

Apolline Ethics and Olympian Victory in Pindar's Eighth *Pythian* 67–78

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THE FOURTH and penultimate triad of Pindar's eighth *Pythian Ode*, composed for Aristomenes of Aegina, begins and ends as a catalogue of the youthful wrestler's athletic successes: the current triumph at Pytho, an earlier victory in the pentathlon at the Aeginetan Delphinia, and wins at Megara, Marathon, and the Aeginetan Heraia. In the middle of the triad, inserted between the first two and last three items of the victory-catalogue, there appears a passage of some eleven lines that has given rise to considerable scholarly discussion and controversy, both regarding its overall intention and train of thought and in particular details of grammatical construction, punctuation, and text.¹

τὸ δ', Ἑκαταβόλε, πάνδοκον
ναὸν εὐκλέα διανέμων
Πυθῶνος ἐν γυάλοις,
τὸ μὲν μέγιστον τόθι χαρμάτων
65 ὦπασας, οἴκοι δὲ πρόσθεν ἀρπαλέαν δόσιν
πενταεθλίου σὺν ἑορταῖς ὑμαῖς ἐπάγαγες·
ᾧναξ, ἐκόντι δ' εὐχομαι νόῳ

κατὰ τιν' ἀρμονίαν βλέπειν
ἀμφ' ἕκαστον, ὅσα νέομαι.

¹ The following works will be cited by author's name alone: E. L. BUNDY, *Studia Pindarica* (Berkeley 1962); R. W. B. BURTON, *Pindar's Pythian Odes* (Oxford 1962); W. CHRIST, *Pindari carmina prolegomenis et commentariis instructa* (Leipzig 1896); L. R. FARNELL, *The Works of Pindar* II (London 1930); C. A. M. FENNEL, *Pindar: the Olympian and Pythian Odes* (Cambridge 1893); G. FRACCAROLI, *Le odi di Pindaro* II (Verona 1894); B. L. GILDERSLEEVE, *Pindar: the Olympian and Pythian Odes*² (New York 1890); T. K. HUBBARD, "Pindaric *Harmonia: Pythian* 8, 67–9," *Mnemosyne* SER. IV 36 (1983) 286–92; G. KIRKWOOD, *Selections from Pindar, Edited with an Introduction and Commentary* (Chico 1982); F. MEZGER, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig 1880); O. SCHROEDER, *Pindars Pythien* (Leipzig 1922); W. J. SLATER, *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin 1969); J. TAILLARDAT, "Sur deux passages de la VIII^e Pythique," *REG* 99 (1986) 225–38.

- 70 κώμῳ μὲν ἄδυμελεῖ
 Δίκα παρέστακε· θεῶν δ' ὄπιν
 ἄφθονον αἰτέω, Ξέναρκες, ὑμετέραις τύχαις.
 εἰ γάρ τις ἐσλὰ πέπαται μὴ σὺν μακρῷ πόνῳ,
 πολλοῖς σοφὸς δοκεῖ πεδ' ἀφρόνων
- 75 βίον κορυσσέμεν ὀρθοβούλοισι μαχαναῖς·
 τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀνδράσι κεῖται· δαίμων δὲ παρίσχει,
 ἄλλοτ' ἄλλον ὑπερθε βάλλων, ἄλλον δ' ὑπὸ χειρῶν.
 μέτρῳ κατάβαιν'· ἐν Μεγάροις δ' ἔχεις γέρας,
 μυχῶ τ' ἐν Μαραθῶνος, Ἥρας τ' ἀγῶν' ἐπιχώριον
 νίκαις τρισσαῖς, ὠριστόμενες, δάμασσας ἔργῳ.²

The present investigation is based on the premise that the individual difficulties posed by the passage can be resolved and an accurate account of its overall meaning arrived at only through the correct identification and appreciation of its generic function within the epinician context. That function, I shall argue, is to articulate the laudator's hopes for Aristomenes' continued success in athletic competition; in other words, *Pyth.* 8.67–78 constitute an unusually complex and elaborate realization of a standard epinician motif, the *Siegeswunsch*.³

The initial clues to the nature of the passage are its position in the midst of a victory-catalogue and the fact that it contains at its very center a request that divine favor be shown to the victor's father and family. Elsewhere in the corpus of epinicia, Bacchylidean as well as Pindaric, an explicit or implicit prayer on behalf of the laudandus and/or his family is found embedded in a victory-catalogue in only two passages, both of which are indubitable *Siegeswünsche* and have valuable light to shed on several aspects of *Pyth.* 8.67–78. The first of these passages

² The text printed is that of C. M. Bowra, *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis* (Oxford 1947); it differs from that of Snell-Maehler in the punctuation at the end of lines 76 and 77 and in the reading of line 78 (codd. καταβαίνει· ἐν Μεγάροις; Snell-Maehler καταβαίνει· Μεγάροις; see n.52 *infra*). Otherwise Pindar and Bacchylides are cited from the editions of B. Snell and H. Maehler, *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis* (Leipzig 1980) and *Bacchylidis carmina cum fragmentis* (Leipzig 1970). Scholia to Pindar are quoted from the edition of A. B. Drachmann (Leipzig 1903, 1910, 1927).

³ There are a total of eight passages in Pindar and one in Bacchylides that make specific and unambiguous reference to hoped-for future victories: *Ol.* 1.106–11, 13.103ff; *Pyth.* 5.122ff; *Nem.* 2.6–10, 10.29–33; *Isthm.* 1.64–68, 6.7ff, 7.49ff; Bacchyl. 8.26–32 (see H. Maehler, *Die Lieder des Bakchylides* I [Leiden 1982] 141). On *Pyth.* 10.55–63 as a candidate for inclusion in the roster of *Siegeswünsche* see A. M. Miller, "A Wish for Olympian Victory in Pindar's Tenth *Pythian*, Lines 55–63," *AJP* 112 (forthcoming).

occurs in the final triad of *Ol.* 13, which is largely devoted to commemorating the athletic achievements of the Oligaitid clan: sixty victories at the Isthmus and Nemea, three at Olympia, six at Pytho, and numerous others at a variety of local festivals in Greece and Sicily. Between the tally of Isthmian and Nemean successes on the one hand and those gained at Pytho and the local games on the other, are the following lines (101–06):

τὰ δ' Ὀλυμπία αὐτῶν
 ἔοικεν ἤδη πάροιθε λελέχθαι·
 τά τ' ἐσσόμενα τότε ἄν φαίην σαφές.
 νῦν δ' ἔλπομαι μὲν, ἐν θεῷ γε μὰν
 105 τέλος· εἰ δὲ δαίμων γενέθλιος ἔρποι,
 Δι τοῦτ' Ἐνυαλίῳ τ' ἐκδώσομεν πρᾶσσειν.

The other relevant passage appears in the second triad of *Nem.* 10, between the mention of Theaios' various victories at the Argive Heraia, the Isthmus, and Nemea and his two Panathenaic victories (29–33):

Ζεῦ πάτερ, τῶν μὰν ἔραται φρενί, σιγᾶ οἱ στόμα·
 πὰν δὲ τέλος
 30 ἐν τιν ἔργων· οὐδ' ἀμόχθῳ καρδίᾳ προσφέρων
 τόλμαν παραιτεῖται χάριν.
 γνῶτ' αἰεῖδω θεῷ τε καὶ ὅστις ἀμιλλᾶται πέρι
 ἐσχάτων ἀέθλων κορυφαῖς. ὕπατον δ' ἔσχεν Πίσσα
 Ἡρακλέος τεθμόν.

When these passages are examined in conjunction with *Pyth.* 8.67–78, three points of similarity emerge:

(1) The underlying principle of the placement of the intercalated passage within the surrounding victory-catalogue seems in all three cases to be that it should separate Panhellenic triumphs most relevant to the laudandus from victories of lesser prestige and/or pertinence, although in each case the general principle is modified to suit particular circumstances. Thus in *Ol.* 13 the Pythian entry in the catalogue of Oligaitid successes is postponed until *after* the victory-wish of lines 103–06, perhaps because Xenophon has Isthmian, Nemean, and Olympian but no Pythian wins to his credit (*sic* Bundy 79). In *Nem.* 10 Theaios' two victories at the Argive Heraia, though not of Panhellenic stature, are recorded *before* his Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean wins (and thus before the victory-wish of lines 29–33) because it is one of those victories that has provided the occasion for the ode. In *Pyth.* 8, finally, Aristomenes' early success at the Aeginetan Delphinia, which one might have ex-

pected to find relegated to the end of the catalogue with his other local (including Aeginetan) wins, is appended instead directly to his current triumph at Pytho (and thus precedes the passage at issue). An explanation lies ready to hand in that both were gained at festivals dedicated to Apollo Pythios/Delphinios.⁴

(2) In all three cases the specific object of the hope or wish expressed on behalf of the laudandus and/or his family, although readily comprehensible, is rather hinted at than directly stated. Thus while in *Ol.* 13.101–06 the phrase τὰ ἐσσόμενα, following as it does upon τὰ δ' Ὀλυμπία αὐτῶν, makes the laudator's prediction of further Olympic triumphs for the Oligaitidai perfectly intelligible, the absence of an infinitive to complete the sense of ἔλπομαι both leaves the precise nature of his "hopeful expectation" verbally unspecified and deprives the demonstrative τοῦτο of a concrete referent in the immediate context. Likewise in *Nem.* 10.29–33 it is not merely Theaios who refrains from explicitly naming the object of his passionate longing (an Olympic victory to complete his περίοδος); so too does the laudator, who however contrives to convey it unambiguously to his audience through his invocation of "father Zeus," his use of a rhetorical ploy ("I speak to those who know") that signals both the presence and the intelligibility of allusive or figurative speech,⁵ and his final aetiological gloss on the phrase ἐσχάτων ἀέθλων κορυφαῖς.⁶ That so marked a reticence of expression is found in two wishes for *Olympic* victory is presumably not a matter of simple coincidence but reflects instead the supreme importance of the Olympic games among Greek athletic festivals: where the stakes are highest and the risk of failure most daunting, there the need for a becoming modesty of approach is most pressing. In *Pyth.* 8.71f the similar inexplicitness evident in the laudator's request that the gods show "ungrudging regard" for the fortunes of the victor's father Xenarkes and his family (θεῶν δ' ὅπιν ἄφθονον αἰτέω,

⁴ For further discussion of this point see *infra* 476; cf. C. Carey, *CQ* n.s. 39 (1989) 293.

⁵ E.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 38f; Bacchyl. 3.85. Other functions include straightforward acknowledgement that what is about to be said is already known to the listener (e.g. *Il.* 1.365; *Pyth.* 4.142), appeal for sympathetic understanding (e.g. *Il.* 23.787f; Aesch. *Supp.* 742), and justification of the abbreviation or omission of a topic (e.g. *Il.* 10.249f; Thuc. 2.36.4).

⁶ Cf. Fennell 127.

Ξέναρκες, ὑμετέραις τύχαις)⁷ is likely to arise from the same cause, since the agonistic *cursus honorum* makes it probable that if further Panhellenic competition is being contemplated by the Πυθιονίκης and his family it is the Olympic games that they will have their eyes on (see Miller [*supra* n.3]). That there is precedent for such achievement in the family has been established earlier in the ode by the reference to Aristomenes' maternal uncle Theognetos (35f), an Olympic wrestler who earned the honor of an epigram by Simonides⁸ and whose importance as a rôle-model for his nephew is underscored both by the image of the youth "following in his footsteps" (35, ἰχνεύων) and by the principle of inherited ability that is illustrated in the myth that follows (*cf.* 44f, φυᾶ τὸ γενναῖον ἐπιπρέπει ἐκ πατέρων παισὶ λῆμα).

(3) In all three passages the hope or wish expressed by the laudator on behalf of the victor and/or his family gives rise to the pious reflection that man's ambitions necessarily depend upon divine power and favor for their fulfillment. This idea, which might be called the 'knees of the gods' *topos* after *Od.* 1.267 (ἀλλ' ἦ τοι μὲν ταῦτα θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται), is a common element in *Siegeswünsche* and takes several different forms. *Ol.* 13.104f and *Nem.* 10.29f exhibit the mode of direct statement (ἐν θεῶ γε μὰν τέλος ~ πᾶν δὲ τέλος ἐν τιν ἔργων), supplemented in the former case by a conditional clause predicating future success on the continuing influence and protection of a higher power (105, εἰ δὲ δαίμων γενέθλιος ἔρποι). In

⁷ W. J. Verdenius (*Mnemosyne* SER. IV 36 [1983] 368 n.1) argues on grounds of usage that θεῶν ὄπι must mean "respect" or "reverence" for the gods rather than the "care or favour" (LSJ), "Gunst" (Schroeder), or "regard" (Slater) of the gods. Although it is true that the noun governs an objective genitive in its only other undisputed occurrence in Pindar (*Ol.* 2.6, ὄπι δίκαιον ξένων), positing such a construction here raises problems with the adjective by which ὄπι is modified. With ὄπι = "respect" ἄφθονον (Schroeder, Bowra [*supra* n.2], Snell-Maehler, Kirkwood) clearly makes no sense at all; but ἄφθιτον (Fennell, Gildersleeve, Christ, Farnell, A. Puech, *Pindare* [Paris 1922-23], A. Turyn, *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis* [Cracow 1948 (repr. Oxford 1952)]), necessarily adopted by Verdenius, is scarcely more satisfactory. Says Verdenius: "a success, even if it is deserved, should not tempt a man to expect that he now will be master of his future, but he should never cease to reverence the gods (who may at any moment cause a reversal in his fortune)." To call even life-long reverence 'imperishable,' however, seems indecorously hyperbolic, since Pindar elsewhere restricts his use of that adjective to entities that are in literal fact immune to mortal transience and decay: deities (*Pyth.* 4.33, 291; *Isthm.* 8.41), divinized heroes (*Ol.* 1.63, 2.29), the Golden Fleece (*Pyth.* 4.230), and the *sperma* of Arcesilas' multi-generational lineage (*Pyth.* 4.42).

⁸ Simonides 30 in D. L. Page, *Epigrammata Graeca* (Oxford 1975).

Pyth. 8.76f a similarly direct statement of the idea (τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀνδράσι κεῖται· δαίμων δὲ παρίσχει)—an echo of *Od.* 1.267 may well be intended—undergoes considerable elaboration both fore and aft. On the one hand it is extended and developed in line 77 by another common *topos*, that of the gods' power to reverse human fortunes by bringing down the mighty and exalting the low,⁹ here appropriately couched in language that reflects Aristomenes' particular *métier* of wrestling: "But these things do not lie within men's power; it is the god who provides them, putting at different times one man on top and another beneath the hands [*sc.* of his opponent]."¹⁰ On the other hand, whereas in *Ol.* 13 and *Nem.* 10 the 'knees of the gods' *topos* follows directly upon the expression of hope for future success, in *Pyth.* 8 a sentence intervenes which purports to explain or justify (73, εἰ γάρ τις)¹¹ the laudator's prayer for the "regard of the gods": although¹² success achieved without long effort is

⁹ Cf. Hes. *Op.* 5f with references *ad loc.* in M. L. West, *Hesiod: Works and Days* (Oxford 1978) 139f.

¹⁰ Cf. Σ 108: ποτὲ μὲν ἄλλοτε ἄλλον ὑψηλὸν ποιῶν, ἄλλοτε δὲ ὑποχείριον ποιῶν καὶ οἰκτρὸν καὶ ταπεινόν; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (*Pindaros* [Berlin 1922] 442 n.3) sees a "Bild vom Ringkampf wegen des Siegers." To take βάλλων as 'placing' or 'putting' (LSJ *s.v.* A.ii.6; Taillardat 233; H. Lloyd-Jones, *ProcBritAc* 68 [1982] 161) rather than 'throwing' obviates the problems posed by a victorious wrestler who is tossed up into the air (cf. Farnell 198; Kirkwood 213). For καθύπερθεν εἶναι γίνεσθαι = 'be in a position of superiority over, get the better of' cf. Hdt. 1.67; 5.69; 8.19, 60, 136; for ὑποχείριος denoting helpless subjection to superior power cf. Theog. 363; Aesch. *Supp.* 392; Hdt. 1.106, 3.154, 5.91, 6.45; for the two locutions combined in a single sentence cf. Soph. *El.* 1090f, ζῶης μοι καθύπερθεν χειρὶ καὶ πλούτῳ τεῶν ἐχθρῶν ὅσον νῦν ὑπόχειρ ναίεις. In taking χειρῶν as the participle of χειρόω Taillardat attributes to the divinity of line 77—"mettant l'un (le vainqueur) au-dessus et, au-dessous, affaiblissant l'autre (le vaincu)"—activities that seem scarcely to accord with his conception of a δαίμων-βραβεύς (see n.52 *infra*).

¹¹ On the usage of γάρ that "gives the motive for saying that which has just been said" see J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford 1934) 60, and cf. Farnell 198, Lloyd-Jones (*supra* n.10) 161.

¹² Considerations of sense indicate that what 'explains' the prayer is not in fact the γάρ-sentence alone but the unit of thought formed by the linking of that sentence to the next through adversative δέ. Burton (187) accurately represents the logical relationship between the two clauses in his paraphrase: "Pindar warns the victor that *though* easy success may seem to many people to mark a man 'wise among fools' (v. 74), it is upon δαίμων that good fortune depends...." (emphasis added). Gildersleeve (332) makes the same point in a different way when he calls 73ff "mere foil to v. 76." For another example of γάρ ... δέ='for, although ... still....' cf. *Ol.* 8.23ff: Themis can be said to be pre-eminently cultivated on Aegina *because, although* (γάρ) scrupulous probity in commercial transactions is difficult to achieve, *nevertheless* (δέ) a divine

viewed by most people as an indication of the ability to manage one's life intelligently,¹³ nevertheless it remains true that success of any kind lies outside men's power to control (and thus must humbly be asked for). We must take it as axiomatic that lines 73ff are applicable to the case at hand only *per contrarium*: in view of his often-enunciated 'doctrine' of πόνος as a necessary (although not sufficient) condition of achievement,¹⁴ Pindar simply cannot intend the audience to understand that Aristomenes has won (or would even want to win) μὴ σὺν μακρῷ πόνῳ,¹⁵ and in fact within a few lines the laudator will be stressing the effort that Aristomenes expended in achieving his three victories at the Aeginetan Heraia (84, δάμασσας ἔργῳ; cf. Gildersleeve 332). Whatever mistaken views the πολλοί may hold about the matter, success, whether sought with toil or without it, cannot rationally be counted on by human beings; all they can do is to offer up their talents and their pains and leave the outcome to the gods. Such, Pindar implies, is Aristomenes' attitude: not merely "wise in the judgment of the many" but truly wise, under no illusion that he can achieve his aims solely through his own exertions and contrivings, he, like Theaios in *Nem.* 10, "asks for grace with a heart not unused to toil."

In summary, all three passages appear in the midst of victory-catalogues; in all three a hope for the future success of the laudandus and/or his family is articulated with marked inexplicitness and indirection of manner; in all three the fulfillment of that hope is said to rest entirely within the competence of divine power. If these parallels are sufficient to establish with fair probability that *Pyth.* 8.67–78, like *Ol.* 13.101–06 and *Nem.* 10.29–33, are intended to be understood as an Olympic *Sieges-*

ordinance has decreed that the Aeginetans should achieve it and thus be a source of support and protection to "strangers of all sorts."

¹³ The reasoning is *a fortiori*: if the simple fact of success can be regarded as evidence of intellectual acuity (for this *topos* cf. *Ol.* 5.16, εὐδὲ τυχόντες σοφοὶ καὶ πολίταις ἔδοξαν ἔμμεν; Eur. fr.1017, τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα καὶ φρονεῖν νομίζομεν; *Hipp.* 700f, εἰ δ' εὐ γ' ἔπραξα, κάρτ' ἂν ἐν σοφοῖσιν ἦ· πρὸς τὰς τύχας γὰρ τὰς φρένας κεκτήμεθα), then success gained with a minimum of effort is even more likely to impress the *vulgus* as constituting proof that one has truly mastered the business of living through the application of intelligent planning (ὀρθοβούλοισι μαχαναῖς).

¹⁴ See Slater *s.vv.* πόνος, μόχθος, κάματος.

¹⁵ So e.g. Schroeder 73, who refers to "den mühelos immerfort siegreichen jungen Ringer"; cf. Kirkwood 212.

wunsch,¹⁶ there are other elements in the passage that require some explication if the interpretation is to be successfully sustained throughout the passage as a whole. These are (1) the prayer concerning ἁρμονία (67ff), (2) the statement about “Justice standing beside the κῶμος” (70f), and (3) the final injunction μέτρῳ κατάβαιν’ (78).

(1) *The ἁρμονία-prayer*. The evidence of etymology and usage¹⁷ suggests that the idea which ἁρμονία is intended to convey in *Pyth.* 8.68, whether directly as an abstract-noun equivalent of the corresponding verb ἁρμόζειν (in its common sense of ‘befit, suit’)¹⁸ or, as is perhaps more probable, indirectly through a musical metaphor (the appropriate ‘fit’ of strings on a

¹⁶ M. R. Lefkowitz, *CJ* 72 (1977) 214, terms *Pyth.* 8.67ff a “prayer for continued success” without elaborating further on its specific content as such. See also n.55 *infra*.

¹⁷ A cursory survey of the protean uses of ἁρμονία reveals as an underlying (and etymologically original: see under ἄρ- in H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* [Heidelberg 1960]) semantic core the notion of the ‘joining’ or ‘fitting together’ of disparate elements; the musical sense (‘method of tuning, scale, mode’) that predominates from the fourth century onward—and that is borne by the word in its other occurrences as a common noun in Pindar (*Nem.* 4.45, fr.140b.2)—derives from this fundamental constant no less obviously than the apparently heterogeneous meanings attested for the word in the fifth century and earlier (e.g. ‘pact, covenant, agreement’ in *Il.* 22.255, ‘fastenings’ to keep a ship’s planks in place in *Od.* 5.248, 361, ‘cosmic order’ in Aesch. *PV* 551, ‘joint’ or ‘seam’ in a ship’s side in Hdt. 2.96, Ar. *Eq.* 533, and physiological/psychological ‘temperament’ in Eur. *Hipp.* 162). The same basic sense can be seen to underlie the various applications of the corresponding verb ἁρμόζειν (Attic ἁρμόττειν): meanings found before the fourth century include, in addition to the ‘adjusting’ or ‘tuning’ of lyre-strings (e.g. Ar. *Eq.* 989f), the ‘fitting’ of armor to the body (*Il.* 3.333, 17.210), the ‘joining’ of planks to build a raft (*Od.* 5.247), and the ‘matching’ of spouses in marriage (e.g. *Pyth.* 9.13, 117; Hdt. 9.108, 5.32). Used intransitively, ἁρμόττειν regularly means ‘suit, befit, be appropriate’, a usage especially frequent in fourth-century philosophical and rhetorical contexts (see Taillardat 229f), particularly in connection with the adequacy of verbal expression to subject matter (e.g. Pl. *Phdr.* 278D, *Thi.* 183B; Isoc. *Paneg.* 82, *Panath.* 225; Dem 21.166) and the suitability of particular topics or styles to particular circumstances (e.g. Isoc. *Panath.* 126, *Peace* 1, *Ant.* 10, 270; Dem. 24.4, 61.2), but found as well in fifth-century poetry (e.g. Soph. *Trach.* 731, *El.* 1293). The participle is used in this sense in *Pyth.* 4.129, ξείνι ἁρμόζοντα τεύχων (guest-gifts such as ‘fit’ the stature of the recipients and the nature of the occasion). Cf. also *Nem.* 1.21, ἐνθα μοι ἁρμόδιον δεῖπνον κεκόσμηται; *Ol.* 3.5: Δωρίῳ φωνὰν ἐναρμόξαι πεδίλῳ; *Isthm.* 1.16: ἢ Καστορεῖῳ ἢ Ἰολαίοι ἐναρμόξαι νιν ὕμνῳ.

¹⁸ So e.g. Taillardat 229: “depuis Homère, ἁρμονία joue le rôle de *nomen actionis* (et *rei actae*) répondant au verbe ἁρμόζειν/ἁρμόττειν: au sens concret, ἁρμονία est l’*ajustage*, au sens abstrait l’*adaptation*, l’*accord*, etc.”

lyre or notes in a scale),¹⁹ is ‘fittingness’ or ‘appropriateness’²⁰—in other words, precisely that notion of ‘what is proper, appropriate, just right’ that in archaic and classical Greek is regularly denominated *καιρός*.²¹ The many passages in Pindar’s odes in which *kairos* is invoked as a principle of rhetorical appropriateness (whether the ‘right amount’ of discourse on a particular topic, the ‘appropriate selection’ from among various topics, or ‘thematic relevance’ to the business at hand)²² may seem to offer *prima facie* support to the commonly held view that in *Pyth.* 8.67ff the laudator is asking Apollo for assistance in

¹⁹ Cf. Hubbard 288; Kirkwood 211. It is difficult to imagine how an audience could fail to think of the word’s musical associations when it appears as part of a prayer to Apollo, the patron deity of music (and specifically of lyre-playing).

²⁰ Such, in essence, is the conclusion of Taillardat 230f and of Hubbard 288f, although they differ in regard to the semantic derivation and specific application of the ‘fittingness’ involved. The latter sees *ἁρμονία* in *Pyth.* 8.68 as a musical metaphor for “the principle of propriety in transition”; the former argues that it anticipates the later rhetorical sense of *ἁρμόττειν* and denotes “l’ajustement des propos à la vérité.”

²¹ The formulation is that of W. S. Barrett, *Euripides: Hippolytus* (Oxford 1964) 231, who makes the important observation that “the temporal ‘right time’ which predominates in later Greek is clearly not original, and in the fifth century is only one application among many.” The many applications of the word are usefully surveyed by J. R. Wilson, *Glotta* 58 (1980) 177–204; W. H. Race, *TAPA* 111 (1981) 197–213. If Jebb’s suppletion in line 16 (termed “sicher” by Maehler [*supra* n.3] II 299) is in fact correct, *καιρός* is found in close association with the *ἄρμο-* in Bacchyl. 14.12–17:

οὔτ’ ἐῖν βαρυπενθέσιν ἄρμό-
ζει μάχαις φόρμιγγος ὀμφᾶ
καὶ λιγυκλαγγεῖς χοροί,
οὔτ’ ἐῖν θαλίαις καναχᾶ
χαλκ]όκτυπος· ἄλλ’ ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ
καιρός] ἀνδρῶν ἔργματι κάλ-
λιστος.

As the logical signposts οὔτ’ ... οὔτ’ ... ἄλλ’ make clear, the idea which in the first sentence is expressed negatively and concretely, namely the suitability (or rather *unsuitability*) of particular activities to particular situations, is in the final sentence restated in positive and general terms as a proposition about the pre-eminent value of ‘what is proper, appropriate, just right’ in human life. (Maehler paraphrases: “Das Wichtigste bei jedem Tun ist, daß es passend, den Umständen angemessen sei; wie wichtig oder wertvoll eine Tätigkeit ist, bemißt sich danach, wie dringend sie in einer bestimmten Situation gebraucht wird....”) The common semantic ground that enables Bacchylides to use *καιρός* in his explanatory gloss on *ἁρμόζει* conversely allows Pindar to use *ἁρμονία*, the literal sense of which is ‘fittingness’, as an apt and expressive alternative to *καιρός*.

²² Cf. *Ol.* 9.38, 13.48; *Pyth.* 1.81, 9.78, 10.4; *Nem.* 1.18.

the proper discharging of his encomiastic duties,²³ particularly since *Pyth.* 9.89af (Χαρίτων κελαδεννᾶν μή με λίποι καθαρὸν φέγγος) can be cited as a parallel for the momentary interruption of a victory-catalogue by a prayer for poetic inspiration.²⁴ Examined in its larger context, however, the ostensible parallel of *Pyth.* 9.89af in fact tells *against* this view of the function of lines 67ff, for whereas both the unusual length and the great elaboration and variety of treatment²⁵ that characterize the victory-catalogue in *Pyth.* 9.76–103 provide verisimilar motivation for an appeal to the Graces as patrons and purveyors of rhetorical skill, there is little either in Aristomenes' modest roster of achievements or in the way in which they are reported that seems particularly challenging and thus plausibly deserving of divine aid.

An additional and even more decisive objection to taking lines 67ff as a programmatic utterance by the laudator *in propria persona* arises from their formal relationship with the preceding sentence: taken together, lines 61–69 constitute a fully developed specimen of the traditional 'cult hymn' or εὐχή so abundantly exemplified in the Homeric epics.²⁶ The fundamental purpose of such *euchai* is to persuade a god to grant some specific favor or to take some specific action on the speaker's behalf (or on behalf of others with whom the speaker is closely associated). Of the three parts into which the *euche* is normally divisible the first, the *invocation*, solicits the god's attention and propitiates him by alluding, through epithets or more complex syntactical structures, to his powers and prerogatives; the second, the *hypomnesis* or 'reminder', advances a claim upon the god's consideration by recalling a previous occasion (or occasions) on which devotion was displayed by the one party and/or assistance rendered by the other; and the third is the actual *request* for which the invocation and hypomnesis have been persuasive preparation. If we compare *Pyth.* 8.61–69

²³ E.g. (with various differences in detail) Σ 95a; Fennell 242; Gildersleeve 331; Schroeder 74; W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion* (Halle 1928) 288; Burton 186; Hubbard 289f; D. S. Carne-Ross, *Pindar* (New Haven 1985) 180; Taillardat 230f.

²⁴ On these lines see E. L. Bundy, "The Quarrel between Kallimachos and Apollonios," *CSCA* 5 (1972) 79.

²⁵ As noted by Bundy 17f, the latter qualities are programmatically announced in 77f, βαιὰ δ' ἐν μακροῖσι ποικίλλειν ἀκοὰ σοφοῖς.

²⁶ E.g. *Il.* 1.37–42, 451–56; 5.115–20; 10.284–94; 15.372–76; 16.233–48; *Od.* 2.262–66; 4.762–66; 17.240–46. For a fuller discussion of the 'cult hymn' and its formal features see A. M. Miller, *From Delos to Delphi: a Literary Study of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (*Mnemosyne* Suppl. 93 [Leiden 1986]) 1–4.

with, for example, Achilles' prayer to Zeus in *Il.* 16.233ff, we find that the passages exhibit not only the same basic tripartite structure but also various similarities of detail in the way that structure is realized.

Ζεῦ ἄνα, Δωδωναίε, Πελασγικέ, τηλόθι ναίων,
 Δωδώνης μεδέων δυσχειμέρου· ἀμφὶ δὲ Σελλοὶ
 235 σοὶ ναίουσ' ὑποφῆται, ἀνιπτόποδες χαμαιεῦναι·
 ἡμὲν δὴ ποτ' ἐμὸν ἔπος ἔκλυες εὐξαμένοιο,
 τίμησας μὲν ἐμέ, μέγα δ' ἴψαο λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν,
 ἥδ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν μοι τόδ' ἐπικρήηνον ἐέλδωρ·
 αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ μενέω νηῶν ἐν ἀγῶνι,
 240 ἀλλ' ἔταρον πέμπω πολέσιν μετὰ Μυρμιδόνεσσι
 μάρνασθαι· τῷ κῦδος ἅμα πρόες, εὐρύοπα Ζεῦ,
 θάρσυνον δὲ οἱ ἦτορ ἐνὶ φρεσίν....

The first three lines of each passage constitute the invocation, which in each case exhibits such typical features as cult-titles (Δωδωναίε, Πελασγικέ ~ Ἐκαταβόλε), participial attributes (τηλόθι ναίων ~ πάνδοκον ναὸν εὐκλέα διανέμων), and cult-loci (Δωδώνης μεδέων δυσχειμέρου ~ Πυθῶνος ἐν γυάλοις). Although *hypomneses* are frequently cast in the form of a conditional protasis ("if ever in the past") to which the request is the apodotic conclusion ("then on the present occasion also"), in both *Il.* 16.236f and *Pyth.* 8.64ff an alternative form is adopted whereby the statement of past favors is syntactically coordinated with the request (by ἡμὲν ... ἡδέ in *Il.* 16, by δὲ alone in *Pyth.* 8) instead of being subordinated to it. Each *hypomnesis* is in addition internally articulated by a μὲν/δέ construction, contrasting two different perspectives on the same action in *Il.* 16.237 and two separate acts of divine favor, present and past, in *Pyth.* 8.64ff. Although the request is much longer and more complicated in Achilles' prayer than in *Pyth.* 8.67f (less than half of it is quoted above), in each case its introduction is accompanied by a renewed apostrophe (εὐρύοπα Ζεῦ ~ ὦναξ) that serves to bind the final section of the prayer to its beginning.²⁷

Considerations of generic form thus dictate that *Pyth.* 8.67ff cannot be detached from the preceding six lines, of which they form the conclusion and climax. Since the prayer as a rhetorical structure is in essence an argument that builds from propitiation of the divinity, through the establishment of a prior claim upon him, to the lodging of a request which that claim justifies, the

²⁷ For other examples of renewed apostrophe in the request section of an *euche* cf. *Il.* 16.523, ἄναξ, τόδε καρτερὸν ἔλκος ἄκεσσαι; *Od.* 5.450, ἀλλ' ἐλέαιρε, ἄναξ; *Il.* 5.117, 10.280, 15.375.

logic of the form necessarily breaks down if the person on whose behalf the request is made is not the same as (or at least closely related to)²⁸ the person whose claim on the god's consideration the *hypomnesis* establishes. Precisely such a rhetorical *non sequitur* results if lines 67ff are understood as expressing the laudator's desire for divine assistance in discharging his poetic responsibilities, a desire on which the favor hitherto shown by Apollo to Aristomenes at the Pythian and Delphinian games can have no possible bearing. What the structure of argument inherent in the prayer-form requires is that the request in lines 67ff, although formulated in the first person, should in fact pertain to Aristomenes—a circumstance for which there is ample precedent elsewhere in the Pindaric corpus in the phenomenon of the so-called first-person indefinite.

According to this rhetorical convention the 'I' whose utterance an epinician purports to be may on occasion espouse a view, declare an intention, or express a desire not in his personal rôle as commissioned encomiast but as a generalized spokesman for all right-thinking persons, including—most notably and relevantly—the victor.²⁹ Relatively extensive examples of this convention can be found in *Pyth.* 3.107ff, commending flexible adaptation to changing circumstances and the use of wealth as a means of securing fame, and in *Pyth.* 11.50ff, commending a life of moderation and devotion to public good; the first sentence of the latter passage (θεόθεν ἐραίμιαν καλῶν, δυνατὰ μαιόμενος ἐν ἀλικίᾳ) is of particular relevance to our passage in that it too takes the form of a prayer or wish.³⁰ The replacement of the simple optative of wish found in *Pyth.* 11.51 by the more formal and ceremonious εὔχομαι + infinitive in *Pyth.* 8.67ff is not only in perfect keeping with the solemnity of tone established by the 'hymnal' invocation in 61ff but also explicitly designates the generic identity of the formal structure

²⁸ Thus in *Il.* 10.284–94 (*cf.* 5.115ff) Diomedes lays claim to Athena's protection on the basis of the assistance given by her to his father Tydeus during the Expedition of the Seven.

²⁹ *Cf.* D. C. Young, *Three Odes of Pindar* (Leiden 1968) 12–15, 58–61, and *Pindar Isthmian 7, Myth and Exempla* (Leiden 1971) 10f; also T. K. Hubbard, *The Pindaric Mind: a Study of Logical Structure in Early Greek Poetry* (Leiden 1985) 145–48. Examples in addition to *Pyth.* 3.107ff and 11.50ff include *Ol.* 3.45, *Nem.* 1.31f, *Isthm.* 7.40ff, and at least some of the first persons in the final triad of *Pyth.* 2, on which see H. Lloyd-Jones, *JHS* 93 (1973) 124f; R. Stoneman, *CQ* n.s. 34 (1984) 46f.

³⁰ With *Pyth.* 11.50, *cf. e.g.* *Pyth.* 2.83, φίλον εἶη φιλεῖν (=χρῆ φιλεῖν τὸν φίλον).

(εὐχή) of which the lines constitute the climax. It should also be noted how the omission of third-person pronouns in lines 64ff—Aristomenes is only *implied* as the indirect object of ὤπασας and ἐπάγαγες—ensures that there is no jarring juxtaposition of ‘he’ and ‘I’ within the prayer.³¹

For the most part the syntactical ambiguities with which lines 67ff are rife do not materially affect their force as a first-person indefinite utterance.³² Whether ἐκόντι ... νόω is to be construed with εὔχομαι (“with full willingness I pray”) or with βλέπειν (“I pray that with full willingness”),³³ whether κατά τιν’ ἀρμονίαν is to be taken as a prepositional phrase modifying βλέπειν used absolutely (“to look in accordance with a kind of *harmonia*”),³⁴ or τιν’ ἀρμονίαν serves as the direct object of κατὰ ... βλέπειν in tmesis (“to keep my gaze fixed on a sort of *harmonia*”),³⁵ or τιν’

³¹ The lack of any specific mention of Aristomenes in 64ff is emphasized (although interpreted differently) by E. D. Floyd, *GRBS* 6 (1965) 195f. It may be objected that the ‘I’ of εὔχομαι and νέομαι cannot be indefinite when that of αἰτέω three lines later clearly refers—and only can refer—to the laudator *in propria persona*; but cf. *Nem.* 1.30ff, where the indefinite οὐκ ἔραμαι πολὺν ἐν μεγάρω πλοῦτον κατακρύψαις ἔχειν (expressing what is—or at least should be—Chromios’ own *proairesis*) is followed within two lines by the encomiastic ἐγὼ δ’ Ἡρακλέος ἀντέχομαι προφρόνως.

³² The one point of controversy that does affect the overall meaning of the prayer is whether ‘I’ or ‘Apollo’ is to be understood as the subject of (κατα)βλέπειν. Hubbard (286) lists numerous proponents of Apollo, to whose number should be added Lloyd-Jones (*supra* n.10) 161 and Verdenius (*supra* n.7) 367f (the latter responding to Hubbard). Among those favoring the laudator are, besides Hubbard, Mezger 406; Christ 199; Fraccaroli 138 n.2; Gildersleeve 331; Fennell 242; J. Sandys, *The Odes of Pindar*² (London 1919) 265; Farnell 196; J. H. Finley, *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge [Mass.] 1955) 172; G. Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley 1945) 82; C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford 1964) 400; and Kirkwood 211. I am firmly convinced that the general rule about the unexpressed subject of an infinitive (Smyth-Messing §1973) applies in this case (on *Ol.* 8.86, the counter-example alleged by Burton 186, see Hubbard 287 n.3).

³³ The former may be suggested by its position surrounding εὔχομαι (so Hubbard 287); the latter would be paralleled by *Pyth.* 5.43f, ἐκόντι τοίνυν πρέπει νόω τὸν εὐεργέταν ὑπαντιάσαι, where the identical phrase has been detached from the verb it modifies (ὑπαντιάσαι) and advanced to the beginning of the sentence for reasons of emphasis.

³⁴ Among those who espouse or incline toward the absolute use are Farnell 197; Finley (*supra* n.32) 172; Kirkwood 211; Lloyd-Jones (*supra* n.10) 161; Hubbard 288; Slater *s.v.* (although under κατά 2.b.α he raises the possibility of tmesis). Farnell (followed by Finley) reads τίν in place of τιν’, construing it as a dative governed by the sense of ἀρμονίαν (“in harmony with thee”).

³⁵ E.g. Gildersleeve 331; Mezger 406 (though like Farnell he reads τιν’ as τίν and construes it as dependent on ἀρμονίαν), Sandys (*supra* n.32) 265; Schroeder 73; Burton 185; Bowra (*supra* n.32) 400; Taillardat 228. It should be noted

is in fact τίν, a second-person accusative pronoun dependent on κατά, while βλέπειν governs ἁρμονίαν as its direct object (“to observe *harmonia* in accordance with you”),³⁶ the whole-hearted espousal of ‘fittingness’ by the generalizing ‘I’ remains both an emphatic affirmation of its value and importance as a guiding principle in human life and an emphatic recommendation that that value and importance continue to be perceived by Aristomenes.³⁷ The phrase that defines the sphere within which the principle of appropriateness is to be operative, ἀμφ’ ἕκαστον ὅσα νέομαι, has close parallels in such *gnomai* on *kairos* as Hes. *Op.* 694 (καίρως δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος), Theog. 401f (καίρως δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος ἔργασιν ἀνθρώπων), Bacchyl. 14.16ff (ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ [καίρως] ἀνδρῶν ἔργατι κάλλιστος), and *Ol.* 13.47f (ἔπεται δ’ ἐν ἐκάστῳ μέτρον· νοῆσαι δὲ καίρως ἄριστος). Of course ἀμφ’ ἕκαστον ὅσα νέομαι differs from the other phrases in being ostensibly limited to the speaker’s own case (“ostensibly” because, as we have seen, the first-person indefinite has general applicability) and—more importantly, as we shall see

that according to LSJ καταβλέπειν is not otherwise attested before the time of Callimachus (*Del.* 303).

³⁶ So Fraccaroli 138 n.2: “io mi auguro ... di essere d’accordo giusta il tuo volere con animo pronto”; and Norwood (*supra* n.32) 237 n.42: “I pray that with willing heart under thy guidance I may see things in true perspective.” More is said about this line of interpretation in n.46 *infra*. Both Fraccaroli and Norwood take ἁρμονίαν as an internal object of βλέπειν on the analogy of e.g. *Ol.* 9.111, ὀρῶντ’ ἀλκάν; *Nem.* 4.39, φθονερά βλέπων. Although Norwood is quite right to reject Farnell’s assertion (197) that the construction of a verb of seeing + inner accusative is necessarily “comic” in its associations, his paraphrase fails to account for the normal force of the idiom whereby ὀρῶντ’ ἀλκάν=‘projecting a look/image of courage.’ In fact there is no difficulty in having βλέπειν govern an accusative of external object in the sense “look at, observe, heed, pay attention to”; cf. *Isthm.* 8.12f, τὸ δὲ πρὸ ποδὸς ἄρειον αἰεὶ βλέπειν χρῆμα πάν, and see Slater *s.v.* Fennell 242 adopts this interpretation of ἁρμονίαν βλέπειν while evidently reading τιν’ as a masculine pronoun: “I pray that I may be regarding due proportion according to anyone’s merits.”

³⁷ That the prayer has an applicability beyond the speaker seems to be implied by Fraccaroli’s remark that the poet prays “più urbanamente in persona propria, come tante altre volte, di conservarsi sempre riverente verso la Divinità” (138); certainly Fraccaroli makes it clear by his comments on e.g. *Nem.* 1.31f (204f) and *Isthm.* 7.40ff (399) that he is well aware of the phenomenon of the first-person indefinite. Explicit in asserting general applicability are Mezger 406, who observes, “Was der Dichter hier zunächst von sich sagt, will er ... als eine allgemein gültige Ermahnung beherzigt wissen,” and Kirkwood 211: “The ‘I’ here [in 67ff] is not only personal; all men, P. implies, should want to accommodate themselves, with good will, to the restraint and order which the Apolline spirit symbolizes, and which Dike, who attends on Aristomenes’ victory celebration (70–71), also typifies.”

shortly—in implying a temporal sequentiality in the ἕκαστα at issue (“as many things as, *one after another*, I come to”). The key rôle played by the verb of perception in the sentence, finally, is paralleled not only by *Ol.* 13.48 (νοῆσαι δὲ καιρὸς ἄριστος) but by other gnomic endorsements of appropriate behavior such as *Isthm.* 8.12ff (τὸ δὲ πρὸ ποδὸς ἄρειον αἰεὶ βλέπειν χρῆμα πᾶν) and *Pyth.* 2.34 (χρῆ δὲ κατ’ αὐτὸν αἰεὶ παντὸς ὄρᾶν μέτρον).

The question of function, however, still remains. What is it that makes the perception of ‘fittingness’ so important to a victorious athlete that the laudator should lodge a petition for it on Aristomenes’ behalf and (as it were) in Aristomenes’ name, and why should the petition be addressed not just to Apollo but specifically to Delphic Apollo, “presiding over the famous all-welcoming temple in the hollows of Pytho”? The answer to the first of these questions lies in the world-view that informs the epinician genre. According to that world-view the moral and psychological position of a successful athlete is fraught with risk precisely because he *is* successful; like material abundance, continued success tempts those who enjoy it to overestimate their innate powers and virtues and to claim personal credit for what is in fact theirs only by grace of god. In the terminology of the early Greek ethical tradition, ὄλβος (prosperity) tends to give rise to κόρος (satiety, excess), which in turn is apt to lead to ὕβρις (insolence, reckless arrogance) and ἄτη (moral blindness, ruin), a sequence that Pindar vividly embodies in such cautionary figures as Ixion and Tantalus.³⁸ An athlete who turns from present victory to the prospect of renewed competition faces the spiritual challenge of allowing both his justifiable self-confidence and his as yet unsatisfied ambition to be chastened and tempered by recognition of human limitations.³⁹ Such self-awareness, or ‘existential modesty’, is enjoined upon humanity by the principle of *kairos* in its largest application, where the criterion by which appropriate thought and behavior are judged is the fact of morality itself. Thus in *Ol.* 13.47f, for example, the

³⁸ Note especially *Pyth.* 2.26, μακρὸν οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν ὄλβον, 28, ἀλλὰ νιν ὕβρις εἰς ἀνάταν ὑπεράφανον ὤρσεν (of Ixion); *Ol.* 1.55ff, καταπέσαι μέγαν ὄλβον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, κόρω δ’ ἔλεν ἄταν ὑπέροπλον (of Tantalus).

³⁹ The ethical force of the *ne plus ultra* theme in both its manifestations, the ‘horizontal’ (e.g. *Ol.* 3.43f; *Nem.* 3.20f; *Isthm.* 4.11f: the Pillars of Heracles) and the ‘vertical’ (e.g. *Ol.* 5.24; *Pyth.* 10.27ff; *Isthm.* 5.14ff, 7.43–48: we cannot get to heaven, do not try to be a god), is precisely to enjoin such existential modesty (despite Thummer’s desire to divest the motif of all but encomiastic force: see *Die Isthmischen Gedichte* [Heidelberg 1968] I 77f; II 66f, 88).

“measure” that “attends in everything” (ἔπεται δ’ ἐν ἐκάστῳ μέτρον) and the “appropriateness” that is “best to perceive” (νοῆσαι δὲ καιρὸς ἄριστος) are not only principles of rhetorical decorum that justify the laudator’s curtailing of the preceding victory-catalogue (lines 29–46) but also moral imperatives built into the conditions of human existence—imperatives which Bellerophon, in the ode’s central paradigmatic narrative, first heeds (to his glory) and then disregards (to his grief).⁴⁰ The cautionary implications of his ultimate fate, only hinted at in *Ol.* 13 by the speaker’s refusal to pursue the topic (91, διασωπάσομαί οἱ μόρον ἐγώ), become in *Isthm.* 7.43–48 the *raison d’être* of the mythical allusion, which is intended to illustrate the “bitter end” that is in store for those mortals who forget, as they “gaze intently into the distance,” that they are “too puny to reach the bronze-floored abode of the gods.” Bellerophon’s desire to join the ὀμάγουρις Ζηνός violates the principle of appropriateness which, in dictating that “mortal things befit mortals” (*Isthm.* 5.16, θνατὰ θνατοῖσι πρέπει), also forbids human beings to “seek to become Zeus” (*Isthm.* 5.14, μὴ μάτευε Ζεὺς γενέσθαι).⁴¹ The ‘fittingness’ that it behooves Aristomenes to observe in his hour of victory is precisely such mortal propriety.

To the second question—why it is Delphic Apollo to whom Pindar implicitly refers the athlete for guidance in his moment of triumph—two answers present themselves, one specific to Aristomenes’ personal situation and the other arising from Apollo’s general nature. On the one hand, the neat bracketing of present and past by the μέν/δέ construction in lines 64ff suggests that what might have been viewed as a matter of simple coincidence—the fact, namely, that the current Πυθιο-νίκης in wrestling won an earlier victory as a pentathlete at the Aeginetan Delphinia—is evidence instead of a special and enduring relationship between Aristomenes and Apollo Pythios/Delphinios. And it can naturally be assumed that a god who has already shown such benevolent concern for his protégé’s agonistic career, conferring his blessing on its early and purely local stages and then lifting it to its present peak of Panhellenic

⁴⁰ Cf. T. K. Hubbard, *HSCP* 90 (1986) 27–48, esp. 36–43.

⁴¹ For the relation of appropriateness to self-knowledge and respect for limit cf. also *Pyth.* 3.59f, χρῆ τὰ εἰκότα παρ δαιμόνων μαστευόμεν θναταῖς φρασίν γνόντα τὸ παρ ποδός, οἶας εἰμὲν αἴσας. It is interesting to note, in light of *Pyth.* 8.68 (ἁρμονίαν βλέπειν), that τὰ εἰκότα is glossed as τὰ ἀρμόζοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις by the scholiast, who remarks that the sentence as a whole is ὁμοίον τῷ Χίλωνος ἀποφθέγματι τῷ Γνώθι σαυτόν.

glory, will have an interest in seeing to it that the protégé maintain the requisite attitude toward his own success that will permit the continuance of his good fortune into the future. On the other hand, it is Apollo—above all, Apollo as worshipped in the oracular cult at Delphi—who of all the members of the Olympian pantheon is most intimately and characteristically associated with the ideas of self-knowledge (γνώθι σαυτόν) and moderation (μηδὲν ἄγαν), and a god whose “all-welcoming temple” bore gnomic commendations of mortal propriety inscribed on its walls⁴² is precisely the power whom it is reasonable to invoke on behalf of any human being anxious to comport himself with with all due modesty and circumspection in his hour of triumph.⁴³ Thus when the laudator, speaking in his generic guise as Everyman, prays to Apollo that he may “observe fittingness in each thing as I come to it,” he is vicariously expressing the victor’s readiness *on two counts* to recognize that each step in his unfolding career is not something to which he can lay arrogant claim as his own unaided exploit but is instead a gift of grace (65, ὤπασας, δόσιν) freely bestowed by a higher power.

⁴² On the Delphic maxims and their significance for Apolline ethics see T. Dempsey, *The Delphic Oracle, its Early History, Influence and Fall* (Oxford 1918) 140–43; E. G. Wilkins, *The Delphic Maxims in Literature* (Chicago 1956) 19–24, 49–73; H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, *A History of the Delphic Oracle I* (Oxford 1956) 387ff.

⁴³ In view of the importance of self-knowledge and self-control in Apolline ethics, the interpretation of line 68 put forward by Fraccaroli and Norwood (see *supra* n.36) would seem to merit serious consideration. An obvious objection to reading κατὰ τιν’ as κατὰ τὴν (or, as Fraccaroli prints it, κατὰ τιν) is that elsewhere in Pindar’s odes that form of the second-person pronoun is always dative, not accusative (cf. e.g. Burton 185); on the other hand, the usage is attested for his fellow Boeotian (and possible contemporary) Corinna (10 L.–P.) and appears also in Theocritus (*Id.* 11.39, 55, 68) and Cercidas (7.6 Powell). The force of κατὰ in the prepositional phrase would be similar to that found in *Ol.* 9.27f, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ δαίμον’ ἄνδρες ἐγένοντ’, where “men become courageous and wise *in accordance with* divinity” (so Slater *s.v.* 2.b.α) must mean, in effect, “in accordance with *the will/decreed/dispensation of* divinity” (cf. Farnell 69). Plato in particular offers numerous examples of κατὰ + the accusative of a person to convey the sense “according to what X says/believes,” “in accordance with X’s doctrines/precepts/instructions” (e.g. *Phlb.* 57D, *Resp.* 334B, *Cra.* 401D); in Ast’s lexicon such passages are listed under the gloss “ut ait, ponit vel praecipit.” The two instances of closest relevance to *Pyth.* 8.68 are found in the *Apology*, where Socrates speaks of conducting his investigation “in accordance with the god” (22A, ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν; 23B, περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν); here Ast’s gloss “deo praecipiente vel iubente” accurately captures the force of the phrase and suggests the route by which Norwood arrived at “under your guidance” (=“following your precepts”) as a rendering of κατὰ τίν.

(2) *Δίκη*. Yet it would be wrong to draw from lines 67ff the conclusion that Aristomenes has *not* shown due regard for ‘fittingness’ up to this point and thus must now be tactfully urged to begin doing so. Not only is it unthinkable on general grounds that Pindar should intend to suggest that a patron’s conduct had fallen short of proper standards, but the idea is directly contradicted by the implications of the sentence that follows. In the context established by the preceding prayer—by which I mean not simply lines 67ff but the entire tripartite *euche* from line 61 on—and given the close logical connection with that prayer signaled by the asyndeton in line 70,⁴⁴ the *komos* at issue in *κῶμος μὲν ἀδυμελεῖ Δίκη παρέστακε* must not be the ode itself as performed by its band of singers⁴⁵ so much as it is the victory-revel proper, that spontaneous outpouring of merriment and jubilation through which the athlete and his friends do honor to the happy event, that εὐφροσύνα or ‘cheerfulness of mind’ which, enhanced by the wine-bowl, “sweet spokesman of the *komos*” (*Nem.* 9.50), is the “best physican of toils brought successfully to decision” (*Nem.* 4.1f).⁴⁶ Since it is the

⁴⁴ On asyndeton of the explanatory type see Smyth-Messing §2167b. Schadewaldt (*supra* n.23: 288) conveys the force in his paraphrase: “du darfst es auch, denn diesem Komos ist Dike gesellt” (emphasis added). Although the conventional tripartite prayer-form with which the third triad of *Pyth.* 8 begins comes to its conclusion with the ‘request’ of lines 67ff, the train of thought continues without a break in the lines that follow: the εὐχή of 61–69 is, after all, not an independent entity but merely one phase in the unfolding argument that makes up the ode.

⁴⁵ The usual view, from the scholiast (99b: δικαίως κωμάζεται ὁ Ἀριστομένης καὶ ἐπιτηδείως· ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ἐστὶ) onward; it has most recently been advanced by A. Burnett, *CP* 84 (1989) 292. Of course the word κῶμος frequently does bear this meaning, often while accompanied by a form of ὄδε (e.g. *Ol.* 4.9, 8.10, 14.16; *Pyth.* 5.22); see, in addition to Burnett, C. Carey, *AJP* 110 (1989) 548f. Moreover, *δίκη* is amply attested as denoting encomiastic equity, the just matching of word to deed; cf. *Ol.* 2.96, 6.12; *Pyth.* 9.96; *Nem.* 3.29, 7.48; Bacchyl. 11.123, 13.202, and see Bundy 61; H. Gundert, *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* (Frankfurt a. M. 1935) 65, 67f.

⁴⁶ On the *komos* as victory-revel see now M. Heath, *AJP* 109 (1988) 180–95; his attempt to demonstrate that as used by Pindar the word *always* denotes a “festive procession” quite distinct from the formal ode has been persuasively rebutted by Burnett and Carey (see previous note). On passages in which victory-revel and formal ode are explicitly contrasted (e.g. *Ol.* 9.1ff; *Nem.* 4.1ff, 9.48ff; *Isthm.* 8.1ff), see Bundy 2, 11, 22f. In *Pyth.* 8.18ff the reference to Apollo “receiving Xenarkes’ son from Kirrha” makes it clear that Δωριεῖ κῶμος must signify an impromptu victory-procession mounted by the athlete’s friends at Delphi (cf. Wilamowitz [*supra* n.10] 440; Schroeder 69f; Burton 180) rather than the group of young men who are presently performing the ode on Aegina. The presence of ἀδυμελεῖ in *Pyth.* 8.70 poses no obstacle to under-

victor who, in his rôle as “master of the *komos*” (*Ol.* 6.18), must set the tone for the proceedings, the presence of “Righteousness” at this particular celebration necessarily reflects credit on Aristomenes’ character;⁴⁷ specifically, it signals his aversion to and rejection of that uncontrolled and arrogant self-assertion, whether directed against one’s fellows or against the powers and conditions that govern human life, to which the Greeks gave the name *hybris*.

The *dike/hybris* antithesis is found as early as the *Odyssey*⁴⁸ and persists throughout archaic poetry.⁴⁹ The contexts in which it is operative are various. In a civic or political context (and thus regularly in such poets as Hesiod, Solon, and Theognis) *dike* denotes respect for established principles of equity, and *hybris* the sort of self-aggrandizement that ignores the rights of others and the common good. In the context of the symposium, which ideally reproduces in miniature the social harmony of a well-ordered *polis*, Dike and her two sister Horai, Eunomia and Eirene, are the presiding powers through whom the *hybris* of excessive drinking, unruly behavior, and physical violence is banished.⁵⁰ These two contexts, the political and the sympotic, are found implicitly linked in the final triad of *Pyth.* 4, where Damophilos’ “righteous mind” (280f, δικαϊᾶν ... πραπίδων) is manifest in, among other things, his rejection of *hybris* against the established social order (284f, ἔμαθε δ’ ὑβρίζοντα μισεῖν, οὐκ ἐρίζων ἀντία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς) and his desire to partake of the peaceful joys of the symposium with his fellow Cyrenaean (294–97, συμποσίας ἐφέπων ... ἡσυχία θιγέμεν). In *Isthm.* 7.47f, finally, where the fate of the overreacher Bellerophon provokes the gnomic comment τὸ δὲ πὰρ δίκαν γλυκὺ πικροτάτα μένει τελευτά, *dike* is implicitly opposed to *hybris* in its largest existential sense of presumption toward the gods.

standing the *komos* as Aristomenes’ victory-revel; for song as an element of such festivities, cf. *Nem.* 9.49, θαρσαλέα δὲ παρὰ κρατῆρα φωνὰ γίνεται, and the Ἀρχιλόχου μέλος that accompanies Epharmentos’ victory-procession in *Ol.* 9.1ff.

⁴⁷ Cf. Kirkwood 211: “Apolline καιρός and the Dike that characterizes Aegina are part of Aristomenes’ nature.” Burton (186) also discerns that the function of the reference to Dika is at least in part to characterize Aristomenes: “it is not only the poet’s point of view that is here in question: Δίκη attends also upon the victor.”

⁴⁸ *Od.* 6.120 (=9.175, 13.201), ὑβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι.

⁴⁹ Cf. Hes. *Op.* 213 and the references cited by West (*supra* n.9) *ad loc.*, to which add Theog. 44f; Solon 4.7f, 33ff; 13.7ff.

⁵⁰ See W. J. Slater, *ICS* 6 (1981) 205–14.

It is likely that the allusion to the presence of Dika at Aristomenes' *komos* is intended to draw upon this entire complex of ideas. In his hour of triumph Aristomenes has neither violated festal decorum by unrestrained elation, nor insulted his townsmen with insolent swagger, nor entertained thoughts of "becoming Zeus," but has instead exhibited a modesty and circumspection that do fitting honor to his divine patron. In praying for, and thus commending, an ever vigilant regard for 'fittingness' in each and every situation that unfolds, the laudator is speaking of something that the victor already possesses and that he confidently expects him to continue to exhibit. Moreover, implicit in the antithesis set up by the μέν/δέ construction in lines 70ff—"Thus and such, as reflected in his victory-revel, has been *Aristomenes*' behavior on the present occasion; may thus and such be the *gods*' response in future"—is the thought that the righteousness of Aristomenes' attitude and conduct hitherto provides ground for hope that the laudator's request for the gods' "unbegrudged regard" in the sphere of athletic competition will be heeded.⁵¹

(3) μέτρῳ κατάβαιν'.⁵² Short as it is, the clause with which our

⁵¹ One might compare *Ol.* 4.12ff, where the general prayer, θεὸς εὐφρων εἴη λοιπαῖς εὐχαῖς, is grounded (ἐπεὶ) in praise of the victor's ἵπποτροφία, φιλοξενία, and devotion to civic tranquillity. Although both Fraccaroli and Gundert see in κῶμῳ a reference to the ode rather than to Aristomenes' victory-revel, each succeeds in capturing the force of the μέν/δέ construction in his paraphrase: "il poeta inserisce una ... preghiera ... che la protezione degli Dei si mantenga sempre sopra la famiglia de Senarco, *il che è ragionevole sperare, poichè* Dice ... è presente al canto e assiste il poeta" (Fraccaroli 138f; emphasis added); "Dika (70f. μέν) steht dem Komos zur Seite. So kann er [the poet] endlich (71f. δέ) um neidlose Fürsorge der Götter für die Geschicke der Familie bitten, denn im Preis ihres Glückes ist Gewähr gegen Hybris; die folgende Weisheit von de Ohnmacht menschlichen Beginns bezeugt es" (Gundert [*supra* n.45] 75; emphasis added). Farnell (197) asserts that "μέν and δέ come dangerously near to a suggestion that Justice was present with them on this occasion but might not be in future," adding that Pindar "could not of course say this." On the latter point, at any rate, Farnell must be right; such an uncomplimentary implication could scarcely be reconciled with the ode's encomiastic purpose.

⁵² Editors in addition to Bowra who have accepted Bergk's emendation κατάβαιν' include Gildersleeve, Christ, Farnell, Puech (*supra* n.7), and Turyn (*supra* n.7); see also Lloyd-Jones (*supra* n.10) 161 n.1. The objections raised against μέτρῳ κατάβαιν' by e.g. K. Crotty (*Song and Action: the Victory Odes of Pindar* [Baltimore 1982] 141) and Kirkwood (212) assume (with e.g. LSJ; Gildersleeve 332; Farnell 199) that the phrase must be an injunction against excessive participation in athletic competition, a notion which they rightly reject as foreign to the epinician ethos; as Kirkwood notes, "moderation is for one's *attitude*, not for competitive effort." It is, however, precisely

passage concludes is deftly contrived to serve a transitional function, pointing backward in its conceptual content and forward in its grammatical form. Although Aristomenes and his athletic career have been the topic of discourse throughout the triad, explicit reference to the youth has been avoided by a variety of stylistic and rhetorical means: the omission of third-person pronouns in 64ff, the use of the first-person indefinite in 67ff, the address to Xenarkes in 71f, the generalizing language of 73–77 (τις, ἀνδράσι, ἄλλον/ἄλλον). Thus by focusing the spotlight of attention directly on Aristomenes for the first time since line 38, the second-person imperative *κατάβαιν'* has the effect of preparing the audience for the imminent resumption of his interrupted victory-catalogue in 78ff (ἔχεις, ὀριστόμενες, δάμασσας, ἔμπετες).

In terms of content, on the other hand, the injunction to “keep on entering contests⁵³ in accordance with the principle of due measure” brings the underlying train of thought in the preceding ten lines to a pithy conclusion. Although in the recent contest at Pytho it was Aristomenes whom the *daimon* “placed on top” and his four opponents who found themselves “under the hands” of a superior wrestler, the outcome of his endeavors on another occasion could easily be very different: he lives, after all, in a world of flux where men’s only certainty is their inability to control their own destinies, where—as the ode’s famous final triad will soon make vividly apparent—triumph and defeat, light and dark, joy and sorrow follow one another in precariously unpredictable alternation.⁵⁴ In the “great

the athlete’s attitude toward his achievements that proves to be at issue in the passage as a whole. Interpretations involving a transitive *καταβαίνειν* (Σ 111a ἀντὶ τοῦ καταβαίνειν ποιεῖ : cf. e.g. A. Boeckh, *Pindari opera quae supersunt* II.2 [Leipzig 1811–32] 317; Fennell 243; Fraccaroli 139 n.2; Wilamowitz [*supra* n.10] 442) founder on the facts of usage (the present stem of *βαίνειν* and its compounds is always intransitive), while to have the *daimon* enter the lists as a wrestler (e.g. Burton 189; Lefkowitz [*supra* n.16] 215; Kirkwood 213) results in the anomalous picture of three simultaneous combatants. Objecting to the last-mentioned view, Taillardat (232–37) proposes instead the image of an umpire who descends into the arena along with the two contestants and adjudicates victory and defeat while wielding the *rhabdos* (=μέτρον) that is his badge of office; but this conception is difficult to reconcile with the highly active rôle attributed to the *daimon* in line 77; see *supra* n.10.

⁵³ For this sense of *καταβαίνειν* see LSJ s.v. I.3.

⁵⁴ Note that when the victory-catalogue resumed in line 78 concludes with a climactic return to Aristomenes’ current achievement at Pytho (81ff), what is dwelt on first is not the joy of success but the pain and disgrace endured by the defeated. At the same time that this emphasis on the consequences of

luxury” of the present moment, flushed with the joy of his recent achievement and the hope that it inspires, he “soars aloft on winged deeds of manhood, entertaining an ambition superior to wealth” (88–92):

ὁ δὲ καλόν τι νέον λαχὼν
 ἀβρότατος ἔπι μεγάλας
 ἐξ ἐλπίδος πέταται
 ὑποπτεροῖς ἀνορέαις, ἔχων
 κρέσσονα πλούτου μέριμναν.

One triumph begets the desire for another; the sweet sense of satisfaction at having proved one’s abilities in action yields soon enough to thoughts of further trials and—may the gods be willing!—further successes. Under the patronage of Delphic Apollo, preceptor of self-knowledge and self-control, the young wrestler has climbed step by step, victory by victory, to his present peak of glory at the Pythian games. According to the agonistic *cursus honorum* the next step, for one whose καλόν τι νέον has been obtained at Pytho, is Olympia;⁵⁵ thus now more than ever, as Aristomenes contemplates the path before him (ὄσα νέομαι) that leads toward further contests and the possibility of still more glorious prizes, he must see to it that he *continues* to pursue his athletic career—the verbal aspect of the imperative is significant⁵⁶—with the same cautious moderation of outlook that has characterized it thus far, never losing sight of the innate limitations under which his species

victory for those who fail to win it throws the glory of Aristomenes’ position into high relief, it also inevitably inspires chastening thoughts of the precariousness of human happiness, of the narrow line that separates joy from misery; cf. Hubbard (*supra* n.29) 89; Lloyd-Jones (*supra* n.10) 161.

⁵⁵ Among scholars who recognize an allusion to Olympian ambitions in 88–92 are Boeckh (*supra* n.52) 319f; Fraccaroli 141; and Mezger 398. Boeckh’s remarks are particularly apt: “Nempe maiora appetit ex magna illa spe: Aristomenes credo Olympicam cupiebat victoriam; poeta vero anxius est ne ille ausis excidat, ideoque commode de fortunae fragilitate admonet ... unde tam diserte et tam lugubri sententia de imbecillitate generis humani loquitur.” The interpretation of 67–78 that I have been advancing here simply retrojects this insight into the penultimate triad.

⁵⁶ The series of present imperatives addressed to Hieron in *Pyth.* 1.85ff (on which see A. Köhnken, *Hermes* 98 [1970] 7–13) has an identical force: keep on doing the (admirable) things you have been doing thus far.

labors or of the unbridgeable gulf that separates his world from the “bronze-floored abode of the gods.”⁵⁷

In conclusion, *Pyth.* 8.67–78 should be added to the roster of Pindaric *Siegeswünsche*. At the heart of the passage we find an overt request for divine favor (71f), phrased with tactful generality and piously qualified by an extended treatment of the ‘knees of the gods’ *topos* (73–77). The first two sentences and the last two words of the passage, which initially appear to have no formal or thematic parallels in other victory-wishes, prove to serve a function that is paralleled, namely the ethical characterization of the victor. In *Ol.* 13.101–106 and *Nem.* 10.29–33 this ἠθοποιία is achieved through the various maneuvers of indirection noted earlier, the laudator’s circumspection of manner reflecting favorably upon the athlete whose advocate and intercessor he is. The effect is particularly marked in *Nem.* 10.29ff, where the innate modesty and piety of which Theaios’ own silence gives such eloquent testimony⁵⁸ seem to be perfectly mirrored in the tactful reserve with which the laudator articulates his unspoken longings; the total impression created is one of dignified humility in the face of divine power and human limitation. In *Pyth.* 8 the ethical effect created by an even more veiled expression of hope for the τύχαι of the victor’s family is reinforced by the appearance on either side of the victory-wish proper of elements—prayer, statement, injunction—that with varying degrees of explicitness attribute to Aristomenes the requisite existential modesty in his attitude toward his own achievements, past, present, and future. Not surprisingly, the key terms used to characterize this young protégé of Apollo—ἄρμονία, Δίκη, μέτρον, ‘fittingness’, ‘righteousness’, ‘due measure’—all belong to the same constellation

⁵⁷ Christ (200) sees in μέτρον κατάβαιν’ a poetic variation of the “vulgar formula” μέτρον ἄριστον, and Mezger (407) paraphrases: “gehe in den Schranken des Masses einher=hüte dich vor Ueberhebung!” The Apolline associations of the phrase are explicitly spelled out by G. Coppola, *Introduzione a Pindaro* (Rome 1931) 210: “‘vivi con misura’ con la norma di vita dettata dalla sapienza del dio, poichè qui Apollo vi è invocato in tutti i suoi attributi, come dio della giustizia e della vita, come il saggio iddio del γνῶθι σαυτὸν e del μηδὲν ἄγαν.”

⁵⁸ Cf. Σ 53b: ὧν γε μὴν ἐπιθυμῆι τυχεῖν, ἐν διανοίᾳ κρύπτει σιωπῶν διὰ τὸ νεμεσητόν; Christ 312: “Olympica certamina subire Theaeum meditari, sed *ob verecundiam* nondum aperte fateri poeta significat” (emphasis added). The prepositional prefix in παρατεῖται perhaps adds an implication of indirection (so Fennell [*supra* n.7] 126) or of “reverent shyness” (so Gildersleeve 194 on *Ol.* 8.3, παραπειρῶνται).

of ethical concepts and precepts as the Delphic maxims "Know thyself" and "Nothing too much."⁵⁹ Imbued with the Apolline spirit, Aristomenes understands (or so his encomiast wishes to assure us) that as a necessary condition for further achievement he must temper all hopes and aspirations, particularly those for so august a prize as an Olympic victory, with a vigilant regard for his mortal limitations.⁶⁰

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⁵⁹ The conceptual associations among the three terms is noted by *e.g.* Hubbard 291, although in his view the first two are to be taken as characterizing the laudator and only the third is applied to the laudandus.

⁶⁰ I wish to thank Joel Lidov, Hayden Pelliccia, William Race, and the anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions.