

The ἀξίωσις of Words at Thucydides 3.82.4

John T. Hogan

IN HIS FAMOUS CHAPTER on the revolutions engendered by the Peloponnesian War Thucydides notes that the effects of *stasis* reached even to the words people used: *καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει* (3.82.4). Scholars have usually taken this as an assertion that the political partisans changed the *meanings* of the words they used, and by this is understood the denotations of the words, their referents:¹ thus (to use Thucydides' first example) acts which once were called 'rash boldness' (τόλμα ἀλόγιστος) were now called 'courageous loyalty' (ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος)—the first phrase was abandoned while the second changed its referent. I wish to argue that this interpretation of Thucydides is imprecise. The root of ἀξίωσις suggests that it ought strictly to mean 'act of assigning worth or value'.² In addition to denoting objects or persons, words of the sort Thucydides gives as examples also have a certain value in themselves and are used to assign values to the objects denoted.³ In the normal course of affairs these words have generally accepted estimations; they carry praise or blame in accordance with

¹ See LSJ *s.v.* ἀξίωσις IV; E. F. Poppo and J. M. Stahl, *Thucydides De Bello Peloponnesiaco* (Leipzig 1882–88) *ad loc.*, “ἀξίωσις propria aestimatio hic significationis vim habet”; J. Classen and J. Steup, *Thucydides* (Berlin 1885–1914) *ad loc.*; A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides II* (Oxford 1956) *ad loc.*; John H. Finley, *Thucydides* (Ann Arbor 1963) 229; Albin Lesky, *A History of Greek Literature*² (New York 1963) 463. The passage has recently been treated in detail by L. Edmunds, “Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis,” *HSCP* 79 (1975) 73–92, esp. 74–75 (following the traditional interpretation); and by C. M. MacCleod, “Thucydides on Factions,” *PCPhS* (1979) 52–68, who recognizes that a literal translation of *τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν* would be “the ‘traditional value’ of words” (56) but who ultimately follows the usual understanding of the passage (61).

² The term thus should not refer to the result of an action, *i.e.*, to a commonly assigned ‘meaning’. See P. Chantraine, *La formation des noms en grec ancien* (Collection Linguistique 38 [Paris 1933]) 286–89. On the other hand, Thucydides' use of *-sis* nouns is relatively free, and *axiōsis* can refer to the result of an estimation. Cf. Gomme *ad* 2.37.1, 2.62.3–4, and 2.65.8; and LSJ *s.v.* ἀξίωσις I.1.2.

³ I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this last phrase.

traditional customs. In *stasis*, however, men may assign different values to these words, or they may confuse normal estimations by designating foul deeds by fair names (or vice versa). A determination of whether Thucydides is in fact describing a change in the estimation or value of words depends on an investigation of the passage in general and of the particular words in this introductory sentence.⁴

To take *ἀξίωσις* first, while it occurs relatively infrequently in Greek, LSJ cite many of the passages in which it appears. Apart from the present use, which they put into a special category by itself, translating the phrase as “the established meaning of words,” they divide the word into three different senses: (1) ‘thinking worthy’, etc., (2) ‘demand, claim (on grounds of merit)’, (3) ‘opinion, principle, maxim’.

The first two definitions are very close to the root meaning of the verb *ἀξιόω*. The third in fact is suspect. LSJ refer to Thucydides 2.88 and compare Aeschines 3.220. In 2.88 Thucydides prefaces Phormio’s speech to his troops before the second battle in the Corinthian Gulf. Phormio had always told his men that they must not retire before any multitude of Peloponnesian ships, no matter how great. As a consequence: *καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀξίωσιν ταύτην εἰλήφεσαν, μηδένα ὄχλον Ἀθηναῖοι ὄντες Πελοποννησίων νεῶν ὑποχωρεῖν*—“and the soldiers for a long time among themselves had held this appraisal [of themselves], that, being Athenians, they must not retire before any multitude of Peloponnesian ships.” *μηδένα . . . ὑποχωρεῖν* expresses the content of the *axiōsis* that the soldiers had taken up. This *axiōsis* is the soldiers’ appraisal (or estimate) of their abilities, as they have formed it in accordance with Phormio’s exhortations, which he had based on an evaluation of his men’s worth.⁵ The root meaning of the word closely determines its sense here; ‘opinion’ would not adequately render the sense.

Again, Aeschines is addressing Demosthenes: *ἐπιμᾶς δέ μοι, εἰ μὴ συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ διαλείπων πρὸς τὸν δῆμον προσέρχομαι, καὶ*

⁴ For a general consideration of fifth-century sophistic theories of language see G. Murray, “The Beginnings of Grammar,” in *Greek Studies* (Oxford 1946) 171–91; C. J. Classen, “The Study of Language amongst Socrates’ Contemporaries,” in *Sophistik* (Darmstadt 1976) 215–47. For Protagoras’ theory of *orthoepia* see D. Fehling, “Zwei Untersuchungen zur griechischen Sprachphilosophie,” *RhM* 108 (1965) 212–29; Charles Segal, “Protagoras’ *orthoepia* in Aristophanes’ *Battle of the Prologues*,” *RhM* 113 (1970) 158–62.

⁵ ‘Existimatio’ E.-A. Bétant, *Lexicon Thucydideum* I (Geneva 1843) s.v. *ἀξίωσις*; ‘Anspruch’ Classen-Steup.

τὴν ἀξίωσιν ταύτην οἶε λανθάνειν μεταφέρων οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐτέρας πολιτείας—“You censure me for coming before the people not constantly, but only at intervals. And you think it will escape notice that you borrow this evaluation from another form of government, not democracy.” Here *axiōsis*, usually translated ‘demand’, refers to the content of Demosthenes’ criticism of Aeschines. It should not be weakened to ‘principle’ or ‘opinion’. Since Demosthenes makes his assessment on the basis of what he thinks is right, the root meaning of the word is close to the surface.

The other occurrences of *axiōsis* in classical Greek (in addition to those cited by LSJ) will be seen also to retain the root meaning, ‘worth’, ‘value’. At Thucydides 3.9.2 *axiōsis* has an active meaning. The Mytileneans are asking for Spartan help in their revolt from Athens. They must first dispose of the commonplace that a deserter will not be a trustworthy ally to the one to whom he deserts. They say that this appraisal is not unjust (*καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος αὕτη ἢ ἀξίωσις ἐστίν*), when the rebels and those from whom they are revolting are united in policy and sympathy and there is no ground for deserting. Their cause, of course, is different. *Axiōsis* means ‘judgement’ or ‘estimation’,⁶ and refers to the value judgement the Mytileneans must combat to win their plea.

At 2.34.6 Thucydides describes the basis for the selection of the man to speak the funeral oration: *ἐπειδὴν δὲ κρύψωσι γῆν, ἀνήρ ἡρημένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὃς ἂν γνώμη τε δοκῆ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι καὶ ἀξιώσει προήκη, λέγει ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἔπαινον τὸν πρέποντα*—“But when they have buried the remains in the earth, a man chosen by the city, who is thought well-endowed with wisdom and who stands out in reputation, speaks over them the fitting praise.” The wise man of outstanding reputation is chosen by the city. The passive sense of *axiōsis* is uppermost.⁷ The word means almost exactly the same thing at 2.37.1: *μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀξίωσιν, ὡς ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ εὐδοκιμεί, οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ πλεον ἐς τὰ κοίνα ἢ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς προτιμάται*—“Concerning private disputes there is equality for all according to the laws, but in respect to a recognition of worth, as each one is in any way highly regarded, he is preferred to public honors not more because of his rank than because of his virtue.” Men are

⁶ The scholiast (*Scholia in Thucydideum*, ed. Carolus Hude [Leipzig 1927]) defines the word here as *ἡ δόξα, ἡ κρίσις, ὁ λογισμός*. Poppo-Stahl compare 2.88.2; ‘Ansicht, Beurteilung’ Classen-Steup.

⁷ So Classen-Steup; E. C. Marchant, *Thucydides Book II* (London 1891) *ad loc.*; ‘dignatio’ Bétant and Poppo-Stahl.

preferred to public office in accordance with their merit or a recognition of worth.⁸ So too at 2.65.8, the esteem in which Pericles was held (*ἔχων ἐπ' ἀξιώσει*) allowed him even to anger and contradict the people.

At Thucydides 1.69 the Corinthians castigate the Spartans for allowing the Athenians to increase their power. The Spartans are the true subjugators of Hellas: *οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν παῦσαι περιορῶν δὲ ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾶ, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται*—“Not the one who enslaves, but the one who is able to stop enslavement and overlooks it, is the truer enslaver, especially if he carries the *axiōsis* of the excellence of liberating Greece.” Here *axiōsis* may have either an active or passive sense, ‘claim’ or ‘esteem’.⁹

In fr.15N. of Euripides the physical beauty of royal offspring is envisioned:

*ἴδοιμι δ' αὐτῶν ἔκγον' ἄρσεν' ἀρσένων
πρῶτον μὲν εἶδος ἄξιον τυραννίδος·
πλείστη γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχον ἐν βίῳ,
τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῶν καλῶν τὸ σῶμ' ἔχειν.*

The last line seems to mean “for the body to have the esteem of the handsome.”¹⁰ The last important instance of *axiōsis* to be considered comes from the *Definitiones*, a work spuriously ascribed to Plato: *μεγαλοπρέπεια ἀξίωσις κατὰ λογισμὸν ὀρθὸν τοῦ σεμνοτάτου* (412E), “Magnificence is being esteemed in accordance with a right reckoning of the most noble.”¹¹ The idea of evaluating is here again predominant in *axiōsis*.

Thus, in all its occurrences the meaning of *axiōsis* is determined by its root. If, then, *axiōsis* at Thucydides 3.82.4 is defined in agreement with its root, it will be translated ‘judgement of worth’ or ‘estimation’, and it will refer (when taken with *εἰωθυῖαν*) to the

⁸ Cf. Marchant: “*ἀξίωσις*—*existimatio*, the consideration accorded to merit, recognition of personal claims.” Classen-Steup (followed by Gomme): “Den νόμοι, welche einem jeden ein unbedingtes Recht gewähren, ist die *ἀξίωσις*, das Urteil der öffentlichen Meinung, entgegengestellt, das durch Verdienste gewonnen sein will.” ‘Dignatio’ Bétant.

⁹ Poppe-Stahl: “*ἀξίωσις* aut passivam hic vim habet, ut sit dignitas . . . vel existimatio, laus, aut activam, ut sit assertio, vindicatio.” Classen-Steup take it as passive, ‘Anerkennung’. ‘Existimatio’ Bétant.

¹⁰ See to a rather different effect C. B. Gulick *Athenaeus* VI (Cambridge [Mass.] 1970 [LCL]) 57 note g.: “The poet goes on to say that it is a great merit to have a physical beauty in keeping with noble estate.”

¹¹ D. F. Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum* I (Leipzig 1835) s.v. *ἀξίωσις*, defines the word here as ‘dignitas’. For the text see H. Richards, *ClQ* 3 (1909) 15.

customary use of words to assess worth, to praise and blame. Thucydides is saying that in *stasis* men changed the customary evaluative power of words. A consideration of the remainder of the sentence confirms this.

Different and specialized meanings have also sometimes been given to τῆ δικαιοῦσει.¹² *Dikaiōsis* basically means ‘making or setting right’; Thucydides’ use of it conforms to this core meaning.¹³ τῆ δικαιοῦσει is a type of instrumental dative, the dative of cause, expressing a motive. Its grammar resembles the second dative in the following expression from Thucydides: οἱ μὲν ἀπορία ἀκολούθων, οἱ δὲ ἀπιστία “some (carried their own food) because they lacked servants, others through distrust of them” (7.75.5). Since this dative is frequently used with verbs of emotion, it is appropriate here in the context of the heightened emotions of partisans in *stasis*.¹⁴ Because men made their own self-serving judgements of what right was, they changed the *axiōsis* of words to suit and support their judgement.

ἐς τὰ ἔργα has also created some difficulty. Classen-Steup take the phrase with τὴν ἀξίωσιν and translate it ‘für die Dinge’. Gomme, on the other hand, asserts that “ἐς τὰ ἔργα goes surely with ἀντήλλαξαν ‘with a view to their actions’, not with τὴν ἀξίωσιν.”¹⁵ But ἐς often means ‘with respect to’ in Thucydides, and it can easily mean that here. There is no reason to regard ἐς τὰ ἔργα as narrowly referring only to the purposes of each party, and to say that party-members changed the *axiōsis* of words in order to accomplish (‘with a view to’) certain ends (τὰ ἔργα). Rather ἐς τὰ ἔργα goes with both τὴν ἀξίωσιν and with ἀντήλλαξαν. The partisans changed the estimations of words as applied to deeds, but they had

¹² ‘At their will and pleasure’ LSJ *s.v.* δικαιοῦσις III; *cf.* Walter Müri, “Politische Metonymasie,” *MusHelv* 26 (1969) 67f, ‘nach ihrer Willkür’. Classen-Steup: “die subjektive Auslegung, wie sie nach dem Umstande recht d.i. gelegen war.”

¹³ δικαιοῦσις occurs in four other places in Thucydides. At 1.141.1 it means ‘claim of right’—so LSJ *s.v.* II, *cf.* Classen-Steup (“eine mit dem Anspruch auf ein Recht . . . gestellte Forderung”). The same meaning is at 5.17.2. At 4.86.6 ἰσχύος δικαιοῦσει must mean ‘right of the stronger’, that is, justification consisting in strength. For 8.66.2 LSJ *s.v.* I.1 translate ‘condemnation, punishment’. The word could easily be understood here as ‘judgement of right’ (which would lead to punishment). In any case, ‘condemnation’ implies a ‘judgement of right’.

¹⁴ See R. Kühner/B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*³ II.1 (Hanover and Leipzig 1898) 438–40 (section 11). The example and its translation are from H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge [Mass.] 1956) §1517. The first dative (ἀπορία) expresses external cause.

¹⁵ But *cf.* Müri (*supra* n.12) 67–68, who argues successfully against Gomme.

their own purposes in mind. The real point of ἐς τὰ ἔργα, however, is that the *axiōseis* were changed in respect to the true value of the deeds (in the eyes of a neutral observer).

ἀντήλλαξαν literally means ‘exchange’ rather than ‘change’, but the latter translation better conveys the sense of the sentence, for ‘exchange’ requires that what a thing was exchanged for be specified, which Thucydides does not do. He only implies that the customary *axiōseis* of words were exchanged for new ones. Thucydides’ sentence may now be translated: “Men changed the customary estimation of words in respect to deeds in judging what right was.”

Thucydides’ full meaning becomes clear in an examination of his examples: τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθῆς δειλία εὐπρεπῆς κτλ. (3.82.4). The traditional interpretation of these clauses originates with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who understands the introductory sentence to mean: τὰ τε εἰωθότα ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι λέγεσθαι μετατιθέντες ἄλλως ἡξιούν αὐτὰ καλεῖν—“Changing the names customarily applied to deeds they deemed it right to call them by new names.”¹⁶ When this interpretation is applied to the examples, the first member of each clause denotes what Thucydides considers the customary (τὰ εἰωθότα ὀνόματα) and correct name for the *erga*, the second member gives what the partisans thought the action was, and what they called it. It gives the new name (ἄλλως) for the *erga*.

Friedrich Solmsen asks the following question about the examples Thucydides offers:

... the longer we look at the sentences purporting to acquaint us with the new meanings of words, the more we are bound to wonder whether people really developed the habit of praising a man for ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος or blaming him for δειλία εὐπρεπῆς. Had they ever, when discussing ruthless daring, spoken of ἀλόγιστος τόλμα?¹⁷

¹⁶ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De Thucydide* 29. Cf. W. K. Pritchett, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: On Thucydides* (Berkeley 1975) 113 n.10 (I have followed Pritchett’s translation closely). So too several of the scholia on Thucydides (M, φ, c₂, in the notation of Hude): τὴν σημασίαν . . . μετέθεσαν τὰ ὀνόματα . . . περιφραστικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα εἴρηκε τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων.

¹⁷ *Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment* (Princeton 1975) 110. Solmsen decides in favor of the traditional interpretation both here and in his article “Thucydides’ Treatment of Words and Concepts,” *Hermes* 99 (1971) 395. Solmsen describes Thucydides’ observations as the discovery of a “new type of synonym.” For Solmsen, the synonymy consists in, for instance, τόλμα ἀλόγιστος being called ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος during *stasis* and

No satisfactory answer to this question can be given unless it is kept in mind that Thucydides does not use the verb *καλέω* but rather *νομίζω*. If he had used *ἐκλήθη*, this would have supported Dionysius' interpretation: deeds were called by new words (a change in referent).

But *ἐνομίσθη* invokes not what men said but what they thought. During *stasis* citizens confounded in thought previously distinguishable concepts. This confusion revealed itself in two different ways. When men saw an action that was objectively *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος*, either they thought (or pretended to think) that it was *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος* and called it that (Dionysius' interpretation); or they considered *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* to be a good thing and when praising it called it by its right name. Certainly the latter is not an impossible occurrence, and Thucydides knew of examples similar to it. Cleon, for instance, in his speech concerning the Mytileneans, praises *ἀμαθία* (3.37.3–4) and urges the Athenians not to show themselves soft, but to go out with *ὀργή*.¹⁸ Cleon praises a kind of *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος*, yet he calls it by its correct name and even claims that it is just (3.40.4).¹⁹ This situation I will call 'realistic' from the 'realistic' use of words to denote what they usually denote. In a similar fashion, during normal times men would consider *μέλλησις προμηθής* a good thing, a sign of intelligence and wisdom, while in *stasis* they might sometimes 'realistically' have called it *μέλλησις προμηθής*, but used the phrase to express disapproval. It is precisely because Dionysius does not take account of this common phenomenon, in which there is no change of denotation or referent, that his interpretation is insufficient.²⁰

Yet of course his interpretation is partly true. Politicians very often call bad deeds by good names (or vice versa), as Thucydides was well aware: *ὥστε εὐσεβεία μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπεία δὲ λόγου οἷς ζυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἄμεινον ἤκουον* (3.82.8). This common occurrence, which I will call the 'deceptive'

τόλμα ἀλόγιστος in normal times. I, on the other hand, believe that these different words were used at the same time and under the same conditions (*stasis*) to describe the same deed. Werner Jaeger, *Paideia* I² (New York 1945) 335–36, seems to interpret Thucydides along the lines suggested by Solmsen's question, although he still speaks of "a change in the meaning of words."

¹⁸ See Gomme *ad* 3.82.2 for *ὀργή*.

¹⁹ For Pericles' view of stupidity *cf.* 1.140.1; of intelligence, 2.40ff. For Thucydides' own opinion *cf.* 1.138.3 and 2.65.13.

²⁰ *ἀντήλλαξαν* does not then refer to an exchange of one word for another, but to the assumption of the new valuations for words. In any case, Thucydides does not say that men exchanged words, but their *axiōsis*.

rhetorical situation, from the deceptive or misleading use of words to indicate deeds other than those to which they normally refer, also involves a change in the estimation or evaluative power of words. To Thucydides *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* was doubtless a bad thing, and *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος* a good thing.²¹ In *stasis* when men thought of *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* as *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος* and called it *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος*, they devalued this phrase (from Thucydides' point of view) by using it as praise for unworthy deeds. Of course, those who employed *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος* to name what was actually *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* relied (whether consciously or unconsciously) on the high estimation of *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος* in order to carry their points. In this sense they did not change the estimation of words, but in fact depended on its remaining the same. Yet they did, from Thucydides' point of view, ultimately lower this evaluative power: through frequent application to what was actually blameworthy, the praise the word formerly conveyed was worn away. The same analysis applies to the next example. Faction members thought that what Thucydides would call *μέλλησις προμηθής* was *δειλία εὐπρεπής*. In condemning *μέλλησις προμηθής* as *δειλία εὐπρεπής* they have increased the estimation of the latter by using it to refer to what had been a good thing.

When someone uses *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος* for what is *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος*, it may seem that he has changed the meaning of *ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος* so that it includes *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος*. But in what sense has he changed the meaning? Certainly for an objective observer the word retains its original meaning. If the man tries to deceive his audience by his conscious misuse of terms, he has not even changed the meaning in his own mind. If, caught up in the rhetoric of the moment, he is himself deceived, he does not know what he is saying. But Thucydides avoids the difficult issue of how conscious the speaker is of the true meanings, or even of the true estimations, of his words. He simply notes the surface phenomenon, the perversion of the customary estimations of value-laden words—when these words are compared with the true estimations of the deeds.

Thucydides' next two examples—*τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ζύνετον ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν*—are in the form of the second example. An (objectively) good thing was considered bad. In the fifth example (*τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὄξυ ἀνδρὸς μοίρα προσ-*

²¹ There is no reason to suppose that in Thucydides *φιλέταιρος* should have an obviously bad connotation. At 82.5 the implication is not that *ἡ ἔταιρεία* is bad, but that men value it too highly; the same is true of *ἔταιρικόν* in 3.82.6.

ετέθη), although a new verb has taken the place of *ἐνομίσθη*, there is only a superficial difference. For *ἀνδρὸς μοίρα* is a virtue, and *τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὄξύ* is an opposing vice. This example thus resembles the first. *ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὐλογος*, the next example, for which the verb to be supplied is *ἦν* or *ἐνομίσθη*, is like the second, third, and fourth.

In section 82.5 Thucydides shifts from the abstract nouns of 82.4 to more 'active' participial forms: *καὶ ὁ χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεὶ, ὁ δ' ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὕποπτος. ἐπιβουλεύσας δὲ τις τυχὼν ξυνετὸς καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος· προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει, τῆς δὲ ἑταιρίας διαλυτῆς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένος.*²² Despite the change, these clauses, like their predecessors, may be analyzed according to both the 'deceptive' and 'realistic' interpretations. The example *ἐπιβουλεύσας . . . δεινότερος* presents some difficulty. When the phrase *τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετόν* was 'realistically' used for condemnation, it was devalued, but here the successful plotter is *ξυνετός*, so that this case resembles the first and fifth. When the plotter was 'deceptively' called *ξυνετός*, praise was intended. Thucydides thus implies that the word was used both for praise and for blame. And here too there is a devaluation. Before the *staseis* the word referred to intelligence, yet in civil strife it was devalued (in Thucydides' eyes) to a praise for success. Thucydides (and Pericles) surely rated mere success lower than *synesis*. *καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος* is more complicated. Either an objectively bad thing (suspicion) would be called by a good name (*synesis*), or what had been a bad name (suspicion) would become a good one. But *δεινότερος*, as well as meaning more clever, also has the familiar undertone of more terrible (*cf.* Gomme *ad loc.*). Thucydides thus suggests the same types of changes in praise and blame as in the other examples, and in addition implies that these new estimations of suspicion and success are false, for the one who suspected was in his eyes more terrible.

In 82.5 Thucydides moves beyond words to more general comments about how men acted and felt in *stasis*, while at the same time reinforcing his remarks about the revolution of values in Hellas.²³ He who anticipated an evil-doer, or he who provoked someone who was not intending a crime, was praised (82.5). Kin-

²² The verb to be supplied with these examples is apparently *ἦν* or *ἐνομίσθη*. If *ἦν* is supplied, we should probably understand "was by custom, that is the new custom," as Solmsen says (*supra* n.17), 109 n.49.

²³ *Cf.* L. Strauss, *The City and Man* (Chicago 1964) 147 n.8.

ship began to have a weaker hold on men than party or faction (82.6). Revenge was of more account than not suffering at all (82.7). Oaths lost their power (82.7, 83.2). No longer did men practice piety, but those who used fair-seeming words had a better reputation (82.8). Finally, simplicity (τὸ εὔηθες), in which honor holds the largest share, was ridiculed and disappeared. In short, Thucydides' examples suggest that it was the power of words to evaluate, not simply to denote, that changed in *stasis*.

In Book 8 of the *Republic* Socrates' discussion of the democratic man and the *stasis* in his soul parallels Thucydides' description of what happens to political discourse in *stasis*. Both Thucydides and Plato see that *stasis* is naturally fostered when parties in the state bring in outside allies, and that in *stasis* political discourse degenerates. In *Republic* 8 (560D) the boasting speeches in the soul of the democratic man do battle with the speeches of the older men and at last conquer them. As Socrates outlines the battle, the boasting speeches, calling shame simplicity, thrust out αἰδώς as a dishonored fugitive (ἀτίμως φυγάδα); calling moderation a lack of manliness, they spatter mud on it and exile it (προπηλακίζοντες ἐκβάλλουσι).²⁴ They also drive out measure and well-ordered expenditure, while castigating them as rustic and illiberal (ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν). Although he here refers only to calling things by new names (*i.e.*, to 'deceptive' rhetoric), Socrates does, by his use of vivid metaphors, emphasize that the boasting speeches blame those qualities that were formerly praised. He does not say that in *stasis* men change the denotation of words such as 'moderation' (σωφροσύνη) and 'measure' (μετριότης). After Adeimantus agrees with Socrates' description, Socrates recounts the corresponding new praise of what had been blameworthy: the boasting speeches next in blazing light bring back from exile insolence, anarchy, wastefulness, and shamelessness (ὑβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀναίδειαν) directly praising them and also calling them by fair names (ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ ὑποκοριζόμενοι). They call insolence a good education, anarchy freedom, wastefulness magnificence, and shamelessness manliness.²⁵

In *Republic* 1 Thrasymachus' arguments provide a good example of a 'realistic' change in the estimation of words, when Socrates

²⁴ With Plato's σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντες (560D) compare Thucydides' τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα (3.82.4), noted by James Adam, *The Republic of Plato* (Cambridge 1902) *ad loc.*

²⁵ For a parallel see Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford 1939) 149–61, esp. 153–56.

presses him for his true views on the nature of justice and injustice. Thrasymachus had begun by asserting that justice is the interest of the stronger (338C), which is a redefinition of justice. But Socrates forces Thrasymachus to reveal his true position (*cf.* 349A), that perfect injustice is more profitable than perfect justice (348B). Finally Thrasymachus denies that justice is a virtue and injustice a vice; he calls justice *γενναία εὐήθεια* and injustice *εὐβουλία* (348C–D).²⁶ This is a new and more difficult position, Socrates concludes (348E). For if Thrasymachus had set down injustice as profitable, but nevertheless agreed that it is base or shameful, Socrates and Thrasymachus would be able to speak in accordance with the customary usage (*κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα*). But Thrasymachus will clearly ascribe to injustice beauty and strength (*καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν*), and all the other qualities that used to be granted to justice, since he has dared to place it with virtue and wisdom (*ἀρετῆ . . . καὶ σοφία*, 349A). As Socrates understands it, Thrasymachus still calls injustice by its proper name, yet he praises it, and, we may infer, condemns justice.²⁷

Thus, in Plato as in Thucydides *stasis* overturns normal customs of praise and blame. Plato also shows in this argument of Thrasymachus that he was aware that an angry man who had a new case to make might continue to use the same words for the same ideas, but might value those words and ideas differently.²⁸

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL
May, 1980

²⁶ With this view of *εὐήθεια* *cf.* Thuc. 8.83.1, with Adam (*supra* n.24) *ad* 348D. For a summary of Thrasymachus' arguments and a review of the scholarship on them see W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* III (Cambridge 1969) 88–97, esp. 92 and 94, where Guthrie discusses the parallels between Thrasymachus' positions and Thuc. 3.82.4ff.

²⁷ Edmunds (*supra* n.1) 86–87 draws several close parallels between Hesiod's description of the Iron Age (*Op.* 174–201) and Thucydides' treatment of *stasis*, among them the inversion of language (*Op.* 190–92). It is interesting that Hesiod speaks in terms of the perversion of customs of praise and blame rather than of the changing denotations of words.

²⁸ I wish to thank Kent J. Rigsby, William H. Willis, and the anonymous referee for many helpful criticisms and suggestions.