

# Dating the Peace of 375/4 B.C.

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THE PEACE OF 375/4 B.C. stands as a minor monument to the complexities of fourth-century chronology. A. Momigliano,<sup>1</sup> G. L. Cawkwell,<sup>2</sup> and R. Sealey,<sup>3</sup> among others, have attempted to date precisely the conclusion of the peace treaty; and the most likely, indeed the only reasonable, candidates suggested so far have been autumn 375 and spring 374.<sup>4</sup> I do not believe that the peace can be fixed beyond all doubt to either date, because the evidence for the date is a blend of the exact and the relative; and the degree of relativity condemns it to uncertainty. Nevertheless each of these writers has failed to devote full attention to one aspect of the question—the Theban operations in Phokis. Xenophon at *Hellenica* 6.2.1 states that while the Spartans and Thebans were confronting each other in Phokis, the peace was concluded. If the Theban invasion of Phokis can be dated with a fair degree of certainty and thus be set securely within the chronological framework, it would put us one step closer to ascertaining the date of the peace treaty itself.

The peace treaty must be put after the cruise of Timotheos, which Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.4.63) clearly places in 375 B.C.: ἄτε δὲ εἰς τὰς Θρήβας

<sup>1</sup> “Un momento di storia greca: la pace del 375 a. C. e il Plataico di Isocrate,” *Athenaeum* n.s. 14 (1936) 3–35 [hereafter, MOMIGLIANO].

<sup>2</sup> “Notes on the Peace of 375/4,” *Historia* 12 (1963) 84–95 [hereafter, CAWKWELL].

<sup>3</sup> “IG II<sup>2</sup>. 1609 and the Transformation of the Second Athenian Sea-League,” *Phoenix* 11 (1957) 95–111 [hereafter, SEALEY].

<sup>4</sup> Scholars favoring autumn 375 B.C. include: K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* (Berlin and Leipzig 1922) III<sup>1</sup> 156 and III<sup>2</sup> 234 [hereafter, BELOCH, GG]; Momigliano 3 n.1, 27; S. Accame, *La lega ateniese del secolo IV A. C.* (Rome 1941) 143–51 [hereafter, ACCAME, *La lega*]; Cawkwell 88–91; T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (London and New York 1965) 58; spring 374 B.C.: Georg Busolt, “Der zweite athenische Bund,” *Njbb* suppl. 7 (Leipzig 1874) 771; W. Judeich, “Athen und Theben vom Konigsfrieden bis zur Schlacht bei Leuktra,” *RhM* n.f. 76 (1927) 181; Sealey 102; summer 374 B.C.: Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* V (Stuttgart and Berlin 1902) 397 [hereafter, MEYER, *GdA*]; F. H. Marshall, *The Second Athenian Confederacy* (Cambridge 1905) 65; A. G. Roos, “The Peace of Sparta of 374 B.C.,” *Mnemosyne* 4.2 (1949) 266 n.1; P. Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie* (Namur 1952) 126; S. Lauffer, “Die Diodordublette XV 38= 50 über die Friedensschlüsse zu Sparta 374 und 371 v. Chr.,” *Historia* 8 (1959) 321.

οὐκ ἐμβεβληκότων τῶν πολεμίων οὐτ' ἐν ᾧ Κλεόμβροτος ἤγε τὴν στρατιὰν ἔτει οὐτ' ἐν ᾧ Τιμόθεος περιέπλευσε. Timotheos fought the naval battle in the waters between Leukas and Alyzeia on the Attic feast of Skira, which took place on 12 Skirophorion.<sup>5</sup> After this point there are no definite dates connected with Timotheos' activities in the Ionian Sea. He undoubtedly spent the rest of the summer ready to baffle any Spartan attempt to regain the area, while at the same time he strengthened Athenian influence there. The fruits of his efforts were not long in coming. By early autumn 375 B.C. Kerkyra, Akarnania and Kephallenia concluded formal alliances with Athens.<sup>6</sup>

While Timotheos was thus engaged, the Spartan navy posed no serious threat to his efforts. Although the Spartan fleet was still a serious naval entity after the Battle of Alyzeia, it did not again challenge the supremacy of Timotheos' squadron.<sup>7</sup> Instead the Lakedaimonian *triereis* were probably called back to the Corinthian Gulf sometime that summer. The Spartans had voted to send their field-army under Kleombrotos to protect Phokis from Theban invasion, and the Spartan warships presumably escorted the transports that were to ferry the army to Phokis.<sup>8</sup> After this event no further Spartan naval activity is mentioned.<sup>9</sup>

Timotheos was still in the Ionian Sea during the time that Kleombrotos was active in Phokis.<sup>10</sup> The sources do not say whether he passed the winter months in the west or returned to the Peiraieus. Yet in all probability he returned to Athens instead of wintering in the

<sup>5</sup> Polyainos, *Strat.* 3.10.4.

<sup>6</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 96 = Tod, *GHI* no.126. On the dating of this inscription, see Accame, *La lega* 46, 86–87, who puts the prytany named in the inscription in August–September 375 B.C., and H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* (Munich and Berlin 1962) II no.262. See also IG II<sup>2</sup> 43 lines 97–110 and IG II<sup>2</sup> 97. Even though IG II<sup>2</sup> 43 lines 97–111 are the source of much trouble, the names above the erasure in line 111 are generally dated to 375 B.C. by Dittenberger, *SIG<sup>3</sup>* 147 n.35, and also by A. G. Woodhead, "IG II<sup>2</sup> 43 and Jason of Pherae," *AJA* 61 (1957) 370–72. For recent bibliography see Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge* II no.257.

<sup>7</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.66, although K. Klee, *RE* 6A (1937) 1326, doubts that Nikolokhos again offered battle to Timotheos' fleet.

<sup>8</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.1; even though Xenophon does not specifically state that Nikolokhos' warships escorted this convoy, it is unthinkable that the Spartans would have ferried their main field-army without an escort, especially with Timotheos still in the Ionian Sea.

<sup>9</sup> The next time that a Spartan fleet was called into action, it first had to be collected again: Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.3.

<sup>10</sup> Otherwise Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.17 makes no sense when he speaks of *morai* stationed near Sparta to be employed against Athenian *triereis*.

Ionian Sea.<sup>11</sup> By autumn 375 he had built up Athenian prestige in the west and had added several new members to the Athenian Confederacy. He could not continue his naval activity into the winter months, due to the inability of the Greek *triereis* to operate safely in rough seas. Clearly there was nothing else to be done there. Nevertheless, K. Klee<sup>12</sup> maintains that Timotheos remained in the west throughout the winter in order to be active on behalf of the Athenian Confederacy and to be prepared to meet a renewed Spartan threat the next spring. In the first place Timotheos had been active for the Confederacy, and had in fact completed this end of his mission with considerable success. Klee's second point is much stronger. Admittedly the Athenians, if they recalled Timotheos' ships, would be forced to reassemble the fleet the next spring, but the same would hold true for the Spartans. Any state threatened by the Spartan fleet would be expected to hold out until the Athenian relief-force arrived. This course of action is exactly the one taken by the Athenians when Mnasippos later blockaded Kerkyra.<sup>13</sup>

If Timotheos had little to gain by remaining in the Ionian Sea, he stood to lose much. Ever since the Battle of Alyzeia he had been hampered by lack of money.<sup>14</sup> He had originally been dispatched from Athens at the head of 60 *triereis*; and after the battle he manned ten more in Kerkyra.<sup>15</sup> Thus he did not lack ships, but he did need money badly in order to pay his crews their overdue wages.<sup>16</sup> Even though he had the necessary provisions to stay the winter, his want of money caused a great deal of grumbling among his ships' crews, who were on the point of mutiny.<sup>17</sup> In these circumstances to keep a fleet in the west throughout the winter would have been a super-human feat. Had the ships' crews been kept there for the winter, it would have been necessary to pay them during that time. If, on the other hand, they returned to Athens, they could be disbanded.

<sup>11</sup> For Timotheos' operations, see Beloch, *GG* III<sup>1</sup> 154 and III<sup>2</sup> 234–35. Cawkwell 89 also argues that Timotheos returned to Athens. Some of those who take the opposite view are Marshall, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.4) 65; Klee, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.7) 1326; and Sealey 102.

<sup>12</sup> *loc.cit.* (*supra* n.7).

<sup>13</sup> *Xen. Hell.* 6.2.4–26; *Diod.* 15.46.1–3. Cawkwell 86 states that "Timotheos went out long before Corcyra was directly attacked," but even so Timotheos sailed originally because the Kerkyrians claimed that they were threatened.

<sup>14</sup> *Xen. Hell.* 5.4.66; [*Arist.*] *Oec.* 1350a30.

<sup>15</sup> *Xen. Hell.* 5.4.63–66; Beloch, *GG* III<sup>1</sup> 154.

<sup>16</sup> *Xen. Hell.* 5.4.66; [*Arist.*] *Oec.* 1350a30.

<sup>17</sup> [*Arist.*] *Oec.* 1350a30.

The added expense of paying for an inactive fleet was not the sort of luxury that Athens could afford at that moment. Despite Athens' brilliant naval victories, especially Chabrias' victory at Naxos and Timotheos' at Alyzeia, Athenian finances were in a depleted state.<sup>18</sup> The Athenians were suffering from extraordinary taxes and from raiding expeditions staged from Aigina.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, Thebes was not contributing to the treasury.<sup>20</sup> Matters were not much better in 373 when Iphikrates resorted to extreme measures to gather money and ships for the relief of Kerkyra.<sup>21</sup> After his operations around Kerkyra, Iphikrates supposedly financed his operations by selling his captives into slavery.<sup>22</sup> At any rate, Athens in this period could hardly support a fleet that did not defray at least part of its own operating expenses. Thus, a fleet laid up for the winter in the Ionian Sea was simply too great a financial burden for the Athenian treasury.

Therefore, in all likelihood, Timotheos sailed home in autumn 375. Here Xenophon ends Book V of the *Hellenica*.

Xenophon begins Book VI by tying preceding events together, this time rather loosely: *Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι περὶ ταῦτα ἦσαν. οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι ἐπεὶ κατεστρέψαντο τὰς ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις, ἐστράτευον καὶ εἰς τὴν Φωκίδα.*<sup>23</sup> The difficulties begin here. If Timotheos did not winter in the Ionian Sea, the Theban expedition into Phokis should be placed sometime in 375. Such dating is not impossible. Earlier in 375 there had been Theban raids on Plataiai<sup>24</sup> and Orkhomenos,<sup>25</sup> both of which probably took place in the spring. That the attack on Orkhomenos and the Battle of Tegyra which ensued occurred in the spring is clearly indicated by the condition of Lake Kopais, still very high and impassable at the time of the battle.

The Thebans had long tried to crush Orkhomenos, which formed

<sup>18</sup> Momigliano 13 sums up Athens' position concisely: "Una piena superiorità militare, limitata dalla precaria condizione delle finanze e correlativamente dalla impossibilità di ottenere per via militare il successo definitivo di prestigio, era insomma la caratteristica della posizione di Atene." See also Meyer, *GdA* V 396.

<sup>19</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1.

<sup>20</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1, although Cawkwell 91–93 points out that Thebes may not have been required to pay out money on behalf of the fleet. His argument involves the thorny problem of when the system of *syntaxeis* was introduced. See also Sealey 109 and, for the opposite view, Marshall, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.4) 38–39, and Accame, *La lega* 131–33.

<sup>21</sup> Polyain. 3.9.30; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.14.

<sup>22</sup> Diod. 15.47.7; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.36.

<sup>23</sup> See also Diod. 15.36.6–37.1.

<sup>24</sup> Plut. *V.Pelop.* 25.3–5; Meyer, *GdA* V 391.

<sup>25</sup> Diod. 15.37.1, 81.2; Plut. *V.Pelop.* 16.3, 17.1–5; Beloch, *GG III*<sup>1</sup> 154–55.

one of the Spartan strongholds in Boiotia. The Thebans kept close watch on the Spartan garrison stationed in Orkhomenos, and awaited a chance to catch the city defenseless. Reports filtered into Thebes that the garrison had made an expedition into Lokris, and immediately the boiotarch Pelopidas led a force against Orkhomenos. Arriving before the city, Pelopidas found it reinforced by a second Spartan contingent. He then retired from the city, moving north of Lake Kopais along the foot of the mountains. The route through Tegyra was the only one open to him, since the plains were impassable due to high water. While thus retreating, the Thebans ran into the first Spartan army returning from Lokris. Pelopidas and the Sacred Band attacked the Spartans and routed them near Tegyra.

The topographical conditions of the area around Orkhomenos, as described by Plutarch, prove that Pelopidas led his abortive raid in the spring. Although Lake Kopais has now been drained, it has been carefully described by Colonel William Leake and by J. G. Frazer. Frazer's observations are of especial interest:

So well recognised were these vicissitudes of the seasons that places on the bank of the lake such as Orchomenus, Lebadea, and Copae had summer roads and winter roads by which they communicated with each other, the winter roads following the sides of the hills, while the summer roads struck across the plain. With the setting in of the heavy autumn rains in November the lake began its rise and reached its greatest depth in February or March, by which time the emissaries were completely submerged and betrayed their existence only by swirls on the surface of the mere . . . In spring the water began to sink. Isolated brown patches, where no reeds grew, were the first to show as islands in the mere; and as the season advanced they expanded more and more till they met. By the middle of the summer great stretches, especially in the middle and at the edges, were bare . . . By the end of August the greater part of the basin was generally dry.<sup>26</sup>

Thus, the depth of the lake when Pelopidas fought the Battle of Tegyra proves that he was operating in the spring, probably very early spring before the water-level had begun to drop to any great extent.

<sup>26</sup> J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias' Description of Greece* V (London 1913) 111; see also W. M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece* II (London 1835) 280–94. Cf. W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography* II (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969) 89 n.13.

Since the Battle of Tegyra had been fought in the early spring, the Thebans could have sent an army into Phokis in the summer of the same year, almost certainly as a follow-up to the battle. This interlude in Phokis was short-lived, and need not be thought of as a major campaign. The Thebans invaded, then withdrew to Boiotia when a Spartan army under Kleombrotos arrived in Phokis. In fact, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.2.1), the Thebans retreated from Phokis while the Spartans and their allies were still assembling (or so one would interpret the imperfect *συνελέγοντο*): *Οἱ μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ κύμμαχοι συνελέγοντο εἰς τοὺς Φωκέας*. Thus it is quite possible that by early August 375 B.C. the Thebans were back in Boiotia, guarding the approaches from Phokis in case of an invasion by Kleombrotos.

Placing the Theban invasion of Phokis in summer 375 would tightly compress the events of that summer, but not impossibly so. Here Polyainos' date for the Battle of Alyzeia becomes even more significant than before. The battle was fought on 12 Skirophorion 375/4 B.C.; and, as Xenophon says,<sup>27</sup> while the Athenians and Lakedaimonians were thus engaged, the Thebans invaded Phokis. True, Xenophon speaks in very general terms, yet he has just been describing the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Alyzeia in the preceding book. Furthermore he has not yet gone on to narrate subsequent events. His opening words in Book VI sum up what has already happened before he continues with his narrative.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, Polyainos' date, if accepted, helps to determine that the Thebans did invade Phokis in 375 B.C., undoubtedly after the Battle of Tegyra and almost certainly as a strategic follow-up to it.

If, on the other hand, the Theban operations against Phokis are put in 374 B.C., as Sealey suggests,<sup>29</sup> another problem is raised, especially

<sup>27</sup> *Hell.* 6.1.1; see also Diod. 15.36.6–37.1.

<sup>28</sup> Malcolm MacLaren Jr, "On the Composition of Xenophon's *Hellenica*," *AJP* 55 (1934) 131 and n.42, discusses this type of sentence in the *Hellenica*, and gives an extensive list of them, among which is 6.1.1. He comments: "With these sentences Xenophon sums up and rounds off one subject, and pauses momentarily before proceeding with the next topic. These sentences are usually very short, they generally contain a demonstrative word . . . and they are very frequently introduced by *μὲν δὴ*." This type of sentence, incidentally, is very similar to the one used by Diod. 15.37.1: "*Ἄμα δὲ τούτοις πραττομένοις Θεβαῖοι μὲν ἐστράτευσαν ἐπ' Ὀρχομενόν*." See also Cawkwell 89, who mentions that peace in 374 would stretch Xenophon's account "uncomfortably."

<sup>29</sup> Sealey 103; Meyer, *GdA* V 397, dates the first dispatch of Kleombrotos to Phokis in 374 and the second (V 409) in 371. J. Wolter, in J. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder* IV (Berlin 1931) 290, assumes that Kleombrotos was first sent to Phokis in 375/4 and remained there until

if the conclusion of the peace is placed in spring or summer 374. Momigliano, and more recently Cawkwell, have shown that the peace was still in effect until 373.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, the Theban attack on Phokis would have come either during or after the peace negotiations. The former would have been in spirit a breach of the peace, and the latter an outright transgression of the articles of the peace. Despite lack of Theban enthusiasm for the peace, it is highly unlikely that the Thebans would have taken a step that would disrupt the negotiations, especially since the Athenians had threatened to exclude them from the peace unless they supported Athenian efforts for a settlement.<sup>31</sup> A Theban attack after the treaty had been signed would have been not only a breach of the peace agreement but also an act of war. Nowhere do the sources accuse the Thebans of any such violation of the peace, and certainly Isokrates in the *Plataikos* would have painted Theban perfidy of this sort in the worst colors, especially since this speech is clearly a propaganda attack on the Thebans and their efforts towards the unification of Boiotia. Thus, placing the Theban threat to Phokis in 374 conjures up more problems than it lays to rest.

The last significant piece of evidence for the date of the peace treaty adds its own perplexities to an already perplexing question. Isokrates and Cornelius Nepos<sup>32</sup> mention that the peace treaty was so advantageous to Athens that a festival to Eirene was established and celebrated with sacrifices every year. The scholiast to Aristophanes' *Peace* 1019 states: *φασὶ γὰρ τῇ τῶν συνοικείων ἑορτῇ θυσίαν τελεῖσθαι Εἰρήνην, τὸν δὲ βωμὸν μὴ αἵματοῦσθαι, Ἑκατομβαιῶνος μηνὸς ἕκτη ἐπὶ δέκα*, which would place the festival in late summer or early autumn.<sup>33</sup> Although M.P. Nilsson<sup>34</sup> places the establishment of the cult after the Peace of 371 B.C., Ludwig Deubner<sup>35</sup> proves that it was founded to celebrate the Peace of 375 B.C. The question here is why the festival of Eirene should be joined with the celebration of the Synoikia. Eirene

the Battle of Leuktra. Beloch, *GG* III<sup>1</sup> 160–61 and III<sup>2</sup> 236–38, argues that he was sent once to Phokis (in 371); against this view is M. Cary, "Notes on the *ἀπιστεία* of Thebes," *JHS* 42 (1922) 184–85.

<sup>30</sup> Momigliano 27–32; Cawkwell 84–88; Ryder, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.4) 61.

<sup>31</sup> Isoc. 14.37; Ryder, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.4) 59.

<sup>32</sup> Isoc. 4.109–10; Nep. *Timoth.* 2.2–3.

<sup>33</sup> Momigliano 17; A. Mommsen, *Heortologie* (Leipzig 1864) 96–104 and Taf. II; but see also E. J. Bickerman, *Chronology of the Ancient World* (Ithaca 1968) 36–38, who points out the difficulties in assigning Julian dates to Attic months.

<sup>34</sup> *RE* 4A (1932) 1435.

<sup>35</sup> *Attische Feste* (Berlin 1932) 37–38, followed by Momigliano 16–17.

and Athena may not have been the direct antithesis to one another, but they were not exactly boon-companions either. F. Jacoby<sup>36</sup> suggests that the festival was inserted in Hekatombaion, which contained the greatest festivals to Athena, because the Athenians were so happy over the peace; yet he does not sound convinced of this himself. Cawkwell<sup>37</sup> proposes that the festival was celebrated on 16 Hekatombaion because that was the day on which peace was made, which would explain the unlikely pairing of the festivals. This suggestion is eminently sensible and probably correct. Taking an opposite view, Sealey<sup>38</sup> feels that peace could not have been made so early as August 375. Yet Cawkwell points out that Timotheos had won the Battle of Alyzeia the month before; and, as suggested above, the Thebans could have concluded their abortive Phokian campaign by this time. True enough, these events are tightly packed together, but nonetheless an acceptable sequence of events can be established: (1) the Battle of Tegyra in spring, (2) the Battle of Alyzeia in June, (3) the Theban invasion of Phokis while the Athenians and Spartans were still embroiled off Akarnania, and finally (4) the conclusion of peace just after the Thebans had returned from Phokis. Therefore, peace was concluded in late summer 375 B.C.

Peace in the autumn of 375, moreover, has two attractive features. First, after the signing of the peace, the Athenians sent messengers to Timotheos with orders to return to Athens.<sup>39</sup> Consequently Timotheos would be relieved of the problem of keeping a fleet manned by unruly sailors in the Ionian Sea over the winter. Next, peace in 375 B.C. would explain why the Spartans did not move south into Boiotia from Phokis, as the Thebans evidently expected them to do. With the Phokians acting as guides (as they were to do for Kleombrotos before the Battle of Leuktra), the Spartans could easily have followed up their early advantage. Yet the Spartans did nothing. Xenophon leaves his readers with the Spartans still assembling in Phokis, and the Thebans guarding the approaches from Phokis to Boiotia. Cessation of hostilities in 375 B.C. would explain why the Spartans did not invade Boiotia, regardless of how inviting the opportunity may have been.

In conclusion, I would date the peace to the late summer or early

<sup>36</sup> *FGrHist* IIIb Supp. I.420–21 and IIIb Supp. II.522–25.

<sup>37</sup> Cawkwell 90 n.56.

<sup>38</sup> Sealey 102.

<sup>39</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.2; E. von Stern, *Geschichte der spartanischen und thebanischen Hegemonie* (Dorpat 1884) 101; Meyer, *GdA* V 397.



autumn of 375 B.C., rather than to spring 374 B.C. This dating is, however, open to dispute because the very nature of the evidence will not permit a dogmatic position. Nevertheless, the sequence of events here suggested is reasonable and agrees well with all available chronological information, especially that contained in Xenophon's account. In summer 375 B.C. the Thebans invaded Phokis while the Spartans and Athenians still faced each other in the Ionian Sea. During the Theban invasion, negotiations took place among the major belligerents which resulted in a general peace. By autumn 375 hostilities had ceased, and Greece saw a brief season of peace.<sup>40</sup>

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