

Some Passages In Plato

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I

Meno 98A

τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὦ Μένων ἑταίρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὁμολόγηται.

ὦ F: om. BTW

“ὦ Μένων ἑταίρε. ὦ is not normally omitted (as it is here by BTW) unless the tone is somewhat peremptory (Kühner-Gerth, I, 48). . . . In our passage Thompson reads ὦ but follows Naber in excising Μένων as ‘a gloss upon ἑταίρε which has extruded ὦ’. Possibly the omission of ὦ can also make for impressiveness: cf. *Crito* 52a, where B omits it: if so, this might justify its omission here. For other possible instances of its omission, cf. *Hipp. Ma.* 289b, *Soph.* 220d, *Lach.* 198a.” R. S. Bluck *ad loc.* Bluck (as also Burnet and the Budé editors) prints ὦ Μένων ἑταίρε on the authority of F,¹ but it is clear from his note that he had doubts. Actually, Bluck’s approach to the problem misses the main point, since every parallel cited in his note is an example of ὦ expressed or omitted with an otherwise unmodified proper name.² What is wanted is some account of the ways in which Plato employs the vocative ἑταίρε, and that I propose to give. First, by far the commonest use is the simple ὦ ἑταίρε, with no proper name expressed; this occurs over seventy times in Plato.³ The evidence thus is overwhelming that Plato’s normal, and frequent, practice was to write ὦ ἑταίρε, not ἑταίρε. The next commonest locution is ὦ φίλε ἑταίρε, again with no proper name expressed. Brandwood lists nine examples;⁴ φίλε ἑταίρε is not found in Plato. In addition, there are three other Platonic occurrences of the word (not counting

¹ For F see E. R. Dodds, *Plato Gorgias* (Oxford 1959) 41–44, and R. S. Bluck, *Plato’s Meno* (Cambridge 1964) 135–40.

² E.g. *Soph.* 220D ὦ Θεαίτητε W Stob.: Θεαίτητε BT.

³ The passages can be found in Leonard Brandwood, *A Word Index to Plato* (Leeds 1976) *s.v.* ἑταίρε.

⁴ *Supra* n.3. The passages are *Euthphr.* 5c, *Grg.* 482A, *Hp.Ma.* 296A, *Ly.* 213B, *Phd.* 91B, *Resp.* 450D, 459B, 562A, 607E.

Meno 98A), all of them unique types for Plato: ὦ ἑταῖρε Ἄνυτε (*Meno* 94E2); ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων (*Crito* 54D); ὦ ἑταῖρε Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης (*Phaedo* 82C). I return now to *Meno* 98A. Both ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε and Μένων ἑταῖρε are singular expressions;⁵ that is no argument against them. I have just given several unique forms of vocative address in Plato; here are some others: ὦ τᾶν (*Ap.* 25C); ὦ μέλε (*Tht.* 178E); ὦ φιλότης (*Phdr.* 228D); ὦ φιλούμενε (*Symp.* 201C); ὦ φέριστε (*Phdr.* 238D); ὦ Πρώταρχε φίλε (*Phlb.* 53D); ὦ παῖ φίλε (*Soph.* 230C).⁶

Clearly, the fact that a vocative phrase happens to occur once only in Plato is, in itself, insufficient reason for questioning the phrase. In the present case, the position of ἑταῖρε after the proper name (with or without ὦ) is most unusual, a phenomenon which Bluck, to judge from his silence, does not seem to have adequately appreciated. But the position of φίλε in ὦ Πρώταρχε φίλε and ὦ παῖ φίλε (*supra*) parallels the position of ἑταῖρε here and may be taken as a reasonable guarantee of its soundness.⁷ This brings us back to the elusive ὦ. Is it possible to determine with any assurance whether Plato wrote ὦ in *Meno* 98A? I think so. Read ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε. In all of Plato there is no example of ἑταῖρε, alone or in combination, used without ὦ. Μένων ἑταῖρε is a singularity which I am not prepared to admit,⁸ and *Philebus* 53D ὦ Πρώταρχε φίλε, an exact parallel to ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε, ought to tip the scale.

The vocative ὦγαθέ (sometimes written ὦ ἀγαθέ with *scriptio plena* in the MSS.) occasionally presents comparable difficulties. Bury prints *Symposium* 189A as follows: . . . καὶ τὸν Ἐρυζίμαχον, Ὠγαθέ, φάναι, [Ἀριστόφανες,] ὄρα τί ποιεῖς. . . . Here is Bury's comment *ad loc.*: "[Ἀριστόφανες]. I follow Sauppe and Hug in regarding the proper name as a gloss on ὦγαθέ: as a rule, ὦγαθέ stands alone." As in *Meno* 98A, so here the spectre of proper name as

⁵ The suggestion that Μένων be deleted as "a gloss upon ἑταῖρε" is fanciful and should be dismissed. Even were one to consider deletion, the obvious procedure would be to assume that, in ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε, the vocatives Μένων and ἑταῖρε are variant readings which have been conflated in the text. (Why would ἑταῖρε require a 'gloss' here? The passage occurs in the middle of a long conversation between Meno and Socrates.) In that case the choice would be between ὦ Μένων and ὦ ἑταῖρε; there is no means of deciding. Should any find this solution attractive, let them toss a coin and be done with it.

⁶ I take these examples from my *Studies in Greek Texts* (*Hypomnemata* 43 [1976]) 125 q.v.

⁷ In *Studies* (*supra* n.6) I suggested that this postposition of φίλε was perhaps "a mannerism of Plato's late style." ἑταῖρε in *Meno* 98A shows that the qualification 'late' should be removed.

⁸ In rejecting the 'singular' Μένων ἑταῖρε after my remarks in defence of singular expressions, I am guilty of no inconsistency: both Μένων ἑταῖρε and ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε are singular phrases. In such a situation one should choose the expression which agrees more closely with the author's style as otherwise known.

‘gloss’ hovers over us. And the reason given in justification? “As a rule, *ὠγαθέ* stands alone.” The facts are—my debt to Brandwood’s *Word Index to Plato* will be obvious—that (1) *ὠγαθέ* (*ὦ ἀγαθέ*) stands alone about forty times in Plato, and (2) *ὠγαθέ* (*ὦ ἀγαθέ*) followed by a proper name occurs a full seven times (not counting this passage).⁹ So much for the rule. There are no grounds for tampering with *Ἀριστόφανες*.

Consider next *Protagoras* 311A:

... καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· “Μήπω, ἀγαθέ, ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν, πρὶ γάρ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν . . .”

μήπω ἀγαθέ BTW: *μήπω ὠγαθέ* corr. Coisl.: *μήπω γε, ὦ ἴγαθέ*
Hirschig: *μήπω γ’, ὠγαθέ* Cobet (secl. mox ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν)

Both Burnet (whose *apparatus criticus* I have reproduced) and the Budé editors, Croiset and Bodin, print the reading of BTW as above, *μήπω, ἀγαθέ*.¹⁰ These editions appeared, respectively, in 1903 and 1955. But already in 1893 J. and A. M. Adam, in their edition of the *Protagoras*, had printed *μήπω, ὠγαθέ* with the remark: “The mss have *μήπω ἀγαθέ*: probably the archetype had *μήπωγαθέ*, by a natural mistake. Cobet rejects *ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν*, reading *μήπω γε*, on the ground that with *μήπω γε* the Greek idiom does not repeat the verb: but there is no proof that the verb could not be expressed with *μήπω* (without *γε*).” This is basically correct. Nowhere else in Plato does *ἀγαθέ* occur without *ὦ*; we should be reluctant to admit the singularity here, where there is such an obvious mechanical cause of corruption. The Adamses are probably not correct in positing an original *μήπωγαθέ*; the corruption is slightly easier if we assume for the archetype *μηπωωγαθε* with *scriptio plena* (compare above). Read then *μήπω, <ὦ> ἀγαθέ* (recognizing, of course, that Plato may have pronounced this *ὠγαθέ*).

II

Phaedo 89D

ἢ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἠγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ

⁹ *Cra.* 401B, 428D, 436C; *Grg.* 511B; *Leg.* 811C; *Phdr.* 243C; *Resp.* 423D.

¹⁰ The *apparatus criticus* of the Budé edition differs slightly from that of the Oxford text: “*ἀγαθέ* BTW: *γ’ ὦ ἴγαθέ* Hermann *ὠγαθέ* Vatic. 1029 (forsan recte).” The main point, that the principal mss. have *ἀγαθέ*, and not *ὠγαθέ*, is not in dispute.

εἶναι καὶ ὑγιή καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὐρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αὐθις ἕτερον· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθη τις κτλ.

Read possibly . . . καὶ αὐθις <ἕτερον καὶ> ἕτερον· καὶ . . . ? The same idiom, in a comparable context, occurs on the next page, 90B: ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περι τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κάπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι . . . καὶ αὐθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος. Note the verbal echoes. The same usage occurs in Menander fr. 656.8 Koerte, ἐτέραν περιμεῖναι χἀτέραν τρικυμίαν. Compare the similar idiom at *Apology* 27B, μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω (where see Burnet for further examples). With ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον, followed by πολλάκις in the next clause, compare Xenophon *Anab.* 1.5.12 ἄλλος δὲ . . . καὶ ἄλλος, εἶτα πολλοί.

III

Phaedo 99E–100A

ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν [τοιῖς] λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν [τοιῖς] ἔργοις.

τοιῖς λόγοις **BW**: τοῖς om. T Stob. τοῖς ἔργοις
B Stob.: τοῖς om. TW

So prints Burnet; Robin (who wrongly reports Stobaeus as omitting the article *τοιῖς* in *both* places) agrees, giving in his text ἐν λόγοις and ἐν ἔργοις respectively. The oldest testimony for this passage, one which goes back practically to the Academy of Plato himself, seems to have been overlooked in constituting the text, Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 987b31–32 (discussing Plato): . . . καὶ ἢ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσαγωγή διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγένετο σκέψιν (οἱ γὰρ πρότεροι διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον). . . . Ross *ad loc.* observes “. . . the Platonists are called οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις in *Θ* 1050b35. The phrase used here is pretty clearly a reminiscence of *Phaedo* 100A, where τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα, ‘one who studies things by the method of definitions’, is Socrates’ description of his own method.” I agree with Ross that the Aristotle passage is a reminiscence of the *Phaedo*, but even if it is not, it is a cogent parallel for ἐν τοῖς λόγοις (as is *Metaph.* 1050b35). Compare further this very passage of the *Phaedo*, 99E: εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυ-

γόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν. Future editors should print . . . ἐν τοῖς λόγοις . . . ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις here.

IV

Phaedo 112c

ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ρεύματα [διὰ] τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὡσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπη, δεῦρο δὲ ὀρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὐθις κτλ.

διὰ ante τῆς γῆς om. Stob., del. Burnet

A difficult passage. Burnet renders *τοῖς κατ' . . . εἰσρεῖ* “the streams flow into the regions on the further side of the earth,” construing *τὰ ρεύματα* as subject and taking *τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς* together. Hackforth rightly pronounces this impossible; he explains the passage thus: “I retain *διὰ* before *τῆς γῆς*, and take the literal meaning to be ‘it flows through the earth into the beds of the rivers of that region (hemisphere)’. Plato writes *τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ρεύματα* rather than *ἐκείνοις τοῖς ρεύμασι* simply because the *ρεύματα* do not exist until the water fills (or refills) their beds” (*Plato's Phaedo* 178 n.5). This is nearer the mark, but fails to explain the dative *τοῖς*; as has long been recognized, *τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα . . . εἰσρεῖ* is very questionable Greek for “flows into the parts about those streams.” *εἰς c. acc.* would have been expected. Compare immediately above, 112B: *ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε κτλ.* Accordingly, Wyttenbach conjectured *τότε* for *τοῖς* here and Ast, followed by Archer-Hind, deleted the word. Neither proposal convinces. There is a simpler remedy to hand:

ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, (ἐν) τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ρεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ κτλ.

The periphrastic *ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ρεύματα* may be compared to *εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα* and *εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε* in 112B.

Archer-Hind (*ad loc.*) has raised a further objection to the transmitted text: “Mr. Cope translates ‘it flows through the earth to the neighborhood of those streams and fills them, as it were by a

pump'. But surely *διὰ τῆς γῆς* describes the progress of the water after it has entered the channels: it would be a strange expression to apply to its surging up and down Tartarus." This objection seems quite valid to me; the insertion of <ἐν> before *τοῖς* has the further advantage of removing all difficulty on this score. The corruption is of the easiest sort; uncial *ϵ* *N* dropped out after *ON*. (The omission of *διὰ* in Stobaeus may be similarly explained: *ΔΙΑ* fell out after *ATA*.)

V

Symposium 176B

ἀκούσαντα οὖν αὐτῶν ἔφη Ἐρυξίμαχον τὸν Ἀκουμενοῦ Ἥ καλῶς, φάναι, λέγετε. καὶ ἔτι ἐνός δέομαι ὑμῶν ἀκοῦσαι πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐρρῶσθαι πίνειν Ἀγάθων. Οὐδαμῶς, φάναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔρρωμαι.

Ἀγάθων: Ἀγάθων <ος> Vahlen

"I still require to hear from *one of you* how *Agathon* is disposed with regard to engaging in drink." "I'm not up to it either," said Agathon.

Difficulties have been rightly felt about this sequence. What is the point of asking a third party about Agathon's condition rather than Agathon himself, who is present? What is the purpose of the emphatic, and unspecified, ἐνός . . . ὑμῶν (stronger than, and distinct from, τινός . . . ὑμῶν)? Vahlen's *Ἀγάθων <ος>*, printed by Burnet, provides a smooth thought-sequence at the cost of an intolerable word-order. Had the MSS given *Ἀγάθωνος* in that position, it would have been deleted as a gloss. A change of punctuation sets everything right:

. . . καὶ ἔτι ἐνός δέομαι ὑμῶν ἀκοῦσαι. πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐρρῶσθαι πίνειν Ἀγάθων; Οὐδαμῶς, φάναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔρρωμαι.

"I still require to hear from one of you. How is Agathon disposed with regard to engaging in drink?" "I'm not up to it either," he said. The emphatic ἐνός . . . ὑμῶν refers to Agathon, who is elegantly addressed in the third person. He understands Eryximachus' meaning and answers accordingly. A passage from Boswell's *Life of Johnson* will illustrate the usage:

As Mr. Burke and Mr. Langton were walking home, Mr. Burke observed that Johnson had been very great that night; Mr. Langton joined in this, but added, he could have wished to hear more from another person; (plainly intimating that he meant Mr. Burke). "O, no (said Mr. Burke) it is enough for me to have rung the bell to him."¹¹

Plato himself in the *Phaedrus* (228A–C), availing himself of this same device, has Socrates address Phaedrus to his face in the third person for some dozen lines.

VI

Symposium 181D

παρεσκευασμένοι γὰρ οἶμαί εἰσιν οἱ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχόμενοι
ἐρᾶν ὡς τὸν βίον ἅπαντα συνεσόμενοι καὶ κοινῇ συμβιωσό-
μενοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξαπατήσαντες, ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ λαβόντες ὡς
νέον, καταγελάσαντες οἰχήσεσθαι ἐπ' ἄλλον ἀποτρέχοντες.

“παρεσκευασμένοι κτλ. For the change of construction from ὡς with fut. partic. to (fut.) infin., cp. *Charm.* 164D, *Rep.* 383A ποιεῖν ὡς μήτε . . . ὄντας . . . μήτε . . . παράγειν. The clause ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ . . . νέον is best taken closely with the preceding participle, and καταγελάσαντες . . . ἀποτρέχοντες closely together.” Bury *ad loc.* “ἀλλ' οὐκ . . . οἰχήσεσθαι is coordinated with ἐρᾶν, and both depend on d3 παρεσκευασμένοι . . . εἰσιν. . . .” Dover *ad loc.* This latter explanation can hardly be correct; the natural contrast is between ὡς τὸν βίον . . . συμβιωσόμενοι and ἐξαπατήσαντες . . . ἀποτρέχοντες, which express, respectively, a noble and ignoble intention. The main statement runs from παρεσκευασμένοι to ἐρᾶν; the rest of the sentence is subordinated to these words. Moreover, the shift of tense from the present ἐρᾶν to the future οἰχήσεσθαι (on which Dover is silent) is very harsh, if the two infinitives are to be coordinated. (Herwerden conjectured οἰχεσθαι, a Procrustean solution.) Furthermore παρασκευάζεσθαι with the future infinitive is a doubtful construction. (Still, it may occur at *Xen. Cyr.* 7.5.12, and I would be prepared to admit it here, were there not other objections to this interpretation.) Bury's interpretation is closer to

¹¹ *Boswell's Life of Johnson* . . . ed. G. B. Hill, rev. L. F. Powell, IV (Oxford 1934) 26–27.

the mark. He rightly sees that the basic contrast is between *ὡς . . . συμβιωσόμενοι* and *οἰχήσεσθαι*, and his analysis of the relationship to one another of the various cola, from *ἐξαπατήσαντες* to *ἀποτρέχοντες*, is correct. However, he does not really explain the shift in construction from *ὡς* with future participle to simple future infinitive, nor are his parallels particularly close. The best explanation is to assume, as so often in Plato, an anacoluthon, or rather a *constructio ad sensum*. *ὡς* with the future participle is used to indicate *purpose* or *intention*; another common way of expressing intent is by *μέλλω* with the infinitive. Plato wrote *οἰχήσεσθαι* as if he had begun *ἀλλ' οὐ μέλλοντες . . .*; the shift was all the easier since Plato had not repeated *ὡς* in the second section (*i.e.*, he did not write *ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς*). The suggestion that *οἰχήσεσθαι*—here clearly expressing intention—is used specifically on the analogy of *μέλλω c. inf.* may seem too precise; but compare W. W. Goodwin: “The future infinitive with *μέλλω* forms the only regular exception to the general principle which restricts the use of the future infinitive to indirect discourse” (*Syntax*² §75).

It remains to discover Plato's motive for the change to the infinitive, which seems to have been quite deliberate, and not the result of careless composition. In the two contrasting clauses (*ὡς τὸν βίον . . . συμβιωσόμενοι ~ οὐκ ἐξαπατήσαντες . . . ἀποτρέχοντες*) the key concepts are *συνεσόμενοι καὶ κοινῇ συμβιωσόμενοι* and *οἰχήσεσθαι*, referring respectively to the faithful and fickle lover. In this sentence there are no less than eight participles, four of them occurring in the last section (beginning with *ἀλλ' οὐκ*). Had Plato written the participle *οἰχισόμενοι* in the midst of these other participles, it would have lacked the emphatic prominence which the infinitive succeeds in bringing out. There was another reason for avoiding the participle here. *οἰχεσθαι* is frequently used with a supplementary participle (*οἰχομαι ἀπιών* etc.). Here *οἰχήσεσθαι ἀποτρέχοντες* is such a construction. One will search a long time to find an example of the *participle* of *οἰχομαι* so collocated with a supplementary participle. A combination such as *οἰχισόμενοι ἀποτρέχοντες* simply does not sound right, and Plato instinctively avoided it.

VII

Symposium 182A–B

καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα νόμος ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι νοῆσαι ῥάδιος, ἀπλῶς γὰρ ὠρισταὶ ὁ δ' ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ποικίλος. ἐν Ἡλιδι μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς, καὶ οὐ μὴ σοφοὶ λέγειν, ἀπλῶς νενομοθέτηται . . . τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται, ὅσοι ὑπὸ βαρβάροις οἰκοῦσιν.

τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας: τοῖς δὲ Ἰωνίας ci. Ast: τῆ δὲ Ἰωνία Thiersch

“τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας. The genitive is taken by Hug as dependent on πολλαχοῦ, by Stallb. as dependent on ὅσοι, ‘vel potius ex demonstrativo ante ὅσοι intelligendo’. Hug quotes Xen. *Hell.* IV.4.16 πολλαχόσε καὶ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἐμβαλόντες.” Bury *ad loc.* “τῆς δὲ . . . πολλαχοῦ ‘in many parts of Ionia and in (*sc.* many) other places’.” Dover *ad loc.*, who, to judge from this translation, agrees with Hug in making Ἰωνίας dependent upon πολλαχοῦ.

Stallbaum’s proposal to govern Ἰωνίας by ὅσοι is unnatural and, indeed, desperate. Nor can Ἰωνίας be governed by πολλαχοῦ (as Hug, Dover, and others); it should have been obvious that τῆς Ἰωνίας and ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ are coordinate phrases linked together by καί. In Xenophon *Hell.* 4.4.16, compared by Hug, the word-order makes all the difference; the two passages are not at all parallel. For true parallels see *Protagoras* 326DE καὶ παρ’ ὑμῖν καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ and *Republic* 394C ἐν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι, which show both that the two phrases are to be taken as contrasting coordinates and that ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ is a set phrase to be taken by itself. (See also *Symp.* 209E, *Resp.* 440A οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἔφην, πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα, Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1.30 πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθι . . . καὶ ἐν τούτῳ δὲ. . .)

Two words have caused all the difficulty, Ἰωνίας and ὅσοι: what is the construction of the genitive and what is the antecedent of ὅσοι? Both uses are in fact quite idiomatic. ὅσοι is a *constructio ad sensum*, introduced for variety where οὐ might have been expected; it is as if ἐν Ἰωσιν καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς had preceded; compare, immediately above: (1) ἐν Ἡλιδι . . . καὶ (2) ἐν Βοιωτοῖς καὶ (3) οὐ μὴ σοφοὶ λέγειν. The other stumbling-block, τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας, is not ‘governed by’ any word in the sentence; it is rather one more example of the common genitive of connection, placed (with connective, but with or without preposition) at the beginning

of a new sentence as a separate colon: “But *as regards Ionia*, and in many other places. . . .” For the usage in general, see Fraenkel on Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* 950, with references.

The same construction occurs at *Phaedrus* 247A:

μένει γὰρ Ἐστία ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνη· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῷ
τῶν δώδεκα ἀριθμῷ τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἄρχοντες ἡγούνται κατὰ
τάξιν ἣν ἕκαστος ἐτάχθη.

τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσοι is not to be rendered “But as many of the others as . . . ,” as if τῶν ἄλλων were genitive dependent upon ὅσοι. Hackforth, for example, has understood the sense: “. . . but for the rest, all such as are ranked in the number of the twelve. . . .” τῶν δὲ ἄλλων is a separate genitive of connection; editors should have printed a comma after it. So also in *Symposium* 221c ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, τάχ’ ἂν τις καὶ περὶ ἄλλου τοιαῦτα εἴποι (where editors omit the comma after ἐπιτηδευμάτων). Compare *Phaedrus* 250c: περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν, μετ’ ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ὃν κτλ. That περὶ δὲ κάλλους was felt to be a distinct colon is shown by the fact that the subject of the main verb ἔλαμπεν is also κάλλος.

VIII

Symposium 184D–E

ὅταν γὰρ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωσιν ἐραστής τε καὶ παιδικά,
νόμον ἔχων ἐκάτερος . . . ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς φρόνησιν
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ὁ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς
παίδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτᾶσθαι, τότε δὴ . . . συμ-
πίπτει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραστῇ χαρίσασθαι, ἄλλοθι
δὲ οὐδαμοῦ.

εἰς post δεόμενος del. Schütz κτᾶσθαι: ἴστασθαι Schanz:
κτᾶσθαί τι Hug

The soundness of the mss here has often been questioned. I quote Bury’s note as typical: “εἰς παίδευσιν . . . κτᾶσθαι. If the text is right we must suppose that κτᾶσθαι is here equiv. to ὥστε κτᾶσθαι, appended to the main verb *ξυμβάλλεσθαι* which is to be supplied with *εἰς παίδευσιν κτλ.* (so Vahlen). Of the corrections suggested . . . Schanz’s is the neatest, but spoils the sense-balance with *ξυμβάλλεσθαι*. The corruption is, perhaps, to be sought else-

where: the expression *τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν* is open to suspicion, since *σοφίαν* as here used after *ἄλλην* stands as a generic subst. whereas *σοφία* has just been termed (184C) *μέρος ἀρετῆς*: moreover, we should expect that *σοφία* should itself constitute the *κτῆμα* of the recipient, just as *φρόνησις* is itself the contribution of *ὁ ζυμβαλλόμενος*. On these grounds, I venture to suggest that another fem. subst., such as *διδασχὴν*, may have fallen out after *ἄλλην* (*ἐκπαίδευσιν* for *εἰς π.* is just possible).” Dover too, in his recent edition, follows earlier scholars in expressing doubts about the soundness of the text: “*εἰς παιδευσιν . . . κτᾶσθαι*: if this is what Plato wrote, we must understand *φρόνησιν καὶ ἀρετὴν* as object of *κτᾶσθαι*; but if *εἰς* were deleted (as by Schütz) *παιδευσιν . . . σοφίαν* would be the object, and the sentence would be easier to follow.”

All this is much ado about nothing. The speech of Pausanias, from which this sentence comes, contains a generous portion of those tricks of rhetoric associated in particular with the sophists. *Πausανίου δὲ πανσαμένου*, says the narrator at its conclusion (185C), *διδάσκουσι γάρ με ἴσα λέγειν οὕτως οἱ σοφοί*, and the present sentence is clearly an instance of *τὸ ἴσα λέγειν*, wherein rhetorical balance counts for more than normal idiom:

- (i) *ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος ~ ὁ δὲ δεόμενος*
- (ii) *εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ~
εἰς παιδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν*
- (iii) *συμβάλλεσθαι ~ κτᾶσθαι*

κτᾶσθαι is in obvious sense respension to *συμβάλλεσθαι*; note the force of the present, ‘acquire’ (not *κεκτηῆσθαι*, ‘possess’). The one makes a contribution; the other acquires the same. Render the disputed phrase quite literally: “. . . the other needing to make an acquisition in regard to *παιδευσίς* and the rest of *σοφία*. . . .” No object need be supplied with *κτᾶσθαι*; the verb is used absolutely.¹²

Objections to the transmitted text clearly have taken their start from the assumption that *εἰς παιδευσιν . . . κτᾶσθαι* is awkward, or even impossible, Greek. I have argued that a desire for artificial balance determined the choice of phrase; no one would deny that *κτᾶσθαι* followed by a direct accusative object would have been

¹² Even were it necessary to supply an object, the comments of Bury and Dover would still be misleading. For here *φρόνησις καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ* and *παιδευσίς καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σοφία* are, for all practical purposes, synonymous; the change of diction was determined solely by a desire for stylistic variation, and it is a mistake to press any difference of meaning. This is apparent from the context: *ὁ δεόμενος κτᾶσθαι* is here equivalent to ‘the one needing to receive a contribution’ and corresponds to *ὁ δυνάμενος συμβάλλεσθαι*. Obviously, giver and recipient are concerned with the same contribution.

more usual. Possibly the expression is unusual; certainly it is Platonic. For this use of εἰς (= 'in regard to', 'with a view to'), where another construction might be expected, is a feature of Plato's style. From this same speech compare 184B εὐεργετούμενος εἰς χρήματα (the dative, *vel sim.*, would be 'normal'). So also below in the *Symposium*, 219 D . . . ἀνθρώπῳ τοιούτῳ οἴω ἐγὼ οὐκ ἂν ᾤμην ποτ' ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρτερίαν. For further Platonic examples see J. Riddell, *A Digest of Platonic Idioms* § 115.

IX

Phaedrus 233D

ἔτι δὲ εἰ χρή τοῖς δεομένοις μάλιστα χαρίζεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ τοὺς βελτίστους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὖ ποιεῖν· μεγίστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλείστην χάριν αὐτοῖς εἴσονται.

καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις has bothered many; consequently καὶ τῶν ἄλλων was printed in the Aldine edition and Badham proposed κὰν τοῖς ἄλλοις. De Vries *ad loc.* defends the mss: "The readings καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (Aldina, Heind., St., Sch.) and κὰν τοῖς ἄλλοις (Badham, Vollgr., Buchw., accepted by Hackf.) are evident attempts to make the text smooth. Ficinus (Bekker) already rendered τοῖς ἄλλοις well by 'omnino'. For the *dativus limitationis* which he rightly sees in τοῖς ἄλλοις, Verd. 271 refers to 234C7 [τὰ . . . ἄλλα, accusative!], *Lysis* 215C ἀρά γε ὄλω τινὶ ἐξαπατώμεθα; *Rep.* 430A ἐπαιδευόμεν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ, *Hom. Od.* 18.234, *Hdt.* I 29, *Thuc.* IV 73, 4, *K.G.* I 437 f. (Rob., too, took it as such, as may be seen from his punctuation καὶ, τοῖς ἄλλοις, and his translation 'par ailleurs'; *Rob. Pl.*, however, wrongly takes τοῖς ἄλλοις as masculine, 'pour les autres aussi'; *Mor.* unnecessarily suggests καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους)."

Thus the majority opinion seems to be that καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις is either corrupt or neuter (or some combination thereof). It is sound and masculine, as Robin once took it—only to change his mind later. For neuter τοῖς ἄλλοις = *omnino* no one has produced a true parallel; I doubt that any exists. Neither the *accusative τὰ ἄλλα* (common) nor the *dativus limitationis* of other substantives is pertinent, much less decisive. What is wanted is another instance of τοῖς ἄλλοις so used; that usage, if it exists, is unknown to me.

(On this compare below.) To understand the sentence, construe as follows: . . . εἰ χρῆ [sc. τοὺς ἐρωμένους] τοῖς δεομένοις μάλιστα χαρίζεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις—*etiam ceteris hominibus praeter τοὺς ἐρωμένους*— . . . τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὖ ποιεῖν· μεγίστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλείστην χάριν αὐτοῖς [sc. τοῖς ἄλλοις] εἴσονται. Note that αὐτοῖς has no reference unless τοῖς ἄλλοις be both sound and masculine.

The argument—which comes from the *oratio erotica* which Plato has fathered on Lysias—is a *reductio ad absurdum*. The general thesis of this speech is that a boy should bestow his favors upon the non-lover rather than the lover. The particular argument here is: “If a boy should yield to those most in need [*i.e.*, to lovers], it follows that it is appropriate for ‘the others’ also to treat well specifically those who are most at a loss [in any human sphere]. . . .” The consequences of such a position are then illustrated; for instance, consistency would require that one invite to a private dinner not his friends, but beggars and those in need of a meal (233DE).

That such is the correct interpretation and that τοῖς ἄλλοις is sound is proved by the words τοῖς ἄλλοις themselves. For it does not appear to have been remarked that in this speech οἱ ἄλλοι, ‘the others’, is frequently used, almost in a technical sense, in explicit contrast to ἐρώντες. The relevant passages are self-evident and need only be set forth, not interpreted:

- (i) ἔτοιμοί εἰσι [sc. οἱ ἐρώντες] . . . τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπεχθανόμενοι τοῖς ἐρωμένοις χαρίζεσθαι (231C)
- (ii) εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐρώντων τὸν βέλτιστον αἰροῖο, ἐξ ὀλίγων ἂν σοι ἢ ἔκλεξις εἴη· εἰ δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων (231D)
- (iii) εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς μὲν ἐρώντας, οὕτως ἂν οἰομένους καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζηλοῦσθαι ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς ὑφ’ αὐτῶν (231E–232A)
- (iv) διόπερ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν ἐρωμένων συνουσίας ἀποτρέπουσιν [sc. οἱ ἐρώντες] (232C)
- (v) τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται· δυστυχοῦντας μὲν, ἃ μὴ λύπην τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχει, ἀνιαρὰ ποιεῖ νομίζειν (233B)
- (vi) οὐδὲ οἱ διαπραξάμενοι [sc. οἱ ἐρώντες] πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοτιμήσονται (234A)¹³

I return for a moment to the suggestion that τοῖς ἄλλοις in 233D is a neuter = *omnino*. The reason why τοῖς ἄλλοις is not

¹³ Note also 252D (from the great myth), πρὸς τε τοὺς ἐρωμένους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὁμιλεῖ τε καὶ προσφέρεται. We are perhaps justified in regarding this as a mannerism of Plato’s and one more, albeit minor, argument for the Platonic authorship of the speech attributed to Lysias.

found so used (*quod sciam*) is that in the dative ending *-οις* neuter and masculine are not distinguished; the gender is unmarked and *τοῖς ἄλλοις* = *omnino* would be ambiguous.¹⁴ Hence the preference for *τὰ ἄλλα* everywhere in ancient Greek. Consider *Phaedrus* 234 c: *τί σοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἰρηῆσθαι*; Here the accusative of respect *τὰ ἄλλα* is used despite the fact that it is collocated with a dative of respect, *τοῖς ὀνόμασιν*. In other words, Plato himself in this very dialogue avoids *τοῖς ἄλλοις* where one might most expect it. There is no doubt of the soundness of the text; Plato repeats the phrase verbatim below, 257A. Elsewhere¹⁵ I have argued for the reality of the collocation of accusatives and datives of respect in Greek; *Phaedrus* 234D and 257A provide the clearest evidence to date for the existence of the usage in classical prose.¹⁶

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¹⁴ One might wish to raise the same objection against a *masculine* *τοῖς ἄλλοις* in 233D. There is far less reason to do so. In the sequence *προσῆκει*/dative/infinite an ancient Greek was not likely to be confused, given the frequency of the construction *προσῆκει cum dat. et infin.* Context determined the sense. But even if the passage is felt to be ambiguous, the fact is that *προσῆκει*/masc. dat./inf. is a normal and frequent collocation, whereas *τοῖς ἄλλοις* = *omnino* is apparently unattested.

¹⁵ *Greek Textual Criticism* (Cambridge [Mass.] 1969) 109–12; CP 75 (1980) 245–46.

¹⁶ I am grateful to my students Lorna Holmes and Morgan de Tarr for reading a draft of this paper and making a number of helpful suggestions.