that enduring negative emotions is essential, as they enable the positive feelings that define a good life.

What follows from the above analysis is that Plutarch's metaphors are deliberate and reflect his views on the relationship between the parts of the soul. He identifies Platonic texts that advocate a moderated form of ἀπάθεια and reinterprets them to counter Stoic doctrine. Recognizing that some emotions hinder ethical growth, Plutarch employs agricultural metaphors to depict the non-rational mind as a garden, where emotions are shoots to be cultivated or pruned. These metaphors help articulate the idea that passions, while in need of management, are still organic parts of the soul's development. Even so, the asymmetry persists: in these metaphors, reason cultivates, but passion remains rooted in passivity. It is in the zoological metaphors—with their emphasis on taming, training, and mutual responsiveness—that Plutarch's ethical vision reaches its fullest expression. The domestication model, which likens passions to animals, aligns with the Platonic bipartite or tripartite soul, attributing autonomy to passions while emphasizing their need for rational control.[30] Before turning to this framework, it is essential to briefly examine the Stoic perspective on emotions: also rooted in the Platonic tradition, Stoic ideas profoundly influenced both philosophical and popular thought, shaping Plutarch's response.

Section 3. Bridling Impulse: Stoic Passion and Equine Disobedience

In *De virtute morali*, Plutarch consistently emphasizes the natural affinity between the non-rational and rational parts of the mind. He extends this idea to the relationship between humans and animals,

have one emotion without making yourself vulnerable to the rest; see Nussbaum, *Apeiron* 20.2 (1987) 141.

[30] For what counts as Platonic doctrine, see G.R. Boys-Stones, *Post-Hellenistic Philosophy* (New York 2001) Ch. 6; see also his *Platonist Philosophy 80 BC to AD 250* (Cambridge 2018) Ch. 1, on the Platonist reconstruction of philosophical history and its implications for doctrinal authority. On bipartition in the early Academy, see D.A. Rees, "Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77.1 (1957) 112-118.

aligning closely with Peripatetic thought as developed by Theophrastus and Strato of Lampsacus.[31] Plutarch devoted three treatises (*De soll. an.*; *Gryllus*; *De esu*) to the relationship of humans and animals, occasionally exploring the continuity between human and animal mentality and arguing that animals share in reason and deserve humane treatment.[32] The Stoics, by contrast, held opposing views: they denied emotions a distinct locus in the mind and rejected any affinity between humans and animals, asserting that animals exist solely for human use, without ethical obligations. This section examines the Stoic ideal of ἀπάθεια, focusing on how their belief in the harmful effects of passions on happiness grounds their assertion that animals are to be used without regard for ethical considerations.

The doctrine of ἀπάθεια, especially in the canonical form it received from Chrysippus,[33] originates from the ideal of self-sufficiency reflected in Plato's *Republic*:[34] passions make us vulnerable by exposing us to external desires and conditions beyond our control, undermining happiness and imperturbability. Also in parallel with the *Republic*, the Stoics claim that εὐδαιμονία depends entire-

[31] See W.W. Fortenbaugh, "Theophrastus and Strato on Animal Intelligence," in M.-L. Desclos and W.W. Fortenbaugh (eds.), *Strato of Lampsacus. Text, Translation, and Discussion* (London and New York 2011) 399-412. See also R. Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals* (Ithaca, NY 1993) 132; J.-F. Lhermitte 2015, *L'Animal vertueux dans la philosophie antique à l'époque impériale* (Paris 2015) 169-170; cf. Porph. *Abst.* 3.25.

[32] All three works appear to be animated by opposition to Stoic doctrine; see J. Mossman and A.V. Zadorojnyi, "Plutarch and Animals," in F. B. Titchener and A.V. Zadorojnyi (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Plutarch* (Cambridge 2023) 282-302, at 289.

[33] On Chrysippus' authority in the crystallization of the doctrine of ἀπάθεια, see Sorabji, *Animal Minds* 122-125; *Emotion* 206-207. For emotions in Stoicism, see M.R. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion* (Chicago and London 2007) Ch. 2. For Zeno's view that passion is an exceeding impulse of the soul, see *SVF* 1.205 ff. Galen reports at *PHP* 6.25 that Posidonius veered from Stoic doctrine by positing an irrational part in the soul. Gill, *Structured Self* 214 argues that Posidonius "*was translating Platonic ideas into Stoic form*" (emphasis in the original); cf. 210 n. 10.

[34] For the influence of the *Republic* on Chrysippus, see Gill, *Structured Self* 304-322.

ly on virtue, not externals like wealth, power, health, or pleasure, which, though preferred, are indifferent to true happiness: for the Stoic sage, virtue alone secures happiness, making passions—*qua* false judgments about the value of externals—obstacles to the ultimate goal of life. Here lies a crucial divergence between Stoic and Plutarchan ethics: Plutarch sees passions as essential to human nature, and their removal as a mutilation of our psychological make-up; the Stoics, by contrast, argue that we should "live in accordance with nature," they define this nature as the divine λόγος that permeates the cosmos and urge us, through their notion of οἰκείωσις, to align with reason and eliminate passion.[35] In short, passions distort reason and, therefore, must be eradicated to restore harmony with nature and achieve true happiness.

The Stoic theory of human development highlights an unbridgeable gap between human and animal nature despite their shared origins: as one source informs us, the Stoics argued that the soul consists of eight parts, namely, the five senses, the capacities for speech and reproduction, and the ἡγεμονικόν, that is, the governing part (*Placita* 4.21 = *SVF* 2.827). In humans, the ἡγεμονικόν matures into rationality, while in animals it remains irrational:[36] accordingly, humans are, or at least should be, governed by reason, whereas animals act purely on instinct, driven by ὁρμή ("impulse").[37] The absence of reason from the animal soul is furthermore corroborated by factual experience since, for the Stoics, animals do not possess innate reason (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος), which controls and regulates speech (λόγος προφορικός): animal utterances, so argues Philo, are no different than sounds produced by wind instruments, which resemble human speech but are meaningless.[38]

[35] For references on οἰκείωσις, see S.T. Newmyer, "Speaking of Beasts: The Stoics and Plutarch on Animal Reason and the Modern Case against Animals." *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 63.3 (1999) 99-110, at 103 n. 12.

[36] S.T. Newmyer, *Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics* (New York 2006) 25; see also Newmyer, *QUCC* 63.3 (1999) 102.

[37] DL 7.85; cf. S.T. Newmyer, *Plutarch's Three Treatises on Animals. A Translation with Introductions and Commentary* (New York 2021) 4.

[38] *De animalibus* 99. Cf. Sorabji, *Animal Minds* 21-28; K. Jażdżewska, "Dialogic Format of Philo of Alexandria's *De animalibus*." *Eos* 102 (2015) 45-56, at 49.

The imperfection of the animal soul creates a growing divide between human and animal nature, shaping the Stoic stance on animals. This divide precludes any social bond, as Cicero argues in *De officiis*: the inability of animals to produce or understand λόγος excludes them from the natural kinship that unites humans (*Off.* 1.50). More critically, lacking reason, animals have no concept of justice, and humans have no ethical obligation to treat them as subjects of justice: according to Diogenes Laertius, Chrysippus maintained that justice cannot exist between humans and animals due to their fundamental dissimilarity, while he is reported by Cicero as holding the view that no injustice can be done against animals, which exist solely for human use (*Fin.* 3.67 = LS 57F5; cf. *Nat. D.* 2.37 = LS 54H1). Porphyry even cites the same philosopher as maintaining that pigs were created for sacrifice and that their souls were given as "salt" to make them tasty (*Abst.* 3.20.6-9 = LS 54P1 = *SVF* 2.1152).[39] Ultimately, then, it can be argued that the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις underpins their view that justice does not extend to animals, rendering any treatment of them ethically permissible.

However, there is evidence that the Stoics as well employed the Platonic image of the charioteer to conceptualize passion. The following excerpts lend support to the supposition that the conceptualization of passions as horses may have been part and parcel of Stoic descriptions of psychological conflict. First, let us look at the definition of passion, preserved by Stobaeus (*Anth.* 2.7.10.1-3 = LS 65A1 = *SVF* 3.378; cf. DL 7.110 = *SVF* 1.205; Galen, *PHP* 4.2.10-11, 4.4.17):

> <Πάθος> δ' εἶναί φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῆ τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ ἢ κίνησιν ψυχῆς <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν …
>
> They [the Stoics] say that passion is impulse which is excessive and disobedient to the dictates of reason, or a movement of soul which is irrational and contrary to nature … (trans. Long and Sedley)

While this definition does not explicitly evoke the Phaedran meta-

[39] Cf. Plutarch *De stoic. rep.* 1044d for the Stoic view that bugs and mice were created for the sake of humans, the former to prevent them for oversleeping, the latter to force them to keep things tidy. Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1256b16-18.

phor, a related passage sheds light on the connection between disobedience and the image of passion as a horse (Stob. *Anth.* 2.7.10a2-8 = LS 65A6 = *SVF* 3.378):

> Πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικόν ἐστι, ὡς πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντας ὅτι συμφέρει τόδε οὐ ποιεῖν, ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους, καθάπερ ὑπό τινος ἀπειθοῦς ἵππου, ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτό …
>
> For every passion is overpowering, since people in states of passion frequently see that it is not suitable to do this but are carried away by the intensity, as though by a disobedient horse, and are induced to do it … (trans. Long and Sedley)

While one might question whether the reference to the disobedient horse in the latter report should be read as implicit in the definition of passion as excessive impulse,[40] there are indications that the met-

[40] Chrysippus uses similar terms (ἀπειθῶς, ἀπειθές, μὴ εὐπειθῶς, ἀλόγως φέρεσθαι, ἐκφέρεσθαι) to characterize the experience of the runner who cannot stop at will, while he describes passionate behavior as "being carried away" (*SVF* 3.462, 476, 478); cf. Nussbaum, *Apeiron* 20.2 (1987) 169. Stobaeus' *Anthology* Book 2.7 provides Arius' summary of Stoic ethics; see Ch.H. Kahn, "Arius as a Doxographer," in W.W. Fortenbauch (ed.), *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Didymus*, vol. I (New York 1983) 3-14, at 3; Graver, *Stoicism* 223-224 n. 6. The Platonic heritage of the image is already mentioned by A. Bonhoeffer, *Epiktet und die Stoa* (Stuttgart 1890) 284. I.G. Kidd, "*Euemptosia*-Proneness to Disease," in W.W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Didymus*, vol. I (New York 1983) 107-113, at 111 argues that the simile goes back to the platonizing Posidonius; ἐκφερομένους might be picking up on ἐκφόρων of fr. 31 E.-K, but see Ph.H. De Lacy, "Comments on Professor Kidd's Paper," in W.W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Didymus*, vol. I (New York 1983) 114-117, at 116, who counters that expressions related to ἐκφέρεσθαι and ἀπειθῶς had been used by Chrysippus in his discussions of πάθη. Recall also Chrysippus' definition of ὁρμή as φορά διανοίας (*SVF* 3.169, 377); cf. T. Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul* (Leiden 1996) 163. Relevant in this regard is Sextus Empiricus' report at *Adv.Math.* 7.19 on Posidonius' remark that philosophy should be likened to a living organism. See now B. Harriman, "Posidonius' Two Systems: Animals and Emotions in Middle Stoicism." *Archiv für Geshichte der Philosophie* 106.3 (2022) 1-37 on Galen's report that Posidonius connects the non-rational aspect of the soul with the animal part of humans. See also Inwood, *Ethics* 141: "When a dualistic contrast of reason and the irrational part of the soul in its undifferentiated formulation was preferred, an anal-

aphor underlies all formulations that describe passion as disobedient: observing that ἀπειθής and its verbal cognates are often used to describe disobedient horses,[41] let us turn to a passage from Galen's *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* to clarify the significance of ἀπειθεῖν. Galen, distinguishing between error and affective action, contrasts the behavior of someone sacrificing their child for the sake of their country with Medea's murder of her children (4.2.26-27). In Medea's case, the act results not from reason persuading her—she fully recognizes the horror of her crime—but from anger clouding her judgment (4.2.27.4-8):

> … τὸν θυμὸν δὲ εἶναι κρείττονα τῶν βουλευμάτων, τουτέστιν οὐχ ὑποτετάχθαι καὶ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἕπεσθαι καθάπερ τινὶ δεσπότῃ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ πάθος ἀλλ' ἀφηνιάζειν καὶ ἀποχωρεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ προστάγματι, ὡς ἑτέρας τινὸς ἔργον ἢ πάθημα δυνάμεως ὑπάρχον, οὐ τῆς λογιστικῆς.
>
> … that is, her affection has not been made to submit and does not obey and follow reason as it would a master, but throws off the reins and departs and disobeys the command, the implication being that it is the action or affection of some power other than the rational. (trans. De Lacy)

The use of ἀφηνιάζειν explicitly links ἀπειθεῖν to the Phaedran metaphor, conceptualizing overpowering anger as a horse refusing to be reined in.[42] This connection lends credence to the idea that the charioteer metaphor of the *Phaedrus* is subtly embedded in Stoic

ogy with only one horse was substituted." Similarly, at *Quaest. Plat.* 1009a-b, the obedient horse seems to have been assimilated with the disobedient one (Machek, *BJHP* 26.2 [2018] 266). Cf. Ch. Gill, "Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on Emotions?" In J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen (eds.), *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (Dordrecht 1998) 113-148, at 136-137. For the influence of Plato's *Republic* and *Timaeus* on Chrysippus' thought, see Gill, *Structured Self* 291-322.

[41] E.g., Xen. *De re eq.* 3.6.4, 3.12.3, 6.10.1, 8.13.5.

[42] Cf. 4.5.18.5. The fact that, right before introducing the *Medea* example, Galen cites Chrysippus and references the definition of passion as disobedient motion of the soul (4.2.24-25) might serve as evidence that ἀφηνιάζειν is not an interpolation by Galen himself. For the view that Galen is here summarizing Chrysippus, see Gill, *Did Galen Understand?* 136. For Chrysippus' use of Euripides' works specifically to discuss πάθη, see Graver, *Stoicism* 3, 61-62, 70-71,

definitions of passion.[43]

These considerations suggest that Plutarch's domestication metaphors, while rooted in Platonic descriptions of psychological conflict, also reflect his effort to reclaim Platonic imagery and critique its Stoic misappropriation.[44] In *De libidine et aegritudine*, Plutarch adopts the definition almost *verbatim* to argue that desire and grief are integral to the human being as a whole (καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως ὁρμὴ μὲν πλεονάζουσα τὸ πάθος, τῷ ἀλόγῳ <τὸ> σφοδρὸν ἔχουσα καὶ ἀπειθές, 7.17-18).[45] Though less explicit in *De virtute morali*, he references this definition when discussing the origin of vice in the soul according to Stoic theory (441c10-13; cf. 449c5-6) and incorporates the term κίνησις in his definition of emotion, likely to capture its phenomenological aspect.[46] Building on Christopher Gill's observations (*Structured Self* 233), it can be argued that Plutarch reconceives the Stoic definition of passion to fit his part-based psychology, portraying ὁρμή as the defining element of emotion and the primary point of interaction with practical reason (e.g., 441b1-4, 444b10-c9, 444f2-445a2). In the next section, I examine Plutarch's use of the charioteer metaphor in *De virtute morali*. Unlike the Stoics, who em-

[43] Philo connects the dots and talks about application of the bridle to the excessive force of the impulse: δύνανται γὰρ οὗτοι χαλινὸν ταῖς ἀλόγοις δυνάμεσιν ἐμβαλόντες αὐτῶν ἐπιστομίζειν τῆς πλεοναζούσης τὴν φορὰν ὁρμῆς, *De agricultura* 94.4. On Philo's ample use of the charioteer metaphor, see Kerns, *Passions in Philo* 164-220. One might even argue that the metaphor implicit in the definition has been carried over to Latin since no less an eminent Stoic than Seneca employs it systematically to describe control of emotion: see, for example, the formulation *voluptates tenere sub freno* at *Ep*. 23.4; cf. *libidinem frenat* 88.4.1, *effrenatam* 92.8.4, *refrenavit* 104.13.2, *cupiditates refrenari* 120.11.2, *refrenemus* 123.14.6. On Seneca's use of animal imagery as a tool of moral and philosophical reflection, see F. Tutrone, *Filosofi e animali in Roma antica* (Pisa 2012) Ch. 6. Cf. Lucr. 4.1085; Varro fr. 177.3; Cic., *Cat*. 1.25.2; *Sen*. 40.1; *Dom*. 115.2; *Fin*. 3.36.10; *Tusc*. 4.12.13; Quintilian, *Inst*. 8.6.41.

[44] For the view that Plutarch's conception of virtue as harmonic mean and good tension aims at reclaiming Platonic imagery that had been adopted by Chrysippus, see A.A. Long, *Stoic Studies* (Berkeley 1996) 214-215.

[45] The work has been disputed, but see F.H. Sandbach, "Plutarque était-il l'auteur du "De libidine et aegritudine?" *Revue de Philosophy* 43 (1969) 211-216 for arguments in support of its authenticity.

[46] 443d6: τὸ δὲ πάθος κίνησίς τις ἤδη τῆς δυνάμεως, 444c7: τὴν παθητικὴν κίνησιν. Cf. 444f2, 451f7.

phasize the disobedience of impulse and its hindrance to reason, Plutarch highlights the obedience of the non-rational soul and its essential role in achieving virtue.

Section 4. Under the Reins: Passions as Horses in Plutarch De virtute morali

Although Plutarch emphasizes the responsiveness of passion to reason, he is careful to note that, without proper education to align with reason in fostering virtue, the irrational mind becomes unruly and leads to vice (443c5-d3). In *De virtute morali*, this educational process is portrayed as domestication: παιδαγωγία is described as τιθάσευσις (441e7), with reason often depicted as the charioteer and passions as the horses. Several passages reinforce this imagery, with the metaphor from the *Phaedrus* either subtly present or explicitly referenced. This section explores the conceptualization of passions as horses in *De virtute morali*, demonstrating how Plutarch employs metaphors of chariot riding and domestication to reclaim the Phaedran imagery. Additionally, it examines Plutarch's engagement with Stoic ethical theories on the relationship between humans and animals.

The first passage in which Plutarch employs the charioteer metaphor comes early in the treatise, addressing those who wonder how the irrational part can heed reason, even though it is ἄλογον (442c6-d4):[47]

> Οἱ δὲ θαυμάζοντες ὅπως ἄλογον μέν ἐστι λόγου δ' ὑπήκοον οὔ μοι δοκοῦσι τοῦ λόγου περινοεῖν τὴν δύναμιν 'ὅση πέφυκε καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον διέρχεται' τῷ κρατεῖν καὶ ἄγειν οὐ σκληραῖς οὐδ' ἀντιτύποις ἀγωγαῖς ἀλλὰ τυπικαῖς καὶ τὸ ἐνδόσιμον καὶ πειθήνιον ἀπάσης ἀνάγκης καὶ βίας ἐχούσαις ἀνυσιμώτερον. ἐπεὶ καὶ πνεῦμα δήπου καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος ἄλογ' ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁρμὴ γένηται, σείσαντος ὥσπερ ἡνίας τοῦ λογισμοῦ πάντα τέταται καὶ συνῆκται καὶ ὑπακούει·
>
> Those who wonder how it is that this part is irrational, yet subservient to reason, do not seem to me to reflect thoroughly upon the power of reason, "How great it is, how far it penetrates," through its mastery and guidance, not by harsh and inflexible methods,

[47] For Aristotle's two senses of ἄλογος, see *EN* 1102a. Babut, *De La Vertu Éthique* 142-43 compares with *De genio Socr.* 588f-589a.

> but by flexible ones, which have a quality of yielding and submitting to the rein which is more effective than any possible constraint or violence. For, to be sure, even our breathing, our sinews and bones, and the other parts of the body, though they are irrational, yet when an impulse comes, with reason shaking the reins, as it were, they all grow taut and are drawn together in ready obedience.

Plutarch argues that such critics underestimate the power of reason, which can shake the reins, as it were, and bring the body—bones and sinews—under its control, whenever an impulse arises: reason takes the role of the charioteer, while the body, presumably representing the seat of the passionate soul, assumes the position of horses under the yoke. The term ἀγωγή frames the relationship between reason and passion as akin to that of teacher and pupil, but, as Babut (*De La Vertu Éthique* 142) observes, the description of the passionate soul as πειθήνιον ("persuaded, obedient") clearly connects to the *Phaedrus* metaphor. Although the influence of the *Phaedrus* is undeniable, another dimension emerges through the use of distinctly Stoic vocabulary: the presence of πνεῦμα as well as the terms ὁρμή and κίνησις calls to mind the Stoic accounts of passion as excessive impulse disobeying reason and suggests that Plutarch may have adopted the metaphor in direct opposition to Stoic doctrine.

The next significant use of a zoological metaphor in Plutarch appears less explicitly and seems more influenced by Plato than by the Stoa. In the *Timaeus*, the appetitive part of the soul is likened to a wild beast, tied and kept apart to avoid disrupting deliberation (70d7-71a3): the imagery suggests a necessary but controlled relationship between reason and desire, echoing the dynamic of the *Phaedrus*' charioteer and unruly horse.[48] However, while the *Timaeus*

[48] In the *Phaedrus*, the soul is housed in the body (κατοικισθεῖσα, 246c3; cf. *Ti.* 70a3: κατῴκισαν); the charioteer positions the horses at the manger (πρὸς τὴν φάτνην, 247e5; cf. *Ti.* 70e2: οἷον φάτνην); the soul is thrown into confusion by the horses (θορυβουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων, 248a4; θόρυβος, 248b1; cf. *Ti.* 70e7: θόρυβον καὶ βοὴν ὡς ἐλαχίστην παρέχον). The *Republic* assumes a similarly suppressive attitude regarding the control of animals in the *kallipolis* since its founders commit to curtailing the liberties enjoyed by domestic animals in democracies, where horses and donkeys roam the streets proudly and freely

emphasizes restraint, Plutarch reinterprets the metaphor to stress harmony and mutual dependence: in *De virtute morali*, he likens the irrational soul to an animal, challenging the Stoic claim that the non-rational part cannot respond to reason. Using everyday examples of trained animals, he highlights their ability to follow reason through habituation, while drawing on Homer's image of Achilles urging both men and horses into battle (443b1-c4):

> ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἐάσας ἡδέως ἂν αὐτῶν πυθοίμην, εἰ κύνας καὶ ἵππους καὶ ὄρνιθας οἰκουροὺς ὁρῶντες ἔθει καὶ τροφῇ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ φωνάς τε συνετὰς καὶ πρὸς λόγον ὑπηκόους κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις ἀποδιδόντας καὶ πράξεις τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν ἐχούσας Ὁμήρου τ' ἀκούοντες τὸν Ἀχιλλέα λέγοντος 'ὀτρύνειν ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας' ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην ἔτι θαυμάζουσι καὶ διαποροῦσιν εἰ τὸ θυμούμενον ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον ὑπακούειν τε τῷ φρονοῦντι καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ συνδιατίθεσθαι πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἀποικοῦν οὐδ' ἀπεσχισμένον οὐδὲ πλασσόμενον ἔξωθεν οὐδὲ τυπούμενον ἀνάγκαις τισὶν ἢ πληγαῖς, ἀλλὰ φύσει μὲν ἐξηρτημένον ἀεὶ δ' ὁμιλοῦν καὶ συντρεφόμενον καὶ ἀναπιμπλάμενον ὑπὸ συνηθείας.
>
> But, letting these subjects pass, I would gladly learn from my opponents whether, when they see dogs, horses, and domestic birds, through habituation, breeding, and teaching, uttering intelligible sounds and moving and assuming postures in subordination to reason, and acting in a manner conformable to due proportion and our advantage; and when they hear Homer declaring that Achilles "Urged on both horses and men" to battle—whether, I say, they still wonder and are in doubt that the element in us which is spirited and appetitive and experiences pain and pleasure, does, by its very nature, harken to the intelligence, and is affected and harmoniously disposed by its agency, and does not dwell apart from the intelligence, nor is it separated therefrom, nor moulded from without the body, nor formed by any extraneous violence or blows, but that by its nature it is dependent upon the intelligence and is always in association with it and nurtured together with it and influenced by familiar intercourse.

Here, Plutarch emphasizes the cooperative potential of the irratio-

without yielding to those coming their way (563c3-d2). For a positive appraisal of animal cognitive abilities in Plato, see E.B. Cole, "Plato on the Soul of Beasts," circulated to *Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy* (Chicago 1991).

nal part, which he no longer depicts as a wild, uncontrollable beast but as naturally yielding to reason. In contrast to the *Timaeus*, where the appetitive soul is kept apart, he envisions the passionate soul as integrated, responsive, and essential for achieving virtue. This interpretation directly challenges the Timaean and Stoic dismissal of the irrational as inherently resistant to reason.[49]

Referencing Plato directly, Plutarch reverts to the metaphor later in the work, in a discussion of Aristotle's distinction between the self-controlled and the temperate person in *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.2 (445b6-c8):

> νῦν δὲ σωφροσύνη μέν ἐστιν, οὗ τὸ παθητικὸν ὥσπερ εὐήνιον θρέμμα καὶ πρᾷον ὁ λογισμὸς ἡνιοχεῖ καὶ μεταχειρίζεται, περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας χρώμενος ὑπείκοντι καὶ δεχομένῳ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ εὔσχημον ἑκουσίως, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ἄγει μὲν ἐρρωμένῳ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ κρατοῦντι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, ἄγει δ' οὐκ ἀλύπως οὐδὲ πειθομένην ἀλλὰ πλαγίαν καὶ ἀντιτείνουσαν, οἷον ὑπὸ πληγῆς καὶ χαλινοῦ καταβιαζόμενος καὶ ἀνακρούων, ἀγῶνος ὢν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ θορύβου μεστός· οἷον ὁ Πλάτων ἐξεικονίζει περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποζύγια, τοῦ χείρονος πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ζυγομαχοῦντος ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἡνίοχον διαταράττοντος ἀντέχειν ὀπίσω καὶ κατατείνειν ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἀναγκαζόμενον ἀεί, 'μὴ βάλῃ φοίνικας ἐκ χειρῶν ἱμάντας' κατὰ Σιμωνίδην.
>
> But the fact is that temperance belongs to the sphere where reason guides and manages the passionate element, like a gentle animal obedient to the reins, making it yielding in its desires and willingly receptive of moderation and propriety; but the self-controlled man, while he does indeed direct his desire by the strength and mastery of reason, yet does so not without pain, nor by persuasion, but as it plunges sideways and resists, as though with blow and curb, he forcibly subdues it and holds it in, being the while himself full of internal struggle and turmoil. Such a conflict Plato portrays in his simile of the horses of the soul, where the worse horse struggles against his better yoke-fellow and at the same time disconcerts the charioteer, who is ever forced to hold out against

[49] Plutarch's criticism of Plato is very subtle, as he mentions neither the *Timaeus* nor Plato himself; cf. G.E. Karamanolis, *Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?* (New York 2006) 89: "[Plutarch] generally appears to refrain from criticizing Aristotle's views, or else criticizes them mildly and implicitly, that is, without naming Aristotle."

him and with might and main to rein him in, "Lest he let fall from his hands the crimson thongs," as Simonides has it.

Plutarch presents reason as the charioteer and passions as the horses that quarrel with one another under the yoke. In the temperate soul, he explains, passion corresponds to an animal that accepts the rein willingly and follows reason gently without causing trouble; on the contrary, the charioteer in the self-controlled person must administer heavy blows to keep in check his desire which resists and plunges sideways. The Phaedran metaphor is furthermore applied in an innovative way to illustrate Aristotle's distinction (446c10-e2):[50]

τὸ γὰρ δάκνον καὶ τὸ λυποῦν καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτοῦν οὔπω τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀπολέλοιπε· τῆς δὲ σώφρονος ψυχῆς τὸ πανταχόθεν ὁμαλὲς καὶ ἄσφυκτον καὶ ὑγιαῖνον, ᾧ συνήρμοσται καὶ συγκέκραται τὸ ἄλογον πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν εὐπειθείᾳ καὶ πραότητι θαυμαστῇ κεκοσμημένον, … ὧν δ' ἡ φύσις ἀναγκαίως δεῖται, ταῦθ' ὁμοπαθῆ καὶ ὑπήκοα καὶ φίλα καὶ συνεργὰ πεποιημένου ταῖς πρακτικαῖς προαιρέσεσιν, ὥστε μὴ προεκθεῖν τοῦ λογισμοῦ μηδ' ὑπενδιδόναι μηδ' ἀτακτεῖν μηδ' ἀπειθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν ὁρμὴν εὐάγωγον οὖσαν 'ἄθηλον ἵππῳ πῶλον ὡς ἅμα τρέχειν' …

For continence is not yet free from remorse and pain and indignation; but in the soul of the temperate man there is serenity on all occasions, freedom from violent changes, and sanity, by which the irrational is harmonized and blended with reason, when this is equipped with great persuasion and a wonderful gentleness. … and those movements which Nature absolutely requires had been made sympathetic, submissive, friendly, and, when the man chose a course of action, willing to co-operate, so that they did not outstrip the dictates of reason, nor fall short of them, nor misbehave, nor disobey, but so that every impulse was easily led "As new-weaned foal beside his mother runs"…

Terms, such as εὐπείθεια and ἀπειθεῖν, link this passage to the *Phaedrus*;[51] yet, it departs subtly from Plato's image of a yoked horse

[50] See Machek, *BJHP* 26.2 (2018) 265. On Plutarch's adaptation of Aristotelian psychology to combat Stoic monism, see F. Becchi, "Aristotelismo ed antistoicismo nel *De virtute morali* di Plutarco." *Prometheus* 1 (1975) 160-180 and "Aristotelismo funzionale nel *De virtute morali* di Plutarco." *Prometheus* 4 (1978) 261-275.

[51] δάκνειν may relate to equine behavior: see Xen. *De re eq.* 5.3.5, 6.10.1. It

obeying a charioteer, shifting instead to Semonides' verse (fr. 5), which evokes the intimate bond between a mare and her well-behaved foal. This relationship serves as a richer metaphor for the interaction between reason and passion: rather than a dynamic of coercion and restraint, it highlights one of trust, harmony, and natural cooperation.

Toward the end of the treatise, Plutarch reaffirms the necessity of retaining passions, arguing that their complete elimination would amount to uprooting the subservient part of the soul. Emphasizing their utility, he compares passions to rebellious oxen and horses (451d2-e4):

> καὶ γὰρ βοῶν καὶ ἵππων τὰ πηδήματα καὶ τοὺς ἀφηνιασμοὺς οὐ τὰς κινήσεις οὐδὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀφαιροῦσι, καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι δεδαμασμένοις χρῆται καὶ χειροήθεσιν ὁ λογισμός, οὐκ ἐκνευρίσας οὐδ' ἐκτεμὼν παντάπασι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὑπηρετικόν. 'ὑφ' ἅρμασι' γὰρ 'ἵππος' ὥς φησι Πίνδαρος 'ἐν δ' ἀρότρῳ βοῦς· κάπρῳ δὲ βουλεύοντα φόνον κύνα χρὴ τλάθυμον ἐξευρεῖν'· ὧν πολὺ χρησιμώτερα τὰ τῶν παθῶν θρέμματα τῷ λογισμῷ συμπαρόντα καὶ συνεντείνοντα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, ὁ θυμὸς τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ, μέτριος ὤν, ἡ μισοπονηρία τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἡ νέμεσις ἐπὶ τοὺς παρ' ἀξίαν εὐτυχοῦντας, ὅταν ἅμ' ἀνοίᾳ καὶ ὕβρει φλεγόμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπισχέσεως δέωνται.
>
> It is, in fact, the rebellious kicking and plunging of oxen and horses that men do away with, not their movements and activities; even so reason makes use of the emotions when they have been subdued and are tame, and does not hamstring nor altogether excise that part of the soul which should be its servant. For "The horse is meet for the chariot," as Pindar says, "the ox for the plough; But if you think to slay a boar, you must find a stouthearted hound." Yet much more useful than these beasts are the whole brood of passions when they are present in the service of reason and help to intensify the virtues: anger, if it be moderate, will assist courage, and hatred of evil will aid justice, and righteous indignation will oppose those who are prosperous beyond their deserts when their

is also used for the horse biting the bit: see Pl. *Phdr*. 254d; E. *Hipp*. 1223. For the long history of biting as metaphor for grief, see Graver, *Stoicism* 29 with n. 47. Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 4.15 (… *ut aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat* …). For the use of δάκνειν by Chrysippus to describe emotions, see Galen *PHP* 5.1.4, 4.3.2, 4.2.4-6.

> souls are inflamed with folly and insolence and they need to be checked.

Plutarch argues that, just as people do not seek to disable animals entirely but only to curb their rebellious behavior and resistance to the rein, reason should aim to tame passions rather than immobilize them. Citing Pindar, he underscores the indispensability of animals in human life and suggests that passions, even more so than animals, play a critical role in supporting reason and fostering virtue: properly subdued, passions like moderate anger, hatred of evil, and righteous indignation contribute to courage, justice, and the restraint of those whose folly and arrogance must be restrained.

The examples above illustrate Plutarch's conviction that passion is essential to human life. Rather than simply framing the relationship between reason and passion as that of an active craftsman shaping a passive product, a gardener overseeing the automatic growth of plants, or a charioteer punishing his horse, Plutarch uses the charioteer metaphor to highlight the benevolent aspects of this dynamic: this metaphor conveys both the distinct, autonomous existence of reason and passion and their deep interconnectedness and interdependence. To conclude, I will offer a few remarks on Plutarch's perspective on the relationship between humans and animals: exploring Plutarch's view on animal nature will shed light on his conceptualization of passion and how it diverges from the Stoic framework, which is grounded in a fundamentally different understanding of animals.

Conclusion: Passion and Kindness

The idea that horses belong to the chariot and oxen to the plough might suggest that Plutarch viewed animals as merely instrumental to human wellbeing. Indeed, the Platonic framework prioritizes reason and, by extension, humans, yet Plutarch's position is far more nuanced than the Stoic stance:[52] he acknowledges an affinity between humans and animals and uniquely argues for ethical

[52] See, in this regard, Epict. *Diss.* 1.6.18, who distinguishes between animals made to be eaten and others to be used as tools.

treatment of animals.[53] Like emotions, he sometimes sees animals as devoid of reason, but at other times suggests a sliding scale of reasoning ability, albeit inferior to humans.[54] However, the novelty of his view lies less in attributing thought to animals and more in challenging Stoic notions of justice, which he critiques as both inconsistent and inhumane. As already pointed out, the Stoics justified unjust treatment of animals by claiming they lack reason and the concept of justice: Plutarch counters this in *De amore prolis*, arguing that justice originates in affection for offspring and recognition of kinship,[55] also noting that even irrational animals display natural parental love, though their limited cognition prevents the full development of justice (495b6-c6).[56] While ambiguously phrased, an argument directed against Stoic doctrine may be latent here:[57] since even Chrysippus admitted that animals' affection for their offspring

[53] Newmeyer, *Animals, Rights and Reason* 103; *Three Treatises* 3. On the human / animal dichotomy in Greek thought, see R. Renehan, "The Greek Anthropocentric View of Man." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 85 (1981) 239-259.

[54] For the view that humans are superior to animals because they can reason, see *De fort. Rom.* 98c and *De frat. am.* 478e. For the view that animals care for nothing other than pleasure, see *Adv. Col.* 1125a. Cf. Newmeyer, *Animals, Rights and Reason* 60-62.

[55] Newmeyer, *Three Treatises* 9.

[56] On the philosophical tradition of φιλοστοργία, see G. Roskam, "Plutarch Against Epicurus on Affection for Offspring. A Reading of *De amore prolis*," in L. van der Stockt and G. Roskam (eds.), *Virtues for the People: Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics* (Leuven 2011) 175-201, at 178-184, who nonetheless views the argument as aimed against Epicurus' rejection of φιλοστοργία as a natural feeling. One should bear in mind, though, that the Stoics provided a definition of φιλοστοργία as a skill (φιλοτεχνία) pertaining to friends and relatives and as found only in the good, and therefore being extremely rare (*SVF* 3.292, 731). The previous tradition, especially the Peripatetics, employed the term with regard to animals: most appropriately for my analysis here, Aristotle describes the race of horses as φύσει φιλόστοργον (*HA* 611a11); cf. Roskam, in *Plutarch Against Epicurus* 180; Lhermitte, *L'Animal vertueux* 290-293.

[57] On the "anti-stoic coloring" of the treatises (termed *tierpsychologischen* by K. Ziegler, "Plutarchos." *RE* 41.1 [1951] 636-962, at 732), see F. Becchi, "Irrazionalità e razionalità degli animali negli scritti di Plutarco. Ovvero: Il paradosso della superiorità razionale ed etica degli animali." *Prometheus* 26 (2000) 205-225, at 205.

arises from recognizing kinship, and Zeno tied justice to οἰκείωσις, it would follow that the principle of justice should also extend to animals.[58]

Plutarch emphasizes that treating animals kindly ultimately benefits humans as well. While the Stoics justify injustice against animals on the grounds that otherwise humans would be reduced to living a life of beasts (cf. *De cap. ex inim.* 86d9-11), Plutarch offers a more nuanced view in *De sollertia animalium*: there, Soclarus defends the Stoic claim that no injustice is done to animals, as they lack respect for others' interests (964b10-11). Autobulus, however, counters this by arguing that animals friendly to humans should be domesticated to aid in tasks, in line with Pythagorean thought (964f1-965a3).[59] He rejects the Stoic dichotomy of "convenience or justice" and asserts that it is not the use of animals that is unjust but their harmful and neglectful treatment (965b5-7). Autobulus, speaking for Plutarch, underscores this ethical stance by referencing his son (Plutarch) as one who, following Plato, guides others toward justice (964d1-5).[60] Plutarch further develops this in his critique of Cato Major, who treated slaves as disposable tools, selling them when old: he argues that, while law and justice govern human relationships, kindness, which flows naturally from gentleness, extends further (*Ca. Ma.* 5.2), and he concludes that living beings should not be discarded like worn-out tools but treated gently, if only as practice in kindness

[58] For Chrysippus, see *De Stoic. rep.* 1038b8-10 = LS 57E2 = *SVF* 2.724; for Zeno, see Porph. *Abst.* 3.19.

[59] Cf. Porph. *Abst.* 3.20: οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν πρὸς τὰ θηρία πραότητα μελέτην ἐποιήσαντο τοῦ φιλανθρώπου καὶ φιλοικτίρμονος ("But the Pythagoreans made kindness to beasts a training in humanity and pity," trans. Clark).

[60] *Contra* Ph.S. Horky, "The Spectrum of Animal Rationality in Plutarch." *Apeiron* 50.1 (2017) 103-133, who, at 114, identifies this Autobulus as Plutarch's son, not his father. A. Pabst, ""Klarere Spiegel des Göttlichen" - Plutarch und die Tiere." *Millenium* 16.1 (2019) 75-92, at 89-90 argues that Autobulus' reference establishes Plutarch's presence and infers, on the basis of the remark at 964c2-5, that Plutarch adopts the maieutic method to encourage the readership to reach new insights. On the aporetic ending of the work as an academic exercise on finding arguments for both sides of a given topic, see Th. Tsiampokalos, "Plutarch in the Middle of a Conflict between Epictetus and Favorinus," in K. Jażdżewska and F. Doroszewski (eds.), *Plutarch and his Contemporaries* (Leiden 2024) 110-124.

toward humans (*Ca. Ma.* 5.5):

> οὐ γὰρ ὡς ὑποδήμασιν ἢ σκεύεσι τοῖς ψυχὴν ἔχουσι χρηστέον, κοπέντα καὶ κατατριβέντα ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις ἀπορρίπτοντας, ἀλλ' εἰ διὰ μηδὲν ἄλλο μελέτης οὕνεκα τοῦ φιλανθρώπου προεθιστέον ἑαυτὸν ἐν τούτοις πρᾷον εἶναι καὶ μείλιχον.
>
> We should not treat living creatures like shoes or pots and pans, casting them aside when they are bruised and worn out with service, but, if for no other reason, for the sake of practice in kindness to our fellow men, we should accustom ourselves to mildness and gentleness in our dealings with other creatures.

Plutarch ties kindness (ἡμερότης) to the domestication of passion, framing it as a mark of virtuous character: the just person, as he notes in *De virtute morali* (452a11), is "neither cruel nor spiteful" (οὐκ ὠμὸς οὐδὲ πικρὸς); conversely, cruelty risks habituating us to treating humans harshly and estranging us from love and affection, which, as he argues in the *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, must be safeguarded above all else.[61]

These considerations suggest that Plutarch's rhetorical choices in *De virtute morali* are intricately tied to its content, with domestication metaphors taking center stage to emphasize the crucial role of the non-rational mind in shaping virtue: unlike mixture metaphors, which reduce passions to passive ingredients, or agricultural metaphors, which depict them as unconscious growths, domestication metaphors elevate passions to the status of animals—responsive agents capable of following reason. Plutarch thus draws on a familiar Platonic trope while reshaping it to portray the passionate soul as an obedient, cooperative animal. Furthermore, by linking passions with animals, he underscores their intrinsic value and the respect they deserve. Such a perspective stands in contrast to the prevailing Stoic view of animals during Imperial times, which justified their mistreatment through the theory of οἰκείωσις. Noting parallels between Stoic cruelty toward animals and their advocacy of ἀπάθεια, Plutarch likely employed these metaphors to caution

[61] Seneca, *De brev. vitae* 13.6-7 recognizes a possible connection between the violence against animals in Pompey's shows for the dedication of the temple of *Venus Victrix* in 55 BC and the blood that would soon be shed among Romans; see Tutrone, *Filosofi e animali* 225-227 with n. 31.

against replicating such dismissiveness in the mental realm. Instead, he drew on Platonic and Pythagorean traditions to promote kindness and affirm the value of passion, rejecting the harshness of ἀπάθεια and its dispossession of passion's inherent worth.

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How to Impeach in Classical Athens: A Response to Edward M. Harris and Alberto Esu

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Abstract: *This paper challenges the hypothesis of Edward Harris and Alberto Esu that Athenian* eisangelia *for major political trials (traditionally known as* eisangelia *to the Assembly) was initiated like ordinary public prosecutions, by filing a written indictment with the relevant magistrate rather than in the Assembly itself. It argues that this reconstruction rests on inference and arguments from silence, and that it conflicts with the available literary evidence. A close analysis of passages in Demosthenes and Hyperides, especially* In Defence of Lycophron, *shows that accusations and the formal submission of the* eisangelia *occurred in the Assembly and constituted the first procedural step, sometimes even in the defendant's absence. Further evidence from* Against Phormio *also fits the traditional model better than Harris' reinterpretation. The paper concludes that the established view of Assembly-initiated* eisangelia *remains more consistent with the sources than its recent revision offered by Harris and Esu*

In a recent paper on 'impeachment' (*eisangelia*) in Classical Athens, Edward M. Harris and Alberto Esu have suggested several improvements to the seminal study on this subject published over half a century ago by Mogens Hansen.[1] Among these, their

[1] E.M. Harris with A. Esu, "Policing Major Crimes: Eisangelia and Other Public Procedures" *Rivista di Diritto Ellenico* [*RDE*] 11 (2021) 39-119; M.H. Hansen, *Eisangelia: The Sovereingty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians* (Odense 1975); since the part dealing with the initiation of *eisangelia* was penned by Harris (Harris with Esu,

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article advances an alternative hypothesis concerning the initiation of this procedure or, to be more precise, of one its specific yet well-attested types: the '*eisangelia* to the Assembly'. According to Harris, this procedure was in fact initiated neither in the Assembly nor in the Council of Five Hundred (which prepared the Assembly's agenda), as the traditional model maintains,[2] but by filing a written plaint with the relevant magistrates. Harris rightly assumes that these magistrates were the *thesmothetai*, yet he is forced to dismiss the only unambiguous piece of evidence linking them to this procedure because there it is explicitly called '*eisangelia* to the Assembly'.[3] His argument is that this type of *eisangelia*, intended to cover major crimes against the state (henceforth it will be simply called *eisangelia*), followed 'the same basic procedure' as other public prosecutions. It began, as he contends, with the volunteer prosecutor issuing a summons to the accused; the next step was the submission of the indictment to the *thesmothetai*, to which the accused would respond with a counter-indictment (*antigraphē*); this in turn was followed by a preliminary hearing and, finally, the trial itself.[4]

It would be difficult to overstate the impact of this hypothesis.[5]

RDE 41), I will refer only to him throughout the remainder of this paper.

[2] On the various possibilities of initiating an *eisangelia* to the Assembly according to the traditional model (such as through the Council, from the floor) see Hansen *Eisangelia*, 22-26, P.J. Rhodes, "ΕΙΣΑΓΓΕΛΙΑ in Athens," *JHS* 99 (1979) 103-114, at 108-111.

[3] οἱ δὲ θεσμοθέται (...) τὰς εἰσαγγελίας <ἃς> εἰσαγγέλλουσιν εἰς τὸν δῆμον (...) εἰσάγουσιν (*Ath.Pol.* 59.2; text after M. Chambers; Teubner). Harris argues that the term εἰσαγγελία here denotes the procedure of 'denunciation' (*mēnysis*), and tacitly dismisses Blass' conjecture <ἃς> when he says: '*eisangeliai* mentioned in the chapter about the *thesmothetai*, who introduce them to the Assembly' (my emphasis); Harris with Esu *RDE* 68.

[4] Harris with Esu *RDE* 44-45, 47; Harris dismisses the statement in Harpocration's definition (ε 7): πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν ἢ τὸν δῆμον ἡ πρώτη κατάστασις γίνεται, as one of the many blunders made by this lexicographer (53-54). On the course of a standard public (and private) prosecution see J.H. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren* (Leipzig 1914) 804-844; A.R.W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens*. V. 2. Procedure (Oxford 1971) 85-105; D.M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (London 1978) 237-242; S.C. Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford 1993) 125-129.

[5] All the more that it has already been given considerable exposure as evident from the two recently updated OCD entries (both penned by Harris),

That eisangelia was always given its first (and sometimes only) public hearing in the Assembly—even when initially submitted to the Council—was an assumption taken for granted by generations of scholars,[6] and often served as a yardstick for identifying many trials as instances of this procedure in the absence of other evidence.[7] By Harris' account, the number of reliably attested cases of eisangelia—which emerged from Hansen's study as the best documented legal procedure—would be drastically limited from around one hundred and thirty to only seventeen. This would force us to seriously rethink the role of the Assembly in the Athenian administration of justice. It would also have, as Harris observes, far-reaching implications for traditionally accepted model of evolution from the 'sovereignty of the people' to the 'sovereignty of law' in classical Athens, in which the transfer of eisangelia cases from the Assembly to the lawcourts is an important element (according to Harris and Esu, no such shift ever occurred because there was no single 'locus of sovereignty' in democratic Athens).[8] What is more, we would

one on 'policing' and the other on 'eisangelia' itself; it is also beginning to gain traction in more recent scholarship even if some of it is directly influenced by Harris (and Esu): e.g., C. Joyce's review of W. Schmitz, *Leges Draconis et Solonis* (Stuttgart 2023) in BMCR 2024 with n. 5; A. Esu, *Divided Power in Ancient Greece: Decision-Making and Institututions in the Classical and Hellenistic Polis* (Oxford 2024) 41 n3; several essays in E. Harris, A. Esu (eds.), *Keeping to the Point in Athenian Forensic Oratory* (Edinburgh 2025); cf. G. Falco, *Ps.-Demostene, Contro Timoteo. Introduzione, traduzione e commento* (Berlin 2024) 186.

[6] E.g., Lipsius, *Das attische Recht* 180-191 esp. 182; R.J. Bonner, G. Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle.* V. 1 (Chicago 1930), 296; Harrison, *Law II* 52; MacDowell, *Law* 183; Todd, *Shape of Athenian Law* 113-14; E. Volonaki, "Abuse of the Eisangelia in the Latter Half of the Fourth Century," in C. Carey, I. Giannadaki, B. Griffith-Williams (eds.), *The Use and Abuse of Law in the Athenian Courts* (Leiden 2018) 293-314, at 293; A. Scafuro, "Law and Politics in the Fourth Century: The Evolution of Public (aka 'Criminal') Justice," in W. Riess (ed.) *Colloquia attica III* (Stuttgart 2021) 133-169, at 137.

[7] In his catalogue of *eisangelia* procedures Hansen frequently states: "The trial must be classified as *eisangelia* because the case is heard/ratified by the Assembly," e.g., *Eisangelia* 83, 87, 91-4.

[8] The traditional model is advocated by Hansen, most explicitly in work on *graphē paranomōn* (M.H. Hansen, *The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Public Action against Unconstutional Proposals*, Odense

have to rewrite many history textbooks, as it presents several notorious cases such as the Mysteries and Herms affair (415 BC) or the trial of the Arginusae generals (406 BC), in an entirely new light. In this paper, however, I argue that the evidence for the traditional model of initiating eisangelia is much stronger than Harris (with Esu) would have us believe.

In the first place, it should be emphasised that Harris' hypothesis is based entirely on inference. There are no sources which would directly attest that *eisangelia* was initiated in the same manner as other public lawsuits. Nowhere are we told explicitly that the prosecutor launched it by filing a plaint with a magistrate, as he would in any standard public procedure. Nevertheless, Harris points to several clues which, taken together, would provide his model with a firm grounding. The first is that in his extended discussion on the scope of *eisangelia*, Hyperides compares it to other standard public prosecutions (*Eux*. 6). The second is that the defendant in such cases had to produce a written 'counter-indictment' (*antigraphē*), for which Harris finds no room in the traditional model: 'if an *eisangelia* was initiated by a decree, how could there be a written reply by the defendant? What form would it take?' he asks. His third and most important clue is that in the cases which can be reliably identified as *eisangeliai*, there is no mention of initiation in the Assembly;[9] those on the other hand, which are explicitly said to have involved this body, Harris regards as different procedures.

Now, the first two clues are something of a mixed bag. In the *Defence of Euxenippus* Hyperides does indeed discuss *eisangelia* alongside other public procedures (*graphē asebeias*, *paranomōn*), but to his list of

1974, 17-18, 59-61), and expanded into a full-length study by M. Ostwald (*From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law*, Berekeley 1986); for Harris' and Esu's counter-arguments see *RDE* 94-95, 100-101.

[9] These are, according to Harris (*RDE* 77): the prosecution of Euxenippus (Hyp. *Eux*.), of Lycophron (Hyp. *Lyc*.), of Leocrates (Lyc. 1), from which speeches have been preserved, and of Timomachus, Leosthenes, Callistratus, Philon, Theotimus (Hyp. *Eux*. 1), of Agasicles, Diognides, and Antidorus (Hyp. *Eux*. 3), of Philocrates (Hyp. *Eux*. 29), of Cephisodotus (Aesch. 3.51-2), of Pistias (Din. 1.52-3; F xv Conomis); of Pytheas (Din. F vi Conomis); I see no reason to classify the trial of Polyeuctus (Din. 1.58-9) as a case of *eisangelia*, all the more because the prosecutors were elected and did not volunteer.

comparisons he also adds 'summary arrest' (*apagōgē*) which was initiated, as the name suggests, by arresting a criminal and not by filing a written indictment against him. Furthermore, in the subsequent chapter of the same speech Hyperides explicitly distinguishes *eisangelia* from other lawsuits, and that precisely on procedural—and not substantive—grounds (Hyp. *Eux*. 7): unlike ordinary *graphai*, *eisangelia* offers no room for postponement, which in any case would have occurred precisely during the preliminary stages preceding the trial itself. It is therefore difficult to infer anything about the initiation and the course of *eisangelia* from its juxtaposition with other procedures here, apart from the obvious fact that in the latter part of the 4th century BCE it found its conclusion in the lawcourt. The second clue, that is the 'counter-indictment' (*antigraphē*), is a more problematic issue. In standard public prosecutions it was indeed submitted to the relevant magistrate, though it is not entirely clear whether this happened during the first meeting or at the *anakrisis*.[10] Unfortunately, we are entirely in the dark as to how these proceedings might have looked in *eisangelia* cases, what would have occurred during them, and even—as some have suggested—whether they took place at all.[11] Were Harris' model sufficiently grounded, it

[10] τίς ἡ παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἀντιγραφή; ([Dem.] 45.87; cf. 42.17; 45.46). Harrison (*Law II* 92) assumed the *antigraphē* was submitted during the first meeting, so does C. Kremmydas, "Anakrisis and the Framing of Strategies of Argumentation in Athenian Public Trials," in Carey et al. (eds.), *Use and Abuse*, 110-131, at 111; MacDowell (*Law* 240) thought it happened during the *anakrisis*, which is also implied by Lipsius (*Das attische Recht* 823).

[11] Uncertain: L. Rubinstein, "Clauses out of Context: Partial Citation of Statutes in Attic Forensic Oratory," in Carey et al. *Use and Abuse*, 165-180, at 173 n16; J. Filonik, "How Does Lycurgus Keep to the Point', in Harris and Esu, *Keeping to the Point* 101-119, at 106, 115; no *anakrisis*: MacDowell, *Law* 242; R. Sealey, "Ephialtes, Eisangelia and the Council," in P.J. Rhodes (ed.), *Athenian Democracy* (Edinburgh 2004) 310-324 at 317-318; *contra*: Kremmydas, "Anakrisis" 117; cf. Hyp. *Lyc*. 11 (σὲ… προειδότα… ἃ ἔχω… λέγειν): the prosecutor could have learned beforehand of Lycophron's line of defense either by hearsay or, which seems more likely given the speaker's certainty, during the *anakrisis*, when both parties became familiar with the key arguments of the other side, as argued by G. Thür, "The Principle of Fairness in Athenian Legal Procedure: Thoughts on the Echinos and Enklema," *Dike* 11, 51-73; see also Kremmydas, "Anakrisis" esp. 121-122.

would offer an elegant way out of this conundrum. As it stands, however, it does not.

The third clue—that in the reliably attested cases of *eisangelia* there is no reference to its initiation in the Assembly—is an argument from silence, but this silence would still be enough to cast doubt on the validity of the traditional model. The key question, it would seem, is what counts as reliable and what does not, and Harris' methodology, it should be acknowledged, is generally sound. He rightly notes that the terms εἰσαγγέλλειν and εἰσαγγελία are not always used by the orators in reference to 'impeachment', but also to other procedures, such as 'denunciations' (*mēnyseis*) and 'audits' (*euthynai*) of generals.[12] He is also right to observe that not every trial involving the Assembly must be qualified as *eisangelia*—a point that may be particularly true for those from the early 5th century BCE, and, again, for cases resulting from 'denunciations' and 'depositions' (*apocheirotoniai*) of generals.[13] Although these otherwise legitimate reservations are not always decisive, with only one exception I will refrain from discussing such doubtful cases, and focus instead on those which Harris himself considers reliable. This is because even among the latter, the silence is not sufficiently telling to provide his hypothesis with a firm foothold.

Two passages stand out as notable troublemakers, both rather cursorily dismissed by Harris in footnotes—which, to my mind, does not do justice to their significance. In his prosecution of Aeschines for misconduct during the embassy to Philip II, Demosthenes recounts the accusations he himself made in the Assembly against his fellow ambassadors (Aeschines included), referring to Hyperides' *eisangelia* of Philocrates—a case which, it should be emphasized, Harris himself regards as a reliable one:

> ἴστε δήπου πρώην, ὅτ' εἰσήγγελλεν Ὑπερείδης Φιλοκράτην, ὅτι παρελθὼν ἐγὼ δυσχεραίνειν ἔφην ἔν τι τῆς εἰσαγγελίας, εἰ μόνος

[12] Cf. Rhodes, *Eisangelia* 103; D. Hamel, The Athenian Generals (Leiden 1998) 122-130; A. Scafuro, "Epicheirotonia and the So-Called 'Euthynai of Generals'," in B. Biscotti, *Kállistos Nómos*. FS A. Maffi (Torino 2018) 199-219, at 217-18; see also Lipsius, *Das attische Recht* 178 n. 4.

[13] Cf. Scafuro "Euthynai" 204, 217-18, who prefers the non-committal designation of 'trials by decree' for such prosecutions of generals.

> Φιλοκράτης τοσούτων καὶ τοιούτων ἀδικημάτων αἴτιος γέγονεν, οἱ δ' ἐννέα τῶν πρέσβεων μηδενός. (Dem. 19.116)[14]
>
> You are well aware that recently, when Hyperides was subjecting Philocrates to *eisangelia* (εἰσήγγελλεν), I came forward and said that I am troubled by one thing in that *eisangelia*: that only Philocrates was to be blamed for so many grave offenses and no one else from the other nine ambassadors.

The clumsy English in 'was subjecting Philocrates to *eisangelia*' is deliberate since a more palatable translation would have risked tilting the interpretation toward one particular view. According to Harris, 'all this passage states is that Demosthenes made a comment about the case [i.e., the *eisangelia*] in the Assembly', to which he adds that it 'implies nothing about how the case was initiated'.[15] In other words, as Harris would have it, the *eisangelia* was launched as any standard public prosecution would be, and Demosthenes merely referenced that fact in the charges he made against the other ambassadors during the meeting of the Assembly. The difficulty lies, however, in the tense of the key verb: εἰσήγγελλεν. In narratives of past events, the imperfect typically 'creates a framework, and makes us expect that, within that framework, other states of affairs will be presented', which is especially true of subordinate temporal clauses (ὅτ' εἰσήγγελλεν).[16] In Demosthenes' case, the temporal framework thus established for his accusations in the Assembly is that of Hyperides subjecting Philocrates to *eisangelia*. The most natural reading, then, is to identify this timeframe with the same meeting of the *ekklēsia* during which both politicians would have performed their respective actions. This would yield the sense: 'recently [in the Assembly], during which Hyperides was subjecting Philocrates to *eisangelia*, I came forward and said…'.

In all fairness, two arguments that could support Harris' interpretation of this passage, should be mentioned. First, the verb εἰσαγγέλλειν can also denote the entire process of conducting the

[14] The text of Demosthenes is that established by M. Dilts (OCT); all translations are my own.

[15] Harris with Esu, *RDE* 77 n. 97.

[16] A. Rijksbaron, *The Syntax and Semantics of the Verb in Classical* Greek. An Introduction (Chicago 2007[3]), 13 (quotation), 76.

prosecution, from its initiation to the trial itself.[17] Even in the imperfect, therefore, it could still be reconciled with Harris' hypothesis: Hyperides initiated the proceedings against Philocrates, which involved several stages (summons, filing of the plaint, preliminary hearing, and hearing-in-chief), and within this broader timeframe the eventful meeting of the *ekklēsia* happened to take place. Second, the reading εἰσήγγελλεν appears only in one manuscript, the Parisinus Graecus 2934 (S), which is both the oldest and generally considered the best. Other manuscripts have εἰσήγγειλεν instead. Modern editors almost unanimously prefer the reading of S, the sole dissidents being C. A. and J. H. Vince (Loeb series), who print the aorist. Placing this latter tense in the temporal clause would yield the sense: 'recently, after Hyperides subjected Philocrates to *eisangelia*, I came forward…'. In this shape, the passage does align with Harris' model: Hyperides first prosecuted Philocrates in court, and only afterwards did Demosthenes make further accusations against the other ambassadors in the Assembly.

No such argument, however, can be produced to dismiss the other troublemaker, which is the most formidable obstacle to Harris' hypothesis. In the defense speech written for Lycophron—prosecuted by way of an *eisangelia* (another reliable example)—Hyperides has him recount the moment he was first made aware of the case mounted against him:

> ἄξιον δ' ἐστὶν ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ κἀκεῖθεν ἐξετάσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀφ' ὧν ἐν τῶι δήμωι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοὶ εὐθὺς ἠτιάσαντο· ἐμοὶ γὰρ <οἱ> οἰκε[ῖ]οι ἀπέστειλαν γράψαντες τὴν τε εἰσαγ[γ]ελίαν καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, ἃς ἐν τῆ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἠτιάσαντό με, ὅτε τὴν εἰσαγγελί[αν] ἐδίδοσ[α]ν, ἐν α[ἷς ἦ]ν γεγρα[μ]μένον, ὅτι Λυκο[ῦ]ργος λέγ[ει], φάσκω[ν τ]ῶν [ο]ἰκ[είω]ν ἀκ[ηκ]οέναι, [ὡ]ς ἐγὼ παρακολουθῶν, ὅτε Χάριππος ἐγάμει τὴν γυναῖκα… (Hyp. *Lyc*. 3)[18]

[17] Initiation: Dem. 19.13 (εἰσαγγέλλοντα καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἰς κρίσιν καθιστάντα); Lyc. 1.1 (εἰσήγγελκα: of the present trial); Hyp. *Eux*. 1 (εἰσηγγέλλοντο: of defendants who did not stand trial), 29 (εἰσαγγείλας: of Philocrates), 39 (εἰσήγγελκε: of the present trial). The entire procedure: Dem. 20.79 (περὶ προδοσίας ἂν αὐτὸν εἰσήγγελλον οὗτοι, καὶ εἰ ἑάλω…); Aesch. 3.252 (εἰσηγγέλθη καὶ ἴσαι αἱ ψῆφοι αὐτῷ ἐγένοντο); Hyp. *Eux*. 3? (εἰσαγγέλλονται: of the present trial among others), 27 (εἰσαγγέλλειν: juxtaposed with κρίνειν).

[18] The text of Hyperides is that established by Ch. Jensen (Teubner).

> It is worthwhile, judges, to examine the matter also from the point, at which during the Assembly they first (τὸ πρῶτον) made their accusations (ἠτιάσαντο) directly. For my relatives have written down and sent me both the *eisangelia* and the charges (αἰτίας) they made (ἠτιάσαντο) in the Assembly, when they were submitting the *eisangelia* (εἰσαγγελίαν ἐδίδοσαν). There it was written (ἦν γεγραμμένον) that Lycurgus said, claiming he heard it from the relatives, that when Charippus was marrying the woman, I followed…

According to Harris, 'there is no reason to believe that the discussion of the charges in the Assembly (…) formed part of the legal procedure', to which he adds, 'it is clear that the formal procedure was initiated by a written indictment and not by a decree'.[19] Indeed, Hyperides does speak of a written indictment here.[20] The crucial issue, however, is when and to whom it was submitted. This brings us to the key phrase εἰσαγγελίαν διδόναι. Unlike the verb εἰσαγγέλλειν, its meaning appears to be more restricted. This is evident not only from its semantics (to give/submit an *eisangelia*, i.e., the indictment itself), but also from the two other instances of its use, where it refers either to submitting (*Eux*. 30) or, more generally, to launching (*Lyc*. 12) the procedure, and not to the entire course of the prosecution.[21] Moreover, in the present passage Lycophron plainly states that the accusations made in the Assembly were the first move against him (τὸ πρῶτον) by the prosecution team. Even more significantly the key verb is—again—in the imperfect (ἐδίδοσαν). The act of submitting the *eisangelia* thus emerges as the timeframe within which the accusations against Lycophron were made (ἠτιάσαντο).[22] This directly contradicts Harris, according to whom *eisangelia* was initiat-

[19] Harris with Esu, *RDE* 45 n. 16.

[20] Unless the ἐν α[ἷς ἦ]ν γεγραμμένον is taken to mean the letter sent to Lycophron; the text itself is uncertain, but the reconstructed relative pronoun (αἷς) most likely refers to the 'charges' (αἰτίας) made by the prosecutors: cf. D. Whitehead, *Hyperides. The Forensic Speeches* (Oxford 2000) 113.

[21] Submitting: καὶ οὐδ' οὕτως ἀπέχρησέ μοι τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν {αν} δοῦναι, ἀλλ' ὑποκάτω παρέγραψα… (Hyp. *Eux*. 30); launching: εἰσαγγελία[ν δέδ]ωκας… ἵνα… [εἰσ]ίῃς εἰς τὸ[ν ἀγῶνα] (Hyp. *Lyc*. 12); cf. Whitehead, *Hyperides* 112-113.

[22] Cf. Hansen, *Eisangelia* 106; Whitehead, *Hyperides* 113; D.D. Phillips, "Why Was Lycophron Prosecuted by Eisangelia." *GRBS* 46 (2006) 375-3 at 390.

ed with the relevant magistrate. Lycophron's prosecutors could not have been filing the case with the *thesmothetai* and at the same time presenting the charges against him in the Assembly. Since both actions were simultaneous, both must have taken place at the meeting of the *ekklēsia*.[23]

There is yet another obstacle to reconciling the present passage with Harris' model, even if the grammatical issues posed by the imperfect are set aside. On the assumption that *eisangelia* followed the same course as any standard public prosecution, the submission of the indictment to the relevant magistrate would have required the presence of the accused, and, accordingly, would have been preceded by a duly delivered summons. Yet Lycophron never mentions this. On the contrary, he explicitly states that the prosecutors were submitting the indictment (εἰσαγγελίαν ἐδίδοσαν) in his absence and makes it clear that he had no prior knowledge of the case. In any standard public prosecution, this would have amounted to a grave procedural irregularity.[24] Lycophron's failure to raise any such objection clearly indicates that no such irregularity occurred in this case.[25]

On a final note, I would like to highlight a passage in Demosthenes' *Against Phormio* (Dem. 34) referring to *eisangelia* but dismissed by Harris as such. The speech concerns a maritime loan that the eponymous Phormio allegedly failed to repay.[26] The relevant argu-

[23] One might also assume that the imperfect εἰσαγγελίαν ἐδίδοσαν has a conative force (denoting an action attempted or intended) which would yield the sense: 'were about to submit the *eisangelia*'. The conative imperfect, however, always presupposes that 'the state of affairs did not get beyond the stage of an attempt' (Rijksbaron, *Syntax* 16), which is of course not the case here.

[24] If the defendant did not show up during the first meeting with the magistrate or during the *anakrisis*, a verdict against him could have been given by default; the public prosecution for false witnessing to summonses (*graphē pseudoklēteias*) was one of the measures intended to forestall such abuses on the part of unscrupulous prosecutors: Harrison, *Law II* 89 (skeptical about the first meeting), 102; Todd, *Shape of Athenian Law* 125-127.

[25] Granted, the speech is only fragmentary, but Lycophron's account of how the *eisangelia* was submitted would have been the most obvious place to mention such a procedural violation.

[26] In fact, the case is a *paragraphē*: the speaker initiated a maritime suit against Phormio, who in turn, before the case went to court, lodged the *para-*

ment is meant to serve as an example bolstering the speaker's case:

> ὑμεῖς γάρ ἐστε οἱ αὐτοὶ οἱ τὸν ἐπιδεδανεισμένον ἐκ τοῦ ἐμπορίου πολλὰ χρήματα καὶ τοῖς δανεισταῖς οὐ παρασχόντα τὰς ὑποθήκας θανάτῳ ζημιώσαντες εἰσαγγελθέντα ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ ταῦτα πολίτην ὑμέτερον ὄντα καὶ πατρὸς ἐστρατηγηκότος (Dem. 34.50)
>
> It was you and no one else that punished with death the man, who borrowed a large amount of money from the emporion, and did not provide the lenders with the sureties for the loan, after he has been subjected to *eisangelia* (εἰσαγγελθέντα) in the Assembly. You did that despite the fact that he was a citizen of your polis and the son of a general.

Harris understands the participle εἰσαγγελθέντα not as a reference to *eisangelia* but to 'denunciation' (*mēnysis*), which, he insists, was a procedure separate from the trial itself.[27] According to his interpretation, after being 'denounced' in the Assembly, the unfortunate citizen was subsequently prosecuted in a standard private lawsuit on the charge of 'making additional loans on security and not handing over to creditors securities (after presumably defaulting on loans)'. This, however, creates a serious problem since—as Harris himself observes—'the charge is a private one, and the penalty is death'. In the end, therefore, he concedes that this passage is 'very odd' and 'very suspect'.

The traditional model of *eisangelia* offers a far less problematic interpretation. The participle εἰσαγγελθέντα would refer to the first stage of a single procedure initiated in the Assembly and concluded in court. The death penalty was a regular feature of *eisangelia* trials,[28]

graphē claiming that the action is inadmissible; for a detailed introduction to this speech see S. Isager, M.H. Hansen, *Aspects of Athenian Society in the Fourth Century B.C.* (Odense 1975) 156-169.

[27] Harris with Esu, *RDE* 64.

[28] Harris suggests on the basis of Aesch. 3.252 that *eisangelia* was an *agōn atimētos* with a statutory death penalty (the other passages he mentions, especially from Hyp. *Lyc*., *Eux*. and Lyc. 1, are inconclusive, since an anticipation of punishment is frequently found in speeches delivered in *agōnes timētoi*); while this solution may seem attractive, the evidence of Dem. 23.117 with Aesch. 3.52 poses a problem nonetheless (that for Menesaechmus is late and therefore less reliable: [Plu.] 843d); both these passages refer to the prosecution of the general Cephisodotus where conviction was followed by *timēsis*, and, according to Harris, this was either a *graphē prodosias* (very poorly attest-

which would explain why the unfortunate merchant was executed. Indeed, as Harris observes, the accusation itself seems more suitable for a private lawsuit where only compensation and damages would be at issue. But Demosthenes is quick to add that the merchant's misdemeanor not only harmed individual private parties but was a matter of public concern (34.51).[29] And if the charge still strikes us as too insignificant for such a high-profile prosecution, we should recall that, according to Hyperides, two Athenian residents (a metic and a citizen) were brought to court precisely by way of *eisangelia* because they had allegedly hired out flute girls at prices higher than those permitted by law. It is not unreasonable to suppose that this latter accusation was, in reality, more serious than Hyperides would have us believe. Perhaps the same can be said about the merchant's case: that the charges against him involved matters more serious than mere mercantile irregularities. After all, both orators had good reasons to trivialize their *eisangelia* examples to suit their rhetorical purposes: Hyperides to underscore the absurdity of Euxenippus' prosecution, and Demosthenes to emphasize the importance of repaying one's loans.

Even in the field of classics and ancient history, fifty years is a long time, enough for long-established models and ideas to be revised and reevaluated. Hansen's foundational study of *eisangelia* is no exception here. It has already been improved on with respect to a number of details throughout the last couple of decades, and its thorough and systematic reassessment is more than welcome.

ed) or a *euthyna* (quite frequent in prosecutions of generals); the problem is that Aeschines explicitly speaks of Cephisodotus as ἀπ' εἰσαγγελίας αὐτοῦ κρινομένου; see Harris with Esu, *RDE* 46, 73-74; *contra*: Hansen, *Eisangelia* 33-36; for discussion on Aesch. 3.252 see also J. Sullivan, 'Second Thoughts on Aeschines 3.252'. G & R 49 (2002), 1-7 (who claims that it refers to the *timēsis* stage); E. Bianchi, "Ancora su Eschine, III 252," *Dike* 5 (2002), 83-94 (who refutes Sullivan), and most recently J. Filonik, "Acquitted/Convicted by a Single Vote? Aeschines 3.252 and the Vote Counts in Athenian Oratory" *Mnemosyne* 78 (2025) 781-94 (who supports Bianchi).

[29] Cf. the prosecution of Lycophron (Hyp. *Lyc.*); while adultery was a serious, potentially capital offense, its representation as an existential threat to the entire community (*Lyc.* 12; cf. F 3) was an obvious hyperbolisation: see Phillips, "Lycophron."

Yet, as I have argued in this paper, Harris' radical departure from the traditional model of initiating *eisangelia* not only renders some cases unduly convoluted and problematic (*Against Phormio*), but also flies in the face of those which Harris himself considers reliable. Hyperides' *In Defence of Lycophron* in particular poses an insurmountable obstacle to this hypothesis and given that there are no sources directly supporting it, one cannot help but consider it too far-fetched if not simply wrong.

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"Like a Speechless Fish": An Anonymous Byzantine Poem on Toothache

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Abstract: *This paper presents the first critical edition and English translation of an anonymous Byzantine dodecasyllabic poem* On Teeth *(περὶ ὀδόντων), preserved uniquely in the late thirteenth-century manuscript Marcianus gr. 524. The poem offers a vivid first-person account of toothache, combining personal suffering with medical, biblical, and classical imagery. Rather than functioning as a didactic medical text, it dramatizes pain as lived experience, using technical medical terminology alongside mythological and scriptural allusions to explore sin, bodily affliction, and speech. Placed between eleventh and twelfth-century literary culture, the poem resonates with works by Andronikos Protekdikos, Theodore Prodromos, Constantine Stilbes, and Michael Psellos in its tragic-ironic tone and skepticism toward medicine. Through close analysis of manuscript context, intertextuality, and language, the article argues that the poem exemplifies a Byzantine mode of poetic journalism, transforming private suffering into a performative act addressed to a small circle of educated readers in later medieval Constantinopolitan intellectual environments and social settings.*

In 1795, Robert Burns, the famous Scottish poet, tormented by an excruciating toothache, gave the pain poetic voice: "Whare'er that place be priests ca' Hell / Whare a' the tones o' misery yell … Thou, Toothache, surely bear'st the bell Amang them a'." Burns' lament is striking not only for its vehemence but for its universality. Some pains are private, others widely shared; among the latter, toothache has long been counted among the most relentless. The most poetic of torments, it withholds food, sleep, and peace. When there is no escape, the sufferer's last recourse is to make the agony into poetry—a response that resonates well beyond

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eighteenth-century Scotland, as Byzantine verse likewise attests.

The Marcianus gr. 524 (late 13th century) contains an anthology of 11th-12th century poetry, predominantly consisting of epigrams on artworks.[1] Among these texts, the manuscript also includes an anonymous dodecasyllabic poem titled *On Teeth* (περὶ ὀδόντων) (189 lines).[2] Foteini Spingou, who has extensively studied the codex and its epigrams, divides the anthology into three sylloges (A, B, and C). Syllogae A (ff. 103v–104v, 1–3v) and B (18–23v, 105–112v, 115v–120v, 33v–39v, 192v–193v, 45v–46v), both collections of anonymous poems, are separated by folia 3v-18, which contain attributed poems to Andronikos Protekdikos (ff. 3v–5), Theodore Prodromos (ff. 5–8v), Theodore Balsamon (ff. 8v–9)[3] and Costantine Stilbes (ff. 10v–18).[4] This poem follows the texts of sylloge A and is located on folios 9r–10v, between Balsamon's and Stilbes' poems. The anthologist's aim seems to have been to put together a compilation of good poetry for his personal use, some from talented authors like Theodore Prodromos, Michael Psellos and Chrystopher Mytilenaeos.[5]

This poem survives exclusively in this manuscript. Spyridon Lampros, the first scholar to catalogue its contents, provided a transcription of both the incipit and explicit of the poem.[6] He mistakenly recorded the length as 168 verses, whereas the poem actually comprises 189 verses, spanning folios 9r to 10v. Despite Lampros' early work, the poem has not received much further scholarly attention,

[1] See E. Mioni, *Bibliothecae divi Marci venetiarum codices graeci manuscripti. Thesaurus antiquus*, II (Rome, 1985) 399–407; F. Spingou, "The Anonymous Poets of the Anthologia Marciana: Questions of Collection and Authorship", in A. Pizzone (ed.), *The Author in Middle Byzantine Literature: Modes, Functions, and Identities* (De Gruyter, 2014) 139-153.

[2] First mention of this text is to be found in S. Lampros, "Ὁ Μαρκιανὸς κῶδιξ 524", *NE* 8 (1911) 3-59, 12.

[3] K. Horna, "Die Epigramme des Theodoros Balsamon", *WS* 25 (1903) 165–217.

[4] J. Diethart – W. Hörandner (eds.), *Constantine Stilbes: Poemata* (Munich/Leipzig 2005).

[5] F. Spingou, *Words and Artworks in Byzantium. Twelfth-Century Poetry on Art from Ms. Marcianus Gr.* 52 (Grosvenor House 2021) 31 and 38.

[6] Lampros, *NE* 8 (1911) 12.

likely due to the text's poor state of preservation, with significant fading of the ink, especially on the right half side of fol.9r, covering the even lines up until l.40. Despite this neglect, the poem is highly intriguing—a true treasure chest of quintessential Byzantine literature. The author narrates his struggle with toothache, unfolding it within the 189 lines of the poem. As he describes his suffering, the very act of writing, and sharing, appears to ease his pain. With each word, the torment gradually subsides, until, by the final lines (188–189), he is at last free from it. Biblical allusions, classical and intertextual references, and just the right touch of medical knowledge—enough technical jargon to demonstrate erudition without becoming incomprehensible—all woven into good enough crafted dodecasyllabic verses. This paper offers the first critical edition and English translation of the poem, together with a broad discussion of the text's composition, function, and literary affiliations.

1. Poetry and Medicine

While Byzantine literature is not particularly abundant in medical poems, several texts in verse from the middle and late Byzantine periods do engage with distinctively medical themes.[7] These include the extensive 1,370-line poem on medicine and a brief eight-dodecasyllable advisory poem on diet by Michael Psellos;[8] the *Kanon on Urine* and the *Kanon on Blood* by Nikephoros Blemmydes;[9] two anonymous short poems on the seven ages of man[10], and the poem in political verse dedicated to Pope Nicholas V by George Sanginatios

[7] The following list is taken from W. Hörandner, "Teaching with Verse in Byzantium" in W. Hörandner, A. Rhoby and N. Zagklas (eds), *A Companion to Byzantine Poetry* (Leiden-Boston 2019) 459-86, 471. Note that the link between medicine and poetry is not without parallels in Byzantium and there are examples of poets who were also doctors (e. g. Nicholas Kallikles, who was Alexios I Komnenos' personal doctor).

[8] L. Westerink, *Michaelis Pselli poemata* (Stuttgart 1991) 190–233 and 237–38.

[9] A. P. Kuzes, "Les oeuvres médicales de Nicéphore Blémmydès selon les manuscrits existants. Praktika tes Akademias", *Athenon* 19 (1944 [1948]) 56-75.

[10] E. Boissonade, *Anecdota Graeca*, vol. 2, 456–57.

on the names of body parts (Ὀνομασίαι τῶν μελῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου).[11]

While all of these texts are didactic in nature, this poem is not. The text presents a narrative centered on a personal experience with tooth pain, intertwining elements of medical literature with the author's subjective account. While it touches upon the nature of toothache—explaining the genesis of the pain and the medical remedies—it does not aim to educate or provide a comprehensive guide to dental health. Instead, the medical explanations serve as a backdrop to the more prominent focus on the individual's own suffering and the often-overwhelming nature of their pain. The discussion of potential remedies is similarly anecdotal, reflecting the author's personal journey rather than offering structured medical advice.

The result is a text that favors reflection over instruction, employing medical concepts to explore the personal and subjective dimensions of pain. The poem is a 'dramatization of personal experience'[12], typical of 11th- 12th century, and the vivid re-telling of a personal experience puts it in the category of 'poetic journalism'[13] or 'public diary keeping'[14], like Psellos' *Psogos against scabies*[15](Στίχους Μιχαὴλ τῇ καλῇ ψώρᾳ πλέκω), or Christopher Mytilenaios' poetry.[16] Most of the texts belonging to those two centuries were probably produced in the context of literary theatres and perhaps also schooling; however, as already argued by Paul Magdalino, one may wonder if such texts focusing on personal experience, were meant to keep to themselves, rather than be read aloud in public.[17] It would

[11] Ed. Sathas, *Μεσαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη —Bibliotheca graeca medii aevi*, vol. 5, νδ–νς; A. Rhoby, "Konsul, Lehrer, Arzt. Leben und Werk des Georgios Sangignatios (Mitte 15. Jh.)", in: Festschrift (in print).

[12] P. Magdalino, "Cultural Change? The Context of Byzantine Poetry from Geometres to Prodromos", in F. Bernard, K. Demoen (eds.), *Poetry and its Contexts in Eleventh-Century Byzantium* (Ashgate 2012) 19–36, 21.

[13] Magdalino in *Poetry and its Contexts* 22.

[14] M. D. Lauxtermann, "Text and Contexts", in W. Hörandner, A. Rhoby and N. Zagklas (eds), *A Companion to Byzantine Poetry* (Leiden-Boston 2019) 19-37, 52.

[15] Psellos, *Poemata*, ed. Westerink 430–31, no. 62, vv. 1–43.

[16] Magdalino in *Poetry and its Contexts* 20.

[17] Magdalino in *Poetry and its Contexts* 34.

be difficult to provide an answer to these questions, but I would agree with Magdalino in saying that it would make sense if 'we imagine it happening among a group of friends who trusted and liked each other, who thought of themselves as cultural equals'.[18] In this regard, this text is closer to poems addressing specific illnesses, such as John Mauropous' poem 92,[19] Christopher of Mytilene's poem 142[20], the aforementioned Psellos' *Psogos against Scabies*[21], and Prodromos' poems 62 and 68, where the author laments his illness, possibly chickenpox, which he describes as 'the worst of diseases.'[22]

Additionally, another feature linking this text to the latter group is its strong critique of medicine.[23] The author shows a lack of trust in doctors, claiming that nothing can relieve his pain, which is so intense that it 'folds all the books of Galen and Hippocrates' and 'puts to shame the healing discipline' (ll. 135-37). Medicine was a subject often criticized in Byzantine literature, with satirical poems targeting doctors being particularly prevalent. Among these, one

[18] Magdalino in *Poetry and its Contexts* 34.

[19] F. Bernard – C. Livanos, *The Poems of Chrystopher of Mytilene and John Mauropous*, DOML, 50 (Harvard University Press 2018) 496-503.

[20] Bernard – Livanos, *The Poems* 309.

[21] Psellos, *Poemata*, ed. Westerink, 430–31, no. 62, vv. 1–43. One must note the authorship of this poem has been questioned, first by Westerink, *Poemata,* 429.

[22] For an edition of these poems see W. Hörandner, *Theodoros Prodromos: Historische Gedichte* (Vienna 1974), 494; 508-9. Poems 77 and 78 are too on illnesses, see Hörandner, *Theodoros Prodromos,* 544-549. For a translation and commentary of these two poems, see N. Zagklas, "Epistolarity in Twelfth-Century Byzantine Poetry: Singing Praises and Asking Favors in Absentia", in K. Kubina – A. Riehle (eds) *Epistolary Poetry in Byzantium and Beyond. An Anthology with Critical Essays* (Routledge 2021) 64-77. Interestingly enough, both authors employ classical references to describe the severity of their diseases: Prodromos compares it to the Hydra (poem 62, l.10), the multi-headed monster, while the anonymous author defines his threefold strength as that of 'Ades' trident' - incidentally, a wrong reference, as the only god with a trident was Poseidon. The comparison to the Hydra can also be found in Stilbes' *Poem on the Great Fire* (l.74), in reference to the power and strength of the fire.

[23] On this topic see A. Kazhdan, "The Image of the Medical Doctor in Byzantine Literature of the Tenth to Twelfth Centuries", *DOP* 38 (1984) 43–51, and M. D. Lauxtermann, *Byzantine Poetry from Pisides to Geometres*, II (Vienna 2019) 142-3.

should note Christopher of Mytilene's poem 85, 'On a Conceited Doctor' (11th century);[24] Prodromos' satirical text *The Executioner or the Doctor,* in which he vividly recounts his experience with a dentist[25]; a passage in Manasses' *Hodoiporikon* (3.71-74); [26] and the anonymous dialogue *Timarion*.[27] The aforementioned *Psogos against scabies* by Michael Psellos is the closest comparison to the tooth poem:[28] in both texts, the subject cannot sleep, cannot eat nor drink, cannot sing; in Psellos' text the author cannot write but does it nonetheless, in this text the author cannot speak but does it anyway.[29] Complaints about the incompetence of doctors were not unique to Byzantium; similar sentiments can be found in 12th-century Latin West, as exemplified by letter n.30 of Arnulf of Lisieux. [30]

As for the specific theme of toothache, the only other text I am aware of that addresses this affliction is Demetrios Kydones' letter n.301, in which he implores his doctor for assistance. Kydones laments that he is unable to sleep or drink and cannot seek help in person, forcing him to find his own solution: either the pain must end, or it will be made more bearable through conversation with his doctor. [31]

2. Literary and socio-cultural context

As this poem has been transmitted anonymously and just in this manuscript, looking at its con-texts, which 'are the other texts in a

[24] Bernard – Livanos *The Poems* 173.

[25] For an edition and translation see T. Migliorini, *Gli scritti satirici in greco letterario di Teodoro Prodromo: introduzione, edizione, traduzione, commento*, PhD Thesis (Pisa 2010).

[26] Ed. K. Horna, "Das Hodoiporikon des Konstantin Manasses", *BZ* 13 (1904) 313-355; ed. and modern Greek tr. K. Chryssogelos, Κωνσταντίνου Μανασσῆ Ὁδοιπορικόν (Athens 2017).

[27] B. Baldwin, *Timarion.* Translated with Introduction and Commentary (Detroit, 1984)

[28] Lauxtermann in *A Companion to Byzantine Poetry* 32.

[29] Lauxtermann in *A Companion to Byzantine Poetry* 32.

[30] F. Barlow, *The Letters of Arnolf of Lisieux* (London,1939) 50–5.

[31] Demetrios Kydones, *Letters, ed. R.-J. Loenertz, Démétrius Cydonès. Correspondance,* 2 vols (Vatican 1956–60) II, 219.

poetry book, small sylloge, anthology, or miscellany'[32], may provide useful information on its genre, purpose and subject matter. Since all texts, in fact, 'engage in an intricate dialogue with the other texts of the manuscript they are in',[33] let us see how such dialogue can help us. While Spingou argues that there are no clear arranging criteria in the collection,[34] the placement of an anonymous text alongside non-anonymous poems from the 11th-12th century, as shown in the introduction, rather than within a seemingly dedicated section for anonymous/non-attributed works, warrants closer examination. By integrating the anonymous text with attributed poems, the editor may be signaling the text's thematic, stylistic, or cultural alignment with the works of known authors from the same period.

Looking at the some of its con-texts, such as Prodromos' *Katomyomachia*[35], Andronikos' Protekdikos *Poem in the form of a Semeioma* (ca. 12th century), and Constantine Stilbes' *Poem on the Great fire*, some similarities emerge. All of the four texts are in dodecasyllables. All of them have a tragical element to it: the *Katomyomachia* is a 'satire in the form of a parody of a tragedy'[36]; Andronikos' *Semeioma*'s object is a tragedy about a cannibal nun who ate her daughter, as clearly stated by the narrator (l.25);[37] Stilbes' text is a 'lament' on the destruction of the city, with the author himself stating he is 'writing a tragic drama' (l.35).[38] Two specific lines in the toothache turns the text into a narrative that feels unmistakably tragic, yet ironically so:

[32] Lauxtermann in *A Companion to Byzantine Poetry* 21.

[33] Lauxtermann in *A Companion to Byzantine Poetry* 21.

[34] F. Spingou, *Words and Artworks in the Twelfth Century and Beyond: The Thirteenth-century Manuscript Marcianus Gr. 524 and the Twelfth-century Dedicatory Epigrams on Works of Art* (PhD thesis Oxford 2013) iv.

[35] H. Hunger, *Der byzantinische Katz-Mäuse-Krieg* (Graz/Vienna/Cologne 1968). On this text, see P. Marciniak and K. Warcaba, "Theodore Prodromos' Katomyomachia as a Byzantine Version of Mock-Epic" in A. Rhoby and N. Zagklas (eds), *Middle and Late Byzantine Poetry: Texts and Contexts* (Brepols 2018) 97–110.

[36] R. Macrides, "Poetic Justice in the Patriarchate. Murder and Cannibalism in the Provinces", in G. Nagy, *Greek Literature in the Byzantine Period* (New York 2001) 341-72.

[37] Macrides in *Greek Literature* 343.

[38] T. Layman, *The Incineration of New Babylon: The Fire Poem of Konstantinos Stilbes* (Geneva 2015) 54.

'the organs of my voice have now been turned into musical instruments of tragedy that cry 'alas!' aloud and bewail because of the pain' (ll. 148-9); 'our organs have bent, as Scripture says, to sorrow and tragic 'melody' (ll.162). The 'tragic' tone is strenghtened by the use of φεῦ, a specifically tragic word.

The whole tone set by author is rather mournful and tragic-like, which given the topic treated almost results in a parody of a tragedy, a 'tragi-hilarious struggle' with toothache[39], and this is what makes this text closer to the *Katomyomachia* than the *Semeioma* or the *Poem on the Great fire*, which focus on life dramatic events. Both the author of the toothache poem and Stilbes succeed in bringing to life and re-telling a close experience to their audience, with the only difference being the subject matter. In the case of Stilbes, he grapples with narrating a harrowing experience—a catastrophe that unleashed widespread destruction. By contrast, our author describes the brief, transient pain of a toothache, a discomfort that passes without any lasting consequences. It would be hard not to see the irony in this: by shifting the focus from a catastrophic event to a minor illness, the reception of the text changes drastically. Stilbes pictures 'himself in physical pain', his writing has rekindled the fire: his speech is affected by it, as it burns both his innards and mouth, he cannot 'roar back' to the fire, which is destroying everything it finds in its way.[40] The author of this poem employs terminology that closely mirrors that of Stilbes in his description of the fire, but shifts to a water metaphor. The acidic liquid causing the toothache is likened to a destructive stream of water, sweeping away everything in its path (ll.40-50)

The ending of the toothache text and the *Semeioma* are quite similar: while in the *Semeioma* the Judge defer everything to judgement of the despotes and the holy synod, which have the power to 'bind and loose' (ll.160), so to at the end of the toothache God is asked to let go of the bridle and let the author's binded jaws be loose (ll.186)

The theme of generational conflict, a common trope of tragedy, recurs across these texts. In the *Katomyomachia*, the anonymous

[39] see Lauxtermann's definition of Psellos' struggle with scabies: Lauxtermann in *A Companion to Byzantine Poetry* 32.

[40] See the introduction in Layman, *The Incineration of New Babylon* 11-14.

mother mourns the loss of her daughter, while in the *Semeioma*, 'the daughter's belly becomes her mother's tomb' (l.34).[41]. This theme is also a central motif in this text. In lines 29-30, the author invokes 'the bitter grape of the ancestor', which gave 'toothache to the descendants', quoting Ezechiel 18:1–4 and Jeremias 38:29. This proverbial saying was a way to exonerate oneself from one's own responsibilities and, in fact, in the following lines 31-32, the author admits that he is the one 'squeezing the sour grape', and responsible for his own faith, i.e. the toothache. Similarly, ll.64-67 of the *Semeioma* speaks about the power of time giving and destroying, and leaving the offspring the same legacy as their forefathers.

The topic of accountability and family relationship is brought forth once again in ll.80-82, where the author describes himself as being pregnant with 'matricide' viper-like creatures. The imagery of viper offspring killing their mother is based on Nicander, *Theriaka*, 128–36, in which Nicander explains that once they mate, the female viper kills the male, and then the offspring is born through eating the mother's belly, thus killing her, too.[42] In a recent paper, Kathryin Wilson points out that there was a trend among ancient readers to draw a parallel between Nicander's vipers and the storyline of Euripides' *Oresteia*, as some scholia testify.[43] This is confirmed in this text, too: the author employs the adjective μητροφόντης ('matricide') to refer to his viper-like offspring, and such an adjective is to be found in Eur. *Or.* 475, where is accompanied by the word 'serpent' (δράκων).

The theme of matricide re-emerges in the subsequent lines (83-85) where the author draws upon the myth of Medusa, referring to 'what is celebrated in stories.' The author portrays himself as being pregnant with a 'monstrous child,' harboring a 'deadly matter' on his head, and fearing the 'sword' of pain, analogous to the sword of Perseus that beheaded Medusa.[44] The expression 'monstrous child' is particularly noteworthy, as it appears in Paul of Aegina (*Med.*

[41] Macrides in *Greek Literature* 343.

[42] K.D. Wilson, "Avenging Vipers: Tragedy and Succession in Nicander's Theriaca", in *Classical Journal* 113 (2018) 257-280, 259.

[43] Wilson, *Classical Journal* 113 (2018) 262.

[44] I would like to thank Stratis Papaioannou for this insight.

Comp. III, 76) in the context of 'difficult labor,' where the adjective τεράστιον is used to describe a fetus (κυόμενον) with anomalies, such as having 'two heads,' which could lead to a challenging delivery.[45] Particularly noteworthy is also the references to the birth-pang goddesses, Eileithyia, with the epithet μογοστόκος, found in *Iliad* (*Il*. 11, 270: δριμύ, τό τε προϊεῖσι μογοστόκοι Εἰλείθυιαι). Although found in Eustathios' commentaries (1, 663, l.23, θέσφατον, θεσπέσιον, θεόσδοτον, μογοστόκος Εἰλείθυια) and in Manasses' *Chronicle* (l.340 Lampsidis: ὠδῖνας ἐπηράσατο δριμείας, μογοστόκους) the adjective is rarely found in sources after the Classical period.

These texts have also in common another theme, that of eating. As noted by Tomasz Labuk, in fact, the 'owner of this miscellany manuscript must have possessed a keen interest in the matters of eating'.[46] The mice of the *Katomyomachia* fight against a voracious cat; the main character of the *Semeioma,* a nun, was accused of murder and cannibalism for consuming her daughter, and the toothache author speaks about eating and drinking throughout the poem. The word παμφάγος occurs in all three texts (referring to the cat, to the nun and the author of toothache) and also in Stilbes' poem (l.57), in reference to the all-destroying nature of the fire. In ll. 88-102, the author introduces the topic of eating (l.88: 'What shall I say in fitting wise concerning food?'), complaining that he cannot drink nor eat, because the 'mouth' spits out everything. His inability to drink is compared to that of Tantalus, and the language employed is yet again quite interesting. The word φιλοτησία is relatively rare in Byzantine sources, and usually refers to the 'cup of friendship', or to 'toast to someone's health', here probably to toothache medication (φιλοτησία φαρμάκου). According to Eustathios 'to drink the toast of Tantalus' was a proverbial saying (*Comm. On Odyssey*, 1.437.17), attested in Phil. *Vita Apollonii*. L.92 κάρας ὑπερτέλλοντα φρίττοντες λίθον is vaguely reminiscent of the ὑπερτέλλοντα πέτρον found in Euripides' Orestes (l.6), when Tantalus is mentioned as someone who cannot control his tongue: Tantalus becomes an analogue of

[45] J.L. Heiberg, *Paulus Aegineta* (CMG IX) I, III, 76, 4.

[46] T. Labuck, *Gluttons, Drunkards and Lechers: The Discourses of Food in 12th-Century Byzantine Literature: Ancient Themes and Byzantine Innovations*, PhD Thesis (Katowice 2019) 8.

him not just because of thirst but for the latter reason too.

The author, in fact, plays with the imagery of the mouth as both means to speak and to eat. In ll. 17-25, he confesses to having uttered harmful words that wounded his brethren, using his tongue like an arrow and turning it into a harlot. The linguistic texture of these lines is particularly interesting: the author first uses a Homeric formula (l.20: 'winged words'), then, quoting Ps.63.3-4, he refers to the 'sharp arrow' of his tongue, playing with the double meaning of στόμα, which can be translated to 'mouth' but also to 'the point of weapons'. In the Bible the mouth has the power of life and death (*Proverbs*, 18:21) and this is why, having used it in the wrong way, he is now 'tasting the soul-destroying wood', i.e the tree of knowledge of Adam and Eve, and experiencing a toothache. The disease is portrayed as a direct consequence of sin (ll.14-16 and 33-34). The connection between sinning and teeth has biblical roots (Ps. 3:8), where it is stated that God will destroy the teeth of the impious. A more precise explanation linking the misuse of words to toothache can be found in a passage from Athanasios (*Exp. in Psalmos*, PG 27, 69D): 'The teeth of sinners are the unreasonable discourses that naturally arise within us. For just as teeth, our enemies approach us to consume our flesh'.

Although sin is listed as the first cause of toothache, in ll. 35-40, the author introduces a second and 'more natural' cause: a bitter fluid coming down from the top of the head is eroding his teeth. Such description is consistent with what is found in Hippocrates. According to Hippocratic theory (*De affectionibus*, 4, 24), toothache results from an excess of phlegm accumulating in the mouth, leading to tooth decay. The remedies listed by the author in lines 137-144 are too what one would find in medical books of the time. The author in fact employs precise medical terminology such as αἰμωδία (ll. 32 and 11, 'having the teeth set on edge'), φλέγμα (l.138, phlegm), ἀχολὴν (l.138, bile), ἀμυχὰς (l.141, scarifications), σικύας (l.141, cupping-glasses), the processes of revulsion (ἀντίσπασις) and depletion (κένωσις).

These dual explanations—natural and divine—which are not mutually exclusive, reflect a broader opposition between divine healing and traditional medicine. This dichotomy was not unique to the Byzantine period but has roots in Roman and Greek tradi-

tions.[47] Throughout the Byzantine era, scientific medicine coexisted with divine and miraculous interpretations of illness and healing.[48] The author's emphasis on both divine and natural causes of toothache aligns with this long-standing tradition.[49] Illness, according to the author, originates in the 'bad use to which [man] has put his own free will,' specifically the sin committed in Paradise. (see ll. 26 and 28 about the 'tree of forbidden knowledge', and 'behaving like a woman').[50]

Since speaking too much is what brought forth toothache, as poetic justice goes, the author is now unable to speak properly: he has injured his 'sweetly-speaking instrument' (l.77). He compares himself to a fish bereft of speaking being grilled on a fire (ll.69-70), to an 'owl wailing out of tune' (l.76), to Philomela being deprived of his tongue by Tereus (l.170). Later in the text, ll.148-55, the author complains his voice has assumed a tragic tone and compares his mouth to a lyre, whose bridges (teeth) have been altered and broken in pieces by the pain, and every sound he makes strikes the grave tone, and produces a tragic melody. The setting, the tone and the language of these verses is very similar to a passage of Manasses' *Monody on death of the Goldfinch* 3.1.10: 'to tune the mournful lyre of discourse, to grieve over the sweet-speaking in lamenting echoes' […] the golden-winged has been deprived of his ornament'.[51]

The author compares the fluid running through his mouth to a stream of water destroying everything it comes across, to the infernal rivers (l.5), and its bitterness to that of the fountain of Marah (Exod. 15:22–27), whose water was for the Israelites too bitter to be drunk. He wishes to die rather than bearing the pain, with his

[47] J. Haldon, "The miracles of Artemios and contemporary attitudes: context and significance", in V.S. Crisafulli, J.W.Nesbitt, J.Haldon (eds), *The Miracles of St. Artemios, A Collection of Miracle Stories by an Anonymous Author of Seventh-Century Byzantium* (Brill 2021) 33-74, 44-47.

[48] Haldon in *The Miracles of St. Artemios* 45.

[49] Haldon in *The Miracles of St. Artemios* 47.

[50] J. C. Larchet, *The Theology of Illness* (Crestwood, New York 2002) 26.

[51] K. Horna (ed.), *Einige unedierte Stücke des Manasses und Italikos*, Progr. Sophiengymnasium (Vienna 1902) 3-26. Translation is taken from I. Nilsson, *Writer and Occasion in Twelfth-Century Byzantium*: *The Authorial Voice of Constantine Manasses* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2020) 78.

sleepless nights being dark as the darkness of death (ll.54-55 and 58-60). He calls his suffering 'sleepless' and the word ἀκοίμητος is not randomly chosen: one of the eternal punishments, together with the gnashing of teeth, is the 'sleepless worm' (*Is.* 66, 24: ὁ σκώληξ ὁ ἀκοίμητος). The gnashing of teeth, the weeping all night, the perennial night, the infernal rivers, they all recall a last judgement atmosphere, as it is specified in ll. 107-109.

3. Authorship

As previously noted, the poem has been transmitted anonymously. While definitively identifying its author remains a challenging endeavor, it is nonetheless possible to offer a tentative profile based on the available textual and contextual evidence.

As the previous discussion has shown, this text shares many features with other examples of 12th-century poetry (e.g., Constantine Stilbes, Andronikos Protekdikos, and Theodore Prodromos), while still retaining distinctive elements that set its author apart (register of the language, use of metre, style). The hypothesis of a 12th-century set is further supported by the language. Although the linguistic register is not particularly highbrow, the author does employ a few rare verbs, suggesting a level of erudition characteristic of the period, such as ἐκκυβέω (only attested in Suda and Zonaras) or, metri causa, ἐξιαύω (instead of the more common ἰαύω), ἀντικελαδέω (Niketas Eugenianos, *Monody to Theodore Prodromos*, 462, 17; Constantine Manasses, *Monody on a Goldfinch*, 5, 13), εὐθυδικέω (attested in John Tzetzes (*Iliad Allegories*, Σ, 731)[52], and the verb ζοφόω, all mostly attested in the 12th century.

The text is most likely intended for an audience of literati, probably the author's peers. The author assumes a level of familiarity with specialized medical terminology, offering no explanations or descriptions of toothache remedies. This is evident in references to techniques such as 'scarification' and the use of 'cupping glasses', as well as medical processes like 'depletion' and 'revulsion', which are mentioned without further clarification.

The abundant use of classical and mythological references points

[52] F. Boissonade (ed.), *Tzetzae Allegoriae Iliadis* (Paris 1851) 253.

towards this too. The allusions to the myths of Philomela, Tantalus and the more obscure one to Medusa are not explained, and Homeric quotations are interspersed throughout the text. For instance, at line 56, the author cites *Iliad* 9.325, the moment when Achilles refuses to rejoin the battle. This quotation is followed by a reference to the "brazen slumber," further evoking Homeric themes and imagery. When the author compares his pain to that of a woman in labour, that is also an allusion to *Il.* XI, 270-72, when Agamemnon gets hurt and compares his sharp pain to that of a woman in travail. The river similes of ll. 40-44 echo *Il.* XI, 492-47, when Ajax is attacking the Trojans.[53]

In conclusion, I would argue that this poem was most likely written in the 12th century, by an author who was probably a member of the intellectual circle of Constantine Stilbes, Theodore Prodromos and Andronikos Protedkikos.

Text and Translation

The text of the Venetian manuscript and its punctuation have been preserved as faithfully as possible. I intervened only where grammatical or syntactic errors required correction; otherwise, the text remains largely as it appears in the manuscript. Some readings have been amended through conjecture, with only a small portion of line 27 left blank due to a lacuna in the manuscript.

As with most Byzantine poems, the treatment of dichrona, as either short or long, has no consistency, as one can note in the different measuring of πάλιν in the different verses: ὠθεῖ πάλιν ἡ σούβλα καὶ θλίβει πλέον and καὶ πάλιν ἀντιβαίνει τῶν ριζῶν κράτος (l.119), where the alpha is first short and then long. After Late Antiquity 'no poet produced verses without at least some metrical inconsistencies'[54], so one must stress the metrical errors, such as when the epsilon or omicron is treated as a long vowel (l.11 ὀδονταλγία;

[53] ὡς δ' ὁπότε πλήθων ποταμὸς πεδίον δὲ κάτεισι / χειμάρρους κατ' ὄρεσφιν ὀπαζόμενος Διὸς ὄμβρῳ/πολλὰς δὲ δρῦς ἀζαλέας, πολλὰς δέ τε πεύκας / ἐσφέρεται, πολλὸν δέ τ' ἀφυσγετὸν εἰς ἅλα βάλλει / ὣς ἔφεπε κλονέων πεδίον τότε φαίδιμος Αἴας.

[54] Lauxtermann *Byzantine Poetry* II 267.

l.17 στόμα; l. 27 πρὸς αι[.]ον; l.31 ὄμφακα; l. 62 τὰ; l.63 γαστέρα; l.184 σιαγόνας; l.58: χάλκεον; l.72: τετάρτη; l.143: ἐν ἀντισπάσει; l.43: σκόλοπας; 152 στόμα) or long syllables are treated as short ones (47 ῥίζας, 90 κοιλία, 127 ῥομφαία, 124 τὰς l.119: καὶ πάλιν ἀντιβαίνει; 8 καρωτικάς, 15 ἐκεῖθεν πρῶτον, 27 πρὸς αι[.]ον, 72 τετάρτη). One must also note the use of wrong accents to mask the prosodic irregularity at line endings: l. 44 βρίθον, l. 98 ψηφίδα, l. 101 λεπτύναι, l. 146 στύφον, l. 180 κράμα, since these words are normally written with a circumflex, not an acute accent. The author uses *correptio attica* quite well in some occasions: l.39: καὶ τοὺς προβλήτας τῶν ὀδόντων ἐκτρίβει; l.98: Ὡς γὰρ μικράν τις ἐκκινήσας ψηφίδα; l.128: ὡσεὶ τριγλῶχιν ὁ τριφυὴς τὴν βίαν; l.152: τὸ στόμα πλουτεῖ τῆς κιθάρας τὴν θέσιν. In l. 130 the omega of Πλούτωνος is treated as short. While this may seem a metrical irregularity, it reflects the Byzantine freedom in handling proper names that do not fit neatly into the metre, so it should be considered perfectly acceptable.[55] The most frequent caesura in the text is the penthimimeres (74 % against the 26 % of the ephtemymeres), with 50 % of the stress pattern on the fifth syllable, 39 % on the fourth and for 11 % on the third. When the caesura is ephtemimeres, the word is usually proparoxytone (62%) or paroxytone (38%) but never oxytone.

Περὶ ὀδόντων

Μόλις διασχὼν ἐξ ὀδύνης τὸ στόμα,
(κλείει γὰρ αὐτὸ τῶν πόνων ἡ σφοδρότης,
δριμὺν κερῶσα τοῖς ὀδοῦσι τὸν σκύφον)
λέξω μικρόν σοι τῆς νόσου τὴν πικρίαν
ὡς συμμετάσχῃς τῆς ὀδύνης τοῖς φίλοις,
ἄριστε φίλων, συμμεριστὰ τῶν πόνων·
ἐξ ἀκοῆς γὰρ πληκτικὸς [καταρ]ρέων
τὰς καρωτικὰς ψηλαφᾷ καταδύσεις
πικρὸν τὸν ἰὸν ἐξεμῶν ὥσπερ δράκων.
Ἄκουε λοιπὸν τοὺς δυσηκόους λόγους·
τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὀδονταλγία
ἢ μᾶλλον ἄλγος τοῦ βάθους τῆς καρδίας·
ἐφάπτεται γὰρ καὶ μυχῶν τῶν ἐγκάτων.
Τὴν γὰρ βρύσιν ἔσχηκεν ἐξ ἁμαρτίας·

[55] See Lauxtermann *Byzantine Poetry* II 272- 274.

ἐκεῖθεν πρῶτον ἐξανοίγονται φλέβες,
μῦσος δ' ἀποβλύζουσι πολλῆς σαπρίας·
ἀνθ' ὧν μολύνω τὸ στόμα σαπροῖς λόγοις,
ἐναδολεσχῶν ὕβρεσιν ἀλλοτρίαις
καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς τραυματίζων τοῖς λόγοις,
ὥσπερ φαρέτρης ἐπτερωμένοις λόγοις
στόμα τε κυρτῶν καὶ περικλῶν τὰς μύλας,
ὀξύ τε γλώττης ἐντιθεὶς θᾶττον βέλος·
ἀνθ' ὧν τε δειπνῶ τὰς τρυφὰς τὰς σαρκίνους
καὶ [κυ]λίω τὴν γεῦσιν εἰς ἁμαρτίαν
καὶ τὴν ἔνοικον γλῶτταν εἰς πόρνην τρέπω
καὶ γεύομαι, φεῦ, τοῦ ψυχοφθόρου ξύλου
ψυχῇ συνάμα συζυγούσῃ πρὸς αι[...]ον,
οὐκ ἀρρενωπῶς προβάλλων τὰς ἐνστάσεις.
Ὢ πικρὸς ὄμφαξ τῶν πάλαι προπατόρων
εἰς γομφιασμὸν τοὺς ἀπεγγόνους τρέπων
ἢ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς καὶ τὸν ὄμφακα θλίβων
τρώγων τε δειπνῶν τὴν πικρὰν αἱμωδίαν.
Πρώτην μὲν οὖν εὕρηκεν ἡ νόσος βρύσιν,
ἐκ τῶν φλεβῶν ὡς εἶπον τῆς ἁμαρτίας,
τὴν δευτέραν τε καί γε φυσικωτέραν,
ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς τῶν φλεβῶν τῶν σαρκίνων.
Χυμὸς γὰρ αὐταῖς ὡς δριμὺς ἐπιβρίσας,
ὡς ῥεῦμα ῥοχθεῖ καὶ τὸ θαλάσσης κῦμα
καὶ τοὺς προβλῆτας τῶν ὀδόντων ἐκτρίβει fol. 9v
καὶ τὰς ῥαχίας τῶν μυλῶν ἐπιτρίβει.
Ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ χείμαρρος ἐκρέων μέγας
εἴ τι κάταντες ἐκ μεταρσίων τρέχων,
καὶ δένδρα καὶ σκόλοπας ἕλκει καὶ λίθους
ἐκ γῆς ἀνασπῶν καὶ τὸ πέτρινον βρίθος,
οὕτω τὸ ῥεῦμα τῆς ἐμῆς καχεξίας
ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς τῶν λόφων ἀποβρύον,
καὶ ῥίζας αὐτὰς τῶν ὀδόντων ἐκθλίβει
καὶ τῶν μυλῶν φάτνωμα καὶ τὰς συνθέσεις,
ἕλκει τε τὴν ὄστωσιν ὡς σκληροὺς λίθους.
Ὢ ῥεῦμα πικρὸν τάχα καὶ Μερρᾶς πλέον·
ὦ ῥεῦμα, χεῦμα φαρμάκων ὀλεθρίων,
κώνειον ἢ κύπελλον ἰώδους λύμης,
Στυγός τε χύσις, Ἀχέροντος πλημμύρα.
Ἐντεῦθεν αὐτὸς τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν σκότος,
τὸ δὲ σκότος κέκρικα θανάτου σκότος·
νύκτας ἀΰπνους ἐξιαύω τοῖς πόνοις
καὶ παννυχίζω γρηγορῶν εἰς τοὺς γόους.

Ὡς εἴθε πρὸς χάλκειον ὕπνον ἐτράπην
εἰς δ᾽ αὖ ἀδιύπνιστον ἐκλίθην κάρον,
ὡς λῆξιν εὗρον τῶν ἀκοιμήτων πόνων.
Πυκνῶς στρέφω τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τῆς κλίνης,
ἐπί τε τὰ δίδυμα τῶν πλευρῶν μέρη
εἰς γαστέρα τε καὶ ῥάχεις μετατρέπων
ἐξυπτιάζω, κύμβαχον [θέσ]ιν φέρω,
ὡς πεσσὸς ἁπλῶς ἀστατῶ μου τοῖς πόνοις.
Καὶ δυστυχῶ φεῦ τὰς μεταπτώσεις πάσας,
ξηροῖς ἀτεχνῶς ἐγκυβεύων ὀστέοις,
σπαίρω τε πυρὸς ὥσπερ εἰς μέσην φλόγα,
ἰχθὺς ἔρημος τῶν λαλούντων ὀργάνων.
Πρώτη φυλακὴ νύκτερος παρερρύη
καὶ τῶν σκοπευτῶν γρηγορεῖν ἔχω πλέον·
τρίτη παρῆλθεν, εὐδρομεῖ καὶ τετάρτη·
ὄρνις κελαδεῖ τοῦ σκότους ὡροσκόπος,
ἀντικελαδῶ νυκτερινοῖς τοῖς γόοις
καὶ ῥήγνυμι, φεῦ, ἐκ μέσων τῶν ἐγκάτων,
νυκτικόραξ καθάπερ ἐκμελὴς βρέμων·
τὴν εὔλαλον γὰρ ὀργάνωσιν ἐθλίβην.
Λέων βρυχῶμαι κἂν μυὸς φέρω πλάσιν,
κἂν τοῖς τοσούτοις ἐξενευρίσθην πόνοις.
Οἷον με συνθλίβουσι τικτούσης πόνοι·
ἐγκυμονῶ γὰρ τὰς ἐχιδναίας φύσεις,
τοὺς μητροφόντας τῆς ἁμαρτίας γόνους·
ἐῶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν τὸ κροτούμενον μύθοις,
ὡς ὠδίνησα τὸν τεράστιον τόκον,
ἐπὶ κεφαλῆς τὴν ὀλεθρίαν ὕλην,
δι᾽ ὃν πτοοῦμαι καὶ θεὰς μογοστόκους
ἢ τὸν πόνου σίδηρον ἐκτέμνοντά με.
Τροφῆς πέρι δε τί προσαρμόσας φράσω;
ζητεῖ φάρυγξ μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὸ στόμα πτύει,
δεξαμενή, κοιλία καὶ σωλὴν βρύει.
Διψῶμεν οὐκοῦν φιλοτησίαις μέσαις,
τὴν Ταντάλου τίνοντες ἀθλίως δίκην,
κάρας ὑπερτέλλοντα φρίττοντες λίθον
καὶ τὸν καταθλάττοντα τὰς μύλας πόνον.
Κἂν καὶ βιασθῇ φύσεως τὸ παμφάγον,
σίτων τε παράψαιτο καὶ τῶν πεμμάτων,
εὐθὺς τὸ ῥεῦμα συγκινεῖται σὺν βίᾳ.
Ὡς γὰρ μικράν τις ἐκκινήσας ψηφίδα
ἤνοιξε ῥεῦμα πολλάκις τῶν πλησμίων,
οὕτω κινήσας τῶν ὀδόντων μετρίους,

ὡς καὶ τεμεῖν τὸν ἄρτον, ὡς καὶ λεπτύναι,
εὐθὺς τὸ ῥεῖθρον ἐξανοίγω τῆς νόσου.
Ὢ τῶν ὀδόντων ἄλγος, ὢ μύλης πόνος·
ἐκ τοῦ στόματος εἰσρέων τοῖς ἐγκάτοις
ὡς ἐξ ἀμάρας εἰς βαθύτερον κύτος.
Ὢ τῶν ὀδόντων ἄλγος, ὢ πόνος πόνων·
σήμαντρον ἄλλο τῶν τελευταίων πόνων
καὶ τῶν ὀδόντων τοῦ βρυγμοῦ καὶ τῆς φρίκης.
Ὢ βρυγμὸς οὗτος, πρόδρομος τῶν ἐσχάτων· fol. 10r
πῶς ἐκλαλήσω τὴν τοσαύτην πικρίαν;
πῶς ἐκφράσω τὰ μέτρα τῆς αἱμωδίας
καὶ ποιότητα τῶν πόνων καὶ τὴν βίαν,
ἂν συνθολῶμαι τῇ τοσαύτῃ πικρίᾳ;
Ἐγγὺς ὅμως ἡ πεῖρα καὶ λαλεῖν θέλει·
σούβλα δοκεῖ πείρουσα τὰς ῥίζας κάτω,
ὡς πᾶν τὸ φυτὸν τῶν ὀδόντων ἐκτέμῃ,
ὡς δ’ ἦν κραταιὸν ἐκ πλοκῆς ῥιζωμάτων
ὠθεῖ πάλιν ἡ σούβλα καὶ θλίβει πλέον,
καὶ πάλιν ἀντιβαίνει τῶν ῥιζῶν κράτος·
μάχη τε πολλὴ καὶ κλόνος πρὸ τῆς μάχης·
ἡ δ’ ὀξύτης τῆς σούβλας ὑπὸ τῆς βίας
τανῦν μὲν ἐξάλλοιτο πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν,
τανῦν τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἐκτέμνειν θέλει,
ζωῆς τὰς ἀρχὰς συγκυκῶσα τὰς δύο,
σφάττουσα καὶ φράττουσα τῆς πνοῆς χύσιν,
ὡς καὶ τελευτᾶν τὴν ὀδύνην εἰς μόρον.
Ῥομφαία τοιγάρ ἐστιν ὁ πλήττων πόνος,
ὡσεὶ τριγλώχιν ὁ τριφυὴς τὴν βίαν·
τέμνει μύλας γάρ, ἐγκέφαλον, καρδίαν·
῎Αιδου τρίαινα, Πλούτωνος τοῦτο ξίφος.
Οὕτως ἀμυδρῶς ζωγραφῶ μου τὸν πόνον
καὶ τῷ μέλανι τὸν ζοφοῦντά με γράφω·
ὑπὲρ λόγον γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ὑπὲρ πόνον.
Ἱπποκράτους δὲ καὶ Γαληνοῦ βιβλία
ἔπτυξε πᾶν τε τῶν ὀδόντων τὸ θλίβον
καὶ τὴν θεραπεύουσαν ἐντρέπει τέχνην.
Μάτην καθαίρει τῆς κεφαλῆς τοὺς πόρους,
κενοῖ τε φλέγμα καὶ χολὴν συνεκχέει,
καὶ τοῖς ἐνύγροις καὶ ποτοῖς τῶν φαρμάκων,
καὶ τὰς ἀμυχὰς εἴτε σικύας μάτην
εἰς τοὺς τένοντας ὑπάγει καὶ τὰς ῥάχεις,
ὡς ἐκροφᾷ τὸ θλίβον ἐν ἀντισπάσει·
τὸ πλημμύρον γὰρ τὴν κένωσιν ἐκτρέχει

ἀντίσπασιν δὲ τὸ σκιρωθὲν ἐκτρέπει·
οἱ γὰρ ὀδόντες ἐνδακόντες τὸ στύφον,
οὗ φασι λῦσαι τῇ βίᾳ τῶν φαρμάκων.
Ὄργανα φωνῆς τῆς ἐμῆς παρετράπη
εἰς μουσικῆς ὄργανα νῦν τραγωδίας,
τὸ φεῦ βοῶντα καὶ γοῶντα τοῖς πόνοις
ὦ μουσικὴ φθέγματος, ὦ ταύτης λύσις.
Τὸ στόμα πλουτεῖ τῆς κιθάρας τὴν θέσιν,
ὁ τῶν ὀδόντων στοῖχος ὡς τῶν μαγάδων,
καὶ σφίσιν ἐντείνοιτο τῆς χορδῆς τάσις·
ἡ γλῶσσα χορδὴ καὶ τάσις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
καὶ τῆς κιθάρας ἐμμελὴς ἅπας κρότος.
Ἡ σύνθεσις δὲ νῦν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἠλλάγη,
ἀργοῦσιν αἱ μαγάδες ἐκτετραμμέναι
ἢ καὶ θρυβεῖσαι τῶν ὀδυνῶν τῇ σφύρᾳ
καὶ μουσικῆς ὁ φθόγγος ἡμῖν ἐρρύη·
κἄν τι παρηχῇ, τὸν βαρὺν ἦχον κρέκει·
ὄργανα παρέκλιναν, ὡς γραφῆς λόγος,
εἰς πένθος ἡμῖν καὶ τραγωδίας μέλος.
Ὀδόντες ἡμῶν ὅπλα καὶ βελῶν στόμα
καὶ τοὺς φοροῦντας ἔκταναν ἀντιστρόφως·
λέγε, προφῆτα, τίς δυνατὸς ἐν κράτει
ἁμαρτανόντων τοὺς ὀδόντας συντρίβειν;
πάντως ὁ μισῶν ἄφρονας τούτων λόγους.
Οὐ μῦθος ἡμῖν οὐδὲ τερθρεία ξένη,
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ Τηρεὺς τὴν λαλοῦσαν ἐκτρίβει·
τομὶς δὲ πικρὰ τοῦ χυμοῦ τοῦ παμφθόρου
σφοδρός τε θυμὸς εὐθυδικούσης δίκης,
τὴν τῶν ὀδόντων ἐκθερίζουσι στίχα
καὶ τραυλὸν ἡμῖν ἐκτελοῦσι τὸ στόμα.
Ὁ θριγγὸς ἦρται καὶ μαραίνεται στόμα·
πτηνοὶ λόγοι σιγῶσιν ἐν τῷ κηπίῳ· fol. 10v
κλύζει γὰρ αὐτὸ δαψιλέστερον χύμα.
Ὦ παιδαγωγὲ τῆς ἐμῆς ἁμαρτίας,
στῆσον μικρόν σου τὴν πατάσσουσαν βίαν
καὶ τῷ στύφοντι μῖξον ἱλαρὸν κράμα,
ὁ καὶ Γαληνὸς καὶ πραΰθυμος μόνος,
ὁ καὶ μαλάσσων τὰς ἀνηκέστους νόσους.
Κιμῷ χαλινῷ, τῆς γραφῆς λέγει στόμα,
σιαγόνας ἔσφιγξας ἡμῶν πρὸς βίαν,
ὡς ἀνακόψῃς ἅλμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας
τὰς ἀλόγους τε τῶν παθῶν ἀταξίας.
Ἄνες βραχύ τι τοῦ χαλινοῦ τὴν τάσιν

καὶ μαστίγων σὴν βίαν ἠρέμα τρέπε·
πληγεὶς γὰρ ὀψὲ συγκομίζομαι φρένας.

17: Eph. 4:29 and Marc. 17:15 29–32: Ez. 18:2 and Ier. 38 (31):29–30 40–44: cfr. *Il.* XI, 492–97 50: Exod. 15:23 and cf. Greg. *Naz. Carmina moralia*, Column 586, line 4 56: *Il.* IX, 325 58: *Il.* XI, 241 86: *Il.* XI, 270 91: Philost. *Vita Ap.* 3.32.22 107: Matt. 8:12, 162–3, Lam. 5:15 162–3 Job 30:31 164: Ps. 57:4 166, Ps. 76 (77):14 167: Ps. 3:8 (3:7) and 57:7 (58:6); 170: Ps. Apoll. *Bibl.* 3, 14, 8 171: Prov. 30:14 183–4, Ps. 31 (32):9

27 προβαλλων] προσκαλῶν | 50 Μερρᾶς] Μερᾶς | 67 σπαίρω] σκαίρω | 69 τερθρεία] τερθρία | 81 ἐχιδναίας] ἐχυδναίας | 92 τίνοντες] τείνοντες | 100 μερίους] μετρίους | 115 πείρουσα] σπείρουσα | 124 δύας] δύο | 186 κιμῷ] κημῷ χαλινοῦ] χαληνοῦ

On teeth

Barely opening my mouth because of the pain
(for the vehemence of the aching shuts it,
pouring a bitter cup on the teeth)
I shall briefly tell you about the bitterness of the disease,
so that you share the pain with your friend,
oh, best of friends, sufferings' sharer!
Through hearing, the numbing pain streams downwards
and touches the depths of sopor,
vomiting out the bitter poison, like a serpent.
Hear now the hard-to-hear words:
Toothache is my disease
or better, a pain coming from the bottom of the heart:
for it affects even my innermost organs.
Having sprung from sin
from there, first the veins open up,
then they spurt out the uncleanness of much rot;
because I defile the mouth with corrupted talks,
jabbering with outrageous insults
and wounding my brothers with words,
winged words as if they belonged to a quiver
opening my mouth and closing down my molars,
swiftly positioning the sharp arrow of my tongue;
because I enjoy the luxurious meals of flesh,
and I roll my taste into sin,
and my tongue I turn into a harlot
and, alas, I taste the soul-destroying wood,
with my soul joined towards […],

not putting forth my resistance in a manly way.
Oh, bitter grape of the first ancestors,
giving toothache to the descendants,
or, rather, I am the one squeezing the sour grape
biting and eating with my teeth set on bitter edge.
The disease finds its first source,
as I said, from the veins of sin.
The second and more natural source
comes from the fleshy veins of the head.
A very bitter humour falling upon them,
gushing like a stream of water or a sea wave,
wipes out the projecting teeth,
and wears off the outer-edges of the molars.
Like a stream of flowing water,
running downhill from up high,
dragging away trees, stakes and stones
drawing up from earth even rocky weights,
so the stream of my own misdeed,
pouring from the top of the head
wrings out the tooth roots,
the mandible and the junctions,
and drags the bone as if hard stones.
Oh bitter stream, more bitter, probably, than Marah's flow!
Oh stream, flow of deadly poisons,
hemlock or poisonous goblet of filth,
flood of the Styx, Acheron's stream.
Because of it my day has become night,
and the night I reckon as the darkness of death.
I go through sleepless nights in pain,
moaning, awake, through the entire night.
I wish I had turned to the brazen slumber,
or cast into the torpor from which you don't wake up
so as to find the end to sleepless sufferings.
I often turn the body against the bed,
twisting around on both sides,
onto the stomach and onto the spine;
I turn on my back, assuming a head first position,
shifting, like a dice, with my pains.
I suffer, alas, all of the ups and downs,
as if playing at dice with dry bones,
flaying amidst the flames of fire,
like a fish bereft of speaking.

The first night shift drifted away
and I remain more vigilant than the watchers;
The third came, and the fourth ran quick;
a bird, a night-watcher, sings,
and I answer back with nightly cries,
and I shatter, alas!, deep from my innards,
like an owl wailing out of tune,
for I have injured my sweetly-speaking instrument.
I roar like a lion even though I have the constitution of a mouse
and I have been stripped of my strength by such great pains.
The pain afflicting me is like that of labor;
I am pregnant with viper-like creatures,
matricide offspring of sin;
not to mention what is celebrated in stories:
namely that I delivered a monstrous child,
a deadly thing on my head,
for which I am scared of the birth-pang goddesses
or of the sword of pain cutting me.
What shall I say in fitting wise concerning food?
The throat seeks yet the mouth spits,
the belly both receptacle and conduit pours (any) food out.
We thirst, indeed, amidst of cups,
miserably undergoing Tantalus' penalty,
fearing a stone hanging over the head,
and a molar smashing pain.
Even if the omnivorous nature is forced (by me)
and might get hold of bread and drinks,
immediately the flow is violently stirred up.
For just as someone, having moved a small pebble,
would often open up an overflowing stream,
so, having moved the most moderate among teeth
to cut the bread or make it thin,
I immediately stir up the stream of the disease.
Oh toothache! Oh molar pain!
Streaming from the mouth into the insides,
just as from a channel to a deeper hollow place.
Oh toothache, worst of the sufferings!
A new symbol of the ultimate sufferings
and of gnashing and shuddering of teeth.
Oh the gnashing, forerunner of the last days!
How shall I describe such bitterness?

How shall I talk about the immeasurable mouth rot,
and which kind of sufferings and violence,
if I am confused by such great bitterness?
Yet the experience is here and wants to speak:
it appears to pierce the roots below, like a skewer,
so as to cut off the teeth entirely like plants;
since they are strong because of the roots' interlacing,
again the skewer pushes and presses more,
and once more the powerful roots withstand it.
A mighty struggle and turmoil before the battle;
now the sharpness of the spit, because of its force,
at one time would leap off against the heart,
now it wants to cut through the brain,
setting in tumult the two principles of life,
cutting off and blocking the fluency of breath,
so that the pain might end in death.
For the smiting pain is indeed a sword,
like a three-edged one with thrice the strength;
for it cuts the molars, the brain, the heart;
the trident of Hades, this is, the sword of Pluto.
Thus, only so dimly do I portray my pain
and with ink I depict my gloom:
it is beyond words as much as beyond pain.
The books of Hippocrates and Galen,
this toothache folds them all,
and puts to shame the discipline of healing.
In vain the latter cleanses the ducts of the head,
empties the phlegm and pours out the bile
through liquid and watery drugs;
in vain does it apply scarifications or cupping-glasses
to tendons and the spine,
since the affliction gulps it down in revulsion;
for the excess fluid runs out through the emptying process,
while what has indurated turns into revulsion.
Even if the teeth bite into the bitter medication,
they reject healing from the force of the drugs.
The organs of my voice have now been turned
into musical instruments of tragedy
that cry 'alas!' aloud and bewail because of the pain.
Oh music of the sound, oh her release
the mouth is elevated to the place of the lyre,
the row of teeth becomes like its bridges,

and the tension of the string would be tightened by them.
The tongue is string and tension through words,
and every melodious bit of the lyre.
Yet now the arrangement has changed for us,
the bridges stopped working, been diverted
or rather broken in pieces by the hammer of pain,
and the sound of music has flowed out of us.
Even if something resounds, it strikes the grave tone;
our organs have bent, as Scripture says,
to sorrow and tragic melody.
Our teeth, our weapons and point of arrows,
have turned against and killed those who carry them.
Tell us, prophet, who has the strength
to crash the teeth of sinners?
it must be the one who hates their silly words.
It's not some myth in my case, nor some far-fetched sophist ry,
nor is Tereus devouring my speaking tongue.
The sharp knife of the all-destroying humour,
and the right judgment's violent anger,
cut out the row of teeth
and give us a stammering mouth.
The fence is removed and the mouth withers;
fleeting words are all silent in the garden:
for a larger wave floods it.
Oh teacher for my sins,
hold briefly your smiting force,
and mix some joy with the astringent
just as Galen [does], the only one with a gentle mind,
the one who soothes incurable diseases.
With bit and bridle, so speaks Scripture,
you have bounded my jaws by force,
so to stop the leaps of sin,
and the irrational disorders of passions.
Let go briefly the tension of the bridle
and gently keep off the strength of your whip;
having been smitten, I finally come to my senses.

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Echoes and Gaps: The Lion in Aristophanes of Byzantium's *Epitome* and the Aristotelian Tradition

Fabio Verthuy

***Abstract**: This paper examines the section on the lion (*Epit. *2.133-150) of Aristophanes of Byzantium's* Epitome *as preserved in the Byzantine* Sylloge. *Close textual comparison with the* Historia animalium *and other Aristotelian works shows that Aristophanes' epitome is not merely derivative, but reflects a deliberate process of selection and reorganization. While usually faithful to its source material, the epitome introduces notable divergences, ranging from stylistic compression to substantive deviations, including omissions and generalizations. The epitome also contains details unattested in extant sources, which may derive from now-lost works, from Aristophanes' own interpretive contributions, or from later additions by the compiler of the* Sylloge. *Crucially, Aristophanes' aim differs from Aristotle's: he produces a species-focused handbook for a different readership, largely omitting causal explanations central to Aristotle. The lion case demonstrates that epitomes are generative: they preserve, adapt, and at times innovate on their sources. Scholars should therefore treat epitomes both critically, when reconstructing sources, and productively, as witnesses to the organization and reception of knowledge in the Hellenistic and Byzantine worlds.*

In the summer of 1880, Spyridon Lambros uncovered a 13th-century manuscript in the library of the Dionysiou Monastery on Mount Athos, which included the previously lost second book of a zoological compilation prepared under the patronage of Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus.[1] The first

[1] *Athos Dionysiou* 180, ff. 335r-387v = S. P. Lambros, *Catalogue of the Greek Manuscripts on Mount Athos* I (Cambridge 1895) no. 3714. There, the manu-

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book of this compilation, already known through a manuscript preserved in Paris (*Paris. suppl. gr.* 495) and published by Valentin Rose in 1870,[2] states in its heading that it was derived from an *epitomē* of Aristotle's zoological writings compiled by Aristophanes of Byzantium, and further enriched with material from Aelian, Timotheus of Gaza, and other authors.[3] These additional sources are found exclusively in the second book; however, explicit attribution to individual authors appears only in the final section of the compilation (from 2.283 onward). In the earlier portion, the blending of texts is more pronounced, and the origins of specific excerpts often remain obscure.

In 1885, Lambros published both books for the *Supplementum Aristotelicum* under the Latin title *Excerpta Constantini de natura animalium*.[4] The Greek title prefixed to the text reads: Συλλογὴ τῆς περὶ ζώων

script is dated to the 14th century. In his edition of the zoological compilation, however, S. P. Lambros, *Excerptorum Constantini de natura animalium libri duo. Aristophanis Historiae animalium Epitome subiunctis Aeliani Timothei aliorumque eclogis* (Berlin 1885) V offered a more precise dating: "exeunte s. XIII vel XIV ineunte scriptus". On the manuscript's dating, see now V. Cuomo, "Athos Dionysiou 180 + Paris, Suppl. Grec 495: un nuovo manoscritto di Teodosio Principe," *ByzZeit* 98 (2005) 23–34, at 28–34.

[2] V. Rose, in V. Rose (ed.), *Anecdota Graeca et Graecolatina. Mitteilungen aus Handschriften zur Geschichte der Griechischen Wissenschaft* II, 17–40. Rose had previously published some passages from the first book of this zoological compilation in *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, Pars Prima: Fragmenta Aristotelis Philosophica* (Leipzig 1863), 283–285.

[3] Ar. Byz. *Epit.* p. 1.4-6 Lambros: Ἀριστοφάνους τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ζῴων ἐπιτομή, ὑποτεθέντων ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ καὶ τῶν Αἰλιανῷ καὶ Τιμοθέῳ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶ περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρημένων ("Aristophanes' epitome of the works of Aristotle about animals, to which has been added, for each animal, what has been said about them by Aelian and Timotheus and certain others"). The other authors include Agatharchides' *On the Red Sea*, Basilius of Caesarea's *Hexaemeron*, the pseudo-Aristotelian *Mirabilia*, Ctesias' *Indica* and Philostorgius' *Ecclesiastic History*.

[4] S. P. Lambros, *Excerptorum Constantini de natura animalium*. The surviving portions that can be attributed to Aristophanes' *Epitome* are reprinted in the third volume of the Berlin edition of Aristotle's complete works: O. Gigon, *Aristotelis opera* III (Berlin 1987) 442–464. Interestingly, the excerpts from Aristophanes' *Epitome* were not included in W. J. Slater (ed.), *Aristophanis Byzantii fragmenta* (Berlin, New York 1986).

ἱστορίας, χερσαίων πτηνῶν τε καὶ θαλαττίων, Κωνσταντίνῳ τῷ μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ καὶ αὐτοκράτορι φιλοπονηθεῖσα.[5] For convenience, this work will be referred to throughout as the *Sylloge*.

As Valentina Cuomo has demonstrated, the *Paris. suppl. gr.* 495 and the *Athos Dionysiou* 180 are in fact two parts of the same codex. This manuscript once belonged to the library of Theodosios IV Prinkips, a descendant of the Villehardouin family and Patriarch of Antioch (1278-1283), and later passed into the collection of the Dionysiou Monastery.[6]

Despite its significance for the transmission of ancient zoological knowledge, the *Sylloge* remains understudied, particularly in terms of its internal mechanics of excerpting and attribution.[7] Once modern scholarship recognized that certain passages could be attributed to Aristophanes drawing on Aristotle, or to later authors such as Aelian or Timotheus, those identifications were often treated as endpoints rather than points of departure. Such passages have rarely been subjected to detailed analysis aimed at tracing their transformations across layers of transmission.[8]

[5] The title appears on fol. 8r of *Paris. suppl. gr.* 495: "Collection of the inquiry about animals terrestrial, winged, and aquatic, prepared as a labor of love for Constantine, the great king and emperor."

[6] Cuomo, *ByzZeit* 98 (2005) 23–34.

[7] Lambros' edition remains the only one to have undertaken a systematic attempt to identify the sources of all the passages in his *apparatus fontium*, despite several errors and uncertainties. For instance, he expunges the entire passage 2.166 on the lion, remarking: "haec particula unde divulsa huc inlata sit nescio" ("I do not know where this fragment was torn away from and how it was brought here"). Yet this paragraph can, in fact, be traced to a section of Aelian's *De Natura Animalium*. Specifically, *NA* 12.7 exhibits correspondences with the *Sylloge*'s version, both in terms of content and lexical choices.

[8] In the case of Aristophanes, for example, the entries on the wolf (2.207–216) have been closely analyzed by O. Hellmann, in W.W. Fortenbaugh and S.A. White (eds.), *Aristo of Ceos: Text, Translation, and Discussion* (New Brunswick 2006) 338–339 and A. Zucker, "Qu'est-ce qu'épitomiser? Étude des pratiques dans la *Syllogé* zoologique byzantine," *Rursus* 7 (2012) § 4.3, while Hellmann, in *Aristo of Ceos* 343–344 has also examined the sections devoted to the hedgehog (2.424–427). Zucker, *Rursus 7* (2012) § 4.2 further investigates the passages concerning the mating of arthropods (1.34–37). More recently A. Falcon, in S. Föllinger (ed.), *Aristotle's* Generation of Animals: *A Comprehensive Approach* (Berlin 2022) 429–440 has compared a substantial portion of Aristophanes'

This paper undertakes a focused case study of Aristophanes of Byzantium's sections on the lion as preserved in the second book of the Byzantine *Sylloge*.[9] The objective is not merely to recover the particulars of a single passage but to treat those sections as a window onto Aristophanes' wider editorial practice. Through close textual and intertextual comparison with passages in Aristotle's *Historia animalium* and related Aristotelian writings, I trace how Aristophanes operates in the service of a new goal. Indeed, epitomes remain bound to earlier authorities while also registering the editorial and authorial work that can transform those dependencies into a distinct textual form.[10]

text (1.27–90) with passages from *De generatione animalium* in order to demonstrate how Aristophanes of Byzantium made use of this Aristotelian treatise in the construction of his *Epitome*.

[9] The account on the lion is based on two primary sources: paragraphs 133–150 are derived from Aristophanes of Byzantium's *Epitome*, while paragraphs 151–166 originate from Aelian's *De Natura Animalium*. On Aristophanes of Byzantium and the role of the zoological *Epitome* within his scholarly production, see R. P. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford 1968) 171–173 and F. M. Montana, in F. Montanari, S. Matthaios, A. Rengakos (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Ancient Greek Scholarship* I (Leiden 2015) 118–123. For studies specifically on the *Epitome*, see E. L. De Stefani, "Per l'Epitome Aristotelis De Animalibus di Aristofane di Bizanzio," *StIt* 12 (1904) 421–445; W. Kullmann, in W. Kullmann, J. Althoff, M. Asper (eds.), *Gattungen wissenschaftlicher Literatur in der Antike* (Tübingen 1998) 121–139; F. Berger, *Die Textgeschichte der* Historia Animalium *des Aristoteles* (Wiesbaden 2005); F. Berger, "Die Textgeschichte der *Historia Animalium* des Aristoteles, Aristophanes von Byzanz und die zoologische *Sylloge* des Konstantinos Porphyrogennetos," *Rursus* 7 (2012); Hellmann, in *Aristo of Ceos* 329–359; O. Hellmann, in M. Horster and C. Reitz (eds.), *Condensing Texts – Condensed Texts* (Stuttgart 2010) 555–583; O. Hellmann, in F. Montanari, S. Matthaios, A. Rengakos (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Ancient Greek Scholarship* II (Leiden 2015) 1235–1266; Zucker, *Rursus 7* (2012); T. Dorandi, in M. M. Sassi, E. Coda and G. Feola (eds.), *La zoologia di Aristotele e la sua ricezione dall'età ellenistica e romana alle culture medievali. Atti della X "Settimana di Formazione" del Centro GrAL, Pisa, 18-20 novembre 2015* (Pisa 2017) 59–80; M. Hatzimichali, in S.M. Connell (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Biology* (Cambridge 2021) 228–245; and Falcon, in *Aristotle's* Generation of Animals 421–442. The nature and function of the work remain subjects of scholarly debate among these authors.

[10] As M. Formisano, P. F. Sacchi, in P.F. Sacchi, M. Formisano (eds.), *Epitomic Writing in Late Antiquity and Beyond: Forms of Unabridged Writing* (London, New

The sections on the lion function as a representative case that reveals recurrent editorial strategies and the methodological problems any scholar faces when working with an epitome—above all, the challenge of attributing material that does not map neatly onto extant works, and the caution required when using material transmitted through epitomes to reconstruct another author's texts and ideas. The evidence developed below therefore aims to move from a tightly focused philological reading to broader claims about how epitomizing reshapes content, context and the possibilities for its use.

A Closer Look at Epit. *2.133–150: The Case of the Lion*

Out of the twenty-two animals discussed by Aristophanes in the surviving section of his *Epitome*, the lion stands out as one of the nine animals examined in greater detail.[11] The description that follows adheres to a structured template established by Aristophanes himself at the beginning of the second book,[12] which includes name

York 2022) 8 highlight, "critics and philologists started laying claim to the *authoriality* of the epitomizer. The apology of the text is hence substantiated through the introduction of a new persona: the *worthy, skilful author*," capable of producing a synthesis that is not merely a reduction but an interpretive and re-foundational act. A telling example of this authorial agency is Aristophanes' omission of Aristotle's discussion of insects, which he deems unworthy of inquiry (2.3: οὐκ ἄξιον ἱστορίας). This decision reflects not only his editorial selectivity but also his interpretive judgment about what constitutes valuable zoological knowledge.

[11] The other eight animals are the elephant (ἐλέφας: 2.68–82), the dog (κύων: 2.167–181), the wolf (λύκος: 2.207–216), the cat (αἴλουρος: 2.295–299), the bear (ἄρκτος: 2.326–336), the camel (κάμηλος: 2.446–459), the deer (ἔλαφος: 2.476–492), and the horse (ἵππος: 2.573–584).

[12] Ar. Byz. *Epit.* 2.1: ἐν τῇδε τῇ συντάξει, τὸν ἀριθμὸν οὔσῃ δευτέρᾳ, πειράσομαι, προγράφων περὶ οὗ ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ζῴου ὄνομα, προσυποτάσσειν τούτῳ ὅσα τὸ προταχθὲν ζῷον μόρια κέκτηται, εἶτα περὶ τῆς οἰκείας αὐτοῦ καὶ πόσους κύειν δύναται μῆνας, περί τε τῆς ἐκτέξεως ποῖα καὶ πόσα ὑπομένει τίκτειν βρέφη· ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τίς ὁ βίος τοῦ προγραφέντος ζῴου καὶ ποῖον τὸ ἦθος καὶ πόσα δύναται ζῆν ἔτη. ("In this composition, which is the second in number, first writing the name of the animal that is under discussion, I will try to put under this heading all the anatomical parts possessed by the animal named at the start. Then, I will speak about its mating, how many months it

(§ 133), anatomical features (§ 133–139), reproduction (§ 140–143), behavioral attributes and temperament (§ 144–149), and lifespan (§ 150).[13]

Epit. *2.133–139: Name and Anatomical Features*

(133) ὁ λέων ἐστὶ μὲν καρχαρόδους καὶ πολυσχιδής, βαδίζει δὲ κατὰ σκέλος καθάπερ ἡ κάμηλος, λέγω ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἐμπροσθίῳ σκέλει τὸ ὀπίσθιον· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τετράποδα κατὰ διάμετρον πορεύεται χιάζοντα τοῖς σκέλεσιν. (134) ἔχει δὲ τὸ τοῦ αὐχένος ὀστοῦν ὁ λέων ἕν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ πολλῶν σπονδύλων συγκείμενον. (135) κοπτομένων δὲ τῶν ὀστέων αὐτοῦ πῦρ ἔξεισι καθάπερ ἐκ τῶν λίθων. ἔχει δὲ τὰ ὀστᾶ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἀμύελα καὶ μικρὰς ὀπὰς ἔχοντα. (136) ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὀπισθουρητικὸν καθάπερ κάμηλος, καὶ γενόμενος ἑξαμηνιαῖος αἴρων τὸ σκέλος οὐρεῖ καθάπερ καὶ οἱ κύνες. (137) ἡ δὲ θήλεια ὑπὸ μικρὸν καθημένη οὐρεῖ· ἔχει δὲ καὶ μαστοὺς δύο ἐν τῇ γαστρί. (138) ἀνατμηθεὶς δὲ ὀσμὴν ἔχει βαρεῖαν, ὥστε μὴ ὑποφέρειν, τὰ δὲ ἐντόσθια ὅμοια κυνί, κοιλίαν δὲ μόνην ὁμοίαν ἔχει ὑΐ. (139) ἔχει δὲ ὁ μὲν ἄρρην χαίτας, ἡ δὲ θήλεια ψιλή ἐστι. βάλλει δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀδόντων τοὺς κυνόδοντας λεγομένους, δύο ἄνωθεν καὶ κάτωθεν δύο.

(133) The lion is saw-toothed and fissiped; it walks leg by leg, like the camel—that is to say, the hind leg follows the front leg. For the other quadrupeds walk cross-corner wise, crossing their legs. (134) The lion's neck consists of one single bone, not of multiple vertebrae. (135) When its bones are struck, fire will come out, just as from flints. It has bones that are as marrowless as possible and have small holes. (136) It is also retromingent like the camel, and, once it is six months old, it urinates lifting its leg like dogs. (137) The female, however, urinates while crouching low to the ground; she also has two breasts on her belly. (138) When it is dissected, it gives off a smell so heavy that it is impossible to endure; its inter-

is capable of gestation and, with regard to its birth, what kind of offspring it is able to bear and how many. After all these aspects, I will explain the way of life of the animal mentioned at the start, what kind of temperament it has and how many years it is able to live.") Cf. De Stefani, *StIt* 12 (1904) 431-432; Kullmann, in *Gattungen wissenschaftlicher Literatur* 127; Hellmann, in *Aristo of Ceos* 335–336; Falcon, in *Aristotle's* Generation of Animals 425-427.

[13] In the following pages, the text of the *Epitome* is quoted according to Lambros' edition.

> nal organs resemble those of the dog, except that it has a single stomach, similar to that of the pig. (139) The male has a mane, whereas the female is smooth. The lion also sheds its so-called canine teeth, two above and two below.

The phrase ὁ λέων ἐστὶ μὲν καρχαρόδους καὶ πολυσχιδής attributes two distinct characteristics to the lion: καρχαρόδους ("with saw-like teeth") and πολυσχιδής ("fissiped"). The term καρχαρόδους appears in several sections of Aristotle's *Historia animalium*, where the lion is cited among the species that possess saw-like teeth. For instance, in *Hist. an.* 2.1, 501a16, Aristotle explicitly states that certain animals, such as the lion, the leopard, and the dog, have this dental morphology.[14] Similarly, in *Hist. an.* 2.7, 502a6–7, Aristotle elaborates on variations in oral structures among animals, stating that certain species, including the lion, possess mouths that open wide, a feature common to saw-toothed animals. Moreover, in *Hist. an.* 7(8).5, 594b17, Aristotle underscores the carnivorous nature of the lion and associates this trait with its dental structure.

The second attribute, πολυσχιδής, is likewise attested in Aristotelian descriptions.[15] This characteristic is explicitly mentioned in *Gen. an.* 2.6, 742a8–10, where Aristotle enumerates fissiped quadrupeds, including the lion.[16] A similar observation is found in *Hist. an.* 2.1, 499b6–8, where Aristotle notes that among blooded viviparous quadrupeds some have multi-cloven feet. Furthermore, in *Hist. an.* 2.1, 499b23–26, Aristotle discusses anatomical variations among fissipeds, describing the distinctive structure of the lion's ankle bone (ἀστράγαλος).[17]

The description of the way the limbs move follows closely *Hist. an.* 2.1, 498b5–10: the lion, which walks κατὰ σκέλος ("leg by leg"),

[14] References to the *Historia animalium* here and throughout follow D. M. Balme (ed.), *Aristotle Historia Animalium* I, prepared for publication by A. Gotthelf (Cambridge 2002).

[15] On the Aristotelian classification of viviparous quadrupeds according to the form of their feet see A. Zucker, *Les classes zoologiques en Grèce ancienne* (Aix-en-Provence 2005) 243–256.

[16] *De generatione animalium* here and throughout is quoted from H. J. Drossaart Lulofs (ed.), *De generatione animalium* (Oxford 1965).

[17] For a commentary on this passage see S. Zierlein, *Aristoteles. Historia Animalium Buch* I *und* II (Berlin 2013) 413–414.

like the camel, is contrasted with the other quadrupeds, which move κατὰ διάμετρον ("cross-corner wise"). For each of these two ways of walking, Aristophanes provides a brief explanatory phrase.[18] The expression ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἐμπροσθίῳ σκέλει τὸ ὀπίσθιον has only two other parallels, in the *Hippiatrica*, a collection of Greek hippiatric texts spanning various periods.[19] In those cases, while describing a condition that affects horses known as "opisthotonos," by which the body is drawn backward and stiffens, one of the symptoms is said to be the failure of their hind feet to follow their forefeet (<οὐκ> ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ ὀπίσθια τοῖς ἐμπροσθίοις *CHG* I p. 186; οἱ ὀπίσθιοι <οὐκ> ἀκολουθοῦσιν τοῖς ἐμπροσθίοις *CHG* II p. 284). The verb χιάζω, in combination with πορεύω, appears only twice elsewhere in Aristophanes—once with certainty and once as a conjecture by Lambros.

[18] Aristotle's *Hist. an.* only explains κατὰ σκέλος. Aristotle articulates this explanation in a similar, yet different way: τὸ δὲ κατὰ σκέλος ἐστὶν ὅτι οὐ προβαίνει τῷ ἀριστερῷ τὸ δεξιόν, ἀλλ' ἐπακολουθεῖ ("Walking leg by leg means that the right foot is not advanced before the left, but follows it"). On the meaning of κατὰ σκέλος see also Zierlein, *Aristoteles* 395–396, who argues that Aristotle's use of the term κατὰ σκέλος to describe the gait of camels and lions should not be equated with the modern concept of the pace gait, despite apparent similarities. While camels do exhibit a lateral gait resembling pacing, Aristotle explicitly rejects the physical plausibility of such locomotion in *De incessu animalium* 712b1–9. Moreover, Aristotle's inclusion of the lion among κατὰ σκέλος movers suggests that the term does not denote strict pacing. Rather, Zierlein suggests that κατὰ σκέλος may refer to a modified diagonal gait in which limb movement follows a specific sequence, without one side initiating locomotion ahead of the other. The meaning of κατὰ διάμετρον is presented, though not in Aristophanes' own terms, in *De incessu animalium* 712a25–28, where Aristotle states: μετὰ γὰρ τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῶν ὄπισθεν κινοῦσιν, εἶτα τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ὄπισθεν ("For after the right front leg, they move the left hind leg, next the left front leg, and after it the right hind leg.") This distinctive diagonal gait is analyzed in detail by S. R. Jansen in A. Falcon, S. Stavrianeas (eds.), *Aristotle on How Animals Move: the* De incessu animalium: *Text, Translation, and Interpretative Essays* (Cambridge 2021) 269–273.

[19] On the *Hippiatrica* see A. McCabe, *A Byzantine encyclopaedia of horse medicine: the sources, compilation, and transmission of the « Hippiatrica »* (Oxford, New York 2007) and S. Lazaris, in S. Lazaris (ed.), *A companion to Byzantine science* (Leiden 2020) 404–428. The standard edition remains E. Oder, C. Hoppe (eds.), *Corpus hippiatricorum graecorum* I-II (Leipzig 1924-1927).

In the first instance, it is used to describe the gait of the elephant.[20] In the second case, Lambros (p. 143) suggests that, since a portion of the text describing the horse's gait is damaged (*cetera corrosa*), it could be reconstructed by drawing a comparison with this passage on the lion.[21] Moreover, unlike Aristotle, who differentiates between two species of camels—the Bactrian and the Arabian—Aristophanes refers to camels in general.

In the description of the lion's neck, Aristophanes inverts the original word order found in Aristotle (*Hist. an.* 2.1, 497b16–17: καὶ ὅ γε λέων τὸ τοῦ αὐχένος ἔχει ἓν ὀστοῦν, σφονδύλους δ' οὐκ ἔχει). Two key differences stand out. One is Aristophanes' choice of the verb σύγκειμαι instead of Aristotle's simpler ἔχω. Another is that while Aristotle refers to vertebrae in general (σφονδύλους), Aristophanes speaks of multiple vertebrae (πολλῶν σπονδύλων).[22] Moreover, in *Part. an.* 4.10, 686a21–24, Aristotle attributes the unique anatomical feature—observed not only in lions but also in wolves—of a neck composed of a single bone to the functional necessity of a strong neck in these particular species.[23] However, the basis for such a conclusion remains unclear, as both lions and wolves, like nearly all mammals, possess seven cervical vertebrae. Given that Aristotle appears to have had direct access to the internal anatomy of the lion—as suggested by his frequent and detailed references to dissection—he ought to have recognized the presence of seven cervical vertebrae. This discrepancy suggests that Aristotle's anatomical account of the lion, particularly with regard to the neck, may have been influenced—at least in part—by the uncritical acceptance of

[20] Ar. Byz. *Epit.* 2.68: ὁ ἐλέφας […] πορεύεται δὲ κατὰ διάμετρον χιάζων, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ σκέλος. ("The elephant […] walks cross-corner wise, in a crossed manner, but not laterally.")

[21] Ar. Byz. *Epit.* 2.573: ὁ ἵπ<πος> […] πορεύεται δὲ κατὰ διάμετρον <χιάζων τοῖς σκέλεσι.> ("The horse […] walks cross-corner wise, <crossing its legs.>")

[22] Aristophanes' use of the graphic variant σπονδύλων is not particularly remarkable. In fact, the manuscript tradition of the *Historia animalium* exhibits the two variant readings σφονδύλων and σπονδύλων.

[23] *De partibus animalium* here and throughout is quoted from A. L. Peck, E. S. Forster (eds.), *Parts of animals; Movement of animals and Progression of Animals* (Cambridge, London 1937).

a now-lost source, rather than by firsthand empirical observation.[24]

The section on the lion's bones corresponds to two passages from Aristotle (*Hist. an.* 3.7, 516b7–11; *Hist. an.* 3.20, 521b11–15). However, while Aristotle emphasizes the relative hardness (στερεά) of the lion's bones—a detail omitted by Aristophanes—both authors highlight their capacity to produce flames.[25] Note that different verbs are used to describe both the breaking out of fire from the lion's bones (ἔξειμι in Aristophanes, ἐκλάμπω in Aristotle) and the action that produces this effect (κόπτω in Aristophanes, συντρίβω in Aristotle). In contrast, entry seventy-four in pseudo-Antigonus' *Collection of Marvellous Investigations*, which is also drawn from Aristotle's *Historia animalium*, uses the verb κόπτω, as found in Aristophanes, alongside ἐκλάμπω, as used by Aristotle.[26] In the *Deipnosophistae* 353E, Athenaeus, while quoting Aristotle, similarly integrates these lexical choices by adopting both ἐκλάμπω and κόπτω.[27] The verb κόπτω in reference to lion bones is also attested in other later works, including Origen's *Fragmenta in Jeremiam (in catenis)*,[28] Horapollo's *Hieroglyphica*,[29] and the

[24] On this point see Zierlein, *Aristoteles* 384.

[25] Aristotle further elaborates on the reasons why lion bones are naturally and exceptionally hard in even greater detail in *Part. an.* 2.9, 655a12–16.

[26] Ps.-Antig. *Mir.* 74 Musso: τοῦ δὲ λέοντος οὕτως εἶναι τὰ ὀστᾶ στερεά, ὥστε πολλάκις κοπτομένων πῦρ ἐκλάμπειν. ("the lion's bones are so hard that often fire flashes forth when they are struck"). On the use of the *Historia animalium* by pseudo-Antigonus, see J. Lightfoot, *Wonder and the Marvellous from Homer to the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge 2021) 68–78. Dorandi, in *La zoologia di Aristotele* 79, building on Musso, "Sulla struttura del cod. Pal. Gr. 398 e deduzioni storico-letterarie," *Prometheus* 2 (1976) 7–9, which demonstrated the existence of close structural and linguistic connections between Aristophanes' *Epitome* and the *Mirabilia* attributed to pseudo-Antigonus, raises the question of whether these elements might indicate that the *Epitome* could be assumed—albeit indirectly and distantly—as a model for at least some parts of the knowledge found in the *Mirabilia*.

[27] Ath. 353E: ἔτι ὁ λέων, φησί, στερέμνια ἔχει τὰ ὀστᾶ, καὶ κοπτομένων αὐτῶν ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν λίθων πῦρ ἐκλάμπειν. ("Moreover, the lion, he says, has hard bones, and when they are struck fire flashes forth as from flints.")

[28] Origen, *Fragmenta in Jeremiam (in catenis)* 3.7–8: λέγεται δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀστῶν αὐτοῦ κοπτομένων ἢ πτισσομένων πῦρ ἐξέρχεται. ("It is said that, even when its bones are struck or pounded, fire comes out.")

[29] Horap. *Hieroglyphica* 2.38.3–4: ἐπειδὴ τὰ ὀστᾶ τῶν σκύμνων, κοπτόμενα, πῦρ ἐκβάλλει. ("Since the bones of the cubs, when they are struck, emit fire.")

excerpt in the *Sacra Parallela* presumably from Clement of Alexandria's *De Pascha*.[30] However, each of these three authors uses a different verb to describe the emergence of fire: ἐξέρχομαι, ἐκβάλλω, and ἐξάπτω, respectively.[31] Aelian (*NA* 4.34) uses the compound verb διακόπτω.[32] Nonetheless, the verb συντρίβω is more widely attested in reference to bones.[33]

Regarding the presence of marrow in the lion's bones, Aristophanes uses the more concise expression ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἀμύελα, which succinctly encapsulates what Aristotle explains in greater detail—namely, that there is marrow only in hollow bones, though not necessarily in all of them; accordingly, in the lion, some bones lack marrow entirely, while others contain only a small amount. The information that lion bones have small holes (μικρὰς ὀπάς) does not appear to be attested in any other author.[34] It may be an addition

[30] *Sacra Parallela* = *PG* 95.1584B: κοπτομένων τῶν λεοντίων ὀστέων, καθάπερ ἐκ τῶν πυριτῶν λίθων πῦρ ἐξάπτεται. ("When the lion's bones are struck, fire is kindled just as from flintstones.")

[31] The verb ἐξάπτω is also used by Aristotle in *Part. an.* 2.9, 655a14–15: οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ταῦτα σκληρὰν τὴν φύσιν ὥστ' ἐξάπτεσθαι τυπτομένων καθάπερ ἐκ λίθων πῦρ. ("For they are so hard by nature that, when they are struck, fire is kindled as it is from flints.")

[32] Ael. *NA* 4.34.2–3: εἰ δέ τις τὰ ὀστᾶ τοῦ λέοντος διακόπτοι, πῦρ αὐτῶν ἐξάλλεται. ("If someone cuts through the bones of a lion, fire leaps forth.")

[33] For example, see LXX, *Exodus* 12.10.2; LXX, *Numeri* 9.12.2; LXX, *Isaias* 38.13.1; Diod. Sic. *Bibliotheca historica* III 35.10.5; Gal. *In Hippocratis librum de fracturis commentarii* III (13 occurrences: 18b330.9 Kühn; 18b330.17 Kühn; 18b366.12 Kühn; 18b393.17 Kühn; 18b397.14 Kühn; 18b398.7 Kühn; 18b400.14 Kühn; 18b404.5 Kühn; 18b408.9 Kühn; 18b412.17 Kühn; 18b429.10 Kühn; 18b438.5 Kühn; 18b534.2 Kühn); and Tzetzes, *Chiliades* 3.115.975.

[34] The term ὀπή appears only three times in Aristotle's extant biological works, all in the *Historia animalium*, and in none of these instances does it refer to bones. In *Hist. an.* 6.1, 559a4, Aristotle notes that the bee-eater is the only bird that nests in holes in the ground (εἰς τὰς ὀπὰς ἐν τῇ γῇ). In *Hist. an.* 8(9).6, 612b6, he states that hedgehogs exhibit a sensitivity to wind changes: those living underground shift the position of their entrance holes (οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ γῇ τὰς ὀπὰς αὐτῶν μεταμείβουσιν) when there is a change between north and south winds. Lastly, in *Hist. an.* 8(9).39, 623a30, he observes that the better-proportioned spider keeps watch from above, concealed in a small hole (ὀπὴν μικράν) within its web. When Aristotle refers to vertebrae in *Hist. an.*

by Aristophanes, possibly based on Aristotle's lost Ἀνατομαί (*Dissections*).[35]

In addition to their way of walking, lions and camels share the characteristic of being retromingent animals, as stated in *Hist. an.* 2.1, 500b15–16 and *Part. an.* 4.10, 689a34–35. In contrast, the description of urinating while lifting a leg is clearly based on *Hist. an.* 7(8).5, 594b25–26. Apart from the use of different adverbs (καθάπερ in Aristophanes and ὥσπερ in Aristotle), the words used are identical, albeit arranged differently. Nevertheless, only Aristophanes explicitly specifies that this behavior begins at six months of age. This is probably taken from the corresponding section on the dog (*Epit.* 2.172), which the lion is compared to in this context. Conversely, Aristotle omits this detail, presumably because he believes that it can be easily inferred from his discussion of the dog. Note, however, that Aristotle's account of canine urination contains an inconsistency: initially, he states that the male begins lifting its leg at eight months (*Hist. an.* 6.20, 574a17–18), but later he changes it to six months (*Hist. an.* 6.20, 574b19–20).

The beginning of paragraph 137, which discusses the way lionesses urinate, also finds a correspondence in Aristophanes' section on dogs. In fact, the only two instances that state that the females of an animal urinate while crouched are those of the lioness and the bitch (*Epit.* 2.172). While the reference to bitches can be directly traced back to Aristotle (*Hist. an.* 6.20, 574b23), no analogous observation is made concerning the urination behavior of lionesses.

3.7, 516a13–14, he does not use ὀπή but rather describes them as "perforated" (οἱ μὲν οὖν σφόνδυλοι πάντες τετρημένοι εἰσίν).

[35] On this treatise, see O. Hellmann, in J. Althoff, B. Herzhoff, and G. Wöhrle (eds.), *Antike Naturwissenschaft und ihre Rezeption* XIV (Trier 2004) 65–86; A. L. Carbone, *Aristote illustré : représentations du corps et schématisation dans la biologie aristotélicienne* (Paris 2011); A.L. Carbone, "Anatomies of Aristotle's *Anatomai*," *Anthropozoologica* 59 (2023) 107–114; J. G. Lennox, in A. Falcon and D. Lefebvre (eds.), *Aristotle's* Generation of Animals*: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge 2018) 249–272; C. Bubb, *Dissection in Classical Antiquity: A Social and Medical History* (Cambridge 2022) 25–33, 183–193. However, Berger, *Rursus* 7 (2012) argues that Aristophanes did not derive his anatomical knowledge from Aristotle's *Anatomai*, but rather from a more recent work. Dorandi, in *La zoologia di Aristotele* 77 supports this interpretation.

It is therefore plausible that Aristophanes transposed Aristotle's remarks on the female dog to his account of lions—particularly given that Aristotle himself, as previously noted, establishes a connection between the urination posture of lions and of dogs.

At this point, Aristophanes proceeds to discuss the anatomy of the lion. His source remains the *Historia animalium* [7(8).5, 594b26–28; 2.1, 497b17–18; 2.17, 507b18–25]. Note, however, that the process of dissection is introduced with the term ἀνατμηθείς rather than by using the aorist passive participle of the verb ἀνοίγω, as found in Aristotle. Indeed, Aristophanes never uses the latter verb in reference to dissections.[36] Furthermore, while Aristotle uses the term ἀτμίς to describe the vapor emitted by the lion's dissected body, the same phenomenon is described by Aristophanes with the phrase ὀσμὴ βαρεῖα, which, in turn, is used by Aristotle to refer to the smell that the lion imparts to its food by breathing on it. As for the internal parts, Aristophanes uses the term τὰ ἐντόσθια, which appears only once in Aristotle's *De partibus animalium* (4.9, 685a3–4),[37] where he discusses the arrangement of the internal parts of cephalopods and conical-shelled testacea.

A particular issue is found in the description of the stomach: Aristophanes claims that the lion's is similar to the pig's. However, he appears to have misinterpreted Aristotle's text (*Hist. an.* 2.17, 507b18–25), which actually makes a distinction between animals with a large stomach (e.g., the pig and the bear) and those with a smaller stomach, only slightly larger than the intestine (e.g., the dog, the lion, and humans).

Finally, paragraph 139 is drawn from *Hist. an.* 6.31, 579b11–14. In this case, it is Aristophanes who reports the phenomenon of the loss of canine teeth in lions, without specifying the age at which it occurs.

[36] The verb ἀνοίγω appears three times throughout the *Sylloge*, in reference to the opening of the eyes (2.126; 2.151) and the mouth (2.418). In contrast, the verb Aristophanes uses specifically for dissections, in addition to ἀνατέμνω, is the compound διοίγω.

[37] This is, in fact, the reading printed by I. Bekker, *Aristotelis de partibus animalium libri quattuor* (Berlin, Boston 1829). However, certain manuscripts of the *De partibus animalium* transmit the diminutive form ἐντοσθίδια.

Epit. *2.140–143: Reproduction*

(140) ὀχεύει δὲ <ὁ ἄρρην> καὶ ὀχεύεται ἡ θήλεια πᾶσαν ὥραν, καθάπερ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἄρχεται βαίνειν ὅταν γένηται δεκαμηνιαῖος.[38] ὀχεύει δὲ συγκαθισάσης τῆς θηλείας· ἐπιβαίνει γάρ. (141) κύει δὲ δύο μῆνας. τίκτει δὲ τὸν ὅλον βίον αὐτῆς ἡ λέαινα πεντάκις, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πέντε σκυμνία, εἶτα τέσσαρα, ἐχομένως τρία, εἶτα δύο, ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἕν, καὶ οὐκέτι συλλαμβάνει. (142) ἔστι δὲ τὰ τικτόμενα μικρὰ καὶ τυφλὰ καθάπερ κυνός, ὥστε μόλις μετὰ δίμηνον βαδίζειν. (143) ὁ δὲ λεγόμενος μῦθος ὅτι ἐκβάλλει τὰς μήτρας τεκοῦσα τῶν εἰκῇ πεπιστευμένων.

(140) <The male> breeds and the female is bred every season, just as in humans, and the lioness' cub starts walking once it is ten months old. Copulation occurs when the female lowers herself and the male mounts her. (141) The lioness is pregnant for two months. Her entire life, the lioness gives birth five times: the first time five cubs, then four, next three, then two, and finally one—after which she conceives no more. (142) The newborns are small and blind, like those of the dog, so that they can barely walk after two months. (143) The story that is told that it expels its womb when giving birth is among the things believed in vain.

The paragraphs concerning reproduction are drawn from *Hist. An.* 6.31, 579a32–579b11. However, the very first sentence already offers information that diverges from Aristotle's text. While Aristophanes asserts that lions bear πᾶσαν ὥραν ("every season"), like humans, Aristotle explicitly denies this (οὐ πᾶσαν ὥραν), stating instead that they reproduce once a year. It is possible that the negative particle οὐ was simply lost either in the epitome or in Aristophanes' copy of Aristotle's text. In any case, it is worth noting that, in *NA* 4.34, Aelian provides a statement that aligns with Aristophanes' claim: μίξεως δὲ αὐτὸν οὐδεμία ἔτους ἀναστέλλει ὥρα ("there is no season of the year in which it abstains from coupling").

I propose that the phrase ἄρχεται βαίνειν ὅταν γένηται δεκαμηνιαῖος, which appears in the section on the lion's mating behavior, may reflect a scribal corruption of βαίνειν ("walking") for <ἐπι>βαίνειν

[38] The manuscript reads δεκαμηνιαῖος ("ten months old"), but Lambros emended this to διμηνιαῖος ("two months old") in his edition. See below for discussion.

("mounting"), especially since Aristophanes already states further down that lions do not begin walking until they are two months old. Moreover, the transmitted reading δεκαμηνιαῖος ("ten months old") warrants reconsideration, as Lambros' conjectural emendation to διμηνιαῖος ("two months old") is grounded precisely in the subsequent statement.

Furthermore, Aristophanes offers a more general statement that lions give birth five times over the course of their lives (a claim also found in Ael. *NA* 4.34). Aristotle (*Hist. an.* 6.31, 579b8–11), however, specifies that this applies specifically to lions in Syria (οἱ δ' ἐν Συρίᾳ λέοντες). This discrepancy may be the result of Aristophanes conflating two distinct statements by Aristotle. Earlier in *Hist. an.* 6.31, 579b1, Aristotle discusses the number of cubs a lioness typically gives birth to (τίκτει δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δύο, τὰ μέντοι πλεῖστα ἕξ· τίκτει δ' ἐνίοτε καὶ ἕν), indicating that while two cubs are most common, a lioness may occasionally bear as few as one or as many as six. Aristophanes may have unintentionally merged these two passages, generalizing Aristotle's statement about Syrian lions to all lions, thereby introducing the inaccuracy. In *Gen. an.* 3.1, 750a32–35 and 3.10, 760b23, Aristotle revisits this topic, discussing the underlying reasons for this phenomenon, though now referring to lions in general. He explains that the semen residue is used up and that the sperm itself diminishes as the prime of life abates. Unlike Aristotle, Aristophanes does not provide a causal explanation—an essential goal of Aristotle's methodological approach—but rather limits himself to systematically collecting zoological information.

The claim that lions are born blind does not have a precise parallel in the *Hist. an.* The information instead seems to be drawn from *De generatione animalium*. While *Hist. an.* 6.31, 580a4–5, in discussing hares, states that most fissiped animals are born blind, *Gen. an.* 2.6, 742a8–11 explicitly includes lions among them. Moreover, *Gen. an.* 4.6, 774b10–13 provides an explanation for this initial blindness, attributing it to the fact that fissiped animals are multiparous. This characteristic causes, in the early stages, the embryos to be fully nourished; however, as they grow and reach a certain size, the mother's body can no longer sustain their full development, leading them to be born in an imperfect condition.

Finally, as in Aristotle, there is an implicit critique of Herodo-

tus,[39] who, commenting on the supposed fact that the lioness only begets one litter in her life, claims that, as soon as a lion cub begins to move within the mother's womb, it tears the womb apart with its claws. This opinion is indicated by the phrase ὁ λεγόμενος λόγος in Aristophanes and ὁ λεχθεὶς λόγος in Aristotle (both without explicit mention of Herodotus' name). Aristotle was well acquainted with Herodotus' scientific observations but frequently disagreed with him. Interestingly, Aristophanes uses the same term as Herodotus, ἡ μήτρα, whereas Aristotle opts for ἡ ὑστέρα. Moreover, the expression τῶν εἰκῇ πεπιστευμένων appears in Aristophanes in two other instances. In *Epit.* 2.180, Aristophanes uses this phrase to express his disagreement with the interpretation found in Aristotle's *Hist. an.* 6.20, 574b29–575a1, which states that Argos, Odysseus' dog, lived for twenty years.[40] In *Epit.* 2.380, while discussing the weasel, he similarly distances himself from the notion that the weasel mates through the mouth,[41] which appears to be a warped version of what

[39] Hdt. 3.108.4: τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, ἡ δὲ δὴ λέαινα, ἐὸν ἰσχυρότατον καὶ θρασύτατον, ἄπαξ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τίκτει ἕν· τίκτουσα γὰρ συνεκβάλλει τῷ τέκνῳ τὰς μήτρας. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε ἐστί· ἐπεὰν ὁ σκύμνος ἐν τῇ μητρὶ ἐὼν ἄρχηται διακινεόμενος, ὁ δὲ ἔχων ὄνυχας θηρίων πολλὸν πάντων ὀξυτάτους ἀμύσσει τὰς μήτρας, αὐξόμενός τε δὴ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐσικνέεται καταγράφων· πέλας τε δὴ ὁ τόκος ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ παράπαν λείπεται αὐτέων ὑγιὲς οὐδέν. ("While this is so with the hare, the lioness, who is a very strong and very bold animal, gives birth once in her life to a single offspring: for when she gives birth, she expels her womb along with the cub. This is the reason for it: when the cub first begins to stir while being in the mother, having much sharper claws than those of any other creature, it tears the womb, and, as it grows, by scratching it penetrates ever deeper; thus, when the hour of birth is near, absolutely nothing of it remains intact.")

[40] Ar. Byz. *Epit.* 2.180: ζῇ δὲ ὁ μὲν Λακωνικὸς ἔτη δέκα, ἡ δὲ θήλεια δώδεκα· αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ζῶσι δεκατέσσαρα. τὸ δὲ μυθολογούμενον περὶ τοῦ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως κυνός, ὡς εἴκοσιν ἔτη ἔζησε, τῶν εἰκῇ πεπιστευμένων ἐστίν. ("The Laconian dog lives for ten years, while the female lives for twelve; the other females live for fourteen years. As for the story about Odysseus' dog, that it lived for twenty years, is among the things believed in vain.") On Aristotle's passage, see R. Mayhew, *Aristotle's lost « Homeric problems »: textual studies* (Oxford 2019) 55-57.

[41] Ar. Byz. *Epit.* 2.380: τὸ δὲ μυθολογούμενον ὡς διὰ τοῦ στόματος ὀχεύει τῶν εἰκῇ πεπιστευμένων· οὐ γὰρ ὀχεύει, ἀλλὰ †τιθασεύει† ὡς ἡ περιστερά. ("The story that it mates through its mouth is among the things believed in

Aristotle states in *Gen. an.* 3.6, 756b13–757a2, namely that weasels are erroneously thought to give birth through the mouth simply because they usually carry their young in their mouth.[42] Aristophanes' switching from "giving birth" to "mating" may be accounted for by the fact that, right before mentioning the weasel, Aristotle explained that, according to some ill-founded belief, raven-like birds copulate via the mouth.[43]

Epit. *2.144–149: Behavioral Attributes and Temperament*

(144) ἔστι δὲ ὁ λέων τὸ ἦθος λιμώττων μὲν χαλεπός, βεβρωκὼς δὲ πραὺς καὶ φιλοπαίγμων, καὶ οὔτε ὑπερόπτης οὔτε τῶν συνήθων ἀδικητικός. συσχεθεὶς δὲ τῇ θηρείᾳ ὑπὸ πολλῶν, οὐδέποτε φεύγει, οὐδὲ τὰ ὀπίσθια διδοῖ· ὑποβαίνει δὲ κατὰ σκέλος βρυχώμενος, καὶ τῷ μὲν βάλλοντι προσέρχεται, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὐ πρόσεισι. διώκων δὲ ἔχει δρόμημα σύντονον καθάπερ καὶ οἱ κύνες. συνεγγίζων δὲ τῷ διωκομένῳ καὶ ἐπιρρίπτει ἑαυτόν, ἵνα ταχύτερον ἐπιτύχῃ. πρὸς δὲ τὰς πόλεις ἔρχονται οἱ λέοντες ὅταν γένωνται γέροντες, ἵνα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διώκωσιν, ἀδυνατοῦντες θηρεύειν. λέγεται δὲ κατ' αὐτοῦ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ πῦρ φοβούμενος φεύγει. (145) ἔστι δὲ τῶν λεόντων γένη δύο, ὧν ὁ μὲν στρογγυλώτερος καὶ οὐλοτριχώτερος δειλός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ μακρὸς καὶ εὔθριξ ἀνδρεῖος. (146) τῶν δὲ δηχθέντων ὑπὸ λέοντος οἱ ἐπίδεσμοι πλυνόμενοι οὐδέποτε ἀνιᾶσι τὸν ἰχῶρα. (147) ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνόσων ζῴων ὁ λέων. (148) χρᾶται δὲ τῇ βρώσει λάβρως ὥστε ὅλα καταπίνειν μέλη· εἶτα διὰ τὴν λαβρότητα ἔστιν ὅτε μὴ φαγὼν διαλείπει ἡμέρας τρεῖς. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀλιγοποτούντων· διὸ καὶ τὸ περίττωμα προΐεται διὰ τρίτης ἡμέρας ἐσφαιρωμένον· προΐεται δὲ καὶ φῦσαν δριμεῖαν καὶ οὖρον ὀσμὴν ἔχον σαπράν. (149) γίνονται δὲ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν λεόντων μεταξὺ τοῦ Νέσσου καὶ

vain; for it does not mate, but †tames†, like the pigeon.")

[42] Arist. *Gen. an.* 3.6, 756b33–757a2: ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τίκτειν πάμπαν μικρὰ τὴν γαλῆν καθάπερ καὶ τἆλλα σχιζόποδα, περὶ ὧν ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, τῷ δὲ στόματι πολλάκις μεταφέρειν τοὺς νεοττούς, ταύτην πεποίηκε τὴν δόξαν. ("But, because the weasel gives birth to very tiny young ones, as the other fissipeds do as well, about which we shall speak later, and it often carries its young in the mouth, this fact has led to this belief.")

[43] Arist. *Gen. an.* 3.6, 756b13–15: εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἳ λέγουσι κατὰ τὸ στόμα μίγνυσθαι τούς τε κόρακας καὶ τὴν ἶβιν καὶ τῶν τετραπόδων τίκτειν κατὰ τὸ στόμα τὴν γαλῆν. ("For there are some who say that ravens and the ibis mate by the mouth and that, among the four-footed animals, the weasel gives birth through the mouth.")

Ἀχελῴου ποταμοῦ.

(144) In temperament, the lion is fierce when hungry but gentle and playful when sated. It is neither arrogant nor aggressive toward those familiar with it. Even when hunted by many, it never flees nor turns its back. Instead, it steps back laterally, roaring, and attacks the person shooting it, but it will not attack those who do not. When pursuing prey, it runs swiftly, as dogs also do. As it closes in on the prey pursued by it, it also hurls itself forward to seize it more quickly. Lions approach the towns after they have grown old, seeking to prey upon humans because they are unable to hunt. It is said that it fears fire above all else and flees from it. (145) There are two kinds of lions: one, rounder in shape and with curlier hair, is cowardly; the other, longer and with flowing hair, is brave. (146) As for those bitten by a lion, the bandages, even when washed, never stop the sero-purulent discharge. (147) The lion is also one of the animals resistant to disease. (148) It eats with such voracity that it swallows limbs whole. Next, because of its voracity, it sometimes takes an interval of three days in which it does not eat. It is also one of the animals that drink little. That is also why it discharges its excrement every other day in a round-like shape. Moreover, it discharges a pungent wind and urine with a putrid smell. (149) Most lions are found between the rivers Nessus and Achelous.

Beginning from paragraph 144, Aristophanes focuses on the character of the lion, drawing from *Hist. an.* 8(9).44, 629b8–29 as his source. However, his account differs significantly from Aristotle's in both style and content. A first distinction between the two texts lies in their sentence structure and overall flow. Aristophanes' passage is characterized by brevity and clarity, resembling an expository style with short, well-structured sentences. His presentation of information is straightforward and easily comprehensible. In contrast, Aristotle's passage employs longer and more complex sentences, resulting in a more fluid and descriptive narrative. This stylistic difference influences how the information is processed: Aristophanes delivers a concise and factual account, while Aristotle presents a more expansive and immersive discussion. A key stylistic divergence is Aristotle's incorporation of literary elements. While Aristophanes' passage remains plain and expository, Aristotle enriches his descriptions by referencing Homer, which lends an authoritative and poet-

ic dimension to his discussion of the lion's fear of fire.

Both texts examine similar aspects of lion behavior, including their reactions to hunger, hunting strategies, and fear of fire. However, Aristophanes emphasizes the lion's courage and steadfastness, asserting that it never flees, even when outnumbered. Aristotle, while addressing similar themes, offers a more detailed account of the lion's movements, particularly its adaptive strategies in response to different surroundings. This additional detail contributes to a more nuanced depiction of the lion's behavior in the face of threats.

A minor variation arises in their respective descriptions of the lion's interactions with familiar individuals. Aristotle characterizes the lion as playful and affectionate toward both those reared with it and those familiar with it (πρός τε τὰ σύντροφα καὶ συνήθη σφόδρα φιλοπαίγμων καὶ στερκτικός). In contrast, Aristophanes refers only to those familiar with the lion (πραΰς καὶ φιλοπαίγμων, καὶ οὔτε ὑπερόπτης οὔτε τῶν συνήθων ἀδικητικός), omitting any explicit mention of its bond with its rearing companions. Furthermore, a subtle distinction emerges in their portrayal of the lion's playfulness. In Aristophanes' account, lions exhibit playful behavior specifically when they are sated, whereas Aristotle presents this as a general characteristic.

Another notable difference pertains to the lion's disposition. Aristotle describes the lion as being free of suspicion toward anything (οὐχ ὑπόπτης οὐδενός), whereas Aristophanes states that the lion is not arrogant (οὔτε ὑπερόπτης). This discrepancy raises the question of whether it originates from a textual corruption, either on Aristophanes' part or that of a later scribe.

Moreover, unlike Aristotle, Aristophanes differentiates between individuals who are attacked by the lion and those who are not (τῷ μὲν βάλλοντι προσέρχεται, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὐ πρόσεισι). Aristotle, in contrast, simply states that, if an individual shooting at the lion misses, the lion will attack but will not harm the person.

Paragraph 145 is closely linked to *Hist. an.* 8(9).44, 629b33–35. In terms of word choice, both texts use the same vocabulary. In Aristophanes' account, however, the adjectives δειλός (cowardly) and ἀνδρεῖος (brave) denote absolute qualities. In contrast, Aristotle uses the comparative forms δειλότερον (more cowardly) and ἀνδρειότερον (braver), which imply a gradation rather than a strict dichot-

omy. Furthermore, Aristotle reinforces the categorical nature of this classification by positioning the term γένη at the beginning of the sentence, thereby emphasizing the distinction between the lion types.[44] Another difference concerns the lion's hair. The manuscript tradition of the *Historia animalium* appears to preserve the adjective εὔτριχον (both LSJ and the Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek refer the reader to the lemma εὔθριξ, while Lampe translates it as "very hairy"), a rarely attested term whose earliest known occurrence is found in a verse from Euripides' *Heracles*.[45] However, the third Basel edition of Aristotle (1550) conjecturally emended this reading to εὐθύτριχον ("with straight hair"). The most recent critical edition of the *Historia animalium*, edited by Balme (2002), has retained εὔτριχον. In contrast, Aristophanes' text attests the form εὔθριξ, meaning "with beautiful/flowing hair."

The subsequent paragraph examines the effects of bites inflicted by a lion, with particular emphasis on the difficulty in treating the sero-purulent discharge through bandages. This passage closely corresponds to *Hist. an.* 8(9)44, 630a5–8. However, Aristotle offers a more detailed description, characterizing ἰχώρ with the adjective ὠχρός (yellow) and comparing the treatment of such wounds to those caused by dog bites.

Paragraph 147 is particularly noteworthy, as it represents the earliest known instance of the adjective ἄνοσος used in conjunction with the noun ζῷον. Furthermore, no other known author states that the lion is among the animals resistant to disease. This unique attribution suggests that Aristophanes may have introduced an original observation or relied on a now lost source.

After that, Aristophanes examines the feeding and excretory habits of the lion, drawing from *Hist. an.* 7(8).5, 594b18–25 as his source. In terms of vocabulary, both texts exhibit significant lexical overlap. However, while Aristophanes describes the lion's excrement as being discharged in a rounded shape (ἐσφαιρωμένον—if Lambros' emendation is accepted), Aristotle characterizes it as ξηρὸν καὶ ἐξικμασμένον (dry and desiccated), emphasizing its texture rather than its form. It is important to note, however, that the

[44] For Aristotle's definitions of the term *γένος*, see *Metaph.* Δ 28.
[45] E. *HF* 934.

manuscript *Athos Dionysiou* 180 appears to read ἐσφυρωμένον instead. Given that the preceding statement—that the lion drinks little—functions as a premise for the subsequent conclusion introduced by διό ("therefore"), it is plausible to consider this a cause-effect structure. Therefore, perhaps the original reading was something akin to ἐξηρασμένον ("dried out"), which would reiterate the dryness of the excrement and thus better support the causal link Aristotle appears to establish between limited water intake and the consistency of the lion's excrement.

The two accounts also diverge in their descriptions of the frequency of defecation. Aristophanes states that waste is expelled διὰ τρίτης ἡμέρας (every other day), whereas Aristotle provides a more flexible account, stating διὰ τρίτης γὰρ ἢ ὅπως ἂν τύχῃ (every other day or at random intervals), thereby acknowledging natural variability. Similarly, they differ in their depiction of the lion's fasting duration. Aristophanes asserts a strict three-day period, while Aristotle allows for either two or three days. Furthermore, Aristophanes uses the adjective σαπρός in conjunction with ὀσμή, a lexical combination unattested in extant Greek literature before his time. This collocation, however, appears in later texts, including Alexander's *In librum de sensu commentarium* (p. 95 Wendland: αἱ σαπραὶ ὀσμαὶ), Pseudo-Aristotle's (Pseudo-Alexander's) *Supplementa Problematorum* II 156 (p. 230 Kapetanaki and Sharples: ταῖς διεφθαρμέναις ὀσμαῖς καὶ σαπραῖς), the *Hippiatrica Berolinensia* (*CHG* I p. 102: ὀσμὴν ἔχοντα σαπράν; *CHG* I p. 352: ὀσμὴν ἔχον σαπράν), and the *Apophthegmata e cod. Coislin. 126* 356 (μετὰ σαπρῆς ὀσμῆς).

Finally, Aristophanes provides geographical information about lions, stating that most of them are located between the rivers Nessus and Achelous. This region, situated in northern Greece, extends from Acarnania to Thrace. His sources for this information are *Hist. an.* 6.31, 579b5–7 and 7(8).28, 606b14–16.[46] However, Aristotle underscores that lions are not only rare but also confined to specific regions. He further specifies that this area between the two rivers is the only place in all of Europe where lions are found.

[46] Nonetheless, the foundational authority on this geographical delineation is Herodotus (7.126). However, note that Herodotus calls the river Νέστος (not Νέσσος).

Epit. *2.150: Lifespan*

(150) βιοῖ δὲ ὅσα καὶ ὁ κύων ζῶν ἔτη δεκαοκτώ.

(150) It lives as long as the dog, which lives eighteen years.

While *Hist. an.* omits specific information regarding the lion's lifespan—only stating that lions live for many years [ἔτη δὲ ζῶσι πολλά, 8(9).44, 629b30]—Aristophanes addresses this gap by referencing the case of the dog, as he does for the wolf,[47] despite the absence of such a connection in the Aristotelian text. Whether this piece of information was introduced by Aristophanes himself—drawing from alternative sources or as his own deduction, transporting the lifespan of the dog to that of the lion—or by an intermediary in the textual tradition between Aristophanes and the Byzantine *Sylloge* remains uncertain, given that no other known work in Greek literature provides an indication of the lion's lifespan.

Nevertheless, this inclusion is significant, as it prompts a deeper investigation into the broader role of the dog within the *Epitome*. Notably, the dog is the most frequently mentioned animal in this text. The word κύων appears 134 times throughout the entire Byzantine *Sylloge*—46 occurrences more than in the *Hist. an*. This frequent citation indicates that the dog is a crucial point of comparison across multiple entries.

The particularly high frequency of references is most evident in the second book, which is specifically devoted to discussions of individual animals. In the passages attributed to Aristophanes of Byzantium, the dog is mentioned in relation to the lion (2.136, 2.138, 2.142, 2.144, 2.150), the wolf (2.210, 2.211, 2.216), the leopard (2.248), the jackal (2.286), the cat (2.296, 2.299), the striped hyena (2.311, 2.312, 2.313), the bear (2.331), the mouse (2.345), the fox (2.390, 2.391), the hare (2.409), the hedgehog (2.424), the deer (2.487), and the horse (2.578). Often these connections are made when it comes to anatomical similarities between dogs and these various species. Aristophanes' Alexandrian readers had likely never witnessed the dissection of a dog. However, they could derive addi-

[47] Ar. Byz. *Epit.* II 216: ζῇ δὲ ὁ λύκος ὅσα περ καὶ ὁ κύων ἔτη. ("The wolf lives the same number of years as the dog.")

tional information from the section on dogs. Aristophanes' comparisons can thus be understood as intratextual references, as pointed out by Hellmann.[48]

In contrast, in the first book—best understood as a general introduction—the term κύων appears seven times. Of these occurrences, six explicitly refer to the dog, highlighting its characteristics as a domesticated and friendly fissiped (1.16, 1.25) with saw-like teeth (1.6). Additionally, the text sheds light on the dog's gestation period, which closely aligns with that of the she-wolf, the lioness, the mouse, the panther, the leopard, the cat, and the mongoose (1.48, 1.50). The dog is also noted as the only animal able to vomit, besides man (1.110). The seventh occurrence of κύων in the first book (1.44), however, refers not to the animal itself but to the *dog days*—the hottest period of summer.

Conclusion

The close reading of the sections on the lion from Aristophanes' *Epitome* confirms four interrelated conclusions with wider consequences for how we use epitomes as sources for ancient biological knowledge. First, Aristophanes depends heavily on Aristotle's *Historia animalium* as his primary source, but he rarely copies it *verbatim*: he paraphrases, reorganizes, and sometimes rephrases Aristotelian material to fit a species-by-species template that he explicitly sets out at the start of the second book. This patterned reordering—name, anatomy, reproduction, behavior, lifespan—means that the *Epitome* often preserves Aristotelian facts, yet presents them in a different textual and rhetorical frame.

Second, not everything in Aristophanes' account is traceable to the *Historia animalium*. The sections on the lion contain elements that are absent from the extant Aristotelian corpus (for example the precise lifespan equated with that of the dog), and they sometimes transfer details from other entries (notably the dog) into the lion's profile. These dislocations can reflect several possibilities that the case study highlights without resolving: dependence on additional sources (other Alexandrian or now-lost writings), selective bor-

[48] Hellmann, in *Aristo of Ceos* 350.

rowing from Aristotle's wider biological corpus (including works no longer extant), or authorial interpolation by Aristophanes himself. In practical terms, such material complicates any attempt to reconstruct Aristotle from epitomizing authors and shows the *Epitome* to be a generative, not merely derivative, witness in the transmission of zoological knowledge.

Third, some of Aristophanes' deviations look like erroneous paraphrase of Aristotle: they are consistent with the possibility that he worked from a faulty exemplar or that he misread or misunderstood his Aristotelian material. Recognizing this possibility matters methodologically: it warns against treating every divergence as evidence of an independent tradition and encourages close textual comparison with other witnesses before attributing novelty to Aristophanes himself.

Fourth, Aristophanes' *Epitome* departs decisively from the methodological program that underpins Aristotle's biological writings. Aristotle's approach—as he frames it in *Part. an.* 1.1, 639a15–22—is a question about level of inquiry: should we treat each substance (οὐσία) such as "human," "lion," "ox" separately, or should we instead investigate the accidents (συμβεβηκότα) common to all animals? Although Aristotle does not resolve the issue in this passage, his zoological project rests on the assumption that one must first assemble the relevant accidents and thereafter account for why those accidents pertain to the animals in question at the proper level of generality. Moreover, the opening to the *Historia animalium* sets out Aristotle's twofold plan: (1) collect and organize the differences and attributes that characterize animals, and (2) go on to discover and give causal explanations for those facts.[49]

Aristophanes, in contrast, reorganizes material according to individual species and confines his action largely to the first stage, while systematically neglecting the second stage, causal inquiry. In the sections on the lion factual observations appear, yet explanations that would locate those facts within Aristotle's causal framework are absent. For example, the *Epitome* provides no causal account of why lion bones are particularly hard, why lion cubs may be born blind, or why certain anatomical features are attributed to the lion. That

[49] *Hist. an.* 1.6, 491a7–14.

absence matters methodologically because, without causal articulation, the listed facts remain formally unintegrated; they read as isolated data-points rather than pieces within an explanatory whole. What in Aristotle functions as data to be explained becomes in the *Epitome* an end in itself.

Why Aristophanes adopted this form remains an open question, but I argue that the evidence favors an intentional editorial choice: Aristophanes set out to produce a compact, species-oriented handbook for a readership different from Aristotle's (poets, scientists, or a more general, non-philosophical public). One can nevertheless concede other factors that likely shaped the *Epitome*'s form: partial access to Aristotle's corpus (for example missing books that set out the theoretical program), or genuine misunderstanding of Aristotle's methodological priorities. Whatever the reason, the crucial point for interpretation is this: the *Epitome* reproduces the descriptive scaffolding of Aristotelian biology while largely excising the causal architecture that gives those descriptions their philosophical significance. Consequently, when using Aristophanes as evidence for Aristotle, scholars must distinguish between the descriptive observations the *Epitome* preserves and the causal, theoretical principles it omits.

Taken together, the case of the lion demonstrates that epitomes can be rich sources of information precisely because they transform their exemplars: they conserve, compress, adapt, and at times innovate. For scholars, this implies two cautions and two opportunities. The cautions are (a) to avoid treating epitomes as transparent mirrors of their sources and (b) to exercise care when using epitomes to reconstruct lost works. The opportunities are (a) to use patterned divergences (repetitions, transpositions, new vocabulary) to trace chains of transmission and lost sources, and (b) to study epitomes as a distinct literary and intellectual phenomenon that reshaped how knowledge was organized and consumed in the Hellenistic and Byzantine worlds.

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