Πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου:
The History of a Greek Proverb

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I N THE SPRING of 427 B.C. a Peloponnesian fleet under the nauarch Alcidas lumbered across the Aegean to raise the Athenian siege of Mytilene.[1] At Embaton in the Erythraea the fleet received confirmation of the report that Mytilene had already fallen; the Spartan mission had failed.[2] But the Elean Teutiaplus, a figure otherwise unknown, proposed to salvage the situation through stratagem: a surprise attack by night would catch the Athenians unprepared, dispersed, and negligent in victory (Thuc. 3.30.1–3).

Teutiaplus justifies his plan by reference to τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου (3.30.4), an obscure phrase, which then appears (always in the plural and always in a military context) in other authors down to Cicero, before eventually entering the collection of proverbs attributed to Diogenianus.[3] Metaphorical use of the phrase (*i.e.*, in a non-military context) is first seen in Philo of Alexandria (*Ebr.* 76) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 41B). Neither Thucydides nor Aristotle, however, recognized the phrase as a proverb, of which Polybius gives the first explicit attestation. The history of the phrase κενὸν/κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου provides a rare glimpse of how a Greek proverb originated, and allows us to probe its relationship to ancient military thought and psychological theory.

Although proverbs are often regarded as colloquial aphorisms of 'folk wisdom' originating at indeterminable points in the past, some

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[1] The following will be cited by author's name: C. von CLAUSEWITZ, *On War*, tr. H. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton 1976); P. BORGEAUD, *Recherches sur le dieu Pan* (=*Biblioteca Helvetica Romana* 17 [Rome 1979]); R. B. KEBRIC, *In the Shadow of Macedon: Duris of Samos* (=*Historia* Einzelschr. 29 [Wiesbaden 1977]); K. MEISTER, *Die sizilische Geschichte bei Diodor von den Anfängen bis zum Tod Agathokles* (diss.Munich 1967); W. K. PRITCHETT, *The Greek State at War* I–IV (Berkeley 1971–85); F. WEHRLI, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* III² *Klearchos* (Basel 1969).

[2] For a reassessment of Spartan strategy in the Archidamian War, emphasizing Spartan hopes for effective naval action, see T. Kelly, "Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War," *AHR* 87 (1982) 25–59.

[3] Arist. *Eth.Nic.* 3.8.6; Polyb. 29.16.3 (=*Suda s.v.* πολλὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμου Adler); Diod. 17.86.1; 20.30.1, 67.4; 21.2.3; Cic. *Att.* 5.20.3; Diogenian. 7.80 (*CPG* I 300) = Apost. 14.53 (*CPG* II 618).

do arise from datable historical events,[4] and it is only an assumption that proverbs must derive from oral tradition. In fact, as I hope to show, the proverb πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου developed over time in both its form and its associations. Speculation about the frequency of this phrase in popular speech would be fruitless, since scholars can work only from written sources. The most we can say with any certainty is that the initial form of the phrase occurs in Thucydides; it is first called a proverb by Polybius; and its metaphorical use appears only in the first century (Philo and Plutarch). To claim it as a proverb before Thucydides would be an *argumentum e silentio*, especially as our first testimony to this effect comes almost three centuries later. πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου thus offers an instance of a proverb deriving from the literary tradition, and it is an exaggeration to think that all proverbs collected in the *Corpus paroemiographorum graecorum* orig-inated exclusively in colloquial use.

The study of proverbs presents numerous difficulties, not the least of which is determining a proverb's correct meaning.[5] πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου is no exception. Throughout its history the phrase was associ-ated sometimes with stratagem, the concept of trickery and deception in war (its initial context in Thucydides), sometimes with panic, the sudden terror seizing armies without rational cause, and sometimes with both.[6] Yet κενὸν/κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου is synonymous with neither *strategema* nor *panika*. Indeed both the meaning of the phrase and its text are at issue: its association with stratagem, especially as found in Thucydides, has prompted arguments for accepting καινόν/καινά, the reading in some manuscripts, or even κοινόν/κοινά rather than κενόν/κενά. Does a textual problem really exist? In contrast, Cicero equates the phrase with πανικά, an interpretation unsuitable for its original Thucydidean context. How did these two apparently unrelated con-cepts, stratagem and panic, gain association with κενὸν/κενὰ τοῦ πο-λέμου?

Previous scholarship has not addressed this question. Gomme, although aware of the phrase in other authors, declined to draw upon this material to explain Thuc. 3.30.4. His interpretation of the phrase, as an error to be avoided yet exploited when seen in others, only

[4] *Cf.* John Patrick Lynch, "Hipparchos' Wall in the Academy at Athens: a Closer Look at the Tradition," in *Studies Presented to Sterling Dow* (=*GRBM* 10 [Durham 1984]) 173–79.

[5] See the introduction to Winfried Bühler, *Zenobii Athoi proverbia* (Göttingen 1982).

[6] Stratagem: Thuc. 3.30.4; panic: Arist. *Eth.Nic.* 3.8.6; Polyb. 29.16.3; Diod. 20.67.4; Cic. *Att.* 5.20.3; both: Diod. 17.86.1, 20.30.1, 21.2.3; Diogenian. 7.80.

partially grasps its meaning, and he failed to understand the universal truism of war that Thucydides attempted to signify. Shackleton Bailey in his commentary on Cic. *Att.* 5.20.3 offers an excellent brief discussion; but his treatment is by no means exhaustive, omitting references to the phrase in Polybius and Diodorus, and offering no explanation of its association with both stratagem and panic.[7] A more extensive treatment is therefore justified.

First, I shall argue that κενόν/κενά is the correct reading. Next, I shall demonstrate that the original Thucydidean meaning of the phrase is a truism signifying a general's problem in perceiving a situation and deriving correct information in war, where the dilemma of discerning reality from illusion has practical significance: illusions and misperceptions are opportunities for stratagem. Thucydides' phrase can be seen as an ancient version of what Clausewitz would later call the 'fog of war'. Finally, I shall discuss how the phrase became a proverb and account for its association with panic—a new aspect of the phrase that began with its appropriation by Aristotle from Thucydides. In the fourth century B.C. the practical problem of army panics became a topic of both military theory and Peripatetic psychological speculation. The key to the later history of the phrase lies with the Peripatetic Clearchus of Soli, who perpetuated the school's practice of collecting proverbs and combined the military and psychological interests in panic in a treatise on the subject. Clearchus, I believe, is the source of the proverb in the collection of the Ps.-Diogenianus, and his association with Duris of Samos, another Peripatetic, suggests that Duris may be Diodorus' (and perhaps Cicero's) source for the proverb.

I

Although κενόν/κενά has been the preferred reading in recent editions of Thucydides, Aristotle, Polybius,[8] Diodorus, and Cicero, Greeks from about the second century B.C., as Gomme noted (*ad* Thuc. 3.30.4), did not distinguish *kenos* from *kainos* in pronunciation, and thus Gomme concluded that the manuscript tradition of both Thucydides and other sources of the proverb had no value. Even the scholiast (of unknown date) on Thuc. 3.30.4 did not know wheth-

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[7] A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* II (Oxford 1956) 292f. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero's Letters to Atticus* III (Cambridge 1968) 226f.

[8] Buettner-Wobst records no manuscript variants for κενά at Polyb. 29.16.3 (Teubner ed., Leipzig 1904), but Adler, *Suidae Lexicon* IV (Leipzig 1935) 156, has καινά. The *Suda* is the only source for this fragment of Polybius.

er κενόν or καινόν was correct and could not offer a single interpreta-
tion of the phrase.[9] The variant reading καινόν/καινά, however, is not
found for all occurrences of the phrase: it is lacking for Diod. 20.30.1
and 64.7.[10] Modern translations often skirt the textual issue.[11] Some
scholars either prefer the readings of inferior manuscripts or reject the
manuscript tradition completely in suggesting τὸ κοινόν (the impar-
tiality of war) or καιρός (the opportunity of war).[12]

Clarence Bill has argued for reading καινά, although he considers
the proverb only in Thucydides, Aristotle, and Cicero. In his view
κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου to an ancient Greek could only mean the "empty
fears of war" or the "futilities of war," neither of which, he thinks,
suits the contexts of the proverb in his three authors. Diogenes Laer-
tius 5.41 is alleged to prove this: τὸ δὲ κενὸν τοῦ βίου πλέον τοῦ
συμφέροντος. Bill, favoring the reading καινά, translates the proverb as
the "shifting nature of war" or the "contingencies of war." Further

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[9] Σ ad Thuc. 3.30.4 Hude: τὸ καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου· τὸ καινὸν οἱ μὲν διὰ διφθόγγου
γράψαντες οὕτως ἐνόησαν, τὸ παρ' ἐλπίδα καὶ παρὰ δόξαν ποιοῦν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις νικᾶν,
τουτέστι τὸ ἐπιπεσεῖν ἀφυλάκτοις τοῖς ἐχθροῖς· οἱ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ε ψιλοῦ γράψαντες οὕτως
ἐξηγοῦνται, τὸ διάκενον καὶ ἀργὸν τοῦ πολέμου. Of the two hands that contributed
scholia to *Laurentianus gr.* 69.2 (*saec.* X), Hude follows the more recent (c₂) in
printing καινόν.

[10] See C. Th. Fischer's Teubner edition (Leipzig 1906). At Diod. 17.86.1 the variant
καινοῖς appears only in **R** (*Paris.gr.* 1665, *saec.* XII) by a late hand.

[11] *E.g.*, Thucydides: Hobbes: "all stratagems of war whatsoever are no more but
such occasions" (R. Schlatter, ed., *Hobbes' Thucydides* [New Brunswick 1975] 192);
Crawley: "baseless panics common in war" (Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*
[Modern Library ed., New York 1951] 161); Smith (preferring the *lectio* καινά): "the
element of surprise in warfare" (Thucydides [Loeb ed., London 1920] II 47); Warner:
"an example of the unknown factor in warfare" (Thucydides, *The History of the
Peloponnesian War* [Penguin ed., Baltimore 1959] 209); Lateiner: "the opportunity of
war" (n.27 *infra*: 177 n.7); Aristotle: Rackham: "war (as the saying is) is full of false
alarms" (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* [Loeb ed., London 1945] 165); Diodorus:
Goukowsky *ad* 17.86.1: "par une ruse de guerre" (Diodore de Sicilie, *Bibliothèque
Historique* [Budé ed., Paris 1976] 120); Greer *ad* 20.30.1, 67.4: "the empty alarms of
war" (Diodorus Siculus [Loeb ed., London 1954] X 223, 325; Walton *ad* 21.2.3: "the
futilities of war" (Diodorus Siculus [Loeb ed., London 1957] XI 9); Cicero: Shackle-
ton Bailey: "nerve warfare" (*supra* n.7: III 59).

[12] κοινόν/κοινά: Steup argues for κοινόν in Thuc. 3.30.4 on the basis of Hom. *Il.*
18.309, Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.11, and Thuc. 5.102, but takes the untenable position that
κενά should be read in the phrase in other authors. Classen prefers καινόν, as do
Poppo and Stahl: J. Steup, *Bemerkungen zu Thukydides* (Freiberg n.d.) 259–62; J.
Classen and J. Steup, *Thukydides*³ III (Berlin 1892) 54, 253f; J. Classen, *Thukydides*
III (Berlin 1867) 188f; E. F. Poppo and J. M. Stahl, *Thucydidis De bello Pelopon-
nesiaco* II.1 (Leipzig 1875) 46f. R. Y. Tyrell and L. C. Purser, *The Correspondence of
Cicero* III (Dublin 1890) 116 suggest κοινά at Cic. *Att.* 5.20, but fail to support their
suggestion with the reading κοινά found in the very poor *digamma* class of manu-
scripts, as noted in Shackleton Bailey's edition. καιρός: Hans-Jörg Schulz, "Zu Thu-
cydides 3,30,4," *Hermes* 85 (1957) 255f, written in ignorance of Bill's article (n.13
infra) and citing Thuc. 1.142.1 as a parallel: τοῦ δὲ πολέμου οἱ καιροὶ οὐ μενετοί.

proof is adduced from an *adscriptum* to *Att.* 5.20.3 in the *delta* class of manuscripts, where the proverb is given as *nova belli.*[13]

There is less room to fault Bill's translation than his arguments. The passage from Diogenes proves nothing, and the *adscripta* in the *delta* manuscripts of Cicero's letters are generally unreliable, as Bill also recognizes. Furthermore, the only variant reading in the manuscripts for *Att.* 5.20.3 is κοινά, not καινά.[14] Seeking a Latin solution for the proper reading of the Greek proverb, however, has merit, since the proverb also appears in Latin sources in contexts where the Roman author has most probably either directly or through a *Zwischenquelle* consulted a Greek text.

Curtius' account of Alexander's stratagem to capture the Sogdian Rock offers the best example. When the local king refused to surrender, Alexander sent a band of Macedonian mountaineers to seize the summit above the king's camp and then dispatched the king's son to urge surrender. When the king saw Macedonians waving white flags from the peak and the Macedonian camp below raised a shout, he yielded:

> *iamque e Macedonum castris signorum concentus et totius exercitus clamor audiebatur. ea res, sicut pleraque belli, vana et inanis barbaros ad deditionem traxit: quippe occupati metu paucitatem eorum, qui a tergo erant, aestimare non poterant* (Curt. 7.11.25)

Certainly Curtius is drawing on a Greek source, and Alexander's stratagem of creating an illusion to induce his opponent to draw a false conclusion in a state of panic fits a pattern of behavior repeatedly associated with the proverb, as we shall see.[15] Curtius' phrase, *sicut pleraque belli, vana et inanis*, can be a paraphrase only of κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου. However much καινά may appear in some cases a more logical reading of the proverb, κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου must be correct. Curtius did not write *nova* in 7.11.25 or elsewhere.

In 4.13.5, part of Parmenio's speech urging a surprise attack by night on the Persians at Gaugamela (the same kind of military action that occasions the proverb in Teutiaplus' speech at Thuc. 3.30), Curtius has Parmenio note the advantage not only of creating a noc-

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[13] Clarence P. Bill, "ΤΑ ΚΑΙΝΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ," *CP* 32 (1937) 160f.

[14] Cf. *supra* n.12. Shackleton Bailey (*supra* n.7) 227 also rejects Bill's arguments but without refuting all of them.

[15] Although names of the Sogdians differ in Curtius, Plutarch, and Arrian (Diodorus' account is lost), Plutarch's abridged account (*Alex.* 58.4) seems to follow the same source as Curtius, *i.e.*, Alexander intimidated the king into surrender: ταύτην (the Sogdian Rock) μὲν οὖν ἐκφοβήσας τὸν Σισιμίθρην ἔλαβεν. Arrian (*Anab.* 4.21) omits the stratagem and has Alexander induce surrender solely through negotiation.

turnal panic but also of Macedonians avoiding the horrifying sight of Scythians and Bactrians: *vanis et inanibus militem magis quam iustis formidinis causis moveri*. Although the passage is a less obvious and less literal version of the proverb, the contrast is again between real fear (*iustis formidinis causis*) and imagined fear or false alarm (*vanis et inanibus*). *Nova/καινά* will not do.

Use of the Greek proverb in Latin, however, is not limited to Curtius: Cato also knew it. When as consul in 195 B.C. Cato governed Hispania Citerior during a major frontier crisis, the chieftain of the Ilergetes, a Roman ally, demanded protection for his people. With too few troops under his command to permit division of his forces in event of an attack, Cato created an elaborate illusion of sending aid, and actually embarked some troops, only to recall them.[16] His deliberation of the stratagem reveals not only a paraphrase of the Greek proverb but also a theoretical perspective on the rôle of deceit in war (Liv. 34.12.3f):

> *stat sententia non minuere copias, ne quid interim hostes inferant ignominiae; sociis spem pro re ostentandam censet; saepe vana pro veris, maxime in bello, valuisse, et credentem se aliquid auxilii habere, perinde atque haberet, ipsa fiducia et sperando atque audendo servatum.*

Cato's stratagem against an ally conforms to a Greek view that a general's deception of his own forces can be just (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.15–17), and the very use of stratagem by the arch-advocate of Roman conservatism points up the hypocrisy of Roman propaganda (*e.g.*, Liv. 42.47.4–9) that Romans never resorted to stratagem (Cato was a skilled practitioner of military ruses—a theme that must be pursued elsewhere).

The phrase *saepe vana pro veris, maxime in bello, valuisse* paraphrases the substance of the Greek proverb. The immediate source is Livy, but it is generally agreed that Livy draws upon Cato's extensive account of his Spanish campaign in the *Origines*, although whether directly or indirectly cannot be determined.[17]

Furthermore, Cato's source for the proverb can even be posited. Among extant sources in which the proverb appears only Thucydides

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[16] Liv. 34.12.2–13.2; Frontin. *Str.* 4.7.31. For a recent discussion of the Spanish wars of the 190's see S. L. Dyson, *The Creation of the Roman Frontier* (Princeton 1985) 186–93.

[17] A. E. Astin, *Cato the Censor* (Oxford 1978) 302–07; J. Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXIV–XXXVII* (Oxford 1981) 63–65; H. Tränkle, "Cato in der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius," *AbhMainz* 1971.4: a strong argument for direct use.

and Aristotle antedate Cato.[18] Knowledge of Aristotle finds no trace in Cato's own writings or biographies of him, but a connection with Thucydides is openly asserted. Cicero twice couples Cato and Thucydides as writers, but Plutarch offers more conclusive evidence. Plutarch asserts that despite learning Greek late in life, Cato in his oratory benefited from a knowledge of Thucydides and Demosthenes, that he moderately embellished his writings with Greek *sententiae* and stories, and that many of his aphorisms were literal translations from Greek sources.[19] Cato's quotation of Themistocles and echoes of Demosthenes confirm this testimony,[20] just as Livy's *saepe vana pro veris, maxime in bello, valuisse* is, I believe, a Catonian interpretation of Thucydides' τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου. The proverb does not occur in Demosthenes. Nor does Cato's allegedly late knowledge of Greek pose a problem. Cato's memoirs of the Spanish campaign need not be a work of 195 B.C., and the *Origines* were still being composed close to the time of Cato's death in 149. In fact Cato probably learned Greek early in his career.[21]

Two other possible Latin occurrences of the proverb may be mentioned. Shackleton Bailey cites Tac. *Hist.* 2.69, Vitellius' dismissal of troublesome Gallic auxilia in A.D. 69: *reddita civitatibus Gallorum auxilia, ingens numerus et prima statim defectione inter inania belli adsumptus.* Of course *inania belli* could be equated with κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, implying a Thucydidean echo in Tacitus. Yet Tacitus' phrase, which does not recur in his works, is obscure, and recent scholarship is skeptical of any direct or significant influence of Thucydides on Tacitus.[22] Wellesley translates the phrase: "as a form of military window-dressing."[23] In Shackleton Bailey's view the Gallic

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[18] As I shall argue below, the proverb was popular in Peripatetic writers such as Clearchus of Soli and Duris of Samos, both of whom antedate Cato, but Cato's familiarity with these writers cannot be demonstrated. Polybius, Cato's contemporary, also seems unlikely: Cato might have been a source for Polybius on some matters, but no instance of the converse is known.

[19] Cic. *Brut.* 66, 294; Plut. *Cat.Mai.* 2.5f, *cf.* 12.5 and Cic. *Sen.* 26.

[20] Plut. *Cat.Mai.* 8.4; Cato *ORF*³ fr.20, *cf.* Dem. *Phil.* 1.30; fr.195, *cf.* Dem. *Phil.* 3.8, 17; Astin (*supra* n.17) 149.

[21] Nep. *Cat.* 3.3: *senex historias scribere instituit*; *Origines* fr.49 (Book 2 written *ca* 168 B.C.), frr.106–09 (Sulpicius Galba affair of 149), *HRR* I² 68, 89–91; Astin (*supra* n.17) 147, 149, 212f. Astin strongly doubts a Catonian interest in Greek rhetorical theory.

[22] Shackleton Bailey (*supra* n.7) 227; O. Luschnat, "Thukydides," *RE* Suppl. 12 (1970) 1298; H. Heubner, *Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Die Historien* II (Heidelberg 1968) 241, contributes nothing significant. The Gallic auxilia are probably those provided by the Agrippinenses, the Treveri, and the Lingones immediately after Vitellius' proclamation as emperor: Tac. *Hist.* 1.57.2.

[23] K. Wellesley, tr., Tacitus, *The Histories* (Penguin ed., Baltimore 1964) 122.

auxilia constituted a useless addition except for their value "in terrorem." This phrase, however, is not Tacitus', as Shackleton Bailey implies, nor does Tacitus use *inania belli* when he does record military panics: *e.g. Ann.* 1.66, *Hist.* 1.63.1. Certainly it could be argued that the Gallic auxilia were a rabble unfit for combat and accepted for service only to create the illusion that Vitellius' army was larger than it really was—hence *inania belli*—a form of stratagem to induce consternation in Vitellius' opponents. If this is really what Tacitus meant to imply, then the association of the phrase with terror or panic is most obscure. As a historian famous for the theme of *dissimulatio*, Tacitus is of course concerned with the problem of appearance vs. reality. *Inanis*, nevertheless, is a frequent adjective in Tacitus,[24] and a Greek source does not come into question for the passage. Tacitus' *inania belli* need not be a Latin rendering of the Greek proverb, but rather could be Tacitus' own abstract phrase. The apparent correlation in meaning between the two phrases may be entirely accidental.

Finally, for the sake of completeness we should note the Latin translation of Byzantine scholia on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* by Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253). For *Eth.Nic.* 3.8.6 (1116b) κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, Grosseteste has *inania belli*.[25] Grosseteste translates from an anonymous continuation of the commentary on the *Eth.Nic.* by Eustratius, metropolitan of Nicaea. Although G. Heylbut, editor of the continuator, notes the κενά/καινά problem in his *apparatus criticus* of the scholiast, the text used by Grosseteste obviously read κενά, since καινά cannot be translated *inania*. Two earlier commentators on *Eth. Nic.* 3.8.6, Aspasius and Heliodorus, have only κενά without the variant καινά in their manuscripts.[26]

This survey of occurrences of the Greek proverb in Latin confirms the correctness of recent editors' preference for reading κενόν/κενά. In addition, Latin usage confirms the ambiguity of the proverb: in Curtius and Cato (Tac. *Hist.* 2.69.1, I have argued, is not an occurrence) the proverb appears in the context of stratagem involving the manipulation of illusion, and both of Curtius' examples associate it with panic. Examination of the proverb in its various Greek contexts can bring the problem of its precise meaning into sharper focus.

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[24] *Cf.* A. Gerber and A. Greef, *Lexicon Taciteum* (Leipzig 1903) 610f *s.v.* Classen (*supra* n.12: III 189) suggests emending *inania* to *semina*.

[25] H. P. F. Mercken, *The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln* (=*Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum* VI.1 [Leiden 1973]) 284, 287.

[26] Σ *in Eth.Nic.* 3.11, *Comm.Arist.gr.* XX 165.18–20; Aspasius *in Eth.Nic.* 3.11, *Comm.Arist.gr.* XIX.1 84.31–33; Heliodorus, *Paraphr. in Eth.Nic.* 3.8, *Comm.Arist. gr.* XIX.2 56.21–28.

II

Thucydides offers the initial and most obscure occurrence of the phrase as part of Teutiaplus' speech (3.30):[27]

Ἀλκίδα καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρεσμεν ἄρχοντες τῆς στρατιᾶς, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πλεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Μυτιλήνην πρὶν ἐκπύστους γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔχο- μεν. κατὰ γὰρ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀνδρῶν νεωστὶ πόλιν ἐχόντων πολὺ τὸ ἀφύλακ- τον εὑρήσομεν, κατὰ μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ πάνυ, ᾗ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἀνέλπιστοι ἐπιγενέσθαι ἄν τινα σφίσι πολέμιον καὶ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀλκὴ τυγχάνει μάλιστα οὖσα· εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ τὸ πεζὸν αὐτῶν κατ' οἰκίας ἀμελέστερον ὡς κεκρατη- κότων διεσπάρθαι. εἰ οὖν προσπέσοιμεν ἄφνω τε καὶ νυκτός, ἐλπίζω μετὰ τῶν ἔνδον, εἴ τις ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὑπόλοιπος εὔνους, καταληφθῆναι ἂν τὰ πράγματα. καὶ μὴ ἀποκνήσωμεν τὸν κίνδυνον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ εἴ τις στρατηγὸς ἔν τε αὑτῷ φυλάσσοιτο καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐνορῶν ἐπιχειροίη, πλεῖστ' ἂν ὀρθοῖτο.

Gomme interprets the phrase solely on the basis of Thuc. 3.30, although he mentions the verbal parallels elsewhere in Thucydides and use of the proverb in other authors. The meaning of τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου, in Gomme's view, depends on that of τὸ τοιοῦτον, which he, like Classen and Poppo/Stahl, takes as a forward reference to the following subordinate clause. He concludes that the proverb, which he translates "the empty, or the fruitless thing in war," signifies an error to be avoided in ourselves and to be exploited when discerned in others.[28] Yet τὸ τοιοῦτον provides an antecedent only for the relative pronoun ὅ, not for the entire clause. The concluding subordinate clause serves only as a didactic flourish to end the speech and does not define the proverb. τὸ τοιοῦτον actually summarizes preceding material.[29]

Teutiaplus' speech advocates a surprise attack by night, but Gomme correctly saw that τὸ κενόν is not surprise attack, which merely takes advantage of the error to be avoided. On the other hand, Gomme rejected equation of τὸ κενόν with τὸ ἀφύλακτον, thinking that this limited the meaning of the phrase too much. Certainly lack of precaution is not the exclusive meaning of τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου, but it

[27] For commentary see D. Lateiner, "The Speech of Teutiaplus," *GRBS* 16 (1975) 175–84. Lateiner essentially follows Gomme's interpretation of the proverb. Note that τάδε is unique here in introducing a speech in Thucydides, who elsewhere uses τοιάδε or τοιαῦτα, implying invention, whereas to introduce documents he uses a definite pronoun, signifying quotation. Hence Gomme argues that Teutiaplus' speech is historical, *i.e.* not a Thucydidean invention: *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford 1937) 166f, *Commentary* II 292f; disputed by S. Hornblower, *Thucydides* (Baltimore 1987) 53. Conceivably τάδε at 3.29.2 is a scribal error for τοιάδε.

[28] Gomme (*supra* n.7) 292; Classen and Poppo-Stahl (*supra* n.12).

[29] *Cf.* Steup (*supra* n.12), *Bemerkungen* 258f, *Thukydides*³ 54.

does represent one of its components. Thucydides' language is obscure because his idea is abstract. τὸ κενόν represents not a single idea, but the abstraction of a group of ideas emphasized in 3.30: undiscovered (πρὶν ἐκπύστους), lack of precaution (τὸ ἀφύλακτον), unexpected (ἀνέλπιστοι), negligence (ἀμελέστερον), and finally the consequence of these—nocturnal surprise attack (προσπέσομεν ἄφνω τε καὶ νυκτός).

Teutiaplus' speech should be compared with two other passages. First, Brasidas' battle plan against Cleon at Amphipolis: the situation is again a surprise attack on an unsuspecting opponent, and Thucydides explicitly characterizes the plan as a stratagem.[30] The Spartans intend to strike without prior exposure to the enemy (5.8.3, ἄνευ προόψεως), and the attack will be sudden (5.8.4, ἐπιχειρεῖν αἰφνιδίως) on an unsuspecting enemy in disorder and taking no precautions (5.9.3, οὐκ ἂν ἐλπίσαντες, ἀτάκτως, ὀλιγωρεῖν). Furthermore, the language and idea of 3.30.4 are strongly echoed in 5.9.4f:

ὅστις δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας ἁμαρτίας τῶν ἐναντίων κάλλιστα ἰδὼν καὶ ἅμα πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖται μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀντιπαραταχθέντος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ξυμφέροντος, πλεῖστ' ἂν ὀρθοῖτο· καὶ τὰ κλέμματα ταῦτα καλλίστην δόξαν ἔχει ἃ τὸν πολέμιον μάλιστ' ἄν τις ἀπατήσας τοὺς φίλους μέγιστ' ἂν ὠφελήσειεν.

It would thus appear that τὸ κενόν is closely associated but not identical with κλέμματα and could be equated with ἁμαρτία. Certainly error, like stratagem, is involved in the idea of τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου, but ἁμαρτία does not convey the proper nuance, as another Thucydidean passage suggests.

When King Archidamas of Sparta addresses his army before the first invasion of Attica, he warns against negligence and overconfidence based on numbers, fearing the possibility of surprise attack (2.11.3f):

οὔκουν χρή, εἴ τῳ καὶ δοκοῦμεν πλήθει ἐπιέναι καὶ ἀσφάλεια πολλὴ εἶναι μὴ ἂν ἐλθεῖν τοὺς ἐναντίους ἡμῖν διὰ μάχης, τούτων ἕνεκα ἀμελέστερόν τι παρεσκευασμένους χωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεως ἑκάστης ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατιώτην τὸ καθ' αὑτὸν αἰεὶ προσδέχεσθαι ἐς κίνδυνόν τινα ἥξειν. ἄδηλα γὰρ τὰ τῶν πολέμων, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου τὰ πολλὰ καὶ δι' ὀργῆς αἱ

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[30] Thuc. 5.8.2 (τέχνη), 9.5 with schol.: κλέμματα=στρατηγήματα. Cf. Otto Luschnat, *Die Feldherrnreden im Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (=*Philologus* Suppl. 34.2 [Leipzig 1942]) 70 with n.1; E. L. Wheeler, *Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery* (*Mnemosyne* Suppl. 108 [Leiden 1988]) 28f, 32f. On the battle see N. Jones, "The Topography and Strategy of the Battle of Amphipolis," *CSCA* 10 (1977) 71–104.

ἐπιχειρήσεις γίγνονται· πολλάκις τε τὸ ἔλασσον πλῆθος δεδιὸς ἄμεινον
ἠμύνατο τοὺς πλέονας διὰ τὸ καταφρονοῦντας ἀπαρασκεύους γενέσθαι.

The themes of negligence, lack of preparation (a variation on the ideas of lack of precaution and unexpectedness at 3.30, 5.8f), and suddenness of attack are common to the speeches of Teutiaplus and Brasidas. The key phrase, however, is ἄδηλα τὰ τῶν πολέμων.[31] The "unseen elements of wars" induce error (cf. ἁρματία, 5.9.4) and can be exploited for stratagem, when avoided in one's own conduct and seen in the enemy's.

Thucydides' τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου thus represents the void of correct information in war, produced by unseen, obscure, or poorly perceived factors. Teutiaplus' appeal to the κενόν of war summarizes his earlier arguments: the Spartan fleet is yet an unseen element; the Athenians revel in the false security of a victory, contributing to their lack of precaution and their negligence; and the Spartans can pounce upon them under cover of night.

Contrary to those who would emend the text, κενόν is appropriate here. Thucydides' "void of information" may be compared to Democritus' τὸ κενόν for the void of space. "Idle boasts" (κενὰ εὔγματα) appears in Homer, and fifth-century Greeks used κενός with ἐλπίς, γνώμη, φροντίδες, and φόβοι.[32] Xenophon describes panic as κενὸς φόβος (Anab. 2.2.21). Most probably, Thucydides' τὸ κενόν is not an ellipsis that requires a noun to be understood with κενόν, but rather simply an abstraction from substantive use of the adjective, summarizing the thought of the preceding three sentences of the speech.

Thucydides' concept of τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου can be better understood through comparison with the ideas of a modern classic on the art and philosophy of war, Carl von Clausewitz's Vom Kriege. Although it cannot be proved that Clausewitz ever read Thucydides, both, as profound thinkers on the phenomenon of war, made chance and the unexpected a motif of their works.[33] In Clausewitz's view a general can fully know only his own situation. Real knowledge about

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[31] Lateiner (supra n.27: 177 n.7) cites 2.11.4 as a parallel to 3.30.4 but does not expound on its significance for understanding the proverb.

[32] LSJ s.v. κενός I.1f. Cf. the proverb κενοὶ κενὰ λογίζονται: Suda s.v.

[33] Thucydides: e.g. 1.78.1f, 83.3f, 140.1; 4.18.3f, 62.4; 7.61.3; 8.24.5; cf. L. Edmunds, Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides (Cambridge [Mass.] 1975). Clausewitz: e.g. 84–86, 89, 101–03, 117, 139f, 156, 167, 193, 580; cf. K. L. Herbig, "Chance and Uncertainty in On War," in M. Handel, ed., Clausewitz and Modern Strategy (=Journal of Strategic Studies 9.2–3 [1986]) 95–116. I do not accept a recent argument that Thucydides and Clausewitz had totally different views and perspectives. I hope to treat this matter elsewhere. See V. Ilari, Guerra e diritto nel mondo antico I (Milan 1980) 123–25.

the enemy must be carefully derived by a sensitive and discriminating judgment, skillful intelligence, determination, and presence of mind, from an overwhelming mass of false information and rumors exaggerated by fear in an environment uncontrollably governed by chance and the unexpected.[34] In brief, a general must operate in a constant fog of uncertainty, in which illusion and reality can scarcely be discerned:

> Der Krieg ist das Gebeit der Ungewissheit; drei Viertheile derjenigen Dinge, auf welche das Handeln im Kriege gebaut wird, liegen im Nebel einer mehr oder weniger grossen Ungewissheit. . . . Endlich ist die grosse Ungewissheit aller Daten im Kriege eine eigenthümliche Schwierigkeit, weil alles Handeln gewissermassen in einem blossen Dämmerlicht verrichtet wird, das noch dazu nicht selten wie eine Nebel- oder Mondscheinbeleuchtung den Dingen einen übertriebenen Umfang, ein groteskes Ansehen giebt.[35]

This "fog of war" constitutes a major source of the "friction of war," Clausewitz's metaphor for those factors complicating and interfering with the execution of plans—the difference between war on paper and in reality.[36]

Thucydides' κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου and Clausewitz's "fog of war" represent essentially the same idea, portraying the problem of a general's uncertainty of information in war as a sort of existential dilemma. The proverb, however, conceptually at least where error due to negligence and the unexpected is involved, is also related to an *exemplum* met with some frequency in Stoic writings and attributed variously to Iphicrates, Fabius Maximus, and Scipio Aemilianus. The version of Valerius Maximus (7.2.2) offers a point of departure:

> *Scipio vero Africanus turpe esse aiebat in re militari dicere "non putarem," videlicet quia explorato et excusso consilio quae ferro aguntur administrari oportere arbitrabatur. summa ratione: inemendabilis est enim error, qui violentiae Martis committitur.*[37]

The *exemplum* emphasizes foresight and expecting the unexpected, in other words, giving heed to the κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου. Scipio Aemili-

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[34] Clausewitz 84, 101, 103.

[35] *Vom Kriege*[4] I (Berlin 1880) 50, 108 (=tr. Howard/Paret 101, 140).

[36] Clausewitz 117, *cf.* 119–21.

[37] *Cf.* Sen. *De ira* 2.31.4: *turpissimam aiebat Fabius imperatori excusationem esse: "Non putavi," ego turpissimam homini puto. omnia puta, expecta.* That Valerius' Scipio is Aemilianus is clear from Gell. 13.3.6 = Sempronius Asellio fr.5 (*HRR* I[2] 181). Iphicrates: Plut. *Mor.* 187A; Polyaen. 3.9.17. *Non putavi* as a general aphorism: Cic. *Lig.* 30, *Off.* 1.81; Anon. Byz. *De re strat.* 20.1; Ps.-Maur. *Strat.* 8.1.26, 2.36 Dennis.

anus probably learned the aphorism from his father Aemilius Paulus (*cf.* Gell. 13.3.6), who may in turn have heard it from Cato.[38] As argued above, Cato knew the proverb τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου from Thucydides, and this *exemplum*, eventually attributed to several famous generals, could indicate Cato's further elaboration of Thucydides' idea.

τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου originally signified the void of accurate information in war, the problem of discerning reality from illusion and expecting the unexpected. A connection of the phrase with panic finds no trace in Thuc. 3.30, except for the logical inference that a nocturnal surprise attack would produce panic in the enemy. If it is correct to connect the phrase with the *exemplum* of "I didn't think," Cicero's association of this *exemplum* with courage and foresight (*Off.* 1.8.1) provides a hint of what direction use of the phrase would take after Thucydides.

III

The subsequent history of the phrase begins with Aristotle. After defining courage as the mean between boldness and fear (*Eth.Nic.* 3.7.13), Aristotle discusses different kinds of courage, first distinguishing the true courage of citizen soldiers from the courage of soldiers compelled by fear of their commanders to be brave (3.8.1–5). Next he discusses courage based on experience, exemplified in the courage of mercenaries (3.8.6–8 [1116b]):

> δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία [τις] εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾠήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι· φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὁποῖα ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὡπλισμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρειότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες.

Does Aristotle's understanding of the phrase differ from Thucydides'?

[38] Cato in Veget. 1.13: *deinde in aliis rebus, sicut ait Cato, si quid erratum est, potest postmodum corrigi; proeliorum delicta emendationem non recipiunt, cum poena statim sequatur errorem; nam aut confestim pereunt qui ignave imperiteque pugnaverint aut in fugam versi victoribus ultra pares esse non audent.* It could also be argued that Cato heard it from Fabius (Sen. *De ira* 2.31.4) or that the aphorism originated with Iphicrates (*cf. supra* n.37), but I would judge both these attributions as inventions common in the literature of *exempla*.

If allowance is made for Aristotle's transfer of the phrase from an historical to a philosophical context, no difference in meaning occurs. Aristotle says that mercenaries are experienced soldiers who understand the many κενά of war while others, presumably non-professional citizen-soldiers, do not. Experience is the key element.[39] All three passages in Thucydides (2.11.4, 3.30.4, 5.9.4f) are speeches of experienced commanders who understand the fog of war and seek to exploit it to advantage (Teutiaplus, Brasidas) or to avoid defeat because of it (Archidamas). Certainly the element of experience is implied in Thucydides' κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου, and Aristotle uses the same contrast between the knowledgeable and the ignorant. Furthermore, Aristotle's elaboration on this experience of the κενά (εἶτα taken consequentially, 'therefore', 'accordingly'), which he says facilitates offensive and defensive operations, is his own reworking of the final subordinate clause in Teutiaplus' speech (3.30.4, cf. 5.9.4). Aristotle used Thucydides for his *Athenian Constitution* and probably for his Συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν.[40] *Eth.Nic.* 3.8.6–8 now offers another instance of Thucydides as a source for Aristotle.

Moreover, Aristotle contributes new elements significant in the later history of the phrase. Thucydides' abstract κενόν is changed to the plural (πολλὰ κενά), and all occurrences of the phrase after Aristotle will also be plural. In addition, Aristotle associates the κενά with fear: experience of the κενά promotes courage, but ignorance of the κενά brings terror.[41] Aristotle establishes the connection of the proverb with panic found later in Diodorus, Cicero, and Diogenianus.

Polybius (29.16), the next writer to employ the phrase, also associates it with an effect on morale. An eclipse of the moon before the battle of Pydna in 168 B.C. prompted a rumor (φήμη) that the eclipse portended the eclipse of a king. The rumor encouraged the Romans and damaged Macedonian morale. Polybius comments οὕτως ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ περιφερόμενον ὅτι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου (29.16.3). The rationalist Polybius scoffs at this interpretation of a natural phenomenon, although realizing the significance of the fog of war on the two armies. His source for the phrase defies even speculation, but two facts should be noted: first, Polybius specifically applies the κενά to a rumor, a strictly aural and unseen phenomenon, and rumor as a cause of panic

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[39] Scholiasts on the passage (*supra* n.26) merely paraphrase Aristotle without adding anything of significance.

[40] See Luschnat (*supra* n.22) 1284f, 1287.

[41] Cf. Aspasius *in Eth.Nic.* 3.11, *Comm.Arist.gr.* XIX.1 84.29–33. Rackham's translation of *Eth.Nic.* 3.8.6 (*supra* n.11) treating the phrase as a proverb is misleading, as Aristotle does not recognize it as such.

will be encountered again below; second, Polybius is the first author to call πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου a proverb (τὸ περιφερόμενον).[42] Polybius' use of the phrase does not conflict with the meaning in Thucydides or Aristotle and indicates that the phrase had acquired a wider currency by the second century B.C.

The proverb occurs four times in Diodorus—more than in any other author, but still hardly a frequent phrase considering the vast corpus of his work preserved, nor likely to be his own addition, as I shall argue below. Our first concern is the meaning of the proverb in Diodorus.

When Alexander's persistence in the siege of Aornus alarmed the Indians, he removed his guard from a path down the rock, permitting the Indians to escape by night. Diodorus adds (17.85.7–86.1):

τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον οἱ βάρβαροι διὰ τὰς τῶν τόπων ὑπεροχὰς προετέρουν καὶ πολλοὺς ἀνῇρουν τῶν προπετῶς βιαζομένων· τοῦ δὲ χώματος συντελεσθέντος καὶ τῶν ὀξυβελῶν καταπελτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀργάνων ἐπισταθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τοῦ βασιλέως φανεροῦ καθεστῶτος ὡς οὐκ ἀποστήσεται τῆς πολιορκίας οἱ μὲν Ἰνδοὶ κατεπλάγησαν, ὁ δ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐμφόνως προϊδόμενος τὸ μέλλον ἐξέλιπεν τὴν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ καταλελειμμένην φυλακήν, διδοὺς ἔξοδον τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐκ τῆς πέτρας ἀναχωρεῖν. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι φοβηθέντες τάς τε τῶν Μακεδόνων ἀρετὰς καὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως φιλοτιμίαν νυκτὸς ἐξέλιπον τὴν πέτραν.

ὁ δ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος τοῖς κενοῖς τοῦ πολέμου καταστρατηγήσας τοὺς Ἰνδοὺς χωρὶς κινδύνου ἐκυρίευσε τῆς πέτρας. καὶ τῷ μὲν ὁδηγήσαντι τὰς ὡμολογημένας δωρεὰς ἀπέδωκεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀνέζευξε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως.

The context is Alexander's use of the well-known stratagem of leaving the enemy a way of escape, and further signalled by καταστρατηγήσας, a verb meaning to 'out-general through stratagem'.[43] The κενά in this case, however, is Alexander's psychological ploy of demonstrating his perseverance and determination, which in conjunction with Macedonian feats of military engineering already displayed at the siege causes the Indians to fear.[44] The Indians failed to see through the fog of Alexander's illusion.

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[42] τὸ περιφερόμενον is certainly a more obscure and periphrastic way to quote a proverb than κατὰ κοινὴν παροιμίαν as at Polyb. 23.14.4, but whether this periphrasis means that πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου has not yet reached the state of a κοινὴ παροιμία is open to debate. Stylistic *variatio* cannot be ruled out.

[43] Way of escape: *e.g.* Thuc. 1.82.4; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.33; Diod. 30.12; Onasander 38.2–6; Joseph. *BJ* 3.208–10; Plut. *Lyc.* 22.5; *cf.* Frontin. *Str.* 2.6. The verb: see Wheeler (*supra* n.30) 9f with n.33.

[44] Parallel accounts omit the proverb, but contain similar elements. In Arrian (*Anab.* 4.30.2–4) the Indians, alarmed by Macedonian progress in the siege, arrange a truce for negotiations which they intentionally prolong to cover their escape. When Alexander realizes this, he permits their escape, seizes the deserted rock, and then

The next three occurrences in Diodorus all concern Agathocles.[45] In 309 B.C. the Carthaginian Hamilcar decided to make an attempt on Syracuse, which was defended by a relatively small garrison as the bulk of the Syracusan forces were in Africa with Agathocles. He initially camped near the Olympeium and intended to occupy Euryalus on the Epipolae after traversing the Anapus River valley by night. The Syracusans meanwhile divined the plan and occupied Euryalus with a small force. Ignorant of the rough terrain and narrow roads, the Carthaginian army stumbled on its way in the dark of night, constantly thrown into disorder by its baggage train. When the Syracusans at Euryalus perceived the Carthaginians in difficulty, they immediately attacked from their superior position. Already in disorder and hampered by the darkness, the Carthaginians supposed that a major Syracusan force had arrived, and panic added to their rout (Diod. 20.29.2-11). Diodorus, in comparing this Syracusan victory to Agathocles' defeat at the Himeras River in 311 B.C., marvels at how a small force can defeat a larger (20.30.1):

καὶ τὸ θαυμασιώτατον, δώδεκα μυριάδας πεζῶν καὶ πεντακισχιλίους ἱππεῖς ὀλίγος ἀριθμὸς πολεμίων, προσλαβόμενος ἀπάτην καὶ τόπον, κατὰ κράτος ἥττησεν, ὥστ' ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον ὅτι πολλὰ τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου.

Once again the context of the proverb is a nocturnal surprise attack, but in this case the attackers are surprised. Moreover, defeat of a superior by an inferior force also figures here, just as in Thucydides' three passages discussed above.[46] Diodorus attributes the victory to terrain (τόπος) and deceit (ἀπάτη), more aptly understood as self-deception, since the ἀπάτη of 20.30.1 is the equivalent of the Carthaginians' ἄγνοια in 20.29.9. Thus self-deception and ignorance constitute the κενά of this incident and produce the panic.

Two years later in Africa after Agathocles had suffered a defeat, five thousand Libyan mercenaries attempted to desert the Syracusan for the Carthaginian army by night. As they approached the Carthaginian camp, which was ablaze from an accidental fire, the Carthaginian sentries supposed the Libyans to be a surprise attack by Agathocles. The Carthaginian forces, already in an uproar from the fire, fell into panic. The Libyan mercenaries decided to return to Agathocles'

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attacks the retreating Indians, creating a panic. In Curtius (8.11.19-24) Alexander's illusion of perseverance is countered by the Indians' illusion of remaining, and Alexander is deceived. When the Indians' departure is discovered, the shout in unison of the Macedonian army causes panic in the Indians.

[45] For a recent discusssion of Agathocles, see K. Meister, "Agathocles," *CAH*[2] VII.1 (Cambridge 1984) 384–411, 524–77.

[46] Thuc. 2.11.4, 5.9.2 (*cf.* 5.8.2f); implied in 3.30.2.

camp, where their approach was mistaken as a surprise attack by the Carthaginians. Here panic likewise ensued (Diod. 20.65–67.3). Diodorus summarizes the incident (20.67.4):

ὅλην δὲ τὴν νύκτα πανταχῇ διασπειρομένων αὐτῶν καὶ πανικῷ θορύβῳ
συνεχομένων συνέβη πλείους τῶν τετρακισχιλίων ἀναιρεθῆναι. ἐπιγνω-
σθείσης δὲ μόγις τῆς ἀληθείας οἱ διασωθέντες ἐπανῆλθον εἰς τὴν παρεμ-
βολήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν δυνάμεις ἀμφότεραι τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἠτύχησαν,
ἐξαπατηθεῖσαι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν τοῖς κενοῖς τοῦ πολέμου.

The passage requires no commentary: the κενά are self-deception and false expectation (cf. 30.67.1, δι' ἀπάτην καὶ προσδοκίαν ψευδῆ), and the panics were the effects of the κενά.

In 299/8 Agathocles sailed to the aid of Corcyra, which was besieged by Cassander. The incident is only partially preserved in Byzantine excerpts of Diodorus. Agathocles apparently surprised the Macedonians and burned their fleet, but in ignorance of the panic created he missed his chance for a more complete victory (Diod. 21.2.3):

ὅτι ᾿Αγαθοκλῆς εἰ μὲν ἀποβιβάσας τὴν δύναμιν ἐπικειμένοις τοῖς πολε-
μίοις ἐπέθετο, κατέκοψεν ἂν ῥᾳδίως τοὺς Μακεδόνας· ἀγνοήσας δὲ τὴν
γεγενημένην προσαγγελίαν καὶ τὴν ἔκπληξιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἠρκέσθη
τὴν δύναμιν ἀποβιβάσας καὶ τρόπαιον στήσας διαλαβεῖν ἀληθῆ τὸν
λόγον εἶναι ὅτι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου. ἄγνοια γὰρ καὶ ἀπάτη πολ-
λάκις οὐκ ἐλάττω κατεργάζεται τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐνεργείας.

Just as in 20.29.9, 30.1, ἀπάτη and ἄγνοια are the κενά. This passage, however, represents the only case in which the κενά worked negatively on a potentially major victory. Clausewitz realized that the fog of war could also produce ill-timed inaction.[47]

Cicero's fall campaign of 51 B.C. as proconsul of Cilicia[48] provides the context for the next occurrence of the proverb. In the aftermath of Carrhae two years earlier, Parthian attacks on Syria and Cappadocia were feared, and in October 51 a Parthian force actually approached Antioch. Writing to Atticus on 19 December and describing his campaign, Cicero attributes the Parthian withdrawal from Syria to the fame of his military success in Cilicia (*Att.* 5.20.3):

> *ibi* (at Issus) *dies quinque morati direpto et vastato Amano inde*
> *discessimus. interim (scis enim dici quaedam* πανικά, *dici item* τὰ
> κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου) *rumore adventus nostri et Cassio, qui Antiochia*
> *tenebatur, animus accessit et Parthis timor iniectus est; itaque eos*
> *cedentis ab oppido Cassius insecutus rem bene gessit....*

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[47] Clausewitz 84.

[48] For a recent treatment see Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait* (Ithaca 1983) 164–82.

As should by now be clear from our examination of the proverb, the proper equation should be κενά with *rumore* (*cf.* Polyb. 29.16.2f), not κενά with πανικά. Cicero boastfully attributes the Parthian withdrawal to his own fame and presence on the Cilician-Syrian border,[49] the latter of which perhaps had some influence on the Parthians, although the occurrence of a true panic seems most doubtful. Cicero's apparent equation of the proverb with panic, which has misled scholars to emend the text of the proverb, is a false interpretation of the proverb's original meaning. Nevertheless, the association of the proverb with panic, first seen in Aristotle and most prominent in Diodorus, perhaps reaches its culmination in Cicero's apparent equation of the two ideas. The association occurs also in the proverb's latest appearance.

In the collection of proverbs attributed to the Hadrianic grammarian Diogenianus the following entry occurs, later reproduced in the collection by Michael Apostolius (d. *ca* 1480):[50]

πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου· ἤτοι διὰ τὸ πολλὰ καθ' ὑπόνοιαν φέρειν· ἢ ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι κεναῖς σφενδόναις καὶ νευραῖς ἐψόφουν πρὸς ἔκπληξιν τῶν πολεμίων.

The first definition does not conflict with the original Thucydidean meaning of the phrase: to be suspicious about everything is apt to the general's dilemma in the void of true information in war. Furthermore, this definition also recalls the point of the "I didn't think" *exemplum*—expecting the unexpected.

The second explanation of the proverb, however, perplexingly adds a totally new element: a Spartan stratagem to panic the enemy. Association of the proverb with stratagem and panic had become traditional, and noise to terrify an enemy suggests nocturnal activity—another traditional trait of the proverb. But identification of the proverb as particularly Spartan is new. Two interpretations of this

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[49] *Cf. Att.* 5.20.3: *erat in Syria nostrum nomen in gratia.*

[50] Diogenian. 7.80 (*CPG* I 300)=Apostol. 14.53 (*CPG* II 618). Apostolius' quotation of the proverb is corrupt: πολλὰ κεν' ἀπὸ πολέμου. No reference to a collection of proverbs appears in the *Suda* entry on Diogenianus and *opinio communis* believes Diogenianus' name was added to a collection of much later, although uncertain, date. Diogenianus' authorship of a lexicon is genuine. On the problem see K. Rupprecht, "Paroimiographoi," *RE* 11 (1949) 1770; Hans Gärtner, "Diogenianus (2)," *Kl.Pauly* 2 (1967) 48f; P. Strengel, "Diogenianus (4)," *RE* 5 (1903) 778–83; K. Latte, *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon* I (Copenhagen 1953) x, xlii–xliv; F. Brachmann, *Quaestiones Pseudo-Diogenianeae* (*NJbb* Suppl. 14 [1885]) 239–416. The attribution probably came about from a supposed parallel with Zenobius, a Hadrianic sophist (*Suda s.v.*) whose epitome in three books of the proverb collections of Didymus and Lucillius Tarrhaeus is genuine.

second explanation seem possible: either this explanation preserves the original occasion of the proverb, or it is a later invention to account for the proverb's association with panic. The latter is more probable.

Certainly, from one perspective, Thucydides' singular κενόν could be seen as an anomaly, since all other occurrences of the proverb have κενά. The context of the proverb in Thucydides is Spartan, just as it is in Diogenianus, and this could indicate a pre-Thucydidean Spartan origin. Strictly speaking, however, the speech of Thuc. 3.30 comes from the mouth of Teutiaplus, an Elean. Furthermore, although Spartans are usually seen as hoplites, Spartan stonethrowers appear in Tyrtaeus, and these could correspond to the slingers in Diogenianus—thus another argument for a pre-Thuycdidean origin.[51] Nor is the use of stratagem implied in Diogenianus alien to the Spartan character or the Spartan art of war: the Spartans had a reputation for trickery and deceit.[52]

Yet despite these possible arguments, a 'Spartan explanation' of the proverb cannot be substantiated by other sources.[53] The proverb is not identified as Spartan and does not occur in a Spartan context in Aristotle, Polybius, Diodorus, and scholia, nor in its Latin use in Cato, Cicero, and Curtius. In fact neither Thucydides nor Aristotle recognizes the phrase as a proverb, of which the first attestation occurs in Polybius, although the phrase may, as I argue below, have achieved the status of a proverb by the late fourth or early third century B.C. It is preferable to see the Spartan explanation of the proverb as a later interpretation, which belongs to the same category of legends as the myth of the Spartan drillmasters.[54]

I have argued that κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου first occurs in Thucydides as an abstraction for the idea of the void of accurate information in war—

[51] Tyrtaeus 11.35f West, *P.Oxy.* XLVII 3316.14.

[52] Thuc. 2.39.1; 5.42.2, 45, 105.4; Xen. *Res.Lac.* 2.6–9; Gell. 11.18.17, *cf.* Pl. *Leg.* 8.547E–548A; Isoc. 12.213f; Paus. 4.17; Plut. *Marc.* 22.3–5, *Mor.* 209B, 218F, 223A, *cf.* Cic. *Off.* 1.33, Hdt. 6.78f; Plut. *Ages.* 9.3; Polyaen. 6.6.2, *cf.* Paus. 4.5.8; A. Arnaud, *Quelques aspects des rapports de la ruse de la guerre dans le monde du VIIIe au Ve siècle* (thèse 3^me cycle, Paris 1971) 164–67; E. Heza, "Ruse de guerre. Trait caractéristique d'une tactique nouvelle dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide," *Eos* 62 (1974) 229f; additional references in P. H. Epps, "Fear in Spartan Character," *CP* 28 (1933) 21. I hope to treat the topic of Spartans and stratagems in detail elsewhere.

[53] No trace of the Spartan sling players appears in Polyaenus, Pausanius, Athenaeus, Plutarch, or the fragments of Attic comedy—sources likely to tell such a story. Unfortunately Plutarch's Πῶς δεῖ Λάκωνα μάχεσθαι (*Lamp.Cat.* 213) is lost.

[54] See my "The *Hoplomachoi* and Vegetius' Spartan Drillmasters," *Chiron* 13 (1983) 1–20.

the dilemma of every general. The κενόν signifies the problem of discerning reality from illusion and finds a modern counterpart in Clausewitz's notion of the fog of war. Aristotle borrowed the phrase from Thucydides, but changed it to the plural, thereby emphasizing the multiplicity of forms which the κενά could take. The initial context of the phrase, the stratagem of nocturnal surprise attack, often reappears in later authors. Likewise, the association of the proverb with panic, first seen in Aristotle, was frequently repeated, although panic is a result of the effects of the κενά and does not constitute the κενά *per se*—the error of Cicero's apparent equation of the two. In the fourth century B.C., however, panic as a military and psychological phenomenon began to interest both military writers and philosophers. A brief study of panic will highlight another aspect of the proverb's history.

IV

Panic, a phenomenon of mass psychology, particularly affected armies. In fact, the concept, as expressed by πάνεια, πανικός, *etc.*, initially has an exclusively military connotation, although based on analogy with a natural phenomenon (see below). Thucydides notes that large armies were especially susceptible to panic at night and when in hostile territory or in proximity to the enemy. Aeneas Tacticus adds that panics could occur in a camp or in a city, after a defeat, by day, or especially by night. Fleets could also suffer panic, in Polybius' view. Panic, to be distinguished from fear in general, is a sudden and irrational terror, which could turn an organized army into a frenzied armed rabble, capable of killing its own members in its madness.[55] Panic was recognized as a real problem, and the connection of sudden terror without actual cause made for the easy association with the κενά of war, the manipulation of illusions.

The phenomenon of panic was by no means new in the fourth century B.C., nor was its association with a god. But πάνεια, πανικός, *etc.*, attributing the phenomenon to Pan, constituted an innovation. In Homer the concept of panic is connected with Phobos (a real god,

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[55] Thuc. 7.80.3, *cf.* 4.125.1; Aen. Tact. 27.1, 4; *Suda s.v.* Πανικῷ δείματι; Polyb, 5.110.1–9; Polyaenus (1.2) defines πανικά as baseless (κενούς) nocturnal fears; panic produces casualties or potential casualties: *e.g.* Aen. Tact. 27.4, 7–10; Diod. 15.24.3, 20.66f; Paus. 10.23.1–8; Polyaen. 2.2.10, 4.3.26. By the Roman period, if not earlier, panic was no longer exclusively a military concept: Plut. *Mor.* 356D. Polybius (5.110.1–9) does not give evidence that anyone in the fleet except Philip V panicked, and the occurrence of a real panic, strictly defined, is open to doubt. Repeated references to Philip's stupidity and gullibility to a false report are probably another instance of Polybius' malignity to Philip.

not a personification), the son of Ares, who often contributes to the flight of a demoralized army. By the fifth century Dionysus could also cause panic, although neither Herodotus nor Thucydides attributes the phenomenon of panic to a god.[56]

Toward the middle of the fourth century, if not earlier, Pan emerged as the chief divinity of the phenomenon that bears his name: Aeneas Tacticus notes that πάνεια was a Peloponnesian and especially an Arcadian word; Ephorus apparently spoke of πανικὸς θορυβός; and Epimenides' *Cretica* contained the word πανικόν.[57] Pan, the god of herders and hunters, was thought responsible for the sudden, unexplained stampedes of domestic herds or of wild animals and the mysterious echoes of mountains, glens, and caverns—Pan's flute playing to the nymphs.[58] An echo, like the κενόν of a false rumor, is unseen, and a state or an army could be viewed as a flock under the rule of its shepherd (*cf.* Xen. *Cyr.* 1.1.2). Furthermore, Pan was the son of Hermes, a god who could cause fright and surprise, and well known for his stealthy activity. Pan, however, differed sharply from Phobos, who participates in battle, causes flight, and symbolizes the combatant's fear. Pan acts from a distance and, like the *rusé* general, can achieve his goal of rendering the enemy *hors de combat* without fighting.[59]

The militarization of Pan in the fifth century is seen in both artistic and literary sources. Vase paintings represent Pan as a warrior.[60] He figures prominently in Herodotus' account of Marathon (6.105) and possibly also has a rôle at Salamis, although in both cases his alleged activity is most obscure, and his responsibility for Persian panic cannot be proved.[61] With the possible exception of a passage from *Rhesus*

[56] Eur. *Bacch.* 302–05 (military context); Hdt. 7.43.2; Thuc. 4.125.1, 7.80.3. On Phobos see Ernst Bernet, "Phobos (1)," *RE* 20 (1941) 309–17; Pritchett III, 45, 162f, *cf.* Epps (*supra* n.52) 1–29; H. Mitchell, *Sparta* (Cambridge 1952) 270–73.

[57] Aen. Tact. 27.1; Ephorus *FGrHist* 70 F 208 (Diod. 14.32.3) with Jacoby's notes, and E. Schwartz, "Diodorus (38)," *RE* 5 (1903) 679; Epimenides *FGrHist* 457 F 18= B 24 D.-K.=Ps.-Eratos. *Cat.* 27. Harrison's attempt to derive πάνεια from πανός (fire signal, alarm) has been refuted: see J. E. Harrison, "Pan, Paneion, Panikon," *CR* 40 (1926) 68; Borgeaud 138 n.6. Greek expressions for panic are listed in Borgeaud 139 n.7.

[58] Apollod. *FGrHist* 294 FF 135, 136a-b, *cf.* Σ *ad* Theoc. 5.16.1; K. Wernicke, "Pan," Roscher *Lex.* 3.1 (1901) 1388–90.

[59] Borgeaud 142, 153, *cf.* Ammonius' distinction of φόβος from δέος: φόβος is immediate terror, but δέος is a long-term suspicion of evil: cited in Bernet (*supra* n.56) 309; on Hermes see N. O. Brown, *Hermes the Thief* (Madison 1947) 3–83.

[60] Borgeaud 142, 200–02, *cf.* F. Brommer, "Pan," *RE* Suppl. 8 (1956) 969.

[61] Borgeaud 146f; Brommer (*supra* n.60) 969; Harrison (*supra* n.57) 6f correctly rejects finding a Pan/panic connection in Herodotus and Aeschylus. Borgeaud's attempt (146–49) to connect nearly all military panics in Greek sources down to Plutarch with a local sanctuary or cult of Pan at the scene of the panic is not convincing.

(34–37), attributed to Euripides but whose authenticity and date have long been debated, the association of Pan with the irrational fear of armies dates from the fourth century B.C.[62]

The real origins of the Pan/panic connection lie in Arcadia, where Pan, widely thought of as Arcadian in origin, was zealously worshipped. Aeneas Tacticus implies (27.1) that πάνεια was an Arcadian word. It would thus seem that propagation of the association of Pan with military panic corresponds to the proliferation of Arcadian mercenaries in the fifth and fourth centuries.[63] Perhaps Arcadian mercenaries were less sophisticated than their Athenian or Spartan counterparts and were more susceptible to panic.[64]

The eventual significance of Pan's military function appears in Polyaenus (1.2), who credits Pan with the invention of military deployment, the term *phalanx*, and the use of panic fear as a stratagem. The last is attributed to Pan as a general of Dionysus, presumably during his Indian campaign, when Dionysus' army, camped in a hollow glen and facing superior hostile forces, was ordered to raise its war-cry by night, so that the echo would create the impression that the army was larger than in reality. The echo aroused the enemy's fear and caused their flight.

Although some believe that Polyaenus derives this account of Pan from a source dating after Alexander the Great, possibly Megasthenes, it has long been recognized that Ephorus was Polyaenus' main source for his first book,[65] and some elements of Polyaenus' anecdote appear in another fourth-century source. Epimenides, who transfers the seat of action to Crete, has Pan aid Zeus in his war against the Titans. Pan both armed Zeus' forces and routed the Titans by the

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[62] Borgeaud 137. On *Rhesus* see W. Ritchie, *The Authenticity of the Rhesus of Euripides* (Cambridge 1964), who argues for authenticity and a date of composition 445–440 B.C. Pritchett III 45 cites Diod. 14.32.3 (panic of the besiegers of Phyle in 401) as proof for the Pan/panic connection in the fifth century, but Diodorus' source is Ephorus (*supra* n.57), and panic is not mentioned in parallel accounts: Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.1–4, Nep. *Thrasyb.* 2.1–5.

[63] On the military influence of Arcadians in this period, see Wheeler (*supra* n.54) 6–9.

[64] It is easy to overestimate the degree of training and discipline in Greek armies of the fifth and fourth centuries, but as late as Chaeronea in 338, one tradition holds, the Athenian army was still untrained: Frontin. *Str.* 2.1.9; Polyaen. 4.2.7, *cf.* Ps.-Xen. *Ath.Pol.* 2.1.

[65] Borgeaud 154; J. Melber, *Ueber die Quellen und den Wert der Strategemensammlung Polyäns* (*NJbb* Suppl. 14 [1885]) 421–23; R. J. Phillips, *The Sources and Methods of Polyaenus* (diss.Harvard 1970) 120–38. My sincere thanks to Dr Phillips for permitting me to see a chapter from her unpublished work.

echo of a blast from his conch shell.[66] Serious concern for panic as a military problem begins with Thucydides. His two brief asides, 4.125.1 and 7.80.3 (summarized at the beginning of this section), constitute the first theoretical observations on panic in Western military thought. In both cases the panics are nocturnal, and in 4.125.1 a false rumor occasions the panic. Thucydides does not connect these passages with the κενόν of war, although in his plan for the surprise attack on Cleon at Amphipolis, Brasidas hopes his attack will cause panic in the Athenians (5.9.7f).

Aeneas Tacticus, composing his *Strategika* between 360 and 346 B.C., knew Thucydides and apparently treated panic in some detail.[67] In the surviving long fragment on defense of cities, Aeneas promises a discussion of panic in conjunction with guards, patrols, watchwords, and counter-watchwords in his book on encampments (21.2, *cf.* 25.1). He later devotes an entire chapter (27) to panic, the lengthiest extant discussion of the topic in ancient military theory. There is no need to paraphrase this chapter, but it is significant that Aeneas, like subsequent historians and military writers, is more concerned with stopping or preventing panic than with creating it in the enemy.[68]

Two of his *exempla* find echoes in the actions of other commanders of the fourth and third centuries B.C. Aeneas records that Euphrates, a Spartan harmost in Thrace (otherwise unknown), to stop frequent panics in his forces, ordered his men when one occurred to sit up in their beds with arms in hand, but anyone standing up would be regarded as an enemy. Similar instructions are attributed to Clearchus, the mercenary commander in Xenophon's *Anabasis*; to Dercylidas, the Spartan general in Asia Minor in the 390's; and to Theodorus of Rhodes, prominent in Antiochus I's victory over the Gauls *ca* 270

[66] *FGrHist* 457F18, *cf. supra* n.57. Romans attributed the panics of armies to Faunus, who could be identified with Silvanus, Inus, and Pan. See Cic. *Div.* 1.101, *Nat.D.* 2.6; Dion. Hal. *Ant.Rom.* 5.16.3; W. F. Otto, "Faunus," *RE* 6 (1909) 2054–73, esp. 2054–62.

[67] Bibliography on Aeneas in Wheeler (*supra* n.54) 8 n.40, to which should be added: G. A. Lehmann, "Krise und innere Bedrohung der hellenischen Polis bei Aeneas Tacticus," in W. Eck *et al.*, edd., *Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte: Festschrift Friedrich Vittinghof (Köln.hist.Abh.* 28 [Cologne 1980]) 71–86; Thucydides and Aeneas: W. A. Oldfather's Loeb edition of *Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander* (London 1923) 10; A. Dain and A.-M. Bon, *Enée le Tacticien, Poliorcétique* (Budé ed., Paris 1967) xix; A. W. Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification* (Oxford 1967) 58; *contra*, S. Celato, "Enea Tattico: il problema dell' autore e il valore dell' opera dal punto di vista militare," *Memorie Padua* 80 (1967/8) 60 with n.35.

[68] Preventing panic: Aen. Tact. 27.2–13; creating panic: 27.14, *cf.* Polyb. 3.93f, Liv. 22.16.4–18.4; and see Onasander 41.2.

B.C.[69] Another means to stop panic involved having a herald command silence and promising a gift of silver to whoever would report the man responsible for turning his horse loose in the camp. In Xenophon these are the orders of Clearchus to stop a nocturnal panic after Cunaxa. A similar tale is told of Iphicrates, who trained his men in how to expect panics and how to manage them.[70]

This discussion, though by no means exhaustive, will suffice to demonstrate that panic was a real problem to Greek armies of the fourth century, and that military thinkers and commanders sought means to prevent it. Panics would continue to be a problem in Hellenistic times, for the Romans, and for the Byzantines, as it does for modern armies.[71] The complexity of the problem further emerges from analysis of the causes of panic in the examples cited here. Inexplicable or multiple causes characterize nine examples while false rumor or report appears only three times as an independent cause. Yet perhaps most interesting is that despite the close association of Pan and panic with echo, *i.e.*, the aural sense, visual causes, the misperception of something seen, account for six cases.[72]

If generals and military thinkers sought practical solutions to the problem of panic, the topic also aroused philosophical interest. Aristotle's student Clearchus of Soli composed a Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ, of which only a fragment survives:[73]

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[69] Aen. Tact. 27.7–10; Clearchus: Polyaen. 2.2.10, *cf. Exc. Polyaen.* 27; Dercylidas: Jul. Afric. *Cest.* 7.1.11; Theodorus: see Wheeler (*supra* n.54) 15 n.77. *Cf* Aen. Tact. 27.2f, Polyaen. 4.3.26 (Alexander the Great).

[70] Aen. Tact. 27.11; Xen. *Anab.* 2.2.21; Polyaen. 3.9.4, 10, 32. *Cf.* Tac. *Ann.* 1.66.3

[71] Hellenistic: *e.g.* Polyb. 5.96.3, 110.1–9; 20.6.12; Paus. 10.23.1–8; Romans: Plut. *Pomp.* 68.3, *Caes.* 43.6; Joseph. *BJ* 5.93, 291–95; Tac. *Ann.* 1.66, *Hist.* 1.63.1; Byzantines: Anon. *De obsidione toleranda* 69 van den Berg, *cf. Exc. Polyaen.* 3.2; Leo *Tact.* 20.195; A. Dain, "Mémorandum inédit sur la défense des places," *REG* 53 (1940) 124 (13), 125 (19); modern: F. Gambiez, "Étude historique des phénomènes de panique," *RevHistModContemp* 20 (1973) 153–66. Antigonus Gonatas' victory over the Gauls at Lysimacheia in 277 B.C., although won by stratagem (Just. 25.1.2–2.7), did not involve panic. The head of Pan on coins of Gonatas has no relation to the battle: Pan, a patron of the Macedonian house, appeared on the coins of earlier kings, and Gonatas' Pan coins began *ca* 271, possibly occasioned by his defeat of Pyrrhus. See G. Nachtergael, *Les Galates en Grèce et les Sôtéria de Delphes* (= *MemAcRoyBelg* 63.1 [Brussels 1977]) 177–80 with n.231; Pritchett III 33f with n.93; R. M. Matthison, *ANSMN* 26 (1981) 110–14.

[72] Inexplicable/multiple causes: Thuc. 7.80.3; Xen. *Anab.* 2.2.19–21; Polyb. 5.96.3; Diod. 20.29f, 21.2.3; Onas. 41.2; Plut. *Pomp.* 68.3 and *Caes.* 43.6 (the same occurrence); Tac. *Hist.* 1.63.1; Paus. 10.23.7; false rumor: Thuc. 4.125.1; Polyb. 5.110, 20.6.12; visual: Diod. 14.32.3, 17.85.7–86.1; Curt. 7.11.25; Onasander 6.5; Joseph. *BJ* 5.91–93.

[73] Ath. 9.389F = fr.36 Wehrli. Kroll, "Klearchos (11)," *RE* 11 (1921) 582, sees a possible occasion for the work in Antigonus Gonatas' victory over the Gauls at Lysimacheia, but a panic in this battle cannot be proved: see *supra* n.71. If the work

Κλέαρχος δ' ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ "οἱ στρουθοί," φησί, "χοἱ πέρδι-
κες, ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀλεκτρυόνες καὶ οἱ ὄρτυγες προίενται τὴν γονὴν οὐ μόνον
ἰδόντες τὰς θηλείας, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀκούσωσιν αὐτῶν τὴν φωνήν. τούτου δὲ
αἴτιον ἡ τῇ ψυχῇ γινομένη φαντασία περὶ τῶν πλησιασμῶν. φανερώτα-
τον δὲ γίνεται περὶ τὰς ὀχείας, ὅταν ἐξ ἐναντίας αὐτοῖς θῇς κάτοπτρον·
προστρέχοντες γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἔμφασιν ἁλίσκονταί τε καὶ προίενται τὸ
σπέρμα, πλὴν τῶν ἀλεκτρυόνων. τούτους δ' ἡ τῆς ἐμφάσεως αἴσθησις
εἰς μάχην προάγεται μόνον." ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Κλέαρχος.

This amusing passage on the libido of birds is not as irrelevant to
military panic as it may initially appear (and its biological accuracy is
not pertinent to my argument). It is unwise to draw from a single
fragment conclusions about the tone and content of a work, especially
when the excerptor is Athenaeus.

Besides various Platonic interests, unusual for a Peripatetic, Clear-
chus specialized in psychology. His Περὶ ὕπνου in at least two books
treated sleep as a *Sonderexistenz* associated with the soul's immor-
tality. His *Erotica*, perhaps influenced by Theophrastus' *Eroticus*,
concerned the phenomenology of love, especially in its pathological
forms in both men and animals (*e.g.* fr.27: a goose's love for a boy),
and the power of mirrors over quails is also alluded to in Clearchus'
commentary on Plato's *Republic*, a work that cannot have been so
silly as Ath. 389F might be taken to imply of the Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ.[74]

Clearchus fr.36 must be placed in its proper context of Aristotelian
psychology. Clearchus states that during the mating season the male
birds' desire for copulation is so strong that both the sight and the call
of females causes the emission of semen, and even the bird's own
reflection in a mirror can produce this result. In his theory of sensa-
tion in *De anima* (2.12 [424a 25–34]), Aristotle distinguishes between
a sense organ and its capacity:

> From this difference it is also clear why excess of objects perceived
> destroy the sense organs; for if the movement imparted to the sense

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was occasioned by a battle, the more likely candidate is the defeat of the Gauls at
Delphi in 279, although only Pausanias (10.23.1–8 and not in 1.4.3f) mentions a
panic. *Cf.* Diod. 22.9; Just. 24.8. Timaeus, Hieronymus of Cardia, Menodotus of
Perinthus, and Agatharchides of Cnidus have all been proposed as Pausanias' source
in 10.23, but Hieronymus at least can now be eliminated: J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias'
Description of Greece* V (London 1898) 341, *cf.* J. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia*
(Oxford 1981) 73; C. Habicht, *Untersuchungen zur politischen Geschichte Athens im
3. Jahrhundert v.Chr.* (=*Vestigia* 30 [Munich 1979]) 87–94, esp. 89 nn.8f; Nachtergael
(*supra* n.71) 15–99. Clearchus was probably born in the 340's, and his authorship of a
monograph on the Academic Arcesilaus attests a long life into the third century B.C.:
Kroll 580f; Wehrli 45.

[74] Clearchus frr.3f, 27; Wehrli 47, 54–56; Borgeaud 137 n.4.

organ is too strong, the form is destroyed; and this form is the sensation; just as the harmony and musical note is destroyed when the strings are struck hard.[75]

If the pupil followed the master's teaching on this point, Clearchus' argument can be reconstructed: during mating season the sight and sound of females so overloads the males' sensory system that they "panic," i.e., ejaculate prematurely. In all probability Clearchus draws upon this example from nature as an analogy to the panic of armies: at night or in enemy territory a strange noise or false rumor can produce such fear as to overload the rational faculties and produce panic. This view is paralleled somewhat in a modern theory of military incompetence, in which generalship is seen in terms of information theory and processing: 'noise' in the system and/or overloading the system's capacity causes a breakdown and failure.[76] Another Aristotelian comment relevant to panic appears in the *Parva naturalia*, where he states that the impulse of a thought cannot be deterred from its object, and that the impulse created by an outburst of fear will produce its own reactions against movements to stop it.[77] Hence a psychological explanation why panics were so difficult to stop—they resisted reason.

Wehrli (58) sees the Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ as an anecdotal-educational work with emphasis on panic as a reaction to the stimuli of the senses and with reference to animal psychology, as in the *Erotica*. This view is safely conservative, given the content of the single extant fragment, although probably overemphasizing a supposed similarity between the *Erotica* and the Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ. The use of one example drawn from nature need not indicate that the work contained many such examples, especially since the fragment derives from Athenaeus, who was prone to excerpt sensational and exotic anecdotes. Wehrli ignores panic as a contemporary practical problem of Greek armies, and use of πάνεια, πανικός, *etc.*, in extant sources of the fourth century occurs only in military contexts. The apparent natural phenomena, to which by analogy military panic was compared, are echo and the unexplained sudden stampedes of animal herds, neither of which has the least to do with the sexual behavior of birds. The extension of the term 'panic' to describe such fowl conduct may result from Aristotle's

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[75] W. S. Hett tr. (Loeb ed., London 1935) 137, *cf.* Wehrli 58.

[76] See N. Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* (New York 1976) 27–35.

[77] *Par.Nat.* 453a23–26=*Mem.* 2. *Cf.* Clausewitz 117: "In short, most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies. As a rule most men would rather believe bad news than good, and rather tend to exaggerate the bad news. The dangers that are reported may soon like waves subside; but like waves they keep recurring, without apparent reason."

research in natural science or may be Clearchus' own contribution. However this may be, an interpretation different from Wehrli's can be offered.

Aelianus Tacticus in his list of military writers notes a Clearchus who authored a *Tactica*, and Arrian adds that this is not the Clearchus of Xenophon's *Anabasis*. Since Aelian and Arrian give these writers in chronological order (so far as it can be determined), Clearchus *tacticus* must be the contemporary of Pyrrhus of Epirus and his son Alexander in the first half of the third century B.C. Köchly and Rüstow, followed by Jähns, identified this Clearchus with the Peripatetic from Soli, and nothing contradicts that a Peripatetic for whom the titles of fifteen works are known, of which one treats *military* panic (as I argue), could have written a *Tactica*.[78] Peripatetics were interested in military affairs: Aristotle devoted sections of the *Politics* and the *Rhetoric* to this topic; Demetrius of Phalerum wrote a *Strategika*; and Phormio, who attempted to instruct Hannibal on the art of generalship at the court of Antiochus III, was a Peripatetic.[79] Some philosophers considered tactics a branch of mathematics, and Clearchus' commentary on Plato's *Republic* was a Περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Πλάτωνος πολιτείᾳ μαθηματικῶς εἰρημένων.[80] Since neither Aelian nor Arrian added a city of origin to the name of his Clearchus, doubt can always intervene, but compelling evidence supports the probability of Köchly's and Rüstow's identification. The burden of the argument really lies with denial of the attribution, essentially based on a modern prejudice that ancient philosophers were too concerned with lofty esoteric matters to consider the practical problems of war in their society.

Clearchus' authorship of a *Tactica* adds further strength to the probable military nature of the Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ, but nothing suggests

[78] Ael. Tact. 1.2; Arr. *Tact.* 1.1; H. Köchly and W. Rüstow, *Griechische Kriegs-schriftsteller* II.1 (Leipzig 1855) 29f; M. Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften* I (Munich 1889) 47. Köchly and Rüstow also considered the possibility of Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea in Pontus and a student of Plato and Isocrates, but he is not known to have written anything, nor does he fit chronologically; see Lenschau, "Klearchos (4)," *RE* 11 (1921) 577–79. Wehrli rejects the identification without citing Köchly and Rüstow or Jähns and in his fr.113 gives only Arrian's text, thereby ignoring Aelian. Unaware of the chronological order of Aelian's and Arrian's lists, he considers Arrian's reference too vague for a famous figure like Clearchus of Soli. Kroll (*supra* n.73) 583 denies the identification without argument.

[79] Arist. *Pol.* 1.8.12; 2.9.7f; 3.4.14f, 7.3f; 4.3.1–3, 13.7–11; 6.7.1–3, 8.14f; 7.2.9–17, 5.3–6.8, 8.7, 9.4–6, 14.13, 19–22; *Rh.* 1.3f; Demetrius: Diog. Laert. 5.80; Phormio: Cic. *De Or.* 2.75f.

[80] G. Aujac, *Geminos, Introduction aux phénomènes* (Paris 1975) 114f (fr.2), *cf.* R. von Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios* (Stuttgart 1890) 295 n.4; M. C. P. Schmidt, "Philologische Beiträge zu griechischen Mathematiker," *Philologus* 45 (1886) 74f: Clearchus frr.3f Wehrli.

that the two works are identical: Arrian in particular would not have been so lax about a title. Köchly and Rüstow also believe that the Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ belongs to the genre of Homeric *tactica*, which saw Homer as the father of military science and used excerpts from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to instruct in the military art. Conceivably panic was a frequent theme of such works.[81] If this view is correct, Clearchus' treatise would conform to a Peripatetic interest in Homeric commentary. Aristotle wrote a *Homeric Problems*, and Demetrius of Phalerum wrote commentaries on both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, curiously listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue immediately after his *Strategika*. More significantly, however, some fragments of Aristotle's Homeric work treat military affairs, and one (fr.159 Rose) explicitly refers to the problem of nocturnal fears in armies.[82]

Clearchus' Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ thus appears a thoroughly Peripatetic work, drawing on Aristotelian psychology and analogy from natural science, concerned with exegesis of Homer, and bringing this knowledge to bear on a contemporary practical problem, the panic of armies. But what has all this to do with the history of the proverb πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου? It is now possible to suggest (although not conclusively prove) that Clearchus is the source of the proverb as found in the collection attributed to Diogenianus.

Certainly the phenomenon of panic fascinated Clearchus, and his interest has deep Aristotelian roots. The connection of the proverb with panic, as already noted, begins with Aristotle, although he does not explicitly call the phrase a proverb. Aristotle, however, founded the genre of the collection of proverbs, which he considered a form of pre-literary philosophy, and with which he embellished his later writing on politics and rhetoric. His *Paroimiai* in one book prompted Theophrastus to compose a collection in one book, but Clearchus excelled his predecessors with a collection in two books.[83]

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[81] Köchly/Rüstow (*supra* n.78) 30; Ael. Tact. 1.1f; Paus. 4.28.7f, *cf.* Wheeler (*supra* n.54) 17 n.85, 18 n.91.

[82] Diog. Laert. 5.26=catal. Arist. pp.7 Rose (no. 118), 14 (no. 106), 16 (no. 147); Arist. frr.152, 159f Rose; Demetrius: Diog. Laert. 5.80f. *Cf.* Wheeler (*supra* n.54) 16 n.83. Homeric scholia underlie Pritchett's unsuccessful attempt (IV 7–93) to prove use of the phalanx formation in Homer, although he fails *inter alia* to demonstrate their historical accuracy for conditions of the eighth and seventh centuries. *Cf. TAPA* 117 (1987) 169 n.54. To Pritchett's claim that I misrepresented his views (II 217) in *GRBS* 23 (1982) 225 n.11, I must note his misrepresentations of mine in IV 16 n.51 and 61f n.189 and urge that readers judge the matter for themselves.

[83] Diog. Laert. 5.22=catal. Arist. pp.8 Rose (no. 138), 15 (no. 127); Arist. fr.13 Rose; Theophrastus: Diog. Laert. 5.45; Clearchus frr.63–83 Wehrli; R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford 1968) 83f; Rupprecht (*supra* n.50) 1736f; Wehrli 68.

If, as argued above, Aristotle borrowed the phrase κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου from Thucydides and changed it to the plural, it is unlikely that Aristotle designated the phrase a proverb, and the first evidence for its proverbial use is Polyb. 29.16.3. Since the phrase in its proverbial form postdates *Eth.Nic.* 3.8.6, and so appears in Diogenian. 7.80, Aristotle and Polybius offer respective *termini post quem* and *ante quem* for when the phrase became a proverb. Both Clearchus and Theophrastus fit these *termini*, but no connection of Theophrastus with panic can be established, and too little is known of Theophrastus' proverbs to consider his candidacy seriously. Conceivably either Theophrastus or Clearchus as the third generation to use the phrase κενὸν/κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου could have recognized it as a proverb.

But apart from the common interests of Clearchus and Aristotle in panic and proverbs, the new element of the proverb as found in Diogenianus, the 'Spartan explanation' connecting the proverb with panic, can also point to Clearchus, whose work *Bioi* (lifestyles, not biographies) included Spartans and stressed a preference for a moral life over luxuriousness.[84] In fact two proverbs of Clearchus deal with Spartans: both appear in Diogenianus, but one only in a variant version. In all, six of Clearchus' twenty-one extant proverbs are found in Diogenianus either wholly or in variants, and Diogenianus' seventh book contains two variants of Clearchus' proverbs (7.13, 23) besides the κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου (7.80).[85] The case for Clearchus as the *Urquelle* of Diogenianus is not unquestionable, but the arguments of *Quellenforschung* rarely are. Nevertheless, all things considered, Clearchus remains a most likely candidate—perhaps the only one for whom a case can be made at all.

V

As a final note on πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, its repeated use in Diodorus permits a suggestion about his source. The proverb occurs

[84] Clearchus frr.37–62 Wehrli, esp. fr.39; Kroll (*supra* n.73) 581. The Spartan element permits elimination of the Atthidographer Demon (*fl. ca* 300 B.C.), whose collection of proverbs contained forty books. No references to Sparta or Spartans appear in Demon's extant fragments, and none of his proverbs is found in Diogenianus. It is also unlikely that Demon was a Peripatetic: see Felix Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford 1949) 78, and *ad FGrHist* 327 (pp.201f); Schwartz, "Demon (6)," *RE* 5 (1903) 142f.

[85] Spartan proverbs: fr.74=Diogenian. 1.83, fr.73 *cf.* Diogenian. 5.1; Clearchus and Diogenianus: fr.65 *cf.* Diogenian. 7.23, fr.66a–c *cf.* Diogenian. 7.13, fr.73 *cf.* Diogenian. 5.1, fr.74=Diogenian. 1.83, fr.77=Diogenian. 8.62, fr.81 *cf.* Diogenian. 2.41. In comparison, five proverbs of Clearchus or their variants occur in Zenobius: frr.65, 66b, 67, 78, 81 *cf.* Zen. 2.32. Three are common to both Diogenianus and Zenobius: frr.66b, 67, 81.

here four times, more than in any other author, though it hardly qualifies as a standard motif given the vast extent of Diodorus' extant work. Three of the four occurrences concern events during Agathocles' tyranny, and one is associated with Alexander's stratagem to capture Aornus.[86] This distribution suggests a source who treated both Alexander and Agathocles. Duris of Samos has long been recognized as either the *Haupt-* or *Nebenquelle* of Diodorus for Agathocles, and Duris also devoted three books of his *Macedonica* to Alexander.[87] A plausible case for Duris as Diodorus' source for the proverb can be constructed.

First, Duris was a Peripatetic: he studied with Theophrastus in Athens *ca* 304 B.C. and wrote a *Homeric Problems* besides his various histories and other works.[88] Like Clearchus of Soli, with his tale of a goose and a youth, Duris could tell a love story about a dolphin and a boy, and his work was moralizing, preaching rejection of luxury. Indeed Kebric has catalogued so many parallels between the fragments of Duris and Clearchus that a direct relationship seems most probable.[89] Furthermore, Duris liked proverbs, of which many survive in Zenobius but none in Diogenianus.[90]

Second, the proverb πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου in Diodorus suggests a criterion for determining his source. Meister for other reasons assigns Diodorus 20.60–67 (the proverb in 20.67.4) to Duris, but 20.29f (the proverb in 20.30.1) to Timaeus, and he denies a discernible source to 21.2 (the proverb in 21.2.3).[91] Since Aristotle, however, all occurrences of the proverb are associated with panic, and this holds true for Diodorus, although only in 20.67.4 is the proverb associated with the word πανικός. Other instances of panic in Diodorus explicitly indicated by πανικός derive from Ephorus and Timaeus, but knowledge of the proverb cannot be demonstrated for either of these authors.[92] Timaeus certainly did not treat Alexander. It is not in dispute that Duris was a source for Diodorus' account of Agathocles. His Peripa-

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[86] Diod. 17.86.1; 20.30.1, 67.4; 21.2.3.

[87] See Meister 133f, *cf.* Melber (*supra* n.65) 504–10: Polyaen. 5.4.1–8 on Agathocles=Timaeus, Diodorus on Agathocles=Duris; Kebric 49f.

[88] *FGrHist* 76; *Homeric Problems*: FF 30, 88?, 92?, 89–91; Kebric 5f.

[89] Dolphin: F 7, *cf.* Clearchus fr.27 Wehrli (goose and boy); Kebric 28–31, *cf.* Wehrli 56, 61. Kebric's monograph is an attempt to rehabilitate Duris' reputation, arguing that he was a moralist and that the sensationalistic fragments extant represent things Duris refuted.

[90] FF 62f, 85, 95f, *cf.* 84, 93 with Jacoby's commentary.

[91] Meister 149, 158, 164. Kebric rejects Meister's analysis, because Meister claims moral criteria have no rôle in Duris, and Kebric denies that anything conclusive can be gained from studies of Diodorus' sources: 75–77 with n.72.

[92] Diod. 14.32.3=Ephorus: see *supra* n.57; Diod. 15.24.3=Timaeus: Meister 103.

tetic background, his apparent relationship to the scholar of panic Clearchus of Soli, and occurrence of three of Diodorus' four instances of the proverb in the account of Agathocles all speak for Duris as Diodorus' source.

If this argument is correct, then Duris must also be the source of the proverb in Diod. 17.86.1. Duris treated Alexander in Books 6–9 of his *Macedonica*. Recent views on the problem prefer Cleitarchus as Diodorus' source, but Cleitarchus was also a source for Duris and both reflected an anti-Macedonian attitude. Use of Duris at Diod. 17.86.1 need not indicate that Diodorus used Cleitarchus exclusively through Duris.[93] In fact Diodorus' account differs slightly from both that of Arrian and that of Curtius, with whom Diodorus is alleged always to agree. If Cleitarchus is the sole source of Diod. 17.86.1, then the proverb should also appear in Curt. 8.11.19–24. But it is lacking.[94] Perhaps Duris deserves better treatment by students of Alexander.

Furthermore, Duris with some probability can also be posited as Cicero's source for the proverb. Cicero had read Duris and considered him *homo in historia diligens* (*Att.* 6.1.18). When Cicero set out to assume his Cilician command, he tried to compensate for his lack of military experience by studying Pyrrhus' *Tactica* and Cineas' epitome of Aeneas Tacticus.[95] Perhaps Cicero chose Duris as his *vade mecum* for Alexander's campaigns. Cicero's use of the proverb (*Att.* 5.20.3) occurs just after he reports his activity while camped at Issus—an account embellished with a reference to Alexander's battle there with Darius. Indeed Cicero's praise of Duris in *Att.* 6.1.18 (20 Feb. 50) comes only two months after his use of the proverb in 5.20.3 (19 Dec. 51). Cicero's citation of a proverb prominent in Duris and used in the latter's account of Alexander, when juxtaposed with *Att.* 6.1.18, suggests more than a passing familiarity with the historian on Cicero's part during his governorship in Cilicia.

Originally a Thucydidean abstraction for a universal truism of war, the phrase πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου thus became a Peripatetic proverb

[93] N. G. L. Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1983) 79, 84f; Kebric 9, 46, 49, 65. *Cf.* J. E. Atkinson, *A Commentary of Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 3 and 4* (=*LondStudClassPhil* 4 [Amsterdam 1980]) 64–67. Goukowsky (*supra* n.11) 120 attributes the proverb to a collection of stratagems. But neither of the two extant examples of this genre, Frontinus and Polyaenus, includes the proverb.

[94] See *supra* n.44. Duris could also be responsible for the proverb in Curt. 7.11.25 and its possible occurrence in 4.13.5. Atkinson (*supra* n.93) rejects use of Duris in Curtius Books 3 and 4.

[95] See Wheeler (*supra* n.30) 13f.

through its association with panic, and passed to the Romans in both its Thucydidean (Cato) and its Aristotelian forms (Cicero, Curtius). Few Greek proverbs have such a traceable history.[96]

DUKE UNIVERSITY
June, 1988