

# The *Logos Endiathetos* and the *Logos Prophorikos* in Allegorical Interpretation: Philo and the D-Scholia to the *Iliad*

*Adam Kamesar*

PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA, it has long been recognized, is the earliest author who provides extensive testimony on the doctrine of the *logos endiathetos* and *logos prophorikos*, first formulated, in all probability, by the Stoics. The doctrine in its original form was put forward with reference to the *logos* in man, and not the cosmic *logos*. Simply stated, it entails a distinction between the “internal *logos*” and the “uttered *logos*.” We reason within ourselves, that is, in our minds, by means of the former, but we express our thoughts in speech by means of the latter. The two *logoi* are closely connected, because the uttered word is the vehicle that delivers to the outside the product or handiwork of internal reason. Although there are antecedents to the distinction in both Plato and Aristotle, the characteristic terminology is attested only later, and in imperial times the theory was attributed to the philosophers of the Stoa. Accordingly, most scholars believe that the elaboration of the doctrine was the achievement of that school.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>On the two *logoi*, see the fundamental studies of M. Pohlenz, “Die Begründung der abendländischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa,” *Kleine Schriften I* (Hildesheim 1965) 79–86 (originally published in 1939), and M. Mühl, “Der λόγος ἐνδιάθετος und προφορικός von der älteren Stoa bis zur Synode von Sirmium 351,” *ABG* 7 (1962) 7–56. Pohlenz expressed uncertainty about the Stoic origin of the doctrine, and thought that perhaps its initial formulation should be ascribed to the Academic philosophers of the second century B.C. Mühl and most later scholars have accepted the traditional view. See especially the new collection by K. Hülser, *Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker II* (Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1987), which has an entire section on the theory of the two *logoi* (582–591 = fr. 528–535). Hülser has included extensive material from Philo and a passage from Porphyry that had not been included by

This doctrine was common property by the time of Philo, who employs it extensively throughout his writings. In fact, he finds it in the Pentateuch by means of the allegorical method of interpretation. Although Philo finds the two *logoi* represented by a number of different biblical images, it is the two brothers, Moses and Aaron, that most often symbolize them. The two biblical heroes are the ἀδελφὰ γεννήματα of a sole mother, the λογικὴ φύσις. Moses represents the *logos endiathetos*, and Aaron the *logos prophorikos*.<sup>2</sup> This allegorical interpretation was particularly useful to Philo when confronted with the phenomenon of God's revelation to Moses. For as Y. Amir has shown, Philo did not hold the belief, common in Palestinian Judaism, that God spoke *to* Moses and dictated to him the contents of the revelation in verbal form. Rather, God spoke *within* Moses, and it was for Moses to relay and communicate the divine message to the people.<sup>3</sup> In Philo's eyes, Moses, that is, mind, or the *logos endiathetos*, was in communication with God, and received a non-verbal revelation from him. The services of Aaron, the *logos prophorikos*, were required in order to transmit the contents of the revelation to the people (*De migratione* 76–81; cf. *Quod deterius* 38–40).

Now, it is of course perfectly conceivable that Philo came up with this allegorical interpretation himself, or received it from an

---

von Arnim in *SVF*. More recent studies are M. C. Chiesa, "Le problème du langage intérieur chez les Stoïciens," *RIPh* 45 (1991) 301–321; E. Matelli, "ΕΝΔΙΑΘΕΤΟΣ ε ΠΡΟΦΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ: Note sulla origine della formula e della nozione," *Aevum* 66 (1992) 43–70 (seeking Theophrastean roots for the distinction); J.-L. Labarrière, "Logos endiathetos et logos prophorikos dans la polémique entre le Portique et la Nouvelle-Académie," in B. Cassin and Labarrière, edd., *L'animal dans l'antiquité* (Paris 1997) 259–279.

<sup>2</sup>For these allegorical equivalencies, see Philo, *Quod deterius* 38–40, 126; *De migratione* 76–81, 84, 169 (in 78 the reference to the ἀδελφὰ γεννήματα); *De mutatione* 208; *Quaest. in Ex.* 2.27, 44. While Philo usually employs the standard term προφορικός, he often refers to the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος with other terminology, such as διάνοια or νοῦς. Cf. Mühl (*supra* n.1) 17. (References to the Greek text of Philo follow the edition of L. Cohn and P. Wendland [Berlin 1896–1915]).

<sup>3</sup>Y. Amir, "Mose als Verfasser der Tora bei Philon," in his *Die hellenistische Gestalt des Judentums bei Philon von Alexandrien* (Neukirchen-Vluyn 1983) 77–106.

earlier Judeo-Hellenistic source. However, we know that Judeo-Hellenistic allegorists drew inspiration from Greek antecedents, not only as regards the allegorical method itself, but also with regard to specific interpretations. Scholars have collected a number of examples of this phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> In this article, we will consider the possibility that the interpretation of the brothers Moses and Aaron as the two *logoi* is a similar case. This is because a Greek source, the D-scholia to the *Iliad*, contains a similar interpretation of another set of brothers, Otus and Ephialtes, the so-called Aloadae. Now, it is possible that a passage such as Plato's *Phaedrus* 276A could have served as a remote inspiration for both interpretations. Here Plato speaks of the spoken word (λόγος) as the "legitimate brother" of the λόγος γεγραμμένος. This kind of metaphorical language could have influenced the later allegorical interpreters.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, it seems likely that Philo is in some way dependent on a later source related to the D-scholium. For we know from his *De confusione* 2–5 that he was familiar with the myths about the Aloadae, and their alleged relevance, from a comparative standpoint, for biblical exegesis. More importantly, however, the interpretation in the D-scholium reveals a conception of the two *logoi* remarkably similar to that of Philo. That conception involves what might be termed an "applied" use of the Stoic doctrine that has received little attention in modern discussions. Indeed, the second objective of our comparison of the D-scholium with the Philonic material will be to further illuminate

<sup>4</sup>See Y. Amir, "The Transference of Greek Allegories to Biblical Motifs in Philo," in F. E. Greenspahn *et al.*, ed., *Nourished with Peace* (Chico 1984) 15–25; cf. P. Boyancé, "Écho des exégèses de la mythologie grecque chez Philon," in *Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris 1967; Lyon conference volume) 169–186.

<sup>5</sup>A late commentator, Hermias of Alexandria, does find an allusion to what would later be known as the *logos endiathetos* and the *logos prophorikos* in *Phaedrus* 276A: *In Plat. Phaedr.* 276A (ed. P. Couvreur [Paris 1901] 259–260). However, Hermias appears to read the text in an arbitrary manner, seeing a distinction between a *logos endiathetos* in 276A5–6 and a legitimate (oral) *logos prophorikos* in 276A8, which is to be contrasted with the illegitimate λόγος ἐν γράμμασι. Plato does not make a clear distinction between the former two, however, and it would probably be rash to conclude that this interpretation goes back to the Hellenistic age.

that use. Thirdly, we will focus our attention more squarely on the scholium itself, and see whether the investigation may also shed some additional light on it. The scholium is not an insignificant one for the history of Homeric scholarship in antiquity.

The D-scholia to the *Iliad* are one of three main bodies of scholia, and are distinguished from the “critical” scholia, transmitted primarily in the *Venetus A* manuscript of the *Iliad*, and from the so-called “exegetical” scholia, often transmitted in *Venetus B* and in other witnesses. The D-scholia are made up mostly of simple elucidations of Homeric phraseology and explanations of mythological references, the earliest sources of which may go back to the age of the rhapsodes. However, on occasion they also contain more advanced exegetical discussions that may be dated to the Hellenistic period and later.<sup>6</sup>

The scholium containing the reference to the two *logoi* concerns *Iliad* 5.385–391. At this point in the narrative, Aphrodite had just told her mother Dione of the fact that she had been wounded by Diomedes in battle. Dione, in an attempt to console her daughter, tells Aphrodite of other instances when the immortals had been attacked by men. She begins with the story of the Aloadae, the gigantic sons of Iphimedia and Poseidon. These two brothers, Otus and Ephialtes, put Ares in bonds, and kept him in a brass jar for thirteen months, until Hermes, on a tip from the stepmother of the brothers, Eriboea, was able to set him free. The D-scholium to *Iliad* 5.385 presents a number of allegorical interpretations of the incident, but the one relevant to our present concerns reads:

βέλτιον δ' ὅτι φιλοσοφεῖν βούλεται διὰ τῆσδε τῆς ῥαψωδίας ὡς  
καὶ δι' ἄλλης τῆς ποιήσεως. Ἄρη οὖν ὀνομάζει τὸν θυμὸν, Ἔκτον δὲ  
καὶ Ἐφιάλτην τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ λόγους. τούτων γὰρ τῶν λόγων ὁ  
μὲν τις ἐκ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ ἕτερος  
ἐνδιάθετός ἐστι καὶ ἐκ φύσεως παρεπόμενος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. τὸν

<sup>6</sup>On the Homeric scholia in general, and on the D-scholia in particular, see G. Nagy, “Homeric Scholia,” in I. Morris and B. Powell, edd., *A New Companion to Homer* (Leiden 1997) 101–122; F. Montanari, “Antichi commenti a Omero,” in Montanari, ed., *Omero: Gli aedi, i poemi, gli interpreti* (Scandicci 1998) 1–17.

μὲν οὖν διὰ τῆς μαθήσεως διδασκόμενον λόγον Ἰωτον προσηγόρευ-  
 σεν, ὅτι διὰ τῶν ὤτων αὐτὸν καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἐκμανθάνομεν  
 παιδευόμενοι. τὸν δὲ ἐνδιάθετον καὶ ἐκ φύσεως παρεπόμενον τοῖς  
 ἀνθρώποις Ἐφιάλτην ὠνόμασεν, οἷον τὸν αὐτομάτως ἐφαλλόμενον,  
 τουτέστιν ἐμβαλλόμενον ταῖς ἀκοαῖς [v. l. ex ed. pr.: ἦτ' οὖν  
 ἐπερχόμενον ταῖς διανοαῖς ἡμῶν]. ὑπὸ τούτων δὲ ἀμφοτέρων φησὶν  
 δεθῆναι τὸν Ἄρη, τουτέστιν τὸν θυμόν, καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ βασανισθῆ-  
 ναι, ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐν παιδείᾳ λόγοι ἐκπαιδεύουσι καὶ ἐκδιδάσκουσι  
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κατέχειν μὲν ὀργὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, ἥκιστα δὲ  
 θυμῷ χρῆσθαι.<sup>7</sup>

But it is better [to suppose] that the poet desires to impart philosophical lessons throughout this segment, as throughout the poem as a whole. He names anger Ares and the *logoi en paideia* Otus and Ephialtes. Of these *logoi* one is impelled (developed) by learning and instruction, while the other is internal (= ἐνδιάθετος), and accrues to men by natural means. The *logos* acquired by learning he called Otus, because we acquire it by means of our ears and our hearing in the educative process. The *logos* which is internal and which accrues to men by natural means he called Ephialtes, as the one coming upon us in a spontaneous fashion, that is, entering our hearing [v.l. or indeed, coming to our minds]. He says that Ares, that is, anger, was bound by both of these two and was put under duress for a long time, because the *logoi en paideia* educate and teach men to restrain anger [here = ὀργή] and desire, and to engage anger only occasionally.

The text continues for several more lines, and involves a further

<sup>7</sup>This citation, including the variant from the *editio princeps* of J. Lascaris (Rome 1517), is taken from the internet edition (*proeccdosis*) of the D-scholium by H. van Thiel, which may be consulted at <http://www.uni-koeln.de/phil-fak/ifa/vanthiel> (pp.221–222). A partial edition of the scholium is given by F. Montanari, “Aristarco negli *Scholium D* all’*Iliade*,” in L. Belloni *et al.*, edd., *Studia classica Iohanni Tarditi oblata* II (Milan 1995) 1156, but he includes only the incipit of this segment. For the broader issues related to the text of the D-scholium and information on printed editions, see H. van Thiel, “Die D-Scholien der *Ilias* in den Handschriften,” *ZPE* 132 (2000) 1–62; Montanari (*supra* n.6). It should also be noted that a version of the same comment in the scholium is preserved in the *Venetus B* codex. It is in a later hand, however, and is not part of the **bT** tradition. Accordingly, it will not be found in H. Erbse’s edition of the scholia vetera to the *Iliad* (Berlin 1969–88), but may be consulted in that of G. Dindorf, vol. III (Oxford 1877) 248–249.

allegorical interpretation of Hermes' freeing of Ares.<sup>8</sup> To this additional interpretation we shall return at the end of the article, but it need not detain us here. The reference to the doctrine of the two *logoi* is clear from the use of the technical term *endiathetos*.<sup>9</sup> What strikes our attention, however, is the notion that the *logos prophorikos* and the *logos endiathetos* are described as οἱ ἐν παιδείᾳ λόγοι. Further on in the scholium we read the similar description οἱ τῆς παιδείας λόγοι. This application of the doctrine of the *logoi* to the educational sphere does not figure prominently in the ancient testimony or in the modern discussions. However, that it goes back to the Hellenistic period can be confirmed from Philo's writings. In his *De mutatione* 208, we read: Μωυσῆς μὲν ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ καθαρῶτατος, Ἰααρὼν δὲ λόγος αὐτοῦ, πεπαίδευται δὲ καὶ ὁ νοῦς θεοπρεπῶς ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁσίως ἐρμηνεύειν τὰ ὄσια ("Moses is mind most pure, and Aaron is its word, and the mind has been trained to grasp holy matters in a manner befitting the divine, and the word to express them in a holy manner").

Another interesting feature in the scholium, based on the etymology of the two names, is the distinction between two modes of learning. On the one hand there is μάθησις and διδασκαλία, through which we acquire the *logos prophorikos*, and on the other hand there is φύσις, which fosters the *logos endiathetos*. The *logos prophorikos* is trained through the sense of hearing, whereas the *logos endiathetos* accrues to us, or develops, as it were, "spontaneously" (αὐτομάτως). This distinction is also paralleled in Philo. In his *De sacrificiis* 6–7, he differentiates between Isaac (and those like him), who was thought worthy of αὐτομαθῆς ἐπιστήμη, and others, who advance by μάθησις and διδασκαλία. This second group learns by the sense of hearing, ἐξ ἀκοῆς

<sup>8</sup>For other discussions of the text, see F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Paris 1956) 299–301; P. Cesaretti, *Allegoristi di Omero a Bisanzio* (Milan 1991) 36–40. For the version in Eustathius, see Eust. *Il.* 5.387–391, 389 (II 97, 98 van der Valk).

<sup>9</sup>That ἐνδιάθετος as a modifier of λόγος represents technical jargon may be seen from *SVF* II 135 and Heraclitus the Allegorist *Quaest.Hom.* 72.14–15.

καὶ ὑφηγήσεως. We learn later in the same treatise (78) that the αὐτομαθῆς σοφία is associated with the “eye of the soul.” In yet another passage, *De fuga* 170, we find that a characteristic of the αὐτομαθῆς (here in the sense of “self-taught” person) is τὸ ἀναβαῖνον αὐτόματον, or the spontaneously developing (wisdom). This is then characterized as “that which is by nature” (τὰ φύσει). We see then that the two modes of learning described in the scholium are described similarly by Philo.

In general, μάθησις and φύσις are broader principles of learning in Philo’s writings, not linked explicitly to the two *logoi*. Together with ἄσκησις, they constitute the three ways by which one acquires virtue, and are symbolized by Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, respectively, and not by Moses and Aaron.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, however, the parts of the human person or faculties that are connected with each of the two *logoi* in the scholium are linked with Moses and Aaron by Philo. In *De migratione* 76–81 (discussed above) Moses, *i.e.*, the *logos endiathetos*, apprehends by means of the “sight of the mind” (77), whereas Aaron, the *logos prophorikos*, is associated with the “flow of speech” (81), which comes to us through the sense of hearing (*Quaest. in Gen.* 4.107). These Philonic parallels have implications for the text of the scholium. Here, in the explanation of the etymology of Ephialtes, who represents the *logos endiathetos*, we find in the manuscripts the words τουτέστιν ἐμβαλλόμενον ταῖς ἀκοαῖς, the reading printed by H. van Thiel in his main text (*supra* n.7), but the words ἢ τ’ οὖν ἐπερχόμενον ταῖς διανοίαις ἡμῶν in the *editio princeps*. Of course, we need not impose on the scholium the Platonistic affiliation of the *logos endiathetos* with the “sight of the mind” attested in Philo. However, it should in any case be clear that an affiliation of the *logos endiathetos* with the sense of hearing is out of place, and the reading of the *editio princeps*, whatever its source, is to be preferred.

<sup>10</sup>On this triad in Philo and its classical sources, see F. H. Colson, “Philo on Education,” *JThS* 18 (1917) 160–161; J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 152–153.

A question, however, does arise about the *logos endiathetos* as it is portrayed in both sources. If it develops within us in a spontaneous and natural fashion, how can it be improved by *paideia*? Indeed, in another passage in Philo, *De migratione* 71, we find the *logos prophorikos* associated with *paideia*, but not the *logos endiathetos*. Nevertheless, that same passage tells us that that both forms of the *logos* may “be improved” (βελτιωθῆναι, *cf.* also 72), and we have already seen from *De mutatione* 208 that the *logos endiathetos* may be educated. The apparent inconsistency may simply reflect the circumstance that the *logos prophorikos* is more easily subject to training, or perhaps may be called the λόγος ἐν παιδείᾳ *par excellence*. One may note in this context another scholium on *Odyssey* 5.182. Here, in a discussion about the word ἐπητής, the word λόγιος is said to be analogous and is defined as follows: ὁ πεπαιδευμένος καὶ τῷ λόγῳ [καὶ τῷ ἔπει] χρῆσθαι δυνάμενος διὰ τὴν παιδευσιν, λόγῳ δὲ οὐ τῷ προφορικῷ μόνῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ.<sup>11</sup> The view that emerges in this comment seems to be that while the application of *paideia* to the *logos prophorikos* is obvious, its application to the *logos endiathetos* is less obvious. This view is parallel to that found in Philo and in the D-scholium.

What is the broader context of these ideas? The training of the *logos prophorikos*, in Philo’s thinking, is clearly assigned to the discipline of rhetoric. Scholars have essentially already recognized this,<sup>12</sup> although it is possible to demonstrate the proposition in a more decisive fashion. In *De cherubim* 105, Philo speaks of rhetoric as the discipline that allows one to attain facility with regard to the φωνητήρια ὄργανα. These φωνητήρια ὄργανα are closely affiliated, if not identified, with the *logos prophorikos* in other passages.<sup>13</sup> That there is a connection be-

<sup>11</sup>This text may be found in H. Schrader’s edition of Porphyry, *Quaestiones Homericae ad Odysseam* (Leipzig 1890) 53.

<sup>12</sup>T. M. Conley, *Philo’s Rhetoric* (Berkeley 1987) 65; M. Alexandre, Jr, *Rhetorical Argumentation in Philo of Alexandria* (Atlanta 1999) 249.

<sup>13</sup>*De mutatione* 69; *Legum alleg.* 3.119. *Cf.* A. Kamesar, “Philo and the Literary Quality of the Bible,” *JJS* 46 (1995) 59–60.



tween the *logos endiathetos* and philosophy in Philo has also been assumed.<sup>14</sup> This assumption too finds some support in the Philonic corpus. In *Quis heres* 4, Philo is again discussing Moses as *logos endiathetos*, in the context of Exodus 4:10, where Moses confesses that he is “weak-voiced and slow of tongue.” Philo notes that it is quite natural, when one is in communication with God, that the speech organ (φωνητήριον ὄργανον) may be held in check, τὸν δὲ κατὰ διάνοιαν λόγον ἀρθρούμενον ἀνυποτάκτῳ φορᾷ χρῆσθαι, νοημάτων οὐ ῥημάτων ἐπάλληλα κάλλη μετ’ εὐτρόχου καὶ ὑψηγόρου δυνάμεως φιλοσοφοῦντα (“while the *logos* of the mind becomes articulate and goes into a free flow, working out philosophically the connected beauties not of words but of thoughts, with a smooth and sublime power”). Here we read of the *logos endiathetos* engaging in philosophy as a non-verbal activity, though becoming in some sense “articulate.”<sup>15</sup> Consequently, it may be that according to some theoretical scheme, the education of the *logos prophorikos* was assigned to the master of rhetoric, and that of the *logos endiathetos* to the teacher of philosophy.

There is support for this assignment of the two *logoi* to the different disciplines of rhetoric and philosophy in some later texts. Plutarch certainly associates the *logos endiathetos* with philosophical study, and Hermias of Alexandria, a late commentator on Plato’s *Phaedrus*, links the *logos prophorikos* with rhetoric.<sup>16</sup> In the introduction to his *Commentary on the Techne of Hermogenes*, Sopater discusses and gives definitions of the two

<sup>14</sup>By Alexandre, *loc. cit.* (*supra* n.12).

<sup>15</sup>This notion of an “articulate” *logos endiathetos* has precedent in Chrysippus. See Pohlenz (*supra* n.1) 82–83 (with reference to *SVF* II 16 [p.8 line 28], and 13 [p.4 line 37]). There is also a clear parallel in Ps.-Iamblichus *Theolog. arith.* (ed. V. De Falco [Leipzig 1922] 65). With regard to the *Quis heres* passage just cited, that Moses, as *logos endiathetos*, should both be in communication with God, *i.e.*, receive revelations from him, and engage in philosophy, is fully in tune with Philo’s view of Mosaic wisdom as given in *De opificio* 8.

<sup>16</sup>Plut. *Max. princ.* 777B–D (*cf. De aud.* 48D); Hermias *In Plat. Phaedr.* 273E (p.252 Couvreur).

*logoi*.<sup>17</sup> In this discussion, he assigns the *logos endiathetos* to one discipline, namely, ἡ περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων, and the *logos prophorikos* to two, γραμματική and ῥητορική.<sup>18</sup> Now, R. Volkman has suggested that the first discipline refers to logic proper, and that the overall scheme reflects the Stoic system, according to which logic (in the broad sense) is divided into two parts, dialectic and rhetoric.<sup>19</sup> However, since logic proper, *i.e.*, dialectic, was more widely viewed as a part of philosophy, one can certainly see how the *logos endiathetos* might be assigned to philosophy, and the *logos prophorikos* to rhetoric as an independent discipline.<sup>20</sup>

Such an assignment of the two *logoi* to the two different disciplines would especially make sense if considered in the light of actual educational practice. For the so-called conflict between rhetoric and philosophy had been going on since the time of Plato and Isocrates, and these two disciplines came to represent the principal competing forms of “higher education” in the ancient world.<sup>21</sup> In the Hellenistic and early imperial age, this is reflected quite clearly in a variety of sources. A *senatus consultum* from 161 B.C., preserved by Suetonius (*Gramm.* 25.1–2), speaks of “philosophers and rhetors” as a pair, and indicates

<sup>17</sup>The text may be consulted in Walz, *RG V* (Stuttgart 1833) 1–2. M. Winterbottom (with D. Innes), *Sopateros the Rhetor* (London 1988) 1, 13 n.10, has questioned the authorship of the commentary, but appears willing to allow a dating in the fourth/fifth century.

<sup>18</sup>There are parallels to this discussion of Sopater in an anonymous prolegomena to Hermogenes’ *On Staseis* and in the *excerpta* of *Cod. Par.* 3032, both edited by H. Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Leipzig 1931 = *Rhetores Graeci XIV*) 184–188, 232. These texts are translated and discussed by Matelli (*supra* n.1) 63–70, although not with reference to the issue discussed here.

<sup>19</sup>*Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer* (Leipzig 1885) 12. The question of the relationship between the Stoic scheme and the teachings of Hermagoras of Temnos (Hermagoras the elder), discussed by Volkman, need not concern us here.

<sup>20</sup>*Cf.*, as a parallel to the idea that the two *logoi* are “brothers,” the view quoted by Philo, *De congressu* 18, that dialectic and rhetoric are “sisters.”

<sup>21</sup>See M. Pohlenz, *Der hellenische Mensch* (Göttingen 1946) 419–420; H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l’éducation dans l’antiquité*<sup>6</sup> (Paris 1965) 146–147, 314–316, 580.

that they should leave Rome. These teachers were in all probability Greeks, and they were no doubt propagating the two chief curricula of Hellenistic higher education.<sup>22</sup> The problem of the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy of course also figures prominently in Cicero's writings.<sup>23</sup> A few centuries later, Fronto speaks of two kinds of *paideia*, a παιδεία τῶν ῥητόρων and a παιδεία τῶν φιλοσόφων (*Ep.* 1.2).

Of course, one could not say with certainty that an assignment of the two *logoi* to the disciplines of rhetoric and philosophy is implicit or taken for granted in the allegorical interpretation given in the D-scholium. Nevertheless, this idea could explain the origin of the allegorical interpretation. For it would account for the designation of the two *logoi* as οἱ ἐν παιδείᾳ λόγοι, and perhaps also for the fact that the two *logoi* are portrayed as functioning in harmonious cooperation. A *paideia* that is concerned with both τὸ φρονεῖν and τὸ εἶ λέγειν, the educational ideal that goes back to Isocrates, would entail the cooperative synergy of the *logos endiathetos* and the *logos pro-phorikos*, if Stoic terminology is employed.<sup>24</sup> This same ideal was propagated in the Hellenistic period, for it was adopted by Cicero, and he was probably dependent ultimately on Greek sources.<sup>25</sup> In concrete terms, the coupling of rhetoric and philosophy seems to have been advocated by Diogenes of Babylon.<sup>26</sup> Consequently, it would hardly be surprising if a Stoic/Stoicizing

<sup>22</sup> Cf. H. von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin 1898) 88; G. Garbarino, *Roma e la filosofia greca dalle origini alla fine del II secolo a.C.* (Turin 1973) 370–371.

<sup>23</sup> See esp. K. Barwick, *Das rednerische Bildungsideal Ciceros* (Berlin 1963).

<sup>24</sup> See Barwick (*supra* n.23) 22–24; cf. E. Mikkola, *Isokrates* (Helsinki 1954) 196–197.

<sup>25</sup> So Barwick (*supra* n.23) 24–25.

<sup>26</sup> See D. Sohlberg, "Aelius Aristides und Diogenes von Babylon," *MusHelv* 29 (1972) 274–276, who thinks that Diogenes was the source for Cicero's linking of the two disciplines. Barwick, *loc. cit.* (*supra* nn.24–25), argues for a rhetorical rather than a philosophical source for Cicero's educational ideal as it emerges from the introduction to the *De inventione*. However, the themes in question are treated in many different ways in Cicero's writings, and he may have employed different sources on different occasions.

educator, be that person grammarian, rhetor, or philosopher, came up with the allegorical interpretation of the Aloadae as the two λόγοι ἐν παιδείᾳ.

An attempt to determine with more precision the date and provenance of the allegorical interpretation in the D-scholium would not be without interest. This is because at the beginning of the very same scholium we read Aristarchus' famous statement that interpreters should understand stories like that of the Aloadae μυθικώτερον and according to poetic license, and not be concerned with things not said by the poet. According to a version of the same statement in Eustathius, Aristarchus was attacking allegorical interpretation.<sup>27</sup> R. Pfeiffer rejected the testimony of Eustathius, and thought, on the basis of the D-scholium, that Aristarchus' statement "was more general, not particularly against allegory."<sup>28</sup> Recent scholars, however, have put greater faith in Eustathius and have acknowledged that Aristarchus did have allegory in mind, partly in light of the allegorical interpretations preserved in the same D-scholium.<sup>29</sup>

Those allegorical interpretations include the one under consideration here, so the question naturally arises whether the interpretation can be shown to antedate Aristarchus. A definitive answer to this question may be beyond the scope of the present article, but some preliminary considerations may be offered. From the classical period onwards, various gods and divine figures were thought to symbolize logos.<sup>30</sup> Of special interest is an interpretation of Cleanthes, according to which the plant moly (μῶλυ) represented logos, δι' οὗ μωλύονται αἱ ὀρμαὶ καὶ τὰ πάθη (*SVF* I 526). We see here both the allegorical/

<sup>27</sup>Eust. *Il.* 5.395–400 (II 101 van der Valk).

<sup>28</sup>*History of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford 1968) 226–227 with n.1.

<sup>29</sup>J. I. Porter, "Hermeneutic Lines and Circles: Aristarchus and Crates on the Exegesis of Homer," in R. Lamberton and J. J. Keaney, edd., *Homer's Ancient Readers* (Princeton 1992) 70–71, 73; A. Cucchiarelli, "'Allegoria retorica' e filologia alessandrina," *StIt* 90 (1997) 211–212.

<sup>30</sup>A extensive inventory is given by H. Leisegang, "Logos," *RE* 13 (1926) 1061–1069. The Aloadae, however, are not included.

etymological method and the idea that *logos* has the potential to quell the passions. We also know that Cleanthes composed a dialogue between λογισμός and θυμός (570), a fact which also points to his interest in the relationship between *logos* and anger. It is more difficult to specify a precise time frame for interpretations of mythological figures as the *logos endiathetos* and the *logos prophorikos*. The idea that the celestial Hermes symbolizes the *logos prophorikos*, and the chthonian Hermes the *logos endiathetos*, is attested in Heraclitus the Allegorist (*Quaest.Hom.* 72.14–18). The interpretation of Iris as the *logos prophorikos* is found in the scholia to Hesiod's *Theogony*, and some scholars have thought that its origin is to be traced to the Old Stoa.<sup>31</sup> In any case, with regard to the allegorical/etymological interpretations of Otus and Ephialtes as the two *logoi*, a date in the early or middle Hellenistic age would seem quite reasonable.

The notion that *paideia* is an aid in anger control strikes one as natural enough for ancient Greek thought in general, and it is attested in the generation just after Aristarchus. Posidonius had much interest in problems connected with human emotions, and he took the view that a παιδεία τοῦ λογισμοῦ or λόγου (= τὸ λογιστικόν, the rational part of the soul) had an important role to play in helping one gain control of desire and anger (ἐπιθυμία and θυμός). The nature of that *paideia* he thought lay in a “knowledge of the nature of things.”<sup>32</sup> This would no doubt constitute a training of the *logos endiathetos*.<sup>33</sup> Posidonius also appears to have employed, in an analogous context, imagery

<sup>31</sup> *Schol. vet. in Hes. Theog.* 266b (ed. L. Di Gregorio [Milan 1975] 53); cf. Heraclitus *Quaest.Hom.* 28.2–3. The scholium is taken up by von Arnim as *SVF* II 137, and by M. Isnardi Parente, *Stoici antichi* II (Turin 1989) 733. She suggests that the interpretation may have been formulated in the school of Diogenes of Babylon. The text also may be found in Hülser (*supra* n.1) 590 (fr.535).

<sup>32</sup> Posidonius fr.31 Edelstein-Kidd. For the broader context, see P. Rabbow, *Antike Schriften über Seelenheilung und Seelenleitung I Die Therapie des Zorns* (Leipzig 1914) 26–35.

<sup>33</sup> There is perhaps something of this idea in Plutarch *Max. princ.* 777C–D; *Sext. Emp. Pyr.* 1.65.

similar to that which we find in the scholium.<sup>34</sup> For more concrete or practical examples of *paideia* in anger control, the most noteworthy parallels I have been able to find, chiefly with the help of two recent works,<sup>35</sup> come from the later Hellenistic or imperial age. In the novel of Chariton, usually dated to the first century B.C. or the first century of the common era, the heroine Callirhoë, “as an educated and reasonable woman” (οἶα ... γυνὴ πεπαιδευμένη καὶ φρενήρης), was able to control her rising anger against the king’s eunuch Artaxates.<sup>36</sup> In a later era, Synesius of Cyrene tells a story about a cruel magistrate, a certain Andronicus. This man, when he heard that Synesius (a bishop) had come to witness the corporal punishment of an unfortunate individual, broke into a rage and began to blaspheme against the Church. He did this three times, “with untrained mind and tongue” (ἀπαιδεύτω γνώμη καὶ γλώττη).<sup>37</sup> In other words, the man was without the two-fold *paideia*, that of the *logos endiathetos* (γνώμη) and that of the *logos prophorikos* (γλώττα). Finally, another passage from Philo proves illuminating. In his *De posteritate* 71, he speaks of young men who were able to put out the flames of their desire (ἐπιθυμία) by employing as fire extinguishers οἱ κατὰ παιδείαν λόγοι. A reference to the suppression of ἐπιθυμία, as well as anger, is also found in the D-scholium cited above. Now, it may be that in the present passage of Philo, the word λόγοι is to be understood not as the

<sup>34</sup>After explaining how Celts, about to do battle, may cease from doing so at the behest of “philosophers” and bards, he comments, ὁ θυμὸς εἵκει τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ ὁ ἄρης αἰδεῖται τὰς Μούσας (fr.169 Theiler = *FGrHist* 87 F 116 = *Diod.* 5.31.5).

<sup>35</sup>W. V. Harris, *Restraining Rage* (Cambridge [Mass.] 2001); P. Brown, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity* (Madison 1992).

<sup>36</sup>*Chaereas and Callirhoë* 6.5.8. I owe this reference to Harris (*supra* n.35) 388.

<sup>37</sup>Synesius *Ep.* 58 (42). I owe the reference to Brown (*supra* n.35) 50. For the text of Synesius’ letter, I follow the older edition of R. Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci* (Paris 1873) 671; see also *PG* 66.1401B. In the more recent edition of A. Garzya (Rome 1979) 74, the words καὶ γλώττη are absent, but are included in a few manuscripts cited in the apparatus. There is a reference to the pair γνώμη – γλώττα earlier in the letter, although this is not an uncommon paronomasia.

*logos endiathetos* and *prophorikos*, but as the contents of *paideia*. These could be the contents in a general sense, but also the contents appropriate to the education of the *logos endiathetos* and *logos prophorikos*, perhaps as represented by the disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric. Somewhat later, Cassius Dio says of Marcus Aurelius that he was greatly aided by his *paideia*, ἔν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἔν τε τοῖς ἐκ φιλοσοφίας λόγοις ἀσκηθεὶς.<sup>38</sup> At any rate, it is probably reasonable to assume that the notion of *paideia*, and/or the λόγοι associated with it, as restraints on anger, does go back to at least the middle of the Hellenistic period.

Finally, we may consider two philosophical aspects of the allegorical interpretation in the D-scholium. At the end of the passage cited above, there is a reference to the fact that the two *logoi* teach men to restrain ὀργή and ἐπιθυμία. Now, in view of the fact that ὀργή and θυμός are used interchangeably throughout the passage,<sup>39</sup> the coupling of ὀργή/θυμός and ἐπιθυμία would seem to reflect a Platonic description of the parts of the irrational soul (*Resp.* 440E–441A). However, we know that in the Middle Stoa there was a return to some aspects of Platonic psychology. It was of course Posidonius who most manifestly adopted a version of Plato's teaching, endorsing a division of the soul into three δυνάμεις: rational, appetitive (ἐπιθυμητική), and irascible (θυμοειδής).<sup>40</sup> Yet it is likely that he was anticipated in this regard, at least to some degree, by his predecessors. A passage of Polybius, the older friend of Panaetius, may reflect a similar view. At 6.56.11, he speaks of ἐπιθυμία, ὀργή, and θυμός as a trio, and it is possible that the latter two terms are almost synonymous, as in the scholium. Panaetius himself

<sup>38</sup>71.35.1; cf. 71.35.6. Michael Psellus would observe that there are two classes of λόγοι, rhetoric and philosophy: *Chron.* 6.41, and Cesaretti (*supra* n.8) 32.

<sup>39</sup>For the synonymy of the two terms in common usage, see Harris (*supra* n.35) 54.

<sup>40</sup>Frr.34, 142, 152 Edelstein-Kidd. Cf. M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa I* (Göttingen 1992) 225.

appears to have acknowledged anger as an independent expression of the θυμός, alongside the classic four passions (among them ἐπιθυμία) recognized by the Old Stoa.<sup>41</sup> There is also evidence that a Platonic-like partition of the soul was adopted already by Diogenes of Babylon.<sup>42</sup>

The second philosophical aspect of the allegorical interpretation that we need to consider relates to an additional component of it, which comes at the end of the scholium and concerns Hermes' freeing of Ares, recounted in *Iliad* 5.390–391. This added comment is put forward in continuity with the interpretation of the imprisonment of Ares by the Aloadae that we have considered thus far, so it is probably derived from the same source. According to this additional part of the interpretation, it is Hermes who now represents λόγος, and his freeing of Ares tells us that occasionally reason must set free the θυμός, so that one may fight against one's enemies on behalf of country, children, or parents. In this part of the interpretation, θυμός represents a kind of "righteous indignation" that is positive and necessary for the virtue of bravery. Such a view of anger is more characteristic of the Peripatetic school than of the Stoa, and Theophrastus in particular stated that good men get angry when their loved ones suffer injury.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, in this case as well, the idea that anger may be necessary, so long as it operates in compliance with reason, is not out of tune with the views of Panaetius and Diogenes of Babylon. The former recognized "impulse," which is probably to be interpreted as

<sup>41</sup> See M. Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum* (Leipzig 1934) 45 n.2 (cf. also 65), cited with approval by A. R. Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis* (Ann Arbor 1996) 198. On Cicero's *Off.* 1.69, the source for this view, see also the review of M. van Straaten's *Panētius* by Pohlenz in *Gnomon* 21 (1949) 118–119.

<sup>42</sup> See D. Obbink and P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Diogenes of Babylon: The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools," *GRBS* 32 (1991) 355–356 n.4.

<sup>43</sup> His view is given by Seneca *De ira* 1.12.3 (cf. 1.14.1; both passages = fr.446 Fortenbaugh). See also the Peripatetic view as reported by Cicero *Tusc.* 4.43. For a summary of Peripatetic views on anger, see R. Laurenti in the introduction to his edition (with G. Indelli), *Plutarco, Sul controllo dell'ira* (Naples 1988) 13–16.



some form of irrational element of the soul, as something that helped stir men to action. One needs to ensure, however, that it remains obedient to reason.<sup>44</sup> On the matter of anger in particular, Panaetius seems to have made concessions to the Peripatetic position.<sup>45</sup> Diogenes of Babylon also appears to have made steps in the direction of a Peripatetic *metriopatheia*, and to have endorsed a view of the “educability of the irrational impulses,” as M. Isnardi Parente has put it.<sup>46</sup> There is a hint that he too allowed for the legitimacy of anger in some cases.<sup>47</sup> In short, the philosophical aspects of the allegorical interpretation that concern the irrational soul and the use of anger according to the dictates of reason would not be inconsistent with Stoic ideas as they developed in the period after Chrysippus.

When we consider the allegorical interpretation in the D-scholium as a whole, there are good grounds for thinking that it originated in the Stoa of Diogenes of Babylon and his immediate successors or in scholarly/“grammatical” circles close to them. Diogenes did employ the allegorical method, a fact we know from Cicero as well as from the Herculaneum papyri.<sup>48</sup> So did Crates, the famous “rival” of Aristarchus who was the teacher of Panaetius, may have been the pupil of Diogenes, and certainly had connections to the Stoic school.<sup>49</sup> The name of Diogenes has also come up in the course of our discussion of the

<sup>44</sup>Panaetius fr.88 van Straaten = test. 121 Alesse. See the discussion of J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969) 182–184, and of F. Alesse, *Panaetio di Rodi e la tradizione stoica* (Naples 1994) 196–197.

<sup>45</sup>See Pohlenz, *Führertum* (*supra* n.41) 52–53.

<sup>46</sup>*Introduzione a lo stoicismo ellenistico* (Rome 1993) 117–118. See also her article “Fra Stoa e media Stoa,” *StIt* 85 (1992) 612–613, 614–616.

<sup>47</sup>See the remark attributed to him by Seneca, *De ira* 3.38.1 (= *SVF* III Diogenes 50).

<sup>48</sup>See the new edition and discussion of an important fragment by D. Obbink, *Philodemus, On Piety* I (Oxford 1996) 19–23.

<sup>49</sup>On the somewhat controversial figure of Crates, on his use of the allegorical method, and on his connections to Stoicism, see the recent balanced assessment of M. Broggiato, *Cratete di Mallo, I frammenti* (La Spezia 2001) xvii, lx–lxv.

relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. He went beyond his Stoic predecessors in his advocacy of a positive relationship between the two disciplines.<sup>50</sup> His view would certainly not be far from the one that may underlie, at least we have so suggested, the interpretation of the two *logoi* in the D-scholium. Finally, the ideas that emerge from the scholium concerning the irrational soul and the use of anger, which have been discussed in the two preceding paragraphs, seem reconcilable with the positions of Panaetius and Diogenes. One may therefore probably accept the notion that the allegorical interpretation of Otus and Ephialtes as the two *logoi* does indeed go back to the period of Aristarchus, and could be one of the objects of his famous criticism of allegorical interpretation as transmitted in the same D-scholium and as illuminated by Eustathius.

The results of our study, which we may summarize briefly, are three. In the first place, Philo's allegorical interpretation of Moses as the *logos endiathetos* and Aaron as the *logos prophorikos* may have been ultimately inspired by a similar interpretation of another set of brothers, Otus and Ephialtes, preserved in the D-scholium on *Iliad* 5.385. Although Philo or one of his predecessors could have come up with the interpretation on his own, we know that the Judeo-Hellenistic writers often drew inspiration from Greek interpreters of Homer. The two sources also share a similar conception of the doctrine of the two *logoi*, or rather an "applied" use of it that is not particularly common. In the second place, the comparison of the Philonic texts and the scholium makes it possible for us to further illuminate that "applied" use. It relates to *paideia*, and may involve the idea that the two *logoi* are to be entrusted to the two disciplines of rhetoric and philosophy. The origin of such an idea could be set within the context of the so-called conflict between rhetoric and philosophy, and might reflect the views of someone who believed in a "brotherly" synergy between those two disciplines.

<sup>50</sup>See above at n.26, and see also Isnardi Parente, *Introduzione* (*supra* n.46) 118.

Thirdly, a more general evaluation of the allegorical interpretation in the D-scholium involving the two *logoi* appears to allow the conclusion that it did arise during the age of Aristarchus or just before, and certainly could have been known to him. The other “rationalistic”/allegorical interpretations of the Aloadae given in the same scholium remain to be more fully investigated.<sup>51</sup>

*December, 2003*

Hebrew Union College  
3101 Clifton Ave.  
Cincinnati, OH 45220-2488  
akamesar@huc.edu

<sup>51</sup>On these interpretations, see Buffière (*supra* n.8) 228, 594. He cites them, however, from sources other than the D-scholium.