

# Lycurgan Finances

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WITH CHAERONEA and the establishment of the so-called League of Corinth, Athens suffered absorption into the Macedonian hegemony;<sup>1</sup> with the leveling of Thebes three years later, Alexander demonstrated his capacity for reprisal against any who would reject that hegemony (Diod. 17.8–15; Plut. *Alex.* 11f; Arr. *Anab.* 1.7f; Just. 11.3.6f). During the Lycurgan period and after,<sup>2</sup> it is clear that Athens was obliged to live in pragmatic accommodation with Macedon, though the spirit in which that accommodation was endured is open to debate.<sup>3</sup> Whatever the spirit, the Athenian economy experienced a singular revival during the twelve years of Lycurgus' ascendancy,<sup>4</sup> when the city's income increased to a yearly average of something like 1,200 talents<sup>5</sup>—a phenomenon without precedent in

<sup>1</sup> On Chaeronea, the ancient accounts (Diod. 16.85f, Just. 9.3) are of limited value. Still standard is N. G. L. Hammond, "The Two Battles of Chaeronea (338 B.C. and 86 B.C.)," *Klio* 31 (1938) 186–218; cf. W. K. Pritchett, "Observations on Chaeronea," *AJA* 62 (1958) 307–11. On the 'League of Corinth', see esp. Tod II 177, [Dem.] 17 *passim* (though note the cautions of G. L. Cawkwell, "A Note on Ps.-Demosthenes 17.20," *Phoenix* 15 [1961] 74–78), and the general discussion in N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia II* (Oxford 1979) 623ff.

<sup>2</sup> Lycurgus' ascendancy is attested for twelve years (Diod. 16.88.1; [Plut.] *X orat.* 841B), from 338/7 to 326/5, though his 'program' remained in effect until the outbreak of the Hellenic War in 323/2; see F. W. Mitchel, *Lykourgan Athens 338–322* (= *Cincinnati Classical Studies* 2 [Norman 1973]) 163–214, esp. 174 n.34 and 211–14.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Mitchel (*supra* n.2), who sees under Lycurgus' direction the implementation of a program of patriotic renewal aimed ultimately at resisting further interference by Macedon (211–14); W. Will, *Athen und Alexander: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Stadt von 338 bis 322 v. Chr.* (Munich 1983), argues that the tradition of Lycurgus' radical anti-Macedonianism is a fiction (97f), and finds Lycurgus increasingly willing to compromise with the reality of Macedonian supremacy, especially after 335 B.C. (141ff). Will's study goes too far, I believe, in discounting Lycurgan opposition to Macedon; see e.g. J. Ober, *Athenian Reactions to Military Pressure and the Defense of Attica* (diss. Michigan 1980) esp. 373ff.

<sup>4</sup> On the Lycurgan program generally, see in addition to Mitchel (*supra* n.2) and Will (*supra* n.3) F. Dürrbach, *L'Orateur Lycurgue* (Paris 1890), A. C. Johnson, "Studies in the Financial Administration of Athens," *AJP* 36 (1915) 424–52, and G. Colin, "Note sur l'administration financière de l'orateur Lycurgue," *REA* 30 (1928) 189–200. On Lycurgus as *ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει*, see most recently P. J. Rhodes, "Athenian Democracy after 403 B.C.," *CJ* 75 (1980) 309–15.

<sup>5</sup> See [Plut.] *X orat.* 842F: *χίλια διακόσια τάλαντα προσόδου τῇ πόλει κατέστησε*. What is meant by this is not altogether clear, especially in light of 841B: *ταμίας γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐπὶ τρεῖς πενταετηρίδας τάλαντων μυρίων τετρακισχιλίων, ἢ ὡς τινες μυρίων*

the fourth century. Indeed, that such income was available without tribute was a phenomenon without precedent in Athenian history.<sup>6</sup> It is the purpose of this paper to review generally the Lycurgan budget, income, and expenditures; to argue that commercial revenues comprised a quite sizable, though indeterminate, portion of total revenues; and finally to suggest that the character of this economic revival served to reinforce the bonds of pragmatic accommodation with Macedon.

A major stumbling block to the analysis of Greek finances is, of course, the character of the evidence. Material remains are fragmentary. With few notable exceptions, ancient written accounts are unself-conscious about even the most important economic matters.<sup>7</sup> Detailed reconstruction of a Lycurgan budget is therefore impossible; and, as M. I. Finley has warned, attempts at quantification in matters of Greek economics are hazardous and can be misleading.<sup>8</sup> As we proceed to examine the Lycurgan budget, it is necessary to keep in mind that the evidence will allow for generalization at best; when quantification of the data is attempted, it is meant to be illustrative, not definitive.

In the matter of expenditures, however, there are two major areas that do allow for at least limited quantification: the regular expenses incurred in the general administration of the state and in the building program. Though we lack certainty, remuneration of the large number of state officials was likely the practice in the fourth century, as it had been in the later fifth.<sup>9</sup> We do know in fact that the state con-

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ὀκτακισχιλίων ἑξακοσίων πεντήκοντα; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 852B. On the assumption, however, that [Plut.] is working in rounded numbers, then over a twelve-year period annual revenues of 1,200 talents would square well enough with a total of 14,000. Still, reconciling the totals of 14,000 and 18,000+ is a problem that allows of no easy solution (cf. Dürrbach [*supra* n.4] 38–46 and Will [*supra* n.3] 77ff). The anonymous reader has suggested that the figure of 18,000+ may derive from the tradition glorifying Lycurgus and include such items as advances made by Lycurgus' friends, the many *epidoseis*, etc. (for which generally see Mitchel [*supra* n.2] 195ff). These, since they were other than regular income, may have been counted twice, once for the annual total and once again for the (larger) cumulative total. There is much that is attractive in this suggestion. Since all figures cited allow for 1,200T *per annum*, and since this figure can be reconciled generally with one of the estimates for total expenditures, I have elected to adopt it, recognizing, of course, that annual revenues would have reached this level (and higher) only over time.

<sup>6</sup> See A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides II* (Oxford 1956) 16–33.

<sup>7</sup> M. M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece* (Berkeley 1977) 26–28.

<sup>8</sup> M. I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (Berkeley 1973) 17–34.

<sup>9</sup> See V. Gabrielsen, *Remuneration of State Officials in Fourth Century B.C. Athens* (Odense 1981) 146–49, who argues plausibly, if generally, against the conclusions of M. H. Hansen, “Misthos for Magistrates in Classical Athens,” *SymbOslo* 54 (1979) 5–22, and “Perquisites for Magistrates in Fourth Century Athens,” *CIMed* 32 (1980) 105–25.

tinued to pay dicasts, members of the *boule*, and those in attendance at the assembly.<sup>10</sup> In all, these expenditures may have amounted to something like 200τ annually.<sup>11</sup> Of the other general administrative expenditures,<sup>12</sup> some were recurrent and apparently fixed in size, such as the maintenance of the sacred triremes,<sup>13</sup> others less so, such as the maintenance of orphans (see Aeschin. 3.154). There were expenditures, too, for religious practices, though the numerous festivals may have been financed when possible from the private income of the temples.<sup>14</sup> Finally, there were expenditures for defense, but given their potential size, the city sometimes had recourse to raising revenues by extraordinary means.<sup>15</sup>

In periods of economic distress there was retrenchment proportionate to the distress (*cf.* Arist. *Pol.* 1317b35–38; Dem. 39.17); and when surpluses were available, they tended to be spent.<sup>16</sup> Budgeting for surpluses, however, was not state practice,<sup>17</sup> and since sizable surpluses did not occur on a regular basis, we may fairly assume a rough correlation between regular annual administrative expenditures and regular income secured by internal means. For the latter there is evidence to suggest that something like 400τ was the norm in times of general prosperity. From Thucydides we learn that at the outset of the Peloponnesian War all revenues contributed by the allies amounted to 600τ, and from Xenophon that the total in state income amounted to 1,000τ.<sup>18</sup> If both figures are roughly accurate, then 400τ

<sup>10</sup> For dicastic pay see Ar. *Vesp.* 661–63; for the *boule* and the assembly, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 62.2.

<sup>11</sup> See A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (New York 1958) 5f; Jones provides some theoretical maximums: 26τ for the *boule* and 21τ for the magistrates. His estimate for the number of magistrates is low, however (see Gabrielson [*supra* n.9] 84 n.28), so the expense here would have been greater. For dicastic pay, see M. H. Hansen, *GRBS* 20 (1979) 243–46, whence totals of between 75 and 100τ *per annum*; and for the *ecclesiasticon*, see Hansen, *GRBS* 17 (1976) 115–34, and *GRBS* 23 (1982) 241–49, where 50τ+ is suggested as the likely annual expenditure.

<sup>12</sup> Systematic review of these is beyond the scope of this study. Perhaps the best starting point for such a review is A. M. Andreades, *A History of Greek Public Finance* (Cambridge 1933) 212ff; the whole issue of Greek public finance is in need of fresh review.

<sup>13</sup> See B. Jordan, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period* (= *UnivCalPubClSt* 13 [1975]) 153ff.

<sup>14</sup> See Gomme (*supra* n.6) 19; on Lycurgan practices here, see 255 *infra*.

<sup>15</sup> See generally R. Thomsen, *Eisphora* (Copenhagen 1964). On expenditures for the fleet during the Lycurgan period, see 256f *infra*.

<sup>16</sup> Austin and Vidal-Naquet (*supra* n.7) 118–20. The noteworthy exception is the reserve built up by Pericles prior to the war; see Thuc. 2.13.3–5 and Gomme (*supra* n.6) 16ff.

<sup>17</sup> Austin and Vidal-Naquet (*supra* n.7) 118ff.

<sup>18</sup> Thuc. 2.13.3; Xen. *Anab.* 7.1.27; see Gomme (*supra* n.6) 17–20.

would have been the amount raised in 431 B.C. by internal means. Nearly a century later, we learn from [Dem.] 10, amid observations about the state's financial recovery after the disasters of the Social War, that annual revenues amounted to 400τ, sufficient to allow for a theoretic distribution—and thus sufficient, we may assume, to cover the normal expenses of the state.<sup>19</sup>

There is, of course, too much that is uncertain to allow us to conclude that these figures are exact. Still, the general direction they indicate is clear: when revenues allowed, annual expenditures for the general administration of the state were considerable, and may have amounted to something like 400τ. Lycurgan revenues certainly would have allowed for such expenditures, and there is nothing in what we know of the administration of the state during his tenure to indicate that an amount significantly less than this would have been spent.

The building program, too, would have necessitated annual expenditures of some size, though about these we can only surmise. The Periclean program, it has been estimated, cost somewhere between 2,000 and 2,500τ.<sup>20</sup> The Lycurgan program, though undertaken in part in emulation of the Periclean program and often compared favorably to it, was in fact a less ambitious undertaking;<sup>21</sup> the rebuilding of the theater of Dionysus and the stadium, the two most impressive items in the Lycurgan program, would not have entailed expenditures comparable to the Parthenon and the Propylaea.<sup>22</sup> Still, the Lycurgan

<sup>19</sup> See [Dem.] 10.35–42, esp. 38. Much to Demosthenes' chagrin, *theorika* had been distributed in the preceding decade when revenues had been considerably less than 400τ. Yet the conciliatory tone of his remarks here suggests that state revenues were now sufficient to allow him to endorse their use; for this reading, as well as on the authenticity of the speech, see J. J. Buchanan, *Theorika* (New York 1962) 60–70, esp. 66ff. The *eisphora* for 342/1, if a part of Demosthenes' totals, would not have amounted to much; see Thomsen (*supra* n.15) 238ff.

<sup>20</sup> A. M. Burford, "The Economics of Greek Temple Building," *PCPS* 191 n.s. 11 (1965) 21–34, based on R. Stanier, "The Cost of the Parthenon," *JHS* 73 (1953) 68–76.

<sup>21</sup> See Andreades (*supra* n.12) 262f, and Mitchel (*supra* n.2) 190.

<sup>22</sup> From the decree of Stratocles (Plut. *Mor.* 852) and [Plut.] *X orat.* 841C–F we learn of Lycurgan work on the theater of Dionysus and the Panathenaic stadium, of the construction of a gymnasium in the Lyceum and a palaestra, and of work on the ship-sheds and arsenal in the Piraeus. Both sources mention the restoration and construction of other buildings, among which are a temple dedicated to Apollo Patroos (see H. A. Thompson, *Hesperia* 6 [1937] 90–115), additions to the *heliaia* (Thompson, *Hesperia* 23 [1954] 32–39), work on buildings in the sanctuary of Eleusis (see *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1672.23–28, 168–87, 291; 1675), and the sanctuary of Amphiarous at Oropus (C. D. Androutsopoulos, *The Amphiareion of Oropos* [Athens 1972]), and perhaps the work done on the Pnyx (H. A. Thompson and R. L. Scranton, *Hesperia* 12 [1943] 291–301, though Thompson has recently pushed back the date to the mid-340's: *Hesperia* Suppl. 19 [1982] 133–47). Also, the outer defenses were repaired and supplemented (see *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 244 and Ober [*supra* n.3] 373ff). For other items to be included generally in build-

program was extensive. Moreover, we need to bear in mind that labor and transport constituted the bulk of building costs,<sup>23</sup> and from the fifth to the fourth century the cost of both, it seems, had doubled.<sup>24</sup> Given these qualifications, a cost of between 750τ and 1,000τ should not be a serious overestimate for the entire Lycurgan program: *i.e.*, roughly one-third to one-half the lower estimate of the Periclean program.<sup>25</sup> To be sure, this is only a guess, but the evidence does not indicate that it is an implausible exaggeration; we are, in any case, concerned primarily with a general characterization of expenditures. And even if the cost of the building program were something close to the larger estimated cost of the entire Periclean program, the annual outlay, if apportioned evenly over the twelve years of Lycurgus' ascendancy, would have been less than 200τ.

There were, we know, other extraordinary expenditures associated with Lycurgus' tenure. The ephebic reforms, for instance, have been estimated to have cost 40τ *per annum*;<sup>26</sup> and the various religious cults, new and revived, would have entailed annual expense of some size—though with these Lycurgus aimed at fiscal conservation through administrative efficiency, as indeed he did with the entire program of restoration.<sup>27</sup> Theoric distributions continued during the Lycurgan period, though with the law of Hegemon in 335 (Aeschin. 3.25), these

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ing expenditures, see the excellent survey in Will (*supra* n.3) 79–93. The Parthenon and Propylaea, constructed with more expensive building materials and techniques, are estimated to have cost 470τ and 200τ respectively; see Burford (*supra* n.20) 24f.

<sup>23</sup> So Burford (*supra* n.20) 30f; but *cf.* S. N. Coumanoudis and D. C. Gofas, *REG* 91 (1978) 289–306, who challenge Burford's view that the cost of building materials was negligible.

<sup>24</sup> Costs for labor, skilled and unskilled, certainly had (*cf.* *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 373f and *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1672f). And in his calculations on the cost of the Parthenon, Stanier (*supra* n.20) 70ff holds the same for transport costs.

<sup>25</sup> To gain a different perspective: this estimate would mean that at fifth-century rates, the Lycurgan program would have entailed something like one-third to one-half the expense of the Periclean program, less the estimated cost of the Parthenon, Propylaea (670τ), and the chryselephantine statue of Athena (750τ; *cf.* Gomme [*supra* n.6] 24f). Admittedly, some of the items in the Lycurgan program were subsidized either through special levies (*cf.* *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 505 for the levy on metics for the arsenal and ship-sheds) or *epidoseis* (*cf.* Tod II 198 and the discussion in Mitchel [*supra* n.2] 195ff), though I have assumed that these were not excluded from the ancient calculations of income and expenditure. For other features of the Periclean program, see W. B. Dinsmoor, *The Architecture of Ancient Greece*<sup>3</sup> (London 1950) 147–215. For some estimates of specific costs, see Burford (*supra* n.20) 23ff.

<sup>26</sup> *Cf.* W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* (London 1911) 10, based on Arist. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3.

<sup>27</sup> See *e.g.* *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 333, and W. S. Ferguson, *The Treasurers of Athena* (Cambridge [Mass.] 1932) 122ff; on Lycurgus' frugality generally, see the anecdotes in [Plut.] *X orat.* 841F–842D.

likely diminished in frequency, if not in size.<sup>28</sup> With one exception, there is nothing otherwise in what we know of the Lycurgan program that would have required annual expenditures of great size. There were, of course, annual surpluses that allowed for the restoration of cult objects, most notably the golden Nikai, and for the purchase of other gold and silver religious paraphernalia (Plut. *Mor.* 852). In time, these surpluses would have amounted to a reserve of some size, though as an annual phenomenon they should not have exceeded 100τ.<sup>29</sup> If we assume, then, that these estimates offer a not grossly misleading characterization of all major known Lycurgan expenditures, we are left with the need to account for something more than a third of the annually expended revenues of 1,200τ.

The one exception in all this is the fleet, which in 354 B.C. had numbered 300 triremes. By 330/29 the number had increased to over 400 (*i.e.*, 392 triremes and 18 quadriremes: *cf.* Dem. 14.13; *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1627.266–69, 275–78). Since the average life of a trireme was twenty years,<sup>30</sup> and since the cost of construction amounted to two talents per ship,<sup>31</sup> then between the Social War and Agis' War the state would have expended, on an average annual basis, roughly 30τ in maintaining and enlarging the fleet. Yet for the state, construction would have been the least burdensome of the annual expenses associated with the fleet. Late in the fifth century the daily wage for rowers was reduced from one drachma to three obols, a consequence of economic exigency (Thuc. 3.17.4; 8.29.1, 45.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.4–7). Through most of the fourth century, it seems, the wage remained at three obols or less<sup>32</sup>—though with the prosperity of the Lycurgan period and the city's need to remain competitive with Macedon in attracting non-Athenian rowers, the wage was probably restored to one drachma. If this was the case, then the monthly cost for rowers

<sup>28</sup> See Buchanan (*supra* n.19) 74ff. The amount expended annually on theoric distributions would of course vary, though even at their peak they probably did not exceed 90τ annually (so Buchanan 83ff); the amounts noted in [Plut.] *X orat.* 843D–E seem clearly an exception since they derive from confiscation, not regular revenues. One means by which *theorika* may have been subsidized as early as Eubulus was through the leasing of sacred properties; see M. B. Walbank, *Hesperia* 52 (1983) 207–31, esp. 228ff.

<sup>29</sup> To be inferred from the fact that when restored the golden Nikai, certainly the most impressive items listed, did not exceed in total value 200τ; see D. B. Thompson, "The Golden Nikai Reconsidered," *Hesperia* 13 (1944) 173–209, and Ferguson (*supra* n.27) 91 n.2.

<sup>30</sup> See W. Kalbe, "Zur athenischen Marineverwaltung," *AthMitt* 26 (1901) 377–418, esp. 386–98.

<sup>31</sup> See Andreades (*supra* n.12) 224.

<sup>32</sup> At times in the fourth century, pay was reduced to food allowances only: Dem. 4.28f.

and crew would have been one talent per trireme, somewhat more for the quadriremes.<sup>33</sup>

The function of the Athenian fleet subsequent to Chaeronea has received little scholarly attention, perhaps because triremes were ships of war, and with Chaeronea the issue had been decided. Yet it is remarkable that despite her loss of independence, Athens continued to refurbish and enlarge her fleet so that by 330/29 she possessed an armada larger by 100 than the imperial fleet.<sup>34</sup> While it is possible that a fleet of such size was meant to serve as a deterrent, first to Philip and then to Alexander, it is a possibility that strains credulity.<sup>35</sup> The Macedonians did not look to the sea for decisive engagements, and Alexander's dismissal of his fleet in 334 B.C. may give us some indication of the regard in which he held the Athenian fleet as a threat to his plans (*cf.* Diod. 17.22.5). Nor, on the other hand, is it likely that the otherwise frugal Lycurgus would have expended considerable monies on a fleet that was meant to serve chiefly as an object of civic pride.<sup>36</sup> Doubtless the fleet did serve this end, but if it was to do more than sit idly in the ship-sheds, then additional and considerable monies would have to be expended to keep even token crews trained. Yet the evidence suggests that the number of crews kept at the ready was significantly more than this.

With the Hellenic War we have evidence of the city's capacity to man a fleet of considerable size. It has been estimated that, in all, something more than 230 Athenian ships of war were at sea prior to the engagement at Amorgos.<sup>37</sup> The war itself was an extraordinary moment, one that might have caused the city to hurl every available man, trained or untrained, into the fray.<sup>38</sup> But given the sense of commitment and foresight necessary to build and maintain an armada of 400, it is unlikely that the city would not have kept at the immediate ready crews to man at least a fifth of them.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, the surviving

<sup>33</sup> See J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships 900–322 B.C.* (Cambridge 1968) 290f.

<sup>34</sup> Thuc. 2.13.8; though at the outset of the war there may have been an additional 100 triremes in reserve; see [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.4.

<sup>35</sup> *Cf.* M. Amit, "Athens and the Sea," *Latomus* 74 (1965) 94.

<sup>36</sup> See Dürrbach (*supra* n.4) 55–64, and Mitchel (*supra* n.2) 198f.

<sup>37</sup> N. G. Ashton, "The *Naumachia* near Amorgos in 322 B.C.," *BSA* 72 (1977) 1–11, esp. 8ff.

<sup>38</sup> A precedent of sorts for rejecting such extreme measures existed from the days following Chaeronea; see [Plut.] *X orat.* 849A.

<sup>39</sup> A precedent for keeping a fifth of the available ships at sea for as much as eight months may be found in the Periclean program, even before the war: Plut. *Per.* 11.4. The objections raised against this number by S. K. Eddy, "Athens' Peacetime Navy in

naval inventories for 330/29, 326/5, and 325/4 show that at the time these inventories were recorded the city actually had at sea between forty and sixty ships.<sup>40</sup> A review of Lycurgan revenues will suggest in fact that naval activity of at least such size was regularly the practice in the period of accommodation between Chaeronea and the Hellenic War; and if this suggestion is correct, then we will have done much to explain the unaccounted portion of Lycurgan expenditures.

Normally the bulk of the state's regular revenues were secured through taxes, direct and indirect, the law courts (chiefly through fines), the concessions at Laurium, the rental of state-owned property, and regular liturgies. While estimates of the exact amount that each of these sources brought to the treasury are impossible to develop, there is general agreement that the principal sources of revenue were the Laurium concessions and the indirect tax on goods entering and leaving the Piraeus.<sup>41</sup> But in conditions of distress peculiar to each, the Laurium mines and the harbor tax could be rendered almost wholly unproductive.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, even under what might be termed normal conditions the amount of revenue from either could not be guaranteed. Investment in each was essentially a matter of private initiative and, as Hopper has shown, there was considerable variation in the enterprises that attracted the attention of investors at different times throughout the fourth century.<sup>43</sup>

After the Social War revenues were gradually restored under the direction of Eubulus, so that by 342/1 they amounted annually to 400τ ([Dem.] 10.38; Ephorus, *FGrHist* 115F166). The Laurium concessions and the harbor tax were the principal means by which this was done. Crosby's reconstruction and Hopper's analysis of the fragmentary mining records found in the Agora suggest that in 342/1 as much as 160τ of the 400τ in total revenue may have been realized from the Laurium concessions: this was in part a result of incentives the state was willing to offer to those investing in mining.<sup>44</sup>

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the Age of Pericles," *GRBS* 9 (1968) 141–156, have recently been challenged; see Jordan (*supra* n.13) 113f n.71.

<sup>40</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1627.266ff, 1628.481ff, and 1629.783ff; cf. Ashton (*supra* n.37) 1ff.

<sup>41</sup> Andreades (*supra* n.12) 268–305 and Finley (*supra* n.8) 131ff.

<sup>42</sup> *E.g.* the mines were closed by the Spartan occupation of Decelea (Thuc. 6.91.7, 7.19.1); and as a result of the Social War, Piraeus revenues were sorely reduced (Isoc. 8.19; Dem. 20.24, 23.209).

<sup>43</sup> R. Hopper, "The Attic Silver Mines in the Fourth Century B.C.," *BSA* 48 (1953) 248ff.

<sup>44</sup> Hopper (*supra* n.43) 239, 251 n.376, based on M. Crosby, "The Leases of the Laureion Mines," *Hesperia* 19 (1950) 205–25; see also P. Gauthier, *Un Commentaire historique des POROI de Xénophon* (Geneva/Paris 1976) 112–15.



In contrast to the city's income from the mines, the realization of the Piraeus' potential necessitated extended effort and no small investment by the state. During Eubulus' administration, expenditures were made to improve living conditions in the Piraeus (Din. 1.98; *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 1216). Further, as part of the effort to attract greater numbers of foreign investors and merchants to the city, legislation was passed requiring that *dikai emporikai* be heard monthly.<sup>45</sup> To this same end, if indirectly, the city under Eubulus conferred *ges kai oikias enktesis* more liberally than it had before the Social War.<sup>46</sup> Admittedly, the more liberal practice was aimed at influential *xenoi*,<sup>47</sup> but it is hard to imagine that metics and foreigners generally, who played a prominent rôle in investment in commerce,<sup>48</sup> would not have seen in the practice a signal to encourage their return.<sup>49</sup> We know that suppression of piracy under Eubulus became a matter of special state concern: this is explicit in the decree of Moerocles and a clause in the peace of Philocrates ([Dem.] 58.53; 12.2), and is implicit in Philip's acknowledgement of the Athenian fleet as the police force of the Aegean ([Dem.] 7.14f). In fact, it seems that Eubulus' efforts to maintain and enlarge the fleet after the Social War were aimed in no small measure at protecting commercial traffic from the depredations of freebooters and others.<sup>50</sup>

Despite Eubulus' success in restoring commercial revenues, the potential of the Piraeus was not to be realized fully during his administration. We know that piracy continued to be an impediment to the free flow of commercial traffic (Dem. 18.145; 23.166; [Dem.] 7.2; 12.2–5, 13; Aeschin. 2.12). And despite the state's gradual economic recovery during the 340's, the financial resources needed to maintain an aggressive maritime police force were limited. The *syntaxeis* may have helped, of course, though after the Social War there is no reason to imagine that the contributions of the allies helped greatly.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>45</sup> See E. E. Cohen, *Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts* (Princeton 1973) 184ff.

<sup>46</sup> J. Peçirka, *The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscription* (Prague 1966) 137–59; cf. G. Cawkwell, "Eubulus," *JHS* 83 (1963) 64 n.95.

<sup>47</sup> As observed by Gauthier (*supra* n.44) 223–25.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. H. Knorringa, *Emporos* (Amsterdam 1926) 79ff, and R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques* (Leiden 1968) 62ff, though their extreme view that Athenian citizens played virtually no rôle in commercial investment is to be rejected; see W. E. Thompson, "The Athenian Entrepreneur," *AntCl* 51 (1982) 53–88.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Isoc. 8.21; the city had been abandoned by its metic population as a result of the Social War.

<sup>50</sup> See my "Eubulus, Olynthus, and Euboea," *TAPA* 114 (1984) 111–20.

<sup>51</sup> Dem. 8.24–26; cf. G. Cawkwell, "Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy," *JHS* 101 (1981) 48, and R. Sealey, *A History of the Greek City-States* (Berkeley 1976) 433. On the *syntaxeis* generally, see most recently F. W. Mitchel,

But the single largest impediment to the full realization of the commercial potential of the Piraeus was Philip. Throughout the 350's and 340's Philip regularly harassed Athenian and allied shipping. We know of his seizure of the emporia of the northwest (Dem. 2.16f) and of his raids on Lemnos, Imbros, the Chersonese, and Euboea (Dem. 4.34). While the grain supply was his specific objective in much of this, it is likely, too, that he sought with these raids to undermine security in the Aegean generally and thus to disrupt Eubulus' efforts to revitalize Athenian commercial revenues.<sup>52</sup> The clause in the peace of Philocrates, mentioned earlier, is clear evidence of Athens' active concern in the matter.

Within less than a decade of Chaeronea annual revenues in Athens had effectively tripled. Yet in what we know of the Lycurgan recovery program there is nothing to indicate that wholly new means were discovered to raise revenues of such size. To be sure, there were unique features to the program, and these have been discussed elsewhere;<sup>53</sup> no doubt a number of these would have had a salutary effect on the economy. But there is nothing to suggest that, as a consequence of such innovations, annual revenues of 1,200τ or more could have been realized. We are left then to assume that normal means of generating revenues were productive to a degree hitherto unrealized, and that they provided the bulk of Lycurgus' 1,200τ. Of these resources only the mines and the Piraeus possessed the necessary potential.

Unfortunately, the amount of revenue generated by the mines in the 330's cannot be estimated with confidence. But while the records found in the Agora do suggest that there was a decrease in mining revenues after 342/1,<sup>54</sup> there is no evidence to indicate that the mines did not continue to be one of the principal sources of the state's revenues during the Lycurgan period. At their most productive, however, the mines cannot have provided more than 160τ annually.

Income from commerce, on the other hand, appears to be an entirely different matter.<sup>55</sup> As we saw, Eubulus' efforts to restore

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"The Assessment of the Allies in the Second Athenian League," *ClassV* 28 (1984) 23-37.

<sup>52</sup> See H. Hauben, "Philippe II, fondateur de la marine macédonienne," *AncSoc* 6 (1975) 51-59.

<sup>53</sup> See Mitchel (*supra* n.2) 193ff, and Will (*supra* n.3) 77ff.

<sup>54</sup> So Hopper (*supra* n.43) 216.

<sup>55</sup> The thesis offered here—that commercial revenues constituted a large, though indeterminate, portion of Lycurgan revenues—is generally consistent, I believe, with

commercial revenues had been extensive and had met with a measure of success. Chaeronea undercut none of this. Indeed, Lycurgus saw sufficient merit in the more liberal conferral of *ges kai oikias enktesis* to continue and apparently increase the practice, extending it to include foreign investors and merchants.<sup>56</sup> The effect, it seems, was quite positive. By the end of the century the metic population in Athens had grown to perhaps 10,000 (Ath. 6.272c), virtually all of whom would have taken up residence in Athens after the Social War (and a significant majority, probably, after Chaeronea).<sup>57</sup>

Chaeronea, in fact, proved decisive to the expansion of Athenian business interests. With the Macedonian victory the Aegean was freed of the major cause of commercial instability—freer than it had been at any other time in the fourth century, except perhaps during the heyday of the Second Athenian League. The pirates employed by Philip and by Athens in the 350's and 340's had lost their patrons. For a time, to be sure, freebooters remained active, though Lycurgus moved decisively in this regard. Early in his administration we hear of a decree proposed by the orator himself to honor the general Diotimus for the suppression of pirates.<sup>58</sup> So successfully, indeed, was the Aegean policed that apart from the pirates employed by Persia against Alexander,<sup>59</sup> there is no evidence of other disruptions in the flow of Aegean traffic. And it is to be remembered that earlier in the century pirates were claimed, if with some exaggeration, to control the seas (Isoc. 4.115).

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the views expressed by W. E. Thompson (*cf.*, in addition to *supra* n.48, "The Athenian Investor," *RSC* 26 [1978] 403–23, and "A View of Athenian Banking," *MusHelv* 36 [1979] 224–41), and opposes generally the position of the economic 'primitivists', most recently enunciated in P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, and C. R. Whittaker, ed., *Trade in the Ancient Economy* (Berkeley 1983). On Lycurgan commerce generally, see Will (*supra* n.3) 77–79.

<sup>56</sup> Peçirka (*supra* n.46) 59–61.

<sup>57</sup> On the exodus of the metics after the Social War, see Isoc. 8.21; *cf.* Dem. 23.23, 21.163, 57.48, 22.68, 24.166, and [Dem.] 25.57, where the presence of metics in Athens from the late 350's through the 330's is noted as a matter of fact. The evidence, however, allows of no precise assessment as to the pattern of their return.

<sup>58</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1623.276–308; [Plut.] *X orat.* 844A; *cf.* Tod II 200 on a colony sent to the Adriatic in 325/4 to defend against pirates; on the Lycurgan character of the decree, see Mitchel (*supra* n.2) 194 n.122.

<sup>59</sup> A policy initiated apparently by Memnon of Rhodes (see Arr. *Anab.* 2.1.2; *cf.* 3.2.4 and Tod II 191). Amphoterus' mission in 331 B.C. seems to have been aimed in part at checking these depredations; see Curt. 4.8.15f. *Cf.* A. B. Bosworth, "The Mission of Amphoterus and the Outbreak of Agis' War," *Phoenix* 29 (1975) 33, whose characterization of conditions in the Aegean generally is exaggerated, as his own subsequent observations imply; *cf.* *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* (Oxford 1980) 177ff.

The effect of all this on Athenian commercial revenues can only be estimated. We need not labor the fact that the Piraeus was a great harbor. In the fifth century the port city had been the center for the flow of commercial goods from throughout the Mediterranean ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.7). At the outset of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles could boast that every kind of goods from every locale came to the city through its port (Thuc. 2.38.2). Early in the fourth century, the harbor again became the commercial center of the Aegean. Products grown or produced to surplus elsewhere were brought to the Piraeus for sale; and for products unavailable elsewhere, people came to the port to buy.<sup>60</sup> Eubulus' efforts in the 340's, augmented by those of Lycurgus, and combined with the enforced peace after Chaeronea, provided the conditions necessary for substantial commercial enrichment.

There are, however, two difficulties in positing that the harbor tax of 2% *ad valorem* produced a sizable portion of Lycurgan revenues. In the only explicit reference to revenues produced by the Piraeus, Andocides (1.133) notes that in 400/399 the harbor tax was farmed out for 30τ, and in 399/8 for 36τ. Much has been written about these figures, none of it decisive, however; we simply lack sufficiently explicit evidence for corroboration.<sup>61</sup> Yet for a period of even modest prosperity these figures seem impossibly low, and the years in question were in no way normal. The war had only recently ended; the citizen population may have been reduced by close to half of what it had been a generation before, and the metic and slave population to a fraction unknown.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, the farm land of Attica, ravaged by war, was only beginning to recover (Lys. 7.6; Aeschin. 2.147), and the imperial fleet had been reduced to twelve triremes (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20). Pirates and Sparta controlled the seas (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.1, 18–24; Isoc. 4.115). Andocides' figures reflect, I suspect, almost exclusively the revenues secured from the import of grain.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Isoc. 4.42, though his comments may refer to the fifth century.

<sup>61</sup> For a survey of the major arguments, see Knorrिंगa (*supra* n.48) 132–39; Andreades (*supra* n.12) 297–99; J. Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece* (London 1933) 158–68; H. Michell, *The Economics of Ancient Greece*<sup>2</sup> (Cambridge 1957) 224–30; R. J. Hopper, *Trade and Industry in Classical Greece* (London 1979) 71–107, esp. 100f. Also of interest are the observations of C. Mossé, “La vie économique d’Athènes au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle: crise ou renouveau?” in *Praelectiones Patavinae*, ed. F. Sartori (Rome 1972) 135–44, and E. Erxleben, “Das Verhältnis des Handels zum Produktionsaufkommen in Attica im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. u. Z.,” *Klio* 57 (1975) 365–98.

<sup>62</sup> See A. W. Gomme, *The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* (Oxford 1933) 25–27.

<sup>63</sup> As the remarks in Lys. 7.6 and Aeschin. 2.147 suggest, Athens' dependence on imported grain immediately after the war was great. While we have no direct evidence on the price of grain for 400/399 and 399/8, it seems clear enough that prices fluctu-

A further difficulty is that harbor revenues of size, earned at a rate of 2% *ad valorem*, would require the coming and going of an enormous quantity of commercial traffic. There is little in the evidence to suggest that Athens herself could have consumed or produced for export the quantity of goods necessary to raise such revenues.<sup>64</sup> The Piraeus, however, was not a conventional emporium, either in size or in function. As early as the fourth century, as we have seen, the harbor served as an *entrepôt*, an intermediary station where goods and materials produced in one locale were brought, purchased, and shipped elsewhere. The *deigma* served to facilitate this process. Here the banks were located,<sup>65</sup> here sample goods from cargo carriers were shown. When a sale was transacted, the appropriate tax was presumably levied on the value of the goods in the bay.<sup>66</sup> Under such conditions the *ad valorem* rate would have amounted, in effect, to 4%.

There is, of course, no way of knowing the quantity of goods that moved through the Piraeus in this manner—though common sense, I think, suggests that it was not small. Certainly Xenophon (*Vect.* 3.1) recognized the harbor's potential, as had Isocrates (4.42) and the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* ([Xen.] 2.7). Other testimony is scant, though one piece of evidence is suggestive. In the 350's, revenues from Cersobleptes' Thracian ports annually provided him with more than 200 (or possibly 300) talents. These revenues were apparently secured through a tithe imposed on the traffic of what appear to be a very few items.<sup>67</sup> Close comparison of the Thracian ports to the Piraeus is impossible; the differences between them in function,

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ated widely during the first two decades after the war; see Ar. *Eccl.* 547ff for 392 B.C., when grain was apparently available for 3 drachmas per medimnos, though with the seizure of grain ships by Antalcidas in 387/6 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28) prices must have soared. On the manipulation of prices in the city during this period, see Lys. 22.11–16. Harbor revenues of 30T would necessitate the import of 1,000,000 medimnoi of grain at 9 drachmas per medimnos. It has been argued that Athens did import such quantities of grain in 355 B.C. The city's population then was probably greater than at the turn of the century (see Gomme [*supra* n.62] 32f); but the city's reliance on imported grain in mid-century was probably less than it was immediately after the war. At times the price of grain rose as high as 16 drachmas per medimnos, though typically it sold for 5 drachmas (see Dem. 24.39; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1672.287; [Arist.] *Oec.* 1352b19).

<sup>64</sup> See *supra* n.61.

<sup>65</sup> Polyæn. 6.2.2: the banks were sufficiently prosperous to invite a raid by Alexander of Pherae in 362/1.

<sup>66</sup> See Plut. *Dem.* 23 for a characterization of the process; for the *deigma* see Dem. 1.33, 35.35; Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.21; Harp. *s.v.*

<sup>67</sup> See Dem. 23.110 and S. Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria* (Oxford 1926) 52–79. There is no compelling reason to prefer a reading of *διακόσια* to *τριακόσια*; it is done, I think, because 300T seems improbably high. See e.g. R. Whitson, *Demos-thenes* II (London 1868) 441.

in tax rate, and in the variety of items moved through them are simply too great. Despite these differences, however, it is clear that in the fourth century revenues of considerable size were raised by the imposition of harbor-taxes; and there is much to suggest that this was the case in Lycurgan Athens.

If the conclusions thus far drawn are correct, then we need to be alert to some additional implications, both economic and political. As harbor revenues fluctuated, so must other state revenues dependent on the volume of Piraeus traffic. Metics, for instance, paid an annual head-tax of twelve drachmas for men, six for women.<sup>68</sup> There were, as well, a tax on all aliens who sold in the Agora (Dem. 7.15) and a sales tax on goods sold there (Poll. 7.15). If there was any correlation between the volume of traffic to the Piraeus and the volume of trade in the Agora, then tax revenues here would not have been slight. Moreover, there were the court fines levied through the *dikai emporikai*. In the fifth century the revenues generated by such fines had been considerable ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.16); with the legislative reforms of the 340's the courts again would have become a profitable source of income.

As a political matter, Athenian prosperity, so dependent on commercial stability, could only serve to reinforce the attractiveness of a pragmatic accommodation with Macedon. While originally a condition imposed by Macedon, accommodation soon became a necessity of economic well-being, if not survival. Successful or not, rebellion by Athens from the Macedonian hegemony would have struck at the heart of the Lycurgan recovery program. With rebellion, traffic on the Aegean would once again have been virtually halted.<sup>69</sup> A variety of factors shaped Athenian foreign policy during the Lycurgan period,<sup>70</sup> but the conclusion suggested by this study is that this policy was in no small measure economically determined.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> D. Whitehead, *The Ideology of the Athenian Metic* (= *PCPS* Suppl. 4 [1977]) 75f.

<sup>69</sup> On the effects of warfare on commerce in the Aegean see, in addition to Isoc. 8.21, Dem. 18.241, 23.110.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Mitchel (*supra* n.2) 211–14 and Will (*supra* n.3) 141ff.

<sup>71</sup> My thanks to the National Endowment for the Humanities, under the auspices of whose Grants for College Teachers the work for this paper was done, and to the anonymous reader of this journal whose criticisms and suggestions have kept me from a number of errors, though perhaps not all.