

Pandora and the Good Eris in Hesiod

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THE PANDORA NARRATIVE in the *Theogonia* and *Opera* is one of the most discussed elements of the Hesiodic corpus; one need only consult Blümer's massive bibliography to see the interest that Pandora has drawn, particularly in the past forty years.¹ While many aspects of the Hesiodic corpus are open to dispute, the *communis opinio* about Pandora is well expressed by West: "Hesiod plainly conceives her, with her various feminine characteristics, as being herself the final, unanswerable affliction imposed by Zeus on man."² West's assertion about Pandora is clearly grounded in the texts of both the *Theogonia* (585, καλὸν κακὸν ἀντ' ἀγαθοῖο, "a beautiful evil in place of something good") and the *Opera* which give an un-

¹ W. Blümer, *Interpretation archaischer Dichtung: die mythologischen Partien der Erga Hesiods II* (Münster 2001) 239–395.

² M. L. West, *Hesiod: Works and Days* (Oxford 1978) 155. Though a prominent theme in Hesiodic scholarship, the perceived misogyny surrounding the Pandora myths is not the focus of this paper, but its importance in any discussion of Pandora specifically and the *Opera* in general demands a brief digression. That Pandora is a bane to men and the penalty mortals must pay for Prometheus' larceny has been the prevailing opinion: e.g., M. L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford 1966) and *Works and Days*; L. Sussman, "Workers and Drones: Labor, Idleness and Gender Definition in Hesiod's Beehive," *Arethusa* 11 (1978) 27–41; P. A. Marquardt, "Hesiod's Ambiguous View of Women," *CP* 77 (1982) 283–291; V. Leinieks, "ΕΛΠΙΣ in Hesiod," *Philologus* 128 (1984) 1–8; and especially P. DuBois, "Eros and the Woman," *Ramus* 21 (1992) 97–116, who says not only that "the *Works and Days* ... is filled with sensible misogynistic advice" (108) but also that she is uncomfortable even reading *Op.* because "I am a woman, and Hesiod seems, on the face of it, to despise my kind." Others have seen nothing in the texts to indicate misogyny; the most intriguing arguments and summary of the scholarship are in A. Casanova, *La famiglia di Pandora: analisi filologica dei miti di Pandora e Prometeo nella tradizione esiodea* (Florence 1979), and G. Arrighetti, *Misogonia e machilismo in Grecia e in Roma* (Genoa 1981).

ambiguous and unflattering depiction of her.³ The repetition of the pattern πῆμα ... κακὸν ... κακὸν in the *Opera* is especially damning (54–58):⁴

Ἴαπετιονίδη, πάντων πέρι μῆδεα εἰδῶς,
χαίρεις πῦρ κλέψας καὶ ἐμὰς φρένας ἠπεροπεύσας,
σοὶ τ' αὐτῷ μέγα πῆμα καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἐσσομένοισιν.
τοῖς δ' ἐγὼ ἀντὶ πυρὸς δώσω κακόν, ᾧ κεν ἅπαντες
τέρπωνται κατὰ θυμὸν ἐὸν κακὸν ἀμφαγαπῶντες.

Son of Iapetus, surpassing all in cunning, you are glad that you have outwitted me and stolen fire—a great plague to you yourself and to men that shall be. But I will give men as the price for fire an evil thing in which they may all be glad of heart while they embrace their own destruction.

and (82–89):

δῶρον ἐδώρησαν, πῆμ' ἀνδράσιν ἀλφιστήσιν.
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δόλον αἰπὺν ἀμήχανον ἐξετέλεσσεν,
εἰς Ἐπιμηθεά πέμπε πατὴρ κλυτὸν Ἀργεῖφόντην
δῶρον ἄγοντα, θεῶν ταχὺν ἄγγελον· οὐδ' Ἐπιμηθεὺς
ἐφράσαθ', ὡς οἱ εἶπε Προμηθεὺς μὴ ποτε δῶρον
δέξεσθαι παρὸς Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου, ἀλλ' ἀποπέμπειν
ἐξοπίσω, μὴ πού τι κακὸν θνητοῖσι γένηται·
αὐτὰρ ὁ δεξάμενος, ὅτε δὴ κακὸν εἶχ', ἐνόησεν.

[And he called this woman Pandora, because all they who dwelt on Olympus] gave each a gift, a plague to men who eat bread. But when he had finished the sheer, hopeless snare, the Father sent glorious Argus-Slayer, the swift messenger of the gods, to take it to Epimetheus as a gift. And Epimetheus did not think on what Prometheus had said to him, bidding him never take a gift of Olympian Zeus, but to send it back for fear it might prove to

³ Many scholars have seen problems with the accounts in the *Theogonia* and the *Opera* and have suggested deletions for various segments of the text; O. Lendle, *Die "Pandorasage" bei Hesiod* (Würzburg 1957) 21–55, provides a summary of opinions, both ancient and modern; cf. W. Berg, "Pandora: Pathology of a Creation Myth," *Fabula* 17 (1976) 1–25, at 2–4.

⁴ Text: G. Arrighetti, *Esiodo Opere* (Turin 1998). Translations of Hesiod are from H. G. Evelyn-White, *Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns and Homeric* (Loeb). Other translations, unless otherwise stated, are my own.

be something harmful to men. But he took the gift, and afterwards, when the evil thing was already his, he understood.

The narrative goes on to say that not only was Pandora herself an evil for man, but that, whether of her own volition or by the will of Zeus, she also unleashed on earth a myriad of wicked creations, which now roam freely bringing the full fury of the Fates down upon mankind (90–95).

In light of the description provided in the texts themselves, it may seem difficult to argue that Pandora was not entirely destructive. However, I believe that the author of the *Opera* has intended another meaning to be drawn from the story of Pandora. The placement of this myth near the beginning of the narrative, and in close proximity to the description of the two types of Eris which opens the text, is significant and intentional. I propose that the position of the Pandora story within the text and, most importantly, the language used to introduce her and also the two Erides, fashions for the audience a strong connection between Pandora and the Good Eris. The two disparate roles of Eris, the conundrum concerning man's life of labor (that it is a bane but also a noble and worthy undertaking), and the ambiguity of the contents of Pandora's jar, all reflect the tendency of early Greek thought to systematize the world according to a series of opposites.⁵ I will argue, through a discussion of three strong parallels, that in the *Opera* these oppositions are related to each other, with the result that the Good Eris and Pandora become equivalent beings.

As the Good Eris does not appear in the *Theogonia*, my argument will naturally focus on the *Opera*, though supporting evidence can be drawn from the earlier text. It is not my intent to correct the traditional interpretations of Pandora's creation, or to suggest that Pandora was not in fact viewed by the gods, mankind, or the author himself as a malevolent being; to argue otherwise would be difficult, if not impossible. Rather, I hope to add a new interpretation to this oft-discussed episode.

In order to better situate the Pandora myth within its context in the *Opera*, we can begin with the disparate genealogies of

⁵ L. F. Doherty, *Gender and the Interpretation of Classical Myth* (London 2001) 127.

Eris in the two Hesiodic works. In the *Theogonia*, generally considered the earlier, Eris is described as *καρτερόθυμος*, “hard-hearted”; this is consistent with her characterization in the Homeric epics.⁶ This “Bad” Eris, which leads men and gods unceasingly into conflict (*Il.* 4.440, 5.518), is the same Eris portrayed in the *Theogonia*. She is *στυγερή*, “loathsome” (*Theog.* 226), and the daughter of Nux and sister to all manner of destructive forces (211–225); this again corresponds to the Homeric epics, which represent Nux and her progeny as being opposed to and beyond the control of the Olympian order (*Il.* 14.259–261). She appears only four other times in the *Theogonia* (637, 705, 710, 782), and twice she is given hostile epithets, *χαλεπή*, “grievous” (637), and *σμερδαλέος*, “terrible to look upon” (710). This Eris also appears prominently in the *Opera* in her Homeric guise as one who fosters wars and gives birth to battles and other contests, as at 14, *ἡ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμόν τε*

⁶ J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* (Paris 1985) 47, concurs, calling this Eris the “spirit of warlike activity” who “expresses the profound nature of the combatant.” Cf. *Il.* 4.439–445, where Eris is a companion in battle of Ares, Athena, Deimos, and Phobos, and 11.3–4, where she is the goddess sent by Zeus against the Achaian ships. The other mentions of Eris in the *Theog.* after 225 (637, 705, 710, 782) are clearly references to the Bad Eris. But even in the Homeric epics, while there is a decided inclination towards Eris as a harmful force, there is still no clear distinction between the Good and the Bad Eris. E. A. Havelock, “Thoughtful Hesiod,” *YCS* 20 (1966) 59–72, at 66–69, has argued persuasively that the roots of the Eris passage in the *Op.* lie in the *Iliad*, particularly those passages where Eris is portrayed as inciting the instincts of men in war, and that the *Op.* presents a culmination of thought on Eris, which begins with her character in the *Iliad*, continues through the rationalization of her genealogy seen in the *Theog.*, to the systematization of the two types of Eris in the *Op.* J. C. Hogan, “Eris in Homer,” *GrazBeitr* 10 (1981) 21–58, at 24, has disavowed any attempt to pigeonhole the Homeric Eris as either good or bad: the “greatest weakness in all studies [of the Homeric *ἔρις*] stems from the desire to find a single equivalent term common to as many contexts as it can be made to cover; at the same time connotative meaning and the type of context in which *ἔρις* occurs are treated inadequately.” Hogan also notes numerous instances of both positive and neutral meanings of *ἔρις* in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; cf. M. Gagarin, “The Ambiguity of Eris in the *Works and Days*,” in M. Griffith and D. Mastrorarde (eds.), *The Cabinet of the Muses* (Atlanta 1990) 173–183, at 182 n.11.

κακὸν καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλει, “for this one fosters evil war and battle,” and 29 (see below).

The *Opera* introduces a second Eris, however; this one causes men to compete with each other for the basic necessities for survival (20–26):

ἢ τε καὶ ἀπάλμόν περ ὅμως ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει
 εἰς ἕτερον γὰρ τίς τε ἰδὼν ἔργοιο χατίζων
 πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρώμεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν
 οἶκόν τ’ εὖ θέσθαι, ζηλοὶ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων
 εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ’· ἀγαθὴ δ’ Ἔρις ἠδὲ βροτοῖσιν·
 καὶ κερამεὺς κερამεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτωνι τέκτων,
 καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ.

She stirs up even the shiftless to toil; for man grows eager to work when he considers his neighbour, a rich man who hastens to plough and plant and put his house in good order; and neighbour vies with his neighbour as he hurries after wealth. This Strife is wholesome for men. And potter is angry with potter, and craftsman with craftsman, and beggar is jealous of beggar, and minstrel of minstrel.

The contrast between the two is made explicit at 28, where Perses is advised not to let the Strife which is κακόχαρτος, i.e. the Bad Eris, hold him back from the work of agriculture, which is brought about by the Good Eris (27–34):

ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα τεῷ ἐνικάτθεο θυμῷ,
 μηδέ σ’ Ἔρις κακόχαρτος ἀπ’ ἔργου θυμὸν ἐρύκοι
 νείκε’ ὀπιπεύοντ’ ἀγορῆς ἐπακουὸν ἔόντα.
 ὥρη γὰρ τ’ ὀλίγη πέλεται νεικέων τ’ ἀγορέων τε,
 ᾧτινι μὴ βίος ἔνδον ἐπηετανὸς κατάκειται
 ὠραῖος, τὸν γαῖα φέρει, Δημήτερος ἀκτῆν.
 τοῦ κε κορεσσάμενος νείκεα καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλοις
 κτήμασ’ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις.

Perses, lay up these things in your heart, and do not let that Strife who delights in mischief hold your heart back from work, while you peep and peer and listen to the wrangles of the courthouse. Little concern has he with quarrels and courts who has not a year’s victuals laid up betimes, even that which the earth bears, Demeter’s grain. When you have got plenty of that, you can raise disputes and strive to get another’s goods.

This introduction of a second, good Eris, appears to supplant,

and indeed contradicts, the account presented in the *Theogonia*. Some commentators have found this passage problematic, not least on the grounds that it is ambiguous as to which Eris, or indeed if it is either or both of them, causes the actions described in 27–34.⁷ Heath, however, has offered a convincing argument against the view that the text is in some way unsatisfactory.⁸ The second Eris, unknown in the *Theogonia*, must then be a purposeful creation, inherently important to the plot of the *Opera*.⁹

The placement of this new account of the Erides helps to explain, and indeed accentuates, its role in the overall narrative.¹⁰ The invocation of the Muses that begins the *Opera* includes the claim that Zeus is powerful because he can easily reverse a man's fortune; he acts as a sort of moderator of the human condition, reducing the excessively successful and bolstering the lowly (3–8).¹¹ Immediately after the exaltation of Zeus comes

⁷ In regard to the “birth certificate” of the Good Eris, as West calls it (*Works and Days* 144), the text does present a slight problem. At 17 the Good Eris is actually older (πρωτέην). I agree with West that this is merely a rhetorical gesture designed to increase the honor afforded to the Good Eris. While a change in punctuation might serve to alleviate the confusion, change here, as W. J. Verdenius, *A Commentary on Hesiod: Works and Days, vv. 1–382* (Leiden 1985) 21, has demonstrated, would remove any similarity the author of *Op.* may have intended with the account in *Theog.*

⁸ M. Heath, “Hesiod’s Didactic Poetry,” *CQ* 35 (1985) 245–263, at 245–248: the apparent inconsistency is not due to the author’s inability to think more than a few lines ahead; Heath sees rather a distinct and conscious division into three sections (1–381, 382–694, 695–828).

⁹ See especially Havelock, *JCS* 20 (1966) 62–65.

¹⁰ S. Nelson, *God and the Land* (Oxford 1998) 60, has in my view the best explanation of the two accounts: “Hesiod has managed to introduce, along with the two kinds of Strife, both the essential opposition of the *Works and Days*, and the ambiguity of that opposition ... Good and evil, in the *Works and Days*, are opposites, but not simply so. They are also twins.”

¹¹ As many commentators have pointed out, including U. von Wilamowitz-Mollendorff, *Hesiodos Erga* (Berlin 1928) 39–40, A. Rzach, *Hesiodi Carmina* (Leipzig 1913) 127, West, *Works and Days* 136–137, and Verdenius, *Commentary* 13, the proem was absent from many ancient editions. However, none of the reasons given for its exclusion refute its authenticity, or show its irrelevance to the rest of the poem, and so I see no reason not to assume that it has a meaning for the rest of the narrative. Indeed, a marginal note

the account of the two Erides, introduced by ἄρα, a particle whose confirmatory and successive nature helps establish a connection between the character of the Erides and the power of Zeus.

The particle, I propose, is key to interpreting the passage in question, as a survey of its use in the Hesiodic corpus suggests.¹² The explanatory and consequential force of the particle, meaning something like “and so,” is felt in each of these passages, and this strengthens the impression that the story of the Erides is related to the mediating power of Zeus described in the proem.¹³ The use of ἄρα elsewhere in the

in *Paris.gr.* 2771 (A. Pertusi, *Scholia vetera in Hesiodi Opera et Dies* [Milan 1955] no. 11), implies that the existence of the Good Eris is consciously related to the powers of Zeus described in the proem διὰ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸν σκοπὸν τοῦ γράμματος, “on account of the appropriateness and aim of the work.”

¹² Far from the profusion of ἄρα that J. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford 1954) 33, decries in Homeric epic, the particle appears only twelve times in the *Opera*: ἄρα at 11, 77, 79, 186; ἄρ' at 49, 132, 489, 784; ῥα at 124 (= 254) and 565; ῥ' at 258. Denniston says that “ἄρα is one of the commonest of all Homeric particles (B 413–17 and τ 435–66 are instances of the almost reckless profusion with which it is used) ... the freshness of ἄρα, in Epic, may be to some extent staled by constant repetition, so that it sinks almost to the level of a mere Epic formula.” Indeed, there are over 1800 occurrences of ἄρα in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, a ratio of 1:14.9 lines in the *Iliad* and an almost identical 1:16.2 in the *Odyssey*. For the two Hesiodic works, however, the ratio is smaller: 1:20.85 in *Theog.*, the more Homeric of the two, and an atypical 1:69 in *Op.* The implication with regard to the Hesiodic corpus, particularly *Op.*, is that the particle has a much more specific meaning here than in the Homeric texts.

¹³ This is the generic definition of the article presented by H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge [Mass.] 1920) 635 §2787; see also Nelson, *God and the Land* 61 n.11. Thus, for instance, in *Op.* 77 and 79 Hermes endows Pandora with his own attributes because Zeus has so ordered; here there is surely no element of surprise or discovery. This meaning of ἄρα agrees with most of the instances in *Theog.* Denniston, *Greek Particles* 32, makes clear that the primary use of ἄρα, “expressing a lively feeling of interest,” is “extremely common” in epic and narrative (especially Herodotus and Xenophon), and this is perhaps the sense that one should understand at *Op.* 11. Yet he places 11 under his discussion of the ἄρα that indicates the “surprise attendant upon disillusionment.” D. B. Munro, *A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect* (Oxford 1891) 316, however, gave the Homeric ἄρα a universal meaning of consequence or explanation, making explicit that “the

Theogonia similarly avoids the implication of surprise or discovery that is so common in Homer.

There is no indication here that we are to view this ἄρα as indicating a state of affairs that is a surprise to anyone, with the possible exception of Perses.¹⁴ It is important to note what precedes the introduction of the Erides: ἐγὼ δέ κε Πέσση ἐτήμυτα μῦθησαίμην, “and now I would say true things to Perses” (10). This appears to be an implicit and important allusion to *Theog.* 27–28. In that passage, it is said that the Muses can make truth appear false and falsehoods appear truthful as their spirit moves them.¹⁵ The Muses are still the

ordinary place of ἄρα is at the beginning of a Clause which expresses what is consequent upon something already said.” LSJ is silent on this, but does give ἄρα a broad sense of consequence or mere succession, with all attendant non-Classical meanings as derivations of the initial definition. Except for Denniston, the literature is largely silent on epic ἄρα; P. Chantraine, *Grammaire homérique* (Paris 1953) II 340, does not cover the particle by itself, only in conjunction with τε to mark uncertainty, and A. Rijksbaron (ed.), *New Approaches to Greek Particles* (Amsterdam 1997), has almost no references to the particle. To the best of my knowledge, the only in-depth treatment of epic ἄρα post-Denniston is J. Grimm, “Die Partikel *ara* im frühen griechischen Epos,” *Glotta* 40 (1962) 3–41, which does not mention the Hesiodic corpus at all.

¹⁴ The comments of E. Bakker, “Storytelling in the Future: Truth, Time, and Tenses in Homeric Epic,” in E. Bakker and A. Kahane (eds.), *Written Voices, Spoken Signs: Tradition, Performance, and the Epic Text* (Cambridge 1997) 17–23, concerning Homeric ἄρα bear repeating (*italics original*): “They [*ara* and *mellein*] may be characterized, in their Homeric use, as markers of *visual evidence in the here and now of the speaker*; more precisely, they mark the *interpretation* of such visual evidence. This interpretation turns the visual evidence into a *sign* that points to a *previous experience or perception* in the past that in its turn transforms the experience/perception in the present into a *re-experience*, the interpretation and understanding of the past in the present.” Perses’ behavior is the catalyst for the author’s revelation. The quarrel and unjust judgment, whether real or metaphorical, have caused the author to revise his belief (expressed in *Theog.*) that there was only one Eris. While not an indication of surprise, ἄρα here implies, in Bakker’s words, that “previous consciousness is characterized by ignorance, just as the present consciousness is a matter of understanding, and the significance of the present speech-act derives precisely from this contrast.”

¹⁵ See also M. N. Nagler, “Discourse and Conflict in Hesiod: Eris and the Erides,” *Ramus* 21 (1992), 79–96, at 82–84. He rightly points out that the

inspiration in the *Opera*, and the implication of *Op.* 10 is that an announcement is being made to the audience/Perses that what the Muses are about to relate is the truth spoken as truth. The opening of 11, οὐκ ἄρα μούνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, would then mean something like “And, contrary to what you might think, Perses, there are in fact two kinds of Strife in the world.”

In support of the idea of surprise in 11, much has also been made of the use of ἄρα with the imperfect ἔην. West believes that “the imperfect is used because, although the speaker is talking of the actual state of affairs as it now appears to him, he is more struck by the fact that it was so before, when it seemed otherwise.”¹⁶ Several scholars, however, have made convincing arguments to the contrary. Sinclair urged that “it is unnecessary to see any allusion to *Theog.* 225 ... the imperfect with ἄρα expresses what was true all along and still is.”¹⁷ Mezzadri claims that the two Erides are not to be considered two separate deities but merely diverse aspects of the single Eris of the *Theogonia*, similar in this respect to Roman Fortuna. Peabody rejects the notion that ἄρα here indicates anything but the introduction of a new chapter in the story: “the development sign par excellence is ἄρα,” which “functions like a cut in a motion picture sequence. It always marks a shift in view or focus, but never an absolute beginning ... the particle ἄρα, the phonic bias, and the responsions show that the Strife Passage is, not the beginning of the text, but a section of develop-

Muses make no intimation that they can speak falsehoods that sound like falsehoods, and draws the conclusion that for a poet to sing untruths that are unconvincing would indicate that he had failed to invoke the power of the Muses at all.

¹⁶ *Works and Days* 143. Verdenius, *Commentary* 16, like West holds that whoever the author of the text was, he is now suddenly struck by the recognition that he was wrong to include only one Eris in *Theog.*; cf. Smyth, *Greek Grammar* 636 §2795.

¹⁷ T. J. Sinclair, *Hesiod: Works and Days* (London 1932) ad loc.; cf. Nagler, *Ramus* 21 (1992) 87–90. Conversely, Nagler posits that there is only one Eris which can “break in one direction or the other,” and the passage merely shows that the narrative is leaving the world of the immortals and “devolving” to the world of men; cf. J. S. Clay, *Hesiod's Cosmos* (Cambridge 2003) 8–9, arguing that “a fuller understanding of Eris must embrace both the divine and human perspectives.”

ment.”¹⁸

Reading *Op.* 11 as I have proposed solidifies the connection of the proem with the exposition of the two types of Eris and the admonition to Perses that immediately follows it. The two Erides have opposite roles in the world: the Bad one leads men into war and unproductive conflict in the law-courts and agora, while the Good Eris causes a man to engage in honest and fruitful labor in the fields. The two sisters balance each other, much as the will of Zeus maintains a balance between pride and humility, fame and infamy (3–8). As Pucci has observed, there is a theme of opposition and complement throughout the *Opera*.¹⁹ Thus, as the poet informs his audience, there is room for both Erides in life, so long as one attends to the Good one first (33–35).

Attending to the Good Eris means working intensely to store up enough grain and supplies to provide for oneself and the family. Labor, though bemoaned as a negative condition of the current, fifth race of mankind, is nevertheless the highest good, a praiseworthy and noble endeavor that makes a man more dear to the immortal gods (303–309). Labor, a divine gift from Zeus, is the domain of the Good Eris, yet labor did not exist until Pandora’s arrival. Both entities are responsible for mankind’s labor, and the descriptions of their characters are conjoined thematically and linguistically, as we shall see: accordingly I would argue that Pandora and the Good Eris, while not to be understood as the same creature (Pandora is surely no longer physically present), do possess the same function in the world of man.

Thus there are two Erides, each providing a counterpart to the other, just as Zeus himself serves as the bridge between success and failure in the world of man. The judgment of Zeus is dispensed as the god himself sees fit (4, Διὸς μέγαλοιο ἔκητι), and one of the recurrent motifs of the Hesiodic works is that it is impossible to escape the will of Zeus (*Theog.* 613, *Op.* 105). It

¹⁸ B. Mezzadri, “La double Eris initiale,” *Métis* 4 (1989) 51–60; B. Peabody, *The Winged Word* (Albany 1975) 473 n.46.

¹⁹ P. Pucci, *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry* (Baltimore 1977), especially 105–115.

appears, however, that allowing the Good Eris to guide a man is the way to avoid Zeus passing judgment against him. A man should resist the temptation of the Bad Eris and avoid the agora and the law courts, and instead let the Good Eris lead him to the fields in order to gather plenty of grain (27–32). Once he has secured abundant stores of food and other necessities, he is free to become a follower of the Bad Eris (33–35), and when this happens he runs the risk of being too proud or successful, a harbinger of possible intervention by Zeus.²⁰ The Good Eris, then, forces a man to focus on his own well-being, and does not allow time for accumulation of exorbitant wealth but conversely will provide a sufficient livelihood. The Good Eris thus leads a man in a more moderate path of life.

The theme of temperance continues with the story of Prometheus. The location of the story seems to reinforce the condemnation of Pandora as reflected in the uncomplimentary language applied to her. She appears between the admonition to the βασιλεις δωροφάγοι (27–42) and the lament about the current despicable and overworked race of men. Not only are the kings avaricious and susceptible to bribery, but mankind has reached its nadir. Four incarnations have come and gone, and the fifth is such that the poet wishes he had never been born (174–175). This race, poisoned by the πόνος brought about by the advent of Pandora (and, it seems, the γένος γυναικῶν of *Theog.* 590–591), is forced to spend its entire existence eking out a meager living by constant toil (90–201). The world of the poet is filled with iniquity, bleak, and burdened with excruciating labor, and the author clearly connects the advent of Pandora with this labor.

²⁰ It may well be that the author is being ironic in 33–34; Perses could in theory be free to attend the law-courts and engage in quarrels to his heart's content if he should ever put away enough grain to support himself (τοῦ κε κορεσσάμενος), but in fact he never will. E. F. Beall, "The Plow that Broke the Plain Epic Tradition: Hesiod *Works and Days*, vv. 414–503," *CLAnt* 23 (2004) 1–32, at 2 n.1, has pointed out a parallel at *Il.* 22.427, where Priam says that he and Hecuba would have had a glut of mourning had Hector died at home (τῷ κε κορεσσάμεθα). This must be counterfactual, as Hector died on the battlefield. The sense appears to be the same at *Op.* 33, which would fit with my interpretation of this passage.

Zeus has hidden the means of life, the βίος, from men. This is the penalty man must pay for the trickery of Prometheus at Mecone. Prometheus, however, avenged man by stealing the immortal fire from Olympus, for which transgression Zeus decides to give man a κακόν that will prove to be their destruction. Thus enters Pandora. Both Hesiodic poems claim that Pandora is the price men pay for fire, and the verbal similarities of *Theog.* 570 (αὐτίκα δ' ἀντὶ πυρὸς τεύξεν κακὸν ἀνθρώποισιν) and *Op.* 57 (τοῖς δ' ἐγὼ ἀντὶ πυρὸς δώσω κακόν, ᾧ κεν ἅπαντες τέρπωνται) are striking: the two works apparently are drawing upon the same source, if not each other. In each case, Pandora is the final misery given to man for the audacity and insubordination of Prometheus.

Yet man is left with the means to recover the βίος, through the χαλεπὸς πόνος of *Op.* 91. This “harsh toil,” though described as a bane to humanity, is in fact the only remaining means of survival. The βίος, instead of being abundant and readily available, is now hidden, and the earth must be worked through harsh labor in order to draw out the sustenance. The introduction of Ponos among men presents the first of three strong parallels which link Pandora and the Good Eris.

In the *Theogonia*, Ponos is one of the many descendants of Nux, specifically the child of Eris (225–226). As stated above, the Eris of the *Theogonia* can only be the Bad Eris of the *Opera*. This should not be surprising, since all manner of destructive afflictions appear in this passage. Eris is said to have born many harmful creatures, most of which have military connotations: thus tearful Pains, Fights, Battles, Murders, Slaughters, Feuds (227–229, Ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα Ὑσμῖνας τε Μάχας τε Φόνους τ' Ἄνδροκτασίας τε Νείκεα). The rest of the children, save Lethe and Limos, also reflect conflict, but are more pertinent to the politics of the agora from which the author wants to dissuade Perses. Ponos, then, as it appears in the *Theogonia*, seems to be related to physical or mental conflict, with no clear connotation of or connection to physical labor.²¹

²¹ In Homer *ponos* is used quite often of the toil of war, or as a synonym for war itself, e.g. *Il.* 6.77, 16.568, *Od.* 12.117; LSJ provides many more examples from the Homeric corpus. Herodotus also uses it to refer to par-

In the *Opera*, however, *ponos* must imply daily work. It is, after all, a life of *ponos* that is the result of Pandora's creation. Twice Hesiod uses νόσφιν πόνουο of the time before Pandora's arrival (91, 113). It follows that Pandora brought *ponos* to the world of men. This much would find wide agreement among scholars. While *ponos* does carry a negative aspect in all occurrences, however, it makes little sense for *ponos*, in the context of the *Opera*, to have only its epic connotation of war or something akin to war; Pandora did not bring war to mankind, but unceasing toil. While *ergon* and *ponos* cannot be substituted as exact synonyms (as at *Op.* 20, for example), it does appear that the author intends for *ponos* to refer to "labor/work."²²

Man is fated to work constantly for survival now that Pandora has arrived. This point is hammered home at 382, καὶ ἔργον ἐπ' ἔργῳ ἐργάζεσθαι, "work with work upon work." That ἔργον is a product of the Good Eris cannot be in doubt; this is explicit at 20–26. Thus in the *Opera*, *ponos* and *ergon* are closely related. The results of both are the same: man works hard in order to have sufficient livelihood to survive. The Good Eris rouses men to work, and men did not have to work before the advent of Pandora. From this evidence, it would not be overreaching to see a conflation of the Good Eris and Pandora.

A second parallel between Pandora and the Good Eris occurs in 85–89: Epimetheus receives into his house Pandora, described as a δῶρον, against the advice of Prometheus, who had warned his foresight-lacking brother not to accept any gift from Zeus lest it prove to be something harmful (85–87). Pandora is here both a κακόν and a δῶρον.²³ Only after accepting her,

ticular battles or wars, including the Trojan War (9.27.4) and the battles of Marathon (7.113–114), Thermopylae (7.224), and Salamis (8.74, 9.15).

²² N. Loraux, "Ponos: sur quelques difficultés de la peine comme nom du travail," *AION (archeol)* 4 (1982) 171–192, at 171, says that the most obvious approximation of *ponos* in French is *travail*, labor.

²³ No special importance is implied by the use of δῶρον as a companion to κακόν here. As a description of Pandora it need carry no more weight than to designate her as a gift from the gods, as δῶρον is used of any divine gift (*Op.* 614, δῶρα Διωνύσου; *Theog.* 103, δῶρα θεάων [the Muses]; 399, of the gifts Zeus gave to honor Styx; 412, of the honors given to Hecate by

however, does Epimetheus understand what she is (89, αὐτὰρ ὁ δεξάμενος, ὅτε δὴ κακὸν εἶχ', ἐνόησεν).²⁴ ἐνόησεν here serves to echo what was said about the Good Eris in 12: men praise her once they understand her (εἰσὶ δὺω· τὴν μὲν κεν ἐπαινέσσειε νοήσας.)²⁵ A gift that at first appeared to be an evil has turned out to be a blessing for men, as she allows man the means to obtain βίος from the earth.²⁶

In the *Opera* νοέω is relatively uncommon, used only eight times and only within the first 296 lines.²⁷ In each instance the verb implies understanding true things, or at least attaining the truth, whether it is followed or not.²⁸ Thus the author will “tell

Zeus). On the gifts of the gods in Hesiod, see Pucci, *Language* 1–6 and 96–101.

²⁴ Verdenius, *Commentary* 62, argues, against West, that δὴ cannot be equivalent to ἤδη, and thus the acts of accepting and understanding should be understood as contemporaneous; E. F. Beall, “Hesiod’s Prometheus and Development in Myth,” *JHI* 52 (1991) 355–371, at 363 n.44, agrees with Verdenius as part of a much larger discussion of Epimetheus’ character. Pucci, *Language* 94, disagrees, as do I: in *Op.*, δὴ seems to imply serial actions, not simultaneous, e.g. at 121, where a similar construction leaves no doubt that the silver race comes after the golden race has been covered by the earth.

²⁵ This association was noted briefly by Wilamowitz, *Erga* ad loc. Cf. J.-P. Vernant, “Le mythe hésiodique des races,” *RPhil* 40 (1966) 247–276, at 254, who claims that Zeus purposefully gives to Pandora an ambiguous form that mirrors that of Eris; Pandora is an evil, but a delightful one.

²⁶ J.-P. Vernant, *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece* (transl. J. Lloyd, New York 1990) 196, even goes so far as to say that Pandora corresponds to βίος, since the belly of a woman is like the belly of the earth in that man must plow it in order to get the βίος hidden inside.

²⁷ *Op.* 12, 89, 202, 261, 267, 286, 293, 296.

²⁸ This is also the meaning reflected in the only two instances in the *Theogonia*. *Theog.* 488–490 tells how Cronus did not know in his heart that he had just swallowed a stone instead of Zeus (οὐδ’ ἐνόησε μετὰ φρεσὶν ὥς οἱ ὀπίσσω ἀντὶ λίθου ἐὸς υἱὸς ἀνίκητος καὶ ἀκηδῆς λείπεθ’). Similarly, at 836–838 the verb speaks to Zeus’s ability to understand everything, “And truly a thing past help would have happened on that day, and he [Typhoeus] would have come to reign over mortals and immortals, had not the father of men and gods been quick to perceive it” (καὶ νῦ κεν ἐπλετο ἔργον ἀμήχανον ἥματι κείνῳ καὶ κεν ὄ γε θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀναξεν, εἰ μὴ ἄρ’ ὄξυ νόησε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε).

a fable for princes who themselves understand” (202, νῦν δ’ αἶνον βασιλεῦσιν ἐρέω νοέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς).²⁹ The fable is presented as a universal truth that Perses has apparently failed to understand: fostering violence is bad (213). The eye of Zeus understands everything (267, πάντα νοήσας), and so too does Hesiod, at least compared with his brother (286, σοὶ δ’ ἐγὼ ἐσθλὰ νοέων ἐρέω). Finally, it is made clear that a man who understands things for himself is best (293, οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτῷ πάντα νοήσει), and whoever does not understand things for himself will be unprofitable (296–297, ὃς δέ κε μήτ’ αὐτῷ νοέη μήτ’ ἄλλου ἀκούων ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ’ αὖτ’ ἀχρήσιος ἀνήρ).

As the author takes pains to point out throughout the *Opera*, the only way to prosper is through hard and honest labor. It is the Good Eris that rouses a man to work, though men did not have to do so before Pandora’s arrival. The choice of the same verb, νοέω, for understanding the two entities that bring about labor, given its meaning throughout the text, strengthens the correspondence between Pandora and the Good Eris.

The third parallel involves the notorious *pithos* of *Op.* 90–105. The traditional view is that Pandora was given a large jar filled with a myriad of evils which she opened, unleashing all manner of ills upon mankind.³⁰ But this may not be the only possible reading. Particularly suggestive is Girard’s proposal that the jar was conceived as containing not evils, but various apotropaic

²⁹ φρονέουσι traditionally read in 202 has been supplanted by νοέουσι, attested by a papyrus: H. Maehler, “Neue Fragmente eines Hesiodpapyrus in West-Berlin,” *ZPE* 15 (1974) 195–206, supported by W. J. Verdenius, “Three Notes on the *Works and Days*,” *Mnemosyne* 28 (1975) 190–191.

³⁰ For example, S. Byrne, “Ἐλπίς in *Works and Days* 90–105,” *SyllClass* 9 (1998) 37–46, at 41 n.10, and Arrighetti, *Esiodo* 414. Thus West, *Works and Days* 169–172, argues that it is the addition of the *pithos* that truly explains the fall from Elysian conditions to those that Hesiod knew. Leinieks, *Philologus* 128 (1984) 4, supports A. Lebègue, *Notes de mythologie grecque* (Bordeaux 1885) 250: ἐλπίς means “l’attente du mal,” an “expectation of evil,” and is kept away from men by being imprisoned in the jar. D. Ogden, “What Was in Pandora’s Box?” in N. Fisher and H. van Wees (eds.), *Archaic Greece: New Approaches and New Evidence* (London 1998) 213–230, makes one of the more extraordinary claims about the contents of the *pithos*, that it held a *teras*-baby, which makes it akin to the vessel that held the infant Erichthonius.

demons, and that opening the jar actually allowed these beneficent creatures to flee to Olympus and away from man, thereby freeing the evils which were already in existence from any restrictions.³¹ He cites a fable of Babrius (58) in which Zeus put all good things into a jar which he then entrusted to man (Ζεὺς ἐν πίθῳ τὰ χρηστὰ πάντα συλλέξας ἔθηκεν αὐτὸν πωμάσας παρ' ἀνθρώπῳ).

Further support can be found in an epigram of Macedonius: he does not blame Pandora for the problems that beset mankind but rather the wings of the good things that originally resided in the jar (Πανδώρης ὀρόων γελῶ πῖθον, οὐδὲ γυναικα μέφομαι, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν τὰ πτερὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν).³² Since at least the 1950's, as the Panofskys have demonstrated, scholarly opin-

³¹ P. Girard, "Le mythe de Pandore dans la poésie hésiodique," *REG* 22 (1909) 217–230, at 229–230. This conclusion was reiterated forcefully by E. F. Beall, "The Contents of Hesiod's Pandora Jar: Erga 94–98," *Hermes* 117 (1989) 227–230. D. and E. Panofsky, *Pandora's Box: the Changing Aspects of a Mythical Symbol* (New York 1956) 8, call attention to the fact that the jar is never depicted as being brought by Pandora to earth, and in a variant of the myth it was brought to Epimetheus by Prometheus (who got it from some satyrs) with the order not to accept Pandora. Indeed, since a *pithos* was certainly too large to be considered portable (the influence of Erasmus' mistranslation of *pyxis* for *πίθος* notwithstanding), it appears that the jar must have been in Prometheus' possession when Pandora arrived. If it was already there, the argument that Zeus sent the evils with her becomes tenuous.

³² *Anth.Gr.* 10.71; J. A. Madden, *Macedonius Consul* (Spudasmata 60 [1995]) 223–232. But W. J. Verdenius, "A 'Hopeless' Line in Hesiod, *Works and Days* 96," *Mnemosyne* 24 (1971) 225–231, at 226–228, reasons that Babrius and other later authors must have contaminated their sources with variants: the *pithos* was in fact intended as a sort of prison which would keep Elpis, defined here as the "expectation of evil," away from the world of men. So too Lebègue, *Notes* 250, who argues that Zeus felt pity for mankind on seeing the evils leave the jar, and so willed Pandora to shut the lid in order to keep Elpis, the "premonition of evil, and the worst of them all," permanently imprisoned. Thus, while men do have "hope," they are unaware of the coming of evils, especially diseases (*Op.* 103–104). For ἐλπίς as "expectation of evil" cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 899, Soph. *Trach.* 951, *Aj.* 1382, and *OT* 487, 1432. The use of ἄνθρωπος in Babr. 58 is initially striking for its possible implication that it was Epimetheus, not Pandora, who opened the jar. However, ἄνθρωπος meaning "woman" was in use regularly after the fifth century, cf. LSJ s.v. II.

ion has tended more and more towards acceptance of Babrius' version of the myth as reflecting the original story which the author of the *Opera* modified for his narrative.³³

That the contents of the jar flew away from mankind and did not remain among men is paralleled in a similar passage at 197–201. The fifth race of men will be destroyed when Aidos and Nemesis, whom West recognizes as forces that inhibit wickedness, depart the earth for Olympus, leaving behind only the evils to fly among men:³⁴

καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς Ὀλυμπον ἀπὸ χθονὸς εὐρουδείης
 λευκοῖσιν φάρεσσι καλυψαμένω χροά καλὸν
 ἀθανάτων μετὰ φύλον ἴτον προλιπόντ' ἀνθρώπους
 Αἰδὼς καὶ Νέμεσις· τὰ δὲ λείπεται ἄλγεα λυγρὰ
 θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι, κακοῦ δ' οὐκ ἔσσειται ἀλκή.

And then Aidos and Nemesis, with their sweet forms wrapped in white robes, will go from the wide-pathed earth and forsake mankind to join the company of the deathless gods: and bitter sorrows will be left for mortal men, and there will be no help against evil.

In this passage, men are left with evils once the remaining apotropaic creatures have left. It can be inferred that while the good things were among mankind, the evils were kept away. But in a replay of the opening of the *pythos*, when Aidos and Nemesis flee their own jar, as it were, they abandon mankind, who are left with a harsher existence. The same sentiment is expressed in 94–101:

³³ Panofsky, *Pandora's Box* 6.

³⁴ West, *Works and Days* ad loc. Gagarin, in Griffith/Mastrorade, *Cabinet* 179–180, has perceptive comments on the duality of αἰδώς, both as a force that leads to poverty (*Op.* 317–319) and an unspecified boon relating to riches (320–326). Though it does not appear that two separate and distinct incarnations are intended, the analyses presented for ἔρις and αἰδώς “are similar in their emphasis on the duality and ambiguity of concepts whose traditional evaluation was unambiguous ... Hesiod's purpose, in fact, is not to resolve but to affirm [the tension between following the rules of life and the perceived arbitrariness of Zeus's justice] and to reveal its presence in language as well as human affairs.”

ἄλλα γυνὴ χεῖρεςσι πίθου μέγα πῶμ' ἀφελούσα
 ἐσκέδασ', ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἐμήσατο κήδεα λυγρὰ.
 μούνη δ' αὐτόθι Ἑλπίς ἐν ἀρρήκτοισι δόμοισιν
 ἔνδον ἔμεινε πίθου ὑπὸ χεῖλεσιν οὐδὲ θύραζε
 ἔξεπτη· πρόσθεν γὰρ ἐπέμβαλε πῶμα πίθου
 αἰγιόχου βουλήσι Διὸς νεφεληγερέταο.
 ἄλλα δὲ μυρία λυγρὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀλάληται·
 πλείη μὲν γὰρ γαῖα κακῶν, πλείη δὲ θάλασσα.

But the woman took off the great lid of the jar with her hands and scattered all these and her thought caused sorrow and mischief to men. Only Hope remained there in an unbreakable home within under the rim of the great jar, and did not fly out at the door; for ere that, the lid of the jar stopped her, by the plans of aegis-holding Zeus who gathers the clouds. But the rest, countless plagues, wander amongst men; for earth is full of evils and the sea is full.

I find further support for Girard's hypothesis in the introductory ἄλλα at 100. Instead of implying that the contents of the jar were negative, this line details the result of Pandora's action with no reference to the contents of the jar. It is because the *πίθος* was opened that a myriad of wicked things are now free to roam among men. West takes ἄλλα to mean that Elpis is not one of the λυγρὰ mentioned by Hesiod, a position earlier taken by Hays.³⁵ If, however, Pandora was supposed to bring nothing but evil to the world of men, it seems odd that she would slam the cover back on the *πίθος* just in time to keep Elpis trapped. Against Girard's reading it can be objected that what were left in the jar were νοῦσοι (92, 102), which must be considered harmful. The problem with this section of the narrative is whether Elpis was good or evil, and why it is kept in the jar.³⁶

³⁵ West, *Works and Days* ad loc.; H. B. Hays, *Notes on the Works and Days of Hesiod* (Chicago 1918) 89–90. Hays further notes that ἄλλα implies that innumerable other things are in the jar besides Elpis, all of which are evils.

³⁶ The problem has no easy solution, as the discussion of I. Musäus, *Der Pandoramythos bei Hesiod und seine Rezeption bis Erasmus von Rotterdam* (Göttingen 2004) 13–30, indicates. For example, F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (Ithaca 1949) 83: "I must confess that I am still unable to understand Hesiod's idea that Hope remained in Pandora's jar." A. S. F. Gow, "Elpis and Pandora in Hesiod's *Works and Days*," in E. C. Quiggin (ed.), *Essays and Studies presented to*

The lack of emphasis on Elpis in the rest of the *Opera* (only two further references, 498 and 500) seems to indicate that while Pandora did not cause grief for mankind by keeping Elpis in the jar, she also did it no great favor either. Elpis seems to be fundamentally neutral.³⁷

The question then becomes why the author troubled to mention Elpis by name when the other evils remain both nameless and voiceless. Girard's proposal removes the confusion, though it seems to make Elpis the prime averter of evil, a role admittedly unsupported in the text. Knox's comments are appropriate: "we should not, however, be looking for logic here" since "Aristotle has not yet invented the syllogism or excluded contradictions."³⁸ There are contradictions in the narrative, but they need not overshadow its meaning for the audience.³⁹

William Ridgeway (Cambridge 1913) 99–109, at 100, remarks that this passage is in "sad confusion," and citing other sources (Babrius, Macedonius, Philodemus, Nonnus), takes the novel step of separating the story of the *pitios* from the Pandora story. Leinieks, *Philologus* 128 (1984) 7, following Gow's suggestion, and not disputing the negative implications that Pandora caused evils in the world by engendering the race of women (so *Theog.* 570–602), calls *Op.* 90–104 an αἴτιος "complete in and by itself" to explain why evils come unexpectedly; it was attached to the Pandora story simply because a woman was the protagonist and evils were the result in both cases. R. Lauriola, "Ἐλπίς e la giara di Pandora (Hes. op. 90–104): il bene e il male nella vita dell'uomo," *Maia* 52 (2000) 9–18, at 12, has commented that the very act of opening the jar gives rise not only to evils but also to an instrument with which to combat them, ἐλπίς, and that the good brought by the trapped ἐλπίς forms a positive counterbalance to the existence of woman and the resulting increase in labor.

³⁷ J.-P. Vernant, "The Myth of Prometheus in Hesiod," in R. I. Gordon (ed.), *Myth, Religion, and Society* (Cambridge 1981) 43–56, at 55–56, while believing that the jar contains evils, gives strong evidence for Elpis' ambiguity. P. J. de La Combe and A. Lernould, "Sur la Pandore des *Travaux*," in F. Blaise et al. (eds.), *Le métier du mythe* (Villeneuve d'Ascq 1996) 301–313, at 313, and Arrighetti, *Esiodo* 414, have subscribed to this reading, particularly in reference to *Op.* 498–500, where the author implies that ἐλπίς is ostensibly good but functionally useless. Cf. R. F. Meagher, *The Meaning of Helen* (Wauconda 1995) 152 n.44: the Hope of the *Opera* "is accorded little if any significance ... [it] is nothing but a fossil from a forgotten time."

³⁸ B. M. W. Knox, *Essays Ancient and Modern* (Baltimore 1989) 17.

³⁹ As Doherty, *Gender* 127–151, argues through a poststructural reading of the narrative.

What is at issue is the result of Pandora's arrival, which is the introduction of work and toil among men.⁴⁰ As the discussion of ἄλλα in 100 has demonstrated, there are a lot of things in the jar. Zeus often mixes the good with the bad, as the famous scene in the *Iliad* relates (*Il.* 24.525–533):

ὥς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι
ζῶειν ἀχνυμένοις. αὐτοὶ δὲ τ' ἀκηδέες εἰσί.
δοιοὶ γὰρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
δώρων οἷα δίδωσι κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἑάων.
ᾧ μὲν κ' ἀμμίξας δῶη Ζεὺς τερπικέρανος,
ἄλλοτε μὲν τε κακῶ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλῶ.
ᾧ δὲ κε τῶν λυγρῶν δῶη, λωβητὸν ἔθηκε,
καὶ ἐ κακῆ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα διὰν ἐλαύνει,
φοιτᾶ δ' οὔτε θεοῖσι τετιμένος οὔτε βροτοῖσιν.

Such is the way the gods spun life for unfortunate mortals, that we live in unhappiness, but the gods themselves have no sorrows. There are two urns that stand on the door-sill of Zeus. They are unlike for the gifts they bestow: an urn of evils, an urn of blessings. If Zeus who delights in thunder mingles these and bestows them on man, he shifts, and moves now in evil, again in good fortune. But when Zeus bestows from the urn of sorrows, he makes a failure of man, and the evil hunger drives him over the shining earth, and he wanders respected neither of gods nor mortals.⁴¹

The interpretation that Pandora's jar contained nothing good seems to be implied from at least the second century, for Plutarch says: "Hesiod ... also confines the evils in a great urn and represents Pandora as opening it" (Ἡσίοδος, καὶ οὗτος ἐν πίθῳ

⁴⁰ Cf. F. J. Teggart, "The Argument of Hesiod's *Works and Days*," *JHI* 8 (1947) 45–77, at 47, who makes this argument central to his assessment of the text.

⁴¹ Text D. B. Monro and T. W. Allen, *Homeri Opera: Iliadis XIII–XXIV* (Oxford 1962), transl. R. Lattimore, *The Iliad of Homer* (Chicago 1951) 489. There has been a long-standing connection between Pandora's *pithos* and the *pithoi* of Zeus. Knowledge of these lines by the author of *Op.* was posited by a scholiast (Pertusi 94a); Lendle, *Pandorasage* 109–112, suggests that the *pithos* story was the author's own invention but based on the *Il.* passage.

κατείξας τὰ κακά, τὴν Πανδώραν ἀνοίξασαν ἀποφαίνει).⁴²

The divine being mentioned in the *Opera* who also brings good with bad is Eris. In the introduction of the two Erides it was said that the Good Eris raises even the shiftless man to toil (20). It emerges that a woman does the same thing.⁴³ Until Pandora was given to Epimetheus, men were νόσφιν ... χαλεποῖο πόνιοι, “far from hard toil” (91). After the appearance of the first woman, man must now spend his days attempting to draw βίος from the earth.⁴⁴ West touches on this point briefly: “Hesiod may have embarked on the description of the making of Pandora ... with the idea of accounting for the need to work simply from the existence of women.”⁴⁵ However, according to West, it is in reality the evils that come from the jar that are the cause of man’s toil, not the creation of the first woman. But the text seems to imply otherwise. Line 91 notwithstanding, the passage elaborates on the contents of the jar by stating that whatever these νοῦσοι were, they wander silently among men, surprising them since Zeus took away their power of speech (102–104). Yet nowhere is it implied that the necessity of labor is a surprise, that like the diseases sprung from Pandora’s *pithos* πόνος appears unannounced. Nor is work necessarily an evil: ἔργον δ’ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ’ ὄνειδος, “work is no

⁴² *Mor.* 105D–E. Cf. Panofsky, *Pandora’s Box* 50–52; Musäus, *Pandoramythos* 131, 135–136.

⁴³ L. B. Quaglia, *Gli Erga di Esiodo* (Turin 1973) 80–83, also sees a connection with the Prometheus/Pandora myth and the workings of the two Erides, based on γάρ in 42 which she believes connects this myth with 11–41.

⁴⁴ The Pandora of the *Opera* must be considered the first woman, even though she is not explicitly called this (contrast *Theog.* 590). If women already existed, then Zeus’s creation of Pandora would seem a highly unlikely source of subterfuge. In addition, if it is to be argued that Pandora is not the first woman, then the implication is that women do not have any bearing on a man’s life of toil, which is repeatedly contradicted (*Op.* 373–375, 586, 695–705, 753–755).

⁴⁵ West, *Works and Days* 155. De la Combe and Lernoùl, in Blaise, *Le métier* 308, believe that the evils that result from Pandora’s unlocking the *pithos* do not concern work, nor can they be ameliorated by the productive activity of a virtuous man, a view also expressed by Lauriola, *Maia* 52 (2000) 11.

disgrace: it is idleness which is a disgrace" (311), a sentiment echoed in 314, τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι ἄμεινον, "working is better." Toil is not in and of itself a boon for man; but toil brings wealth, which is a boon because it can provide at least a temporary release from labor. The genesis of woman thus corresponds to the advent of the Good Eris among mortals.

The association of Pandora and the Good Eris is reinforced in the long exegetical passage known as the Myth of the Five Ages, which implies that the Good Eris came after the Bad Eris. The relationship between the Myth of the Five Ages and the myth of Pandora has proven problematic for more than one commentator, mainly on the argument that time is subjective, relative only to the person and the circumstance. But we should not dismiss this section of the story as merely a rhetorical device designed to make the author's warnings to Perses more easily understandable.⁴⁶ The suggestion of Most seems correct, that the author of the *Opera* was aware of the difficulty in revising the Pandora myth of the *Theogonia* for inclusion in this later work, and that the Myth of the Five Ages is not "an appendage to the myth of Prometheus, but rather a corrective."⁴⁷ However, the two myths juxtaposed in *Op.* 47–212, while representing alternate expressions of reality, do serve a common purpose, as Fontenrose has urged: the Pandora myth details how and why Zeus ordained work for man, and the Five Ages support this doctrine and illustrate clearly the results of

⁴⁶ On the problems of reconciling the Pandora myth with the Myth of the Five Ages, see J. Fontenrose, "Work, Justice, and Hesiod's Five Ages," *CP* 69 (1974) 1–16, at 1–2, and West, *Works and Days* 172–177, who hold that the two myths are incompatible. Others, e.g. K. von Fritz, "Pandora, Prometheus, and the Myth of the Ages," *Review of Religion* 11 (1947) 227–260, at 240, deny that the Five Ages even follow a temporal pattern. K. Kumarniecki, "The Structure of Hesiod's *Works and Days*," *BICS* 10 (1963) 79–96, at 81, even claims that the Myth of the Five Ages is of much greater importance than the Pandora story, since it better expresses the theme of mankind's guilt in respect to the gods.

⁴⁷ G. W. Most, "Hesiod and the Textualization of Personal Temporality," in G. Arrighetti and F. Montanari (eds.), *La componente autobiografica nella poesia greca e latina* (Pisa 1993) 73–92, at 90. Most's argument of course rests on the assumption that the author of *Theog.* and *Op.* is the same person, a view to which I also subscribe.

disobedience.⁴⁸

In this genealogical myth of men, the Bad Eris appears to have been present almost from the beginning. Destructive war and conflict is a hallmark of every γένος except the golden one; anarchy, not civilized order, carried the day among early man.⁴⁹ The third race completely destroyed themselves, and even in the generation of heroes a good portion of them were killed in battle. Since several of the races of men knew war, and killed each other in great numbers, we can safely assume that there was Bad Eris in the world independently of Pandora.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Fontenrose, *CP* 68 (1974) 5. Resolution of the temporal relation of these stories should not be sought in attempting to create a synchronistic amalgamation of two disparate myths, for it should not be assumed that Hesiod's audience viewed these two myths as happening in the same continuum. A useful discussion of this point is found in M. I. Finley, "Myth, Memory, and History," *History and Theory* 4 (1965) 284–287; see also Nelson, *God and the Land* 61–62, and Beall, *JHI* 52 (1991) 356–357.

⁴⁹ Such is the power of the Bad Eris among men that it even causes the subordination of Dike. Cf. H. Munding, "Die böse und die gute Eris," *Gymnasium* 67 (1960) 409–422, at 414–415, who uses both the *Iliad* and the character of Perses to illustrate that contentiousness is so deeply rooted in mankind that it cannot be overcome. K. Olstein, "Pandora and Dike in Hesiod's *Works and Days*," *Emerita* 48 (1980) 295–312, at 295, is mistaken to assume that Dike replaces Pandora and represents evil-giving and the evils of her jar in and after the Five Ages of men. About the current race of men Hesiod in his lament (176–201) says nothing to imply that "evil-giving" is replaced by Justice; in fact, it appears that both the Good Eris and Dike herself are completely absent. Hesiod is explicit that Dike will conquer Hubris (217), but nowhere is either Eris or Pandora associated with Hubris; cf. Vernant, *RPhil* 40 (1966) 258–260. Perses is indeed advised ἄκουε δίκης μηδ' ὑβριν ὀφέλλε, "listen to justice and don't foster hubris" (213), which draws a parallel to the Bad Eris, who δῆριν ὀφέλλει (14). But 213 seems to imply that Perses has a choice, not that Dike will defeat or replace Hubris. I agree, however, with M. Gagarin, "Dikē in the *Works and Days*," *CP* 68 (1973) 81–94, at 81, who holds that Dike does not apply to any actions outside the peaceful settlement of disputes and concludes that *Op.* is not a treatise about morality or justice "but rather about prosperity and the necessity of an effective legal process to help achieve it."

⁵⁰ Beall, *Hermes* 117 (1989) 228, argues that to say that evil was in the world before Pandora makes the *Op.* sound more like the *Theog.*, which implies that such forces as πόνος were primordial. Note Most's argument

The earlier races of men did not have to work in order to survive. All they needed was provided by the earth (116–118):

θνήσκον δ' ὡσθ' ὕπνω δεδμημένοι· ἐσθλὰ δὲ πάντα
τοῖσιν ἔην· καρπὸν δ' ἔφερε ζεῖδωρος ἄρουρα
αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον.

When they died, it was as though they were overcome with sleep, and they had all good things; for the fruitful earth unforced bore them fruits abundantly and without stint.

This is not so with the current fifth race of men. The poet laments the never-ending labor, and in no uncertain terms makes known his wish that he was not a part of the Iron Age. Even in this spirit of despair, however, we are told that notwithstanding the need to work constantly, there will still be some good mixed with the bad (179, ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ τοῖσι μεμείξεται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν). Here again is the idea of opposite forces in constant contradiction.⁵¹

The relation of Pandora to the Good Eris is now clear. The position of the story within the Hesiodic text, the confirmatory particles used to connect the parts of the narrative, and the end results of the appearance of Pandora lead to the conclusion that there is more to Hesiod's Pandora than appears on the surface. There are indeed two types of Eris, one that is bad for mortals and one that is good for them. The Bad Eris is the one that inhabited the world of men before Pandora. But the Good Eris only appears in conjunction with the creation of Pandora. The presence of the Good Eris causes men to labor constantly for survival, yet this Eris is the one who is far kinder to men, who is ἀγαθή, not ἐπιμωμητή (13). Pandora, and the race of women descended from her, produce the same result. The advent of woman brings wholesome rivalry, honest labor, and a decent way of life, the hallmarks of the Good Eris. The

(above, 26) about the relation between the Pandora myth and the Myth of the Five Ages.

⁵¹ Cf. Gagarin, *CP* 68 (1973) 92, where the moral of the *Op.* is that “life is hard; prosperity comes only through peaceful cooperation and hard work.” Peabody, *Winged Word* 250, relates *Op.* 106–108, the prelude to the sermon concerning the ages of men, to 11, and thus takes the whole passage from 106–201 as a parallel of the Eris passage at 11–26.

existence of both the good and the bad aspects of women is part of Zeus's order and is thus to be embraced. Pandora, like the Good Eris, allows man to continue his own existence, and the author's intent is to conflate the two.⁵²

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