

Peripatetic Soul-Division, Posidonius, and Middle Platonic Moral Psychology

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THROUGHOUT THE LONG tradition of Greek anthropological speculation the principles of both popular and philosophical psychology were based, virtually without exception, upon the dichotomy between rational and irrational forces in the human soul.¹ Plato's elevation of *θυμός* to the status of a separate soul-part—the most radical attempt to modify this division so fundamental to Greek ethics²—exercised considerable influence throughout antiquity, but its significance as a challenge to the principles of earlier psychology was misunderstood almost immediately. As early as the first generation of the Peripatos, the tripartite psychology of the *Republic* was re-interpreted in the terms of Aristotelian bipartition (*Mag.Mor.* 1182a24f); subsequently, throughout later antiquity, tripartition was regularly presented as a bipartite dichotomy. The Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition is based upon a dichotomy between reason and emotion that Plato's elevation of *θυμός* to independent status was meant to modify; in representing tripartition in terms of Aristotle's division into *ἄλογον* and *λόγον ἔχον* the Peripatetics could not help but misrepresent the fundamental orientation of Plato's psychology.³ Nevertheless, both philosophers—such as Posidonius, who explicitly adopts tripartition in opposition to orthodox Stoic moral psychology—and school texts of Platonic doctrine—such as the *Didaskalikos*—are strongly influenced in their exposition of tripartition by the formulations and principles of Aristotelian bipartition. Middle Platonic writers regularly represent tripartition as a bipartite dichotomy, and through them this understand-

¹ This is clearly brought out by A. Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley 1982) 20–67; see also F. Solmsen, *Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment* (Princeton 1975) 126–71.

² W. Jaeger (*Eranos* 44 [1946] 123–30; cf. E. L. Harrison, *CR* n.s. 3 [1953] 138–40) has argued plausibly that *Περὶ ἀέρων* 12 and 16 influenced Plato's doctrine of *θυμός*, but the ethnology of this work neither presupposes a tripartite psychology, as Jaeger argues, nor does it fall within the mainstream of Greek psychology. The attribution of the tripartite soul to Pythagoras is apocryphal (cf. n.64 *infra*).

³ See P. A. Vander Waerdt, "The Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato's Tripartite Psychology," *GRBS* 26 (1985) 283–302. Except as indicated below, editions and abbreviations here correspond to those of the previous study (esp. 283 n.1).

ing of Plato's soul-division passed into the Christian, Islamic, and mediaeval traditions as well.⁴ The interrelations between the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions in moral psychology are clearly of great importance for subsequent philosophical investigation, but the complex history of their interaction has never been written.⁵

The purpose of the present study is to contribute toward such a history by establishing the influence of the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition upon Middle Platonism and by tracing the transmission of that doctrine. Our investigation will throw light upon the cross-fertilization of Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic principles of soul-division that formed the basis of Middle Platonic moral philosophy, as well as upon the diffusion of Peripatetic doctrine in later antiquity.⁶ I shall argue that the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition became canonical in the doxographical tradition and in Middle Platonism through the influence of Posidonius' theory of *πάθος*, which became part of the orthodox school tradition by the first century B.C.⁷ Our intention is not to investigate how particular philosophers adapted

⁴ Recently D. N. Bell, "The Tripartite Soul and the Image of God in the Latin Tradition," *RecTh* 47 (1980) 16–52, has collected the extensive evidence concerning soul-division in the Christian tradition. He demonstrates that "much more important than the three-fold analysis is the duality of rational and non-rational . . . to accommodate the tripartition to this scheme, the later writers simplify Plato's original doctrine by grouping together *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* and equating them with the non-rational part of the soul" (17f). Bell traces the history of this doctrine from the Middle Platonists through the Christian tradition, and observes that "the reception and transmission of the tripartition by the Middle and Neo-Platonists was marked by singularly little dissension" (16); but he does not consider the source of the Middle Platonic usage, a task we attempt here. On the harmonization of Platonic tripartition with Aristotelian moral psychology and the transmission of this doctrine from Greek sources into the Islamic tradition, see R. Walzer's remarks in *Festschrift Bruno Snell* (Munich 1956) 192f and in *Studi Orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi della Vida II* (Rome 1956) 603–21.

⁵ P. Merlan provides a brief survey in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge 1967) 53–83, 107–23; cf. P. L. Donini, *Tre studi sull' aristotelismo nel II secolo d.C.* (Turin 1974) 63–125.

⁶ Much work remains to be done on the influence of the doxographical tradition on Middle Platonic philosophical speculation. J. Mejer, *Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background* (= *Hermes Einzelschr.* 40 [Wiesbaden 1978]), is not concerned with the interaction between doxography and philosophical speculation. On the Aristotelian tradition see P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen I* (Berlin 1973), which should be studied with L. Tarán's important critique, *Gnomon* 53 (1981) 721–50. M. Giusta, *I Dossografi di Etica* (Turin 1964–1967) has treated the Hellenistic ethical doxographies in detail, and although his work contains much of value, its main thesis, that these doxographies derive from a hypothetical ethical *Vetusta placita* patterned on the *διαίρεσις* of Eudorus of Alexandria, has been shown to be unfounded: see P. Boyancé, *Latomus* 26 (1967) 246–49, and Moraux 264–68.

⁷ J. M. Dillon's useful survey of psychological doctrine in *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) deliberately minimizes the influence of Posidonius; cf. n.44 *infra*. On the question of whom to include as a Middle Platonist I have generally followed Dillon; but cf. R. E. Witt, *Gnomon* 51 (1979) 383.

this doctrine to their own purposes, but rather to show how a specific Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division became the lens through which Platonic and Aristotelian moral psychology were understood in antiquity, and how this doctrine affected not only the interpretation of Plato but also virtually all post-Aristotelian discussion of soul-division.⁸

We take as our starting-point a section of Aëtius' *Placita* (4.4= *Dox. Graec.* 389.8–390.24, under the title *Περὶ μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς*, preserved in the Pseudo-Plutarchan *Placita philosophorum* [898E–F] and copied from there by Eusebius into his *Praeparatio Evangelica* [15.60]), which serves as a link between the early Peripatetic doctrine preserved in the *Magna Moralia* and later doxographical reports that represent tripartition in the terms of Aristotelian bipartition. We saw in our previous paper that the author of the *Magna Moralia* attributes bipartition to Plato by interpreting tripartition in terms of Aristotle's doctrine of *ὄρεξις*: he collapses the *θυμοειδές* and the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* of Plato's tripartite psychology into a single *ἄλογον*, opposing it to the *λογιστικόν* in a bipartite dichotomy, and so represents Plato's soul-division in Aristotelian terms.⁹ Aëtius provides an exact parallel to this interpretation: *Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον διμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν λογικόν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον· κατὰ δὲ τὸ προσεχές καὶ ἀκριβές τριμερῆ· τὸ γὰρ ἄλογον διαιροῦσιν εἰς τε τὸ θυμικόν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν* (*Dox. Graec.* 389.10–390.4).¹⁰ Aëtius here reproduces exactly the doctrine of *Magna Moralia* 1182a24f, as we have interpreted it, by representing Plato's tripartite psychology as a bipartition into *ἄλογον* and *λόγον ἔχον*, with the former subdivided into *θυμικόν* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν* and the latter synonymous with Plato's *λογιστικόν*; moreover, his use of *-ικός* formations, rather than Plato's *-ειδές* formations, provides proof, if any were needed, that his source is ultimately Peripatetic, for such formations are the characteristic Peripatetic terms for soul-division.¹¹ The preservation of this doctrine in Aëtius and in numerous other sources (to be assembled below) shows that the Peripatetic interpretation of Plato's tripartite psychology was well known in the early Peripatos and is attested by

⁸ Galen, of course, is an important exception; see also n.56 *infra*. Study of the transmission of this doctrine is the essential foundation for further investigation of the use to which it was put by individual Middle Platonists, for the derivative character of their doctrine on soul-division requires that the interrelations between authors be established if their originality is to be measured.

⁹ See Vander Waerdt (*supra* n.3) 283–302.

¹⁰ Here *προσεχές* and *ἀνωτάτω* are contrasted, the former meaning 'particular' (so LSJ s.v. 4) and the latter 'highest' in the sense of 'most general' (so used for *summa genera*: Sext. Emp. *Pyr.* 1.138, *SVF* I 211).

¹¹ See Vander Waerdt (*supra* n.3) 286 n.9.

the Peripatetic source(s) of the doxographical tradition as well as by the *Magna Moralia*. Once this Peripatetic doctrine became canonized in the doxographical tradition, it strongly influenced subsequent philosophical speculation, both in the interpretation of Plato's soul-division and in the harmonization of Platonic and Aristotelian moral psychology.

Although Aëtius reproduces exactly the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition, his attribution of this doctrine to Pythagoras as well as to Plato shows that his source postdates the *Magna Moralia*, for although the author criticizes Pythagoras at the beginning of his doxography (1182a10–14), he clearly states that Plato was the first to advance bipartition (1182a24f). The addition of Pythagoras' name to this doctrine is plainly a later development, typical of the association of Pythagoras with Plato in the doxographical tradition,¹² but it will enable us to trace the transmission of this doctrine. In the *Tusculan Disputations* Cicero attributes this doctrine to Pythagoras and describes it as a *vetus descriptio* (4.5.10): *qui animum in duas partes dividunt, alteram rationis participem faciunt, alteram expertem. in participatione ponunt tranquillitatem, id est, placidam quietamque constantiam, in illa altera motus turbidos cum irae tum cupiditatis contrarios inimicosque rationi. Ira and cupiditas here translate θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, and it is plain from this passage and others that Cicero subdivides the ἄλογον in exactly the same way as the doxographers.¹³ Clearly the source of these passages is related somehow to Aëtius': while Cicero might have arrived at this interpretation of Plato's soul-division from study of the *Timaeus* (which he translated during the composition of the *Tusculans*), his attribution of bipartition to Pythagoras as well shows beyond doubt that he is relying here on a doxographical source.*

The phrase *vetus descriptio* well conveys the respect with which the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition was invested in later antiquity, for virtually all Middle Platonic authors who discuss soul-division represent Plato's tripartite psychology as a bipartite dichotomy, and they display the same kind of harmonization of bipartite and tripartite doctrine and terminology as the *Magna Moralia* and the doxographical tradition. The consistency with which Middle Platonic texts adopt this interpretation of Plato's soul-division excludes the possibility that each arrived at it independently. But to trace the sources of each of

¹² See *infra* nn.62, 63.

¹³ In one passage Cicero obviously has the *Timaeus* in mind: *Plato triplicem finxit animum, cuius principatum, id est rationem, in capite sicut in arce posuit, et duas partes ei parere voluit, iram et cupiditatem, quas suis locis iram in pectore, cupiditatem subter praecordia locavit* (*Tusc.* 1.10.20; *cf.* 1.33.80, 2.21.47; *Rep.* 3.25.37).

these texts is clearly too large a task to be attempted here: each derives from different sources (usually lost) and each displays a different combination of doxography, interpretation of canonical texts, and philosophical speculation.¹⁴ It will be more fruitful instead to trace the source of Cicero's *vetus descriptio*—in which bipartition is attributed to Pythagoras as well as to Plato—and employ the results of this investigation to show how the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition became canonical in Middle Platonic moral psychology.¹⁵

Middle Platonic doctrine is best represented by the epitomes and school texts, which record commonly accepted doctrine and, on account of their derivative character, are less likely than authors such as Plutarch or Clement to be influenced by independent interpretation. Without exception these texts harmonize bipartition and tripartition in accordance with Peripatetic doctrine by collapsing the *θυμικόν* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν* into a single *ἄλογον* and by opposing this to a reasoning faculty.¹⁶ We cannot here consider in detail all the

¹⁴ It is a common tendency of Posidonian *Quellenforschung* to refer all instances of a commonplace doctrine to a single source when such a commonplace might well exemplify a developing thread of common discussion and interpretation quite independent of a single source. In arguing that the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition became a widely accepted commonplace in later antiquity through the influence of Posidonius' theory of *πάθος*, I do not claim that *all* instances of that doctrine necessarily derive from Posidonius.

¹⁵ One justification for this procedure is that the attribution of this doctrine to Pythagoras as well as Plato in the doxographies of Cicero and Aëtius ensures that we are tracing the transmission of related doctrine. Peripatetic texts now unknown to us may have influenced Middle Platonic views on soul-division, and hence their sources are far more difficult to specify than that of the *vetus descriptio*. Once the source of the doxographical tradition is established, it will be possible to show how the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition became a commonplace among the Middle Platonists.

¹⁶ Different terms are used for the reasoning faculty: *λογιστικόν*, *λόγον ἔχον*, and *ἡγεμονικόν*. One outcome of the later Peripatetics' extended controversy with the Stoics over the status of the *πάθη* was their acceptance of a theory of *αἴσθησις* which caused some of them to adopt the Stoic *ἡγεμονικόν* (*Dox.Graec.* 394.21–25). According to Plutarch (*Adv.Col.* 1115B), Strato (of whose views we are best informed) differed with Aristotle on many points and adopted views opposite to Plato's on the soul. His treatment of the relation between sensation and thought (*cf.* *Plut. De soll.an.* 961A=fr.112) represents a radical revision of Peripatetic doctrine. According to Ps.-Plut. *De libid.* 4, Strato localized all *αἴσθησις* in the *ἡγεμονικόν*, and although other testimonia (collected by Wehrli as fr.107–31) confirm this, it is unclear how he connected his physiological theory with bipartition (*cf.* fr.74; *Dox.Graec.* 416.10–13). As a result of such discussion, the *ἡγεμονικόν* is regularly identified with the *λογιστικόν* in later Peripatetic and in Middle Platonic texts, as is stated explicitly in *Didaskalikos* 182.24–26 (*cf.* 173.1–13) and as is evident from other texts: *SVF* II 839, Clem. *Strom.* 6.135 (III 224.34), Arius 53.5–15, Cic. *Tusc.* 4.5.10, Plut. *De virt.mor.* 441B–C, Philo *Leg.alleg.* 1.72, 2.6, *De spec.leg.* 4.92, Tert. *De anim.* 14.2. Plutarch's polemic against Stoic moral psychology (*De virt.mor.* 446E–448B) provides an indication of the character of the Middle Platonic debate over the rôle of the *ἡγεμονικόν* and of the implications of identifying it with the Aristotelian reasoning faculty.

relevant authors and passages, but in order to document how this doctrine influenced the Middle Platonists I include a list of authors with brief comment on some passages relevant to their understanding of soul-division and, where possible, reference to detailed discussions. This list is intended to be representative rather than exhaustive (it could be lengthened greatly); authors discussed elsewhere in my argument are omitted here.

1. Arius Didymus' epitome shows the variations in the terminology of soul-division characteristic of Middle Platonic usage; in his proem he surveys the definitions of *ἦθος* and *πάθος* attributed to the Platonists, to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, and to Zeno and the Stoics (38.3–39.9). He attributes to οἱ κατὰ Πλάτωνα φιλοσοφούντες (38.14) four definitions of *ἦθος*, three of which are formulated closely in Aristotelian terms (*ἀλόγου μέρους-λόγω, ἄλογον μέρος-λόγω, παθητικὸν μέρος-λογικῶ, ὀρεκτικὸν μέρος-λογικῶ*), and the last of which conflates this terminology with Stoic *ὄρμη* (cf. 48.17–19), a conflation paralleled in Arius' report of Plato's views on *εὐδαιμονία* in terms of the *ἡγεμονικόν* (53.5). These definitions prove that Platonists in Arius' day based their moral psychology upon Aristotelian bipartition. Arius' epitome of Platonic ethics (if he wrote one)¹⁷ is not extant, but his harmonization of bipartition and tripartition in the Peripatetic fashion (117.16–18) suffices to show that he conceived tripartition in bipartite terms.¹⁸ In other passages Arius employs Aristotelian bipartition, sometimes mixed with Stoic or tripartite terms (47.14, 48.17–19, 51.7f, 53.5–15, 128.5f, 20–23, 137.15–23).¹⁹

2. Albinus, if he is the author of the school-text of Platonic doctrine entitled *Didaskalikos*,²⁰ displays usage similar to Arius': he harmonizes tripartition with bipartition, and employs the Stoic terms *ὀρμητικόν* and *ἡγεμονικόν* (178.32–37, 173.1–13, 176.26). Albinus considers the soul tripartite (176.30–177.14, 182.13–183.14), but organizes it according to the Peripatetic bipartite dichotomy: *ὡς ἡνίκα τέμνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τε τὸ λογικὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ παθητικόν, καὶ αὖ πάλιν τὸ παθητικὸν εἰς τε τὸ θυμικόν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν* (156.30–32; cf. 173.9–12, 176.30–177.14, 182.13–183.14).²¹

¹⁷ The evidence for this supposition is collected and criticized by C. Kahn, "Arius as a Doxographer," in *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus*, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh (London 1983) 3–13.

¹⁸ See Vander Waerdt (*supra* n.3) 294–96. It is presumably because Arius subdivides the *ἄλογον* that in discussing *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* he finds it necessary to add the qualification, *ἐπειδὴ διμερῆ πρὸς τὴν παρούσαν θεωρίαν ὑπέθεντο τὴν ψυχὴν* (137.17f).

¹⁹ There is no general study of Arius' relation to Middle Platonism, but one hopes that the recent revival of interest in Arius will result in such an investigation.

²⁰ J. Whittaker, *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 450–56, has recently challenged the traditional ascription of the *Didaskalikos* to Albinus, restated by C. Mazzarelli, "L'autore del *Didaskalikos*," *Riv.filos.neoscol.* 72 (1980) 606–39; without entering into this debate I continue to refer to the author as Albinus.

²¹ Albinus' soul-division is discussed by R. E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism* (Cambridge 1937) 80–86. Witt's argument that Albinus excerpted directly

3. Apuleius attributes the bipartite version of tripartition to Plato (*De dog. Plat.* 1.13.207f, 18.216–18; cf. 2.4.225, 6.228–7.229); although he does not make the two lower soul-parts subdivisions of an ἄλογον, he does conceive them as a bipartite dichotomy: *sed tunc animanti sanitatem adesse, vires, pulchritudinem, cum ratio tota regit parentesque ei inferiores duae partes concordantesque inter se iracundia et voluptas nihil adpetunt, nihil commovent, quod inutile esse duxer[is] ratio* (1.18.216). *Iracundia* is not the ally of *ratio* in controlling *voluptas*, but both *inferiores partes* are obedient to *ratio* in the healthy soul, and hence it is clear that Apuleius denies *θυμός* its Platonic rôle as an ally of *λόγος* and sides with the Peripatetics in considering *θυμός* only a component of the ἄλογον. Apuleius conceives tripartition as a bipartite dichotomy.²²

These texts demonstrate that the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition, as recorded in the *Magna Moralia*, Aëtius, and Cicero, was well-known school doctrine in Middle Platonism. I now continue the list with several Middle Platonic philosophers.

4. Plutarch's essay *De virtute morali* contains much of interest to the study of soul-division; in his polemic against Stoic moral psychology he incorporates Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic terminology into a bipartite division, and adopts the Peripatetic formulation by dividing the soul into the λογιστικόν and the παθητικόν or ἄλογον, and subdividing the latter into the ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμοειδές (442A). This interpretation underlies Plutarch's interpretation of Aristotle's soul-division,²³ and is paralleled elsewhere in Ps.-

from a single main source, Arius' *Περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων Πλάτωνι*, was called into question by H. Cherniss (*AJP* 59 [1938] 351–56), but has been advanced again by M. Giusta, “Ἀλβίνου Ἐπιτομή οὐ Ἀλκινόου Διδασκαλικός?” *AttiTor* 95 (1960–61) 186–91. On Albinus' psychology see also Dillon (*supra* n.7) 290–94.

²² On Apuleius' position in Middle Platonism, see C. Moreschini, *Apuleio e il platonismo* (Florence 1978), with remarks on soul-division at 96–99; also Dillon (*supra* n.7) 326–32.

²³ 442B: ταύταις ἐχρήσατο ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπὶ πλέον Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν. ὕστερον δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδές τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ προσένευεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμίαν τινὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὄντα καὶ ὄρεξιν ἀντιληπῆσεως. Plutarch appears to distinguish between a 'Platonic' phase in which Aristotle accepted tripartition and a later one in which he advanced bipartition. According to D. Babut, *Plutarque, De la vertu éthique* (Paris 1969) 137–41, Plutarch bases this distinction upon comparison of the *Topics* (129a13–16, 133a30–32) with other writings in which bipartition was advanced. Although this is the most straightforward solution, it presupposes that Plutarch knew the *Topics*, and the interpretation of τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους τοπικῶν βιβλία η' (Lamprias catalogue no. 56; cf. *Quaest.conv.* 616D) as a commentary on Aristotle's *Topics* has been challenged by F. H. Sandbach, *ICS* 7 (1982) 212f, whose own explanation, that Aristotle's *Topics* were wrongly placed among Plutarch's works, has little to recommend it, especially since he concludes that “it may be most likely that he had some acquaintance” with the *Topics*. Sandbach's objection to Babut's interpretation of ἐπὶ πλέον as “made much use of” (217–19), that Aristotle continued to use Platonic tripartition in such passages as *Eth.Nic.* 1149b1 and *Pol.* 1334b22, is refuted by a proper understanding of the soul-part Aristotle calls τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὄρεκτικόν (*Eth.Nic.* 1102b30). His further claim (ascribed to I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* [Göteborg 1957] 354, who, however, tries to have it both ways on the same page) that “Plutarch was reproducing a

Plutarch, *De vit. et poes. Hom.* 129.²⁴ In his interpretation of Platonic tripartition Plutarch does make the *θυμοειδές* an ally of *λογισμός* (τὸ δὲ θυμοειδές εὐήνιον τὰ πολλὰ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ σύμμαχον [*Quaest. Plat.* 1008c; cf. Cherniss *ad loc.*]); but here as at 442A he neglects Socrates' argument that the *θυμοειδές* always supports *λογισμός* against the *ἐπιθυμῖαι*, *Resp.* 440A–441E. Elsewhere Plutarch does not often use tripartite terminology (*Cor.* 15.4; *De def. or.* 429E; *Quaest. Plat.* 1007E–09B [with the notes of Cherniss *ad loc.*]; cf. *De E ap. Delph.* 390F), but variations on bipartition are common.²⁵

5. Philo combines Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic terminology and principles of soul-division: for bipartition see *Leg. alleg.* 2.6, *Quod det. Pot.* 82, *De sob.* 18, *De conf. ling.* 111f, 176, *Quis rer. div. her.* 132, 138, *De cong. quaer. erud.* 26–33, *De fug. et inv.* 24, *De somn.* 2.151, *De sac. A. et C.* 112, *De sp. leg.* 1.201, 333, 3.99; for tripartition see *Leg. alleg.* 1.70–73, 3.115–17, *De conf. ling.* 21, *De mig. abr.* 66–68, *De sp. leg.* 1.145–150, 4.92–94, *De virt.* 13f; and for divisions into seven and eight parts, based upon Stoic principles, see e.g. *De opif.* 117, *De Abr.* 29f, *Quis rer. div. her.* 232f, *De mut. nom.* 110–14. Clearly Philo's usage was determined largely by the needs of his immediate argument, for usually he makes no effort to reconcile these different divisions (cf. *Quis rer. div. her.* 225 with 232f); but two passages clearly attest the Peripatetic doctrine: first, his discussion of the μάχη between λόγος and πάθος in which θυμός and ἐπιθυμία are referred to as μέρη τοῦ ἀλόγου (*Leg. alleg.* 3.116f); and second, his discussion of the συμφωνία of tripartition: συμφωνία δὲ αὐτοῖς (sc. τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς) ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ κρείττονος ἡγεμονία, οἷον ὅταν τὰ δύο, τό τε θυμικόν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἠνιοχῶνται καθάπερ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ, τότε γίνεται δικαιοσύνη· δίκαιον γὰρ τὸ μὲν κρείττον ἄρχειν αἰεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἄρχεσθαι· κρείττον μὲν δὴ τὸ λογικόν, χεῖρον δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν καὶ τὸ θυμικόν (*Leg. alleg.* 1.72f).²⁶

standard view, not giving evidence of personal study of the *Corpus*" is flatly contradicted by Plutarch's ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψε. Moreover, one who reads this passage as a *locus communis* (in spite of the fact that there are no close parallels) merely sets the problem at one further remove: if Plutarch is reproducing an earlier source, that source's explanation of Aristotle's psychology remains to be explained. In my view the most likely explanation is that Plutarch knew the *Topics* (or perhaps some lost exoteric work) and based his interpretation of Aristotle's soul-division upon a comparison between its version of tripartition and the division into ἀλογον and λόγον ἔχον found in other works.

²⁴ Edited by G. N. Bernardakis in his *Moralia VII* (Leipzig 1896). Ensuing references to the *Quaestiones Platonicae* are cited from the Loeb *Moralia XIII*, pt.1, ed. H. Cherniss (London/Cambridge [Mass.] 1976).

²⁵ Examples are cited by Babut (*supra* n.23) 72 n.2; unfortunately his discussion (71f, 136f) of Peripatetic influence on Plutarch's interpretation of tripartition (442A–B) is vitiated by his view that this division rests upon the distinction between mortal and immortal soul. On Plutarch's place in the Peripatetic tradition, see, in addition to Babut's introduction, Donini (*supra* n.5) 63–125 and S. G. Etheridge, *HSCP* 66 (1962) 252–54. It goes without saying that one would not expect Plutarch to resort to a doxography for information about Plato (cf. R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch* [Chicago 1916]); his interpretation of tripartition no doubt is based upon his own reading.

²⁶ See T. H. Billings, *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus* (Chicago 1919) 47–52, and Dillon (*supra* n.7) 174–78.

6. Clement combines Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic terminology in a similar way: for bipartition see *Strom.* 4.9 (II 320.18), 5.53 (III 42.7–10), 6.135 (III 224.33–36); for tripartition see *Paed.* 3.1 (I 325.3–9), *Strom.* 3.68 (II 285.18–20), 5.80 (III 63.11); and for divisions based upon Stoic principles see *Strom.* 6.134–36 (III 223.17–224.2), 2.50 (I 179.1–4). In *Strom.* 5.53 (III 42.7–10) Clement attributes the Peripatetic doctrine to Plato: οὕτως καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς τὸν τε ἡνίοχον καὶ τὸν ἀποστατήσαντα ἵππον, τὸ ἄλογον μέρος, ὃ δὴ δίχα τέμνεται, εἰς θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καταπίπτειν φησίν.²⁷

This list may be augmented considerably, especially from later writers who, in varying degrees, were influenced in their doctrine on soul-division by the Middle Platonists,²⁸ but even in abbreviated form it shows that the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition was widely accepted in Middle Platonism. The transmission of this doctrine from the early Peripatos to the Middle Platonists, however, raises difficult problems: for no extended discussion of early Peripatetic soul-division survives apart from the *Magna Moralia*, and the oblique way in which the author records the Peripatetic interpretation of Plato's tripartite division (1182a24f) shows that he is not the direct source of the doxographical tradition, much less of Middle Platonic usage generally. And yet the widespread diffusion of this Peripatetic doctrine among later writers can hardly be coincidental.²⁹

In the prolegomena to his *Doxographi Graeci*, Diels established that virtually the whole of ancient doxography derives from a work he entitled the *Vetusta placita* (ca 50 B.C.), which in turn is a redaction, at least partly under Posidonius' influence, of Theophrastus' *Φυσικῶν Δόξαι*.³⁰ We must first, then, demonstrate that the *Vetusta placita* in-

²⁷ References in parentheses are to the volume, page, and line number of Dindorf's edition (Oxford 1869). On Clement's debts to Middle Platonic moral psychology, see S. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism* (Oxford 1971) 60–117.

²⁸ See *supra* n.4 and K. Gronau, *Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesisexegese* (Berlin 1914) 242–52; H. Cherniss, *The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa (CPCP 11 [1930])* 12–25; H. J. Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague 1971) 21–25.

²⁹ Cf. *supra* n.14.

³⁰ Diels based his characterization of the *Vetusta placita* as a "Sammlung eines Posidonianers" (*SitzBerl* 1893, 102) upon his investigations into Posidonian influence upon the doxography (*Dox.Graec.* 224–32). On the transmission of the *Φυσικῶν Δόξαι* to later writers, see in addition to Diels' prolegomena, O. Regenbogen, *RE Suppl.* 7 (1940) 1535–39 s.v. "φυσικῶν δόξαι"; a table of the transmission of ancient doxography is presented by T. L. Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos* (Oxford 1913) 3. On the paucity of Hellenistic doxography independent of the Theophrastan *Placita*, see Mejer (*supra* n.6) 87f. Not everyone today would accept Diels' sweeping claims for Posidonian influence upon the doxographical tradition, and my own argument in no way depends upon his case. Clearly there were influential Posidonian doxographies (e.g. fr.22, with the context that follows in Strabo 17.1.5; fr.129f, 149), and certainly the

corporated the Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division. Cicero's phrase *vetus descriptio* suggests that the doxography that attributes bipartition to Pythagoras and Plato had a long history before his time; the evidence of Aëtius and of Tertullian's *De anima* are independent witnesses to the contents of the *Vetusta placita*³¹ and enable us to establish that the section of Aëtius on the division of the soul belonged to this work. In his doxographical account of soul-division, Tertullian attributes to Plato the bipartite division into *ἄλογον* and *λόγον ἔχον* (*quod Plato bifariam partitus animam, per rationale et inrationale*, 16.1 [20.9f]; cf. 14.2 [17.28f]), and subdivides the *ἄλογον* in the Peripatetic fashion: *proinde cum Plato soli deo segregans rationale duo genera subdividit ex inrationali, indignativum, quod appellant θυμικόν, et concupiscentivum, quod vocant ἐπιθυμητικόν . . .* (16.3 [20.25–27]). The plurals *appellant* and *vocant* provide proof, if any were needed, of the doxographical origin of this passage.³² That Aëtius and Tertullian independently reproduce the Peripatetic interpretation of Plato's soul-division proves that the *Vetusta placita* contained a section on soul-division in which the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition was attributed to Plato.³³

Without entering into the problem of Cicero's use and adaptation of doxography,³⁴ it is clear that the source of his interpretation of

Vetusta placita preserves some Posidonian doctrine (e.g. fr.101 = *Dox.Graec.* 302.19–303.2; fr.103 = 324.11–14; fr.122 = 356.5–7, 357.6–8, 14–19; fr.129 = 366.1–3), but re-examination of the evidence for pervasive Posidonian influence upon the *Vetusta placita* and upon the doxographical tradition as a whole is a desideratum.

³¹ On the sources of Tertullian other than Soranus, see J. Waszink's edition of the *De anima* (Amsterdam 1947) 38*–44*, who concludes that Tertullian's mention of Arius (54.2 [73.1f]; cf. *Dox.Graec.* 471.10–15) is to be ascribed to Soranus, but that Tertullian used Albinus directly. It is doubtful whether Tertullian drew upon any source other than Soranus for his doxography of soul-division (see n.32 *infra*), and since he did not use Aëtius it is clear that Tertullian and Aëtius are independent witnesses to the contents of the *Vetusta placita*.

³² On Tertullian's doxography of soul-division in *De anima* 14–16 see the thorough commentary of Waszink (*supra* n.31) 209–34. Waszink concludes (33*–35*) that Tertullian borrowed his account of soul-division from Soranus, who in turn derived it from the *Vetusta placita*, perhaps through intermediate sources. It is generally accepted that Tertullian's main, if not sole, source for the *De anima* was the four books of Soranus' lost *Περὶ ψυχῆς*; see *Dox.Graec.* 203–13, H. Karpp, "Sorans vier Bücher *Περὶ ψυχῆς* und Tertullians Schrift *De anima*," *ZNTW* 33 (1934) 31–47, and Waszink 21*–44*, who builds upon and modifies Karpp's conclusions.

³³ The testimonium of Theodoretus 5.19 (*Dox.Graec.* 389: Πυθαγόρας μὲν γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων διμερῆ ταύτην εἰρήκασι καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς εἶναι λογικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄλογον. διχῆ δὲ [αὐτὸ πάλιν] τὸ ἄλογον ἕτερον. καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ θυμικὸν εἶναι τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν) is derived from Aëtius (cf. *Dox.Graec.* 46) and hence does not represent independent evidence.

³⁴ The range and complexity of which were well stated by P. Boyancé in *REL* 14 (1936) 288–309.

tripartition cannot be the *Vetusta placita* or a doxographical compilation derived from it. Although Cicero reproduces the Peripatetic subdivision of the *ἄλογον*, he has also been influenced by Stoic doctrine: *principatus* in *Tusc.* 1.10.20 translates the Stoic term *ἡγεμονικόν* rather than the Peripatetic terms *λογιστικόν* or *λόγον ἔχον*,³⁵ and Cicero's localization of the soul-parts in the manner of the *Timaeus*, without parallel in the doxography, suggests that if he was following a written source, it was more expansive than the *Vetusta placita*. One might think that Cicero is merely elaborating upon the doxography, but for the context of both 1.10.20 and 4.5.10: the first passage occurs in the midst of a review of *sententiae* on the soul that is likely to be the translation or adaptation of a doxographical source; and the attribution (4.5.10) of bipartition to both Pythagoras and Plato proves that in this passage and in 1.10.20 Cicero is indebted to a doxographical source. Accordingly we must consider what work other than the *Vetusta placita* this might have been, bearing in mind that both might have a common origin.³⁶

It has long been disputed whether Cicero's account of immortality in Book I of the *Tusculans* derives from Antiochus or Posidonius.³⁷ For our present purpose we need only focus upon the doxography at 1.9.18–11.24, which prefaces Cicero's account of immortality, and consider which of these thinkers attributed the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition to Plato. Only unambiguous evidence will settle the question of the source of 1.10.20. Hans Strache recognized the conflation of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine on soul-division in Arius Didymus (117.11–18) and believed Antiochus to be its source.³⁸

³⁵ *Principatum autem id dico quod Graeci ἡγεμονικόν vocant* (*Nat.D.* 2.29); cf. the edition of A. S. Pease (Cambridge 1958) *ad loc.*, and n.55 *infra*.

³⁶ I shall argue (388f *infra*) that Posidonius is the source both of Cicero's *vetus descriptio* and of the doxographical tradition deriving from the *Vetusta placita*.

³⁷ See most recently Dillon (*supra* n.7) 96–101, who concludes that either may have been the source; among earlier work, in favor of Antiochean origin, see K. Reinhardt, *RE* 22 (1953) 575–84, and G. Luck, *Der Akademiker Antiochos* (*Noctes Romanae* 7 [Bern 1953]) 36–42; and, in favor of a Posidonian origin, P. Corsen, *De Posidonio M. Tulli Ciceronis in libro I Tusculanarum Disputationum* (Bonn 1878). See also A. Barigazzi, "Sulle fonti del libro I delle Tuscolane di Cicerone," *RivFC* n.s. 26 (1948) 161–203. R. M. Jones argues against Posidonius as the source in "Posidonius and Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* i 17–81," *CP* 18 (1923) 202–28, but is inconclusive regarding the doxography at 1.9.18–11.24: Jones observes that it is incongruous in certain ways with the exposition of immortality proper and hence may derive from a different source. In any event 1.10.20 may be Posidonian, even if the rest of the doxography is not (Cicero's source, if not Posidonius, could have been influenced by him on this point).

³⁸ "Peripateticae huic rationalis animi partitioni adiungitur mirum in modum irrationalis Platonica in partem concupiscentem et irascentem. Quam confusionem quam maxime decere Antiochum nemo non videt" (*De Aarii Didymi in Morali Philosophia Auctoribus* [Berlin 1909] 31f; cf. 25). In *Der Eklektizismus des Antiochus von Askalon*

His parallels between Arius and the *De finibus*, however, do not withstand examination; his claim that Antiochus is Arius' single direct source is untenable; and there is no evidence that Antiochus accepted the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition. Some passages in Cicero mention tripartition, and others refer to a distinction between *animus* and *corpus*, but none attests *animi partes* in the sense of *μέρη ψυχῆς* and certainly none suggests the Peripatetic doctrine present in Arius (117.11–18) and recorded in the doxographical tradition.³⁹ It is more likely that Antiochus accepted orthodox Stoic views on soul-division.⁴⁰ Thus there is no evidence to support Strache's claim that Antiochus was Arius' source, and no reason to think that he was the source of Cicero's *vetus descriptio* or that he transmitted the Peripatetic doctrine to later authors.⁴¹

Plainly we must look elsewhere for the transmission of Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division, and the attribution of bipartition to Pythagoras as well as Plato enables us to establish the source of the doxography and of Cicero's *vetus descriptio*. The association of Pythagoras with Platonic doctrine does not figure in the extant fragments of Antiochus, but it is a well-attested feature of Posidonian doxography;⁴² and I believe that Cicero's source for this doctrine can be shown to have been the first book of Posidonius' *Περὶ παθῶν*.⁴³ Once

(= *Philol. Unters.* 26 [Berlin 1921]) 28–30, Strache throws no additional light on this question: he fails to recognize that the conflation of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine on soul-division, so far from being an Antiochean innovation, dates from the early Peripatos, and hence he does not investigate its transmission or the wide range of doxographical material that must be brought to bear in any discussion of Arius' source.

³⁹ *Acad.* 2.39.124 attributes tripartition to Plato, but does not explain how this division is understood. The Antiochean psychology elaborated in *De finibus* V depends upon a distinction between *animus* and *corpus* different from the Peripatetic dichotomy between reason and emotion, and the discussion of *animi partes* and *corporis partes* and their corresponding *virtutes* is based upon principles quite different from those of Platonic or Aristotelian soul-division. If Cicero has represented Antiochus' views at all accurately, it is clear that his psychology cannot have been Arius' source.

⁴⁰ Cf. Dillon (*supra* n.7) 102.

⁴¹ A further reason for rejecting Antiochus as the source for Cicero and the doxographical tradition is the absence of any mention of Pythagoras in Luck's collection of the fragments (*supra* n.37).

⁴² Cf. frr.T91 (Galen *De plac.* 334.30–33), T95 (*ibid.* 290.1–5), discussed 386–88 *infra*; and fr.140, 253.113–16, 284.17; also n.54 *infra*.

⁴³ I find that I am anticipated in maintaining that Cicero's source was Posidonius by M. Pohlenz, *Ciceronis Tusculanarum Disputationum* II (Stuttgart 1929) 56f, by E. Rohde, *Psyche* (Leipzig 1894) 464f n.1, and by H. Hunt, *The Humanism of Cicero* (Melbourne 1954) 109, none of whom, however, argues for this view. The *Περὶ παθῶν* is not, however, the only work by Posidonius that might have recorded this doctrine, since the *Περὶ ψυχῆς* also contained a doxography (fr.28a); but we know almost nothing of the contents of this work, and have solid evidence for extensive discussion of soul-division in the *De affectibus*.

Posidonius' pivotal rôle in the transmission of this doxography is established, it will be possible to trace the wide diffusion of Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division in Middle Platonism; it will also become apparent that Posidonius' influence on the moral psychology of subsequent thinkers was far greater than has recently been allowed.⁴⁴

Posidonius' rejection of the principles of Chrysippean moral psychology is well known, and the very considerable fragments of his *De affectibus* (preserved, with extensive paraphrase and discussion, by Galen in *De plac.* IV and V) enable us to measure how he revised orthodox Stoic psychology by adopting many fundamental principles from the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions.⁴⁵ Although this feature of Posidonius' moral psychology has often been studied,⁴⁶ many interesting questions remain concerning the sources and character of his reformulation of Stoic doctrine. Here we consider his rôle in the transmission of Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division to Middle Platonism. One significant aspect of Posidonius' revision of Chrysippean doctrine on *πάθος* is his adoption of Plato's tripartite soul-division, which is attested again and again by Galen.⁴⁷ Posidonius' understand-

⁴⁴ I have in mind Dillon's attempt "to eliminate [Posidonius] from the scene" and to "try to write a history of Middle Platonism largely without him" (*supra* n.7: xiv)—an effort, avowedly "extreme," that appears to be more a reaction to the excesses of earlier *Quellenforschung* than an impartial evaluation of the importance of Posidonius for the Middle Platonists; cf. Witt's severe criticism (*supra* n.7: 384). Posidonius is also ignored in W. Deuse's *Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre* (Wiesbaden 1983). I hope that the evidence collected here is sufficient to show that Posidonius' influence upon Middle Platonic moral psychology was considerable.

⁴⁵ On Galen's own philosophical affiliations, see P. De Lacy, "Galen's Platonism," *AJP* 93 (1972) 27–39; M. Frede, "On Galen's Epistemology," in *Galen: Problems and Prospects*, ed. V. Nutton (London 1981) 65–86, and *Galen: Three Treatises on the Nature of Science* (Indianapolis 1985) ix–xxxvi.

⁴⁶ See especially A. Dihle, "Posidonius' System of Moral Philosophy," *JHS* 93 (1973) 50–57; A. Glibert-Thirry, "La théorie stoïcienne de la passion chez Chrysippe et son évolution chez Posidonius," *RPhL* 75 (1977) 393–434; and I. G. Kidd, "Posidonius on Emotions," in *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. A. A. Long (London 1971) 200–15; also, among earlier work, M. Pohlenz, *De Posidonii libris Περὶ Παθῶν* (*Jahrb.f.cl.Phil.*, Suppl. 24 [Leipzig 1898]) 535–634; "Poseidonios' Affektenlehre und Psychologie," *NGG* 73 (1922) 163–94 (= *Kleine Schriften* [Hildesheim 1965] 140–71); and Reinhardt (*supra* n.37) 732–45.

⁴⁷ Cf. n.49 *infra*. It sometimes is claimed, on the basis of some passages in Cicero (fr.82, 87f), that Panaetius distinguished between rational and irrational parts of the human soul; on this view Panaetius—*φιλοπλάτων καὶ φιλαριστοτέλης* (fr.57 van Straaten² [Leiden 1962], cf. fr.55f, 58f; Galen *De plac.* 284.33–286.3, 292.20–26)—would anticipate Posidonius' revision of orthodox Stoic moral psychology. Recently, however, M. van Straaten, "Notes on Panaetius' Theory of the Constitution of Man," in *Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought* (Louvain 1976) 104–09, has shown this view to be unfounded; see also his *Panétius* (Paris 1946) 95–129. The use of a version of bipartition in fr.83 (=Cic. *Tusc.* 1.33.80) to refute Panaetius' criticism of

ing of Platonic moral psychology, however, is also indebted to Peripatetic doctrine, and, like the early Peripatetics, Posidonius conceives tripartition as a bipartite dichotomy.

In *De affectibus* I, Posidonius presented (as Galen attests: 322.27–324.23) “a kind of epitome” of Plato’s views on the rearing of children and the rôle of the ἄλογον in their παιδεία. After noting that Posidonius admired Plato’s views on child-rearing, Galen continues:

καὶ γέγραφεν οἶον ἐπιτομήν τινα κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ Περιπαθῶν σύγγραμμα τῶν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένων, ὡς χρή τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς σύμμετρον ἀποφαίνεσθαι ταῖς κινήσεσι καὶ τοῖς τοῦ λόγου προστάγμασιν εὐπειθές. “αὕτη γὰρ ἀρίστη παίδων παιδεία[ς], παρασκευὴ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐπιτηδαιοτάτη ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ” (324.5–11; cf. 292.17–28).

According to Galen’s explanation of this quotation (324.11–23), Posidonius used Plato’s simile of the charioteer and horses (*Phaedr.* 246A ff) as the basis for his interpretation of Platonic moral psychology: he likens the λογιστικόν to a charioteer which, around the age of fourteen, becomes strong enough to rule the team of horses—θυμός and ἐπιθυμία—that are disobedient and lawless unless habituated to obey λόγος. Posidonius’ use of this simile introduces a powerful new element into the interpretation of Platonic moral psychology that proved highly influential among later writers (cf. n.58 *infra*). It also shows that he is interpreting Plato directly, in the light of his own philosophy, and that in conceiving tripartition as a dichotomy between a ruling δύναμις of reason and ruled δυνάμεις of emotion he is not simply following earlier sources. But he does not hesitate to use Peripatetic terms, and his interpretation of tripartition closely resembles that of the Peripatetics: for Posidonius the παθητικόν, while ἄλογον in itself, is nonetheless open to the persuasion and rule of the λογιστικόν (cf. 324.16f);⁴⁸ it is subdivided (as in 324.11–23) into the ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμικόν. Numerous other passages show that Posidonius interpreted tripartition along Peripatetic lines,⁴⁹ and

Plato on the immortality of souls suggests that Panaetius did not adopt Platonic or Aristotelian doctrines on soul-division.

⁴⁸ Galen apparently uses παθητικόν and ἄλογον here as synonyms (324.8), and other quotations show that Posidonius too employed this usage (cf. e.g. 320.23–28, 332.5–334.15).

⁴⁹ Cf. *De plac.* 248.3–6, 260.25–28, 284.33–290.19, 292.17–26, 312.25–34, 316.21–358.22 (esp. 320.23–28, 332.10–334.10). For our purposes it does not matter whether Posidonius spoke of δυνάμεις of the soul, as Galen claims (348.16–22; cf. 312.29–34,

by interpreting the tripartite psychology of the *Republic* in the terms suggested by the *Phaedrus* he provided a new basis for the Peripatetic interpretation. Such an exposition of tripartition of itself would make Posidonius a likely source of Middle Platonic doctrine on soul-division, but there is further evidence that establishes his rôle in the transmission of the *vetus descriptio*.

The one feature of the doxographical tradition on soul-division that postdates the *Magna Moralia* is the attribution of the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition to Pythagoras as well as to Plato. In his *De affectibus* Posidonius included a doxography in which he reported, on the basis of some Pythagorean writings, that Pythagoras anticipated Plato in advancing bipartition. Galen attests this doxography in two passages. In the first, he says that Posidonius' theory of emotion preserves ἡ τε τοῦ λόγου μάχη τε καὶ διαφορὰ πρὸς τὸ πάθος (288.30f), and argues that the proper explanation of human emotion is given not by Chrysippus, but by the "ancients":

οὐ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης μόνον ἢ Πλάτων ἐδόξαζαν οὕτως ἀλλ' ἔτι πρόσθεν ἄλλοι τέ τινες καὶ ὁ Πυθαγόρας, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος φησιν ἐκείνου πρώτου μὲν εἶναι λέγων τὸ δόγμα, Πλάτωνα δ' ἐξεργάσασθαι καὶ κατασκευάσαι τελεώτερον αὐτό (290.1–5).

This passage shows that *De affectibus* contained a doxography in which Pythagoras was reported to have held the δόγμα that Plato later worked out and made more complete. Galen's discussion preceding and following the quoted passage depends upon the dichotomy between reason and emotion and shows that the δόγμα in question is the bipartite moral psychology which for Posidonius, as we have seen, incorporates the tripartite soul-parts. In his second passage Galen specifies the source of his attribution of bipartition to Pythagoras:

Ποσειδώνιος δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόραν φησίν, αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ Πυθαγόρου συγγράμματος οὐδενὸς εἰς ἡμᾶς διασφζομένου τεκμαιρόμενος δ' ἐξ ὧν ἔνιοι τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ γεγράφασιν (334.30–33).

In his account of the "ancient doctrines" Galen does not attribute bipartition to Pythagoras and Plato specifically, but the subject of this paragraph is the emotions and their relation to rationality, and hence this passage (with 290.1–5) must refer to the bipartite soul-division upon which the dichotomy between reason and emotion is based.⁵⁰ In

368.22–29), or whether he used the term μέρος, attributed to him by Clement (*Strom.* 2.129.4); see J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969) 212f.

⁵⁰ It seems likely that the passage Posidonius had before him represented tripartition in bipartite terms and attributed this doctrine to Pythagoras and Plato alike; cf. Iam-

the terms of Posidonius' doxography, then, Plato owes the main outlines of his moral psychology to Pythagoras because the latter advanced bipartition. In his epitome of Platonic views on moral education in the first book of the *De affectibus*, Posidonius will have included a doxography in which the principles of Plato's tripartite psychology were represented in the terms of Aristotelian bipartition and, on the basis of Pythagorean writings, attributed to Plato and Pythagoras alike.

There are strong reasons to think that Posidonius' doxography is the source for the *Vetusta placita* and Cicero's *vetus descriptio*. It is easy to see how his doctrine found its way into a collection of *placita* of the sort preserved by Aëtius: once tripartition is represented in the terms of Aristotelian bipartition, and Pythagoras is said to have held the moral doctrines that Plato worked out and completed, it is only a short step for the doxographer to attribute a bipartite version of tripartition to Pythagoras as well as Plato. Moreover, Diels' argument that the *Vetusta placita* displays much Posidonian influence suggests that the report preserved by Aëtius is a summary of the more expansive doxography presented by Posidonius in *De affectibus* I.⁵¹ As for Cicero, it is well known that several of his works reflect Posidonian influence, and the *Tusculans* are generally counted among these.⁵² Cicero's phrase *vetus descriptio* is strongly reminiscent of Posidonius' stress on *ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος* and his frequent appeal to *οἱ παλαιοί*;⁵³ it would aptly describe Posidonius' doxography, in which the attribution of bipartition to Pythagoras and Plato was traced back to early Pythagorean writings. Moreover, Cicero, obviously following a doxographical account, closely parallels Posidonius' representation of Plato as a student of Pythagoras who furnished reasoned argumentation in support of his doctrine (*Tusc.* 1.17.39; cf. *De plac.* 290.1–5): *Platonem ferunt, ut Pythagoreos cognosceret, in Italiam venisse et didicisse Pythagorea omnia, primumque de animorum aeternitate non solum sensisse idem quod Pythagoram, sed*

blichus: οἱ δὲ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀρχύτας καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν ψυχὴν τριμερῆ ἀποφαίνονται, διαιροῦντες εἰς λογισμὸν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν (ap. Stob. 1.369.9–11); Aristid. Quint. *De mus.* (ed. R. P. Winnington-Ingram [Leipzig 1963]), e.g. 2.5 (58.11–21), 2.6 (63.4–16), 2.8 (67.5–14), 3.16 (116.2–12), with A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford 1928) 497f, and the passages from the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha cited 392 *infra*.

⁵¹ See *supra* n.30. It is an open question whether the doxographical reports derive directly from the *De affectibus* or from a school text influenced by Posidonian doctrine.

⁵² See *supra* n.37. Strong Posidonian influence upon the *De Divinatione* cannot be doubted; cf. the edition of A. S. Pease (Urbana 1921) 18–24.

⁵³ See Kidd's index, s.v. *παλαιοί*.

rationem etiam attulisse.⁵⁴ Taken together, this evidence strongly suggests that both the section on soul-division in the *Vetusta placita* and Cicero's *vetus descriptio* derive from Posidonius.⁵⁵ Works no longer known may have played a rôle in the transmission of this doctrine into the doxography, and the Pythagorean writings used by Posidonius may have been available to later writers as well, but all the extant evidence supports our view that this doxography derives from Posidonius.

Posidonius' rôle in the transmission of Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division to Middle Platonism is less clear, if only because the immediate sources of most of our extant texts are no longer known. The examples collected above (378–81) show that the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition had become commonplace by Cicero's day, both in the doxographical tradition and in Middle Platonic moral psychology. The obvious explanation is that this interpretation of tripartition formed part of a body of Posidonian doctrine on *πάθος* that became canonical in Middle Platonic ethics through the influence of Posidonius' moral psychology. Clearly not all Middle Platonic writers derived their doctrine from Posidonius—Clement, for example, drew upon Philo—and many Middle Platonic writers will have known this doctrine only at several removes or even independently of Posidonius.⁵⁶ But Posidonius' general influence upon later moral psychology

⁵⁴ In the *Tusculans* Cicero constantly refers to Pythagoras and assigns him a pivotal rôle in the historical development of philosophy: cf. 1.10.20, 1.16.38–17.39, 1.21.49, 1.25.62, 3.17.36, 4.1.2–2.4, 4.5.10, 4.19.44, 4.25.55, 5.3.8–4.10, 5.23.66; *Rep.* 1.10.16. This parallel, although highly suggestive, is not decisive, for in the first century B.C. there was an important revival of interest in Pythagoreanism, one purpose of which evidently was to show that Plato and Aristotle derived their fundamental doctrines from Pythagoras (cf. Dillon [*supra* n.7] 117–21). The origins of this movement are obscure, but Posidonius—with his interest in Pythagoras and in the historical development of philosophy (cf. Kidd [*supra* n.46] 213)—may well have helped to stimulate it. In any event no one other than Posidonius is likely to have transmitted the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition to Cicero, especially in the form that attributes this doctrine to Pythagoras as well as Plato. Posidonius probably took this attribution from the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha of the third or second century B.C. (see n.65 *infra*).

⁵⁵ Cicero's use of *principatus*, translating the Stoic term *ἡγεμονικόν*, is easily explained if Posidonius is his source, for Posidonius assimilated the Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division with Stoic moral psychology. We know on other grounds that Cicero was indebted to Posidonian moral psychology in the *Tusculans*: see *supra* n.54 and n.57 *infra*.

⁵⁶ I do not of course claim that *all* later passages recording the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition derive from Posidonius, only that he was instrumental in making this doctrine a widely accepted commonplace (cf. *supra* n.14). It appears that there was a doxographical tradition on soul-division independent of Posidonian influence, in which tripartition is reported without any suggestion of a bipartite dichotomy; cf. Epiph. *Prooem.* (*Dox.Graec.* 587.10), *Adv.haeres.* 3.22 (*Dox.Graec.* 591.19); Gal., *Hist.philos.* 24 (*Dox.Graec.* 615.1f); Iambl. *ap.* Stob. 1.369.9–11; Diog. Laert. 3.67, 90.

cannot be doubted. Lilla has shown that “Posidonius’ theory of *πάθος* and his criticism of Chrysippus had become part of the school-Platonism of the first centuries A.D.,” and has illustrated how Posidonius is followed by later writers even in the smallest details: Galen, Clement, Albinus, and Plutarch, for example, all quote Euripides’ *Medea* 1078f in discussions of *πάθος* and have borrowed this illustration from Posidonius’ polemic against Chrysippean moral psychology.⁵⁷ Similarly, Middle Platonic writers regularly follow Posidonius in representing tripartition as the charioteer guiding his horses, a simile derived from the *Phaedrus* that became a *topos* in Middle Platonism through Posidonius’ influence.⁵⁸ Kidd has recently shown that distinc-

A. A. Long has demonstrated that there is no foundation for the view that Posidonius is the source for the doxographical section in Diogenes’ Life of Plato (*CR* n.s. 22 [1972] 408f), although elsewhere (e.g. 7.137–43) Diogenes does rely heavily upon Posidonius.

⁵⁷ For the evidence cf. Lilla (*supra* n.27) 87–91. The suggestion, however, that the influence of this doctrine among the Middle Platonists is due to Antiochus is untenable; if there was an intermediary, it is far more likely to have been a school handbook now unknown. Two quotations from Euripides’ *Chrysippus* (*TrGF* 840f) also are commonplaces in Middle Platonic texts: Plutarch (*De virt. mor.* 446A, *De audi. Poet.* 33E), Albinus (*Isag.* 24.117.3–10), Clement (*Strom.* 2.63.3). Cicero clearly alludes to the *Chrysippus* at *Tusc.* 4.33.71, and thus once again, under Posidonius’ influence (cf. Witt [*supra* n.21] 81f), records doctrine that later became part of the school tradition. Galen’s quotations of *Medea* 1078f (*De plac.* 188.17–190.15, 244.2–9, 274.10–23) show that the Middle Platonic use of such quotations derives from Posidonius’ polemic against Chrysippus, who quoted this passage himself even though, as Galen points out (188.15–190.15, 274.10–23), it seems to conflict flagrantly with his own theory of the soul. See also A. Dihle, “Euripides’ *Medea*,” *SitzHeidelberg* 1977.5, and C. Gill, “Did Chrysippus Understand *Medea*?” *Phronesis* 28 (1983) 136–49. Another dimension to the influence of Posidonius’ moral psychology on Middle Platonism is revealed by Galen’s *De moribus*, of which an Arabic epitome is extant (translated by J. N. Mattock in *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*, ed. S. M. Stern et al. [Oxford 1972] 235–60). R. Walzer, “New Light on Galen’s Moral Philosophy,” *CQ* 43 (1949) 82–96, has shown that Galen’s doctrine of *ἦθος* in this work derives from Posidonius and that this doctrine is paralleled in other Middle Platonic texts bearing Posidonius’ stamp.

In arguing that Galen is dependent upon Posidonius for his use of *Med.* 1078f I do not wish to imply that he is the source of Galen’s polemic against Chrysippus as a whole. It is true, as the referee points out, that “Galen gives every impression of knowing first-hand Chrysippus’ *De anima* and *De affectibus*, and he does not mention Posidonius until p.248.3, after he has made the transition (on p.238) from *De anima* to *De affectibus*.” Without underestimating Galen’s originality or resourcefulness as a commentator, however, it seems plain that in analyzing *Medea*’s *θυμός* in terms of a “disobedient horse” (188.21f) he is drawing upon Posidonius, who introduced this comparison into discussion of *πάθος* (324.11–23); see nn.58f *infra*.

⁵⁸ See Lilla (*supra* n.27) 95–103. The early Peripatetics, in harmonizing bipartition and tripartition, do not seem to have turned to the simile of the charioteer and horses in the *Phaedrus* for support; Posidonius appears to have introduced it into discussions of soul-division (Gal. *De plac.* 188.21–24, 324.11–23, 332.12–15), and its prominence in Middle Platonic texts is apparently due to the influence of Posidonius’ moral psychology (a point that Lilla fails to consider). Even in cases where the *Phaedrus* appears

tively Posidonian doctrines on *πάθος* twice appear in Arius' epitome of Stoic ethics: the phrase *ἐκφερομένους καθάπερ ὑπό τινος ἀπειθοῦς ἵππου* (89.8f) clearly derives from Posidonius' polemic against Chrysippus over the explanation of "impulse in excess," and the technical term *εὐεμπτωσία* (93.1) encapsulates Posidonius' explanation of the *ψυχὴ* of *φαῦλοι*, which had passed into the doxography by the first century B.C. (cf. Phld. *De ira* 97.15–18 [Wilke] and Cic. *Tusc.* 4.27f [*proclivitas*]).⁵⁹

This body of Posidonian doctrine may have been known to Middle Platonic authors through intermediate handbooks rather than in the original, but whatever the stages of transmission, Posidonius' theory of *πάθος* became an integral part of Middle Platonic doctrine. His doctrine on soul-division, I suggest, is another of his legacies to Middle Platonic moral psychology. His attribution of the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition to Plato is central to his polemic against Chrysippus, and it would be surprising indeed if this doctrine were not handed down to the Middle Platonists along with the rest of his theory of *πάθος*. Moreover, we have established that Posidonius was responsible for the transmission of Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division to the doxographical tradition, and he is known on other grounds to have influenced most of the Middle Platonic authors who attribute this doctrine to Plato.⁶⁰ We conclude, therefore, that the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition became canonical in Middle Platonic moral psychology through the influence of Posidonius' doctrine of *πάθος*, which by the first century B.C. had found its way into the orthodox school tradition.

The transmission of the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition before Posidonius is difficult to establish because of the almost total loss of early Peripatetic discussion of soul-division. The *Magna Moralia*, our earliest testimony for the harmonization of Platonic and Aristotelian moral psychology, does not appear to have directly influenced later discussions: it antedates the attribution of bipartition to Pythagoras recorded in the doxographical tradition and in the Pythag-

to be used directly (e.g. Philo *Leg.alleg.* 1.72f) Posidonius may have provided the original impetus.

⁵⁹ "*Euempōsia*—Proneness to Disease," in Fortenbaugh (*supra* n.17) 107–13, approved by De Lacy (*ibid.*) 114–17.

⁶⁰ We cannot here enter into the details of Posidonius' general influence upon Middle Platonism, some of which are highly controversial. See the discussion and references collected *supra* nn.28, 30, 37, 46, 54, 57–59, as well as Babut (*supra* n.23) 55–66, Witt (*supra* n.21) 95f, K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios* (Munich 1921) and *Poseidonios von Apameia* (Stuttgart 1954), and W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus* (Berlin 1930).

orean writings used by Posidonius; and while Arius Didymus knew the *Magna Moralia* and reproduces similar doctrine on soul-division, it is likely that he is drawing here upon a Peripatetic compendium close to the *Magna Moralia* rather than on the *Magna Moralia* itself. The interpretation of tripartition recorded in the *Magna Moralia* seems to have been common doctrine in the Peripatos,⁶¹ and although Peripatetic texts no longer known may have contributed to Posidonius' understanding of soul-division, he clearly derived at least his doxography, and perhaps his interpretation of Plato's soul-division, from the writings ascribed to Pythagoras' students.

The identity of these writings is uncertain. In the extant Pythagorean pseudepigrapha a variety of psychological doctrine is recorded: one text adopts Aristotle's division into *ἄλογον* and *λόγον ἔχον* (Archytas *De leg.* 33.15f), and others variations on Platonic tripartition (Aresas *De nat.hom.* 48.22–50.23; Diotogenes *De regn.* 73.9–15; Callicratidas *De dom.felic.* 103.3–10; Timaeus *De univ.nat.* 218.4–11; Nicomachus *Intro.ar.* 1.23.4).⁶² But a number of texts clearly record the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition by collapsing the *θυμικόν* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν* into a single *ἄλογον* in opposition to the *λογιστικόν*, texts that reveal strong Peripatetic influence in other respects (Metopus *De virt.* 116.23–119.26; Theag. *De virt.* 190.2–193.16; Anon. Photii 240.16–26). Posidonius derived his attribution of the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition to Pythagoras from writings purportedly by Pythagoras' students, as he explicitly claims, and we are left with the problem of the character of these writings which, through Posidonius' influence, were the source of the doxographical attribution of bipartition to Pythagoras as well as Plato. The addition of Pythagoras' name to the doxography on soul-division plainly derives from an attempt to achieve a synthesis between Peripatetic and Pythagorean doctrine, and this attempt in turn may have been inspired by the claim—as early as the first generation of the Peripatos (Aristox. fr.43; Dicaearchus fr.41; cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 987a29–988a17)—that Plato was the imitator of Pythagoras.⁶³ Throughout Aëtius IV, as well as in other

⁶¹ See Vander Waerdt (*supra* n.3) 301f.

⁶² Cf. *supra* n.50. The Pythagorean pseudepigrapha are cited from H. Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* (Åbo 1965).

⁶³ It is difficult, of course, to trace the source of the doxographical synthesis: Posidonius' testimony makes clear that he based his account on some anonymous Pythagorean writings, which appear to have been third or second century B.C. pseudepigrapha, but it is impossible to know whether these writings were original in conflating Platonic and Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division and in attributing it to Pythagoras. Perhaps the authors of these pseudepigrapha were following earlier Peripatetic writings, since the early Peripatetics attributed to Pythagoras not only the ideal of the philosophi-

doxography, such an attempt at synthesis is reflected in the constant association of Pythagoras with Plato and Platonic doctrine,⁶⁴ but the doxographical attribution of the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition to Pythagoras clearly is apocryphal.⁶⁵ It appears therefore that the writings used by Posidonius belonged to a genre of third and second century B.C. pseudepigrapha that purported to record authentic Pythagorean doctrine and to reveal Pythagoras as the originator of various fundamental Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines.⁶⁶ Many of the extant documents of this genre borrow Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine wholesale and attribute it to Pythagoras. We cannot be certain, of course, that the writings used by Posidonius were of this

cal life, but much current philosophical doctrine as well (see W. Jaeger, "Über Ursprung und Kreislauf des philosophischen Lebensideals," *SitzBerlin* [1928] 390–421). Aristoxenus' account of Pythagorean ethics, in particular, essentially reproduces current Peripatetic doctrine: as Wehrli says, "Hauptmerkmal der Ἀποφάσεις ist aber die Beanspruchung akademisch-peripatetischen Gute für die Pythagoreer" (*Aristoxenos* [Basel 1945] 59; cf. W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* [Cambridge, Mass. 1972] 107f); a number of fragments record his views on the πάθη (frg.30–41), and it is entirely possible that in his Πυθαγορικά ἀποφάσεις he attributed Peripatetic doctrines on soul-division to Pythagoras, an attribution that would have been readily adopted in turn by the Hellenistic writers of pseudepigrapha.

⁶⁴ *Dox.Graec.* 392.12f (Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν), 393.10–14 (Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἄφθαρτον, καὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἄλλ' ἔργον τοῦ αἰδίου θεοῦ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον φθαρτόν), 432.15–20 (Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων λογικὰς μὲν εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων καλουμένων τὰς ψυχὰς, οὐ μὴν λογικῶς ἐνεργούσας παρὰ τὴν δυσκρασίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ φραστικόν, etc.); cf. 417.21–25, 409.25–410.4, 397.26–33, and also 391.23–392.2. This attribution of Platonic doctrine to Pythagoras is common in other doxography; cf. Iamblichus *Vit.Pyth.* 229 (*ap. Stob.* 1.369.9–11), Arius 49.8–50.10, and *supra* n.54.

⁶⁵ No historical value should be attached to Iamblichus' statement in *Vit.Pyth.* 229 that Pythagoras taught φιλία of the λογιστικόν το τὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου εἶδη through φιλοσοφία, nor to his report that those associated with Plato, Archytas, and the remaining Pythagoreans divided the soul into λογισμός, θυμός, and ἐπιθυμία (*ap. Stob.* 1.369.9–11), nor to Diogenes Laertius' attribution to Pythagoras of a tripartite division into νοῦς, φρένες, and θυμός (8.30); cf. Burkert (*supra* n.63) 74f. Iamblichus' terminology shows that he is attributing to Pythagoras the Peripatetic version of tripartition; perhaps he is drawing upon the same Pythagorean tradition as Posidonius. Rohde's attempt (*supra* n.43: 464 n.1) to find justification for the doxography in Philolaos fr.B13 D.-K. (an account of the ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ζώου τοῦ λογικοῦ) is unfounded. A defense of the Pythagorean origin of tripartition may be found in Taylor (*supra* n.50) 497, and J. L. Stocks (*Mind* n.s. 24 [1915] 207–21) even developed an interpretation of Plato's tripartite soul based on the assumption that Plato inherited this division from the Pythagoreans; but neither of these views is tenable, and I agree with Jaeger (*supra* n.63: 396 n.1) that this attribution is apocryphal. In no case is it possible to trace such doctrine back before the fourth century B.C.

⁶⁶ Cf. W. Burkert, *Philologus* 105 (1961) 16–43, 226–46. In other cases Posidonius was responsible for transmitting pseudo-Pythagorean doctrine to later antiquity (cf. Burkert [*supra* n.63] 54–56), and hence it is not surprising that the doxographical attribution of Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division to Pythagoras was transmitted by him.

sort, but there is no reason to think otherwise, and their attribution to Pythagoras of a doctrine so anachronistic as Platonic tripartition modified by Aristotelian bipartition does not give one confidence in their historical accuracy. Yet these writings were the source for Posidonius' doxography on soul-division, and it is upon them that the later tradition largely depends.

The transmission of the Peripatetic interpretation of tripartition may be summarized, necessarily schematically, as follows: as early as the first generation of the Peripatos, tripartition was re-interpreted in the terms of Aristotelian bipartition, a psychology based upon fundamentally different principles; this Peripatetic doctrine was then pressed into service by some Hellenistic writers of pseudepigrapha who attempted to reveal Pythagoras as the originator of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine; their writings were used by Posidonius for his doxography of Platonic views on moral education; and his exposition of tripartition, probably through intermediate school texts, in turn influenced Middle Platonic doctrine on soul-division, which thence passed into the Latin and Arabic traditions. Posidonius' transmission of Peripatetic doctrine on soul-division to Middle Platonism serves as a salutary reminder both of the complex and often fragile way in which Peripatetic doctrine was transmitted to later antiquity, and of the influence that derivative school-doctrine often assumed in shaping philosophical speculation, even when the original expositions of that doctrine were available.⁶⁷

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