

# Prepositional Problems in Thucydides, Xenophon, Isaeus and Plato

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IN 1967 and 1968 I reviewed the doctrine of prepositions by checking the critical status of passages adduced in standard authorities, especially in Krüger's *Griechische Sprachlehre für Schulen*, which is rather closer to the text-critical origins of the science than many subsequent presentations.<sup>1</sup> My conclusion was that in contrast to many other elements of syntax the doctrine of prepositions does not stand in need of major revision. But in the course of the study I did come upon some outstanding textual difficulties, which, if correctly solved, could lead to changes of detail in a general reformulation of Greek syntax. Four of the more interesting and consequential problems of this kind are brought together here.

## I

THUCYDIDES 6.29.1–2; 3.13.5. PLATO, *Cratylus* 420A.

Thuc. 6.29.1–2: 'Ο δ' [*sc.* Ἀλκιβιάδης] ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρὸς τὰ μηνύματα ἀπελογεῖτο καὶ ἐτοῖμος ἦν πρὶν ἐκπλεῖν κρίνεσθαι, εἴ τι τούτων εἴργασμένος ἦν (ἤδη γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἐπεπόριστο), καὶ εἰ μὲν τούτων τι εἴργαστο, δίκην δοῦναι, εἰ δ' ἀπολυθείη, ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπεμαρτύρητο μὴ

<sup>1</sup> The following bibliographical abbreviations are used in this essay: GILDERSLEEVE, *Notes*=B. L. Gildersleeve, "Notes from the Greek Seminary II. οὐ μή," *AJP* 3 (1882) 202–05; GOODWIN, *MT*=W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*<sup>3</sup> (Boston 1900); *KG*=R. Kühner and B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, Satzlehre*,<sup>2</sup> 2 vols. (Hannover/Leipzig 1898, 1904); *Kr. Spr.* 1=K. W. Krüger, *Griechische Sprachlehre für Schulen, Attische Syntax*<sup>5</sup> (Berlin 1873); *Kr. Spr.* 2=K. W. Krüger, *Griechische Sprachlehre für Schulen, Poetisch-dialektische Syntax*<sup>3</sup> (Berlin 1871); *PREUSS, Ind.Isoc.*=Siegmund Preuss, *Index Isocrateus* (Furti 1904, repr. Hildesheim 1963); *REHDANTZ-BLASS*=C. Rehdantz and F. Blass, "Indices" in Demosthenes, *Neun Philippische Reden*,<sup>4</sup> I.2 (Leipzig 1886); *SCG*=B. L. Gildersleeve and C. W. E. Miller, *Syntax of Classical Greek*, I and II (New York, Cincinnati, Chicago 1900, 1911); *SCHWYZER, GG 2*=Eduard Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik II, Syntax und syntaktische Stilistik*, ed. Albert Debrunner (München 1950); *SHORT, Word Order*=Charles Short, "The Order of Words in Attic" prefixed to C. D. Yonge, *An English-Greek Lexicon*, ed. Henry Drisler (New York and London 1889); *STT*=Guy L. Cooper III, *Zur syntaktischen Theorie und Textkritik der attischen Autoren* (Zürich 1971); *STURZ, Lex.Xen.*=F. W. Sturz, *Lexicon Xenophonticum I–IV* (Leipzig 1801–1804, repr. Hildesheim 1964).

ἀπόντος πέρι αὐτοῦ διαβολὰς ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἀποκτείνειν, εἰ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ ὅτι σωφρονέστερον εἶη μὴ μετὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, πρὶν διαγνώσκειν, πῆμπειν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τοσούτῳ στρατεύματι.

ἀπόντος πέρι αὐτοῦ Jones-Powell, ἀπόντος πέρι [αὐτοῦ] Krüger, *vid. et Kr. Spr.* 1.68.6.1, ἀπόντος περὶ αὐτοῦ ABEGM Poppo-Stahl<sup>2</sup> Classen-Steup Hude<sup>1</sup> Smith Bodin-de Romilly (*acc. posuit vel refinxit corr. in C, posuit corr. in F*).

Alcibiades' public posture in the time between the mutilation of the herms and the departure of the Sicilian expedition is described in this passage, which contains a peculiar, hitherto unexplained collocation of genitives about the preposition *περί*, written *πέρι* by those who take it as standing in anastrophe. The solution adopted by most editors, and, after some hesitation, by scribes, is to construe the preposition with the substantive *αὐτοῦ* and to consider *ἀπόντος*, although it stands before the preposition, to be an adjective which goes with *αὐτοῦ*. But that is very hard, and, I think, even impossible in Attic prose of unaffected seriousness.<sup>2</sup> Nor, if both genitives are to

\* The problematical character of this syntax in Attic prose has long since received good coverage in *Kr. Spr.* 1.68.4.2 and 2.68.4.4 (KG 1.554–55 and Schwyzer, GG 2.427 are derivative and in some respects less complete). There are a very few passages in which emphasis on pronominal adjectives throws them before the preposition, as at *Pl. Cri.* 48c οὐδενὶ ξὺν νόῳ and *Criti.* 115c τοιῶδ' ἐν τάξει (but *Thuc.* 5.57.2 καὶ εἶ τινα πρὸς ἄλλον δέοι and similar passages are not examples because the position of *τις* is to be explained by its enclitic nature. For Wackernagel's 'Law of Postpositive Enclitics' as exemplified here, cf. J. Wackernagel, "Über ein Gesetz der indogermanischen Wortstellung," *IF* 1 [1892] 367f [= *Kleine Schriften* I (Göttingen 1953) 35f].) But such passages are suspect of being playfully poetic: in the *Crito* Socrates mockingly refers to thaumaturgical resuscitations from the dead and the *Critias* passage is a description of the idyllic agriculture of Atlantis. It is questionable anyway to what extent pronominal adjectives can serve as justification for other kinds of adjectives. These are in the word order in question strictly confined to poetry or to prose which is so plainly parapoetic in style that it may be said to be nonmetrical poetry. For metrical poetry cf. *Od.* 4.586 φίλην ἐς πατρίδ' ἔπεμψαν; *Aesch. Pers.* 696 ἀρχαίῳ περὶ τάρβει; *Eur. fr.* 28.1 (N\*) σοφοῦ πρὸς ἀνδρός. For poetical prose cf. *Pl. Resp.* 457b ὥσπερ κύμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν τοῦ γυναικείου περὶ νόμου λέγοντες, ὥστε μὴ παντάπασι κατακλυσθῆναι, where the typical wave-simile (cf. *LSJ s.v. κύμα* 1 2 a and b) marks the passage as plainly paratragic. *Pl. Phdr.* 244D παλαιῶν ἐκ μνημάτων, from Socrates' "Elegy of Love," is pseudo-oracular gush. See 244A–B, and note the epic and tragic provenance of μνήματα (*LSJ s.v.* 1). *Pl. Leg.* 943A Ἐπαινον μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἀκούειν τὸν νέον χρῆναι δοκεῖ πολεμικοῦ περὶ βίου refers to an immediately preceding passage where Plato extols the proper themes of choral lyric in the education of the national youth in Spartan military virtues.

Despite commentators (e.g. Classen-Stahl on 1.3.3) there is nothing like this in Thucydides. At *Thuc.* 1.3.3 ἀντίπαλον ἐς ἐν ὄνομα ἀποκεκρίσθαι the word ἀντίπαλον is, as Krüger, Böhme and Morris have seen, an acc. substantive standing as inner object with ἀποκεκρίσθαι. For the inner acc. with a passive inf. cf. *Pl. Phdr.* 242A ἀπέρχομαι πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τι μείζον ἀναγκασθῆναι and other examples in *Kr. Spr.* 1. 52.4.8. For ἀντίπαλον used as an inner acc. cf.

be taken with the preposition, does the expedient adopted by some uneasy editors of considering the preposition to stand in anastrophe with the adjective *ἀπόντος* offer a really useful solution.<sup>3</sup> One sees therefore that there is a certain logic to Krüger's suggestion. By taking the participle as a substantive and excising the pronoun he obtains a perfectly regular and relevant commonplace *ἐπεμαρτύρητο μὴ ἀπόντος πέρι διαβολὰς ἀποδέχεσθαι* "... he protested that they should not accept slanderous charges against an absent man."<sup>4</sup> *ἀπόντος* (*sc. ἀνδρός*) stands without reference to Alcibiades except by inference. It is thus another advantage inherent in the acceptance of this text as the original that one is able to understand how the seemingly ungrammatical *αὐτοῦ* might have been introduced: it would have been intended originally to make explicit the implicit reference to Alcibiades.

Despite the attractiveness of Krüger's suggestion, however, the surgery he recommends, excision of *αὐτοῦ* despite the unanimous

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Thuc. 6.23.1 *ἀντίπαλον . . . παρασκευασάμενοι* and 7.34.6 *ναυμαχίσαντες . . . ἀντίπαλα*. At Thuc. 7.86.5 *διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν* (*πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν Vaticanus solus*) the prepositional phrase, if it is not a later addition, goes with *νενομισμένην*, cf. 5.105.1 *ἐς τὸ θεῖον νομίσειωσ* and 7.77.2 *ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα*. *πᾶσαν* must be taken with *ἐπιτήδευσιν*.

Investigations into the relation of poetry to Thucydides' historical style have been frequent and intensive: see C. F. Smith, *TAPA* 23 (1892) Proc. xlviii ff and *TAPA* 25 (1894) 61ff; O. Luschnat, *RE* suppl. 12 (1971) 1264.40ff; Schmid-Stählin I.2 pp. 181–204, esp. 189ff. But no one has ever succeeded in showing that Thucydides ever deliberately sought a 'poetic' effect. Poetry comes into his text when he uses it as historical source material. Why would Thucydides go against his practice at this one place? He is discussing a man whom he plainly admires, whose ultimate removal from command sealed the doom of the Sicilian expedition. The syntax usually accepted here would be hard to credit to Thucydides anywhere. At this juncture it would be tantamount to tasteless flippancy.

<sup>3</sup> It follows from Short, *Word Order* lxxxii col. 1, that when a substantive and an associated adjective are both used with *πέρι* the adjective follows: Thuc. 2.70.1 *βρώσειωσ πέρι ἀναγκαίας*; Pl. *Gr.* 520A *ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων*, *Leg.* 865B *ιατρῶν δὲ πέρι πάντων*. Neither does the thought that both *ἀπόντος* and *αὐτοῦ* might be substantives, perhaps standing in apposition, receive any support from the usage discussed by Short. When more than one substantive is used with *πέρι*, they are found to be ranged rigidly parallel with copulative and disjunctive conjunctions: Pl. *Gr.* 455A *δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων*, *Plt.* 305D *ἐγκαυρίας τε πέρι καὶ ἀκαυρίας*; Thuc. 7.72.2 *νεκρῶν μὲν πέρι ἢ ναυαγίων*; Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.12 *ὑγιείας πέρι ἢ ῥώμης*. No example of substantives standing in appositional relationship and separated by *πέρι* is cited.

<sup>4</sup> This commonplace was resorted to by speakers freely wherever it might apply: see Lys. 19.50 *χαλεπῶσ φέροντος ὅτι ἀπὼν διεβάλλετο* and Isoc. 16.8. It would have been particularly advantageous to Alcibiades to put the onus of arbitrary procedure upon his opponents. His own personal style (cf. Thuc. 6.28.2) had laid him open to charges of an *οὐ δημοτικὴ παρανομία*. Our explanation of the passage recognizes the commonplace and makes it the occasion of distantly echoed rhetorical conviction, which is the ultimate reason for the seemingly jumbled word order.

testimony of a copious and complex tradition, is still violent. Careful consideration should be given to any alternative, and there is one which seems obvious enough: *αὐτοῦ* does not go with *περί* at all, but stands as an objective genitive with *διαβολάς* forming, as will be demonstrated, one phraseological concept with it. The phrase *ἀπόντος περί* specifies a most important limitation of the phraseological unity *αὐτοῦ διαβολάς*.<sup>5</sup> The translation is: “And he protested that they should not accept without question slanderous charges against him—not when they were charges in the case of an absent man.”

There is no difficulty about accepting the construction of *διαβολή* with an objective genitive. It is often so used: Pl. *Leg.* 731A *ὁ δὲ φθονερός, τῇ τῶν ἄλλων διαβολῇ δεῖν οἰόμενος ὑπερέχειν, . . . τοὺς . . . ἀνθαμιλλωμένους εἰς ἀθυμίαν καθίστησι τῷ ἀδικῶς ψέγεσθαι*; *Resp.* 499E *τὴν τῆς φιλομαθείας διαβολὴν*; Thuc. 2.13.1 *ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ αὐτοῦ* (v.l. *ἐαυτοῦ*). Nor is it difficult to understand how *ἀπόντος περί*, standing as a phrase conceived as a unity apart, may be applied to the concept *αὐτοῦ διαβολάς*, which will be shown to constitute a close phraseological unity. Prepositional phrases with *περί* are frequently used as an explanatory addition to verbal nouns: Pl. *Leg.* 846B *νόμιμα . . . λήξεών τε περί δικῶν καὶ προσκλήσεων καὶ κλητήρων*; Thuc. 1.23.3 *τὰ . . . πρότερον ἀκοῆ . . . λεγόμενα . . . κειμένων τε περί*; Thuc. 5.5.2 *ὁμολογία ξυμβάσεως περί*. So, too, such phrases are often placed as here ahead of the substantive they explain: Pl. *Grg.* 455B *στρατηγῶν αἰρέσεως περί ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς πολεμίους ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμβουλή*; Thuc. 2.45.2 *ἀρετῆς περί ἢ ψόγου . . . κλέος*; Thuc. 4.74.3 *τούτων περί . . . ψῆφον*.

Two objections might be advanced: (1) Why should we believe that *αὐτοῦ* does really go so closely with *διαβολάς* that it forms essentially one concept with it? (2) Is it really believable that *ἀπόντος* should stand as a substantive without specific reference to Alcibiades when implicit reference to him is quite inescapable and when *αὐτοῦ*, which stands so near, does in fact have direct reference to him? Each of these questions

<sup>5</sup> The use of prepositional phrases involving anastrophe *περί* as adversative clausulas has caused text-critical difficulties elsewhere. The speaker for the Mytileneans at the conference at Olympia in 428, urging war upon the assembled Peloponnesians, says with reference to his island homeland at 3.13.5 *νομίμη τε μηδεὶς ἄλλοτρίας γῆς περί οἰκείου κίνδυνον ἔξειν (περί οἰκείου ABCDEFGM edd. pl., περί οὐκ οἰκείου Hude)*. The contrast between *ἄλλοτρίας* and *οἰκείου* gives this last its rueful-bitter tone and with this its special sense of ‘all too personally significant’. Perhaps Hude conceived his unnecessary conjecture because he missed this contrast, which the clausal character of the phrase *ἄλλοτρίας γῆς περί* makes possible.

is readily answered. *αὐτοῦ διαβολὰς* goes closely together because it is a set expression which would and did naturally occur to anyone who felt himself to be the object of unjust accusations.<sup>6</sup> Moreover we know that it did, at least according to Thucydides, present itself to Alcibiades—twice in his great speech to the Spartans: 6.89.1 *Ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διαβολῆς πρῶτον ἐς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν*, and 6.90.1 *καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐς τὰς ἐμὰς διαβολὰς τοιαῦτα ξυνέβη*. The whole section at the beginning of paragraph 29, with which we are more especially concerned, is a kind of pastiche of indirectly quoted Alcibiadean language, and so this same expression appears there appropriately.<sup>7</sup> It is only disguised by being expressed in the third person, which necessitates a change which is unavoidable in Attic, where *ἄς* (*ἐὰς*) *διαβολὰς* would be impossible. The only third-person possessive adjective *ὄς* (*ἐός*) is never used in Attic prose, but instead is replaced regularly by *αὐτοῦ* or *ἑαυτοῦ*.<sup>8</sup> So, just as the present-tense first-person statement which would correspond to Xen. *Cyr.* 1.3.1 *μετεπέμψατο Ἀκτυάγης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θυγατέρα* would be *μεταπέμπομαι Ἀκτυάγης ἐγὼ τὴν ἐμὴν θυγατέρα*, and the present-tense first-person statement which would correspond to Xen. *Anab.* 6.2.14 *αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ αὐτῶν στρατιῶται (sc. ἐξέπλευσαν)* would be *ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι στρατιῶται ἐκπλέομεν*, so the present-tense first-person statement corresponding to *ἐπεμαρτύρετο*

<sup>6</sup> It occurred to Socrates in his time of public troubles too: Pl. *Apol.* 19A *ἡ κατηγορία . . . ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν*, *Apol.* 20B *ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει*. In this idiom the possessive adjective takes the place of or has the same relationship to the noun as an objective genitive. See the many citations in Kr. *Spr.* 1.47.7.8 and KG 1.560.11, among which are Lys. 20.21 *τὸ δέος . . . τὸ τε ὑμέτερον καὶ τὸ τῶν κατηγορῶν* “fear, both of you and of the accusers”; Antiph. 5.41 *οὐ χάριτι τῇ ἐμῇ* “not by way of a kindness to me.”

<sup>7</sup> The quoted snippets appear more clearly when one notices the polysyndeton which organizes the entire passage, *νῆξ. καὶ ἐποίημος . . . καὶ εἰ . . . καὶ ἐπεμαρτύρετο . . . καὶ ὅτι . . .* *STT* 79–81 shows that this is an organization typical of passages in Attic which build up a personality portrait or the picture of a person or group of persons in a particular rôle. Each *καί*-sentence adds a particular typical activity to the composite whole which makes up the portrait, and it is not uncommon that the activity contained in such a sentence is a typical speech pattern, hence a kind of quotation. D. P. Tompkins, “Stylistic Characterisation in Thucydides: Nicias and Alcibiades,” *YCS* 22 (1972) 181–214, *cf. esp.* “The Paratactical Style of Alcibiades,” 204–14, has pointed out the frequency with which Alcibiades begins his sentences with initial *καί*. Thuc. 6.29.1–2 may be in this respect too a reference to language typical of Alcibiades, but the comparison to the polysyndetic mosaic portraits mentioned above seems on the whole more probable. Tompkins’ main thesis is that Thucydides reflects within the general framework of his own style the personal idiom of the leading personalities whose speech he reports, a point well taken. Some text-critical consequences have been discussed in *STT* 95–102.

<sup>8</sup> The clearest discussion is still Kr. *Spr.* 1.51.4.2.

μη̄ ἀπόντος περί αὐτοῦ διαβολὰς ἀποδέχεσθαι would be ἐπιμαρτύρομαι μη̄ ἀπόντος περί τὰς ἐμὰς διαβολὰς ἀποδέχεσθαι. And this is the very set expression which has been pointed out above.

The other point of hesitation may be explained as easily. Not only is it possible for a participle to be used as a substantive with general reference so near to a possible specific reference, but this kind of switch from specific to general reference and *vice versa* involving participles is actually a special nicety of the best Attic idiom, and not at all rare.<sup>9</sup> It can be well illustrated with this very participle. At Dem. 47.80 Καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὸ νόμων καὶ ψηφισμάτων ἀναγκαζόμενος . . . ἐπειδὴ οὐ κατέλαβον αὐτὸν [*sc.* Θεόφημον] ἔνδον, οὐχ ἄρπάσας ὠχόμην οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ μετελθεῖν ἐκέλευσα αὐτόν, καὶ παρόντος, οὐκ ἀπόντος, τὴν ἐνεχυρασίαν ἐποιησάμην, the pledge seizure which is described undoubtedly took place in the presence of Theophemus, so the two participles παρόντος and ἀπόντος have implicit reference to him. But the point which interests the speaker is that it was a seizure carried out in good form, which is to say, *from a man who was present, not absent*. The participles echo the intent, and probably the language, of the mentioned laws and decrees and are therefore general in reference. The ellipse, if one is to be supplied, is τινὸς or ἀνδρὸς and not αὐτοῦ = Θεοφήμου. Similarly at Isoc. 16.8 νομίζων δεινὰ πάσχειν ὅτι παρόντα μὲν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔκρινον, ἀπόντος δὲ κατεγίνωσκον, the rhetorical force comes from the speaker's identification of his own case with a general principle preexistent in the minds of his hearers, a principle which stated that it is bad form to condemn *any man* in his own absence. That the speaker was in fact so condemned merely gives him an excellent motive for insistence on the principle of the thing. One more example, this time with a neuter participle, may be mentioned, and it occurs at Pl. *Crat.* 420A καὶ μὴν 'πόθος' αὐτὸ καλεῖται σημαίνων οὐ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι ἡμέρου τε καὶ ρεύματος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἄλλοθί που καὶ ἀπόντος (ἡμέρου τε καὶ ρεύματος **BTWCDGV** *secl.* Ast Burnet Méridier), "And then again 'yearning' receives that name as being indicative that the thing which the word designates is not so much a matter of the lust and thrill which is at hand, as it pertains rather to *anything* which is somewhere else and felt as being wanting." (There is a deliberately awful pun on πόθος and ἀπών.) The editors excise ἡμέρου τε καὶ ρεύματος because they

<sup>9</sup> Many parallels for the illustration of the standard use of the participle as a generic substantive are cited in SCG 30–31 and KG 1.608.1. When so used participles are typically anarthrous, like ἀπόντος in our passage.

think that if it is used with *παρόντος* it will have to be supplied with *ἀπόντος* also, and that gives no satisfactory sense. But that measure is not necessary because the Attic switches so easily from the use of participles as adjectives in one moment to their use as generic substantives in the next that there is no reason why *ἀπόντος*—and the parallel substantivized adverbial phrase *ἄλλοθί που*—cannot be taken as having general reference. There is nothing requiring correction in this passage, which merely shows Plato playfully heightening a usage which is common enough elsewhere, being found, for instance, also in our passage of Thucydides.

## II

### ISAEUS 8.24. XENOPHON, *Cyropaedia* 8.1.5

Isae. 8.24: *καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἦν θυγατριδοῦς Κίρωνος, οὐκ ἂν ταῦτα διαωμολογεῖτο* [*sc.* ὁ Διοκλῆς], *ἀλλ' ἐκείνους ἂν τοὺς λόγους ἔλεγε. "Σὺ δὲ τίς εἶ; Σοὶ δὲ τί προσήκει θάπτειν; Οὐ γινώσκω σε. Οὐ μὴ εἰσίης τὴν οἰκίαν."* *Ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν προσῆκεν, ἃ περ νῦν ἑτέρους πέπεικε λέγειν. νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν εἶπεν, εἰς ἔω δὲ τὰργύριον ἐκέλευεν εἰσενεγκεῖν.*

*εἰσίης τὴν* A Q B L M P Z Schömann, *εἴσει εἰς* Bekker Dobree Thalheim Wyse Forster Roussel.

The sense of the words of the text as correctly transmitted in the mss is (adapting Forster), "Yet had I not been Ciron's grandson, he [*sc.* Diocles] would never have made these arrangements with me, but would rather have said, 'Who are you? What right have you to carry out the burial? I do not know you: you'll not set foot into the house.' This is what he ought to have said, and what he has now instigated others to say. As it was, he said nothing of the kind, but only told me to bring the money next morning."

But, as the critical apparatus shows, the text which is now usually printed is not the same as that which we receive in the mss. A conjecture of Bekker's, *εἴσει εἰς*, has been generally taken up instead. It is the purpose of this essay to show that no valid reason for accepting this conjecture and departing from the tradition exists, and that both the arguments which have been used to justify such a move are mistaken. But these arguments must first be repeated before they can be refuted.

The first argument is that *τὴν οἰκίαν* with *εἰς* would be an ‘accusative of the direction in which’, a use of the accusative which is supposed to be archaic and so in the Classical period limited to the poets. In prose ‘the accusative of the direction in which’ is supposed always to require a preposition by way of specification. It would be to supply this need, then, that the conjecture was made.<sup>10</sup>

A second argument, which one suspects came up later, is based not on need for the preposition but on the supposed superior appropriateness in this passage of the (virtual) future *εἴσει* in the construction with *οὐ μή*. It is argued that the future in this construction gives a strong prohibition, whereas the subjunctive gives only a negative prediction, and that, inasmuch as a strong prohibition is here needed, the future therefore fits the sense of the passage better.<sup>11</sup>

These two arguments together do seem at first to give fairly telling support to Bekker’s conjecture. Yet when they are examined more critically, this appearance turns out to be illusory. The illusion does not however reside, as one might at first suspect, in a possibly over-subtle distinction between the future and the subjunctive in the construction after *οὐ μή*. There is a very plain difference between the two. The sense of the two different constructions is in fact so distinctive that, at least in the second person and the third, they can hardly be confused.<sup>12</sup> The sense of the future as ‘strict prohibition’ is not the

<sup>10</sup> This argument is given in Kr. *Spr.* 1.46.1.1. Bekker’s conjecture might seem more attractive because it can be explained as the correction of corruption due to itacism. Wyse (xli), however, is able to show only five passages where the confusion *ι* for *ει* is found in all Isaeus mss., while in 8.24 alone there are sixteen examples of correctly transmitted *ει*. Of *η* for *ει* Wyse (xlii) has only four examples to show. Thus our confidence in the classical orthography of the paradosis is strengthened. Actually the odds against this particular conjecture are even greater, for Bekker has produced an example of hiatus where there was none before. Now Isaeus is not usually very careful about hiatus, but Wyse (p.178 and again on 8.30) remarks that orations 1, 8 and 9 are unusually polished in this respect, and he cites only nine examples in the eighth oration. Since there are of course hundreds of junctures in the oration this adds a stylistic argument against the emendation.

<sup>11</sup> Wyse gives the emended text *οὐ μὴ εἴσει εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν* and remarks: “‘You shall not enter the house’, the future is not predictive but prohibitory, expressing the will of the speaker. See Goodwin *MT* 295 and Appendix, p.389ff.” Wyse might well have mentioned Gildersleeve, *Notes*, an admirable article.

<sup>12</sup> It is true, as Barrett on Eur. *Hipp.* 210–11 correctly observes, that a really systematic explanation of these usages, one which would relate them to other imperatival expressions in some developmental or logical way, has long been a desideratum and a matter of endless discussion. It will continue to be so until a study of the syntax of the moods is made which takes the effect of hypophora fully into account (see the brief introductory essay in *STT* 10–31).



sense of strictness which comes from unchallenged authority, from the certainty that the prohibition will be obeyed. Rather it is a shrill stringency which proceeds from fear on the part of the speaker that his prohibition may not be complied with. There is something like terrorized reaction, like *beseching*, in this form of prohibition. We cannot review all the examples here, but only a few are needed to make the point. Consider the following.

The old man in Sophocles' *Trachiniae* who is watching over the agonized Heracles tries desperately to hush Hyllos, whose lamentations threaten to rouse the hero from his fitful repose: Soph. *Trach.* 978ff <Πρέβυς> Σίγα, τέκνον, μὴ κινήσης . . . ὀδύνην πατρός . . . ἀλλ' ἔσχε δακῶν στόμα σόν . . . Οὐ μὴ 'ξεγερεῖς τὸν ὑπνῶ κατόχον κάκκινήσεις κἀναστήσεις . . . δεινὴν νόσον, ᾧ τέκνον.

Or again, in Euripides' *Supplices* Iphis forbids Euadne, her unheeding daughter, to publicise her intent to commit suicide by self-immolation: Eur. *Supp.* 1066 <Εὐ.> ἄισσω θανόντος Καπανέως τήνδ' ἐς πυράν. <Ἰφ.> ὦ θύγατερ, οὐ μὴ μῦθον ἐς πολλοὺς ἐρεῖς. <Εὐ.> Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ χρήζω, πάντα Ἀργείους μαθεῖν.

This tone of desperate forbidding, forbidding which is actually expostulation, is no less clear when it is used in irony and to comic purpose as at Ar. *Ach.* 166 Οὐ μὴ πρόχει τούτοις ἐσκοροδικμένοις, and Aeschin. 3.177 τοὺς . . . πονηροὺς οὐ μὴ ποτε βελτίους ποιήσετε.

And the tone might be equally well illustrated by Soph. *OC* 848; Eur. *Andr.* 757, *El.* 982, *Hipp.* 213, *Bacch.* 343; Ar. *Nub.* 367, *Vesp.* 397, etc.<sup>13</sup> But does it fit our passage of Isaeus? Not at all. The sense here is rather one of haughty disdain. It is the tone of a man who is dismissing an unwanted intruder and who will shortly shut the door unceremoniously in his face.

What kind of negative predictions are expressed by the subjunctive with οὐ μὴ? The character which impresses one in these is the supreme confidence of the speaker. So, for instance, the general of the Athenian forces, Hippocrates, assures his men before the battle that if they win it they will never have to fear Peloponnesian invasion again: Thuc. 4.95.2 ἦν νικήσωμεν, οὐ μὴ ποτε ὑμῖν Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς τὴν χώραν . . . ἐσβάλωσιν. The reader may, of course, for his own part have his doubts. But there is no doubt as to how Hippocrates meant his prediction to be understood.

Similarly we find the idiom used in Plato to express Socrates' un-

<sup>13</sup> See the collections in Gildersleeve, *Notes* 204-05.

shakable confidence in the immortality of the soul: Pl. *Phaedo* 105D *Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε δέξεται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.*

This is the tone again which Theseus uses to assure Oedipus that the Athenian border patrols will allow no kidnapping culprit to escape Attica: Soph. *OC* 1022ff *οὐδὲν δεῖ πονεῖν . . . οὐ μὴ ποτε χώρας φυγόντες* [*sc. οἱ ἐξηρπασμένοι*] *τῆσδ' ἐπεύξωνται θεοῖς.*

And this sense of absolute security and confidence in the prediction is met everywhere in this construction. Further examples are Aesch. *Sept.* 38 and 199; Soph. *Aj.* 560, *El.* 42, *Phil.* 103; Eur. *HF* 718; Hdt. 1.199; Xen. *Cyr.* 5.1.17; Dem. 18.246, etc.<sup>14</sup> And it is precisely this tone which our passage requires: “You’ll not set foot into the house.” A prediction of such a kind is really the strongest kind of statement, strong to the point of unruffled quietness, even condescension.

We see then that the second argument in favor of the emendation is mistaken. It is the result of over-hasty application of a general grammatical formulation, applied in such a way that the true nuance of the passage is distorted. The subjunctive which stands in the mss. suits this passage better than the future which has been conjectured.

This, however, still does not prove that the preposition was not correctly conjectured. We still have to deal with the first argument for Bekker’s conjecture, that the simple accusative without the preposition is tragic diction. The diction is in fact typically tragic: Soph. *Trach.* 1167 *ἐσελθὼν ἄλκος*, Eur. *HF* 598 *ἐσῆλθον χθόνα*, *Phoen.* *ἐσῆλθε πόλιν*, *Ion* 69 *εἰσελθόντι μαντεῖον*, *Ion* 1547 *εἰσελθὼν δόμους*. In prose *εἰέρχομαι* (50 LSJ *s.v.*) regularly takes a preposition, especially *εἰς*. But here Isaeus uses tragic idiom (in conjunction with a typically tragic *οὐ*

<sup>14</sup> The second person as found in our passage is rather less common than the third, especially in prose. But there are parallels enough to warrant the construction, and the fact that these parallels occur mostly in tragedy only supports the paratragic explanation of this passage. Cf. Aesch. *Sept.* 281 *φύγης*, *Cho.* 895 *προδῶς*; Soph. *El.* 1029 *πάθης*, *OT* 771 *σπερθηῆς* Eur. *Hec.* 1039 *φύγητε*; Pl. *Resp.* 341c *οἶος τ’ ἦς*. Similarly, the present subjunctive is less common than the aorist. But cf. Pl. *Resp.* 341c just cited and Xen. *Anab.* 4.8.13 *μείνη*; Pl. *Phlb.* 48D *δυνατός ᾧ*; Xen. *Hiero* 11.15 *δύνωνται*, *Anab.* 2.2.12 *δύνηται*. Only the subjunctive can be right at Xen. *Cyr.* 8.1.5 *καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ εἰ εἰδέναι χρή ὅτι οὐ μὴ δύνηται Κῦρος εὔρειν ὅτι αὐτῷ μὲν ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ χρήσεται, ἡμῖν δ’ οὐ (δύνηται FDAHV, δυνήσεται CERG Gemoll Marchant Miller-Hug)*, for the prediction is brightly confident. See also the parallels just given. Probably the reason why the aorist is more common is that the clear future conception which the construction implies is more naturally conceived as an intellectually complete fact. The present introduces a durative or conative nuance. I would guess that the present is used in our passage because the person conceived of as being addressed by the (hypothetical) speaker is thought of as trying to get his foot in the door.

μή construction) as an ironically intended hypothetical quotation from an opponent whom he is attempting to set in a ridiculous light. Isaeus prefers, of course, to argue on the basis of straightforward narrative and points of law.<sup>15</sup> But such substantial points are largely wanting in the material with which he must here deal. The relevant documents seem to have been lost, and so the advocate must take recourse to circumstantial evidence and to that species of inductive, constructional argumentation based on probabilities which every advocate must be able to provide when the situation demands it. This kind of argument brings with it a higher rhetorical color than Isaeus usually practices, here entailing a touch of paratragical diction. The very mode in which the fictive quotation is introduced with the words *ἐκείνους . . . τοὺς . . . λόγους* suggests that the speaker places some distance between himself and his accustomed style on the one hand and the speaker who follows and the language attributed to him on the other. This language is not presented as having been actually used by the opponent but is intended only to point up a contrast between his actual deeds and the proper course of action which he should have pursued but did not, having only used the pretext of the interment to get his hands on a little extra money. The mocking irony of the passage is clear, and the paratragic diction is part of the intended effect. The preposition then should also be rejected, and there is no reason to change the manuscript tradition in this place.

### III

XENOPHON, *Anabasis* 7.7.5; 6.3.19; 4.2.19.

Xen. *Anab.* 7.7.5: *ἐπορευόμεθα διὰ ταύτης τῆς χώρας ὅπη ἐβουλόμεθα, ἦν μὲν ἐθέλοιμεν πορθοῦντες, ἦν δ' ἐθέλοιμεν κατακαίοντες.*

*κατακαίοντες* FMDVZHT, *καίοντες* CBAE Krüger Marchant Masqueray Hude<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> See F. Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit* II (Leipzig 1874) 471–85, and esp. 471 on Isaeus simplicity of diction, narrative vigor and lawyerly method of proof. At the same time, as Blass remarks (471), Isaeus is not adverse to occasional poetic diction. LSJ confirms the essentially epic, lyric and tragic character of *χεῖλιος* (11.6), *ἀναίνομαι* (2.27), *ὁ ἐν Ἄιδου ὦν* [= *τεθνεώς*] (2.47), *ἀποκυλάω* (5.30), *λυμαίνομαι* (6.18), all of which serve to lend a tone of elevation or pathos. Similarly *ἄττω* [*ἀττω*] (4.10), *γρύζω* (8.27) and *καλινδέομαι* [*κυλίνδω*] (5.44), which add sprightliness to narrative passages, are essentially comic in provenance. More significant still is Blass' remark (485) that Isaeus' sparse resort to humor and irony is reserved for sallies against the opponent, citing 2.21 (*cf.* 2.33) and 11.20 (*cf.* 11.37ff).

<sup>16</sup> Since the appearance of A.W. Persson, *Zur Textgeschichte Xenophons* (Lund/Leipzig 1915), a reappraisal of the relative value of *Anabasis* mss. has been under way. Since the

The editors desert the tradition of the older mss. at this point to take up a form of *καίω* (*κᾶω*) instead of the compound *κατακαίω*, and it is not hard to see why they might make this mistake by relying too strictly on close lexicography. There is an indubitable, clear-cut, fundamental distinction between the two words, which is observed in almost all cases. And *καίω* is the only word which seems to fit this passage. In Xenophon, it is used in a military context, often in conjunction with *ἄγω*, *κόπτω*, *πορθέω*, *τέμνω* of destructive sweeps across stretches of land, cf. *Anab.* 1.6.1; 6.3.19 οἱ δ' ἵππεῖς διασπειρόμενοι ἐφ' ὄσον καλῶς εἶχεν ἔκαιον ἢ ἐβάδιζον, καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ ἐπιπαριόντες κατὰ τὰ ἄκρα ἔκαιον πάντα, ὅσα καύσιμα ἐώρων (ἔκαιον ἢ ἐβάδιζον, καὶ MDVZHT Krüger Hude; ἔκαιον, καὶ F(?)CBAE Marchant Masqueray)<sup>17</sup>; *Hell.* 5.4.41; *Ages.* 1.33; cf. *Hell.* 5.2.39. It can, accordingly, be used of country hamlets, when these are considered as districts. See *Anab.* 3.5.3; 7.7.19; 4.2.19 μὴ καίειν τὰς κώμας (κώμας FMDVZHTBE Krüger; οἰκίας AC Marchant Masqueray Hude; τε καὶ τὰς κώμας add. in marg. corrector in C). In other cases the district is named standing in the accusative as object, so e.g. at *Hell.* 3.2.5; 6.5.27. And the most common object is simply *χώραν*, the word for 'district, land, country', as at *Anab.* 3.5.5; *Hell.* 3.2.26; 4.1.1; 4.2.15. This is, of course, the precise same object we find at *Anab.* 7.7.5, and, if the simplex is read, these passages will all be parallels.

On the other hand, *κατακαίω* does not, in its ordinary acceptance,

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early thirties terminology prejudiced in favor of the group CBAE and against the group FMDVZHT has been modified. Thus in the *praefatio* of his 1931 edition Hude writes, "nomina meliorum deteriorumve usu tradita relinquenda [sc. sunt]." Hude's own evaluation at that time was "non solum familiam Parisinam [i.e. CBAE], sed etiam familiam Italicam [i.e. FMDVZHT] ab recensionibus satis antiquis originem duxisse [sc. credo]." Since then the balance of critical opinion has swung more heavily in favor of the generally older 'Italian' family and against the generally neater and more easily legible 'Parisian' family. In the "Notice" (liv f) to his edition (Paris 1971) of *Cyropaedia* I and II, a work contained in C along with the *Anabasis*, M. Bizos explains that he rarely reports the readings of that ms. In this he may be indulging in excessive reaction, but my own studies in Xenophon have caused me to form a very favorable conception of M and F, which were strongly favored also by Krüger. Despite a degree of unity in the families, in this paper I report the reading of each of the better known mss. in order to avoid confusion.

<sup>17</sup> F is in bad shape in some places, and here its reading is not clear. Hude reports that it omits the relative sentence ἢ ἐβάδιζον, but Masqueray cannot discern what the reading is. The fuller version of the text seems preferable because ἢ ἐβάδιζον well serves, like ὅσα καύσιμα ἐώρων in the parallel clause, to intensify the completeness of the destruction caused by the verb ἔκαιον. The only seemingly redundant relative sentences in both places serve a purpose very like that served by the prepositional prefix *κατα-* in our principal passage *Anab.* 7.7.5.

fit this passage. *κατακαίω* often has military applications, but it is used properly of things, objects which are consumed in a fire, burned up, or burned down level with the ground. See *Hell.* 4.1.33, and *cf.* the accusative objects at *Anab.* 1.4.10 and *Hell.* 6.5.37. But it can be applied to standing crops, as at *Anab.* 2.5.19, or even to grain stubble, as at *Oec.* 18.2. Cities and towns, when these are considered as architectural conglomerations, and their contents go with this verb too: hence an accusative object such as that at *Anab.* 7.4.1, *cf.* 3.5.13 and 7.4.5, and see in this connexion especially *Anab.* 5.2.27. Almost any object which can be thrown into a fire or set on fire may accompany this verb. For weapons see *Cyr.* 4.5.36; 4.6.1; 7.4.14. For personal possessions, supplies and equipment see *Anab.* 3.3.1, *cf.* 3.2.27 and 7.4.18; *Hell.* 6.5.50. For ships see *Anab.* 1.4.18; *Hell.* 1.1.18. For fortifications and their contents see *Hell.* 3.1.7; *Anab.* 5.4.26.

But, of course, none of these passages is anything like a parallel to *Anab.* 7.7.5. Editors are wrong to reject the compound because in many cases in Xenophon and contemporaries *κατά* is used in composition simply as an intensifying prefix. Therefore *κατακαίω* can have the effect of the simplex reinforced by an adverbial intensifying modifier. If *καίω* ‘burn’ is used of countrysides, then *κατακαίω* can be used, not in its ordinary sense, but simply as an intensified form of *καίω* to mean ‘burn completely’.

That seems to happen in only this one place. But consultation of Sturz, *Lexicon Xenophonticum* II 671–721, where the compounds in *κατα-* are treated, brings overwhelming evidence that this prefix, used as a mere mark of intensification, is acceptable almost anywhere. Sturz remarks specifically in a number of his articles that it is hard to distinguish the compounds in *κατα-* from the simple forms. And he mentions five instances where the simple form alternates with the compound with *κατα-* or some other preposition with almost no distinction in sense.<sup>18</sup> More evidence appears from the fact that five words beginning with *κατα-* tend to alternate in the mss. with typical variant alternatives.<sup>19</sup> This would naturally suggest that the exact

<sup>18</sup> Sturz, *Lex.Xen.* II 678–93 between *καταθύειν* and *καταμύειν*.

<sup>19</sup> Sturz, *Lex.Xen.* II 679–709 between *κατακάειν* and *κατατρίβειν*. In addition to the occurrence in our principal passage the confusion between *κατακάειν* and *καίειν* occurs at *Hell.* 5.2.39 . . . *ἐπορεύετο εἰς τὴν πολέμιαν. πρὸς μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἰὼν οὐτ’ ἔκαεν οὐτ’ ἔκοπτε, νομίζων, εἴ τι ποιήσειε τούτων ἐμποδῶν ἂν αὐτῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ προσιόντι καὶ ἀπίοντι (οὐτ’ ἔκαεν BDHMOVPLNEA, οὐ κατέκαεν CFU)*; either reading might conceivably be correct. The proper verb for a destructive sweep is *καίω*. Moreover the negated imperfects suggest a

significance of the *κατα-* in such compounds was, in many cases, not clear to the scribes.

Further evidence is the extraordinary number of words which Xenophon compounds with *κατά* only once, eighty-eight in all. It is tempting and natural to suppose that such *ἄπαξ λεγόμενα* were actually nonce words, formed as mere expressive alternatives to the simple forms. Ten such words appear with variants on the single occasion when they do occur.<sup>20</sup> Nine again appear only as variants.<sup>21</sup>

Moreover, similar phenomena are not confined to Xenophon. Isocrates shows, according to Preuss, *Index Isocrateus* 103–07, no less than sixteen *ἄπαξ λεγόμενα* which are compounds of *κατά*.

Under these circumstances it appears that no amount of lexical research, no matter how precise it may be, can rule out the possibility of apparently anomalous *κατα-*compounds being correct. In such cases the compound would be equivalent in sense to the simple form plus an intensive prefix. In our particular case there is every reason to accept such a compound as entirely appropriate. The speaker in the text, Xenophon himself, is responding to a threat with a bit of braggadocio. He gratuitously emphasizes the arbitrary, and hence wanton, pillaging the Greeks have been indulging in so as to emphasize that they are masters of the situation and cannot be treated lightly or taken on as enemies without bad consequences. This tone is revealed in the passage by the recurrent use of verbs implying free exercise of will, viz. *ἐβουλόμεθα . . . ἐθέλομεν . . . ἐθέλομεν*. The intensive form *κατακαίοντες* simply accords with the tenor of that which precedes it.

## IV

### THUCYDIDES 3.53.1.

Thuc. 3.53.1: *Τὴν μὲν παράδοσιν τῆς πόλεως, ᾧ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πιστεύσαντες ὑμῖν ἐποιησάμεθα, οὐ τοιάνδε δίκην οἰόμενοι ὑφέξειν, νομιμωτέραν*

well-considered policy pursued in the face of strong temptation (SCG 216). This firm and calculated tone would not seem to consort well with the expressive compound form of the verb. For that reason it is no doubt better to choose the simple form with the majority of good mss. and editors. Since the military sweep, however, is negated precisely because it was considered to be a shocking and hence bad policy, the compound may emphasize a pejorative nuance: “He refused to practice a *mercilessly systematic* policy of arson during his advance.” But this alternative is, at best, a subtle and barely arguable choice. It provides no parallel to justify *κατακαίοντες* in *Anab.* 7.7.5.

<sup>20</sup> Sturz, *Lex.Xen.* II 671–716 from *καταβλακεῖν το κατευρύνειν*.

<sup>21</sup> Sturz, *Lex.Xen.* II 676–719 from *καταδρῦντεςθαι το κατηγορεῖσθαι*.

δέ τινα ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ἐν δικασταῖς, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις δεξάμενοι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐσμέν, γενέσθαι ἢ ὑμῖν, ἡγούμενοι τὸ ἴσον μάλιστ' ἂν φέρεσθαι.

*Comma post δικασταῖς misi.* οὐκ ἐν **ABCEFGM** Poppo-Stahl<sup>2</sup> Classen-Steup, οὐκ ἂν Krüger Hude<sup>1</sup> Smith Powell-Jones Weil-de Romilly. γενέσθαι ἢ ὑμῖν ἡγούμενοι **ABCEFGM** Krüger Poppo-Stahl<sup>2</sup> Classen-Steup Smith, γενέσθαι, ἡγούμενοι Hude<sup>1</sup> Powell-Jones Weil-de Romilly. *Vel ἐν ὑμῖν vel παρ' ὑμῖν ante ἂν φέρεσθαι ponere vult* Gomme.

This passage has been much plagued by editors and exegetes,<sup>22</sup> but there is a simple and demonstrable rule of syntax applicable to it which forbids the suggested excision of the second preposition ἐν. The preposition is always repeated with a second substantive conjoined to a first substantive by a single negative conjunction (οὐ or

<sup>22</sup> E.g. by A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides II* (Oxford 1956). For him the relation of the participles is the decisive issue. He says that if the conjecture ἂν for ἐν is accepted, οἰόμενοι may be taken as coordinate with δεξάμενοι, and ἡγούμενοι follows as a causal participle; but if ἐν is retained, then οἰόμενοι must be taken as coordinate with ἡγούμενοι, and δεξάμενοι depends upon it in *oratio obliqua* and serves as protasis to ἂν φέρεσθαι. Since Gomme prefers the former interpretation he accepts the emendation. But he has created a false dilemma: either interpretation is possible without emendation, and Krüger, who made the conjecture in the first place, says as much. The latter conception (which I prefer with Poppo-Stahl<sup>2</sup>) may be translated “We put our faith in you, Lacedaemonians, and surrendered our city on the supposition that we were going to stand no such trial as this, but that it was going to be a more customary procedure. And we believed that, in as much as we had duly submitted ourselves to appearance before judges—but not before men both different from and differently disposed than yourselves, as now in fact we are—we would most certainly be awarded a just decision.” The other conception is also possible: “And we submitted ourselves duly to appearance before judges, etc. . . . for we believed that we would most certainly be awarded a just decision.” Gomme’s reason for accepting the emendation is, therefore, not cogent: the passage may be taken either way without change. Let us examine the consequences of accepting the emendation. If ἂν is introduced it must be construed with the participle δεξάμενοι, interpreted as an unreal statement: “And we would have submitted ourselves duly to appearance before no other judges than you, as now we in fact are, for we believed that we would most certainly be awarded a just decision.” The ἡγούμενοι clause is left dangling. Or ἂν must go with the infinitive γενέσθαι, interpreted as a potential statement: “And we accepted that we would duly appear before no other judges than you, as now in fact we are, for we believed that we would most certainly be awarded a just decision.” And the ἡγούμενοι clause is still left dangling. Seeing the difficulty Gomme attempted to solve it by suggesting the introduction of ἐν ὑμῖν or παρ' ὑμῖν before ἂν φέρεσθαι. This does allow a meaningful interpretation of the ἡγούμενοι clause: “for we believed that *before you* we would most certainly be awarded a just decision.” But he has paid the price of introducing a new emendation to save the old one, for which he can give no cogent reason to justify departure from the transmitted text.

οὐδέ), or a unitary negative conjunctive collocation (καὶ οὐκ).<sup>23</sup> The following passages are strictly comparable and also additional illustrations of the rule: Thuc. 4.98.6 *παρανομίαν τε ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀνάγκη κακοῖς ὀνομασθῆναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν κυμφορῶν τι τολμήσασιν*; Pl. *Crat.* 387A *κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἄρα φύσιν καὶ αἱ πράξεις πράττονται, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν*; Dem. 18.20 *ἢ . . . εἰρήνη διὰ ταῦτ', οὐ δι' ἐμέ . . . ἐπράχθη*; Dem. 18.193 *ἐν γὰρ τῷ θεῷ τὸ τούτου τέλος ἦν, οὐκ ἐν ἐμοί*; Dem. 19.330 *πάνθ' ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου καὶ οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἔπραξαν*. There is a simple reason for this rule. When parallel substantives are conjoined so that they coalesce into a single thought, the preposition is frequently omitted. These single negatives, however, introduce a distinction between the two substantives they conjoin. Therefore the two cannot coalesce in thought, and the preposition must be repeated.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> The rule for *parallel* negative conjunctions is quite different; in these the preposition may be repeated or omitted in the second member. Examples for repetition are: Thuc. 1.31.2 *οὔτε ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς οὔτε ἐς τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων*; Thuc. 7.57.1 *οὐ κατὰ δίκην τι μᾶλλον οὐδὲ κατὰ ξυγγένειαν*; Isoc. 7.48 *οὐκ ἐν τοῖς κικραφείοις οἱ νεώτεροι διέτριβον, οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς αὐλητρίαις, οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις κυλλόγοις*. Examples for omission are: Dem. 9.2 *οὐ παρ' ἐν οὐδὲ δύο*; Dem. 9.19 *οὐδὲ δοκεῖ μοι περὶ Χερρονήσου νῦν σκοπεῖν οὐδὲ Βυζαντίου*; Dem. 9.49 *οὐδὲν ἐκ παρατάξεως οὐδὲ μάχης γιγνόμενον*.

This distinction between single and parallel negative conjunctions is essential in regard to the permissibility of omitting prepositions in subsequent members. But the distinction seems never to have been noted before. Short, *Word Order* lxxxviii col. 1 failed to observe it because of an apparently exceptional omission after a single negative at Dem. 9.72 *χρόνους γ' ἐμποιήτε τοῖς πράγμασι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔστιν πρὸς ἄνδρα καὶ οὐχὶ συνετώσης πόλεως ἰσχὺν ὁ πόλεμος, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἄχρηστον* [*sc. ἔστι*] "at any rate introduce delay into the course of events. For when the war is directed against a man and the might of no well-constituted city-state, there is advantage in even just that." But here the negative *οὐχὶ* goes closely with the adjacent participle, and therefore it does not have the effect of a conjunction: since *καὶ* simply joins the two substantives, *ἄνδρα* and *ἰσχύν*, so closely as to effect a new unity, the preposition quite regularly is not repeated. Illustrations are: Thuc. 3.72.3 *ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς πόλεως*; Pl. *Apol.* 32b *μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου*; Dem. 18.33 *ἐν φόβῳ καὶ πολλῇ ἀγωνίᾳ*. For more examples see Short, *Word Order* lxxxiv col. 1.

<sup>24</sup> The formulation of KG 1.548.1 is, "In einer Reihe beigeordneter Substantive wird die Präposition a) entweder vor jedem einzelnen wiederholt, wenn jeder einzelne Begriff besonders aufgefasst und nachdrücklich hervorgehoben, oder der Gegensatz oder die Verschiedenheit der Begriffe bezeichnet werden soll, b) oder die Präposition wird vor das erste Substantiv gesetzt bei dem oder den folgenden aber weggelassen, wenn die Begriffe zu einer Einheit zusammengefasst, zu einem Ganzen verbunden werden sollen, mögen die Begriffe gleichartig oder verschiedenartig sein." This holds. Like other authorities, however, KG fails to observe that coordination by single negative conjunctions or equivalents always falls under (a), never under (b). But KG is correct in asserting in subsequent paragraphs that conjunction with single positive conjunctions, and every manner of multiple conjunction, can fall under (a) or (b), depending upon the conception. KG does



The further difficulty which has been felt as to ἡ ὑμῶν disappears when it becomes clear that in this passage οὐκ must have approximately the same effect as the other negative conjunctions in the parallels cited, that it must, in other words, approximate in meaning καὶ οὐκ.<sup>25</sup> This negative adversative compels the logical interpretation that ἄλλοις must refer to someone other than the Lacedaemonians before Plataea, whom the representatives of the town suggest they would credit as δικασταί. It is natural to suppose that it refers to the special panel of judges from Sparta mentioned in 3.52.3. The reason that these are feared is that they are considered to be less reasonable and mild. This fact favors the interpretation of ἄλλοις as developing the secondary sense ἀλλοίοις—which is frequent when forms of ἄλλος are followed by ἡ.<sup>26</sup> The pronoun ὑμῶν does not refer to these same persons but to the generality of the audience addressed.<sup>27</sup> The fact

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not make the mistake of accepting ἄν for ἐν in this place, but the analysis given leads others to make that error.

<sup>25</sup> Adversative asyndeton with οὐ or μή as virtual conjunctions is usually sharper than καὶ οὐ (cf. Kr. Spr. 1.59.1.10). Thucydides seems to avoid it elsewhere, in accord with his well-known avoidance of asyndeton in general. But οὐκ-asyndeton is so common in oratory that it is hardly possible to doubt that he might have used it in this brilliantly impassioned speech. For further examples from oratory see Dem. 1.22 τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ Θετταλῶν ἀπὸ τούτων δέοι διοικεῖν, οὐ Φίλιππον λαμβάνειν; Dem. 3.18 ἀναστὰς ἄλλος εἰπάτω, μὴ τοῦτον αἰτιάσθω; Dem. 4.26 εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν χειροτονεῖτε τοὺς ταξίαρχους καὶ τοὺς φυλάρχους, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον; and many more cited in Rehdantz-Blass I p.9 s.v. ἄρεις, p.10 s.v. Asyndeton.

<sup>26</sup> LSJ s.v. ἄλλος III 2.

<sup>27</sup> Until ἡ ὑμῶν is reached, the reference of ἄλλοις to the special panel is not quite clear. For a while in the course of the period the precise reference is left hanging; the indignant Plataean speaker associates those present with the hostile persons (ἄλλοις = ἀλλοίοις) actually serving as judges, and suggests thus in passing that the Lacedaemonian soldiers listening are in part responsible for the judicial farce because they tolerate it. This is a rhetorical effect not readily translatable. The scholiast, however, does remark upon it οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις] ἡ ὑμῶν. τὸ δὲ ἐξῆς, καὶ ἐν δικασταῖς οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις δεξάμενοι γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐμὲν ἄρτι κρινόμενοι ὑφ' ὑμῶν. This highly elliptical comment may be paraphrased "οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις] construe ultimately with ἡ ὑμῶν. But in the immediate succession of the thought understand 'in as much as we had duly submitted ourselves to appearance before judges, not before hostile persons as we in fact were when we were just now being judged by you'." The temporary identification of the audience with the special panel of judges is brought out by the scholiast with the words ὑφ' ὑμῶν. ἐμὲν refers logically to the present judicial condition of the Plataeans—that they are subject to the special panel. With the words ἄρτι κρινόμενοι the scholiast brings out that the effectiveness of this condition lay in the immediate past while the special panel was actually sitting. The speaker's own sudden, overwhelming awareness of the injustice the Plataeans have been suffering is the cause for his passionate and reproachful interpolated phrase ὥσπερ καὶ ἐμὲν. The phrase ἡ ὑμῶν is taken by many to be a gloss by the scholiast which has crept into the text, and so to be

that it is assimilated in case to the case of its term of comparison  
*ἄλλοις* is entirely regular.<sup>28</sup>

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excised. I suppose rather that the scholiast is only explaining the hyperbaton which removes the comparative member so far from its term of comparison, and so would not excise it.

<sup>28</sup> KG 2.309b. I am indebted to Professor Dr Ernst Risch of the Universität Zürich, Professor James Poultney of the Johns Hopkins University, Dr Alison Burford of the University of North Carolina at Asheville, and the anonymous referee for helpful suggestions during my preparation of these notes.