

Asklepiades and *Historia*

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WHAT WE KNOW of Asklepiades' grammar is preserved by Sextus Empiricus, who quotes him by name three times in the *adv. Grammaticos*, but follows him, as has long been known, to some extent in the general layout of his refutation. In his summary of the doctrines of the grammatical theorists, however, Sextus has not only compressed their views but also distorted them by forcing them into artificial schemes.

We know that Asklepiades (*adv. Gramm.* 61, *cf.* 72) defined *γραμματική* as a *τέχνη* in contradistinction to the *ἐμπειρία*-definition¹ of his great predecessor Dionysius Thrax; in this I believe he was following an otherwise unknown Ptolemaios the Peripatetic;² in addition he quoted³ Callimachus (*adv. Gramm.* 47ff) to demonstrate that *γραμματική* was divided into two sections, *γραμματιστική* (= *litteratio*), reading and writing, and *γραμματική* proper (= *litteratura*),⁴ higher literary studies. This was a well known division (Stoics, Quintilian, Varro, Cicero),⁵ the origin of which lay in Greek educational and

¹ For Cicero's view on such a distinction see H. Dahlmann, *Studien zu Varro 'de Poetis'*, *AbhMainz* 1962 no.10, p.14. It seems that Asklepiades too followed a traditional scheme in the introduction to his work.

² A. Dihle, *Hermes* 85 (1957) 314ff, rejects the identification with Ptolemaios Chennos, and also Wilamowitz' guess of Ptolemaios of Askalon (*Antigonos von Karystos* [Berlin 1881] 27). But his own equation with the *φιλολογώτατος* peripatetic Ptolemaios whom Longinus heard in his youth (*Porph. V.Plot.* 20; *cf. RE* 23.2 [1959] 1860 s.v. PTOLEMAIOS 70) can scarcely stand in view of F. Kudlien's new dating of Sextus to *ca.* 100 (*RhM* 106 [1963] 254). If the *adv. Gramm.* is in fact a late work (references in E. Krentz, *Phronesis* 7 [1962] 155), it should have been written about 130 or before. More important, the language of § 61 seems to indicate to me that Asklepiades is following Ptolemaios' argument, *i.e.* that Ptolemaios is to be placed between Dionysius Thrax and Asklepiades, and therefore, like all the other grammarians quoted by Sextus, before 30 B.C.

³ For the reasons adduced by B. A. Müller, *De Asclepiade Myrleano* (diss. Leipzig 1903) 27; *cf. schol. Dion.Thrax* 3.19ff Hilgard.

⁴ E. W. Bower, *Hermes* 89 (1961) 474ff.

⁵ *RE* 7 (1912) 1808ff s.v. GRAMMATIK (Gudeman); *SVF* II p.31,25; Varro fr.235 F.; Quint. 1.4.2; K. Barwick, *Remmius Palaemon und die röm. Ars grammatica* (Leipzig 1922) 219ff and esp. 231. Varro, as one would expect, mentioned several systems of grammar, including that of Dion. Thrax (234F) and the notorious *quadripartitio*, which H. Usener probably wrongly attributed to Tyrannion (*RE* 7A [1943] 1818 s.v. TYRANNION 2 [Wendel]).

grammatical theory, as can be seen from the division into *ὀριστική-ἐξηγητική* or *μεθοδική-ἱστορική*. Unfortunately what follows Asklepiades' definition is certainly not all his, nor is what precedes (*ad. Gramm.* 44–46);⁶ and we can only conclude that his analysis of the word *γράμματα* was meant to justify the concern of grammar with literature in its widest form, *i.e.* both prose and poetry.

In §§ 61–90 Sextus gives us a series of definitions of previous grammarians (Ptolemaios, who agrees with Asklepiades in his criticism of Dionysius Thrax; Chares;⁷ Crates the Stoic; and Demetrios Chloros).⁸

These two fragments however are insignificant compared with Asklepiades' tripartition of *γραμματική* quoted in *adv. Gramm.* 252, for it corresponds to Sextus' own outline in § 91, which he follows throughout. *γραμματική* is divided by Sextus into *τεχνικόν*, *ἱστορικόν* and *ἰδιαιτέρον*, while Asklepiades (§ 252) divides into *τεχνικόν*, *ἱστορικόν* and *γραμματικόν*, which partakes of the previous two parts.⁹ Sextus has rechristened Asklepiades' special term *γραμματικόν* as *ἰδιαιτέρον*, in order to avoid confusion with the general term *γραμματική* (*cf.* 44 with 93). By this division Asklepiades doubtless meant, in Stoic fashion, that the *τεχνικόν* and the *ἱστορικόν* were together subordinate to the *γραμματικόν* proper, *i.e.* the study of literature, or literary criticism. This view takes support from several considerations: (a) the definition of Chares (76ff), which looks like a development of Asklepiades' system, where this subordination is evident; (b) the fact that Asklepiades' *γραμματικόν*, unlike the other two parts, is nowhere separately defined by Sextus; (c) the parallel with the Stoic system of

⁶ W. Heintz, *Studien zu Sextus Empiricus* (Halle 1932) 264, points out that §§ 44–48 and 49–56 do not logically connect with each other or what follows or what precedes.

⁷ J. Mau's second ed. (Leipzig 1961) annoyingly fails to correct the definition of Chares or Chairis as it appears in § 76; the correct text is given by schol. Dion. Thrax p.118,11 Hilgard: *ἔξιν εἶναι ἀπὸ τέχνης <καὶ ἱστορίας> διαγνωστικὴν*. The homoeoteleuton was first corrected, to my knowledge, by Barwick, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.5) 219 n.2. I am incidentally not quite so certain as Mau and some older scholars that Chares was not his name. The paradigmatic declensions of Chares and Theon in § 237 are both grammarian names, and it was a habit of grammarians to use their own names as *παραδείγματα*, which would then be transmitted by the doxography, the most notorious instance being Tryphon in Apoll. Dysc. *Syntax*; in general see A. Nauck, *Aristophanis Byz. Fragmenta* (Halle 1848) 6 n.8; many Stoic examples in G. Bühring, *Untersuchungen zur Anwendung . . . der stoischen numeri officii* (diss. Hamburg 1960) 26 n.83.

⁸ In the middle of the first cent. B.C., V. di Benedetto, *AnnPisa* 35 (1966) 321ff.

⁹ There is a remarkable parallel in Sen. *Ep.* 88.3, which was noted by Barwick, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.5) 219, and not by A. Stückelberger, *Senecas 88. Brief* (Heidelberg 1965) 103, who wrongly compares Dion. Thrax for the tripartition *curam sermonis . . . historias . . . carmina*.

Tauriskos (248), whose *λογικόν* and *τριβικόν* together equal Asklepiades' *τεχνικόν*, and whose *κριτική* has subordinate to it *λογικόν*+*τριβικόν* and *ἱστορικόν*; (d) the fact that Sextus clearly has confused Tauriskos' system by parallelism instead of subordination.¹⁰

These three divisions of Asklepiades are followed by Sextus:

(i) §§ 97–247 deal with the *τεχνικόν*, or technical part, divided as Sextus promises (91ff) into three parts, as was customary: (a) 99–168, *στοιχεῖα* and *μέρη λόγου*; (b) 169–75, orthography; (c) 176–247, *ἑλληνισμός* (= *latinitas*), which includes a discussion of analogy *versus* anomaly, etymology, and barbarism.

(ii) The *ἱστορικόν*: §§ 248–69.

(iii) The literary part: § 270–end, *τὸ περὶ ποιητᾶς καὶ συγγραφεῖς*. Roughly speaking, these three parts represent the same areas as the six subdivisions of Dionysius Thrax.

The problem centres on § 252, where Sextus summarizes Asklepiades' theory of the *ἱστορικόν*, a passage which at one time gave rise to a great deal of controversy¹¹ through its implications for the origin of the novel and its parallels with the divisions of *narratio* according to the *Auctor ad Herennium* and Cicero, *De Inventione*. My purpose is to see what we can derive from the text of Sextus' treatise to help elucidate this early theory of the *ἱστορικόν*. The text of §§ 252–53 runs as follows (in my translation, with Mau's text and apparatus):

“Asklepiades, after stating in his work on grammar that there are three primary parts of grammar, technical, historical, grammatical (the last partakes of both the historical and the technical), divides the historical part (*ἱστορικόν*) into three; for, he says, of *ἱστορία* one (*sc. ἱστορία*) is true to some extent [if this is the translation of *τινα*], one false, and one as if true; true is the *πρακτική* (*sc. ἱστορία*), *ψευδῆ δὲ τὴν περὶ πλάσματα καὶ μύθους, ὡς ἀληθῆ δὲ οἶά ἐστιν ἢ κωμωδία καὶ οἱ μῆμοι*. Of the true (*sc. ἱστορία*) there are in turn three parts: the one (*sc. ἱστορία*) is concerned with the persons of gods and heroes and notable men, another with places and times, another with actions (*πράξεις*). Of the false (*sc. ἱστορία*) i.e. the mythical, he says there is only one kind, the genealogical. He says, like Dionysius, that the part dealing with glosses is also subordinated to the *ἱστορικόν*; for it evidences (*ἱστορεῖ*) that *κρήγυον* is ‘true’ or ‘good’. Similarly with *παροιμιῶν καὶ ὄρων*.”

¹⁰ Barwick, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.5) 218 n.2.

¹¹ E.g. W. Schmid (1914) in E. Rhode, *Der griechische Roman*⁴ (Darmstadt 1960) 603 n.3.

πλάσματα καὶ *del.* Mette | ἀληθῆ δὲ <τὴν περὶ πλάσματα> οἷα Mette:
ctrdic. Theiler *cl.*I 92 || ὄρων **G** *edd:* γρίφων *dub.* Fabricius: ἑορτῶν *dub.*
 Usener.

Mau quotes Mette for the transposition and Theiler for the refutation. The original emendation, however, was made by Kaibel (*cf.* § 263) in 1897¹² and rejected by Reichel,¹³ who compared § 265. This was rejected in turn by Barwick.¹⁴ Mau followed Theiler's defense¹⁵ of the text, in comparing § 92. The question is highly complex and depends ultimately on how carefully Sextus followed and interpreted his sources.

As it stands § 252 makes no practical sense, nor does it fit in with §§ 91ff or 263, where we have views so similar that it has been generally assumed that both these passages also are to be attributed to the influence of Asklepiades. Schissel von Fleschenberg¹⁶ recognized the problem in § 252 that there were really two divisions, one wrongly subordinated to the other, but his solution appealing to the divisions of some of the later progymnasmatic theoreticians is improbable; yet he rightly saw that there were two separate systems, one literary 'rhetorische-tendenziöse', the other historiographical 'historisch-sachlich'. Yet he did not account for the parallel chapters in Sextus, nor consider whether it was reasonable for Asklepiades to postulate a system into which only the first of the three types of history (true, false, and as-true) could be divided according to the aspects of place, time, etc., while the other two are apparently incapable of such a division.¹⁷ Worse still, how can γλῶσσαι be true or false or as-true, let alone παροιμίαι or 'definitions'?¹⁸ The one example that Sextus gives,

¹² G. Kaibel, *Die Prolegomena περὶ κωμωιδίας*, *AbhGöttingen* n.f. 2.4 (1897) 25, approved by R. Reitzenstein, *Hellenistische Wundererzählungen* (Leipzig 1906, repr. Darmstadt 1963) 90 n.1.

¹³ G. Reichel, *Quaestiones progymnasmaticae* (diss. Leipzig 1909) 60, approved by W. Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der röm. Literatur* (Stuttgart 1924) 61 n.37, and presumably by O. Schissel von Fleschenberg, *Hermes* 48 (1913) 626. See too D. Matthes, "Hermagoras von Temnos," *Lustrum* 3 (1958) 197 n.3.

¹⁴ Barwick, *Hermes* 63 (1928) 269 n.1, followed by J. Mesk, *WS* 46 (1928) 234.

¹⁵ *Gnomon* 28 (1956) 285, against H. J. Mette, *Sphairopoiia* (Munich 1936) 157, fr.18,20ff.

¹⁶ *Op.cit.* (*supra* n.13) 627.

¹⁷ E.g., how would one classify Plin. *Ep.* 9.33, *incidi in materiam veram sed simillimam fictae*, under the system enunciated in § 252?

¹⁸ Both glosses (*cf.* the definition of Dion. Thrax) and possibly παροιμίαι might be the object of *ιστορία*; but definitions must belong to the *τεχνικόν* since that is the origin of the term *ὀριστική*, and grammarians, including perhaps Asklepiades (B. Heinicke, *De Quintiliani*,

that the gloss *κρήγυον* means 'true', is meaningless as a general criterion, for then we would divide according to the meaning of glosses, and not according to the correctness of the use of glosses. As it stands and probably as Sextus wrote it, § 252 can only be a misrepresentation of a grammatical system.

We have three sources to which we may appeal, all in themselves of dubious value as evidence, §§ 91, 263 and Sextus' general discussion¹⁹ of the *ἱστορικόν* 248–69. He begins, as he did in classifying the parts of *γραμματική*, by discussing earlier theories of the Stoic Tauriskos, pupil of Crates, of the Alexandrian Dionysius Thrax, and finally of Asklepiades. In §§ 255–69 he deals with and refutes various types of *ἱστορία*, utilizing his own medical analogies.

In §§ 257 (cf. 92) and 263 the definitions of Asklepiades recur, first the tripartite division (*ἱστορίαι*) times/places, people, actions, followed by examples; then the tripartite division (*ἱστορούμενα*) true, false, as-true, followed again by examples. Here there is no sign that these systems are in any way subordinated to each other; on the contrary, it seems clear that these two systems are redivisions of the same subject matter according to different criteria. The 'historiographical' division occurs in §§ 92, 252, 257, and from 252 and 257 we see that such divisions are called *ἱστορίαι* whereas the 'rhetorical' divisions are called *ἱστορούμενα*; i.e. we have a division according to (a) the nature of the subject to be investigated and (b) the degree of truth of the object under investigation. It might be possible then to subordinate (b) to (a), but not *vice versa*, and we may safely assert that it is Sextus who forced this absurdity upon Asklepiades.²⁰

What caused Sextus to introduce his mistaken subordination? It is possible that he thought that the 'historiographical' division applied only to *πρακτική ἱστορία*, but in trying to follow through with his equations he became muddled in equating *πλάσματα*, 'myth', 'false', and *γενεαλογική*, which of course must be wrong. An incidental but im-

Sexti, Asclepiadis arte grammatica [diss. Strassburg 1904] 75) apparently agree that the *ὀριστικόν* is unsystematic (§§ 269 and 254). To the emendations proposed in Mau's text I would add *ποταμῶν καὶ ὄρων*, comparing *ὄρων ἢ ποταμῶν* in § 92 as the object of the *ὀριστικόν*; but see below p. 324 for a probable explanation.

¹⁹ Barwick, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.5) 253ff, indicates the dangers inherent in using Sextus as a source for Asklepiades; cf. Heinicke, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.18) 8ff, who makes this error.

²⁰ Barwick, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.14) 269, gives a similar explanation of the confused divisions of *narratio* in Anon. Seguerianus, which is generally accepted, e.g., by A. La Penna, *Sallustio e la rivoluzione romana* (Milan 1968) 312ff.

portant advantage of this supposition is that it would partially resolve the problem of the glosses and proverbs; since it might conceivably be possible to consider them under the headings of both (a) the area to which they belong and (b) whether or not they are true. The example that Sextus gives then must be fictitious, an attempt to explain his own confusion. It may be that Sextus' confusion was caused by the terminology of Asklepiades. He divides *γραμματική* into three parts, one being *γραμματικόν*; he divides—so Sextus—*πρακτική* into three parts, one of which is *πράξεις*;²¹ and he divides *ἱστορικόν* into three parts, one of which was *ἱστορία*, corresponding to the later *argumentum, fabula, historia*.

Both these systems occur elsewhere, separately but never subordinated. The 'historiographical' system is really quadripartite, as the parallel literature shows, and, we might suppose, originally a Stoic *περίστασις*;²² it is not historiographical (Polyb. 9.1.3; Cic. *De Or.* 2.53) in any real sense, but is simply a practical system of division (*quis, quid, ubi, quando*) which finds expression in rhetoric, law and philosophy, technical grammar (Varro, *Ling.* 1.5.3ff) and *ἐκφράσεις*. None of Sextus' three statements concerning this system match each other exactly. In § 92 he divides *personae, loci* and then switches into *πλάσματα, μῦθοι* and the rest, where we should expect *tempora* and *res*. We have a tripartition here compounded from our two systems, which should not therefore be used as a basis for judging the text of § 252. In § 257 Sextus gives us the complete division into four parts, which he subdivides into two groups; *personae + res* and *tempora + loci*. In § 253 these four divisions have become three by a fusion of *loci + tempora*. This is significant, since it seems to me almost certain that Asklepiades' division of the *ἱστορίαι* was quadripartite, as in § 257, and that therefore the presentation in § 252 is caused by Sextus himself.

After I had written this paragraph, I discovered that the remarkable dissertation of G. Bühning suggested other avenues of exploration. The Stoic *numeri* have a longer history and a wider application than

²¹ On the possibility of confusion with *πραγματική* and *πρακτική*, see *infra* n.37.

²² *Quis, quid, quando, ubi* are the first parts of almost all the *περίστασεις* cited by R. Volkman, *Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*² (Leipzig 1885) 36ff. See also Dahlmann, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.1) 121ff with litt.; M. Fuhrmann, *Das systematische Lehrbuch* (Göttingen 1960) 186 n.2, and 166. H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* I (Munich 1960) 202ff, follows the slightly different system of Quint. 5.10.23. First authority on all these systems is now Bühning, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.7), after H. Usener, "Ein altes Lehrgebäude," *Kl. Schriften* II (Leipzig 1912) 286–87, and F. Schupp, *WS* 45 (1926) 175f.

previously realized. Bühring²³ seems to follow Matthes in suggesting a dependence of Asklepiades from Hermagoritic rhetoric; this I believe to be unjustified. The *quadripartitio* of Asklepiades has no more direct parallel with Hermagoras' or Theophrastus' rhetoric than with Quintilian's or with Aristotle's categories or the ethical *numeri* of the Stoics. It is a definite division into four and no more. We know it to be associated principally with Varro, as his words (*Ling.* 5.10) reveal:

*Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse bina ut finitum et infinitum, bonum et malum, vitam et mortem, diem et noctem. quare item duo status et motus; quod stat aut agitur, corpus; ubi agitur, locus; dum agitur, tempus; quod est in agitu, actio. quadripartitio magis sic apparebit; corpus est ut cursor, locus stadium qua currit, tempus hora qua currit, actio cursio. quare fit, ut ideo fere omnia sint quadripartita et ea aeterna, quod neque unquam tempus, quin fuerit motus; eius enim intervalum tempus; neque motus, ubi non locus et corpus, quod alterum est quod movetur, alterum ubi: neque ubi is agitur, non actio ibi. igitur initiorum quadrigae locus et corpus, tempus et actio.*²⁴

Whence Varro derived this strange paragraph, we cannot say; I do not follow Dahlmann's view, who sees a mixture of Stoic and Pythagorean doctrines, and prefer to think that Varro found both bipartite and quadripartite divisions in the same text, which would not of course exclude the view that the ultimate sources were as Dahlmann postulates. If Varro had one text, then it was a pseudo-Pythagorean.

What is important is the fact that Varro attached such importance to this *quadripartitio* that he used it as scheme for different works, and even in such a place as this, fr.335 Buecheler from Aulus Gellius 13.11: *Ipsum deinde convivium constat, inquit, ex rebus quattuor et tum denique omnibus suis numeris (!!) absolutum est, si belli homunculi conlecti sunt (1), si electus locus (2), si tempus lectum (3), si apparatus non neglectus (4).*

Bühring²⁵ learnt this from Knoche, but Dahlmann²⁶ had already drawn attention to this same phenomenon and paralleled it from other works, following Boissier and Usener. There can be no doubt that this is the same *quadripartitio* as is followed by Asklepiades, since

²³ *Op.cit.* (*supra* n.7) 248 n.606, though only indirectly.

²⁴ Quoted after H. Dahlmann, *Varro und die hellenistische Sprachtheorie* (Berlin 1932) 36, who analyses the passage.

²⁵ *Op.cit.* (*supra* n.7) 314.

²⁶ Dahlmann, *MusHelv* 7 (1950) 219 with references.

Varro's *actio/actus/res* corresponds to Asklepiades' *πράξεις*,²⁷ where we might expect *circumstantiae* or *causae* had the system followed been that of Theophrastus (*ap. Gell. 1.3.28*) or Aristippus (fr.29 Mannebach = Diog.Laert. 2.66) or Seneca (*De Officiis*, deduced by Bühring from Martin of Bracara, *Formula vitae honestae* p.475,30 Haase) or other quadripartitions. Bühring follows Dahlmann in supposing that Varro derived his *quadripartitio* from a reduction of the Stoic *numeri* and suggests as source Antiochus of Askalon.²⁸ I find this not entirely satisfactory. Certainly Varro was much influenced by Stoic linguistic theory as by other Stoic beliefs, but it is difficult to see why at the cost sometimes of great confusion to his work he should have picked out only the four *numeri* and applied them so relentlessly to so many areas. One feels he must have known of a *quadripartitio* of some wider appeal. Again it seems impossible that Varro and Asklepiades, who were contemporaries, could have derived the *quadripartitio* from each other, or independently from the Stoic *numeri*; it would be easier to imagine an intermediate source for both Varro and Asklepiades.

But now we see that the 'historiographic' divisions are *numeri*, and are intended to define an act, hence the frequent connection of them with *ὀρίζω*, e.g. Arist. *EN 1109b14*: οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον διορίσαι καὶ πῶς καὶ τίς καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον; cf. Pl. *Leg. 636E*, where the νόμων πέρι διασκοπούμενοι will be able to judge by using them.

From this observation we may derive two results. The 'definitions' of Sextus are a mistaken attempt to convey the notion that the *quadripartitio* is a means of definition of the subject of *ἱστορία*; its four divisions are *διορισμοί*, the very term that Bühring²⁹ has found in Aspasius applied to the *numeri*. Secondly they are means of definition, not, as Sextus claims, objects of definition of *ἱστορία*, which is represented by our next division.

The second division³⁰ of the *ἱστορούμενα* into true, false and as-true

²⁷ Noted by Bühring, *loc.cit.* (*supra* n.23); Dahlmann (see previous note) defends *actus* in Varro, *Ep. ad Mar. ap. Non.Marc. 545,4 M. Res=actus* in Quint. *Inst. 3.6.28*. Varro also used *res* as the final part of a *quadripartitio* (Bühring, *op.cit.* [*supra* n.7] 113; Dahlmann, *op.cit.* [*supra* n.24] 36 n.4). Obviously the terminology was not fixed, which means that in Greek we could substitute *πράξεις* for *πράγματα*. See *infra* n.37.

²⁸ Cf. W. Kroll, *RhM* 58 (1903) 564ff.

²⁹ Bühring, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.7), quoting Aspasius, *Comm. in Arist. EN* p.82,21 (Heylbut) on *EN 1115b10 ff.* I am indebted to Bühring for the two previous quotations also.

³⁰ A. Rostagni, *Arte poetica di Orazio* (Turin 1930) introd. lvii, and *Scritti minori* I (Turin 1955) 207, calls this system Theophrastean without, I think, sufficient justification. Barwick, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.14) 282, gives better reasons (doubted by F. W. Walbank, *Historia* 9 [1960]

recurs only in § 263, since we have seen that the mention of *πλάσματα* and myths in § 92 is due to a confusion and therefore unhelpful for our purposes. However, § 263 contradicts § 252 both in general and in detail: (a) in general, the divisions that are defined in § 263 are *ἱστορία*, *μῦθος* and *πλάσμα*, whereas the divisions defined and exemplified in 252 are true, false and as-true; (b) in particular, *πλάσμα* as division is defined in 263 as ‘as-true’ while the division ‘false’ in 252 is exemplified by *τὴν περὶ πλάσματα καὶ μύθους* (*sc. ἱστορίαν*).

Not unreasonably, therefore, Kaibel and others saw in 263 the original system, since (a) *πλάσματα* must include comedies and mimes, (b) a similar connection of *μῦθος* and *πλάσμα* occurs in 92 and 265, showing the tendency of the thought of Sextus (*cf.* Plut. *Camill.* 22 . . . *μυθώδη καὶ πλασματίαν*), (c) the parallels show that the objects to be defined are as in 263, and (d) the addition in 263 of *γεγονότα* (truth) and *ἀγένητα* (myth) presupposes a third division of *οὐ γεγονότα ἀλλ’ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο*, *i.e. κατὰ φύσιν* possible, *i.e. comedy*³¹ and mime. However it should be apparent by now that Sextus, probably by equating true *ἱστορία* with the *numeri*, was perfectly capable of making the blunder with *πλάσματα*; we should therefore refrain from emending the text in § 252.

If the first division represents means, then the second division represents objects, which are to be defined by the application of the *numeri* as belonging to three groups, true, false and in-between. The immediate inference is that we have a reworking of the Stoic concept of the ethical *ἀδιάφορον*, which by application of the *numeri* can be defined as good, bad or indifferent. But we can go further. What Asklepiades has done is to introduce a literary true, false and true-false *tripartitio* into the framework we normally associate with Stoic ethics. This tripartition has been traced rightly to Isocrates and ultimately to Plato, *Rep.* II 376E by Pfister.³²

227) for its being generally Peripatetic. Matthes, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.13) 196 n.3, agrees with Barwick, and in the context of the rhetoric of Hermagoras, shows that we have in it a *κατὰ πράγματα* system opposed to a *κατὰ πρόσωπα* system. Müller, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.3) 35, thinks of *ὄργανα* as opposed to *μέρη*, as in the system attributed by Usener to Tyrannion.

³¹ Clearly New Comedy, since Old Comedy would be *παρὰ φύσιν*. On this complex issue, see the basic discussion of Barwick cited *supra* n.20 with Matthes’ comments. Sextus has misunderstood his source here too.

³² F. Pfister, *Hermes* 68 (1933) 457. One must of course avoid confusion with the common *historia* (= *facta*)—*fabula* antithesis, where grammatical theory is disregarded; *cf.* Mesk, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.14) 233. Our tripartition is not to be confused again with the famous one in Pl. *Rep.* III 392D, on which lastly P. Steinmetz, *Hermes* 92 (1964) 461.

To summarize, Asklepiades subordinated τεχνικόν and ιστορικόν to his γραμματικόν proper, explained in § 91. The τεχνικόν he subdivided into elementary grammar, orthography and ἑλληνισμός. The ιστορικόν he subdivided in one way, according to a quadripartition (*personae, loci* and *tempora, res*, the first being subdivided [§§ 92, 252] into gods, heroes and men); the object being a κατὰ πράγματα division of ιστορούμενα according to truth content.³³ Asklepiades then used a περίστασις with the object of defining ιστορία as true, false, or as-true, i.e. *historia* proper, *fabula*, and *argumentum*.

It will be obvious that such a scheme might be useful for the historiographer, but of little value for the grammarian, since the application of truth as a criterion to literature is historical, not literary criticism. We shall find that this suspicion is justified. What have we to understand by this term ιστορία, and why is Sextus so opposed to it? The complexity of the problem is principally due to the varied meanings of the Greek word, which underwent further variations on being imported into the Roman language.³⁴ As a result, a historian or a grammarian or a rhetorician each had a different view of ιστορία, inasmuch as it formed a part of all their arts. I offer an example of Polybius' conception, which makes an interesting parallel with the scheme of Asklepiades.

Polybius (9.14, 11.8) defines an education in generalship³⁵ as (a) research ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων, i.e. *in commentariis*, (b) acquaintance with proper informants,³⁶ (c) personal experience δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. In 12.25E he applies a similar system to πραγματικὴ ιστορία, i.e. (a) research into the *commentarii*, (b) geographical experience, (c) experience περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς. This methodological treatment of the art of the political historian³⁷ is parallel and not subordinate to

³³ Cf. the discussion in Entretiens Hardt 9, Varron (Geneva 1963) 26.

³⁴ In general see *TLL s.v. historia* and litt. there cited.

³⁵ Bühring, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.7) 302, notes that Epictetus, *Ench.* 30 mentions the application of *numeri* to define the duties of a general.

³⁶ H. J. Mette, *Paratereseis. Untersuchungen zur Sprachtheorie des Krates von Pergamon* (Halle 1952) 56, considers Polybius' views here to be 'empiric'.

³⁷ F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* (Oxford 1957) *ad loc.*, translates πραγματικὴ as 'political history', which must be right. But the term was a difficult one, cf. esp. for rhetoric W. Kroll, *Philologus* 91 (1936) 197ff, and for poetical theory H. Färber, *Philologus* 92 (1937) 369ff. In Plut. *Galba* 2.3 the function of πραγματικὴ ιστορία (cf. A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* I [Oxford 1945] 55), as opposed to Plutarch's own methods, is τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν γενομένων ἀπαγγέλλειν ἀκριβῶς. This comes from Arist. *Poet.* 1451b11: τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τί Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπραξεν καὶ τί ἔπαθεν. At *Pol.* 1341b30 πρακτικὰ is a division of poetry.

another theoretical discussion of historiography in 9.1.3 (cf. 9.2.1), where Polybius opposes his own *ὁ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τρόπος* to (a) *ὁ γενεαλογικός=περὶ μύθους* and (b) *ὁ περὶ τὰς ἀποικίας κτλ*, which is essentially a chronological scheme.³⁸ Despite the seeming coincidence here of his own type of history, which he claims appeals to the *πολιτικός*, with the *πραγματικὴ ἱστορία*, a closer examination shows that this is not so, since the two schemes are different in nature, one dealing with methods of acquiring and distinguishing true information, the other dealing with the (chronological) areas to be covered by historical research. Yet as I have suggested it is precisely by this easy error in subordinating the methodological division to *πρακτικὴ ἱστορία* only that Sextus too may have arrived at his subordinating system.

We must note also that in 12.25D–F Polybius is making an extensive but scarcely apposite³⁹ comparison with an early Alexandrian tripartite division of medicine. Of this comparison, which is both epitomized and corrupt, we can say only with certainty that Polybius equated the first part of his historical division with the *λογικόν*⁴⁰ of medical terminology, *i.e.* theoretical research into doxographical case histories, which, according to Polybius, being over-emphasized by the Alexandrians, militates against truth and the facts because not enough attention is paid to the practical side of medical research.

It will not be denied that there is a suspicious similarity between Polybius' three systems (a) *commentarii*/genealogy-myth/theory, (b) *θεά* concerning geography, (c) personal experience, *πράξεις, πράγματα*; and a resemblance to the quadripartition. Important for us is the conclusion that behind all this artificial systematization we seem to see a scheme where a type of *ἱστορία* was equated with *λογικόν*, with *commentarii*, research into myth, genealogies and mythological

³⁸ P. Scheller, *De Hellenistica historiae conscribendae arte* (diss. Leipzig 1911) 15ff; Schissel, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.13) 624. Isoc. 15.45 distinguishes prose mythographers, commentators on poetry, and war historians as prose genres before giving up. Varro apparently followed this chronological scheme in his *De Gente Populi Romani*.

³⁹ Cf. Walbank (*supra* n.37) *ad loc.*; Fuhrmann, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.22) 177; in general P. Pédech, *La Méthode historique de Polybe* (Paris 1964) index s.v. ASCLEPIADE, and pp.21–43.

⁴⁰ Cf. Tauriskos *ap. Sext. adv. Gramm.* § 248; later the empiric-skeptic *σημειωτικόν*. Also cf. Galen, *Subfiguratio empirica* 67.4 (Deichgräber): *καλεῖν πᾶν τὸ ἐν βιβλίοις γεγραμμένον ἱστορίαν, δῖοτι τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν ἰατρῶν οὕτως συνήθές ἐστι καλεῖν*. For genealogy in place of *personae* in our quadripartition see the scholia to Dion.Perieg. cited by Usener, *loc.cit.* (*supra* n.22).

personae. Therefore Polybius (9.14.1, cf. 11.8.1) equates τὰ ἐξ ἱστορίας with διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων, i.e. not empiric research, a true Hellenistic attitude.

Historia in Latin may mean *fabula* as in poetry or *annalium confectio* (Cic. *De Or.* 2.52) or anything in between. But in grammatical (i.e. educational) and medical parlance it preserved an original Greek sense of bibliographic research. In grammatical language, despite the definition of Dionysius Thrax and occasional protests from grammarians, this *historia* came to mean what every schoolboy knew, the *enarratio poetarum*.

This grammatical *historia* may be of a more specialized kind as in Varro, *Ling.* p.126,19 (Goetz-Schoell), which appears to mean 'Entwicklung der Sprache',⁴¹ or in the general use of *auctoritas* to translate ἱστορία in the sense of determination of stylistic authority. But its most common use in Latin as in Greek in grammatical language is in describing the research necessary to determine and explain the meaning and origin of a word or phrase or story in poetry; e.g. Cicero, *Div.* 1.116 compares interpreters of oracles with the grammarians' duty to the poets. Now this *historia fabularis* (Suet. *Tib.* 70) was always the province of the *grammaticus* (Suet. *Gramm.* 4: *poetarum interpres = grammaticus*) and included even what we should call aetiology.⁴² But there was a strong feeling that history in the strict sense belonged to the *rhetor* (Quint. 2.4.2, 2.5.1, esp. 2.1.4). This was a professional quarrel which could arise only with the division of education between *grammaticus* and *rhetorician*. Sextus § 268 agrees with Quintilian and Cicero (*De Or.* 2.62; *De Leg.* 1.2.5 etc.) that true historiography is the province of the *rhetorician*, though they often meant by this no more than prose history: *concessum est rhetoribus ementiri in historiis*, jokes Cicero, *Brut.* 42. In *De Or.* 2.62ff⁴³ Cicero assumes this, regrets the *rhetoricians* have not written historiography, proceeds to give (a) general historiographical principles, and then in 63 (b) the areas of history according to the scheme *tempus, locus, res gestae, homines, causae*.

⁴¹ R. Reitzenstein, *M. Terentius Varro und Johannes Mauropus von Euchaita* (Leipzig 1901) 82.

⁴² Dahlmann, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.24) 27.

⁴³ But Isoc. 15.45 and schol. Dion. Thrax 449.1 both exclude historiography from rhetoric. Note that at *De Or.* 2.53 Cicero classifies our *quadripartitio* as *annalium confectio*, possibly a hit at Varro.

In the eyes of dedicated historians, or those who had learned the proper clichés, the division between poetic *historia* and prose history was one between lies⁴⁴ and truth, and therefore the limits of grammatical *historia* were of perennial interest to all historians, since it was part of elementary schooling; many of the fixed clichés assembled by Scheller and Avenarius are to be explained by the desire on the part of historians to disassociate themselves from the common school prejudices about history, which reeked of pedantry and mythological obscurities, but also of fiction.

Precisely what this grammatical history was we can see best from the examples given us by the educators, who, if rhetoricians, usually write with a certain contempt, and by Sextus himself: it consists almost wholly of what we should now call mythology and biography, *usque ad ineptias atque derisum* (Suet. *Tib.* 70). Sextus adduces (§§ 257–258) several stories of biographical interest, which he calls ἄχρηστα.⁴⁵ He goes on to exemplify the folly of biography from the various accounts given of the deaths of Odysseus and Asklepios.⁴⁶

In Roman and in Hellenistic times we see the traces of a discussion that begins with the critics of Homer in the fifth century concerning the relationship of *historia* to truth⁴⁷ and its place in education. Of this we are offered principally views biassed according as the source is a historian, a rhetorician or a grammarian.⁴⁸

Sextus' tirade against *ἱστορία* falls into place when we realize that though skeptic, he dislikes the empiric school of medicine.⁴⁹ Especially he dislikes their—to his mind—unskeptical reliance on *ἱστορία*, transmitted case doxographies. We have a remarkable parallel in

⁴⁴ G. Avenarius, *Lukians Schrift zu Geschichtsschreibung* (Meisenheim 1956) 16; and *cf.*, Sext. *adv. Gramm.* 267: μηδεμίαν οὐσης ἀληθοῦς ἱστορίας παρὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς.

⁴⁵ Avenarius, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.44) 22ff, shows this to be a part of the technical abuse used by historians.

⁴⁶ *Cf.* RAC 6 (1966) 1258ff s.v. EXITUS ILLUSTRUM VIRORUM (Ronconi) for this *topos*, where add Cic. *Brut.* 43 on *mors vulgaris*.

⁴⁷ The quarrel begins with the critics of Homer's veracity; see F. Mehmel, *AuAbendl* 4 (1954) 16ff; H. Homeyer, *Lukian, Wie man Geschichte schreiben soll* (Munich 1965) 279; and *litt.* cited by R. Haüssler, *Tacitus und das historische Bewusstsein* (Heidelberg 1965) 191 n.2, with whom I cannot agree.

⁴⁸ Isid. *Etym.* 1.41.2 following Augustine still defines *historia* as belonging to grammar, but *cf.* 1.44.5 and L. Arbusov, *Colores rhetorici*² (Göttingen 1963) 95 and 109, where most of the *topoi* listed are Hellenistic in origin.

⁴⁹ See his comments at the end of *Pyr.*, and K. Deichgräber, *Die griechische Empirikerschule* (Göttingen 1930, repr. 1964) 268, and on *ἱστορία* 65ff, 298ff: he quotes Gal. *Subfig.emp.* § 8 (restored): . . . μικρολογία τίς ἐστι περὶ τοῦ τῆς ἱστορίας ὀνόματος.

[Galen's] *Περὶ ἀρίστης εὐρέσεως* I, pp.142ff Kühn,⁵⁰ where arguments very similar to those of Sextus are marshalled against *ἱστορία*, e.g. that it is *ἄχρηστος* and without a *κριτήριον* of truth. Again with [Galen's] contention that (I p.145,5–6) the judges of *ἱστορία* cannot judge *λόγῳ*, compare Sextus' introduction § 43, where a claim of the grammarians is that they can *τὰ ἐκ τῶν μύθων τε καὶ ἱστοριῶν λόγῳ διορίζειν*.

In this passage (I p.148,4 Kühn) and in Galen's *Subfiguratio empirica* p.68,8 D. we have the same example given for methods of *ἱστορία*, viz. how can we know for a fact that Crete is an island. We shall not, we are told, accept e.g. as evidence letters to this effect, cf. Sen. *Ep.* 22.1ff: *non potest medicus per epistolas cibi aut balinei tempus eligere*. But we shall accept as evidence the *συμφωνία* of reports of intelligent observers. Deichgräber⁵¹ says: "In der Zusammenstellung dieser Kriterien wie in der Einführung des Prinzips der *ἱστορία* überhaupt sind die Empiriker durchaus selbständig. Wenn Philippson . . . in Aristoteles einen Vorläufer dieses Prinzips findet, so weiss ich nicht welche Nachrichten es sind, die zu dieser Annahme berechtigen."

There is in fact such evidence: at Pl. *Leg.* 662B the Athenian replies ironically to the Cretan, who has asked *καὶ πῶς ἂν ταῦτά γ' ἔτι συγχωροῦμεν;* the following: *ὅπως; εἰ θεὸς ἡμῶν, ὡς εἰσικεν, ὦ φίλοι, δοίη τις συμφωνίαν, ὡς νῦν γε σχεδὸν ἀπάδομεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται ταῦτα οὕτως ἀναγκαῖα, ὡς οὐδέ, ὦ φίλε Κλεινία, Κρήτη νῆκος καφῶς.* This is a direct reference to the proverb *ὁ Κρήτης τὸν πόντον*, which is as old as Alkman (Alcaeus?) fr.164 (Page, *PMelGr*) and is based on the ancient reputation of the Cretans for falsehood. The variant proverb *ὁ Σικελός* . . . is therefore secondary, though *Σικελίαν* occurs at Gal. *Subfig.emp.* p.68,7 D. also. We are forced to believe that the methodological discussion of *ἱστορία* is at least as old as Plato.

Now Bühring has shown that from the time of Plato onwards the *numeri* are often connected with medicine (Pl. *Phdr.* 268A, *Prot.* 314A, etc.), and Aristotle speaks of them as being applied by a doctor, *EN* 1137a16: *τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι*. It becomes all the more difficult to believe the *numeri* and the discussion of *ἱστορία* do not belong together in medical practice from an early period. Why should Asklepiades have been interested in them? There is an obvious solution.

⁵⁰ Deichgräber, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.49) fr.59, with other medical passages.

⁵¹ Deichgräber, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.49) 300, but cf. Reid on Cic. *Acad.Pr.* 95.

Opinion has been unanimous in this century,⁵² though not before, that Asklepiades in the *adv. Gramm.* is Asklepiades of Myrlea, who was among other things a source for Strabo. The grounds for this are (a) the Myrlean was a grammarian and only a grammarian would write on grammar; (b) Suidas, in a confused passage,⁵³ tells us that an Asklepiades wrote at least ten books on grammarians; if he followed an *ars/artifex*⁵⁴ principle or *ars/artifex/opus* division,⁵⁵ we should expect that he would be the same man who wrote on grammar; and (c) both Asklepiades of Myrlea and our Asklepiades criticize Dionysius Thrax. Against these arguments we have to set others just as convincing. (a) Sextus does not indicate that Asklepiades is a grammarian; in fact everywhere else in his works Asklepiades or οἱ περὶ Ἀσκληπιιάδην refers to the famous doctor of the first century B.C., Asklepiades of Bithynia.⁵⁶ Since there is no further definition in the *adv. Grammaticos*, Sextus must mean the same person. Even the οἱ περὶ Ἀσκληπιιάδην (*adv. Gramm.* 73) has its exact parallels in other works with the systematic school founded by Asklepiades the physician, while we nowhere hear of a school of the Myrlean. Perhaps Sextus mistook another Asklepiades—as a physician he must have read several—as the famous physician, but there seems little doubt that he does not differentiate his source in the *adv. Grammaticos* because he believes it to be the same as the one he knows best. (b) Though we do not know that either Asklepiades wrote a grammar, we learn from Pliny, *NH* 26.7 that the medical Asklepiades was a rhetorician before he became a physician and earned the abuse of Galen. Further, physicians were more interested in literary matters than we are apt to believe. Galen especially wrote an immense number of literary tracts.⁵⁷ Dahlmann

⁵² *RE* 2 (1896) 1628 s.v. ASKLEPIADES 28 (Wendel), on which see W. Kroll, *Philologus* 88 (1933) 463 n.34, who there makes some sensible remarks about our evidence for Stoic rhetoric.

⁵³ Suidas s.v. Ὀρφεὺς κροτωνιάτης, cf. F. Susemihl, *Gesch.gr.Lit.Alex.* II (Leipzig 1892) 18 n.96.

⁵⁴ E. Norden, *Hermes* 40 (1905) 481ff: despite C. O. Brink, *Horace, Ars Poetica* (Cambridge 1971) 325ff, I still prefer to believe H. Dahlmann, *Varros Schrift 'de Poematis'*, *AbhMainz* 1953 no.3, p.111 n.2, when he claims that there is simply not enough evidence for Norden's thesis.

⁵⁵ D. van Berchem, *MusHelv* 9 (1952) 79ff, but again there is no evidence for general application.

⁵⁶ There is no collection of his fragments beyond that of the incompetent H. von Vilas, *Der Arzt und Philosoph Asklepiades von Bithynien* (Vienna/Leipzig 1903). Newer litt. cited by I. M. Lonie, *Mnemosyne* SER.4, 18 (1965) 126.

⁵⁷ J. Ilberg, *RhM* N.F. 52 (1897) 617ff.

has shown the fragility of the whole *ars/artifex* argument; we cannot suppose that a work on Grammarians automatically implies a work on *Grammar*. (c) The third point has to be considered in the light of the reputation of Dionysius Thrax; since he was the grammarian *par excellence* for the first century B.C. and later times, it would be impossible for anyone who wrote a grammar to avoid criticism of his definition of grammar. This is far from being sufficient evidence for equating two people of the same name.

We cannot say who the source of Sextus certainly is, but Sextus appears to assume that it is the famous physician. Confusion was easy, since there were many persons named Asklepiades, and our two came from the same area at about the same time; they are confused even in the text of Strabo 12.4.9 C566. But if the physician wrote on grammar and had available to him the source of Varro's *quadripartitio*, he would have produced a chapter on *ἱστορία* much as we have reconstructed. The 'historiographical' element in the system would be due to its use in medical *historia*, and ill adapted to grammar. Polybius too saw parallels in medicine with historiography; it is not surprising that someone applied the methods of medical *historia* to grammatical *historia*. Who could be more likely to do so than a rhetorician (*i.e.* at this time a *grammaticus* also) with medical interests?

To sum up, I believe the methodological interest in *historia* to be originally a medical one; its methodology produced a series of *numeri* which could be applied not only to *historia* but to ethics and other fields. The application to grammar took place in the first century B.C. when both Varro and Asklepiades applied it to the *τεχνικόν* and the *ἱστορικόν* respectively. Their source had affinities with Stoicism, but need not have been Stoic.

A final thought. Bühring, following Knoche, points out that fr.127 of Pindar seems to presuppose the concept of *numeri*. The term *ἀριθμός* one connects with Pythagoreanism. Varro mentions a debt to Pythagoreanism. Is it too much to suggest that the original impetus to systematize might have come from that fertile but obscure source of much Greek thought? The *μεσότης* concept, which is not too far from the *numeri*, we can trace in medicine and then in ethics;⁵⁸ it too is found in Pythagoreanism. Perhaps the idea is not to be rejected out of hand.

⁵⁸ F. Wehrli, "Medizin und Ethik," *MusHelv* 8 (1951) 40ff, esp. 56.

As for Sextus, we find him to be a bungling doctor, whose eagerness to refute grammatical doctrines was not equalled by his capacity to understand them. Since we have recently been informed by a learned essay that the *adv. Grammaticos* illustrates Sextus' "unity of thought,"⁵⁹ it may be as well to emphasize that what little unity of thought we find usually conceals a distortion of his sources.⁶⁰

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⁵⁹ Krentz, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.2). The tendency to tripartition is attributed with exaggeration to Asklepiades by Müller, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.3), a view modified by Heinicke, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.18) 14ff. There is good reason to believe that Sextus may be in part responsible for the division into three, since this was typical of empiric medicine, with its *ευστατικά* and *τελικά*, and cf. Usener, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.22) 274ff.

⁶⁰ I should have noticed E. Elorduy, *Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa* (*Philologus* suppl. 28.3, Leipzig 1936) 69ff, 251ff, and L. Radermacher, *Artium Scriptores* (*SBWien* 227.3, 1951) 116.