

Tyrants and Demagogues in Tragic Interpolation

David Kovacs

THE SUBJECT of ancient interpolation in tragedy is one on which disagreement is nearly impossible to avoid and for obvious reasons. The interpolator is often no more than a century or two removed from the period of the work he is enlarging and frequently has a good grasp of the elements of tragic style. It is presumably his intention in most cases to remain undetected, and he apparently succeeded in this intention with an audience of Greek speakers some of whom possessed an acute sense of literary style.¹ At times his work is sloppy, and modern scholars are unanimous in deletion. At other times, decision is not easy: are the anomalies the result of corruption, of ordinary carelessness in the poet, or of a later hand deliberately expanding the work? Certainty in many cases is not to be had but only varying degrees of suspicion based on the number and gravity of the linguistic regularities the suspected lines are alleged to violate and the logic of the passage with and without them.

The present study examines a number of passages in Euripides, all but one hitherto unsuspected, where lexical, grammatical, and stylistic regularities are violated and which, I argue, adversely affect the logic of the context in which they stand. Before proceeding to these, however, I will briefly examine several other passages previously diagnosed as interpolations, passages which share a subject-matter with those I will come to later. My reasons for doing this are twofold. First, some of the passages I propose to delete are extensive discourses—too extensive and too discursive, it might be argued, for them to be interpolations into otherwise undisturbed scenes. (The interpolation of whole scenes, such as the end of the *Septem*, is obviously quite another matter.) If, however, it can be shown that

¹ This is not to say that ancient literary scholars were always fooled. But we cannot tell how many lines they suspected or condemned since their editions probably retained even rejected lines and marked them with signs which might easily disappear. On the form of Aristophanes of Byzantium's text see W. S. Barrett, *Euripides Hippolytos* (Oxford 1964) 47, and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Euripides Herakles*² (Berlin 1909) 143, 148.

interpolations of this kind and extent are not infrequent, the objection falls. Second, this introductory group of passages shows that the themes of the second group—the tyrant as bane to society, the tyrant as bane to himself, the demagogue—are characteristic of the interpolator. This similarity—of little weight by itself in establishing spuriousness—can then be added to the evidence from style, grammar, vocabulary, and logic.

I. Previously Suspected Passages

There is evidence to show that those who revived Euripides' plays in the fourth century and later were interested themselves, or had an audience interested, in certain general topics that might approximately be described as political, and that they occasionally inserted passages of as much as a dozen lines in length on these topics into the plays they were producing. D. L. Page calls these 'topical' interpolations.² Whether they are topical in the sense of alluding to or reflecting on events contemporary with the production or merely in the sense of being *topoi*, there are several cases where general reflection of this kind can be shown to be due not to Euripides (who, of course, wrote passages of similar reflection himself) but to a later hand.

1. *Heracles* 588–92

πολλοὺς πένητας, ὀλβίους δὲ τῷ λόγῳ
δοκοῦντας εἶναι συμμάχους ἄναξ ἔχει,
590 οἱ στάσιν ἔθηκαν καὶ διώλεσαν πόλιν
ἐφ' ἀρπαγαῖσι τῶν πέλας, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις
δαπάναισι φροῦδα διαφυγόνθ' ὑπ' ἀργίας.
ᾧφθης ἐσελθὼν πόλιν κτλ.

The case against these lines was made by Wilamowitz (*ad loc.*) and Page (70), and while it is not absolutely conclusive, it is strong. The argument of the passage is interesting for what it reveals about the concerns of the interpolator. Lycus is regarded as the creature of a group of ruined aristocrats who have created civil strife³ and installed a tyrant so that under his rule they may recover their dissipated fortunes. Whether the author's personal observations are the source

² *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1934: hereafter 'Page') 117.

³ The motif of civil war is represented in the genuine line 34.

of this brief portrait or his reading of Aristotle,⁴ we see here an example of interpolation discussing political themes.⁵

2. *Orestes* 907–13

ὅταν γὰρ ἡδύς τις λόγοις φρονῶν κακῶς
 πείθη τὸ πλῆθος, τῇ πόλει κακὸν μέγα·
 ὅσοι δὲ σὺν νῶ χρηστὰ βουλευούσ' ἀεί,
 910 κἂν μὴ παραυτίκ', αὐθίς εἰσι χρήσιμοι
 πόλει. θεᾶσθαι δ' ὦδε χρὴ τὸν προστάτην
 ἰδόνθ'· ὅμοιον γὰρ τὸ χρέμα γίγνεται
 τῷ τοὺς λόγους λέγοντι καὶ τιμωμένῳ.

Whoever wrote these lines, they are clearly alien to this context, as Page shows (54). If they are by Euripides but from another play, their presence here might still be due to actors and thus furnish evidence of their or their audience's interests. But it is more likely that they are post-Euripidean. (a) “Those who with intelligence always devise good things are beneficial to the city at a later time even if not at once” is either a tautologous statement or a false one: tautologous if by ‘beneficial’ is meant only that their advice is good whether or not it is taken; false if ‘beneficial’ means more than this, since good advice is sometimes ignored completely or recognized as such only when it is too late. The lines are thus a clumsy and misleading statement of a quite straightforward argument, which Euripides could easily have made if he had wanted to, that rhetorical persuasiveness and sound thinking (or good will)⁶ do not always go together and that people often recognize good advice presented without artifice only at a later time. Euripides is a master of argumentation, and it is hard to believe that he could have failed to make this simple point clearly. (b) 911–13 do not easily yield sense. Whether we take *προστάτην* as subject or object, it is still difficult to give ὦδε any clear reference or to assign a Greek meaning to *θεᾶσθαι*, either alone or in combination with *ἰδόνθ'*.⁷ The last line has clearly suffered

⁴ *Pol.* 1305b39ff. Pl. *Resp.* 555D, cited by Wilamowitz, is not so close a parallel since there the sedition of the aristocrats results in democracy.

⁵ In this same play note also 65–66, convincingly athetized by James Diggle, “On the ‘Heracles’ and ‘Ion’ of Euripides,” *PCPS* n.s. 20 (1974) 3–4.

⁶ Page takes *φρονῶν κακῶς* as referring to evil designs, but in view of the contrast with 909 it would seem to refer to imprudence or folly. The phraseology of 909, where both *σὺν νῶ* and *ἀεί* look like unnecessary words introduced *metri causa*, is not very happy.

⁷ See Vincenzo di Benedetto, *Euripides Orestes* (Florence 1965) *ad loc.* Benedetto considers the possibility that 907–10 may be from another play of Euripides, but rejects this possibility for 911–13.

corruption. Brunck's τῷ τ' ἰωμένῳ gives the author his due and may well be right. But we are still left with (c) an unwanted τούς at 913, (d) a comparison that is not developed (and need not be for an audience familiar with the philosophical commonplace that rulers are like physicians and cannot always please),⁸ and (e) language that is generally flat and colorless.⁹ The passage is therefore likely to be a second example of post-Euripidean political reflection, perhaps slightly influenced by Platonic metaphor, added to the text of one of our plays.¹⁰

3. *Supplices* 238–45

τρεῖς γὰρ πολιτῶν μερίδες· οἱ μὲν ὄλβιοι
 ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλειόνων τ' ἐρώσ' ἀεὶ·
 240 οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπανίζοντες βίον
 δεινοί, νέμοντες τῷ φθόνῳ πλέον μέρος,
 ἐς τοὺς ἔχοντας κέντρ' ἀφιάσιν κακά,
 γλώσσαις πονηρῶν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι·
 τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἢ ἕν μέρω σώζει πόλεις,
 245 κόσμον φυλάσσουσ' ὄντιν ἄν τάξῃ πόλις.

These lines, though retained by the play's most recent editor C. Collard, are deleted by Schenkl, Wecklein, Grégoire, and, most recently, by M. D. Reeve.¹¹ That the lines do not belong in this place is sufficiently indicated by the κᾶπειτ' of 246 which 238–45 render unintelligible, and by the fact that this enumeration of the classes in the state makes no contribution to the argument. Collard's attempt (II 171) to show its relevance ("if you do want advice, get it from

⁸ I take 912–13 as emended to mean "the situation is the same for the public speaker as for the physician." For the comparison, see for example Pl. *Grg.* 463E–466A.

⁹ Note the unemphatic πόλει and ἰδόνθ' in emphatic positions.

¹⁰ W. Biel, *Textprobleme in Euripides Orestes* (Göttingen 1956) 54, alleges that the exact repetition of 773b in 909b is evidence of Euripidean authorship. But ἀεὶ in the first passage has a point while in the second it has none. His several attempts to explain 907–10 as a piece of genuine Euripides inserted as a *Randnotiz*, with 911–13 added subsequently, are no more convincing in their multiplicity than they are singly. It should be noted further that 907–10 occur in a papyrus fragment of the *Orestes* and are quoted as from this play by Stobaeus. This should warn us against treating citation either on papyrus or in florilegia as evidence of authenticity. (Absence from papyrus, by contrast, can be a strong argument for spuriousness: cf. M. Haslam, *P.Oxy.* XLVII pp.22–30.)

¹¹ See C. Collard, *Euripides: Supplices* (Groningen 1975) *ad loc.*; N. Wecklein, "Beiträge zur Kritik des Euripides," *SitzMünchen* 1895, 485–86; H. Grégoire, *Euripide* III (Paris 1923) *ad loc.*; M. D. Reeve, "Interpolation in Greek Tragedy, III," *GRBS* 14 (1973) 148. I was unable to consult K. Schenkl, *PhilolAnz* 6 (1874) 392, cited by Collard. Wecklein suspected 232–37 as well, though this is unimportant for our present purpose.

middlemen [244–45], not extremists”) ignores the fact that not a word is said about getting advice from any class: it is their behavior that is in view.

That these lines might be from another play of Euripides is a possibility that cannot be entirely ruled out. There are some slight indications of later authorship. (a) The word *μερίς* (238) is used only here in extant tragedy, as Collard notes. Though the word is attested for the fifth century in the sense ‘share’ (Pherecrates fr. 45, Antiphon 5.51), it comes into its own as a word for faction or party only later.¹² (b) There is nothing, as Norwood notes, to give *κέντρα* in 242 its meaning ‘bee-stings’ rather than ‘goads’ except a familiarity with discussions such as Plato *Resp.* 552c, 555d, and 565cd, which use the image of drones with stings to describe the impoverished element of the state.¹³ (c) In 242, *κακά* is otiose. If these are insufficient to prove later authorship, it remains true that the presence of these lines here is not due to accidental incorporation of a parallel (they are not parallel to anything else in the speech) but to deliberate interference. They thus show the interest of later redactors in topics such as these.

4. *Ion* 595–606 and 621–32

I also draw attention to two passages in *Ion* which I have elsewhere given reasons for regarding as spurious.¹⁴ In the first of these the author, attempting to show that participation in political life is futile, makes a triple division of the state into the powerless, the quietist intelligentsia, and the politicians. The aspirant to public office, he says, will incur the hatred and envy of the first class, the contempt of the second, and the active opposition of the third. The conclusion is that political eminence is not worth striving for (contrast 593–94, where *Ion* does not wish to be weak and a non-entity) and that quietism is the best policy. I do not know from what source this triple division derives, but both the general tendency of the passage and its identification of the wise (598) with the inactive suggest the influence of Epicureanism. In the second passage, the author attempts to show that a wise man will not attempt to become a tyrant (*cf.* Diog. Laert.

¹² See Dem. 18.64, Men. fr. 336.8 K., Plut. *Mor.* 203b, and Lucian *Hist. conscr.* 40.

¹³ Gilbert Norwood, *Essays in Euripidean Drama* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1954) 123–24. Contrast *e.g.*, Soph. fr. 683 Radt, where it means ‘goad’. In Philostr. *VA* 6.36 *κέντρον* is assigned to its proper sphere by the foregoing *ὑποβλίττουσι*. The language of the passage does not suggest that Aristophanes’ *Wasps* is in view here, and indeed an allusion in tragedy to comedy would be quite remarkable.

¹⁴ “Four Passages from Euripides’ *Ion*,” *TAPA* 109 (1979) 116–24.

10.119). Both passages, in their attitude toward public life and their preference for happy obscurity, betray a point of view hard to parallel in the fifth century but which receives abundant literary expression in the centuries following the death of Alexander.¹⁵

II. Newly Proposed Excisions

I now turn to some other passages, all but one hitherto unsuspected, where I believe we can detect the same kind of interference with the text. In none of these cases is the evidence so strong as to make interpolation the only possible conclusion, but in the light of tendencies we have discerned elsewhere it is a hypothesis that should be carefully considered.

1. *Supplices* 442–55

καὶ μὴν ὅπου γε δῆμος ἀυθέντης χθονός,
 ὑποῦσιν ἀστοίς ἦδεται νεανίας·
 ἀνὴρ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐχθρὸν ἠγείται τόδε,
 445 καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους οὓς τ' ἂν ἠγῆται φρονεῖν
 κτείνει, δεδοικῶς τῆς τυραννίδος πέρι.
 πῶς οὖν ἔτ' ἂν γένοιτ' ἂν ἰσχυρὰ πόλις,
 ὅταν τις ὡς λειμῶνος ἠρινοῦ στάχυν
 τόλμας ἀφαιρῆ κάπολωτίζῃ νέους;
 450 κτᾶσθαι δὲ πλοῦτον καὶ βίον τί δεῖ τέκνοις
 ὡς τῷ τυράννῳ πλείον' ἐκμοχθῆ βίον;
 ἢ παρθενεύειν παιῖδας ἐν δόμοις καλῶς,
 τερπνὰς τυράννοις ἠδονὰς, ὅταν θέλῃ,
 δάκρυα δ' ἑτοιμάζουσι; μὴ ζῶην ἔτι,
 455 εἰ τὰμὰ τέκνα πρὸς βίαν νυμφεύσεται.
 445 οὓς τ' Markland: οὓς LP

(a) The most striking anomaly in this passage is the use of *ἀυθέντης* (442) in a sense which it does not bear elsewhere until centuries later. The word is quite well attested in the classical period. In every

¹⁵ This is not Ion's point of view elsewhere in the play. At 593 he deprecates powerlessness and at 668 he accepts Xuthus' offer with no hesitation once Xuthus has shown him that the practical difficulties can be overcome. On 633–47 see my discussion (*supra* n.14) 122–23. For illustrations of these themes in later Greek literature see A.-J. Festugière, "Nature and Quietism in the Hellenistic Age," *Sileno* 1 (1975) 125–41. On the near universality, in the classical period, of the view that tyranny, while a bad thing for the subject, is good for the tyrant, see W. R. Connor, "Tyrannis Polis," in *Ancient and Modern: Essays in Honor of Gerald F. Else* (Ann Arbor 1977) 95–109.

occurrence until the third century B.C. the word is connected exclusively with murder and denotes a murderer of his own kin or a murderer in relation to the kin of the man he has murdered.¹⁶ The earliest attestation of a sense other than ‘murderer’ is Polybius 22.14.2, where it means someone who does something on his own initiative and responsibility. According to A. Dihle¹⁷ it was this sense that formed the bridge to the still later sense ‘master’, ‘ruler’, attested for the Imperial period by the Atticists (e.g., Phrynichus 96) and in many sources thereafter, and which is the sense the word bears in our passage.¹⁸ This sense displaces the earlier sense completely so that the scholiast to Thucydides 3.58.4 glosses τοῖς ἀυθένταις with τοῖς φονεῦσι, adding that his contemporaries now use ἀυθέντης to mean κύριος or δεσπότης. I find it difficult to believe that the word meant ‘ruler’ in the classical period. Certainly much Greek literature has been lost to us, but the Atticists, who could read more of it than we do, would not have been so emphatic on the incorrectness of this meaning if there were other examples of this sense in classical authors. It is of course impossible to suppose that Euripides could have anticipated semantic developments by so many centuries and could have expected comprehension from his audience while using their word for ‘murderer’ as his word for ‘ruler’. If our MSS. give us 442 as its author wrote it, that author was almost certainly not Euripides.

The alternative is to emend. Markland suggested εὐθυνητής and Paley εὐθυνητήρ. The only two instances of the former known to me are both at Plato *Leges* 945BC, where the sense is ‘public examiner’, the usual Attic sense of εὐθυνητος, which appears in the same passage. εὐθυνητής thus does not appear in tragedy, and where it does appear it does not have the meaning we require.¹⁹ Paley’s suggestion fares no better. At *Theognis* 40 it means ‘chastiser’; elsewhere in the classical period it is used as an adjective, modifying ‘rudder’ and meaning ‘that which steers’ (cf. Aesch. *Supp.* 717, Eur. *IT* 1356).²⁰ While it is true that εὐθύνω is used metaphorically to mean ‘govern’, there is no

¹⁶ See Louis Gernet, “AYΘENTHΣ,” *REG* 22 (1909) 13–22, and Friedrich Zucker, “AYΘENTHΣ und Ableitungen,” *SitzLeipzig* 107.4 (1962). For other literature see Collard *ad loc.*

¹⁷ “Αυθέντης,” *Glotta* 39 (1960) 77–83.

¹⁸ I find unconvincing the supposition of P. Kretschmer, “Griechisches 6, ἀυθέντης,” *Glotta* 3 (1912) 289–93, seconded by Zucker (*supra* n.16) 14, that there are really two distinct words, one derived from *θενέιν*, the other from the root **sen-* visible in *άννω*. Among other inconveniences it causes Zucker to regard *αυτοέντας* in Soph. *OT* 107 (a valuable piece of evidence for etymology) as “eine in Unkenntnis der Etymologie vermutlich aus metrischen Gründen auseinandergezogene Form.”

¹⁹ The genitive *χθονός* shows that ‘public examiner’ is not a possible sense.

²⁰ In Manetho 4.293 it is used of someone who levels a course of stones.

direct warrant for either of these two nouns in the sense required by our passage. There is always the obelus, of course. But another indication in the passage points to a similar late date, a date at which the reading of the mss. makes perfect sense.

(b) In fifth-century Attic, *φρονεῖν*, used absolutely, means ‘to be intelligent, wise, prudent’. It is only in later Greek that it has the meaning ‘to be proud’.²¹ Read as fifth-century Attic, therefore, 445–46 describe the tyrant as killing “whatever noblemen he regards as intelligent” (the reading of the mss.) or “the nobles and all those he regards as intelligent” (reading Markland’s τ’). This could be defended by persistent ingenuity if necessary. Intelligence is a quality potentially dangerous to tyrants (though whether *φρονεῖν* with its overtones of prudence is the right word to suggest this sort of cleverness is open to question). And intelligence may be found among the nobility (the mss.) or in humbler men as well (Markland). But we have only to compare this interpretation with its rival to see which of them is obviously right. The price of perfect intelligibility is the assumption, already suggested by *ἀνθέντης*, that these lines belong to a later age. On that assumption, we now have either “nobles whom he regards as proud” (mss.) or “the nobles and all whom he regards as proud” (Markland). We may then recall that in Greek literature of every age it is *φρόνημα* and not *φρόνησις* that strikes terror into the tyrant’s soul.²²

(c) The refence of *τόδε* in 444 is unclear. The neuter should refer to a *fact* which the tyrant finds hateful. Is it the existence of young men? Surely not—even tyrannies need young men. Is it democracy’s joy in them? That will not affect him. Collard’s note, “τόδε: sc. ὑπείναι (τολμηροῦς: 449) νέους,” shows what the author must have meant, but at the same time this note impugns rather than defends by showing the necessity of supplying both a word and an idea that do not appear until five lines later.²³

(d) *τερπνὰς . . . ἡδονὰς* is pleonastic and has given rise to various unconvincing attempts at emendation. (e) The repetition of *βίον* in 450 and 451 is suspicious, but the deletions and emendations it has provoked are improbable. (f) If we remove 442–55 (together with 435–36),²⁴ Theseus makes a fitting and brief reply to the Herald’s

²¹ See LSJ s.v. II.2.b; cf. Wilhelm Schmid, *Der Atticismus in seinen Hauptvertretern* IV (Stuttgart 1896) 380, 725.

²² Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 567A; Arist. *Pol.* 1313a40, 1314a3–8, 15–17.

²³ These considerations induce G. Jachmann, “Binneninterpolation, II. Teil,” *Nachr.-Göttingen* 1936, 200, to delete *ἐχθρὸν . . . ἀρίστους*, following Nauck. Wilamowitz obelized *ἀρίστους* in 445: “debebant iuvenes nominari.”

²⁴ (a) Stobaeus omits them. (b) The aorist stem *ἐνισπείν* is exceedingly rare in tragedy, the tragedians using *ἐν(ν)έπω* as present to *εἰπείν* (see LSJ s.v. 1). It is intro-

aspersions on democracy and does not lay himself open, by speaking thirty-seven lines to the Herald's seventeen, to the very charge of being a chatterbox that he makes against him (462).²⁵

2. *Supplices* 414–16

ἐν μὲν τόδ' ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἐν πεσσοῖς δίδως
 410 κρείσσον· πόλις γὰρ ἧς ἐγὼ πάρειμ' ἄπο
 ἐνὸς πρὸς ἀνδρός, οὐκ ὄχλω κρατύνεται·
 οὐδ' ἔστιν αὐτὴν ὅστις ἐκχαυνῶν λόγοις
 πρὸς κέρδος ἴδιον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοσε στρέφει.
 ὁ δ' αὐτίχ' ἠδὺς καὶ διδοὺς πολλὴν χάριν,
 415 ἐσαῦθις ἔβλαψ', εἶτα διαβολαῖς νέαις
 κλέψας τὰ πρόσθε σφάλματ' ἐξέδν δίκης.
 ἄλλως τε πῶς ἂν μὴ διορθεύων λόγους
 ὀρθῶς δύναιτ' ἂν δῆμος εὐθύνειν πόλιν;
 ὁ γὰρ χρόνος μάθησιν ἀντὶ τοῦ τάχους
 420 κρείσσω δίδωσι. γαπόνος δ' ἀνὴρ πένης,
 οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο πρὸς τὰ κοῖν' ἀποβλέπειν.
 ἦ δὴ νοσῶδες τοῦτο τοῖς ἀμείνοσιν,
 ὅταν πονηρὸς ἀξίωμ' ἀνὴρ ἔχει
 425 γλώσση κατασχὼν δῆμον, οὐδὲν ὦν τὸ πρίν.

We turn now from Theseus' reply to the Herald's speech which provoked it. Here too there is some evidence of interference, though the case is not as strong and there is one difficulty in the passage which the supposition of interpolation does not address.

Several things suggest that 414–16 are a later addition. (a) In 414 the mss. read ὁ δ', beginning a new sentence. But this expression ought not to denote the subject of the previous sentence.²⁶ Wilamowitz's conjecture (τὸ δ', with a comma at the end of the preceding line) attempts to meet this difficulty, but though it is printed by Murray and other editors, it is not a very satisfactory solution since the sentence thereby created is rather ungainly. Given a choice be-

duced plausibly by conjecture at Aesch. *Supp.* 603 but occurs, apart from our passage, nowhere else. (c) 435–36 separate 437 from 434 of which it is the natural continuation.

²⁵ Wilamowitz in his *Analecta Euripidea* (Berlin 1875) 97, operating on the not unreasonable supposition that, just as the praise of lawfully constituted democracy in Theseus' speech (429–41) answers the criticism of democracy in the Herald's (410–25), so we could expect in the Herald's speech a praise of tyranny to correspond to Theseus' criticism of it in 442–55, proposed a lacuna after 422. The lack of correspondence can be remedied by more economical means, however, the excision proposed here on other grounds.

²⁶ On ὁ δέ see Kühner/Gerth I 584 for the rule and 656–58 for the few post-Homeric exceptions.

tween starting a new sentence at 414 (with the mss.) and continuing the old one (as Wilamowitz's conjecture virtually forces us to do) we could scarcely hesitate: it is far less awkward to read ἔβλαψ' as a main verb. The price of this, however, is a non-classical use of ὁ δέ. In view of the possibility that corruption may be deeper than Wilamowitz thought, we cannot lay very much stress on this difficulty.²⁷

(b) In 414, διδούς πολλήν χάριν is pleonastic after ἡδύς. Collard *ad loc.* tries to make a distinction between "pleasing in his words" and "gratifying in his conduct." But 'words' are nowhere mentioned. And διδούς πολλήν χάριν cannot mean 'doing many favors' but only 'being very pleasant' (*cf. Hipp.* 1020). It is the adjective πολλήν and the singular, of course, that make the difference, so that citation of all the passages where χάριν δίδοναι τινί means 'do someone a favor' would be irrelevant.

(c) Omission of the participle ὄν, except in certain special circumstances, is rare.²⁸ Here the necessity of supplying it with ἡδύς strikes me as harsh, though perhaps the participle διδούς gives some help here, as it appears to at *Orestes* 457. The most convincing parallel, however, is *Ion* 598, a passage I have already given reasons for regarding as spurious.²⁹

(d) In fifth-century Greek, ἐσαῦθις (written either thus or *divisim*) means 'until a later time', rather than 'at a later time' as here.³⁰ The passage from the one meaning to the other is facilitated, of course, by the 'pregnant' use of prepositions, and there is no compelling reason why the word should not have meant 'later' in the fifth century, just as εἰσέπειτα does at Sophocles *Ajax* 35. Still, it may be significant that the only parallel to our passage occurs elsewhere in this play in lines that are highly suspect.³¹

²⁷ Nauck kept the reading of the mss. but posited a lacuna before 414, an unattractive suggestion. Markland's οὐδ' ἀντίχ', attractive palaeographically, introduces an unwanted negative (414–16 should describe what such a man does, not what others do not do) and also produces the same ungainly length as Wilamowitz's suggestion.

²⁸ See Kühner/Gerth II 101–03 and the corrections in Schwyzer II 404–05.

²⁹ In contrast to my former hesitation (*supra* n.14) 117, I am now convinced that the τε at *Ion* 598 connects δυνάμενοι εἶναι σοφοί with χρηστοί *sc.* ὄντες (see Owen *ad loc.*) and that the whole means "but all who, being well-born [or of good character] and having the capacity to be savants, keep quiet and do not rush into politics," etc.

³⁰ *Cf. IT* 377, *Ar. Eccl.* 983, *Thuc.* 4.63; contrast *Pl. Phd.* 115A, *Polit.* 257B, 262A, 286C, 299E, etc.

³¹ *Supp.* 551. The whole passage 549–57 is an embarrassment. Murray thought of moving it to the lacuna in Adrastus' speech, after 179, an unconvincing suggestion. It is plain, however, that it does not belong where it now stands. Theseus, whose views on the beneficent management of the universe we have already heard (195–218), can scarcely be allowed to speak of divinity luxuriating at the expense of poor, hopeless

(e) In 415, “new slanders” ought to imply that old slanders have been mentioned. They have not. Nor do I find any evidence that νέος is used like ἄλλος to mean ‘something else, namely’.

None of these difficulties is so large as to compel the conclusion that 414–16 are interpolated. But the resemblance in thought and language to *Orestes* 907–13, almost certainly the work of a later hand, provides further grounds for thinking that we have here detected the interpolatory style.³²

The rest of the passage is linguistically blameless. The sole difficulty, apart from two possible corruptions of single words,³³ is that 423–25 follow much more naturally on 413 than they do on 422.³⁴ For 423–25 are about the low-born leader of the people, who is clever and unscrupulous and an affront to the aristocracy. He was the subject of 412–13. Lines 417–22, however, find fault with the low-born not as leaders but as followers, and it is implied that their humble origins will make them anything but clever. The transition, therefore, from the clever and eloquent upstart of 412–13 to the stupid and inarticulate *canaille* of 417–22 and back again to the clever and eloquent upstart of 423–25 is jarring. Coming after 413, however, the lines follow naturally. The Herald has just been talking about the demagogic leader, his social origin is implied by πρὸς κέρδος ἴδιον, and it remains only to say that such a leader, the inevitable product of a democratic state, is an offense to the better sort. (The τούτο, pointing backwards as it usually does, is amplified by the ὅταν clause: contrast the anticipatory τῶδε in *Hec.* 306.) There is, however, not enough evidence to justify transposition, especially in view of the difficulty of explaining the displacement. The lines can be read in their transmitted place and regarded as an afterthought.

mortals (552: contrast 214). And a Theseus who urges the justice of his city’s cause (341, 526, 575, 671) is not perhaps the man to call for (557) the committing of only such injustices as will not harm the city or recoil on the doer. Linguistically the lines have difficulties too. τάχα does not mean ‘now’ as it must here (at *Soph. Aj.* 1255f, cited by Collard as a parallel, the word still implies futurity). And πνεῦμα δειμαίνων λιπεῖν is not very satisfactory either as “afraid of losing one’s life” (where “to leave behind one’s spirit” implies that one *is* one’s body and that the body can walk off from its animating principle) or as “afraid that the breath of god’s favor may desert him” (Collard, with difficult ellipsis of θεοῦ not found in any of his examples).

³² Cf. ἡδύς, ἀντίκα, and ἐσαῦθις in our passage with the ἡδύς, παραντίκα, and αὐθις of *Or.* 907 and 910.

³³ Doubts may be felt about either διορθεύων or λόγους in 417 and about the collocation ἡ δὴ in 423.

³⁴ This is presumably the reason for Kirchhoff’s deletion of 423–25, seconded by Wilamowitz (*supra* n.25) 97. There are no internal grounds. Rudolf Gebhardt, *De Supplicum Euripideae interpolationibus* (Coburg 1882) 22, puts them after 413.

3. *Phoenissae* 549–67

τὴν τυραννίδ', ἀδικίαν εὐδαίμονα,
 550 τιμᾶς ὑπέρφεν καὶ μέγ' ἤγησαι τόδε;
 περιβλέπεσθαι τίμον; κενὸν μὲν οὖν.
 ἢ πολλὰ μοχθεῖν πόλλ' ἔχων ἐν δώμασι
 βούλῃ; τί δ' ἔστι τὸ πλεόν; ὄνομ' ἔχει μόνον,
 ἐπεὶ τὰ γ' ἀρκοῦνθ' ἱκανὰ τοῖς γε σώφροσιν.
 555 οὔτοι τὰ χρήματ' ἴδια κέκτηνται βροτοί,
 τὰ τῶν θεῶν δ' ἔχοντες ἐπιμελούμεθα.
 ὅταν δὲ χρήζωσ', αὐτ' ἀφαιροῦνται πάλιν.
 ὁ δ' ὄλβος οὐ βέβαιος, ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος.
 ἄγ', ἦν σ' ἔρωμαι δνὸ λόγῳ προθεῖσ' ἄμα,
 560 πότερα τυραννεῖν ἢ πόλιν σῶσαι θέλεις,
 ἐρεῖς τυραννεῖν; ἦν δὲ νικήσῃ σ' ὅδε,
 Ἄργεῖά τ' ἔγχη δόρυ τὸ Καδμείων ἔλη,
 ὄψῃ δαμασθὲν ἄστῃ Θηβαῖον τόδε,
 ὄψῃ δὲ πολλὰς αἰχμαλωτίδας κόρας
 565 βία πρὸς ἀνδρῶν πολεμίων πορθουμένας.
 ὀδυνηρὸς ἄρ' ὁ πλοῦτος, ὃν ζητεῖς ἔχειν,
 γενήσεται Θήβαισι, φιλότιμος δὲ σύ.

Like *Ion* 621–33, this passage argues the undesirability of tyranny from the viewpoint of the tyrant himself (contrast *Supp.* 438–55, where the viewpoint is that of the governed). Here too the quality of the writing is not utterly bad, but the interpolator betrays himself (a) by the irrelevance of his disquisition to the concrete dramatic situation; (b) by his inability to write arguments that are intelligible in fifth-century terms; and (c) by his uncertain grasp of fifth-century tragic style.

(a) 555–58 have already been athetized by Fraenkel as a piece of misplaced sententiousness.³⁵ The thought is popular in late antiquity, as Fraenkel shows.³⁶ Its relevance to Jocasta's argument is tenuous at best. Clearly, one set of commonplaces about money has attracted another. But if these lines are irrelevant to those immediately before them, those lines in turn are irrelevant to the speech as a whole, and for more than one reason. In the first place, Eteocles, who is brutally frank about the motives of his action, devotes not one syllable to the desire for great wealth.³⁷ He wants *τυραννίς*, power. He wants the

³⁵ Eduard Fraenkel, *Zu den Phoenissen des Euripides* (SitzMünchen 1963.1) 28, and "A Passage in the *Phoenissae*," *Eranos* 44 (1946) 81–89.

³⁶ "A Passage" (*supra* n.35) 83–84 and the literature cited there.

³⁷ There is nothing necessarily monetary about τὸ πλεόν and τοῦλασσον in 509 and 510.

greater share, the more important position. To this desire Jocasta addresses the genuine lines 531–47³⁸ in which she argues that the principle of equality, not self-aggrandizement, is founded in nature. Eteocles, of course, remains unimpressed by this argument. But it is at least addressed to the position he has staked out for himself. Secondly, Jocasta is not elsewhere asking Eteocles to give up power completely but merely to share it with his brother. This is Polynices' suggestion too (484–87). Here she deprecates rule of any kind in favor of the modest life of a private citizen. This is in itself an improbable suggestion for her to make if she is attempting a reconciliation. And it also fits ill with her insistence on the principle of equality.

(b) The presuppositions of the argument, what it takes for granted, are also grounds for suspicion, for they have no parallels in fifth-century or earlier literature. It is obviously foolish to expect to find an earlier or contemporary parallel for every idea: new ideas occur, sometimes in isolation. But when an idea is not argued for but simply presupposed, one naturally expects that it will have had some currency. “Is it a valuable thing to be the object of every gaze? Nay, ’tis a vain thing” (551). This sentiment runs counter to the basic presuppositions of Greek thought in the classical period. Eminence may be dangerous, it may call down the envy of gods or men, but no one doubts that it is in itself desirable. To ask this question in such a rhetorical form, clearly expecting the answer “no,” and then to answer it by calling τὸ περιβλέπεσθαι a thing without content, empty, is to take an exceedingly austere view of what is desirable, to locate it exclusively in τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν. It may be that Socrates held such a view, but in this respect as in so many others it was Socrates *contra mundum*.³⁹ Even Aristotle, who recognized (*Eth.Nic.* 1095b24) that honor appears to be ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, makes it one of the ingredients of the good life (*cf.* 1097b2–3, 1107b27, 1123b20, etc.). The vanity of other men’s praise is not something that may be simply presupposed in the classical age.

“Or do you want to toil greatly since you have great wealth in your house? What advantage does this give you? A merely nominal one, since for the self-controlled a sufficiency is enough.” Again, the sentiments are expressed with a brevity that seems to imply a setting where such ideas as *Quam multa non desidero* have a great deal more currency than we have any reason to think they did in Euripides’ day.

³⁸ On 548, see Fraenkel, *Zu den Phoenissen* (*supra* n.35) 28.

³⁹ Note how even Socrates must argue painstakingly for his view. See *Crito* 45c–47b where it is argued that the opinions of the many are to be ignored; on the lack of common ground between Socrates’ views and those of other men, see 49d.

Wealth has several drawbacks in archaic and classical thought. It tempts men to be insolent (Aeschylus), it makes them soft (Herodotus), it raises innately base people to prominence (Theognis *et al.*). It is demonstrated by Xenophon with specific examples (*Ages.* 9.3–5) that the life of Persian overlords, who cannot do without the luxuries to which they have become accustomed, is less pleasant than that of a self-controlled Spartan. But to the idea that wealth is an encumbrance, that even with slaves to do the work and subordinates to manage it the rich man has less leisure than the poor man, I can find no parallel at all.⁴⁰ For a philosopher like Diogenes to argue for the desirability of self-sufficiency is one thing. For a dramatist to assume it without argument is another.

(c) Some minor points of style and grammar show that the author is not completely at home in the diction of fifth-century tragedy. (1) The perfect of ἡγέομαι is used with present meaning by Herodotus, in the dialogues of Plato, and in later Greek.⁴¹ But there is apart from our passage no instance of this in tragedy, nor, so far as I am able to tell, in Attic Greek outside of Plato.⁴² Indeed, the perfect in any sense does not appear in tragedy and seems not to be in use in Attic before Plato. (2) τόδε at 550 is otiose since it duplicates the direct object expressed in 549 (*cf.* the vague τόδε of *Supp.* 444). Here are two words, therefore, in one line which suggest a man struggling with the trimeter. (3) The occurrence of γε twice in 554 suggests the same thing. (4) One may doubt whether δύο λόγῳ προθειῶσ' ἄμα has any clear Greek sense.

Three other points deserve mention. First, the wording of 559–65 suggests a mind easily distracted by irrelevant 'literary' flourishes from the business at hand. We may paraphrase the argument as follows: "Surely no one would accept tyranny if it meant destruction

⁴⁰ But *cf.* *Ion* 631, part of a similar essay on the life of quiet obscurity.

⁴¹ Hdt. 1.126, 1.136, 2.40, 2.72, 2.115; Pl. *Ti.* 19E, *Leg.* 837c, *Hp.Mi.* 374D, *Clit.* 407C (some MSS. give the present); LXX Job 42.6; Acts 26.2; Joseph. *BJ* 6.100, *AJ* 14.308, 17.159, 19.107, 20.90; Paus. 10.6.5, 10.32.7; Lucian *Pisc.* 14; *P.Oslo* II 49.3 (*ca* A.D. 100).

⁴² Search of lexica and indices together with such works as W. Veitch, *Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective* (Oxford 1879) and the Verbalverzeichnis of Kühner/Blass, *Griechische Grammatik*, reveals no instance of ἡγέομαι in the sense of 'I think' in any Attic author besides Plato. Kühner/Blass call this use Ionic, a hypothesis consistent with its widespread use in the Koine, while its appearance in Plato is to be explained as an aberration peculiar to him. Apart from a Doric oracle quoted in [Dem.] 43.66 and the compound διήγηται used passively in Antiphon 1.31, the perfect seems not to occur in Attic in any sense and to be very rare in any dialect besides Ionic until the advent of the Koine. There is one further instance in Pind. *Pyth.* 4.248. On the use of perfect for present as a feature of late Greek, see further Schmid (*supra* n.21) 617 and references.

of the very city he means to rule. But this is precisely what will happen if Polynices is victorious.” To this argument, cogent and simple, the description of the plight of captive maidens adds nothing but irrelevant and distracting pathos. It is not their misery but the destruction of the tyrant’s own city that is important. Likewise, the contrast between Argive sword and Theban spear is pointless, and editors have been moved to delete 562. Deletion of a single line is an attractive remedy where nothing else is wrong with the passage. But where the offending line is merely the most extreme example of a tendency visible elsewhere in the passage, such a procedure no longer merits the name of caution. Second, there is the peroration of the speech to Eteocles (566–67): “So then the wealth which you seek to possess will be painful to Thebes, and you are an ambitious man.” These lines (and especially the last clause) are exceedingly lame as the capstone to Jocasta’s remarks to Eteocles.⁴³ Line 547, by contrast, makes a fine ending. Finally, if we accept excision, Jocasta now addresses her two sons at approximately equal length (20½ lines to Eteocles, 15½ to Polynices) in keeping with the generally even-handed treatment of the two elsewhere (69–82, 452–64, 584–85).

4. *Hippolytus* 1012–15

καὶ δὴ τὸ σῶφρον τοῦ μὸν οὐ πείθει σ'· ἴτω·
 δεῖ δὴ σε δεῖξαι τῷ τρόπῳ διεφθάρην.
 πότερα τὸ τῆσδε σῶμ' ἐκαλλιστεύετο
 1010 πασῶν γυναικῶν; ἢ σὸν οἰκήσειν δόμον
 ἔγκληρον εὐνήν προσλαβῶν ἐπήλπισα;
 μάταιος ἄρ' ἦν, οὐδαμοῦ μὲν οὖν φρενῶν.
 ἀλλ' ὡς τυραννεῖν ἠδὲν τοῖσι σώφροσιν;
 ἠκιστά γ', ἴει μὴ τὰς φρένας διέφθορεν
 1015 θνητῶν ὅσοισιν ἀνδάνει μοναρχία.
 ἐγὼ δ' ἀγῶνας μὲν κρατεῖν Ἑλληνικοὺς
 πρῶτος θέλοιμ' ἄν, ἐν πόλει δὲ δεύτερος
 σὺν τοῖς ἀρίστοις εὐτυχεῖν αἰεὶ φίλοις·
 πράσσειν τε γὰρ πάρεστι, κίνδυνός τ' ἀπὼν
 1020 κρεῖσσω δίδωσι τῆς τυραννίδος χάριν.

The discontented tyrant appears once more in the extant plays of Euripides, and although I am not the first to suspect interpolation, I

⁴³ They are, however, sharpened a bit stylistically if *P.Oxy.* XLIV 3153 is correct in reading *δαπανηρός* for *ὄδωνηρός*. Haslam *ad loc.* argues persuasively for it, though the word’s absence from any poetical author is a weightier objection than he allows. (This objection falls, of course, if it is part of an interpolation.) As remarked above (n.10), occurrence of the passage in the papyrus does not guarantee authenticity.

think the passages discussed so far tend to increase the suspicion of interpolation here too. Barrett, whose text I give, suggests cautiously that 1012–15 may be a later addition. The situation is complicated by the likelihood of textual corruption in 1014. Even so, it is possible to contrast with some plausibility the argument of the passage with and without the suspected lines. For the small number of linguistic anomalies in the lines see Barrett's discussion.

As the passage stands in our mss., Hippolytus is suggesting, in order to refute, three possible motives he might have had for doing what he is accused of.⁴⁴ First, Phaedra's beauty might have been so superlative that Hippolytus, who has thus far resisted the attractions of all other women, has succumbed to hers. This is treated as a self-evident absurdity. Second, he might have hoped by winning Phaedra's heart to succeed to his father's fortune when he died. (In this case, the reference in *δόμον* must be to wealth since Theseus' power is reserved for the third argument.) This too is treated as a self-evident absurdity (1012), though it is not clear just why. There are two possible reasons, as Barrett notes, the ineffectiveness of the means and the inadequacy of the end. It is difficult to be sure whether 1012 means "I would be foolish to suppose that such a scheme would work" or "I would be foolish to desire Theseus' wealth," but on balance the second seems more likely. For if the ineffectiveness of the means is being presupposed here, the same objection ought to apply to marriage as a way of gaining kingship, yet a quite separate argument is advanced to deal with that case. Secondly, 1013 follows naturally on the second interpretation of 1012, as Barrett points out: "but you can want royal power when your mind is sound." It would appear that Hippolytus is here being made to despise wealth.

The third suggested motive is the desire for kingly power. Here matters are complicated somewhat by a textual problem in 1014,⁴⁵ but it seems on balance that Hippolytus is made to reply that no sensible person would want to be king and that all who love monarchy have had their minds corrupted by it. On this showing, therefore, Hippolytus is made to reply to two of the suggested motives

⁴⁴ Note that, as far as he knows, Hippolytus has been accused of seduction, not rape (*cf.* 943–45). His arguments make sense as a defense against that charge, while, as Barrett points out (*ad* 1007–20), they do not make sense against the charge of rape.

⁴⁵ Barrett, *ad* 1014–15, discusses the possibility that these two lines may be made, by reading *μάλιστα γ'*, to mean "certainly the *σώφρονες* like to be king—unless you're going to say that all contented monarchs are off their heads; only (1016ff) it's not what I prefer myself." But the corruption is more difficult to explain. Furthermore, the argument is less cogent, for instead of introducing a motive that cannot actuate him in order to refute it, he introduces the motive, says that such a motive is entirely reasonable, and claims only that he doesn't *happen* to be actuated by it.

with the assertion that it is foolish to want either wealth or political power. This is suspicious from several points of view. First, Hippolytus is not in a position to despise riches, as Barrett (352) points out: “you cannot keep horses on a pittance.” Second, the lines are not a plausible defense and—more important—not the best defense Hippolytus’ situation allows.⁴⁶ If a man in Hippolytus’ position is accused of attempted usurpation, he will not bother to argue that power has no attraction for him. That defense would convince only those who already had such a high view of the defendant’s character that they would disbelieve the charge. The proper defense—which, I argue below, is the one Hippolytus actually makes—is that of Creon (Soph. *OT* 587ff) who argues that while wealth, power, and position are good, he already enjoys these in the highest possible degree and would only add to his responsibilities without increasing his pleasure if he seized the throne. This is an argument ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων appropriate to a man on trial. Third, we have seen two passages we have reason to suspect are interpolations where the vanity of wealth and power are likewise assumed without argument.

Without 1012–15, the argument is simpler and more cogent. Now there are only two possible motives discussed. First, Phaedra’s beauty is treated, as before, as an obviously inadequate motive. Then the suggestion is made that Hippolytus wished by this seduction to succeed to Theseus’ fortune and power (where δόμον means both). To this Hippolytus replies that while he wants to be first in the games, a second place in the city gives him all that he or any sane man could require. By ‘second place’ he does not mean a life of quiet obscurity but the place next to the first place. For he praises it for the happy combination it affords of power and absence of danger.⁴⁷ Like Creon’s defense, therefore, and unlike the quietist lines suspected earlier, this speech comes to terms realistically with the attraction that power has for almost everyone. It is therefore a plausible argument, one of the few that Hippolytus can make without breach of his oath.⁴⁸

There is one other passage in Euripides where the unhappy tyrant appears and where there is other evidence of spuriousness, from the

⁴⁶ See A. M. Dale, *Euripides Alcestis* (Oxford 1954) xxvii–xxviii.

⁴⁷ On πράσσειν as power, see Barrett *ad loc.* The variant πράσσειν γὰρ εὖ shows a ‘quietist’ misunderstanding of the passage, as Barrett observes.

⁴⁸ For the form of this argument—two possible motives, one of them self-evidently absurd, the other explicitly refuted—*cf.* *Andr.* 192–204 and my discussion in “Three Passages from the *Andromache*,” *HSCP* 81 (1977) 137–48. From the foregoing it will be clear that I do not agree with the approach of R. M. Newton, “*Hippolytus* and the Dating of *Oedipus Tyrannus*,” *GRBS* 21 (1981) 5–22, who, however, is not concerned with the defense of 1012–15 as such and does not discuss the textual difficulties.

lost *Peliades*. There has been a general reluctance in the past to attack the authenticity of passages preserved as quotations in other authors, and for this reluctance there are two good reasons and one bad. The two good reasons are that the absence of context deprives us of one of the most important means of determining spuriousness—contradiction with or irrelevance to the surrounding argument; and that the text of quotations is more liable to corruption than the main tradition of the author's work, with the result that in the absence of context the means for emending with plausibility are considerably reduced and the choice between emendation and excision is harder to make. The third reason is the conviction that since interpolation accounts for a very small percentage of the bulk of the extant plays, it is *a priori* unlikely that a given fragment is a quotation from interpolated rather than from genuine matter.

While full weight must be given to the first two difficulties, the third consideration can be shown to lead to the opposite conclusion. Of the nine passages I have discussed thus far, five are quoted wholly or in part by Stobaeus.⁴⁹ The same is true of a few of the more expansive and sententious interpolations isolated by Page.⁵⁰ If therefore *Orestes*, for example, had not survived, 907–13 would appear in Nauck as a fragment of Euripides, mistakenly if we are right about its origin. That such a thing should have occurred frequently in the case of lost plays is made *a priori* likely by the following consideration. The taste of the interpolator and the taste of the excerptor are not two tastes but one. Both like sententiousness, philosophizing, and generalities. If therefore interpolations of the sort we have been pursuing were made in the text of the lost plays, as seems inevitable, they were virtually certain to find their way into the compilations and from there into Nauck. There is therefore every incentive to be as clear-eyed in discerning faults of grammar, logic, and style in the fragments as in the surviving plays. Where such faults are multiplied and emendation is plainly inadequate to fix them, we should consider deletion.

5. fr. 605 (*Peliades*)

τὸ δ' ἔσχατον δὴ τοῦτο θαυμαστὸν βροτοῖς
 τυραννίς, οὐχ εὐροῖς ἂν ἀθλιώτερον.
 φίλους τε πορθεῖν καὶ κατακτανεῖν χρεῶν,
 πλείστος φόβος πρόσεστι μὴ δράσωσιν τι.

⁴⁹ *Or.* 907–13, *Supp.* 238–45, *Ion* 605–06 and 621–28, *Phoen.* 554 and 555–57 are quoted in Stobaeus. In addition, *Phoen.* 549 and 555–57 are quoted by Plutarch and *Phoen.* 554 by Clement of Alexandria.

⁵⁰ *Andr.* 668–77 and *HF* 1291–93 are quoted wholly or in part by Stobaeus.

The first two lines are clearly meant to say “You would not find anything more wretched than tyranny, this thing most highly admired by mortals.” But the unbiased reader must surely be unfavorably struck by the peculiarly paratactic method of expressing the comparison. The sense and grammatical function of ἔσχατον are left unclear. But since there is some possibility that the lines were not originally written as we find them in our mss., we need not press this point.⁵¹

There is more trouble, however, in the second couplet, only some of which is the result of corruption. We may strongly suspect that one or more lines have dropped out before 3, as Gomperz suggested. It would, at any rate, be needlessly uncharitable to assume that our author used τε to connect assertion and ground. There is also an unusual asyndeton in the fourth line, which could be removed or made more palatable at need (e.g., by F. G. Schmidt’s φόβος γὰρ ἐστὶ). But these methods do not succeed in removing the confusion of thought, the kind of confusion that suggests that the writer, dealing in familiar commonplaces, feels no need to state them accurately but merely alludes to their chief features. (Cf. the logical sloppiness of *Or.* 909–10 and *Supp.* 444–46 and the inexact ἡδονή of *Ion* 627.) It is a commonplace that the tyrant can trust no one, not even those he regards as his friends, whom he will often discover plotting his destruction. It is also a commonplace that the tyrant will often kill men of ability to insure that they will not move against him first. Our author, with utter disregard for logic, combines the two motifs and represents the tyrant as taking the precautionary measure of killing off his friends. That this is nonsense scarcely needs saying. Then too this pre-emptive first strike against putative enemies is not usefully described by the verb πορθεῖν, which suggests quite different motives.

To write πόλεις for φίλους, as do Nauck and O. Hense, eliminates this last discrepancy by providing πορθεῖν with a more suitable object but at the cost of creating difficulties elsewhere. For the plundering of cities by tyrants has one motive, the need for money (cf. *Xen. Hiero* 4.11), and it makes no sense to have the tyrant plunder cities out of a quite different motive, fear (either retaining the reading of the mss. in line 4 or reading πλείστους for πλείστος with H. Bengl).⁵² Nor is it

⁵¹ The most promising attempt on this couplet is that of B. A. van Groningen, *Mnemosyne* SER. III 9 (1941) 305, who succeeds in eliminating several difficulties by writing

τὸ δ' ἔσχατον δὴ τοῦθ' ὁ θαυμαστὸν βροτοῖς,
τυραννίς, οὐδ' εὖροις ἂν ἀθλιώτερον.

⁵² *Staatstheoretische Probleme im Rahmen der attischen, vornehmlich euripideischen Tragödie* (Diss. Munich 1929) 78 n.1.

satisfactory to read φίλους for πλείστος with Hense, for not only does that involve mentioning in the same breath the plundering of cities for money and the killing of friends out of fear, it also supplies an explanation for the second of the actions while leaving the first, which needs one just as much, without one. In fact, no version of this couplet (whether the reading of the MSS. or a conjecture) that includes πορθεῖν is exempt from the charge of logical absurdity: plundering, whether of friends or of cities, does not belong in this context. On the other hand, the attempts to eliminate this unwanted verb, such as Munro's and Gomperz' τ' ἀπωθεῖν, are utterly lacking in probability. Unless we are prepared, therefore, to rewrite, we must recognize that we are dealing here with the inept and careless statement of a *topos* and one which, we have good reason to think, has elsewhere inspired the *epigoni* to compose iambic trimeter verse. These are not inconsiderable grounds for suspicion.

I record finally my suspicions, falling short of proof, about fr. 420. (a) There is a contradiction between lines 1 and 3. Either the tyrant gains power by long and strenuous efforts (1) and we are invited to consider this in contrast to his rapid fall, or his rise and fall are equally swift (3) and we are asked to contemplate the fickleness of fortune. Either pattern may commend itself to a poet, depending on the dramatic situation. But only a writer whose use of commonplaces is essentially thoughtless would combine the two. (b) The same impression of someone trading with worn counters he scarcely bothers to look at (as at fr. 605) is sustained by the odd mixture of metaphors at 4–5. In 4 it is Wealth who is winged (*i.e.*, unstable and capricious), yet in 5, instead of simply flying off from his former favorites, it is they who are suddenly airborne and he lets them fall backwards out of their hopes.⁵³

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⁵³ My thanks to the anonymous readers of this journal for their helpful criticisms. Albrecht Dihle, *Der Prolog der 'Bacchen' und die antike Überlieferungsphase des Euripides-Textes* (Sitz-Heidelberg 1981.2), appeared too late for me to take into account, though I note that his view that tragic interpolations by actors continued to be made down to the Imperial period lends support to the date implied by ἀυθέντης (*Supp.* 442), ἡγήσασαι (*Phoen.* 550), λογίων (*Ion* 602), and ἐκνικᾶ (*Ion* 629).