Coniectanea Euripidea

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JAMES DIGGLE'S new Euripides, now two-thirds complete, is a major advance in the establishment of the text. Diggle has considered each line afresh, made a number of successful emendations, and rescued numerous earlier suggestions from undeserved oblivion. I offer here some discussions of further places in the first volume where I believe text or apparatus can be improved.

Alc. 829–34

βίᾳ δὲ θυμοῦ τάσδ' ὑπερβαλὼν πύλας
ἔπινον ἀνδρὸς ἐν φιλοξένου δόμοις,
πράσσοντος οὕτω. κᾆτα κωμάζω κάρα
στεφάνοις πυκασθείς; ἀλλὰ σοῦ τὸ μὴ φράσαι,
κακοῦ τοσούτου δώμασιν προσκειμένου.
ποῦ καί σφε θάπτει; ποῖ νιν εὑρήσω μολών;

833 προσκειμένου Scaliger: προκ- codd.

Dale explains σοῦ in 832 as an exclamatory genitive and φράσαι as an exclamatory infinitive. Yet her grammatical explanation states, and her examples show, that when an exclamatory genitive is not dependent on φεῦ or the like, it must contain some word that implies the quality in virtue of which an exclamation is appropriate, as τῶν ἀλαζονευμάτων at Ar. *Ach.* 87.[1] This makes against σοῦ as genitive of exclamation, for the pronoun implies no qualities at all. Dale thinks it a possible construction because it is followed by an exclamatory infinitive, but she gives no real parallels and appears not to believe it herself, as her next words show. For she alleges that ἀλλά here and at *Med.* 1051 has the force of an interjection. I doubt that ἀλλά functions as an interjection here, and while κάκης in *Med.* 1051 is a genitive of exclamation, it does not depend on "interjectional" ἀλλά. (See the discussion of *Med.* 1049–55 *infra.*)

If grammar is parlous, sense is no better. Why should Heracles berate the servant for what was obviously not his own choice? The tone of the words, if they were grammatical, would be one of personal affront ("and could you bring yourself not to tell me?") and suggests

[1] See Kühner-Gerth I 388f, Schwyzer II 134.

that Heracles is rebuking the servant for a failure in the duties of friendship, which is impossible here: the man is a slave, and Heracles has never met him before this day.

Grammar and sense are both set right by changing *σοῦ* to *σὸν* and substituting some other monosyllable for *μὴ* or some other verb for *φράσαι* in 832, removing the period after 833, and replacing the two question-marks in 834 by a comma and a period:

βίᾳ δὲ θυμοῦ τάσδ' ὑπερβαλὼν πύλας
ἔπινον ἀνδρὸς ἐν φιλοξένου δόμοις,
πράσσοντος οὕτω. κᾆτα κωμάζω κάρα
στεφάνοις πυκασθείς; ἀλλὰ σὸν τὸ †μὴ φράσαι,†
κακοῦ τοσούτου δώμασιν προσκειμένου,
ποῦ καί σφε θάπτει, ποῖ νιν εὑρήσω μολών.

832 *νῦν φράσαι* vel *μὴ στέγειν* sensui satisfaceret

"Doing violence to my feelings I passed through these gates and drank wine in the house of a hospitable man in his hour of misfortune. And then am I carousing with my head crowned with garlands? But it is your job now, with such a great misfortune added to the house, to tell me where in fact he buried her, where I must go to find her." There is theoretically no reason not to read *σοῦ τὸ †μὴ† φράσαι* (at *Supp.* 99 we read *ἡμῶν δ' ἀκούειν* with similar construction), but with *σόν* exact parallels may be had by the handful: *Hcld.* 132, *σὸν δὴ τὸ φράζειν ἐστί, μὴ μέλλειν δ', ἐμοί*, and also *Supp.* 98, *HF* 314, *IT* 1203, and *Ion* 1020. See *Alc.* 1027 for the corruption of *-ον* to *-ου*.

In its new setting the genitive absolute in 833, with Scaliger's necessary correction, bears a rather different sense. "Such a great misfortune added to the house" seemed in the old text to refer to the death of Alcestis (*cf.* 551), but there is talk elsewhere in the play (1039, 1048) of adding new griefs to this. That seems to be the case here too, for the phrase makes the most sense if the reference is to the magnitude of the insult Heracles has unwittingly paid the memory of Alcestis, an insult just described in the three-and-a-half lines preceding. This description gives *τοσούτου* its point. A further benefit of the repunctuation is that we are now free of an asyndeton (beginning of 834) that is hard to account for.

Alc. 1037–40

ΑΔ. *οὗτοι σ' ἀτίζων οὐδ' ἐν αἰσχροῖσιν τιθεὶς*
ἔκρυψ' ἐμῆς γυναικὸς ἀθλίους τύχας.
ἀλλ' ἄλγος ἄλγει τοῦτ' ἂν ἦν προσκείμενον,
εἴ του πρὸς ἄλλου δώμαθ' ὡρμήθης ξένου.

1037 *αἰσχροῖσι(ν)* **LPQ**: *ἐχθροῖσι(ν)* **BOV** (ἐ- v^{lc}, αἰ- **V**)

The corruption of *αἰσχρός* into *ἐχθρός*, which Diggle's text assumes here, is common (*El.* 138, *HF* 293, and *Tro.* 1059 if Hermann's conjecture is correct), but the opposite change also occurs (*Hec.* 200, *Pho.* 585; Aesch. *Sept.* 695), and the intermediate *αἰχθρός* can be seen in the original reading of **V** above as well as at *Tro.* 741. Sense and style here favor *ἐχθροῖσιν*. There is a strong tendency in a Euripidean *agon* for the second of two paired speeches to answer the first point by point in order. "Not dishonoring you or considering you one of my enemies" is a perfect reply to 1010f, Heracles' first substantial point, that he expected to be treated as a *friend* and to be allowed to show his loyalty. *Pace* Dale, for Admetus to tell Heracles that he does not consider him an enemy is a good response to Heracles' disappointment at not being allowed to act as a friend. The exaggeration of "no friend" to "enemy" has a rhetorical function in making the change easier to rebut.

The decisive point, however, is grammar. One has the sense that if there are in the same line two co-ordinated transitive participles (or verbs in any other mood, for that matter) and the first of them has an object, that object is to be supplied with the second as well. This intuition can be confirmed by the following examples:

Alc. 787, *ταῦτ' οὖν ἀκούσας καὶ μαθὼν ἐμοῦ πάρα*
Alc. 855, *ὅς μ' ἐς δόμους ἐδέξατ' οὐδ' ἀπήλασεν*
Andr. 731, *οὔτ' οὖν τι δράσω φλαῦρον οὔτε πείσομαι*

and many others one could cite. In light of the expectations raised by *οὗτοι σ' ἀτίζων οὐδ'* it is almost impossible to supply *τύχας* as the object of *τιθείς*. This ought to make *ἐχθροῖσιν* the certain reading.

Med. 1008–10

ΜΗ. *αἰαῖ*
ΠΑ. *τάδ' οὐ ξυνῳδὰ τοῖσιν ἐξηγγελμένοις.*
ΜΗ. *αἰαῖ μάλ' αὖθις.* ΠΑ. *μῶν τιν' ἀγγέλλων τύχην*
οὐκ οἶδα, δόξης δ' ἐσφάλην εὐαγγέλου;

1009 *ἀγγέλλων* **BA** et $\mathbf{P}^2$ et **gE**: *-έλων* **ODEV**: *-έλω* **LP** et $\mathbf{V}^c$

The messenger brings the news that the children have been given permission to stay in Corinth. Medea answers with cries of woe. The messenger is puzzled: "Can it be that I do not know that I am announcing some *misfortune* and that I am cheated of my expectation of being the bearer of good news?" All is well here except that *τύχην* ought to have some qualifier to change the neutral "turn of events" into "misfortune." For while context can make an expression like *τήνδε τὴν τύχην* mean "this misfortune" because the demonstrative, by indicating which *τύχη*, makes its nature clear, I can find no in-

dubitable examples in tragedy of bare and unqualified τύχη meaning "*unhappy* turn of events."

The reading of **LP** and the corrector of **V** is a *vox nihili*, but it is an easy corruption of a reading that would make perfect sense and could easily have given rise to the other two readings as well:

μῶν τίν' ἀγγέλλω τύχην
οὐκ οἶδα, δόξης δ' ἐσφάλην εὐαγγέλου;

"Can it be that I do not know what turn of events I am announcing and have been cheated of my hopes of being the bearer of good news?" On one side of the tradition, some ancestor of **L** and **P** omitted one of the *lambdas*, while on the other a superfluous *nu* crept in from the ending of the words on either side of it.

Med. 1049–55

καίτοι τί πάσχω; βούλομαι γέλωτ' ὀφλεῖν
ἐχθροὺς μεθεῖσα τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἀζημίους;
τολμητέον τάδ'· ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης
τὸ καὶ προσέσθαι μαλθακοὺς λόγους φρενί.
χωρεῖτε, παῖδες, ἐς δόμους. ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ
θέμις παρεῖναι τοῖς ἐμοῖσι θύμασιν,
αὐτῷ μελήσει· χεῖρα δ' οὐ διαφθερῶ.

I have never seen a satisfactory explanation of 1053–55. It is usually claimed that they are a sort of macabre parody of expressions like *procul o procul este, profani*, and that Medea is warning the Chorus not to interfere. But construing them to get this meaning is difficult. We can see at a glance what corresponds to *profani*, but where is the *procul este*? Can μελήσει mean "Let him see to it [that he does not come]" (both R. Warner and P. Vellacott)?

There are at least three problems: Why use the verb μέλει to express this meaning? Why use the future indicative if the meaning is jussive, "Let him see to it"? And what is the understood genitive complement of the verb?

Various translations give various answers to these questions. Some are quite possible versions of the Greek that happen to make little sense in context. "To him I leave it (*i.e.*, let him come or stay away)," says Verrall. This apparent indifference is a plausible reading, for when you say "this will be a concern to him," you imply that it is none to your addressee. *Cf.* Hector's words to Andromache (*Il.* 6.492f), "War shall be the concern of men," with its clear implication that it is none to women. So translations like "It shall be his concern that he *not* enter" (a view that starts with the scholiast) seem to have little if any warrant. At the same time, it seems rather understated to say "It

will be your concern to enter or not" if your real purpose is, as Verrall says in his previous note, to forbid the women of the Chorus to attempt interference.

Other renderings fit the context but cannot be gotten out of the Greek. "If anyone thinks it impious to be present, to take part in my sacrifice, that will be his concern," runs J. R. Majors' note. Here we miss a δοκεῖ or the like to indicate the subjectivity of "thinks it impious" instead of the objective "is forbidden" which the Greek gives. (Note too the modernity of the sentiment: "If you think what I am doing is wrong, that is your problem.") Translations such as "der ziehe den eigenen Weg" (E. Buschor) lose contact with the Greek entirely.

The absence of an expression in the Greek to indicate the object of the care is a stumbling-block to interpretation. It is also anomalous. In all but four instances of the verb in Euripides (*Heracl.* 712, on which see below, *Hec.* 1274, *Bacch.* 1387, fr.287.2), it has either a genitive complement or a nominative subject (or its equivalent, an indirect question). In each of these four instances, the context leaves no doubt about what is to be supplied.

Likewise αὐτῷ is not above suspicion. In the extant plays and the fragments in Nauck, Euripides uses a resumptive pronoun after a preceding relative clause forty-two times. In twenty-nine of these the pronoun is a form of οὗτος, in eight it is ὅδε, in one it is ἐκεῖνος, and in one it is ὁ αὐτός. All these are words of strong demonstrative force. By contrast there are, besides our passage, only two other *prima facie* instances of the relatively colorless αὐτός.[2] By far the commonest procedure is to use no pronoun at all, as at *Med.* 507f and *Bacch.* 228. There is no reason why Euripides, if he had wanted a pronoun, should not have followed his normal practice and written τούτῳ, but his MSS. tell us that he almost certainly did not. Transmitted αὐτῷ thus gives us both more and less than we need, for it supplies a pronoun that is both unnecessary and unusual and fails to give us the object the verb requires.

"We look before and after and pine for what is not," wrote Shelley.

[2] Relative clauses resumed with οὗτος: *Alc.* 979, *Hipp.* 81, 445, 889, *Andr.* 369, *Supp.* 916, *El.* 20, *HF* 1328, *Tro.* 492, 646, *Hel.* 1376, *Phoen.* 49, 706, 916, 1016, *Or.* 66, 659, *Bacch.* 656, *IA* 62, frr.37.2, 175.2, 328.3, 583.2, 634.2, 757.1, 952.2, 953.2 and 16 (both probably spurious), 1048.6; with ὅδε: *Med.* 548, 1409, *IT* 822, *Hel.* 961, *Bacch.* 432, frr.110.2, 297.3, 852.2; with ἐκεῖνος: *Bacch.* 445; with ὁ αὐτός: *Phoen.* 386. Of the two counterexamples, one is fr.377.3, which, even if it were undoubtedly sound and undoubtedly genuine, is sufficiently different in form from the others that it does not present much of a challenge to the rule that a resumptive pronoun should have demonstrative force. The other, interestingly, is *Ion* 600, from a passage that I had concluded on other grounds was spurious (see *TAPA* 109 [1979] 116–24).

He was, of course, speaking of the textual critic, whose duty it is to look at the context preceding and following any passage and divine from it what is no longer there, the meaning the poet's words once expressed, a meaning now obscured by corruption. Immediately before the doubtful lines, Medea reproaches herself for cowardice and sends the children into the house, the μαλθακοὶ λόγοι of maternal feeling firmly mastered. Immediately after them is a half line in which she proclaims the firmness of her resolve. The δ' with which it is connected to what precedes could be adversative and might suggest a contrast with other feelings and other people. If so, it could be that the verb μελήσει refers to those feelings, that it is indicative because Medea is making a statement about the future, not issuing a command, that it has as its object the children, and that Medea means that those who are forbidden to be present at her sacrifice *shall feel concern for them*, while she shall not. Our choice is between αὐτῷ (*sc.* ὑμῶν *vel* αὐτῶν), a suppletion that does not easily suggest itself, or the trifling change αὐτῶν for αὐτῷ.

The grammatical considerations already adduced make αὐτῶν a logical choice: a genitive complement to the verb is needed, as we have seen, a resumptive pronoun is not, and the transmitted pronoun is anomalous. Translate: "But what has come over me? Do I wish to be a laughing-stock, allowing my enemies to escape unpunished? Must I suffer that?[3] Nay, what cowardice in me to lay such soothing words to my soul. Children, go into the house! Whoso may not attend my sacrifice shall care for them. My hand I shall not weaken." For the corruption see *Alc.* 75, *Andr.* 1220, and for the reverse, *Alc.* 1025, *Hipp.* 302. The shift from second to third person is not difficult provided we recognize that only the imperative is directed to the children and the rest of Medea's words are spoken to herself and the Chorus.

Med. 1076–77

> χωρεῖτε χωρεῖτ'· οὐκέτ' εἰμὶ προσβλέπειν
> οἵα τε †πρὸς ὑμᾶς† ἀλλὰ νικῶμαι κακοῖς.

1077 τε πρὸς ὑμᾶς **A** et **V** in ras. et **B**[3]: τε προσμᾶς **B**: τε πρὸς ἡμᾶς **O**: τ' ἐς ὑμᾶς **LP** et **V**[3]: πρὸς ὑμᾶς **gE**: τε πρὸς σφᾶς Page

[3] At *CQ* N.S. 36 (1986) 351f I suggest that the correct reading in 1078 is τολμήσω, the reading of all the MSS. except **L**, that it could well mean "undergo, bear up under," as the verb frequently does, and that another instance of this meaning is *Med.* 1051, where we should perhaps read τολμητέον τάδ'; This makes the reference of τάδ' easier to understand (the unendurable things just mentioned rather than unnamed things she must dare to do) as well as making ἀλλά function more naturally.

It may be possible to see a little further into the darkness of 1077. The essential question concerning the crux, as Page saw, was whether προσβλέπειν πρός τινα is good Greek. He answered in the affirmative and proposed τε πρὸς σφᾶς, taking the third person as an aside, which was then 'corrected', on his view, to a direct address.

The solution is a neat one, for Medea does in fact leave off speaking to the children in the next line and the aside leads into this. But the whole rests on a shaky foundation, for the evidence for προσβλέπειν πρός τινα is exceedingly slender (a single inscriptional prose text in a non-Attic dialect), while the use of προσβλέπειν with simple accusative is overwhelmingly attested. The reading of **LP**, τ' ἐς ὑμᾶς, is almost certainly conjectural, and if we supposed it to be genuine, we would have great difficulty explaining the corruption of ἐς to πρός. It is an obvious inference that in πρὸς ὑμᾶς neither pronoun nor preposition is the work of Euripides but rather that of a glossator, and that what Euripides wrote was, *e.g.*,

οὐκέτ' εἰμὶ προσβλέπειν
οἵα τ' ἐναντί' ἀλλὰ νικῶμαι κακοῖς.

That ἐναντίον is the *mot juste* with προσβλέπειν can be seen from, *e.g.*, *Hipp.* 1078 and *Hec.* 968. (For the neuter plural form of the adverb, see LSJ *s.v.*) In these places and others like them the direct object of the verb is expressed. Here the object has to be understood, which perhaps created difficulty enough for the prosaic mind that Medea's "in the face" was at some point glossed by "at you," and the lemma ousted by the glossema.

Med. 1314–16

χαλᾶτε κληῖδας ὡς τάχιστα, πρόσπολοι,
ἐκλύεθ' ἁρμούς, ὡς ἴδω διπλοῦν κακόν
[τοὺς μὲν θανόντας, τὴν δὲ τείσωμαι δίκην].

1316 del. Schenkel. τίσωμαι δίκην **LP**: τίσομαι φόνω(ι) **HQ**

That two such disparate items as τοὺς θανόντας and τήνδε τείσωμαι δίκην should be contrasted by μέν and δέ is clearly impossible. But Diggle's deletion is wrong for two reasons. First, it seems equally unlikely that an interpolator should have expressed himself so nonsensically. Second, when a character in Euripides announces that there is a double toil, *etc.*, he will rarely fail to spell out its two components: *cf. Alc.* 760, 1057, *Med.* 1185, *Heracl.* 1043, *Andr.* 396, *Hec.* 518, *Supp.* 333, 1035, *IT* 688. Something, therefore, seems to be required after 1315, and as it is unlikely that anyone, either the poet

or an interpolator, wrote 1316 as it stands, it is likely to be corrupted, not interpolated. I suggest:

ὡς ἴδω διπλοῦν κακόν,
τοὺς μὲν θανόντας, τὴν δὲ <δράσασαν τάδε,
φόνου τε παίδων τῶνδε> τείσωμαι δίκην.

Open the doors so that I may see a double evil, my dead children and the one who did these things [*cf.* 1318], and so that I may exact punishment for the murder of the children.

Heracl. 165–74

ἦ κακὸν λόγον
κτήσῃ πρὸς ἀστῶν, εἰ γέροντος οὕνεκα
τύμβου, τὸ μηδὲν ὄντος, ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος,
παίδων <τε> τῶνδ' ἐς ἄντλον ἐμβήσῃ πόδα.
†ἐρεῖς τὸ λῷστον ἐλπίδ' εὑρήσειν μόνον†
καὶ τοῦτο πολλῷ τοῦ παρόντος ἐνδεές.
κακῶς γὰρ Ἀργείοισιν οἵδ' ὡπλισμένοις
μάχοιντ' ἂν ἡβήσαντες, εἴ <τι> τοῦτό σε
ψυχὴν ἐπαίρει· χοὐν μέσῳ πολὺς χρόνος
ἐν ᾧ διεργασθεῖτ' ἄν. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ.

Both 170 and the larger context establish the general sense of the Herald's point, that it is unwise to put too much trust in unfounded hopes, that one had better take the cash and let the credit go. If ἐλπίδ' in 169 is the credit, τὸ λῷστον is surely the cash, solid advantage, the sensible course. Excellent sense would be attained by writing

παρεὶς τὸ λῷστον ἐλπίδ' εὑρήσεις μόνην,

"If you let solid advantage slip, you will find only insubstantial hope, and this is far inferior to cash on the barrel." I am unsure about the asyndeton at the beginning of 169, which is difficult. κἀνείς or κἀφείς would solve that problem, but the corruption becomes considerably more difficult to explain. Others may be able to do better.

Heracl. 637–41

ΘΕ. ἥκω γε μέντοι χάρμα σοι φέρων μέγα.
ΙΟ. τίς δ' εἶ σύ; ποῦ σοι συντυχὼν ἀμνημονῶ;
ΘΕ. Ὕλλου πενέστης· οὔ με γιγνώσκεις ὁρῶν;
ΙΟ. ὦ φίλταθ', ἥκεις ἆρα σωτὴρ νῷν βλάβης;
ΘΕ. μάλιστα· καὶ πρός γ' εὐτυχεῖς τὰ νῦν τάδε.

640 ἥκεις apogr. Par.: ἦκες **L** νῷν σωτὴρ Porson

Hyllus' servant, coming with news of his master, who has been away trying to win allies for the children of Heracles, finds Iolaus in a state

of collapse caused by the sacrifice of Macaria. Iolaus does not at once recognize the servant. But the servant reminds him who he is. "Oh, dearest one," Iolaus replies (this being, as D. Gregor, *CR* 71 [1957] 14f, has shown, a common way of addressing the messenger of good news, whether or not any propinquity actually obtains), "have you come as a savior from harm for the two of us?" We may grant that the recipient of good news may in the first flush of the moment treat the bearer as if he were the cause of the happy circumstances themselves. One cannot help but wonder, though, why the salvation in question is restricted to a pair of individuals and not shared with all of Heracles' children. Suspicion darkens when we read the servant's reply: "Indeed I have [come as a savior] and furthermore you are fortunate in your present circumstances." It is somewhat remarkable that the servant accepts the exaggerated view of his own accomplishments. It is even more remarkable that his "furthermore" adds nothing to the implications of *μάλιστα*.

I suggest that what Euripides wrote was:

IO. *τίς δ' εἶ σύ; ποῦ σοι συντυχὼν ἀμνημονῶ;*
ΘΕ. *Ὕλλου πενέστης· οὔ με γιγνώσκεις ὁρῶν;*
IO. *ὦ φίλτατ', ἦλθεν ἆρα σῶ<ς ἄ>τερ [νῷν] βλάβης;*
ΘΕ. *μάλιστα· καὶ πρός γ' εὐτυχεῖς τὰ νῦν τάδε.*

When *σῶς ἄτερ* was corrupted to *σωτήρ*, the meter was repaired by the makeshift *νῷν* (which Porson thought was misplaced). After *ὦ φίλτατ'* it is not unnatural to expect a second-person verb, and that is what some scribe's expectation caused him to see. If this suggestion is correct, it removes another curious anomaly. In 659 Iolaus reports to Alcmene the messenger's news that Hyllus has *arrived*. In the transmitted text this is information that the messenger never explicitly gives but is now restored to him.

Heracl. 709–13

ΑΛ. *τί χρῆμα μέλλεις σῶν φρενῶν οὐκ ἔνδον ὤν*
710 *λιπεῖν μ' ἔρημον σὺν <τέκνου> τέκνοις ἐμοῖς;*
IO. *ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἀλκή· σοὶ δὲ χρὴ τούτων μέλειν.*
ΑΛ. *τί δ'; ἢν θάνῃς σύ, πῶς ἐγὼ σωθήσομαι;*
IO. *παιδὸς μελήσει παισὶ τοῖς λελειμμένοις.*

Iolaus explains that it is Alcmene's job to care for the children while he goes off to fight. When she says, "If you die, how shall I survive?" Iolaus, according to L, replies, "Your grandchildren who are left shall take care of you." But the restrictive "who are left" is not notably apposite, suggesting as it does a contrast with grandchildren who will

be dead. There is no suggestion in this context that any of the grandchildren is about to die. Worse still, if we found a scrap of papyrus with the two lines, "If you die, how shall I survive?" "Your remaining grandchildren will take care of you," we would almost certainly conclude that the two speakers were related as grandparent to grandchild. That is not, of course, the relation between Alcmene and Iolaus.

The simplest solution is to read *τῶν λελειμμένων*, "Your grandchildren will care for those who are left behind." The error is simple assimilation of endings. (In view of 711, 709 should be punctuated *τί χρῆμα;*)

Heracl. 729–33

ΘΕ. *ἦ παιδαγωγεῖν γὰρ τὸν ὁπλίτην χρεών;*
730 ΙΟ. *ὄρνιθος οὕνεκ' ἀσφαλῶς πορευτέον.*
ΘΕ. *εἰθ' ἦσθα δυνατὸς δρᾶν ὅσον πρόθυμος εἶ.*
ΙΟ. *ἔπειγε· λειφθεὶς δεινὰ πείσομαι μάχης.*
ΘΕ. *σύ τοι βραδύνεις, οὐκ ἐγώ, δοκῶν τι δρᾶν.*

733 *δοκῶν* Tyrwhitt: *δοκῶ* **L**

In 732 Iolaus says "Hurry: if I am left out of the battle I shall suffer terrible things." One may grant that Iolaus in his excitement may be given to exaggeration, but "suffering terrible things" is an expression usually reserved, on the tragic stage or off, for people who have suffered sharper stings than those of even the keenest disappointment at being late. But the *δεινά* that look so exaggerated as the object of *πάσχω* are quite at home in another idiom of perfect aptness to this situation, and I suggest that Iolaus meant "I am (or shall be) wroth at being left out of the battle" and that Euripides wrote *δεινὰ ποιοῦμαι* or *θήσομαι*.

In the next line, the reading of **L** is nonsense. Tyrwhitt's conjecture restores the obviously intended contrast of subjects *σύ . . . οὐκ ἐγώ* with the same verb. But the participial phrase is lame: "It is you, not I, who are slow, seeming to do something." Why "seeming"? And, more important, why should *τι δρᾶν* not be the complement to *βραδύνεις*, as it was clearly meant to be? The sense is "It is you who seem to be slow to act, not I," and it is achieved by undoing the assimilation of the endings of *βραδύνεις* and *δοκῶ* to the pronouns that precede them, writing *σύ τοι βραδύνειν, οὐκ ἐγώ, δοκεῖς τι δρᾶν*. For similar parentheses see *Andr.* 248 and *Hipp.* 352. See further, for parentheses as cause of corruption, J. Jackson, *Marginalia Scaenica* (Oxford 1955) 128–40.

Hipp. 664–68

ὄλοισθε. μισῶν δ' οὔποτ' ἐμπλησθήσομαι
γυναῖκας, οὐδ' εἴ φησί τίς μ' ἀεὶ λέγειν·
ἀεὶ γὰρ οὖν πώς εἰσι κἀκεῖναι κακαί.
ἤ νύν τις αὐτὰς σωφρονεῖν διδαξάτω
ἢ κἄμ' ἐάτω ταῖσδ' ἐπεμβαίνειν ἀεί.

664–68 in suspicionem vocavit Valckenaer: certe ex Hippolyti sententia (79 seqq.) σωφροσύνη non discendo capitur

Barrett, following Valckenaer, suspects these lines of being an interpolation. Diggle's apparatus mentions a further telling point against them. I would like to add to the suspicion. "A curse upon you! I shall never get my fill of hating women, not even if someone says that I am always speaking (*sc.* of this)." Hating and reviling are two different things. It makes sense to speak of getting one's fill of the second but not of the first. Furthermore, it makes even greater sense to say (as this passage almost says) "I shall never get my fill of reviling women, even if someone says I am always doing so." These lines do not quite succeed at saying what they are intended to say, and though we must of course be prepared to be told that the illogicality of Hippolytus' words betokens his agitation, the excuse seems particularly feeble at the end of a long speech that has been as articulate as has this.

His justification for always speaking ill of them is also strange: "for they too are always in some way vile." The position of καί suggests that women share the quality of vileness with someone else. (The καί in 668, by contrast, might modify the whole co-ordinate clause.) But this is clearly not the intended meaning. Finally, the collocation γὰρ οὖν πως (666) looks rather like metrical filler: γὰρ οὖν[4] does not seem to be particularly apt here since the kind of emphasis this combination provides is not needed. This emphasis is cancelled out, moreover, by the thoroughly unnecessary πως. For πως as a make-weight for inept versifiers, see Soph. *Aj.* 827, rightly bracketed by Dawe in his Teubner edition.

Hec. 52–54

γεραιᾷ δ' ἐκποδὼν χωρήσομαι
Ἑκάβῃ· περᾷ γὰρ ἥδ' ὑπὸ σκηνῆς πόδα
Ἀγαμέμνονος, φάντασμα δειμαίνουσ' ἐμόν.

53 σκηνῆς Ω ξ **T**[t] et **P**[c] et Σ[mv] : σκηνὴν **FLP**ζ et Σ[rec.] ad 762.

[4] See J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*[2] (Oxford 1954) 445f.

Line 54 was first suspected by Usener, whose disquiet was apparently shared at least to a degree by Murray. With reason. Several possibilities of reading and interpretation all yield some sort of contradiction with the rest of the play. (a) We might read, with Diggle, σκηνῆς and construe πόδα with περᾷ. But why should Hecuba be coming out of Agamemnon's tent? One scholiastic explanation is too complicated to be true. We are to imagine, says the scholiast, that she has already left her tent and entered that of Agamemnon, from which she now exits, not having found her daughter Cassandra. But the distinct impression we get, both from Polydorus and from Hecuba herself, is that during the prologue she was asleep in her own tent and is now just awakening: *cf.* 30f, 69, 72. She has just seen the dream (caused by the ghost hovering over her head) and she bids her slaves take her out of her own tent so that she can avert its ill effects. No audience will understand that she is telling her slaves for the second time to help her go forth or that 87–89 are her way of saying that she was unable to find Cassandra in the tent (with Helenus too?). (b) We might read with Diggle but construe πόδα as the object of ὑπό or read σκηνήν. Now we have Hecuba going *toward* the tent of Agamemnon. This is possible, at least. But in 59 she says ἄγετ', ὦ παῖδες, τὴν γραῦν πρὸ δόμων, and πρὸ δόμων with a verb of motion is more naturally used of an exit (*cf. Andr.* 495, *Tro.* 897, *Phoen.* 1264, *Or.* 112, 1504, *Bacch.* 914, *IA* 1, fr.773.59 [=*Pha.* 102 Diggle]) than of an approach to the entrance of a structure from the outside (only *Bacch.* 1217). And it seems more natural that Polydorus' words, like his mother's at 59, should refer to the start, rather than the end, of her journey.

But what of the possibility that the tent where Hecuba sleeps is in fact the tent of Agamemnon? There is nothing in the play to contradict this notion explicitly, but apart from this line there is nothing to support it either. It is clear elsewhere (1016ff) that a tent housing Trojan captives is to be imagined as the backdrop of the action. Hecuba can assure Polymestor with plausibility that there are no men within. If this same tent were Agamemnon's as well, it is strange that nothing is made of this fact.

The suspect line also says that Hecuba comes out "being afraid of my ghost." This misrepresents the situation, as the scholiast's contorted attempt to make it square with the facts shows: περὶ τοῦ φαντάσματος οὗ εἶδε περὶ ἐμοῦ δεδοικυῖα. Hecuba nowhere alludes to her son's presence as a ghost but only as a dream. She comes out seeking oneirocritical advice, not in flight from an apparition. While it is true that 53 by itself is a rather abrupt sentence, it is not impossibly so, and its abruptness might help to explain the manufacture of 54. For another possible motive, see below on *Hec.* 504.

Hec. 74–97

The lemma here is too long for transcription: see Diggle. J. M. Bremer's discussion pinpoints the major difficulties in this passage.[5] Hecuba's dream is caused by the appearance of her son Polydorus' ghost over her head as she sleeps. Yet 74f and 90f give us two dreams, one the dream we expect and the second a quite extraordinary allegorical dream about "a dappled doe killed by the bloody paw of a wolf, torn pitilessly from my knees." About this second dream one should note that (a) it is strange to have one dream caused in the expected fashion by a spectral visitant and a second by a quite different agency; (b) Hecuba is made in 75 to identify the doe with her daughter, an easy identification for the audience to make and for that reason oddly put in the mouth of Hecuba, who ought to be properly baffled; (c) the second dream is superfluous in that Hecuba already has, apart from any dream, a reason to feel concern for her daughter, as we will see below; (d) metrically these lines interrupt the lyric anapests that have been used consistently since 68, right after a system of marching anapests; (e) though they have obviously suffered corruption, their style is not such as to suggest that strenuous efforts to restore them will be rewarded: see the clumsy ἀμφὶ after περὶ in 75, the inelegant postponement of τε in the same line, the confused δι' ὀνείρων in a clause following ὄψιν.

Wilamowitz goes too far, however, in deleting 92–97. This suggestion carries very little plausibility for several reasons. The palpable motive for the interpolation was to spell out Hecuba's dream in such a way as to include Polyxena in its scope. The interpolator chose to attempt dactylic hexameter, which contrasts with the meter of the rest of the passage. At 92, however, the subject is no longer the dream about Polyxena but a passage that makes the dream unnecessary, as we will see below. And the meter is no longer hexameter but anapestic dimeter, the meter of the undoubtedly genuine portion. It is hard to assign to a single interpolator a passage that is diverse both in motive and in manner of execution. And to posit two interpolators seems a rather expensive hypothesis.

There *are* two objections to 92–97, but neither is decisive. First Achilles' demand here is for "one of the Trojan women," and this does not seem to square with his *nominatim* request for Polyxena in 40 and elsewhere. In an appendix to the chapter on *Hecuba* in *The Heroic Muse* (Baltimore 1987) I discuss this contradiction along with

[5] "Euripides, *Hecuba* 59–215: A Reconsideration," *Mnemosyne* SER. IV 24 (1971) 232–50.

a number of similar discrepancies in the play, visible to the scholar in his study but unlikely to be noticed by the audience, which Euripides accepted in order to make a play out of two distinct and materially unrelated stories, those of Polyxena and Polydorus. Euripides wrote 92ff in order to give Hecuba reason to be anxious about Polyxena equally with Polydorus. Just as with Polydorus, she must have *some* reason to be afraid for her daughter but not certitude that she is in clear danger, while in the rest of the play the plot required a *nominatim* request. The discrepancy is of a piece with others in the play, such as the location of the action, discrepancies whose motives we can also trace, and it should not tell against the genuineness of 92ff.

The second objection concerns the sequence of four shorts in 97; A. M. Dale notes the oddity and is inclined to suspect wholesale interpolation.[6] But Nauck's solution, deletion of 97 and of οὖν in 96, is the most economical as it removes not only the metrical anomaly but also that most prosaic and least lyrical of connectives. (It is surely no accident that of all the instances of οὖν cited in Allen and Italie's *Concordance* only three occur in lyric passages, and in two of these, *Med.* 1290 and *IT* 895, the text is corrupt [see Page and Platnauer *ad locc.*], while the third, *Ion* 209, is in answer to another singer in a lively lyric dialogue.) The reason for the manufacture of 97 and the insertion in 96 is perfectly transparent, that horror of the elliptical that bedevils nearly every sentence in tragedy ending in ἀλλ' ὅμως. We need not delete 92–97, and at most we need delete only 97 itself, which, however, may be protected by *IT* 215, cited by Diggle. This solution in its essentials was already set forth in brief by A. Lesky.[7]

Hec. 144–47

ἀλλ' ἴθι ναούς, ἴθι πρὸς βωμούς,
[ἵζ' Ἀγαμέμνονος ἱκέτις γονάτων,]
κήρυσσε θεοὺς τούς τ' οὐρανίδας
τούς θ' ὑπὸ γαίας.

145 del. Heimsoeth: vide *Studies* 45

Here I will merely confirm Diggle. (My reason for doing so will appear in my discussion of 504.) The diagnosis of interpolation was made by Heimsoeth, though milder measures have been proposed (by Nauck, for once, who wrote Ἀγαμέμνονος ἵζ'). To pass sentence against a verse raised from the altar by Nauck argues a steely temperament indeed. Yet severity is called for. (1) The suggestion that Hecuba

[6] *Collected Papers* (Cambridge 1969) 30 n.1.
[7] *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen*[3] (Göttingen 1956) 326 n.81.

become Agamemnon's suppliant is absurd coming from the same Trojan women who have just reported his utter helplessness in the assembly. (2) Line 145 interrupts the sequence "Go to the temples, go to the altars, call upon the gods in heaven and beneath the earth," as Barrett points out. (For this sense of κηρύσσω, see Aesch. *Cho.* 124a.) (3) If 145 is retained, the Chorus must be advising Hecuba to take *refuge* at the shrines or at Agamemnon's knees, and then κήρυσσε would most naturally mean "proclaim (to the Greeks) the (sanctity of the) gods (and the protective power of their altars)." But (a) that would not prevent Polyxena's death but only Hecuba's; and (b) since she can be a suppliant at only one shrine, she cannot claim the protective power of the entire pantheon. Rather, the Chorus are advising her to call on the gods for help, and the appeal to Agamemnon is beside the point. (4) One further consideration is that in 62f we have already detected an interpolator at work whose ideas of metre are compatible with lines such as 145.

Hec. 260–70

πότερα τὸ χρή σφ' ἐπήγαγ' ἀνθρωποσφαγεῖν
πρὸς τύμβον, ἔνθα βουθυτεῖν μᾶλλον πρέπει;
ἢ τοὺς κτανόντας ἀνταποκτεῖναι θέλων
ἐς τήνδ' Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐνδίκως τείνει φόνον;
ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτὸν ἥδε γ' εἴργασται κακόν.
Ἑλένην νιν αἰτεῖν χρῆν τάφῳ προσφάγματα·
κείνη γὰρ ὤλεσέν νιν ἐς Τροίαν τ' ἄγει.
εἰ δ' αἰχμαλώτων χρή τιν' ἔκκριτον θανεῖν
κάλλει θ' ὑπερφέρουσαν, οὐχ ἡμῶν τόδε·
ἡ Τυνδαρὶς γὰρ εἶδος ἐκπρεπεστάτη,
ἀδικοῦσά θ' ἡμῶν οὐδὲν ἧσσον ηὑρέθη.

Lines 265f should be deleted. (1) Both 265f and 270 make the same point, as has already been noticed by Herwerden, who proposed deletion of 269f, by C. Busche, who deleted 270 alone, and by M. L. West (*BICS* 27 [1980] 12), who wants to excise 267–70. Yet these lines are blameless, whereas (2) 265 stands in asyndeton with 264, inexplicably; (3) 266 contains a none too attractive *hysteron proteron* and a false tense, ἄγει; and (4) the language is flat and colorless, entirely within the capabilities of the dullest Byzantine schoolmaster (I do not insist on a mediaeval provenance) penning an explanatory mythological note in verse: *cf. Andr.* 655f, excised by Verrall.[8] West fails to see the outline of the argument:

[8] *CR* 20 (1906) 214–47. I give supporting arguments in *The Andromache of Euripides* (Chico 1980) 93 n.58.

(1) Has fate forced them to perform human sacrifice? (Understood answer: No.)
(2) Is it in requital for injuries received? Polyxena has inflicted none.
(3) Shall the most beautiful captive then be sacrificed? The choice falls on Helen, who also and incidentally fulfills (2).
West's construction of 267f is mistaken. These do not suggest that Helen is ineligible because she is not a captive. The emphasis is not (despite its early position) on *αἰχμαλώτων*, but on *ἔκκριτον*, *eximiam*. Besides, Helen *is* regarded elsewhere as a captive, *e.g. Tro.* 35.

Hec. 409–12

> ἀλλ', ὦ φίλη μοι μῆτερ, ἡδίστην χέρα
> δὸς καὶ παρειὰν προσβαλεῖν παρηίδι·
> ὡς οὔποτ' αὖθις ἀλλὰ νῦν πανύστατον
> ἀκτῖνα κύκλον θ' ἡλίου προσόψομαι.

Diggle deletes *Alc.* 207f (Murray had deleted 208) and retains *Hec.* 412 (as did Murray), both inexplicably. *Alc.* 205–08 explains why Alcestis is coming out of doors, and therefore 208, though slightly repetitious (see Dale *ad loc.*), is at least intelligible. In the *Hecuba* passage, by contrast, (1) the line must be treated as merely a way of saying "I will shortly die," and its emphasis on the physical act of looking at the sun's light is unexplained; (2) the motif of a last look at the sun occurs in Polyxena's dramatic last words (435–37), and its effect should not be blunted by anticipation; and (3) without 412, 409–11 mean "give me your embrace knowing that you will never do so again." This is the sense we require (*cf. Tro.* 761–63), and whether 412 belongs in *Alcestis* or not, it is not wanted here. (4) There is also MS. evidence for its spuriousness, fully reported in Diggle and Wecklein, who was the first to propose deletion.

Hec. 503f

> ΤΑ. Ταλθύβιος ἥκω, Δαναϊδῶν ὑπηρέτης
> [Ἀγαμέμνονος πέμψαντος, ὦ γύναι, μέτα].

504 del. Jenni: cf. *Alc.* 66

Once again I merely confirm Diggle, though now I say why I do so. To construe this line as it stands in the MSS. is impossible; anastrophic tmesis seems not to occur in tragedy (see Barrett on *Hipp.* 548f); to take *μέτα* with Ἀγαμέμνονος would be grammatically unobjectionable but factually false; and Verrall's suggestion of an aposiopesis, duly recorded in Murray's apparatus, is merely unspeakable. Of the proposed conjectures, only Dindorf's *πάρα* has any plausibility; but does not *πάρα* make *πέμψαντος* unnecessary? Add, however, that the real

authors of Talthybius' mission are named in 510 and in their proper and official style (this is no private errand, as 504 might imply), and that 504 makes 505 less rather than more natural, as a paraphrase makes clear ("I am Talthybius, servant of the Greeks [, come with a message from Agamemnon]." "Have they decided to sacrifice me too?"), and Jenne's conclusion is hard to avoid, with or without the reference to *Alc.* 66 as the supposed model. Just what this line was intended by its author to mean is something we cannot and need not determine. Diggle's deletion is right.

What is interesting here is that this is the third time we have good reason to believe that Agamemnon's name has been added to the text by a later hand. (The others are 54 and 145.) Is this an actor's attempt to increase the importance of Agamemnon in the play? The actor who played Agamemnon might easily have played both Polydorus (who speaks 54) and Talthybius here. Presumably he was also able to persuade the Coryphaeus to add a dimeter to the anapests he had to recite.

Hec. 585–92

585 ὦ θύγατερ, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰς ὅτι βλέψω κακῶν,
πολλῶν παρόντων· ἢν γὰρ ἅψωμαί τινος,
τόδ' οὐκ ἐᾷ με, παρακαλεῖ δ' ἐκεῖθεν αὖ
λύπη τις ἄλλη διάδοχος κακῶν κακοῖς·
καὶ νῦν τὸ μὲν σὸν ὥστε μὴ στένειν πάθος
590 οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἐξαλείψασθαι φρενός·
τὸ δ' αὖ λίαν παρεῖλες ἀγγελθεῖσά μοι
γενναῖος.

> Daughter, I know not to which of my misfortunes I am to look, since there are so many. For if I lay my hand to one, *this does not allow me* (or *does not let me go*) and from it again some other grief calls me as a successor to my former misfortunes. *And now* [as a particular instance of this] I cannot, to be sure, wipe from my mind what has befallen you so as not to groan at it. But you have relieved me of excessive grieving by the report of your nobility.

Several things trouble here. While it is conceivable that an actor by skilful use of his hands could convey by τόδ' the meaning "this [other] grief [over here]," the most natural reading is that τόδ' in 587 refers to the same grief as in 586. But, to speak algebraically, it is Misfortune B that should prevent Hecuba from grieving over Misfortune A, not Misfortune A itself. If we take the second of the two renderings, in the parenthesis above, if Misfortune A will not let her go, no subsequent

misfortune can be regarded as its genuine successor. A further indication that this second alternative is wrong and that one misfortune really succeeds another instead of being simply added to it is παρακαλεῖ δ' ἐκεῖθεν. Here again it is just conceivable that an actor could convey by gesture the meaning "from over there [*i.e.*, from some other quarter] another grief calls me" (thus Méridier), but its most natural meaning is "calls me away from it," which implies that Misfortune A does release its grip. The verb ἐᾷ, therefore, will mean "allow" rather than "let go," and it ought to have some other subject than Misfortune A. We might be tempted, accordingly, to write τότ' for τόδ', making λύπη the subject of ἐᾷ as well as of παρακαλεῖ. But word-order and connective seem to tell against this.

A second worry is διάδοχος κακῶν κακοῖς. The passage seems to require of διάδοχος a sense that is "quasi-active [better: causative], bringing a succession of evils after evils" (LSJ), "qui fait succéder des malheurs aux malheurs" (Weil), "bringing succession of new ills to old" (Russell), a sense not easy to parallel. At any rate, *Supp.* 72, cited by editors and LSJ, will not serve since the plain sense of 71f (reading Valckenaer's widely accepted conjecture) is "taking up groans in succession to groans" (Paley). This is the usual sense of διάδοχος with genitive of the thing received and dative of the person (here personified thing) from which it is received, as in Aesch. *PV* 464, θνητοῖς . . . διάδοχοι μοχθημάτων, and Eur. *Alc.* 655, σοι τῶνδε διάδοχος δόμων. Hadley, in fact, says that Euripides is not being logical for "he proceeds to speak of one of [the woes] as receiving in his turn a burden of misery from another." Emendations have been suggested (Heath's διάδοχον κακόν, Musgrave's διαδόχοις κακῶν), but they have not won acceptance.

A third problem is the relevance of 585–88 to 589–92. The καὶ νῦν promises an application in specific circumstances of a general truth just enunciated: *cf. Alc.* 597, *Med.* 350, *Andr.* 60, *Hec.* 494. Yet it is hard to see how the hopelessness of 585–88 is exemplified by the consolation Hecuba derives in 589–92 from her daughter's nobility.

Simple inversion of 587 and 588 solves the first difficulty and smooths the way for the solution of the second and third:

585 ὦ θύγατερ, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰς ὅτι βλέψω κακῶν,
586 πολλῶν παρόντων· ἦν γὰρ ἄψωμαί τινος,
588 λύπη τις ἄλλη διάδοχος κακῶν κακοῖς
587 τόδ' οὐκ ἐᾷ με, παρακαλεῖ δ' ἐκεῖθεν αὖ.

This transposition provides employment for τόδ' as object, not subject, of ἐᾷ (for ἐᾶν with infinitive to be supplied, *cf. HF* 1361, *IA* 858,

and Soph. *Ant.* 538: see also K.-G. I 327f) and makes λύπη the natural subject (which was what the unsuccessful emendation τότ' tried to do).

Even more important, however, it makes clear the meaning of of the passage, a meaning by no means obvious: "O daughter, I know not to which of my misfortunes I am to look with so many present. For if I fasten on one, some other grief, taking the burden of misfortune from misfortune [or relieving misfortune by means of misfortune], does not permit me to do this but calls me away from it again." The second grief comes as a strange sort of relief to the first, paradoxically decreasing its pain. This is to give διάδοχος precisely its Greek sense, precisely what Hadley said Hecuba ought not to mean. For whether κακοῖς is construed as a dative of the person (here personified thing) from which one receives something in succession or as a dative of means, this second grief is one that succeeds to Hecuba's pain, relieves her of it.

This explains καὶ νῦν. Talthybius in the conclusion to his speech (580–82) had said that Hecuba was of all women the one with the noblest offspring and (because she had lost them) the most terrible misfortune. For Hecuba, these same facts, her daughter's death and her nobility, stand in a different relation. She cannot but mourn her daughter's death. But the very fact of her nobility, which might have given the loss its most terrible sting, works to mitigate it.

Hec. 671–73

> ἀτὰρ τί νεκρὸν τόνδε μοι Πολυξένης
> ἥκεις κομίζουσ', ἧς ἀπηγγέλθη τάφος
> πάντων Ἀχαιῶν διὰ χερὸς σπουδὴν ἔχειν;

The periphrasis σπουδὴν ἔχειν means what σπουδάζειν means, "be eager, in earnest, zealous, busy, in a hurry" (*cf. Cycl.* 84, *Alc.* 778, 1014, *Med.* 557, *Heracl.* 118, *Andr.* 1050, *HF* 709, *IT* 1434, *Phoen.* 901, and *Or.* 1056). But a τάφος can be none of these. It is true, as Hadley points out, that ἔχω sometimes has the meaning "cause," as in 353 where ζῆλον ἔχουσα means "causing contention" rather than "being contentious" (see *Ion* 472 and Kannicht on *Hel.* 93 for this usage). But add διὰ χερός and the scale tips decisively: the subject of ἔχειν and hence of ἀπηγγέλθη is an entity capable of feeling eagerness and of having something literally or figuratively on its hands. That entity is concealed under the dissylable τάφος, it is naturally the Greek army in one or another guise, and the meaning is "the body of Polyxena, with which the Greek army was reported to be busying itself." For σπουδὴν ἔχειν τινός, *cf. Alc.* 778 and 1014. The word to

replace τάφος, for my money, is the most obvious one, στρατός. If anyone objects to στρατὸς πάντων Ἀχαιῶν as a phrase, he may have, at the trifling cost of changing one more letter, the attested collocation στρατὸς πᾶς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν (*Hec.* 530).

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