

# Interpolation in Greek Tragedy, I

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IT is not always possible to read a classical text without feeling from time to time that more than one mind has played a part in its creation. In Homer the feeling is familiar, but lesser authors can arouse it in forms even more acute. If not all scholars share it, those who act upon it and excise what strikes them as alien are liable to be accused of arbitrariness by others who have been brought up on the author from the cradle and never seen reason to doubt the received text. In no branch of literature has the issue engaged more attention than in tragedy.<sup>1</sup>

As of many other things, the great age of arbitrariness in the textual criticism of tragedy was the second half of the nineteenth century. Many scholars of that age who shortened the extant plays have left no name to posterity outside bibliographical compilations,<sup>2</sup> and no two scholars of the present century will agree on a second practitioner of the craft; but the first is invariably August Nauck, whose range alone guarantees him notoriety.<sup>3</sup>

The present century has seen two works concerned with interpolation in tragedy, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* by D. L. Page (Oxford 1934) and *Binneninterpolation* by G. Jachmann (*GöttNachr* 1 [1936] 123–44, 185–215, of which all but 123–33 deal with tragedy). Where Page places the responsibility for most interpolations is evident from the title of his book. Jachmann, on the other hand, is convinced

<sup>1</sup> This article is in three parts, which for reasons of space will appear separately. Professor William M. Calder III was kind enough to suggest the idea for the first, and all three owe many improvements, visible and invisible, to the acumen and careful scholarship of Mr W. S. Barrett.

<sup>2</sup> For Sophocles see the exemplary *Index Commentationum Sophoclearum* by H. Genthe (Berlin 1874). For Euripides, Prinz and Wecklein (Leipzig 1878–1902) endeavour to record all conjectures, and the sources can usually be located by recourse to the relevant sections of Engelmann-Preuss, *Bibliotheca Scriptorum Classicorum* I (Leipzig 1880), and the continuation to 1896 by Klussmann (Leipzig 1909–11).

<sup>3</sup> To mention nothing else, he edited the whole of Euripides (ed. 1 Leipzig 1854, ed. 3 1869–71) and revised all Schneidewin's commentaries on Sophocles (Berlin 1856–60 and several later editions, for which see ed. 9 of *Ajax*, 1888, p. iii n.\*\*).

that most interpolations in tragedy are of the same nature as interpolations in other literary works and date from the period of purely literary transmission, which lasted much longer than the period of performances. Both Page and Jachmann lean heavily on the labours of nineteenth-century scholars, though Jachmann's respect for them, especially for Nauck, is greater by as much as he is the reader of the two to delete.<sup>4</sup>

How is the student of tragedy to make up his mind about the extent and the origin of interpolation? "It would be possible to collect all the passages which have ever been suspected or expunged," says Page (p.55), "and then to make two inquiries. First, whether the grounds for suspicion or deletion are strong enough; second, if they are strong enough, whether the interpolation is histrionic or not. This would seem to be the proper method. But nobody could study even fifty passages chosen at random without beginning to understand the feeling which lay behind Jebb's acrimonious strictures (pp.li, lii of the Introduction to his edition of OK). It soon appears that careful scrutiny of a very great number of suspected passages is a waste of time, and that animadversions on the deletors' methods and reasons must be ineffably tedious." A German scholar has recently attempted, however, to circumvent the ineffable tediousness of the operation. In a dissertation entitled *ENIOI AΘETOYΣIN* (Tübingen 1968), J. Baumert has collected and examined all the deletions ever proposed in *Alcestis* and *Medea*, not so much for the sake of *Alcestis* and *Medea* as because the deletions proposed in them raise all the questions that ever arise about the propriety of deletion. If it could be proved that certain kinds of argument for deletion are invalid, much of the work that Page had no stomach for would have been done. Deletors and defenders alike must be grateful to Baumert for undertaking the proof; deletors cannot afford to ignore, and defenders certainly will not ignore, an investigation so fundamental.

Baumert distinguishes two kinds of evidence for interpolation, external and internal. The external evidence, however, presents nothing

<sup>4</sup> For all its aggressiveness, Jachmann's article is on the whole more instructive than Page's book, partly because his arguments on individual passages are more incisive, partly because he is better informed about scholarship in antiquity, partly because he exposes many of the prejudices that deletors have to contend with. It must not be forgotten, however, that Page's book was his first publication.

more than a choice of variants, and such choices can be made only on internal grounds. Not until they have been made can the reliability of the external evidence be assessed. Stobaeus, for instance, attributes *Andr.* 330–31 to Menander. Who is right, Stobaeus or the scribes of *Andromache*? There is a simple conflict of evidence, and it can be resolved only by an examination of the context in *Andromache*. If the context is incomplete without the lines, Stobaeus is wrong; if they do not belong to the context,<sup>5</sup> Stobaeus may still be wrong but has some chance of being right.

Baumert divides the external evidence into three categories according to the nature of its source: the mediaeval manuscripts, citations, and the scholia. A division according to the nature of the evidence itself might have been more helpful: direct evidence, indirect evidence, and editorial comment. There is no difference in principle between a mediaeval manuscript that visibly gives one reading and an ancient scholion that explicitly attests another; but there is a difference between transmitting a text and compiling an anthology, and there is also a difference between transmitting a text and passing judgement on it. Baumert's conclusions about these three kinds of evidence are as follows: (1) direct evidence indicates omissions rather than interpolations; (2) indirect evidence is altogether unreliable because the sources go their own way; (3) editorial comment, which includes much that has been mistaken for direct evidence,<sup>6</sup> is of no evidential value. His argument for (1) is completely invalid, and though he is more right than wrong about (2) and (3), he fails to formulate his points sharply and to discriminate between one case and another.

To take (3) first, what does it mean if a scholiast remarks that a line is *περισσός*?<sup>7</sup> Noticing that the term is often used in grammatical

<sup>5</sup> In fact they do not. See most recently O. Zwierlein, *GGA* 222 (1970) 204 n.9.

<sup>6</sup> E.g., the greater part of what the scholia say about actors.

<sup>7</sup> One of the scholia Baumert discusses in this connexion is irrelevant, *Σ Phoen.* 1692 *πῶς γὰρ θάψει Πολυαείκην Ἀντιγόνη συμφεύγουσα τῷ πατρί; πλεονάζει δὲ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ εἶδει ὁ Εὐριπίδης.* Baumert says (p.63) "für den Scholiasten . . . liegt in der Verbindung von Bestattungs- und Begleitungsmotiv einfach ein Pleonasmus des Euripides," and again (p.65) "im Schol. Phoen. 1692 werden zwei Motive, die sich nicht glatt zueinander fügen, mit dem Vermerk *πλεονάζει* dem Euripides zuerkannt." The comment of course means "Euripides is full of such things."

Baumert is not at his happiest interpreting scholia: at *Or.* 640, where the scholiast says *ἔνιοι ἀθετοῦσι τοῦτον καὶ τὸν ἐξῆς στίχον· οὐκ ἔχουσι γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδειον χαρακτήρα*, he regards as "erwägenswert" (p.51 n.1) Biehl's suggestion that the subject of *ἔχουσι* is the same as the.

elucidation when a word fulfils no obvious function, Baumert argues that it is never more than an editorial judgement. Some of the most interesting cases bear him out. At *Or.* 249, for instance, the scholiast rightly takes exception to the article in ἐς τὸν ψόγον, but there is no reason to think that he knew of any other text; and at *Phoen.* 428 anyone could easily feel that κύγαμος γάρ ἐστ' ἐμός is περιεσσόν after 408–25. Nevertheless, editorial judgment may not be the whole story.

*Phoen.* 973 λέξει γὰρ ἀρχαῖς καὶ στρατηλάταις τάδε,  
 πύλας ἐφ' ἑπτὰ καὶ λοχαγέτας μολῶν

ἤρκει οὗτος· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιφερόμενος . . . περιττός ἐστιν. Σ 973

Why is 974 περιττός? On the strength of Homeric scholia such as that on *Iliad* 8.528 ἀθετεῖται ὅτι περιεσσός, Fraenkel suggested<sup>8</sup> that περιεσσός is a remnant of an Alexandrian athetesis. Though in this particular case he could well be wrong, since the scholiast may have disliked λοχαγέτας in 974 after στρατηλάταις in 973, the idea itself is perfectly plausible, especially in the abbreviated state of the extant scholia. The problem of περιεσσός then gives way to the thornier problem of Alexandrian atheteses; but if in one single case an Alexandrian athetesis can be shown to have rested on documentary evidence, the possibility must always be reckoned with that περιεσσός has documentary authority behind it. One such case is *Iliad* 23.92: ἀθετεῖται ὅτι . . . Σ A, ἐν πάσαις δὲ οὐκ ἦν ὁ στίχος Σ T. Two others have been pointed out by Jachmann:<sup>9</sup> *Iliad* 4.88 Ζηνόδοτος τούτου μὲν τὸ ἀκροτελεύτιον οὕτως γράφει 'εἶρε δὲ τόνδε', τὸν δὲ δεύτερον οὐδὲ γράφει, δοκῶν ἀνθρώπινον τὸ ζητεῖν εἶναι, cum Zenodoto consentit P.Hib. 20;<sup>10</sup> *Iliad* 21.290 ἀθετεῖται ὅτι . . . Σ A, om. Κρητικὴ secundum P.Oxy. 221 col. xv 26–27. In general, then, Baumert is right that editorial comment is of no evidential value; but the Homeric scholia show that it may occasionally reflect a documentary divergence.

Then (2). Baumert discusses a number of excerpts in Stobaeus and

subject of ἀθετοῦσι. To say nothing of the strain this imposes on ἔχουσι, a refutation is provided by *hypoth. Rhesus*: τοῦτο τὸ δράμα ἔνοι νόθον ὑπενόησαν ὡς οὐκ ὄν Εὐριπίδου· τὸν γὰρ Σοφοκλεῖον μᾶλλον ὑποφαίνει χαρακτήρα.

<sup>8</sup> *SBMünchen* 1963, Heft 1 p.46.

<sup>9</sup> *Klio* 33 (1940) 240–41; *GöttNachr* 4 (1942) 343 n.1. Cf. also *op.cit.* (p.247) 141 n.1.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. S. R. West, *The Ptolemaic Papyri of the Iliad* (Cologne 1967) 27, 68–69.

*Christus Patiens* without properly illustrating the elementary point (p.18) that not every word of the original always suited the purpose of the excerptor. He mentions, for instance, that Stobaeus cites Eur. *El.* 369–70 without the rest of the sentence (p.19), but he does not mention that the rest of the sentence was irrelevant to the heading under which the citation comes, namely *ὅτι οὐκ αἰεὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ χρηστοῖς τῶν πατέρων ἔοικε τὰ τέκνα*. Similarly, Stobaeus cites *HF* 101–06 (Baumert p.26) without 103 *οἷ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες διὰ τέλους οὐκ εὐτυχεῖς*, which may have seemed unsuitable for a section *περὶ ἐλπίδος*. Such omissions clearly reveal nothing about the original. On the other hand, the omission of a line that would not have conflicted with the purpose of the excerptor may well reveal something more interesting than the mere selectiveness of the excerptor, as it does at *Bacch.* 314–18:

*cod. L*            οὐχ ὁ Διόνυσος κωφρονεῖν ἀναγκάσει  
                       γυναῖκας εἰς τὴν Κύπριν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει  
                       τὸ κωφρονεῖν ἔνεστιν εἰς τὰ πάντ' αἰεὶ.  
                       τοῦτο σκοπεῖν χρή· καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμασιν  
                       οὐδ' ἢ γε κώφρων οὐ διαφθαρήσεται.

*Stob. Flor.* 5.15            οὐχ ὁ Διόνυσος μὴ κωφρονεῖν ἀναγκάσει  
     (= 3.5.1 W.-H.)        γυναῖκας εἰς τὴν Κύπριν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει  
                                   τὸ κωφρονεῖν ἔνεστιν εἰς τὰ πάντ' αἰεὶ.

*Stob. Flor.* 74.8            οὐχ ὁ Διόνυσος μὴ κωφρονεῖν ἀναγκάσει  
     (= 4.23.8 W.-H.)        γυναῖκας εἰς τὴν Κύπριν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν φύσιν  
                                   τοῦτο σκοπεῖν χρή· καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμασιν  
                                   οὐδ' ἢ γε κώφρων οὐ διαφθαρήσεται.

Here for once Baumert does try to show why the citations differ (p.26): the longer version, he thinks, was suitable for the section *περὶ κωφροσύνης* but would not have made a good *γαμικὸν παράγγελμα*. Unfortunately it is by no means clear why he takes this view.<sup>11</sup> Since 316 is undoubtedly an interpolation,<sup>12</sup> it is perverse to deny that the shorter version derives from an uninterpolated text.

<sup>11</sup> “Die verkürzte Fassung ist eine Ermahnung für Hochzeiter. Für mangelnde Keuschheit entschuldigt Dionysos nicht: . . . ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν φύσιν τοῦτο σκοπεῖν χρή, ‘. . . sondern auf die Anlage muss, wer auf Brautschau geht, in dieser Hinsicht prüfend sehen.’”

<sup>12</sup> See Dodds on 314–18, and W. S. Barrett, *Hippolytos* (Oxford 1964) 175. Baumert ignores Dodds' observation that *ἔνεστιν* nowhere else means ‘depends on’ (for which the Greek is *ἔστιν ἐν*: see *LSJ ἐν* A.1.6).

Finally (1). Direct evidence is supplied mainly by the mediaeval mss but also by the scholia they contain, which report the readings of ancient mss, and divergences at both stages of the tradition are discussed by Baumert. About the mediaeval mss he has this to say (pp.7–8): “Die mittelalterliche Überlieferung basiert aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach auf einer einzigen, vermutlich in der Photius-Zeit vorgenommenen Transliteration. Divergenzen unserer Handschriften können folglich, wenn überhaupt, ausschliesslich byzantinische Fälschungen und Übertragungen anzeigen.” That no divergence in the mediaeval tradition can be older than Photius is a strange misapprehension, and Baumert would no doubt have avoided it if he had read more widely.<sup>13</sup> It invalidates completely the ingenious argument to which he proceeds.<sup>14</sup> His argument about ancient variants is more complex but equally invalid. If a scholiast says that a line was not *ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς*, these *πολλοί*, unless descended from Aristophanes’ edition, must have been either mss used by him or mss independent of him. The latter alternative is rejected by Baumert (p.46) on the ground that there is no evidence for the existence after Aristophanes of mss independent of him;<sup>15</sup> but how can such evidence be recognized when so little is known about the form in which Aristophanes presented his results? and how likely is it that the Aristophanean edition drove all other texts out of circulation? As for the other alternative, that the *πολλοί* were mss used by Aristophanes, Baumert argues as follows (pp.45–46): Aristophanes used the official Athenian copy (Galen 17.1.607 Kühn = in *Hippocr.Epid.* 3.2.4 [*Corpus Med.Graec.* V 10.2.1 p.79]), which was the mainstay of his edition; the scholia were written

<sup>13</sup> E.g. Barrett, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.12) 58–59; G. Zuntz, *An Inquiry into the Transmission of the Plays of Euripides* (Cambridge 1965) 261–72. The unsoundness of Baumert’s argument does not entail that the conclusion he wishes to establish is false. If later centuries shared Aristophanes’ desire for completeness (*cf.* n.18), interpolations might be expected to have spread throughout the tradition by the time of Photius. Certainly the mediaeval mss all contain, with two trivial exceptions (*Phoen.* 1282 *om.* **OP**; *cf.* Baumert p.11), every one of the 11 Euripidean passages that are known to have been unevenly attested in antiquity. *Cf.* Jachmann’s remark, *GöttNachr* 4 (1942) 366–67, that “nahezu überall die interpolierten Rezensionen sich vorherrschend durchsetzen und den breiten Hauptstrom der Überlieferung bilden.”

<sup>14</sup> Namely: Byzantine interpolations, if they were to have been written in Euripidean Greek, would have had to be derivative, say borrowed from an anthology; but of the 65 lines unevenly attested not one is in Stobaeus; therefore uneven attestation is a sign not of interpolation but of omission.

<sup>15</sup> In spite of holding that there were no such mss to collate, Baumert considers it impermissible to restrict the practice of collation to Aristophanes (p.45).

to accompany the Aristophanean edition; therefore the *πολλοί* are of no authority. This argument depends on the reliability of the official Athenian copy, which for all anyone knows may have been heavily interpolated. The conclusion that Baumert draws after he has rejected both alternatives is that the *πολλοί* were vitiated by post-Aristophanean omissions (p.47). This conclusion does not follow, however, unless Aristophanes suppressed information about all his sources except the official Athenian copy, which is the last thing he is likely to have done.<sup>16</sup>

Baumert regards it as significant that the scholia record omissions in other mss but never additions (pp.44–45).<sup>17</sup> An explanation readily suggests itself: Aristophanes drew up a text that included every line attested, so that the only symbol he needed to use was a symbol for omission.<sup>18</sup>

What does it mean, then, if a line was unevenly attested in the ancient mss? Once more, only an examination of the context in each case can give the answer.

- (1) *Alc.* 818–20 (?): 818–19 *del.* Wecklein, *recte*.<sup>19</sup>
- (2) *Hipp.* 871–73: *del.* Nauck, *recte* (see Barrett).
- (3) *Hipp.* 1050: *del.* Nauck, *recte* (see Barrett).
- (4) *Andr.* 1254: *del.* Kirchhoff, *recte*.<sup>20</sup>
- (5) *Phoen.* 375: *del.* Usener, *RhM* 23 (1868) 155, *recte*.
- (6) *Phoen.* 1069 (?): 1070 *del.* Bruhn, *Jahrb.f.cl.Phil.Supp.* 15 (1887) 271.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>16</sup> See Barrett, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.12) 47.

<sup>17</sup> This is not actually true: *Σ Or.* 1229 *ἐν τῷ ἀντιγράφῳ οὐ φέρονται οἶδοι οἱ δ' ἱαμβοί, [καὶ] ἐν ἄλλῳ δέ.* Baumert does not discuss the passage, but if he thinks omissions in mss other than the scholiast's *Hauptexemplar* have no authority, he must think the addition here has no authority.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. U. von Wilamowitz, *Einleitung in die griechische Tragödie* (Berlin 1895) 149: "Sein Bestreben war offenbar, möglichst wenig von dem Überlieferten umkommen zu lassen"; *Hermes* 44 (1909) 449: "Unser Text ist, wie so oft, von den Alexandrinern aus verschiedenen Exemplaren componiert, in der Absicht, möglichst wenig umkommen zu lassen."

<sup>19</sup> *ταῦτα δὲ τὰ τρία ἔν τινι οὐκ ἔγκειται Σ 820 in V*, where 819 is written as two lines. Whichever lines the scholion originally referred to, 818–19 at least are interpolated (see Dale or Weber).

<sup>20</sup> The line separates *ἀπαλλάξασα* (1255) too awkwardly from *κέ* (1253).

<sup>21</sup> *βραδέως μὲν ἐξέρχῃ, ὁμοῦ δὲ ἐξελθε, ἀκουσὼν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀντιγράφοις οὐ γράφεται ὁ στίχος (Σ V 1069).* Since 1071 cannot stand as it is without 1070, Bruhn altered *λήξας* to *λήξεις* and attached the line to 1069. Not the least objection to this procedure is that it does not account for the interpolation; for it would be a coincidence if a line was interpolated

- (7) *Phoen.* 1075: *del.* Kirchhoff, *recte.*<sup>22</sup>  
 (8) *Phoen.* 1225: *del.* Kirchhoff.<sup>23</sup>  
 (9) *Phoen.* 1282: *del.* Grotius, *recte.*  
 (10) *Or.* 957–59: *del.* Kirchhoff, *recte.*<sup>24</sup>

after ἀλλ' ὁμως when the construction was not elliptical. Elliptical it surely was: (enter messenger) ὡή, τίς ἐν πύλαισι δωμαίων κυρεῖ; ἀνοίγεται, ἐκπορεύεται Ἰοκάστην δόμων (no response); ὡή μάλ' αἰθίς (pause, and then the bolts rattle); διὰ μακροῦ μέν, ἀλλ' ὁμως (Jackson, *Marginalia Scaenica* [Oxford 1955] 173–74). Either, therefore, 1070 must be left alone, or 1071 must go with it; so that unless the original note has been badly garbled, it looks as though Σ V had wandered from 1075. Irrespective of Σ V 1069, a case can be made out against 1071, but too many other passages would have to be considered with it for a footnote to suffice.

<sup>22</sup> Contrary to what Wecklein and Murray say, Valckenaer retained the line: “quae secundum scholiasten, si recte conicio, deerant in exemplaribus non paucis, τί μοί ποθ' ἦκει καινὸν ἀγγελῶν ἔπος, Euripidea tamen mea quidem opinione, non miror si nonnullis hac in sede displicuerint.” As Pearson points out, the line interrupts the sequence of thought.

<sup>23</sup> For the interpolation of such lines see e.g. *Il.* 9.224a and Ed. Fraenkel, *Agamemnon* III (Oxford 1950) p.756 n.1. If *Phoen.* 1225 were unanimously transmitted, deletion would not be justified. Baumert's remarks on the scholion are confused and the italicized sentences irreconcilable (pp.49–50): “G. JACHMANN . . . beurteilt dieses Scholion als urkundlichen Nachweis für eine nacharistophaneische Interpolation . . . Möglicherweise deutet das Scholion auf eine Interpolation hin. Den Anspruch einer Urkunde allerdings kann das Scholion nicht erheben. Denn G. JACHMANN hätte vielleicht doch bedenken müssen, dass gerade die Sinnlosigkeit der Kombination beider Bemerkungen [(1) ἀπὸ τοῦ διηγηματικοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ μιμητικὸν μετέβη· λείπει οὖν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ταῦτα λέγων, (2) οὗτος δὲ οὐ φέρεται ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀντιγράφοις] auf byzantinische Zeit hinweisen kann, in der systematisch alles antike Material zusammengestellt wurde, um es vor dem Untergang zu bewahren. So ist es durchaus denkbar, dass ein Scholion aus einem Exemplar, welches den Vers *Phoen.* 1225 nicht führte, in ein vollständigeres Manuskript übertragen wurde.”

<sup>24</sup> 960–81 are rightly given to the chorus by Weil, *RevPhil* 18 (1894) 208–09, and G. Pasquali, *Athenaeum* 8 (1930) 72–76. The formal facts about Euripidean messengers' speeches are as follows: (1) they are invariably followed by some utterance from the chorus; (2) if no other character is on the stage, the chorus follow with lyrics (*HF.* 1016, *Ion* 1229, *Bacch.* 1153; cf. *Alc.* 212) or anapaests (*Andr.* 1166, *Phoen.* 1480); (3) if some other character is on stage, the chorus either (a) follow with trimeters and are followed by that character in trimeters (*Med.* 1231, *Hcl.* 867, *Hipp.* 1255, *Hec.* 583, *Supp.* 731, *IT* 340, 1420, *Phoen.* 1200, *Bacch.* 775; cf. *Hec.* 1183) or tetrameters (*Hel.* 1619), or (b) follow with lyrics and are followed by that character in trimeters (*El.* 858). Formal considerations, therefore, tell against two of the possibilities at *Or.* 949–1012: that the chorus both speak 957–59 and sing 960–81, and that Electra sings 960–81 immediately after 956. There is no strict parallel for either of the other possibilities, that the mss are sound and that the chorus sing 960–81 immediately after 956; but since there is only one other passage (*El.* 858) where the chorus follow the messenger in lyrics while some other character is present, it can hardly be called anomalous if at *Or.* 982 they are followed by Electra in lyrics rather than trimeters. *El.* 854–72 is in fact closely parallel to Weil's arrangement: just as the chorus there start dancing when the messenger announces to Electra that Orestes is returning triumphant, so the chorus here start dancing when the messenger announces to Electra that Orestes is returning in distress.

Formally, then, Weil's arrangement has more to commend it than the arrangement in

(11) *Or.* 1229–32 (?): 1227–30 *del.* Nauck.<sup>25</sup>

(12) *Or.* 1394: *del.* Kirchhoff, *recte.*<sup>26</sup>

Out of 12 omissions, then, nine are right, and one more (8) will be accepted by anyone who is not defending a theory like Baumert's; of the remaining two, (11) may be right if the scholion is misplaced, and (6) is almost certainly a misplaced version of (7). Jachmann therefore has every justification for the view that the omission of lines from some ancient mss casts such suspicion on them that their genuineness and not their spuriousness must be proved (Baumert p.43).

Even Jachmann makes one mistake in dealing with omissions. Manuscripts occasionally omit lines accidentally, and if there are obvious palaeographical reasons for an omission it cannot be used in support of a deletion, however attractive the deletion may be on internal grounds. In an otherwise excellent article on Horace, *Odes* 4.8,<sup>27</sup> Jachmann castigates scholars who seize on a palaeographical

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the mss; but the crux of the matter is whether 960–81 are better suited to the chorus or Electra. Di Benedetto's summary does not do justice to Pasquali's arguments for giving them to the chorus, and he is unable to point to a single word that suits Electra better. His assertion that "da vv. 960–967 risulta che chi parla assolve alla funzione di *ἐξάρχων* del *treno* e questa era propria dell'attore" makes no allowance for 960 ᾠ Πελαγία and 965 ἰαχέτω δὲ γὰ Κυκλωπία.

<sup>25</sup> ἐν τῷ ἀντιγράφῳ οὐ φέρονται οὗτοι οἱ δ' ἴαμβοι, [καὶ] ἐν ἄλλῳ δέ Σ 1229. If the ἀντίγραφον really omitted 1229–32, the omission can only have been an accident, because 1231–32 are indispensable. No other scholion, however, with the doubtful exception of Σ V *Phoen.* 1069 (see n.21), records an omission that can only have been an accident, and so Nauck deleted 1227–30 on the supposition that they were the four lines originally referred to by the scholion. The deletion has two advantages: it restores symmetry to the prayer (*cf.* *Cho.* 479–509), and it allows *μολεῖν* in 1226 to be echoed immediately by *ἰκοῦ δῆτ'* in 1231 (*cf.* *El.* 672–73, 675–76, *Hyps.* fr.64.69–70 Bond, Aesch. *Supp.* 215–16).

<sup>26</sup> If what Di Benedetto says were true, that the line makes sense and is immune to considerations of either attestation or symmetry, then there would be no case against it, certainly not that it is "una evidente dittografia del precedente," which it is not, even in the loose acceptance of 'dittography' that prevails in modern editions. As for the sense, the chorus ought to be saying 'for I did not understand what went before', but the line makes them say 'for what went before, which was not readily intelligible, I have worked out'; or does it mean 'I grasp not your previous story with any clearness as the result of conjecturing' (Wedd)? Weil pardonably goes no further than to quote Heath's translation and declare the line "assez obscur."

<sup>27</sup> *Philologus* 90 (1935) 331–51. When Jachmann has demonstrated once and for all the spuriousness of lines 15b–19a (*del.* Lachmann), it is a surprise to find G. W. Williams, *The Third Book of Horace's Odes* (Oxford 1969) 84, invoking *eius* at line 18 in defence of *eius* at 3.11.18.

explanation of correct omissions; but in method, if not in their conclusions, they are right and he is wrong.<sup>28</sup>

Now to internal evidence. Baumert divides arguments for deletion into categories, so that if a variety of arguments have been brought to bear on one passage, it has to be discussed separately under each heading. Since many kinds of argument for deletion turn out to be bad, any accumulation of such arguments is presumably bad. Methodical as this approach seems, it is misguided and dangerous, as an example will show.

Or. 1022            οὐ εἶγ' ἀφείκα τοὺς γυναικείους γόους  
                           στέρξεις τὰ κρανθέντ'; οἰκτρὰ μὲν τὰδ', ἀλλ' ὅμως  
                           φέρειν ε' ἀνάγκη τὰς παρεστῶσας τύχας.

Three arguments have been used for the deletion of 1024: (1) it was unknown to the scholiast (*λείπει τὸ δεῖ φέρειν*); (2) it was obviously put in to complete the sense of *ἀλλ' ὅμως*; (3) it disturbs the sequence of couplets (1022–46). Now it is true that each of these three arguments is inadequate: (1) and (3) would go by the board if the line were vital to the sense, and (2), as Baumert says (p.277), is just as likely to be an explanation of why the poet put it in as why an interpolator put it in. An inadequate argument, however, is not the same as a bad one: three bad arguments do not make a good one, but three inadequate arguments may make an adequate one. That is the case here, and it is the case in many other passages.<sup>29</sup>

A relevant argument is bad only if its premises are false or its logic

<sup>28</sup> Jachmann's examples (p.341 and n.13) are Hes. *Scut.* 209b–11a ἵκελος [. . . ἵκελοι], Ov. *Fasti* 2.203–04 *omen habet* [. . . *omen habet*], 2.281–82 *erat* [. . . *erat*], 6.271–76 *onus* [. . . *onus*], and Prop. 3.10.17–8 *caput* [. . . *caput*]. Cf. also *Med.* 304 τοῖς δ' . . . [τοῖς δ' . . .] *om. A, del.* Pierson; *Hipp.* 691 ἐρεῖ . . . [ἐρεῖ . . .] *om. A, del.* Brunck; *Hec.* 756–58 [οὐ δῆτα . . .] οὐδέν *om. MB, del.* Kirchhoff; *Juv.* 7.135 . . . *purpura* . . . [. . . *purpura* . . .] *om. U, del.* Knoche; 8.5–6 [*Corvinum/i* . . .] *Corvinum/i om. G, del.* C. F. Hermann; 159b–60a [*Syrophoenix* . . .] *Syrophoenix om. F, del.* C. F. Hermann; 160 . . . *Syrophoenix* . . . [. . . *Syrophoenix* . . .] *om. A, del.* Jahn; *Soph. OC* 1321 ἀδμήτης [. . . Ἀταλάντης] *om. Φ, del.* Gratwick, *CR* 79 (1965) 243–46 (for this omission cf. *Or.* 1393–94 ἕκαστα [. . . εὐγνωστα] *om. A*).

<sup>29</sup> It would be nice to know why Baumert regards *Med.* 468 as spurious (p.257 n.2). The only objections that are advanced against it nowadays are that it recurs at 1324 and without it the two speeches are of equal length; yet Baumert discountenances both kinds of argument. All credit to him if he agrees with Matthiae, *Euripidis tragoediae et fragmenta VI* (Leipzig 1821) 469: “aptius ibi haec conferuntur in Medeam post Creusae et liberorum caedem perpetrata, quam hic in Iasonem, nullo nisi uxoris desertae crimine laborantem.”

faulty. The three arguments above are bad only if their major premises are expressed in a way that renders them false: (1) no line unevenly attested in the ancient tradition is genuine (false for the sake of argument); (2) no line that completes what would otherwise be an elliptical construction is genuine; (3) no sequence in dialogue is irregular. Most scholars, however, would be content to express them as follows: (1) very few lines unevenly attested in the ancient tradition are genuine; (2) many spurious lines complete what would otherwise be an elliptical construction; (3) the regularity of sequences in dialogue is usually broken for some dramatic reason (this will do, but the matter is rather more complex).<sup>30</sup> The conclusions yielded by these premises all begin “probably,” and the degrees of probability vary. To think that there is anything discreditable about that is to misunderstand the logic of textual criticism. In default of an autograph, no textual decision in Euripides or any other author can rise above probability. At *Alc.* 1037 all the mss and the scholia as well offer *οὗτοι εἴ ἀτιμάζων*, but all editors since Scaliger have printed *οὗτοι εἴ ἀτίζων*. That Euripides intended *ἀτιμάζων* is overwhelmingly improbable, but it is not in any strict sense impossible. A tempting syllogism must be resisted: (1) Euripides always made his trimeters scan; (2) *Alc.* 1037 does not scan; (3) therefore Euripides did not write *Alc.* 1037 as it stands. What after all is the authority for (1)? To go no further, it founders on *Alc.* 1037. The notion that it holds good can only be entertained after a judgement of probability has been made, namely that a scribe is far likelier than Euripides to have written *ἀτιμάζων* instead of *ἀτίζων*.

It is unreasonably exacting, then, to demand that a transmitted reading should not be changed unless the poet cannot possibly have written it.<sup>31</sup> It should be changed if he is likelier not to have written it than to have written it. There are no rules for weighing probability in such matters,<sup>32</sup> and different critics will tilt the balance in different

<sup>30</sup> See Denniston on *El.* 651–52.

<sup>31</sup> Baumert's assertion (p.97) “Änderungen des überlieferten Textes können—will man nicht jeden methodischen Halt verlieren—ausschliesslich dann erlaubt werden, wenn zwingende Notwendigkeit vorliegt” is vacuous until “zwingende Notwendigkeit” is defined, and no definition is likely to meet the objection put forward above.

<sup>32</sup> To be more precise, general rules are too vague to be helpful in particular instances, and specific rules are too numerous to be worth drawing up. It is trivially true that anyone who gives a reason for making a change is setting up a rule, but the number of helpful rules to be extracted even from a large number of good reasons is usually very small.

ways; but an editor who prints a reading when he regards another as more probable is not doing his job, and an editor who fancies he can avoid arbitrary procedure by sticking to the transmitted text is making a judgement of probability just as arbitrary as if he were to change it.

If there were rules for weighing probability in such matters, they would not include, as *Alc.* 1037 shows, the rule that a transmitted reading is the likeliest reading simply because it is transmitted. A transmitted reading is never more than part of the evidence for what the author wrote. Another example will make the point clearer and take it further. At *Hipp.* 1228, where **L** has *πρὸς πέτρας*, editors rightly print *πρὸς πέτραις*; but at *Hel.* 409, where **L** again has *πρὸς πέτρας*, editors all retain it. In neither passage is *πέτρας* impossible (cf. *Od.* 12.71). Why then the discrepancy? Because at *Hipp.* 1228 several other mss have *πρὸς πέτραις*, whereas at *Hel.* 409 **L** is the sole authority. Can it really be maintained in these circumstances that *πρὸς πέτρας* at *Hel.* 409 is protected by the mere fact of being possible?

The deletion of a line does not differ in principle from the addition or alteration of one letter, and the text may be no more affected by it. At *IA* 1032, for instance, Wilamowitz deleted a line that makes no difference to the sense:

*μηδὲ πατρῶον δόμον  
αἴχυν'· ὁ γάρ τοι Τυνδάρεωσ οὐκ ἄξιος  
[κακῶσ ἀκούειν· ἐν γὰρ Ἕλλησι μέγασ].*

Many editors who might bring themselves to add an *iota* or alter a letter would balk at deleting a whole line, and yet by deleting *IA* 1032 they would run no graver risk of misrepresenting what the poet meant. By altering a letter, indeed, they might run the gravest possible risk, the risk of reversing the sense completely (*Soph. El.* 1320 *καλῶσ codd.*, *κακῶσ Nauck*; 1466 *οὐ codd.*, *εὖ Tyrwhitt*; *OT* 376 *με . . . γε σοῦ codd.*, *σε . . . γ' ἐμοῦ Brunck*; *Eur. fr.* 1035.2 *κακοῖσ codd.*, *καλοῖσ Grotius*). The best that can be said for the reverence some scholars display towards transmitted lines is that they are following Alexandrian precedent; but the Alexandrian editors possessed an equivalent of square brackets and were not afraid to use it.

Broadly, the difference between emending and deleting is that the one corrects an accidental change in the text, the other a deliberate

change. Some changes made by scribes were deliberate, but their object was to restore what the author wrote, not to improve on it. That actors in antiquity often tried to improve on the text of the tragedians is shown by the notorious measure of Lycurgus ([Plut.] *Mor.* 841F), and only a devout believer in the purity of the copy sanctioned by Lycurgus can suppose that their efforts have left no mark on the tradition.

If the deletion of a line is being considered, therefore, the question to be asked is which is more likely, that the line was written by the poet or by an interpolator. It is a more difficult question than which is more likely, that a word was written by the poet or by a scribe. Scribes often wrote *δέξεσθαι* when they should have written *δέξασθαι*, but they were not given to writing *φεῦ* when they should have written *παρασκευασθησομένην*. About the mental processes of interpolators, however, nothing useful is known beyond what can be inferred from their work. In comparison with what survives of Euripides, what survives of their work is very little, and there is no reason to think they all shared the same mental processes. It is futile, therefore, to demand that before a line is deleted some explanation should be forthcoming of why it was put in. Futility is not all: are doctors forbidden to treat a patient for pneumonia unless they know how he contracted it? Not but what the motives of some interpolators are perfectly clear; and if it turns out that interpolators often put lines in for the same reason, say to complete an elliptical construction, then something useful is known about them, and anyone who refuses to contemplate the possibility that less offensive lines elsewhere were interpolated for the same reason is turning a blind eye to part of the evidence.

Enough on the metaphysics of interpolation. It remains to say a word about Baumert's views on internal arguments. With one exception, his categories do not lend themselves to general comment, because it is not so much the value of certain arguments that he disputes as their applicability to particular passages: editors have been too intolerant of grammatical anomalies,<sup>33</sup> too strict in

<sup>33</sup> "Es ist letzten Endes eine Frage des Ermessens, bis zu welchem Grade syntaktische Schwierigkeiten zu billigen sind. Aber der Spielraum sollte nicht zu eng bemessen sein" (p.116). The second sentence, incidentally, is tautological and therefore completely unhelpful.

their logical requirements,<sup>34</sup> too quick to diagnose obscurity,<sup>35</sup> and so on.

The one exception concerns words that occur nowhere else or nowhere else in the same sense, a motley collection about which no comprehensive statement can be made; for along with *κόρευμα* (*Alc.* 178; *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*) and *βαδικτής* (*Med.* 1182; *ἄπαξ* in classical Greek) come *πόμπιμος* (*Med.* 848; *ἄπαξ* in the sense 'hospitable') and *πέπρακται* (*Med.* 1064; *ἄπαξ* in the sense 'it is settled'). No *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον* is automatically suspect: in the messenger's speech in *Orestes*, for instance, there are at least five words beginning with *alpha* alone that appear nowhere else in Euripides (866 *ἀγρόθεν*, 874 *ἄθροισμα*, 903 *ἀθυρόγλωστος*, 920 *ἀντουργός*, 922 *ἀνεπίπληκτος*), but it would not occur to anyone to suspect either the whole speech or the lines in which they appear. In trimeters suspicion falls on words of the following classes: (1) words common at the time but otherwise absent from poetry;<sup>36</sup> (2) words otherwise found only in epic or lyric;<sup>37</sup> (3) words common elsewhere in the poet in a different sense;<sup>38</sup> (4) words common in later Greek but otherwise absent from the language of the time; (5) words not found elsewhere in the poet but common in the other tragedians. None of the five words from the messenger's speech in *Orestes* belongs in any of these five classes; nor does *κόρευμα* or *βαδικτής*.

<sup>34</sup> "Mit einem Urteil, das ein Missverhältnis eines Verses oder einer Versgruppe zum Kontext feststellt, erhebt man einen schwerwiegenden Einwand gegen die Echtheit der Überlieferung . . . Auf die sich zwangsläufig ergebende Frage, wann wir von einer Verletzung der gedanklichen Gestaltung eines Abschnittes sprechen dürfen, kann freilich keine umfassende Antwort erteilt werden. Eine Entscheidung ist von Fall zu Fall zu treffen" (p.198); "Für uns ergibt sich die Aufgabe zu überprüfen, ob die Widersprüche an den verdächtigsten Stellen immer richtig 'diagnostiziert' sind" (p.209).

<sup>35</sup> "Diese Stelle kann ein Beispiel für die Neigung einiger Kritiker sein, bei schwierigen Perikopen, denen man fehlende Klarheit und Mängel im Ornatus nachsagt, gar zu schnell zum Mittel der Athetese zu greifen" (p.136).

<sup>36</sup> E.g. *οικία*, read by **A V B** at *Med.* 1130 and introduced by Pearson at *Trach.* 911, and *λόγιον* at *Held.* 405 (cf. Wilamowitz, *Hermes* 17 [1882] 352 n.1=*Kleine Schriften* I p.97 n.1).

<sup>37</sup> E.g. OC 304 *αἰών* (cf. GRBS 11 [1970] 293 n.21).

<sup>38</sup> E.g. Or. 806 *δμαιμος*, which elsewhere means 'brother' or 'sister' (674, *Hipp.* 339, IT 1361, *Hel.* 890—where in the words of Hermann "mirum si elidere vocalem, quam *δμαιμον* scribere maluisset Euripides," *Phoen.* 319, fr.515.5; the same applies to Sophocles). Together with the unemendable metrical anomaly in 804 (P. Maas, *Greek Metre*, transl. H. Lloyd-Jones [Oxford 1962] § 118), this suffices to condemn 804–06. 803, incidentally, is corrupt, because *ἐπαρκεῖν* elsewhere takes the dative, a point that did not escape Weil and Wecklein but failed to worry them; read perhaps *εὐρών* for *δντα* (*εἶ γε . . . δντι* would be closer, but *γε* is unjustifiable).

*πέπρακται* at *Med.* 1064, if the objection is correctly formulated,<sup>39</sup> belongs in class (3), and of course *πράττειν* is so common in Euripides and everywhere else that the objection is a very serious one. In short, misuse of a word, whether in sense or stylistically, is what matters.

From Baumert's treatment of individual passages there is very little to be learnt. Under both 'external evidence' and 'internal evidence' he defends a large number of interpolations commonly recognized,<sup>40</sup> and even if he had always seen the force in his opponents' arguments, his own too often defy probability and strain language. Two illustrations will suffice.

*Andr.* 5                    ζηλωτὸς ἔν γε τῷ πρὶν Ἀνδρομάχῃ χρόνῳ,  
νῦν δ', εἴ τις ἄλλη, δυστυχεστάτῃ γυνή  
[ἐμοῦ πέφυκεν ἢ γενήσεταιί ποτε]

6 οὔτις V. οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τὸν ἴαμβον προσέθηκαν ὑπονοήσαντες εἶναι τὴν γραφὴν δὴ τίς Σ 7.

Baumert accepts οὔτις from V and agrees with the scholiast's interpretation ἀντὶ τοῦ συγκριτικοῦ τὸ δυστυχεστάτῃ. Why Euripides in this one place should have used the superlative for the comparative, and why δ' οὔτις was ever corrupted to δ' εἴ τις or δὴ τίς, he does not explain. There is no clearer case in Euripides of an interpolation designed to obviate an elliptical construction.<sup>41</sup>

*Med.* 1314                χαλᾶτε κληῖδας ὡς τάχιστα, πρόσπολοι,  
ἐκλύεθ' ἄρμούς, ὡς ἴδω διπλοῦν κακόν,  
τοὺς μὲν θανόντας, τὴν δὲ τείωμαι δίκην.

“Nach allgemeiner Auffassung wird das Objekt διπλοῦν κακόν des Finalsatzes durch zwei mit den Partikeln μὲν und δέ abgesetzten Bestimmungen erläutert. Die Verbindung zweier Glieder, die trotz

<sup>39</sup> Another way of putting it is that the perfect is being made to do duty for the future. The whole of 1056–80 is interpolated, as G. Müller argued in *StItal* 25 (1951) 65–82; cf. now CQ 66 (1972) 51–61.

<sup>40</sup> E.g. *Hipp.* 1029, *Alc.* 795b–96a, 1094–95 (on which see Zwierlein, *op.cit.* [n.5] 205 n.10), *Med.* 87, 262, 785, *Phoen.* 912, *Hec.* 1087.

<sup>41</sup> But for Baumert's treatment of the passage, it would scarcely be necessary to add that the interpolator altered *δυστυχεστάτῃ* to *δυστυχεστέρα*, which must already have disappeared from the margin (or wherever Aristophanes put it) when the text came into the hands of the scholiast.

der Partikeln syntaktisch nicht parallel geordnet sind, noch sich inhaltlich unter den gemeinsamen Oberbegriff fügen, veranlasste einige Interpreten mit Recht zu Textänderungen. K. SCHENKL 1868<sup>42</sup> streicht den Vers Med. 1316 . . . Zweifelhaft jedoch ist der Ausgangspunkt dieser Vorschläge . . .” (p.146); and he goes on to suggest that only the punctuation need be altered:

ὡς ἴδω (διπλοῦν κακόν)  
τοὺς μὲν θανόντας, τὴν δὲ τείωμαι δίκην.

The words διπλοῦν κακόν constitute a “betont vorangestellte Apposition zu τοὺς μὲν θανόντας,” the children being two in number, and “die Partikeln μὲν und δέ, die an keine bestimmte Stelle des Verses gebunden sind, stellen dann völlig parallel die Objekte (τούς, τήν) der beiden Prädikate ἴδω und τείωμαι gegenüber.” In other words, the text is the nearest Euripides could get to ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἴδω θανόντας, διπλοῦν κακόν, τὴν δὲ τείωμαι δίκην.

In most of the passages Baumert discusses, the pertinent arguments have already been used, and Baumert’s reluctance to accept them is not reason enough for repeating them; but in two passages something can be added.

Med. 37                      δέδοικα δ’ αὐτὴν μὴ τι βουλευέση νέον·  
[βαρεῖα γὰρ φρήν, οὐδ’ ἀνέξεται κακῶς  
πάσχουσ’· ἐγῶδα τήνδε, δειμαίνω τέ νιν  
μὴ θηκτὸν ὄση φάσγανον δι’ ἥπατος  
αιγῆ δόμους εἰσβάς’, ἵν’ ἔστρωται λέχος,  
ἢ καὶ τύραννον τόν τε γήμαντα κτάνη,  
κάπειτα μείζω συμφορὰν λάβῃ τινά.]  
δεινὴ γάρ· οὗτοι . . . .

No one seems to have noticed that δεινὴ γάρ in 44 very nicely picks up δέδοικα δ’ αὐτὴν in 37. Cf. Or. 102–03:

Ελ. δέδοικα πατέρας τῶν ὑπ’ Ἰλίῳ νεκρῶν.  
Ηλ. δεινὸν γάρ,<sup>43</sup> Ἄργει τ’ ἀναβοᾶ διὰ στόμα.

<sup>42</sup> The article here referred to, *ZöstG* 19 (1868) 344–58, contains no mention of Med. 1316. Good luck to anyone who sets about tracing the conjecture to its true source.

<sup>43</sup> δεινοὶ γάρ?

Or. 1366 ΧΟ. ἀλλὰ κτυπεῖ γὰρ κληῖθρα βασιλείων δόμων,  
 κυγήσατ'· ἔξω γάρ τις ἐκβαίνει Φρυγῶν,  
 οὐδ' πευσόμεσθα τὰν δόμοις ὅπως ἔχει.

ΦΡ. Ἄργειον ξίφος ἐκ θανάτου πέφευγα  
 βαρβάρους ἐν εὐμάρι-  
 σιν κεδρωτὰ παστᾶδων ὑπὲρ τέραμνα  
 Δωρικὰς τε τριγλύφους,  
 φροῦδα φροῦδα, γᾶ γᾶ,  
 βαρβάρουσι δρασμοῖς.

τούτους δὲ τοὺς τρεῖς στίχους οὐκ ἂν τις ἐξ ἐτοίμου συγχωρήσειεν Εὐριπίδου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, οἵτινες, ἵνα μὴ κακοπαθῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν βασιλείων δόμων καταλλόμενοι, παρανοίξαντες ἐκπορεύονται τὸ τοῦ Φρυγὸς ἔχοντες σχῆμα καὶ πρόσωπον. ὅπως οὖν διὰ τῆς θύρας εὐλόγως ἐξιόντες φαίνονται, τούτους προ(σ)ενέταξαν. ἐξ ὧν δὲ αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν ἀντιμαρτυροῦσι τῇ διὰ τῶν θυρῶν ἐξόδῳ· φανερόν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐξῆς ὅτι ὑπερπεπήδηκεν. Σ 1366

A familiar problem. As the scholiast observes, 1369–74 seem to indicate that the Phrygian has just jumped off the roof; but defenders of 1366–68 put some other interpretation on them, such as that he jumped off a roof somewhere in the palace before emerging through the door (Σ1371, Baumert pp.78–79).

That is as far as the argument can go if it is confined to 1366–74.<sup>44</sup> In fact the structure of the whole scene must be taken into account.

CHO. 1353–65 strophe

1366–68 three trimeters

PHR. 1369–1502 monody, punctuated by single trimeters from the chorus (1380, 1393, 1425, 1452, 1473)

CHO. 1503–05 three trimeters

OR./PHR. 1506–36 dialogue in tetrameters

CHO. 1537–48 antistrophe

Now in the strophe the chorus assume, naturally enough (cf. 1296–1310), that Helen is dead, and only at the end of his long monody does

<sup>44</sup> One small point, however: if Δωρικὰὶ τριγλύφοι were represented on the σκηνή, would it not be confusing for a slave who emerged through the door to speak of having escaped over them?

the Phrygian reveal that she has escaped (1494–98). No sooner has he revealed it, however, than he is agreeing with Orestes that her death was fully deserved (1512–13), and Orestes goes on to say that he will not stop at one corpse (1536). This and other difficulties in 1503–36 led A. Grüninger<sup>45</sup> to delete 1506–36 and substitute 1503–05 for 1549–53 (with Ἀτρεΐδην for Ὀρέστην in 1505). Grüninger's proposal has recently been revived, albeit tentatively, by B. Gredley, who shows that none of the solutions so far offered is satisfactory.<sup>46</sup> Amongst other things, Gredley observes that without 1503–36 the structure of the scene is much more orderly; what he fails to observe is that it is more orderly still, in fact perfectly symmetrical, without 1366–68.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>45</sup> *De Euripidis Oreste ab histrionibus retractata* (Basel 1898).

<sup>46</sup> GRBS 9 (1968) 409–19. He deletes 1503–05 and leaves 1549–53, except that he suspects 1550 (414 n.11). If 1506–36 go, the remaining tetrameters in the vicinity inevitably come under suspicion. Their use just to announce an entry seems rather pointless (on *Phoen.* [1308–09] see Fraenkel, *op.cit.* [n.8] 83 and n.2), and the shouted γνώμη in 1552–53 is strange technique; the γνώμη itself makes only superficial sense, and Grüninger remarks (p.23) that εὐτυχῶν ἀνήρ “male cadit in Menelaum, praesertim si dicitur a choro, qui modo calamitatem vel iam ruinas domus Atridarum cecinerat” (cf. Di Benedetto: “Riesce strano che il Coro qualifici Menelao εὐτυχῶν in una situazione simile. Si avrebbe l'impressione che Euripide faccia ripetere poco opportunamente al Coro una formulazione dei rapporti tra Menelao e Oreste, che andava bene per una fase precedente della tragedia,” followed by the suggestion, ingenious but impossibly demanding on the audience, that εὐτυχῶν is meant to pull the wool over Menelaus' eyes).

On tetrameters in tragedy see J. Kanz, *De tetrametro trochaico* (diss. Giessen, Darmstadt 1913) 23–39; W. Krieg, *Philologus* 91 (1936) 42–51; M. Imhof, *MusHelv* 13 (1956) 125–43; T. Drew-Bear, *AJP* 89 (1968) 385–405. Of 1549–53 Imhof says (p.137): “Die Tetrameter von 1506ff. wirken hier noch nach.”

This is as good a place as any for drawing attention to another proposal of Grüninger's that has recently been revived and elaborated on, the deletion of 1618–20. In *Hermes* 97 (1969) 8–22, an article that would do credit to the most methodical of detectives, G. Seeck finds cause for suspecting not only 1618–20 but every other mention of setting the palace on fire (1593–96, 1149–52, 1541–44+1357–60). This reference was kindly supplied by Professor W. G. Arnott.

<sup>47</sup> The inconsistency between the dialogue and the surrounding context is so glaring that even the interpolator can hardly have overlooked it. Was the dialogue written not to follow the monody but to replace it, at a time when monodies were either out of fashion or beyond the capacity of the actors? Without the monody the Phrygian does not contradict himself, and the disappearance of Helen is not forgotten but merely delayed (1579–86).

In this hypothetical version the arrival of the Phrygian must have been announced, and it is tempting to wonder whether 1366–68 might have announced it. As Mr Barrett points out, however, they are not quite suitable: 1368 aptly introduces the monody, in which the chorus do learn what has been happening inside the palace, but not the dialogue, in which the Phrygian is so intent on saving his skin that his entry must have been too precipitate to be greeted so calmly by the chorus.

So much for *ENIOI AΘETOYΣIN*, a catalogue of deleterial obliquities. As it happens, two recent articles on tragedy have furnished ample material for a dissertation in the manner of Baumert entitled *ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΙ ΔΕ ΕΙΣΙΝ*; and though the second part of this trilogy will not pretend to be anything so grand as a dissertation, it may at least succeed in showing that the boot fits either foot.

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May, 1972