The Speech of Teutiaplus (Thuc. 3.30)

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IN THE SUMMER OF 427 B.C. the Peloponnesian fleet under the Spartan nauarch Alcidas reached Ionia too late to aid the Mytilenaean rebellion against the Athenians. At Embaton in Asia Minor the commanders discussed their options. Teutiaplus, a commander from Elis otherwise unknown, is reported by Thucydides to have urged that the fleet sail immediately on Mytilene and surprise the Athenian occupation forces. His speech is brief, to the point, and without result. How does one explain this 119-word speech in the literary plan of Thucydides? Speeches report τὰ δέοντα—historically important and politically instructive material—and are not undigested notes.[1] I hope to show that Teutiaplus' words reflect the past and analyze a type of situation which recurred in the Ten Years War and later.

Thucydides' interest in human behavior (1.22.4; 3.82.2) often led him to reduce to essentials reports of actions, and then to encourage his reader to compare reports of other actions.[2] Speeches precede a battle or a war and are tested by the following narrative. The speeches often explore possible strategies; antithetical speeches give *ex parte* analyses of varying accuracy.[3] Of three levels of Thucydides' history—

[1] See Thuc. 1.22.1–3. I generally agree with the interpretation of Thucydides' speeches sketched by J. de Romilly, *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide* (Paris 1956) 236–39: the speeches present arguments actually employed but in a manner, style and organization by means of which Thucydides clarifies the issues for his reader. The question of historicity in Thucydides' speeches will not be settled for all speeches with but one doctrine. Recent writers, stressing the interplay of speech and narrative, do not thereby *necessarily* impugn the author's fidelity to the substance of the speeches. See, for instance, H.-P. Stahl, *Thukydides Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozess* (*Zetemata* 40, Munich 1966) *passim*; D. Tompkins, "Stylistic Characterization in Thucydides: Nicias and Alcibiades," *YCS* 22 (1972) 181–215. For further bibliography, consult W. C. West III, "A Bibliography of Scholarship on the Speeches in Thucydides 1873–1970," in *The Speeches in Thucydides*, ed. P. A. Stadter (Chapel Hill 1973), items 1–148.

[2] de Romilly, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.1) 123–50, on the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians before the battle of Naupactus (2.87–89); 150–61 on the Syracusans and the Athenians before the last battle in the harbor (7.61–68). See also the stimulating remarks of H. D. F. Kitto, *Poiesis, Structure and Thought* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1966), "Thucydides" 257–354, esp. 349–50 on "to-and-fro" references.

[3] *cf.*, *e.g.*, Hermocrates and Athenagoras on the Athenians: 6.33–40.

speech, narrative and judgemental analysis—the speeches are the most ambiguous. Speeches are proven by the narrative to be partially wrong (Archidamus' 2.11.6–8), or mostly wrong (Athenagoras' 6.36–37), or more or less correct. Thucydides will use a speech to convey his appreciation of the factors in a particular situation but also to distance himself from the thoughts expressed. A speech, with its subsequent narrative, frees Thucydides from explicitly endorsing or rejecting the speaker's position. The unusual speech of Teutiaplus analyzes a type of military problem an important example of which is to be found two years previously. On the advice of the Megarians, the Peloponnesians had determined to bring their fleet into the Saronic gulf and surprise the Piraeus. They took fright during the voyage to the Attic coast and changed their plan; they merely attacked an Athenian fort on Salamis and ravaged the countryside. When they perceived the Athenians approaching, they retreated to Megara (2.93–94). A comparison of Teutiaplus' speech and its context with Thucydides' narrative of the earlier, abortive Peloponnesian attack on the Piraeus ought to demonstrate that Thucydides' negative attitude[4] towards earlier Spartan faintheartedness in action receives a fuller presentation and a clearer authorial pronouncement only in this speech.

The fleet of Alcidas moved slowly (3.29.1 *ἐνδιέτριψαν . . . σχολαῖοι*) when there was need of speed (29.1 *ἐν τάχει*). Cnemus' and Brasidas' earlier scheme for the Piraeus also required speed (2.93.2 *κατὰ τάχος*). Teutiaplus' stratagem demanded an immediate attack (3.30.1 *πλεῖν . . . πρὶν ἐκπύστους γενέσθαι*) as did Cnemus' and Brasidas' (2.93.2 *πλεῦσαι εὐθύς*), while still the enemy was unguarded (3.30.2 *ἀφύλακτον*—2.93.1 *ἀφύλακτος*, 93.3 *οὔτε προφυλάσσον*)[5] because of Athenian confidence in their naval dominion (3.30.2 *κεκρατηκότων*—2.93.1 *ἐπικρατεῖν*). To attack then (3.30.3 *προσπέσοιμεν*—2.93.4 *ἐπιπεσόντες*), suddenly (3.30.3 *ἄφνω*—2.93.3 *ἐξαπιναίως*) and by night (3.30.3—2.93.4),[6] would catch the enemy (3.30.3 *καταληφθῆναι*—2.94.1 *ἧρῆσθαι*)

[4] Thucydides' judgements are indirect but not infrequent. No one doubts his admiration for Phormio and Brasidas or his contempt for Cnemus and Alcidas, although no explicit judgements are passed on them (except, perhaps, 4.81.2 on Brasidas).

[5] 3.30.2: *ἀφύλακτον, ἀνέλπιστοι, ἀμελέστερον*; the privatives point to lack of forethought, not ability.

[6] Thucydides regards night attacks (from their first mention in 2.3.4) as particularly risky. See A. W. Gomme *et al.*, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford 1945, 1956, 1970) on 4.135 and (K. J. Dover on) 7.44 (a general discussion).

at a moment when he had no expectation of attack (3.30.2 *ἀνέλπιστοι* —2.93.3 *προσδοκία οὐδεμία*) and no preparation against one (3.30.2 *ἀμελέστερον*; *cf.* 33.2 *ἀτειχίστου* [Ionia]—*cf.* the Piraeus before and after Cnemus' and Brasidas' appearance: 2.93.1 *ἄκλητος*, 94.4 *λιμένων τε κλήσει καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπιμελείᾳ*). Alcidas should not, Teutiaplus says, shirk the risk (3.30.4 *μὴ ἀποκνήσωμεν τὸν κίνδυνον*) as Cnemus and Brasidas in fear had done (2.93.4 *καταδείσαντες τὸν κίνδυνον*, 94.1 *κατοκνῆσαι*).

To guard against surprise (3.30.4 *τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου . . . φυλάσσοιτο* —*cf.* 2.94.1, 2, 4 *ἔκπληξις . . . θορύβῳ . . . φυλακήν*),[7] to attempt some daring enterprise (3.30.4 *ἐπιχειροίη*—*cf.* 2.93.1 *ἀποπειρᾶσαι*), leads to success (3.30.4 *πλεῖστ' ἂν ὀρθοῖτο*—*cf.* 2.94.1 *ὅπερ* [success] *ἂν . . . ῥᾳδίως ἐγένετο*). In both cases fear (3.31.1 *φοβεῖται*, 33.1 *δεδιώς*—2.93.4 *καταδείσαντες*, 94.3 *ἐφόβουν*) leads to speedy retreat (3.31.2 *ὅτι τάχιστα . . . πάλιν προσμεῖξαι*, 33.1 *κατὰ τάχος . . . φυγὴν ἐποιεῖτο . . .* κτλ.—2.94.3 *κατὰ τάχος . . . ἀπέπλεον*), frustrating reasonable expectations of success (3.31.1 *ἐλπίδα δ' εἶναι*, 33.2 *μέγα τὸ δέος*—2.94.1 *ὅπερ ἂν* κτλ.)[8] through surprise (3.32.3 *ἐλπίδα οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην εἶχον . . . ναῦς Πελοποννησίων*—2.94.1 *ἔκπληξις οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐλάσσων*).

The Peloponnesian abstention from the original plan of attacking the Piraeus was approved by Gomme,[9] who asked, "How much harm could they have done to Athens? . . . They could have sailed into one or more of the Peiraeus harbors (and burnt an arsenal)?" This rejection of Thucydides' judgement underestimates the effect of the novelty of a Peloponnesian fleet commanding the Piraeus. Thucydides considers the morale of each side to be a significant factor in war

[7] The 'opportunity of war', *τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου*, is the advantage that your enemy's mistakes momentarily offer. *κενὸν* **C M**: *καινὸν cett.*: *κοινὸν recc.* See Gomme, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.6) *ad loc.* With the repeated tag *πλεῖστ' ἂν ὀρθοῖτο* (5.9.3–4) Brasidas argues that surprise in war most harms one's enemies and benefits one's friends; it indicates intellectual more than physical incompetence in the enemy. *Cf.* Archidamus, 2.11.4.

[8] The result of *ἔκπληξις* is Athenian *ταραχή*, eventually *θόρυβος* (2.94.2), very desirable in the enemy, but the Spartans wastefully speed home in fear. The Athenians henceforth take precautions (94.4 *φυλακήν, κλήσει, ἐπιμελείᾳ*) and successfully seek ways to surprise the Peloponnesians (Nisaea, 3.51; Pylos 4.3ff; Cythera 4.53ff).

[9] Gomme, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.6) *ad loc.*, II 240. This is not the place to question Gomme's *military* evaluation. Sneak attacks are far from unknown in Greek history and could be decisive. At Aegospotamoi, Lysander attacked the Athenian fleet with crews in the vicinity and won a nearly total victory (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.27–29). With the possibility of traitors (*e.g.* Athens in 490), sudden attacks could win an entire city. This was the Athenians' intention at Mytilene (3.3.3) and Phoebidas' accomplishment on the Cadmeia in Thebes (382 B.C.).

calculations and often reports it.[10] The effect of the threat of a Peloponnesian fleet in the Piraeus produced a fright greater than any other ἔκπληξις of the Ten Years War (2.94.1). Similarly, the Spartan invasion of 431 (2.20.2) and the revolt of certain Chalcidian cities (4.120.3, 122.5, 123.1) were less important in military or economic terms than psychologically. When the Athenians lost the island of Euboea (8.96), important both economically and psychologically, there was ἔκπληξις μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρίν which led to fear, loss of heart, confusion (ἐφόβησεν, ἠθύμουν, ἐθορύβει). Thucydides indulges (8.96.3–5) in a rare extended "might have been," pointing to the Athenians' vivid fear of sudden attack (εὐθὺ . . . πλεῖν), the Spartans' timorousness and inability to act (εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἦσαν, βραδεῖς, ἄτολμοι), and the success (ὅπερ . . . ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐποίησαν) which would have attended a resolute attempt.[11]

The contrast to the Athenians' frightening alacrity (3.16.1–2, 18.3–4) could not be more pointed. From the first word of revolt (3.3.1) the Athenians acted to forestall (προκαταλαβεῖν). They immediately (ἐξαπιναίως) despatched troops with orders to fall of a sudden (ἐπιπεσεῖν ἄφνω) on the islanders. Forty ships arrived only a bit later (οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον) than a lone messenger. Their swiftness placed the Mytilenaeans in a very bad military position: ἀπαράσκευοι δὲ οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἀναγκασθέντες πολεμεῖν (3.3.2–4.2).

Teutiaplus underlines the vacillation of the Spartan state as well as of individual commanders. At Olympia, the Mytilenaeans indicated the need for haste (3.13.2) if the Peloponnesians were to gain the Lesbians' large navy and lose their own reputation for being loathe to aid rebels from Athens' empire (13.7). The ambassadors' calculation (εἰκός, 13.4) concerning the Athenians' ability to fight on two fronts is persuasive to the Spartans (προθύμως ταῦτα ἔπρασσον, 15.2), but the Athenians later demonstrate it to be wrong in fact (16.1). The Spartans, now thrown into confusion and doubting everything the Mytilenaeans said because of the πολὺς παράλογος (16.2), leave the Mytilenaeans to

[10] For instance, the Greeks were confounded by the Spartan surrender at Pylos (4.40.1–2), the Athenians by the Sicilian disaster (8.1.1). See also Pericles' speeches, reactions to fear and excessive confidence, and Thucydides' comments on them (2.65.9).

[11] Alcidas and Cnemus are nearly indistinguishable, but together they are the best foil for the bold Brasidas. Phormio's actions also shape a narrative which illustrates Spartan slowness and Athenian dash. The account of Phormio reflects Thucydides' concerns, as H. D. Westlake argues in *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge 1968) 136 (Alcidas), 44, 59 (Phormio). 2.94 and 8.96 have many verbal similarities.

fight alone until the next spring. Then Cleomenes invades Attica and raids the countryside in constant (*αἰεί*, 26.4) anticipation of some action in Lesbos by Alcidas' fleet (*ibid.*). But when nothing happens, the army is forced to disperse, and the Mytilenaeans surrender to the Athenians.

Thucydides has indicated the military importance of Lesbos by the ambassadors' speech, Sparta's impatient enthusiasm (3.15.2 and 26.4) and his own comments (*e.g.* 3.3.1 *μέγα ἔργον*; *cf.* 1.116.1, 117.2). The net result of the Spartan expedition was but to increase the Athenians' wrath.[12]

Teutiaplus' speech analyzing its own particular *καιρός* recalls and reflects on the earlier event. Concept and spirit are remarkably congruent in a way that Thucydides must have intended. Part of that which Hobbes called "Thucydides' secret instruction," it indicates one tactic that Spartans rarely mastered. His criticism of both Cnemus and Alcidas is unusually blunt and contemptuous.[13]

Teutiaplus' speech does not persuade Alcidas. His uselessness is clarified by three subsequent incidents, two of them speeches indirectly reported. First Ionians and Lesbians in his fleet urge him to seize an Ionian city as a base. The advantages mentioned are five (3.31.1). He will gain an ally, provide a headquarters for the chafing subjects of Athens, deprive Athens of revenues and cause the city additional expense. Finally, the aid of Pissuthnes may well be gained. Alcidas is moved by these magnificent possibilities no more than by Teutiaplus' words. His only act is to kill prisoners-of-war, which arouses some exiled Samians to protest (32.2) that he was alienating Sparta's friends. Alcidas is persuaded but again thinks of nothing else than home. The 'lost chance' is underlined by the final Ionian event: no one *yet* expected Peloponnesian vessels in Ionian waters, and so the natives sailed up to their ships expecting to find Athenians. The account of Alcidas thus closes (33.1) as it began (26.4), with reasonable expectations frustrated by Alcidas' inadequacy. The former failure of Cnemus, the present shirking of Alcidas, and the

[12] *Cf.* Stahl, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.1) 109.

[13] Westlake, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.11) 136, 141, 144; *cf.* 146. Alcidas appears again later in Book 3, with Brasidas there as his adviser (69.1, 76), but he foolishly rejects Brasidas' advice to attack the Corcyraeans utilizing the enemy's *πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ* (79.3) and again retreats hastily (81.1 *εὐθὺς κατὰ τάχος ἐκομίζοντο*). *Cf.* Gomme, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.6) II 233–34, on Spartan and Athenian characteristics. Spartan hesitancy and lack of daring is significant in 1.70 , 118.2, 132.5; 4.55.2; 5.63.2, 75.3; 6.88.10; 8.96.5.

coming energy of Brasidas are illuminated by this programmatic fourteen-line speech on military decisiveness.

Thucydides has reported a number of other exhortations on military topics which fail of their intention: Archidamus (1.80ff), Nicias (6.9ff), Lamachus and Demosthenes (6.49, 7.42, both indirect speech) futilely try to sway a congress or colleagues. They appear to offer the reader Thucydides' judgement of the best way to handle their respective situations (two complain of resources insufficient for war, three [including Teutiaplus] call for immediate attack), and to focus attention on the καιρός. They point to the road not taken. Their very presence in Thucydides' work, *because* they were ignored, indicates the importance the author attaches to them. Furthermore their arguments are generally correct. With hindsight, Thucydides observed the accuracy of Archidamus' point of view (and Pericles' development of it), the tragedy of Nicias' abused but correct assessment of Athens' chance to master Sicily, the neglected wisdom of Lamachus' plan of attack and the misfiring of Demosthenes'. Each speech dramatizes an alternative course of action followed not at all or without success. These analyses thus serve both historical and literary purposes.[14]

The relation of speech to narrative and of both to the factual past requires comment. The historian selects, but Thucydides' statement of purpose (1.22.4)—not a moral but a utilitarian end—leads the reader to expect factual accuracy at the least.[15] Narrative and speech illuminate each other in various ways (agreement, contradiction, amplification, etc.). Thucydides' judgements and analyses are infrequently explicit because his history by proper selection and

[14] Stahl, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.1) 107–09, develops further the literary function of the incident at Embaton. I cannot agree that Teutiaplus' speech is the equivalent of a tragic chorus' *Freudenlied* (108) nor that Thucydides insists on—or even sees—the paradox, that Alcidas *hat . . . das genaue Gegenteil seiner Mission erreicht* (109, Stahl's italics). Stahl too (107, n.6a) remarks that the situation and advice of 6.49 and 7.42 is parallel to 3.30. He considers these later speeches at length in "Speeches and Course of Events in Books Six and Seven of Thucydides," pp.60–77 in Stadter, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.1), esp. 72.

[15] The fundamental fallacy of books like V. Hunter, *Thucydides, The Artful Reporter* (Toronto 1973), is that the distortion of historical reality which she perceives makes nonsense of Thucydides' hope that he will be useful to those who wish to consider that which can be known (τὸ σαφές) about the past and which will be likely to happen again. Perceptivity becomes no more than solipsistic fiction (see on Brasidas, p.29; Cleon, p.38; Phormio, p.45, etc.). The logic of Professor Hunter's false assumptions brings her to conclusions conveniently gathered into one choice paragraph (p.177) on "The Least Objective Historian."

emphasis can make evident the necessary connections and evaluations.

Gomme has argued[16] that this ineffectual speech by an unknown makes it difficult to argue that Thucydides' speeches are 'free inventions', or indeed that this advice was given but only by another or in a different form. If an 'invented' speech *of this purport* had been desired, Thucydides could have economically written it into the narrative of the abortive attack on the Piraeus. We can imagine more reason to suppress than to invent either Teutiaplus or his speech. Speech here gives existence to a non-action. The Peloponnesians did not attack. But this non-attack is itself an historical fact, and the Elean's speech and the admiral's fear are both significant. Teutiaplus' speech singles out this moment, gives it weight in Thucydides' history.

How did Thucydides learn of this speech? Gomme divides Thucydides' speeches into three categories:[17] those which Thucydides himself heard, those which he did not hear but soon learned of, those which he was informed of only long after their delivery. Teutiaplus' comments must belong to the third group; here an Athenian, *strategos* in 424/3, reports the words of an enemy war-council. The generality of this speech, however, is explained by its function as a paradigmatic illustration of Spartan βραδυτής (see below) as well as by the passage of time and the nature of the information.

The surrounding narrative indicates that Thucydides endorses the ideas of Teutiaplus as military advice in a particular adverse situation. The welcome reception the Spartans could have found in Ionia (3.31.1) and their total unexpectedness (32.3) specifically parallel Teutiaplus' statements that the Spartans could hope for help from Athens' subjects (30.3 μετὰ τῶν ἔνδον . . . καταληφθῆναι) and that their arrival

[16] Gomme, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.6) II 292–93.

[17] A. W. Gomme, "The Speeches in Thucydides," *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford 1937) 171–72. N. G. L. Hammond, "The Particular and the Universal in the Speeches in Thucydides . . .," in Stadter, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.1) 49–53, esp. 49–52, argues that Thucydides employs subjective criteria and a greater freedom of composition in direct proportion to the scarcity of information about the *ipsissima verba*. τὰ δέοντα are thus "the essentials of the situation . . . according to Thucydides' own judgment" (49). How one can do this "holding as near as possible to the full purpose and purport of the actual words" (1.22.1) is not clear to me. *Cf.* Moses Finley, "Introduction" to Rex Warner's translation of Thucydides in the Penguin series (Harmondsworth/Baltimore 1972) 26: "There is no way to get round the incompatibility of the two parts of that statement [1.22.1]." For a very brief speech, even one written up long after delivery, it seems safer to assume accurate reporting than authorial fancy.

was as yet unknown (30.1–2). This juncture marks the first time, Thucydides suggests, that the Spartans had a chance to win something important and crucial (Lesbos) in their struggle to dismember Athens' empire. Alcidas' failure had as important consequences the absence for fifteen years of Spartan ships in the East Aegean and the rarity of rebellions by Athens' subjects that this entailed. Teutiaplus' speech is tactical and *ad hoc*, if not *ad hominem*, but it contains advice found frequently in Thucydides' history. The Saronic gulf adventure had no sufficiently serious and lasting purpose to merit a speech. Thucydides, that is, can measure a situation's importance by potential, as well as actual, results.

Spartan failure in the face of Athenian boldness is also evident in the Pylos disaster and the authorities' behavior there.[18] At the height of Athenian success, Thucydides reports on Spartan morale (4.55). Their unexpected misfortunes (*ἀνελπίστου*) left them afraid (*φοβούμενοι*) and made them yet more hesitant (*ὀκνηρότεροι*) in the face of swift tactics beyond their capacity to foresee (*πολέμου ταχέος καὶ ἀπροφυλάκτου*). Athenian daring (*ἐπιχειρούμενον*) and the vagaries of experience (*παρὰ λόγον*) stunned the Spartans (*ἔκπληξιν μεγίστην*) into fear and cowardice (*ἐδέδισαν . . . ἀτολμότεροι*). This collection of negative attributes, familiar from 2.93–4 and 3.29–33, helps us understand why the Spartans were the most convenient enemies for Athens (8.96; also 3.15–16). Criticisms of Spartan slowness or hesitation appear at Sparta in the Corinthians' request (1.71.4 *ὡρίσθω ὑμῶν ὁ βραδυτής*), the Athenians' taunt (1.78.1 *βουλεύεσθε οὖν βραδέως*), Archidamus' defense (84.1 *τὸ βραδὺ . . . μὴ αἰσχύνεσθε*) and Sthenelaidas' decisive plea for action (86.4, let others *πολὺν χρόνον βουλεύεσθαι*). Pericles states the principle (2.61.3): *δουλοῖ γὰρ φρόνημα τὸ ἀφνίδιον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ παραλόγῳ ξυμβαῖνον*.

Brasidas' enterprise[19]—the sort Teutiaplus had and hopes for in others—is antithetical to Spartan character.[20] His first appearance illustrates his decisiveness (2.25.2). Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis

[18] 4.36.2, 38.3. The former passage also reflects Teutiaplus' speech: *ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς . . . χωρίου ἰσχύι πιστεύσαντες οὐκ ἐφύλαξαν . . . ἐξαπίνης . . . τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ ἐξέπληξε*.

[19] It is compared to Teutiaplus' advice by John Finley, *Thucydides* (Cambridge [Mass.] 1942) 314 with n.42.

[20] Brasidas often made swift yet intelligent decisions: *e.g.*, 2.25.2 (*διαδραμών, ἐσπίπτει, τόλμημα*), 86.6; 3.79.3; 4.11.4, 79.1, 81 (Brasidas' reputation), 135. Note especially 4.70 (*κατὰ τάχος, πρὶν ἔκπυστος γενέσθαι* [found in 3.30.1], *λαθών, πειρᾶσαι*) and 4.103–04. He was not trusted at home, and supervisors were sent to him (4.108.7, 132.3; *cf.* Gomme *ad loc.*).

uses the familiar cluster of words for an intelligently planned surprise (4.103–04): λαθεῖν, φυλακὴ . . . βραχεῖα [the Athenians'], ἀπροσδοκήτοις προσπεσών, εὐθύς, ἄφνω, θόρυβον). Speech, narrative and judgement concerning the second battle of Amphipolis conform to each other. Brasidas states his intentions (5.9), then Thucydides records the battle fought according to plan (5.10.6–8), and *in propria persona*, he states that Brasidas' victory was achieved just as he had expected (5.11.2). All three versions mention Athenian disorder (μὴ ἀντιπαρατεχθέντος—ἀταξίᾳ—μὴ ἐκ παρατάξεως), and sudden fright (φοβηθῆναι—πεφοβημένοις, θορυβηθῆναι—προεκφοβήσεως); the speech and the account both detail Athenian ignorance and lack of preparation and the Spartans' speedy and sudden attack.

Demosthenes'[21] successes (and failures) depended on speed, carefully executed plans and surprise,[22] as in his momentarily successful assault against the Syracusan counter-wall on Epipolae (7.43.3–6). The reappearance here of Teutiaplus' cluster of concepts (unexpected daring, fright, *Athenian* disorder) owes something to a general similarity in surprise attacks, but verbal echoes suggest that Thucydides wishes his careful readers to perceive the similarities of Teutiaplus' λόγος to these ἔργα.

As Teutiaplus foreshadows Brasidas and Demosthenes, so Alcidas foreshadows Nicias' slowness in Books 6 and 7. From his first speech in 415 (6.9.1) through the crisis in which Demosthenes lays out his plan,[23] to the spreading of Nicias' ὄκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις (7.49.4) and his μονή after the eclipse (7.50.4), the old general, still trusting to a virtue and military technique no longer viable, is presented as excessively fearful and militarily unfit. His unusual prior evaluation (5.16.1) has prepared us for such behavior. Like Alcidas in the presence of Teutiaplus, he has no satisfactory answer to Demosthenes' arguments.[24]

[21] Thucydides does not evaluate Demosthenes directly. An explanation of this silence which depends on Thucydides' full adherence to Pericles' advice (*e.g.* Westlake, *op.cit.* [*supra* n.11] 120–21, 276) underrates the historian's independence of judgement. Although 2.65.6–7 endorses Pericles' strategy, 2.65.11 suggests that a more energetic policy could have succeeded.

[22] The excursus on Themistocles similarly stresses his mental speed and originality (1.138.3 τῶν τε παραχρῆμα . . . κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων . . . ἄριστος εἰκαστής. . . . μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος . . . αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα).

[23] 7.42.3–5: nine words for speed and against delay, plus ἐκπλήξει; *cf.* 47.3.

[24] Nor can Nicias answer Lamachus, who had advised him (6.49.1–2): ὡς τάχιστα τὴν μάχην ποιεῖσθαι while the Syracusans ἔτι ἐκπεπληγμένοι and the Athenian army is δεινότατον. . . . αἰφνίδιοι δὲ ἦν προσπέσωσιν . . . the Athenians will dismay the enemy. Thucydides' epitaph

The subsequent disaster commends the latter's analysis—speed and risk, surprise, victory or escape.[25]

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
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on Nicias (7.86.5) has often been understood as high praise. K. J. Dover in Gomme, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.6) IV 461ff, noting that "No one who has read this history up to the present point is likely to have formed a very favourable view of Nikias," reduces the compliment (ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος) to mean something like "least deserving of this particularly ignoble death" (τοῦτο δυστυχίας), *i.e.* "executed in cold blood by the enemy to whom he had surrendered." This approach honors the statement that Nicias lived his whole life according to Hellenic morality—a morality whose passing Thucydides grieves (*e.g.*, 2.52.3–4, 3.83.1).

[25] I thank Professors Martin Ostwald, A. E. Raubitschek and Daniel Tompkins for useful criticism; any remaining errors are mine.