

# Demosthenes on Distrust of Tyrants

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DEMOSTHENES' ARGUMENT ON DISTRUST OF TYRANTS as a bulwark of liberty in the *Second Philippic* is a recognized masterpiece of political oratory. Stobaeus excerpted it. Cicero, Plutarch, Themistius, and Lord Brougham paid it the compliment of imitation, and it stands as an important example of the stylistic ideal of Solemnity in the Aristeides *Rhetoric*.<sup>1</sup> This famous passage has unique stylistic virtues of its own, and these would repay close study from the point of view of stylistic rhetoric, even if the argument were mediocre, dated, or ephemeral. In fact, the argument is of the first importance for understanding the ideological foundations of Demosthenes' policies and the role of ideological arguments in Athenian debates on foreign policy. It is a strong appeal to the solidarity of free constitutions against the dangers of alliance with tyrants, and it rests ultimately upon convictions about the 'ends' of constitutional government and despotism, a theme which is important in Greek political theory. Such an argument, occurring as it does in an oration by a democratic politician before a democratic audience, would be historically important even as an isolated example. But Demosthenes' argument in the *Second Philippic* is not isolated; it has distinct resonances with the rhetoric of the Persian War era as reflected in Herodotus, and, I shall argue, it is a particular manifestation of a chain of reasoning which Demosthenes developed first in an anti-oligarchical context in *On the Liberty of the Rhodians*, adapted for the struggle against Philip in the *First Olynthiac*, and then used as a commonplace in his attempts to discredit Philip's diplomacy after 346.

By a close rhetorical analysis of four Demosthenic passages which appear to be related in language and argument, I hope to prove that the passages are reflections of a common chain of reasoning and of a deliberate process of invention and adaptation on Demosthenes' part—Demosthenes at work on his own set of commonplaces. Demosthenes repeats himself, as must all politicians

<sup>1</sup> Dem. 6.24–25: cf. Cic. *Phil.* 4.5.11–6.15; Plut. *Mor.* 821B; Themistius 22.278a; *The Works of Henry, Lord Brougham* IX (London 1857) 183–84; Stob. *Flor.* 4.1.52; [Aristeides] *Tech. Rhet.* 1.1.24.

who frequently defend the same policy in public. Sometimes he repeats a good argument almost *verbatim*, but on the whole he keeps key terms and premises, while varying the diction and style of the actual prose. Without the benefit of Aristotelian theory, he observes in practice the Peripatetic distinction between enthymeme and period, between 'invention' and style.<sup>2</sup> These four passages all appeal to a common principle of foreign policy, *viz.*, that no secure basis for trust can exist between cities or nations which have opposite constitutional 'ends'. It ought to be possible to observe Demosthenes' style varying with the circumstances, the audience, and his own development as an author between the period of the *Hellenic Orations* and the *Third Philippic*.<sup>3</sup>

The Greeks of the archaic and classical periods had a great deal to say about tyranny and tyrants. In one place or another Demosthenes makes use of almost every important aspect of this tradition, from accusations of moral depravity and sadism appropriate to the stage tyrant to objections based upon constitutional principles and independent of the character of an individual ruler.<sup>4</sup> Not all of that material is relevant here. One important element in Demosthenes' argument, the contrast between the 'ends' of tyranny and constitutional government, is already evident in Solon's apology for not making himself a tyrant (32ff West): tyranny is lawless and violent self-aggrandizement, the pursuit of personal power at the expense of the unity and order of the community as a whole. Its true antithesis in Solon's poem is not 'aristocracy' or 'democracy' but the rule of laws which apply equally to all members of the community. This sentiment is closely echoed in Demosthenes' *Second Philippic* (25). This contrast between the rule of law and the rule of one man is also an important theme in Herodotus' treatment of tyranny, both in the constitutional debate set in Persia after the fall of Smerdis and in Demareteus' speech to Xerxes on Spartan discipline and obedience.<sup>5</sup> Whatever allowances

<sup>2</sup> See Arist. *Rh.* 1354a14, b15ff; 1403b15ff; *cf.* Demetr. *Eloc.* 11.30–33.

<sup>3</sup> For the development of Demosthenes' style see G. Ronnet, *Étude sur le style de Démosthène dans les discours politiques* (Paris 1951), and L. Pearson, "The Development of Demosthenes as a Political Orator," *Phoenix* 18 (1964) 95–109.

<sup>4</sup> For instance, the portrait of Philip in the *Second Olynthiac* 14–21 exploits the stereotyped luxury and depravity of the 'tyrannic man' as in Pl. *Resp.* 571A–76C, Xen. *Hiero.* and similar sources, while the argument at 21–25 or in *On the Chersonese* 41–43 rests upon a general principle of policy and is closer to the spirit of Aristotle's analysis of the decline and fall of tyrannies than to Plato's (*cf.* Arist. *Pol.* 1312a39–b6).

<sup>5</sup> Hdt. 3.80.2–6 and 7.104.1–5. For Herodotus' views on tyranny, see now A. Ferrill, "Herodotus on Tyranny," *Historia* 27 (1978) 385–98.

civic politicians made for 'legitimate' monarchs when they sought their friendship or the benefits of their *euergesia*, this antithesis between personal power and freedom under law must emerge when a city finds itself in conflict with a monarch, be he legitimate heir to an ancient throne like Xerxes, or usurper of a lawful constitution like Dionysius.<sup>6</sup>

So one important element in Demosthenes' argument, the ultimate appeal to the opposite constitutional 'ends' of tyranny and democracy, is quite commonplace and long-established in Greek political oratory. Appeals to this principle turn up also in Lysias, Aeschines, and Hypereides, and their importance in the oratory of Demosthenes' day is reflected in rhetorical theory.<sup>7</sup> Aristotle includes an account of the 'ends' of the three basic types of constitutions among his specialized topics for deliberative oratory in the *Rhetoric* (1366a4ff). But Demosthenes' argument on distrust of tyrants is not only an appeal to irreconcilable constitutional differences. That principle serves as a universal major and as a final maxim to something more paradoxical and less appealing, the recommendation of distrust as a basic rule of foreign policy. Now trust and good faith are among the most valuable possessions of an individual or a city. Trust makes steadfast friendships and alliances possible, and the trust of a state or ruler is often the only guarantee that acts of good will are part of a consistent policy and not for some immediate advantage. The importance of trust in diplomacy is one of Demosthenes' most telling arguments against the law of Leptines (20.8–13, 25, 163ff). Distrust, on the other hand, is usually associated with disunity within a city, with *stasis*, and with the deterioration of peace and alliances among cities—so both Thucydides and Demosthenes.<sup>8</sup> Even the gnomic poets who recommend distrust as a prudent policy in private life do so with a note of bitterness and cynicism. There is no grandeur or nobility in

<sup>6</sup> Thus, when being honored by the Athenians Dionysius is called 'archon' of Sicily (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 18.6–7), but he is 'tyrant' of Sicily in Lysias' polemic against barbarians and tyrants, the *Olympiakos* (33.5). Philip is of course a good king and a Hellene of noble descent in Isocrates' *To Philip*, but a 'tyrant' and a barbarian in Demosthenes' *Philippics* (3.16; 6.25; 8.41–43; 9.31, 38).

<sup>7</sup> Lysias 33.3–5, 6–9 (Spartan inconsistency in supporting tyranny despite their tradition of enmity towards it on principle); Aeschin. 1.4–6 and 2.131 (against Athenian supporters of the Phocian tyrants who suppressed constitutional governments); Hypereides *Against Philippides* 8 and *Epitaphios* 20–26, cf. 39–40. Many more examples could be cited, especially for 'tyrannic' (or 'oligarchic') vs 'democratic' traits of character (cf. Dem. 22.52, 24.75–76; Aeschin. 1.4–6, 3.220–21).

<sup>8</sup> Thuc. 3.83.1; 8.48; 8.66.5. Dem. 14.36; 9.21, 51; 18.188. Compare Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.29, 2.1, 3.22, 4.9; Isoc. 5.49, 6.67.

Epicharmus' saying "Be sober and remember not to trust," or in the similar maxims in Theognis or Euripides' *Helen*.<sup>9</sup>

How is it that Demosthenes is able to discover the material for Solemnity and grandeur in an appeal to the principle of distrust for tyrants? A partial answer, and the nearest traditional precedent for Demosthenes' argument in the *Second Philippic*, is to be found in Herodotus in the stirring exchange of speeches in which the Spartans and the Athenians compete to display their greatness of spirit and their loyalty to the Hellenic cause in the debate on Alexander's embassy. The final argument in the Spartan speech appeals to the solidarity of constitutional states against 'tyrants' and to distrust and enmity towards barbarians as a principle of policy (8.142.4–5):

Do not let Alexander the Macedonian persuade you by softening the proposal of Mardonius. That is just what he ought to do, for, a tyrant himself, he works hand in hand with a tyrant. Such conduct is not for you, especially if you are wise, knowing that there is nothing of trust (*πιστόν*) or truth (*ἀληθές*) among barbarians.

The Spartan envoys in Herodotus are not saying quite what Demosthenes does in the *Second Philippic* (25), and their final maxim is aimed at 'barbarians' rather than 'every king and tyrant', but the principle of distrust for tyrants *and* barbarians is certainly present. That Demosthenes knew of such arguments from the Persian War era is proven by a passage in the *Third Philippic* (38), where "distrust towards tyrants and barbarians" is one of the statesman-like qualities attributed to the orators and generals who overcame the wealth and power of Persia. In this context, distrust is not mere worldly wisdom, nor can it be attributed to the spirit of faction. When directed outwards, "towards tyrants and barbarians," it is a venerable and patriotic sentiment with none of the unfortunate associations of 'distrust' or 'suspicion' among Greeks. The language in Herodotus is polemical and ignores the claims of the Macedonian royal house to legitimacy and Hellenic descent, but Demosthenes had also to deal with the claims of a Macedonian king, and the sneers of the Spartan envoys provided him an appropriate model.

Like Thucydides, Demosthenes is quite capable of treating dis-

<sup>9</sup> Epicharmus fr. 250 (Kaibel), *cf.* Hes. *Op.* 370–72, Theog. 831–32, Eur. *Hel.* 1617–18, [Isoc.] 1.22, and Poor Richard: "In the affairs of this world men are saved, not by faith, but by the want of it." *Cf.* Cicero's embarrassment, *Att.* 2.20.1.

trust in foreign policy as a purely pragmatic question. The good faith of Athens towards foreign rulers like Leucon, tyrant (or, more diplomatically, 'archon') of Bosporos, must be maintained for the sake of the commercial advantages granted Athens by that generous monarch.<sup>10</sup> In the *Against Aristocrates* (108), the Olynthians are represented as having begun to distrust Philip purely because of his growing power and not, as in the *First Olynthiac* (5), because he is a 'tyrant'. In the same oration, the Athenians are advised not to include in their honorary decrees clauses condemning the slayer of a friend of Athens, for the very pragmatic reason that, though Athens must deal with foreign despots as occasion demands, it is unwise to guarantee their safety for the future: such friends may easily become enemies, and if, as happened with Philip and Cotys, they become powerful enough to act with complete independence, Athens might be deprived of a means of resisting their influence (23.123–26). In the *Against Aristocrates*, as in *For the Megalopolitans*, the operative maxim of foreign policy is to measure friendship and enmity by the interests of Athens rather than by any absolute standard, and to regard friends as potential enemies and enemies as potential friends.<sup>11</sup>

In contrast stand Demosthenes' arguments for distrust based upon constitutional differences. The first of the four passages representative of this commonplace is in the speech *On the Liberty of the Rhodians*, of 351 B.C.<sup>12</sup> Demosthenes spoke on behalf of the Rhodian democrats exiled after an oligarchical coup d'état that followed the successful rebellion of Rhodes in the Social War (357–355 B.C.). Having thrown off the relatively light yoke of the Athenian naval league, the Rhodians found themselves under a new and harsher master: Mausolus of Caria took the side of the oligarchic faction, overthrew the democracy, and installed a garrison.<sup>13</sup> Even after the death of Mausolus, the current Athenian policy of retrenchment and the danger of a wider conflict involving Persia were powerful deterrents to Athenian intervention on behalf of the exiles. In addition, Athenian public opinion cannot have

<sup>10</sup> Dem. 20.30–40, cf. *CIRB* 8, 1111, etc. Deinarchus (1.43) later uses Demosthenes' close relationship with the 'tyrants from Pontus' as proof of his corruption and, by implication, of the insincerity of his democratic and anti-tyrannical oratory.

<sup>11</sup> 23.122, cf. 16.15, 23–24, 27, 32.

<sup>12</sup> For a brief discussion of this passage as an example of ideological bias in foreign policy, see R. MacMullen, "Foreign Policy for the *Polis*," *G & R SER.* II 10 (1963) 121.

<sup>13</sup> For the events and their significance for Athenian policy, see K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*<sup>2</sup> III.2 258ff.; S. Accame, *La Lega Ateniese del Sec. IV. A.C.* (Rome 1941) 189–95; R. Sealey, "Athens after the Social War," *JHS* 75 (1955) 74–81.

been very sympathetic towards the exiled Rhodian democrats, who were only suffering the consequences of their own rebellion against the Athenian alliance. In this oration Demosthenes opposes both the policy of retrenchment and the indifference of his audience to the troubles of the Rhodians. He seems to have seen in their appeal an opportunity for reasserting Athenian influence in the region. Both here and in the speech for the Megalopolitans, Demosthenes advocates a policy of selective interventionism in order to restore Athens' fortunes as a hegemonic city and maintain the balance of power among the Greek states. Unlike the Isocrates of *On the Peace*, he was not yet ready to give up naval power and armed intervention as techniques for maintaining an Athenian hegemony in the Aegean.<sup>14</sup> Most of the argumentation in the speech is calculated to prove that the expediency of aiding the Rhodians outweighs the pleasure the Athenians would derive from allowing the Rhodian democrats to suffer their just deserts. As in Diodotus' speech in the Mytilenian debate, the claims of strict justice and righteous indignation are to be sacrificed for the sake of expediency.<sup>15</sup>

But Demosthenes also employs an argument which might well have been used to good effect by Diodotus, if only Thucydides had allowed his speakers more latitude in the use of ideological appeals. This argument may, as the scholiast to the passage and Werner Jaeger both suppose, be an *ad hoc* ideological appeal aimed at manipulating the democratic sentiments of the audience,<sup>16</sup> but undeniably it is carefully constructed and far more abstract and philosophical than the usual appeals to democratic ideology in Athenian oratory. If there is actually any insincerity, it probably lies in the exaggerated claim that a war with all the Hellenes at once under democratic constitutions would be more expedient than friendship with them all under oligarchies. This is not Demosthenic common sense as we know it from the *Leptines* and *On the Navy Boards*, but it is perhaps a justifiable hyperbole inspired by the universality of the speaker's concluding maxim (15.17–18):

<sup>14</sup> Isoc. 8.19–24 and *passim*. For Demosthenes' policies at this time see P. Cloché, "La politique de Démosthène de 354 à 346 av. J.-C.," *BCH* 47 (1923) 97–162, and W. Jaeger, *Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy* (Berkeley 1938) 90–97.

<sup>15</sup> Thuc. 3.44.4 and 47.5. Parallels with the speeches in the Mytilenian debate have been noticed since antiquity. The scholium to Dem. 15.25 (244 Dindorf) adduces Thuc. 3.40.4: on the one hand it is expedient to pardon the Rhodian democrats, though they deserve our anger; on the other, it is just to attack the Rhodian oligarchs despite the terms of the peace that ended the Social War.

<sup>16</sup> Schol. Dem. 15.17 (242 Dindorf), *cf.* Jaeger (*supra* n.14) 90–97.

And you will observe, my fellow Athenians, that you have fought many wars, both against democracies and against oligarchies. This is a fact you know well without any prompting, but perhaps none of you considers the stakes for which you fight wars in either case. What are these then? Your wars against democracies are fought either over private claims, when these cannot be settled by public negotiations, or over a piece of land or frontiers or for love of victory and hegemony, but your wars against oligarchies are fought for none of these aims, but for your constitution and your freedom. So much is this the case that I would not hesitate to say that I think it would be more expedient for you to be at war with all the Greeks at once, if they were under democratic regimes, than to have them all as oligarchical allies. For I reckon that you could easily make peace with them, if they were free, but with oligarchies, not even friendship is safe. It is impossible that the few should become well-disposed towards the many, and that those whose aim is domination should feel good will towards those who have chosen to live with equality before the law.

Now at this point in the speech, Demosthenes had already disposed of the major foreign policy issues and the anticipated objections arising from the head of expediency. He still had the very difficult task of arousing enthusiasm for the cause of the Rhodian democrats, men who had already proven untrustworthy allies in the Social War. The above argument is calculated to give the Athenian audience a motive for taking sides with unreliable democrats against oligarchs who represented no immediate threat to Athens. Demosthenes employs the topic of division to define two species of war, already known empirically to the audience, wars against democracies and wars against oligarchies.<sup>17</sup> The role of the Rhodian democrats in the Social War may be dismissed as a war of the first sort, a struggle between democracies over private claims, land, and hegemony. Such a war may always be resolved through negotiation in the long run, provided the parties are both free and can find some basis for mutual trust. The new oligarchical regime at Rhodes is quite a different case; even friendship with that regime would be unsafe.

As far as his immediate purpose was concerned, Demosthenes could have stopped at this point, but he intended to pursue the

<sup>17</sup> For division see Arist. *Rh.* 1398a30–32 (topic #9). I believe that the topic of definition (#7) is also at work here. The two go naturally together, and Demosthenes could have picked them up from any of the schools of dialectic, if they were not already, as seems probable, incorporated into rhetorical training long before Aristotle.

ideological motive further in the remainder of the oration and found this a convenient moment to introduce a more universal and abstract ideological appeal. As is his habit in introducing an intricate and abstract argument, he begins by posing a paradox which commands the attention of his audience by its very outrageousness.<sup>18</sup> This, I believe, is the sole purpose of his claim that war with democracies would be more expedient than alliance with oligarchies. This paradox, this hyperbole, demands explanation, and the need for an explanation permits Demosthenes to introduce a very nice appeal to the first principles of democracy and oligarchy. Why is friendship with oligarchies insecure? Because good will, which Aristotle will call a prerequisite for friendship, cannot exist between those who have chosen opposite 'ends' in life.<sup>19</sup> The constitutional principles which Demosthenes represents as the 'ends' of democracy and oligarchy, are, in fact, irreconcilably opposed. The aim of oligarchy, at least internally, is the domination of a class or faction over the people as a whole, while democracy implies choosing to live with equal rights under the law for all the people. The sentimental choice for Demosthenes' audience would have been easy, and, as the scholiast remarks (*ad* 15.17), "By this means, he invites his audience, even if they have no wish to help the Rhodians, to be influenced by their anti-oligarchical zeal and overthrow the Rhodian oligarchy."

Demosthenes' argument on the insecurity of friendship with oligarchies in the *Rhodian* speech falls somewhat short of his ideological master-arguments in the *Philippics*. The reasoning is too close, too concentrated, too blatantly artificial, to achieve the force and sincerity of the great passage in the *Second Philippic*. Both ancient and modern readers have, with some justification, seen it as an attempt to exploit the democratic sentiments of the audience in a cause that may have been expedient but was certainly unjust by the terms of the peace which ended the Social War. It does, however, provide the topic and the pattern for the later arguments, including a very effective passage in the *First Olynthiac*. It is here that Demosthenes first adapts his argument on ideologi-

<sup>18</sup> Cf. 14.24–30, 4.2, 6.24, 9.4, 18.199.

<sup>19</sup> *Rh.* 1378a6–19, 1380b35ff; *Eth.Nic.* 1167a3ff (good will is the *archē* of friendship). Aristotle's formulation—'ends' shared in common/good will/friendship—is variously anticipated in the documents (Bengtson, *Gr. Staatsvertr.* II 120.3–4), in poetry (Pind. *Nem.* 10.78; Soph. *Aj.* 683, *Phil.* 1374), and in philosophy (Pl. *Leg.* 705A, 730c). Many texts also testify to the inability of tyrants to feel or to receive genuine trust or friendship: Xen. *Hiero* 4.1–2; Pl. *Resp.* 576A, 580A; *Epist.* 7.327B; Cic. *Amic.* 15.52.



cal distrust to the struggle against Philip by replacing oligarchy with tyranny in his equations.

The situation in the *First Olynthiac* is closely parallel to that in *On the Liberty of the Rhodians*. An appeal from former allies who have proven themselves untrustworthy in the past provides an 'opportunity' for timely Athenian intervention.<sup>20</sup> The Olynthians themselves had had to overcome their own distrust of Athens, in former times a greater threat to their independence than Macedon, in order to offer alliance at all. The Athenians, for their part, had recently been rivals with the Olynthians for the control of Amphipolis and clearly recognized that the change in Olynthian policy was motivated solely by the increase in Philip's power.<sup>21</sup> In order to make this opportunity provided by the Olynthian appeal seem credible to his Athenian audience, Demosthenes must try to remove the fear that the Olynthians will again change sides, possibly leaving an Athenian expedition in the lurch. But in this case, Philip's usual advantages in exploiting the opportunities of war will work against him. His position as king, in unified control of diplomacy, arms, and finance, which makes it so much easier for him to act promptly in a crisis, is actually a source of suspicion towards him on the part of the Olynthians (1.5):

For it is clear to the people of Olynthus that they are not fighting for glory, or over a piece of land, but for survival in the face of the overthrow and enslavement of their country, and they know what he did to the people at Amphipolis who betrayed their city to him and to the people at Pydna who received him within their gates. And tyranny is, I believe, generally an object of distrust to constitutional states, but especially if they have a common frontier.

This argument begins with the same distinction, between wars fought for the customary prizes and wars of national survival, that we have seen in the *Rhodian* speech. Here the topic of division is used less blatantly and less abstractly than before. These are concrete considerations for the Olynthians to weigh in their dealings with Philip, not universal characteristics of wars between states with different constitutions. The *Rhodian* speech did appeal

<sup>20</sup> Both the scholiast *ad* 1.5 (42f Dindorf) and Apsines *Tech. Rhet.* 1.6 (Spengel/Hammer I 264f) emphasize the distrust felt by the Athenians towards the Olynthians as the anticipated objection refuted in this argument.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Dem. 23.107–09 and G. L. Cawkwell, "The Defense of Olynthus," *CQ* n.s. 12 (1962) 136–37.

loosely to the experience of Demosthenes' audience in past wars, but here two specific examples of Philip's treachery towards cities support the minor premise, inserting a truly inductive element in the proof. This feature was noticed by the scholiasts and by Minucian, who use this passage as a textbook illustration of the 'paradeigmatic epicheireme', an enthymeme incorporating and supported by an example.<sup>22</sup> The effect of the one really abstract statement in the argument, qualified though it is by the clause about the 'common frontier', is neatly summed up by the scholiast (45 Dindorf): "having stated the particular examples, he seals them up with the universal premise of the maxim."

In this version of the argument, abstract ideological principles have given way to concrete facts and examples. The elaborate figures of the passage in the *Rhodian* speech—paradox, hyperbole, and rhetorical question—are replaced with a very practical line of reasoning that is supposed to be going on in the minds of the Olynthians. There is a slight fullness of style, and the inclusion of 'enslavement' as well as 'overthrow', not strictly necessary to the argument, increases the pathos of the Olynthians' situation;<sup>23</sup> but on the whole the argument is much simpler and more elegant than in the *Rhodian* passage. The maxim about distrust of tyranny is left to stand by itself, without further proof from the nature of good will or alliance among states or the opposite 'ends' of the different constitutions. The clause about the common frontier softens the abstraction and universality of the maxim, while suggesting that the speaker is a man of common sense who is sensitive to the demands of pragmatism in foreign policy as well as to the appeal of ideology. From the rich scholia on this passage and from its use as a textbook illustration in Minucian and Apsines, it is clear that this little snippet of Demosthenic reasoning was highly regarded in antiquity. And justly so. In place of the highly concentrated and elaborate deductive reasoning of the older argument, this passage offers a single clear enthymeme, grounded in the concreteness of the immediate situation, and supported by two pointed and relevant examples. Although it does not aspire to the heights of literary rhetoric, it deserves its place in the tradition as a model for the combination of deductive and inductive proofs in a practical debate on policy.

<sup>22</sup> Minucian *Peri epicheir.* 2 (Spengel/Hammer I 341f). For the theory involved, which is essentially Aristotelian in origin, see Prentice A. Meador, "Minucian, *On Epicheiremes*: An Introduction and a Translation," *Speech Monographs* 31 (1964) 54–63.

<sup>23</sup> So already the scholiast (43f Dindorf).

Nonetheless, one cannot help feeling that an opportunity for grandeur was missed when Demosthenes adapted his argument on distrust to the new situation in the *First Olynthiac*. One misses the sense of a dialogue, almost a philosophical dialogue, between speaker and audience that characterized the argument in the *Rhodian* speech; and, even more, one misses the loftiness of thought in the appeal to the first principles of democracy. What was lost, however, in the adaptation of this topic in the *First Olynthiac* is more than made up for in the *Second Philippic*.

In the *Rhodian* speech and the *First Olynthiac*, the argument on distrust was brought in mainly in response to Athenian doubts about a prospective ally who might prove untrustworthy or undeserving of help. After the peace with Philip in 346, the issue is somewhat different. There are still doubtful allies and former enemies in search of aid, but the main focus of foreign policy debate at Athens has shifted to the question of Philip's reliability as partner in a shaky peace. It is now possible to treat Philip as a philhellene, as a good and legitimate king, and the potential source of benefits for Athens. Athenians could represent Philip as the heroic leader of a national campaign against that other 'tyrant' and 'barbarian', the king of Persia, or as the new and powerful ally who might be manipulated into breaking once and for all the power of Thebes.<sup>24</sup> Other orators in other states, notably in Argos and Messene, could look to Philip as a source of potential aid against their old enemy Sparta. All these hopes rest upon the assumption that Philip's many offers of friendship and good will reflect the *euergesia* characteristic of the good king rather than the dangerous ploys of a master of diplomatic intrigue. The Athenian politicians who were opposed to Philip, and who, at least after the destruction of Phocis, regarded the peace as a sham, were concerned to refute the trustworthiness of Philip's offered 'friendship'. The whole of the *Second Philippic* is aimed at exposing Philip's duplicity and his crimes against the peace, not least the diplomatic intervention in the Peloponnesus, which appeared to be directed against Athens as much as against Sparta.

The argument on distrust of tyrants in the *Second Philippic* comes in a long quotation from a speech Demosthenes delivered at Messene, employing, as he says, examples which would be clear even to men of moderate prudence (6.19). By this time the Olyn-

<sup>24</sup> For the hopes associated with Philip's beneficence after the Peace, see the whole of Isocrates' *To Philip*; Aeschin. 1.169, 2.136-41; Dem. 19.72-85.

thians have become examples of the principle that “excessive intercourse with tyrants is not safe for constitutional governments” (6.21). This principle echoes the language and thought of Demosthenes’ argument about insecure friendships with oligarchies in the *Rhodian* speech a decade before (*ἀσφαλεῖς . . . ὁμιλῖαι* in 6.21 and *φιλίαν ἀσφαλῆ* in 15.18). Then comes the establishment of some sort of tyranny over Thessaly through Philip’s deceit, against which the Messenians are advised to arm themselves, not with ditches and walls, which are built by men’s hands and require the possession of adequate financial resources, but by a certain quality of mind which is available free of charge to all men of good sense (6.24):

“But there is one common thing, which the nature of sensible men possesses within itself as a safeguard, a thing which is a valuable life-saver for all, but especially for the people against tyrants. What is this then? Distrust. Guard this, hold on to it. If you keep this principle safe in your mind, you will suffer no harm. What is your aim?” I said, “Freedom. Then don’t you see that even Philip’s titles are quite alien to it? For every king and tyrant is an enemy to freedom and in opposition to law. Won’t you be on your guard,” I said, “lest seeking to avoid war, you find a master?”

First comes the antithesis between physical and intellectual safeguards, then the riddling introduction of the principle of distrust for tyrants, as a ‘thing’ which is a *φυλακτήριον* and *σωτήριον* for all. The question calls for a conclusion (*οὖν*) based on the clues in the riddle, which the orator answers himself in a single word. The opening sentence here, with the question and single-word answer that follow it, have been admired by orators and critics from antiquity onwards. That Cicero, Plutarch, and Themistius imitated this passage in arguments of their own (not necessarily on tyranny) is an indication of the powerful impression it made upon them as readers. Almost certainly they are recalling a favorite passage, memorized in youth, rather than looking up a text suitable for stylistic imitation. The impression that this is a classical *topos* in Demosthenes for the ancient reader is confirmed by the testimony of the Aristeides *Rhetoric*, where Demosthenes’ suspension of the main point of his argument through a long, riddling panegyric of an unnamed quality stands as a prime example of the virtue of Solemnity through stylistic effects.

The first part of this passage intrigues us and catches our atten-

tion by playing on our curiosity, while the rhythm of Demosthenes' prose sweeps us along from the quick anapaestic or dactylic rhythms of the second clause and the beginning of the third to the slower rhythm in *τοῖς πλῆθεσιν πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους*.<sup>25</sup> The second part of this passage, from *τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο* to *δεσπότην εὖρητε*, involves us and excites us. The second-person plural imperatives repeat the sounds, and recall the sense, of *φυλακτήριον* and *σωτήριον* above. Now we are asked to guard and save this quality of mind which has itself been recommended to us as a safeguard and a life-saver. Its supposed attributes are now our own, if we are prepared to adopt a watchful attitude (*φυλάξασθ'*). It is as if a symbol had been moved from one side of an equation to the other. Through a series of rhetorical questions and exhortations, the audience is invited to follow along with the speaker's reasoning and give its assent at each step, until the speaker's arguments seem to be their own. Demosthenes had attempted to produce the effect of a dialogue between speaker and audience through rhetorical questions in the *Rhodian* speech, but the premises there were too abstract and the argument too compressed for the dialogue figure to be truly convincing.<sup>26</sup> Here he moves more slowly through the steps of his argument, beginning with clear examples which prove the insecurity of relations with tyrants (as in the *First Olynthiac*), then developing the contrast between material and intellectual safeguards, and finally bringing on his deductive proof from the 'ends' of tyranny and constitutional government with the help of premises derived from an appeal to the audience. Thus, instead of saying "freedom is the 'end' of democracy," the abstract formula in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1366a4), he gets the necessary premise for his argument from the answer to his rhetorical question, "what is your aim?" This partially conceals the essentially abstract and philosophical character of his argument and makes what is really a long chain of deductive reasoning comprehensible and pleasing to his audience.

Although the phrase 'distrust towards tyrants and barbarians' occurs once in the *Third Philippic*, no single passage repeats all the argumentative steps that are found in *Rhodians* 17–18 and *Second Philippic* 21–25. I believe that this is because Demos-

<sup>25</sup> For the structure of this passage as a series of balanced antithetical clauses, and for the rhythms, see K. Welzhofer, *Die Komposition der Staatsreden des Demosthenes* II (Straubing 1906) 25–29, and K. Rehdantz, ed., *Neun Philippische Reden*<sup>7</sup> II, rev. F. Blass (Leipzig 1884) 25–26 (note on 6.24–25).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 9 and the works cited *supra* n.3.

thenes has expanded the argument to include almost the whole of this oration, which breathes the spirit of distrust towards tyrants throughout. In this speech, as in *On the Chersonese*, Demosthenes defends a policy that involves violations of the peace, and he does so by arguing that, offers of negotiation or arbitration notwithstanding, Philip is already at war with Athens. It is a corollary of this assertion that any further offers of 'friendship' or 'good will' by Philip towards Athens or her allies must be insincere.

Just as Demosthenes begins the argument in the *Rhodian* speech and the *First Olynthiac* with a distinction between two kinds of war, so he opens the whole argument of the *Third Philippic* with a distinction between two kinds of peace, the genuine sort and Philip's 'peace' that gives him freedom of action while tying the hands of the Athenians (9.8–9). The examples of Philip's treachery towards cities in the *First Olynthiac* and the *Second Philippic* are repeated and expanded in the *Third Philippic* (10–14, 15–20, 26–27, 32–35, 56–68). In several cases, most notably those of Olynthus, Eretria, and Oreus, Demosthenes abandons the briefer form of the historical example which is typical in his earlier deliberative speeches and resorts to longer stretches of narration mingled with proofs.<sup>27</sup> The speech as a whole has a more inductive flavor than many of the earlier orations, and even the deductive arguments are presented as if they were conclusions derived from the examples which precede them.<sup>28</sup> The principle of distrust of tyrants is embedded in praise for the virtues of the spirit of the ancestors in their heroic struggle with Persia, an epideictic passage which prepares the audience for yet another argument from example, the story of Arthmius (36–46). The abstract appeal to the opposite 'ends' of tyranny and constitutional government, which provided the deductive proof for the maxim about distrust in the *Second Philippic*, is absent here, though it is clearly stated, for slightly different ends, in *On the Chersonese* (8.41–43) and the *Fourth Philippic* (10.3–4). In this speech, Demosthenes consistently offers his proofs in an inductive form, through examples or narrative, and the abstract principles to which he appeals freely in other orations of the same period would have been out of place. The *Third Philippic* is, above all, Demosthenes' definitive proof,

<sup>27</sup> Thus especially 9.56–68, intrigue in Euboea. This passage resembles a narration in a courtroom case rather than the usual use of examples or short narration in deliberative oratory; see Pearson (*supra* n.3) 107–09.

<sup>28</sup> 9.63ff (conclusions drawn directly from a narration, again as in a courtroom speech; cf. 54.13).

by a long accumulation of cases, that Philip is not to be trusted, and it is natural that in such an argument the abstract principles take a back seat to the instances.

It is worth noting the exact passages in which Demosthenes alludes to distrust of tyrants in the *Third Philippic*; both relate the principle of distrust to treason and the dangers of faction and anti-democratic subversion. In the epideictic passage mentioned above, distrust towards tyrants and barbarians is associated with the patriotic spirit of the Greeks of the Persian Wars:

In each case, therefore, the opportunity for action, with which fortune often supplies the unconcerned against the ever attentive [and the willingly inactive against those who do all they ought], was not to be bought from the orators and generals, nor was mutual concord, nor distrust towards tyrants and barbarians, nor, in sum, any such thing.<sup>29</sup>

The whole purpose of this speech is to urge the audience to take advantage of the opportunity for action, though the Peace of Philocrates is still in effect, and to promote concord among the Greeks and distrust of Philip as tyrant and barbarian. What stands in the way is the 'treason' of the pro-Macedonian orators and factions in the cities. The effect of such 'treason' is illustrated in the examples from recent history, but the appeal to what was probably a genuine aspect of Greek ideology in the Persian War period (Hdt. 8.142.5) serves to introduce the solution in the Arthmius story: an incorruptible vigilance and exemplary punishment for traitors are the only defense against the enemy within. There is a more contemporary echo of this principle in Demosthenes' summary of the effects of treason and faction in Olynthus, Eretria, and Oreus (9.63–64). The public-spirited party in those cities advised the people to "fight Philip and not to trust him," while the pro-Macedonian party advised peace and trust in Philip's habitual offers of friendship and good will towards the objects of his treacherous designs. That prudent and patriotic politicians might advocate peace with Philip as the most expedient course of action available is ruled out by the very terms of the argument and by the sheer weight of example, both ancient (Arthmius) and new (Olynthus, Eretria, and Oreus). It might well be said that distrust of tyrants, and of their supposed agents, has grown from a single, if important, argument in

<sup>29</sup> 9.38; the passage in brackets is an addition in the best MSS., though preserved intact in the rest; it probably goes back to a longer version of the oration.

the earlier speeches to the central and controlling theme in the *Third Philippic*.

In each of these four passages, which are linked by common terminology and common premises in the argument, the audience is asked to distrust and be wary of 'friendship' with a foreign power not only because of its strength or potential for mischief, but also on ideological grounds. Such an argument is to be distinguished from appeals to suspicion or distrust based upon the perception of excessive power, an argument found frequently in Thucydides as well as in Demosthenes' *Against Aristocrates* and *For the Megalopolitans*.<sup>30</sup> An argument of the latter sort would have as its starting point the premise that it is prudent to suspect the diplomacy of any powerful and imperialistic nation. Our argument, on the other hand, begins very differently. Nations whose constitutions aim at opposite 'ends' have no firm basis for mutual friendship or good will. In the absence of the potential for real friendship, the prudent policy is distrust, whether one is openly at war or technically at peace. Such alliances are undertaken for temporary advantages, but they are, *a priori*, insecure and dangerous.

As this is an *a priori* argument, it may conveniently be applied to any pair of constitutions whose 'ends' may be characterized as in opposition. In Demosthenes' first, and most abstract, formulation, in the *Rhodian* speech, the constitutions are oligarchy and democracy, and their 'ends', as Demosthenes defines them, 'to rule' and 'to live with equal rights before the law', truly opposite. The definition of oligarchy is polemical and ignores the constitutional character of some types of oligarchy, but it is valid as a democrat's view, enunciated before a democratic audience. Having established the irreconcilable opposition of the two types of constitutions, Demosthenes can easily prove, on common Greek assumptions about good will and friendship, that no peace or friendship with an oligarchical state, including the peace that ended the Social War, can be secure. Thus it is right to intervene on the side of the Rhodian exiles, even if that means breaking the peace. This is the skeleton of Demosthenes' argument on distrust. Opposition of constitutional 'ends' rules out the possibility of genuine good will, without which friendship and alliance must be insecure and dangerous; what remains is distrust and vigilance.

<sup>30</sup> Thuc. 1.23.6 (*cf.* the language of Dem. 23.108); 3.10.4–12.3; 8.48.5–7 (constitutional factors less important than fear of Athens' power), 64.5. Dem. 23.108, 123–25; 16.5, 24, 31–32.



In adapting this skeleton argument to the struggle against Philip, Demosthenes necessarily made some important changes. In substituting *politeia* and tyranny for democracy and oligarchy, he was able to use terms which themselves suggest opposite constitutional 'ends' with little need for further definition. To a fourth-century Athenian a tyrant is lawless by definition, while *politeia* implies constitutional civic government, government based upon the rule of law rather than the rule of men, whether the details are strictly democratic or not.<sup>31</sup> The opposition of oligarchy and democracy, however justifiable, had been a tale of civil war and disunity among the Greeks, but in contrasting tyranny with *politeia* Demosthenes is on the firm ground of panhellenic patriotism, not only of Persian War vintage but also as seen in the panegyric orations of Lysias and Isocrates.<sup>32</sup> As Demosthenes insists repeatedly that Philip is a barbarian, the appeal to the old 'tyrants and barbarians' formulation of the Persian War period makes it less necessary for him to state specifically the 'ends' of tyranny and *politeia*. When he does include an appeal to the 'ends' of constitutional government, in the *Second Philippic* (25), this is partly to achieve stylistic grandeur by stating a lofty idea which his audience already knows, and partly to emphasize the more absolute form which he gives to his ideological argument here. "Every king and tyrant is an enemy to freedom and in opposition to law," is perhaps another way of saying that the niceties of constitutional theory and of diplomacy with beneficent monarchs do not apply in this situation: whether one call Philip 'king' or 'tyrant', it is still disastrous to deal with him.

Another characteristic of Demosthenes' argument on distrust, as adapted to Philip, is its inductive element. The Olynthians will consider not only the fact that Philip is a tyrant and is on their frontier, but also what he did at Amphipolis and Pydna. In the *Second Philippic* Olynthus itself has become an example of the dangers of "excessive intercourse with tyrants," and the fate of the Thessalians is a further proof of the risks of accepting favors from Philip. In both passages, the examples prepare the audience for the deductive proof and lend that proof greater weight when it does appear. Even if the principle of distrust of tyrants should admit of

<sup>31</sup> J. E. Sandys, ed., *The First Philippic and the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes* (London 1910) 131, was mistaken to follow Harpocration in taking *politeia* to mean 'democracy' (which by his time could denote any free civic government, even ruled by aristocracy: see *Plut. Mor.* 813Aff). The fourth-century sources adduced by Sandys show that then the meaning of *politeia* was wider, including both democracy and moderate, or constitutional, oligarchy.

<sup>32</sup> *Hdt.* 8.142.4–5 (*cf.* 7.104.1–5), *Lys.* 33, *Isoc.* 4.110–18.

certain benign exceptions, even if it is relative to circumstances, still Philip cannot be an exception to the rule. His inclusion in the class of dangerous tyrants, with whom no city should deal on a naïve basis of trust, is proved by his own actions. In the *Third Philippic*, where Demosthenes is focusing his argument directly on the claims of Philip and certain Athenian politicians that the peace is still in effect and should not be recklessly broken, the inductive element in the argument predominates, and the examples push the deductive proof into the background. The ideological basis for distrust of tyrants can be assumed, and it is present in allusions to the uncorrupted distrust of tyrants and barbarians by the statesmen of the Persian Wars and to the principles for which patriots like Euphraeus of Oreus were persecuted by the pro-Macedonian factions in their own cities. As in some other Demosthenic arguments, a key phrase in one speech may allude to a fuller argument made elsewhere.<sup>33</sup>

The abbreviation of the deductive element, except in the *Second Philippic* where the dialogue figure and other concessions to the audience make it easier to follow, and the greater importance of the inductive reflect an important aspect of Demosthenes' development as a political orator.<sup>34</sup> In his earliest deliberative speeches Demosthenes' style is almost Thucydidean in its complexity, abstractness, and compression. His arguments simply demand too much effort of the audience. In the passage from the *Rhodian* speech, he moves swiftly from a distinction between two kinds of war to a paradoxical exaggeration of a hypothetical case (war with all the Greeks at once under democracies), and from there to an intricate enthymeme deriving distrust of the peace with the Rhodian oligarchs from the opposite 'ends' of oligarchy and democracy in general. The argument is clever, the use of figures adroit, but, though the proof has some merit and is expressed more exactly than elsewhere in Demosthenes, it still fails to carry conviction. Even those of the audience who could follow and appreciate the close reasoning must still have been impressed more by its ingenuity than by its truth or appropriateness. Demosthenes' early political orations are rich storehouses of maxims and arguments on such themes as the insecurity of alliances, the nature of justice in international relations, and the balance of power, but

<sup>33</sup> Compare *ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσχύνη* at 1.27 with the fuller argumentative context in 4.10 and 8.51.

<sup>34</sup> See especially Pearson (*supra* n.3).

these excellent arguments are presented with the authority of the intellectual rather than statesman.

In the speeches against Philip, Demosthenes had not only a better case to argue, but also a different claim to authority on his subject. His claim to have followed Philip's affairs from the beginning (18.172) is justified, if not always by the foresight he laid claim to, at least by the wealth of detailed knowledge of Thrace and northern Greece that he displays in the *Against Aristocrates* and the orations against Philip. This authority is reflected in the effectiveness with which he combines his abstract argument for distrust of tyrants with his running catalogue of Philip's conquests. Even if one doubts whether deceitful diplomacy or martial prowess played a greater role in any individual instance, the rhetorical effect of the cumulative examples is impressive. And it changes the impact of his *a priori* argument against tyrants. The whole weight of the argument is no longer borne by an ideological appeal that is too absolute to make for good policy in every situation. Now, as the scholiast on the *First Olynthiac* saw, the political maxim puts the seal on (we should say 'caps') the inductive proof. Although the skeleton of proof from the *Rhodian* speech remains (almost entire in the *Second Philippic*), the examples not only confirm it, but also make it more convincing and more accessible to the audience.

Pearson has rightly stressed the effective use of narration and inductive argumentation in Demosthenes' mature style.<sup>35</sup> My observations on one Demosthenic topic confirm, in miniature and for the detailed structure of an argument, his conclusions based upon the general structure of whole orations. But Demosthenes' increased maturity and confidence are also reflected in his handling of the deductive part of the proof, considered by itself. The passage in the *Second Philippic* repeats, for tyrants and cities, most of the steps in the deductive argument in the *Rhodian* speech. But now the whole deductive argument follows a series of examples which lead to a similar conclusion, and each step in the deductive argument is developed slowly and solemnly. The play on physical and mental safeguards and the suspension of sense which introduces 'distrust' lend grandeur to the passage, where the paradox in the equivalent position in the *Rhodian* speech merely seemed clever and invited suspicion of a weakness in the speaker's case. Toward the end of the passage, the individual terms in the argument are clearly set out and emphasized, with appropriate repetition (espe-

<sup>35</sup> See Pearson (*supra* n.3) 107–09.

cially of the word 'freedom') to throw the final antithesis between tyranny and polity into stronger relief. Everything that was weak, or merely clever, in the former speech, everything that hinted at the sophist pretending to statesmanship, has been strengthened here, and, if there is artifice, that artifice is clearly working in the service of the speaker's argument rather than against it.

The effectiveness of Demosthenes' argument on distrust may be gauged externally as well as on its rhetorical technique. For however one may judge the wisdom of his advice, it is a striking fact that none of his opponents is able to produce an *antilogos*. Aeschines, though uncertain of Philip's intentions, is willing to trust his promises (1.169), but nowhere in his extant speeches does he make a case for such trust: instead he will evade the question by calling Thebes Philip's true enemy<sup>36</sup> or by accusing Demosthenes of corruption and inconsistency<sup>37</sup>—an *ad hominem* argument which fails to refute either the deductive argument from constitutions or the examples of Philip's deceit. One might expect a clearer defense of Philip from Isocrates, but instead we are offered praise of his wealth, power, and ability to unite Greece, which distinguish him from civic statesmen bound by laws (5.14–16); accusations against him reflect only that fact that he has not made his intentions clear (79–80). Such praise could only be disquieting to those inclined to distrust just these qualities, which approximate Demosthenes' characterization of Philip as a tyrant whose very titles are opposed to freedom and law. In formulating his argument on distrust, Demosthenes evidently addressed the most basic instincts of the Athenian democracy, and the heart of the issue.

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<sup>36</sup> 2.136–41 (*cf.* Dem. 19.72–85) and 3.132–33, 148–51.

<sup>37</sup> 2.131, 3.93ff (*cf.* Deinarchus 1.41–45), 3.171–73 (*cf.* Deinarchus 1.43, 70).