

Polybius, the Achaeans, and the 'Freedom of the Greeks'

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IN THE SPRING OF 196 B.C. the proconsul T. Quinctius Flaminius, victorious in the war against Philip V of Macedon, announced at the Isthmian Games that the outcome of the war would be freedom for the Greeks. Not only would the states and peoples of European Greece be free from Macedonian hegemony and control, but all would be totally free: free from taxes, free from garrisons, free to live under their own ancestral laws—free (in a word) from Rome. Flaminius' announcement was greeted by the assembled Greeks with enormous cheers and explosive enthusiasm. It is a famous scene, made ironic by the subsequent history of Rome's relations with the Greek world.¹

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate how Polybius may have emphasized the Achaean contribution to the Isthmian Declaration. It is first necessary, however, to review the evolution of the concept of full freedom, for it has been a topic of intense scholarly debate—both about the specific stages by which the Romans arrived at this policy, and also about the influences that bore upon their ultimate decision.

Some scholars believe that the outline of Flaminius' policy was already in place at Rome as early as 200—perhaps even before the war against Philip began.² Some maintain that in 199

¹ On the Isthmian Declaration and preceding events see Polyb. 18.44–48; Liv. 33.30–35; Plut. *Flam.* 10ff; App. *Mac.* 9.3f; Just. 30.4.17f; Val. Max. 4.8.5; Zon. 9.16. The Greek states would be ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις (Polyb. 18.46.5).

² K. E. Petzold, *Die Eröffnung des zweiten römisch-makedonischen Krieges* (Berlin 1940) 37; cf. A. H. McDonald, review of E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford 1957), *JRS* 49 (1959) 149. The Romans may have already experimented with *civitates liberae ac immunes* in Sicily from the mid-third century: Badian 37–42; cf. A. M. Eckstein, *Senate and General: Individual Decision-Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264–194 B.C.* (Berkeley 1987) 103–15. But there is no necessity for a strong connection between free cities

Flamininus had run for the consulship for 198 on an explicit slogan of freedom for the Greeks.³ Others have argued that the new Roman policy can at least be seen in Flamininus' demands during his two peace conferences with Philip V in the spring and autumn of 198.⁴ And still others would place the development of the true policy of freedom only after Flamininus' victory at Cynoscephalae in summer 197, with the Roman Senate (and its representatives in Greece, the *decem legati*) being brought around fully to this policy only in the course of late 197 and early 196.⁵ On the first three reconstructions of events, Roman policy was established quite early. On the last reconstruction, its evolution was quite gradual and *ad hoc*.

There is similar controversy over exactly who influenced the Senate to adopt the outlines of the Isthmian policy. Did the *patres* arrive at the policy independently early in the war?⁶ Or did the policy evolve as the Senate came increasingly under the influence of envoys from the Greek states in 197–196?⁷ Or was the most important proponent of full freedom for the Greeks T. Quinctius Flamininus, as a result of his experiences in Greece, with his ideas being transmitted to the Senate via his own lieutenants?⁸

within a permanent Roman province and the declaration of 196, whereby the Romans promised to leave the whole of Greece free, withdrawing completely from the region. See now J. W. Rich, "Patronage and Interstate Relations in the Roman Republic," in A. Wallace-Hadrill, ed., *Patronage in Ancient Society* (London 1989) 121.

³ J. Briscoe, "Flamininus and Roman Politics, 200–189 B.C.," *Latomus* 31 (1972) 42, reiterated in *A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXI–XXXIII* (Oxford 1973) 32f.

⁴ See, most recently, J.-L. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique* (Rome 1988) 59–69.

⁵ R. Seager, "The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia: from Alexander to Antiochus," *CQ* n.s. 31 (1981) 109f; E. S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* (Berkeley 1984) I 145f; Eckstein (*supra* n.2) 296f, 300f (a variation).

⁶ Cf. Petzold (*supra* n.2) 37; McDonald (*supra* n.2) 149.

⁷ Cf. Seager (*supra* n.5) 109f; Gruen (*supra* n.5) 145f.

⁸ Cf. E. Badian, *Titus Quinctius Flamininus: Philhellene and Realpolitik* (Cincinnati 1970) 55; Eckstein (*supra* n.2) 296f, 300f.

I

The evidence suggests that the evolution of the Isthmian doctrine was only gradual at Rome. The ultimatum given Philip's general Nicator by Roman envoys at Athens in spring 200 merely demanded the immediate end of Philip's wars against the Greeks and the payment of an indemnity to Attalus of Pergamum (Polyb. 16.27.1ff); there is nothing here about Greek 'freedom'. The Abydus Declaration of autumn 200 (16.34) did contain a senatorial demand that Philip withdraw from certain possessions of Ptolemy; but the intention was surely to return these places to the Ptolemaic government after the Macedonian withdrawal, not to set them free.⁹ To judge from the sentiments ascribed to L. Furius Purpureo (Liv. 31.31.6–9), the Roman diplomatic position in 199 was still that *libertas* was only *pro merito*, not something inherent for Greeks.¹⁰ In 198 at the Aous Conference and again at Nicaea, Flamininus demanded that Philip withdraw from specified Greek territory (the amount varied), but with no indication of the fate of that territory after the Macedonian withdrawal.¹¹ It is true enough that in the Diodorus excerpt (28.11) Flamininus at the Aous is depicted as demanding, on senatorial instructions, that all Greece be left ungarrisoned and autonomous (ἀφρούρητος ... αὐτόνομος). But this is totally missing from Livy's far more detailed account of the Aous conference, and is obviously the result of a confused source that has retrojected by two years the terms of Flamininus' more famous declaration at the Isthmia.¹²

⁹ On the Abydus Declaration *cf.* also Liv. 31.18. Against Petzold (*supra* n.2: 37), for whom the essentials of the Isthmian Declaration can already be perceived at Abydus, see (rightly) Badian (*supra* n.2) 67 with n.4.

¹⁰ See M.-L. Heidemann, *Die Freiheitsparole in der griechisch-römischen Auseinandersetzung (200–188 v. Chr.)* (Bonn 1966) 28f.

¹¹ On the Aous Conference see Liv. 32.10; *cf.* Diod. 28.11; App. *Mac.* 5 (a variant tradition discussed immediately *infra*); on the Nicaea Conference see Polyb. 18.1–9; Liv. 32.32.5–36.10; Plut. *Flam.* 5.6; App. *Mac.* 8; Just. 30.3.8ff; Zon. 9.16.

¹² See (rightly) Heidemann (*supra* n.10) 105 n.2; Seager (*supra* n.5) 108. E. M. Carawan ("Graecia Liberata and the Role of Flamininus in Livy's Fourth Decade," *TAPA* 118 [1988] 213) argues that Diod. 28.11 (*cf.* App. *Mac.* 5) reflects the accurate and otherwise unpreserved tradition of Polybius, whereas Livy's account of the Aous (32.10) reflects an inferior annalistic source. His view is undermined by Polybius 18.1–10, where Flamininus' position at the

Such demands for an enemy's withdrawal from territory were in fact traditional Roman military-diplomatic practice, and it is thus somewhat imprudent to see them as strong precedents for the Isthmian policy. If there is any implication of 'freedom' here, it is merely the Romans' wish that these places be free of the power of Philip.¹³

This concept of freedom as liberation from Philip also resembles the views of the Greek envoys to Rome under the tutelage of Flamininus' friends in winter 198/7 (Polyb. 18.11). They told the *patres* that they wished Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth (the "three fetters of Greece") to be free from Philip, for only then could the Greeks have any thought of *eleutheria*; as it was, Corinth threatened the Peloponnesians, Chalcis threatened Central Greece, and Demetrias threatened Thessaly and Magnesia. It was precisely this demand which the Senate then took up with Philip's envoys.¹⁴ Still, we perhaps see in the phrase referring to the Greeks' "ability to enjoy freedom" once they were liberated from the baleful effects of Philip's fortresses (18.11.7, δυνατὸν ἐπαύρασθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας) a hint of prospective Greek freedom in a positive sense, as opposed to mere freedom from Philip's power; and that would be something new.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the first explicit reference to a Greek future free not only from Macedonian but also from Roman troops of any sort occurs in a scene that Polybius places in Flamininus'

Nicaea Conference much later in 198 is still very far from the Isthmian policy: here Flamininus is concerned with 'freedom' only in the sense of Macedonian withdrawal from certain Greek territories. That fits well with Livy's version of the Aous (see *infra* 52f) but hardly with Diodorus (or Appian).

¹³ Cf. the terms of Rome's treaty with Hiero II of Syracuse in 263, under which the king formally renounced his claim to areas in northeast Sicily held by Syracuse before the war, restricting himself to the southeast corner of the island (Diod. 23.4.1; cf. Polyb. 1.20.1 on Roman intentions here); or the terms of Rome's treaty with the Illyrians in 228, under which they formally agreed never to sail in arms south of the Lissus River (Polyb. 2.12.3; cf. 3.16.3).

¹⁴ For the Greek ambassadors' emphasis on freedom from the "three fetters" see Heidemann (*supra* n.10) 34.

¹⁵ Cf. also Polyb. 18.11.4 (τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν ἐλευθερίας) and 18.11.11 (τοὺς Ἕλληνας ψεῦσαι τῶν περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐλπίδων), although these phrases are even vaguer than the one at 18.11.7. Ferrary (*supra* n.4: 68 with n.84) especially emphasizes the novelty of the Greek position on "freedom" in winter 198/7 at Rome.

camp shortly after his victory at Cynoscephalae in 197 (the Tempe Conference). This first indication of total Roman withdrawal from Greece occurs in a speech of King Amyntander of Athamania during the debate over whether Philip should retain the Macedonian throne (18.36.4, χωρισθέντων Ῥωμαίων ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος). But as K. S. Sacks has shown, Polybius makes Amyntander in fact the stalking horse for Flamininus. Thus Amyntander addresses not Flamininus but the Greeks, while the Aetolian representative Alexander responds to Amyntander as if Flamininus had just spoken (18.36.6, ἐπήνεσε τὸν Τίτον ... καὶ παραπίπτειν αὐτόν). This vision of the postwar withdrawal of Roman troops from Greece is therefore Flamininus' vision.¹⁶

Yet well into the spring of 196, and despite the vision of Roman withdrawal expounded in Flamininus' camp in 197, Roman policy toward the Greeks in fact remained somewhat unclear. The *senatus consultum* brought by the *decem legati* to Greece in 196 did indicate that all Greeks except the former subjects of King Philip were "to be free and to enjoy their own laws."¹⁷ Here for the first time is an official Roman pronouncement about the freedom of the Greeks—or rather, of some Greeks—which has a specific positive content, as opposed to mere freedom from Philip. This is obviously an important step towards the Isthmia. On the other hand, the former subjects of Philip (and they were many) are by the terms of the *senatus consultum* merely to be turned over to the Romans by a set date, with no explanation offered as to their ultimate fate.¹⁸ This suggests significant senatorial hesitation, even in spring 196, about extending the policy of freedom everywhere in Greece. Indeed, our sources are unanimous that there was strong sentiment among the senatorial commission of 196 for garrisoning the most strategic of Philip's former possessions with Roman troops. It took all Flamininus' persuasive power, and

¹⁶ See K. S. Sacks, "Polybius' Other View of Aetolia," *JHS* 95 (1975) 102f, with Eckstein's comments (*supra* n.2) 296f. The phrase "freedom for the Greeks" (18.36.6, τοῖς Ἑλλησι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν) first appears at the Tempe debate, but its meaning may still be mere "freedom" from Philip in the context of debate over Philip's fate, where fear of the king's power is a prominent theme (*cf.* 18.36.4, 6; 37.12).

¹⁷ 18.44.2, ἐλευθέρους ὑπάρχειν καὶ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις; *cf.* Liv. 33.30.2, *libertatem ac suas haberent leges*.

¹⁸ 18.44.3; Liv. 33.30.2.

much debate, before the *decem legati* were won over to the policy finally proclaimed at the Isthmia. Even so, the Romans decided to remain in temporary control of Demetrias, Chalcis, and the Acrocorinth fortress, along with Oreus and Eretria.¹⁹

Since the first reference to the total Roman evacuation of Greece occurs in the speech of someone speaking for Flamininus in 197, and since a year later it is Flamininus alone who convinces the senatorial commission to accept the idea of eventual total Roman withdrawal, it follows that T. Quinctius had done his best in the intervening period to convince a rather hesitant Roman Senate of the correctness and diplomatic benefits of this policy—a policy in which he deeply believed. It further follows that insofar as the Senate *was* convinced to adopt this policy, it was probably through the influence of envoys sent to Rome by the victorious proconsul, rather than by anything the Greeks had to say. Flamininus' envoys were undoubtedly senatorial aristocrats, and in winter 197/6 they helped procure for him—under rather difficult political circumstances—the ratification of his preliminary peace with Philip; this attests to their political effectiveness.²⁰ By contrast, the Senate seems not to have been much impressed by the Greek ambassadors who came to Rome that winter (*cf.* Polyb. 18.42.7f). One may add that the fully articulated definition of Greek freedom found in the Isthmian Declaration (“free, un-taxed, ungarrisoned, and enjoying their own laws,” as opposed merely to “free, and enjoying their own laws,” the formulation of the *senatus consultum*) appears only *after* Flamininus' consultations with the senatorial commission.²¹ Further, Flamininus' spectacular dedication at Delphi connected his name directly with *eleutheria*, while the Greeks for their part publicly

¹⁹ Flamininus' consultation (and debate) with the senatorial commissioners: Polyb. 18.45.7–12; Liv. 33.31.7–11; Plut. *Flam.* 10.2; *cf.* App. *Mac.* 9.3f (a contrary and clearly inferior tradition); Zon. 9.16 (simplified). The *decem legati* wanted garrisons placed at strategic points because of Antiochus III's advance into Thrace: Polyb. 18.45.10; Liv. 33.31.10; Demetrias, Chalcis, and the Acrocorinth garrisoned: Polyb. 18.45.12; Liv. 33.31.11; Oreus and Eretria: Liv. 34.51.1, *cf.* Polyb. 18.45.5, 47.10f; Liv. 33.31.4.

²⁰ For discussion *cf.* Eckstein (*supra* n.2) 293, 297.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 297, 299f.

honored him, and only him, as the author of their liberation.²² All in all, it looks as if the evolution of a policy of full Greek freedom among the Romans—hesitant as that evolution evidently was—owed most to the impact of T. Quinctius Flaminius.²³

Yet it is also obvious that Flaminius is likely to have gone through his own evolution in thinking about the outline of a postwar settlement in Greece. He has sometimes been seen as an idealistic and sentimental philhellene from the very beginning.²⁴ But recent scholarship has cast significant doubt upon such a reconstruction. Flaminius' political experience with Greeks before his consulship in 198 should not be exaggerated; during his Greek campaigns, he and his lieutenants showed themselves as comfortable in the use of terror-tactics against Greeks as all earlier Romans had been; the celebrated diplomatic offensive of late 198 that brought the Achaean League onto the Roman side appears to have been an *ad hoc* operation undertaken only after the unexpected Roman failure to break into Macedon that summer (*i.e.*, a traditional military solution, which Flaminius had clearly preferred); and even Flaminius' position in 198 regarding the extent of Macedonian territorial withdrawal (*i.e.*, how much of Greece would be free of Philip) shifted dramatically against Greek interests between the spring and the autumn.²⁵ It therefore stands to reason that if Flaminius by the time of Cynoscephalae had come to accept a vision of postwar Greece that included full freedom for the

²² Flaminius' dedication at Delphi emphasized his personal bestowal of *eleutheria* upon the Greeks: Plut. *Flam.* 12.5f. Various Greek states accorded Flaminius personally a vast array of honors: Gytheum, Argos, Thessaly, Corinth (where he is saluted as σωτήρα καὶ ἐλευθέριον), Larissa (Eleutheria games established in his honor), Cos, Chalcis, Delos. See F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* II (Oxford 1967) 613f; J. Bousquet, "Inscriptions grecques concernant des Romains," *BCH* 88 (1964) 609.

²³ Cf. Badian (*supra* n.8) 55: "It was clearly Titus Flaminius who developed the principle of the 'freedom of the Greeks' in the form in which it was proclaimed at the Isthmian Games and carried out after—that principle of which he was later so proud and for which he demanded, and received, exuberant gratitude." See also Eckstein (*supra* n.2) 296f, 300f.

²⁴ Cf. T. Frank, *Roman Imperialism* (New York 1914) 50–59.

²⁵ A detailed discussion in A. M. Eckstein, "T. Quinctius Flaminius and the Campaign against Philip in 198 B.C.," *Phoenix* 30 (1976) 119–42. Cf. now Gruen (*supra* n.5) 208 with n.24; Ferrary (*supra* n.4) 58–69.

Greeks, this was because of his growing experience with Greek thinking and sentiment on this issue. In other words, if it is Flamininus who primarily influenced the *patres* regarding the policy of *eleutheria* in 197–196, the development of Flamininus' own ideas here was crucially influenced by his interchanges with various Greek statesmen, which led him to see the diplomatic benefits of such a policy.

II

Which Greek statesmen influenced the development of Flamininus' conception of full freedom for the Greek states, and the traditional Hellenistic language in which this new policy eventually found expression at the Isthmia? Given the state of our evidence, certainty is impossible. But working from the basic reconstruction of events established so far, the rest of this paper will propose that Polybius—our original and basic source for this period—consistently emphasized the close association of Achaëa, and particularly the Achaëan statesman Aristaenus, with the concept of Greek freedom.

To begin with, it can be shown that the first explicit reference to the theme of *libertas* by a Greek in Livy's narrative of the Second Macedonian War appears in the speech of Aristaenus to the Achaëan assembly in autumn 198 (Liv. 32.21). Second, it can be shown that the concept of *libertas* in Aristaenus' Livian speech, while primarily freedom from Philip, also hints at Greeks living in freedom in a positive sense—just the version of *eleutheria* that Polybius (18.11) has the Greek ambassadors presenting at Rome later in the winter of 198/7. And third, it can be shown (by new arguments, and contrary to recent doubts) that Aristaenus' Livian speech in fact derives directly from Polybius—which in turn tells us something about how Polybius structured the story of the development of the concept of freedom for the Greeks in the 190's.

Carawan has rightly emphasized the appearance of *libertas* in Aristaenus' speech. The situation, however, is more complicated than Carawan presents it. In Livy the Macedonian envoy to Aetolia in spring 199 (in a speech in which he accuses Rome of oppressing the Greeks of the West) already mentions that the power of Philip would appear to restrict Aetolian *libertas*, while in his depiction of the Aous negotiations of spring

198, Livy presents both Philip and Flamininus as employing the word *liberare*. But at the Aous *liberare* is meant only in the narrow sense of Macedonian withdrawal from certain cities.²⁶ The appearance of *libertas* in Aristaenus' speech of autumn 198 must therefore be seen as definitely prefigured in the Livian narrative of the previous eighteen months. Still, Aristaenus' speech seems to be the first time in Livy that we are provided with a strictly *Greek* perspective on *libertas* as an issue in the war.²⁷

Aristaenus' speech was crucial for the history of the Achaean League. For twenty-five years, ever since Antigonos III Doseon had saved Achaëa from Cleomenes of Sparta, the League had been the premier member of Macedon's Hellenic Symmachy. In the early years of the Second Macedonian War the League—distracted by its own new war with Sparta—managed to maintain a position merely of benevolent neutrality toward Philip, without taking sides in his conflict with Rome.²⁸ In autumn 198, however, envoys from Flamininus came to Achaëa to propose that the League now reverse its traditional pro-Macedonian stance and join Rome's war against Philip. This proposal deeply divided the Achaeans, for the kings of Macedon were popular in many Achaean towns (not least Polybius' hometown of Megalopolis). In Livy (32.21), Aristaenus—the Achaean chief magistrate (*strategos*) for 199/8—is given a long and dramatic speech in which he tries to convince a hesitant Achaean assembly to accept the Romans' proposal: the League faced terrible dangers if it refused the Roman offer of alliance, thereby indicating an open preference for Philip (32.21.4–35).²⁹ Still, at the end of the speech Aristaenus does present one positive

²⁶ Carawan (*supra* n.12) 214; Macedonian envoy in 199: Liv. 31.29.12; the verb *liberare* at the Aous Conference: Liv. 32.10.4, 7, with Heidemann (*supra* n.10: 32) on its limited meaning in this context.

²⁷ In Livy's presentation neither the Athenians nor the Aetolians at their meeting of spring 199 refer to *libertas*. The Athenians restrict their speech to Philip's atrocities, while the Aetolians are concerned strictly with *Macht-politik*: Liv. 31.30, 32.

²⁸ For Achaean politics and policies in this period see A. M. Eckstein, "Polybius, Aristaenus, and the Fragment 'On Traitors'," *CQ* n.s. 37 (1987) 140ff.

²⁹ On this theme in Aristaenus' speech see esp. A. Aymard, *Les premiers rapports de Rome et de la Confédération achaienne* (Bordeaux 1938) 92f.

advantage for the Achaeans in the Roman alliance, and it is in terms of *libertas*:

liberare vos a Philippo iam diu magis vultis quam audetis. sine vestro labore et periculo qui vos in libertatem vindicarent cum magnis classibus exercitibusque mare traiecerunt (32.21.36).

The last phrase of the speech (37) returns to the threat Rome now poses to Achaea's very existence.

Carawan has suggested that Livy 32.21.36 in fact constitutes a vision of Rome's having come to Greece truly to liberate the Hellenes, without territorial ambitions of her own; the passage thus fully anticipates the declaration of liberty at the Isthmia. This is claiming too much. The place of emphasis is occupied by the phrase in which the Achaeans long to "free" themselves from Philip (*liberare vos a Philippo*).³⁰ This emphasis fits the picture of Philip that Aristaenus draws in his speech: cruel, greedy, a murderer, subject to irrational passions, and now a ruler incapable even of protecting his allies. Who would not wish to be free of him?³¹ But this usage of *liberare* is much closer to the usage in Livy's depiction of the Aous Conference earlier in 198 (see *supra*) than to the "liberty" enshrined in the Isthmian Declaration. The implication of *libertas* in the subsequent sentence of Liv. 32.21.6 is, admittedly, more suggestive: *sine vestro labore et periculo qui vos in libertatem vindicarent ... maria traiecerunt*; the Romans have come across the sea to "assure you your liberty." Carawan rightly notes the striking parallel between this phrase and the favorable commentary that Livy later appends to the Isthmian Declaration itself: *suo labore ac periculo bella gerat pro libertate aliorum ... maria traiciat* (33.33.5f). It is a point to which we shall return. Still, for the reader of Book 32 the phrase *vos in libertatem vindicarent* can only be a hint of future freedom for Greece.

In fact 32.21.36 taken as a whole, with its double employment of *libertas*, seems similar in tone to what Polybius has the Greek envoys say in Rome later in winter 198/7: their emphasis, as we saw, is on freedom from Philip via the withdrawal of Macedonian garrisons from the "three fetters"; but there is also

³⁰ Cf. Carawan (*supra* n.12) 214, who oddly omits *liberare vos a Philippo* from his discussion.

³¹ Cruelty: Liv. 32.21.21, 25; murder and robbery: 32.22f; ungovernable passion: 32.21.21, 25; military weakness: 32.21.7–20.

a hint (especially in the phrase ἐπαύρασθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας, 18.11.7) of a future of freedom in a positive sense.³² If in both cases this hint lacks specific content, it is still legitimate and important to see here a step forward in the transformation of the theme of freedom during the war, and it is important as well to see that it is the Achaean Aristaenus who in Livy seems to take the first step. But one step is not the whole way to the Isthmia.

The question immediately arises, did the statements of Aristaenus on freedom appear originally in Polybius? If so, then we could trace a definite development in the transformation of the freedom theme in the *Histories*: from an emphasis purely on freedom from Philip (in the Aous Conference) to a more complex formulation, first established by Aristaenus the Achaean and reiterated by the Greek ambassadors in Rome, in which the emphasis is still on freedom from Philip but where 'living in freedom' in a positive sense is also present.³³ The problem here is that Polybius' Book 17—in which the Achaean assembly of autumn 198 must have appeared—is completely lost. Moreover, Carawan has recently expressed serious doubts that Livy's account of the Achaean assembly in fact derives from Polybius at all: at 18.13.8 Polybius gives Aristaenus credit for saving the League from destruction by convincing the assembly to side with Rome, while in Livy the speech of Aristaenus results only in a deadlock among the Achaean magistrates, which is broken not by Aristaenus but by the intervention of Pisia of Pellene with his son the magistrate Memnon. Only in this way did the motion for the Roman alliance even come to a vote in the assembly (Liv. 32.22.4–7).³⁴

If Carawan is correct, then we are ignorant of how Polybius presented the Achaean assembly or how he presented the development of the freedom theme in his account of the war. But in fact Carawan's argument against Polybian derivation is weak. Before Aristaenus' speech in Livy, the Achaean assembly is completely unable to decide what to do (32.20.1–7), but after the

³² See *supra* 48; cf. Ferrary (*supra* n.4) 68 with n.84.

³³ For Polybius as Livy's source for the Aous Conference see n.12 *supra*.

³⁴ Carawan (*supra* n.12) 215 with n.12: part of Carawan's unlikely hypothesis that Livy's account of Flamininus' activities in Greece 198–194 derives not from Polybius but from an annalistic source hostile to the Roman commander.

speech the majority of the assembly—once it gets a chance to vote—decides for the Roman alliance (32.22.7–12). Since Aristaenus' speech is a long and dramatic set-piece, it is clear that Livy intended his audience to see it as decisive. In other words, the basic presentation of what occurred at the assembly in autumn 198 is the *same* in Liv. 32 as in Polybius' retrospective remarks at 18.13; Aristaenus is the dominant figure in both passages. If Memnon and Pisia are missing from Polybius 18.13, this is probably because they are an unnecessary detail in what is merely a brief review of the Achaean decision.

On the other side, the arguments in favor of the Polybian derivation of Aristaenus' speech in Livy are formidable. It stands to reason that Polybius, as an Achaean, would have covered the crucial Achaean decision of autumn 198 in detail; moreover, to judge from the retrospective discussion in Polyb. 18.13, Aristaenus was given the central place in Polybius' account of that decision (in the lost book 17)—and why not via a speech? Further, the main argument in Aristaenus' speech in Livy is precisely the reason Polybius offers at 18.13.8 for Aristaenus' actions: fear for the survival of the League if it did not side with Rome. This is hardly likely to be a coincidence. Finally, Aristaenus' speech in Livy contains the kind of detailed knowledge of Peloponnesian history (e.g. the accusation that Philip V had engineered the murder of the otherwise unknown Chariteles of Cyparissia: 32.21.23) that is typical only of Polybius among Livy's likely sources.³⁵

To these well-known arguments one may add the appearance of two quintessentially Polybian motifs in Aristaenus' speech. First, the praise of the Macedonian king Antigonos Doson, who saved the Achaean League in the 220's: "that most merciful and just king who did so much for us" (32.21.25).³⁶ Livy had no cause for a special interest in Doson, but as one of Polybius' heroes he won highest praise for μεγαλοψυχία and φιλάνθρωπία.³⁷ Second, Aristaenus argues that wise men prefer to

³⁵ Cf. Aymard (*supra* n.29) 94; Eckstein (*supra* n.28) 143; compare this detail on the obscure Chariteles with the equally obscure (to us) Memnon and Pisia of Pellene (Liv. 32.22.4–7: discussed *supra*).

³⁶ *Antigono, mitissimo ac iustissimo rege et de nobis omnibus optime merito....*

³⁷ Polyb. 2.70.1; 5.9.8ff; cf. K.-W. Welwei, *Könige und Königtum im Urteil des Polybios* (Cologne 1963) 37.

learn prudence from the misfortunes of others rather than by offering themselves as negative examples (29): Achaea's burning towns should not exemplify the folly of refusing a Roman alliance (*cf.* 28). To learn from others' misfortunes and thus to avoid the bitter experience of one's own errors is a major Polybian theme (*e.g.* 1.1.2). Significantly, it appears in the speech Livy's Aristaenus delivers at a crucial turning point in Achaea's history.³⁸

That Aristaenus' speech in Livy derives in general from Polybius' lost Book 17 does not, however, prove that any specific passage within the Livian speech directly reflects Polybius. Livy transformed his source material according to his own purposes, and Aristaenus' speech is in particular a masterpiece of *Latin* rhetoric.³⁹ Hence the appearance of the *libertas* theme at 32.21.36 does not guarantee its occurrence in Polybius or his emphasis on Aristaenus' rôle in the eventual development of the the concept of freedom for the Greeks. The exceptions to this general rule about the relationship of Aristaenus' Livian speech to its sources would be passages where a specific Polybian motif is independently attested elsewhere (*e.g.* the passages on Antigonus Doston and learning from others' misfortunes). Does Liv. 32.21.36 fit this pattern?

Yes, and Carawan has shown the way (*supra* n.12: 214). He notes the remarkable parallel in language between 32.21.36 (*sine vestro labore et periculo qui vos in libertatem vindicarent ... mare traiecerunt*) and Livy's later commentary on the Isthmian declaration (33.33.5ff: *suo labore ac periculo bella gerat pro libertate aliorum ... mare traiciat*). But one can go further. Polybius' commentary on the Isthmian declaration (18.46.13ff) closely resembles Liv. 33.33. And the phraseology of 33.33.5ff has clearly been adapted directly from Polyb. 18.46.14: θαυμαστόν γὰρ ἦν καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαίοις ... πᾶσαν ὑπομεῖναι δαπάνην καὶ πάντα κίνδυνον χάριν τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ("for it was a wonderful thing that the Romans had incurred every expense and peril for the sake of the liberty of

³⁸ For this theme in Polybius see F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* I (Oxford 1957) 39, 94. The most famous example is probably Polybius' remarks (1.35.7) on the fate of M. Atilius Regulus during the First Punic War.

³⁹ *Cf.* R. Ullmann, *Étude sur le style des discours de Tite-Live* (Oslo 1929) 137ff; Briscoe, *Commentary* (*supra* n.3) 21.

the Greeks³⁹). Yet if Liv. 33.33.5ff can thus be shown a direct echo of Polybius, and if (as Carawan rightly remarks) there seems an integral conceptual and literary connection between Liv. 33.33.5ff and the phraseology of Aristaenus earlier at 32.21.36, then 32.21.36 probably reflects a Polybian sentiment directly as well as one similar to that at Polyb. 18.46.14—namely, the theme of freedom that originally appeared in Aristaenus' speech in Polybius.

Thus in Polybius' account of the Second Macedonian War the initial evolution of the concept from 'freedom from Philip' to freedom in the positive sense occurred in Aristaenus' speech of autumn 198. In other words, Polybius has an *Achaean* statesman begin the transformation of the freedom theme that would eventually result in the Isthmian Declaration. Perhaps it is no surprise that Achaean historian chose to underline an Achaean contribution to the Roman peace settlement of 196, so favorable to the Greeks. Nevertheless, this aspect of the *Histories* has not been noticed.

Despite the scanty evidence, still further indications of this Polybian slant on the development of the Isthmian doctrine can be traced. One must say, however, that Polybius did associate other Greeks with the theme of freedom (in particular, Attalus I of Pergamum), and that his emphasis on the specifically Achaean contribution may well contain a strong element of truth.

After Book 17 Polybius continued to connect Aristaenus with the theme of freedom. He begins Book 18 with a digression on the nature of treason. Its context, perhaps a summary of Aristaenus' achievements, was clearly intended to defend Aristaenus against the charge of προδοσία—an accusation apparently arising from his (highly controversial) switch of Achaëa to the Roman side in autumn 198.⁴⁰ Polybius (18.13ff) asserts that Aristaenus committed treason neither against Achaëa nor against the other Greeks; on the contrary, he not only saved Achaëa from destruction but even increased her power. Polybius then associates Aristaenus with the fourth-century Arcadian statesmen who brought Philip II of Macedon into the Peloponnese against Sparta. In spite of Demosthenes' fulminations, these

⁴⁰ See Eckstein (*supra* n.28) 145–50 (on Aristaenus' controversial actions, including reaction at Megalopolis, Polybius' hometown), 150–61 (on the context and purpose of Polyb. 18.13–15).

men were not traitors: they brought safety to their cities and many advantages to their fellow citizens, while fully preserving the rights of the communities (τηροῦντες τὰ πρὸς τὰς πατρίδας δίκαια, 18.14.10). Polybius considered as traitors only those who admitted foreign garrisons into their cities, abolished the existing laws for their own political advantage, or restricted their fellow citizens' free speech (παρρησία) and ἐλευθερία (18.14.9, cf. 15.1ff).

Aristaenus, in Polybius' view, did none of these things; his beneficial acts are parallel to those of fourth-century Arcadian statesmen. Indeed the Polybian definition of treason (18.14f) approximates, in a negative way, the definition of Greek freedom proclaimed at the Isthmia (18.46.5: *eleutheria*, no garrisons, one's own laws preserved). Aristaenus is thus proclaimed (18.14f), against his apparent adversaries, as a champion of these values.⁴¹

Similarly, a retrospective defense of Aristaenus' policy during the Second Macedonian War (found in a digression at 24.11ff, reporting the debate between Aristaenus and Philopoemen), emphasizes Aristaenus' protection of Achaean rights in regard to Rome (24.13.9, τὰ δίκαια τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους). The remark parallels Polybius' praise of the Arcadian statesmen at 18.14.10 (τηροῦντες τὰ πρὸς τὰς πατρίδας δίκαια). Aristaenus always maintained to his fellow citizens (24.13) that the Romans highly valued fidelity to sworn oaths and treaties and good faith with allies (cf. 13.3: τὸ τηρεῖν τοὺς ὄρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους πίστιν)—a view parallel to Polybius' own comment (cf. 24.10.10ff). Further, Polybius cites a maxim of Aristaenus that the morally correct course for the powerful is always to aim at the καλόν (24.12.2); perhaps this is the kind of advice which, in Polybius' historical tradition, Aristaenus gave the Romans about Greek freedom.

This raises the issue of Aristaenus' relationship with Flamininus. Indeed, something can be gleaned from the remaining Polybian and Polybian-derived scenes where Aristaenus accompanies the Roman, and where once more themes related to freedom often occur.

⁴¹ On the connection of the principles of action expounded in 18.13–15 to international as well as domestic political relations, see the interesting discussion of D. Musti, *Polybio e l'imperio romano* (Naples 1978) 70–73, who notes also the parallel with Polyb. 9.37.9 (the speech of Lyciscus in 211/0).

After the crucial Achaean assembly Aristaenus first appears at Flamininus' side as chief envoy of Achaea to the Nicaea peace conference of late 198 (Polyb. 18.1–10).⁴² Polybius depicts him as a leading speaker, ready both to demand the total Macedonian withdrawal from Greece and to emphasize another aspect of the freedom theme by castigating Philip and his policies in precisely the same fashion as at the assembly in Achaea.⁴³

After Polybius' defense of Aristaenus at 18.13ff (*supra* 58f), he next appears with Flamininus and Attalus of Pergamum, attempting to win over the Boeotians in spring 197. From Polybius only a fragment of Attalus' speech survives (18.17.6); but in Livy (33.2.4f) the aged Attalus soon becomes ill (he eventually died), and Aristaenus' speech convinces the Boeotians. Moreover, Flamininus immediately seconds Aristaenus' speech.⁴⁴ Livy says that Aristaenus employed the same arguments used in Achaea the previous autumn (33.2.4): this means a heavy emphasis on Roman military power and probably yet another attack on Philip. But the audience is perhaps also meant to assume that Aristaenus' oration included (as in Achaea) pertinent remarks on freedom, since Flamininus' supporting speech emphasizes Roman *fides*, an aspect of Rome Aristaenus strongly endorsed (Polyb. 24.13.3). Indeed, Polybius' comment on the death of Attalus indicates how he may have inserted the theme of freedom into the Boeotian episode: the king (struck down at Thebes) died "in the midst of his most noble endeavor, fighting for the freedom of the

⁴² By this time Aristaenus' term as *strategos* had evidently expired, but the Achaeans appointed him chief delegate to the conference: see Aymard (*supra* n.29) 111 with n.2. Xenophon of Aegium accompanied Aristaenus to Nicaea: Polyb. 18.1.4; Liv. 32.32.11.

⁴³ Aristaenus and total Macedonian withdrawal: cf. Polyb. 18.7.1f, 9.1; Aristaenus ready to castigate Philip: 18.8.2ff (πρὸς τὸ συμπλέκεσθαι καὶ μεμψιμορεῖν αὐτῷ)—another argument for the Polybian derivation of Aristaenus' speech in Livy, since (as shown *supra*) that speech is filled with criticism of Philip: Aristaenus' themes remain consistent. In Livy's version of Nicaea, Aristaenus is subsumed under the term *Achaei*: cf. Polyb. 18.8.2ff; Liv. 32.35.1.

⁴⁴ Aristaenus was probably at Thebes as head of an official Achaean diplomatic delegation accompanying T. Quinctius in spring 197: cf. Liv. 33.1.2, with Aymard (*supra* n.29) 155. Nevertheless, Aristaenus' presence at Thebes offers strong evidence of the good personal relations that had by now developed with Flamininus; clearly the Achaeans in spring 197 saw Aristaenus as the best man to communicate with the proconsul.

Greeks” (18.41.9, ἀγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας).⁴⁵

Aristaenus’ next Polybian appearance is during the war against Nabis of Sparta (195), again with Flamininus, and the issue of freedom is even clearer. Livy’s account, obviously derived from Polybius’ lost narrative, depicts a war of liberation to restore *eleutheria* at least to Argos and perhaps also to Sparta.⁴⁶ Aristaenus, re-elected Achaean *strategos* in 196/5,⁴⁷ firmly supports Flamininus’ policy against Nabis at the meeting of Greek allies before the war, and sides with the Athenians against the Aetolians in presenting Rome as the champion (not the subverter) of *libertas* in Greece (Liv. 34.23–24.4).⁴⁸ After the failure of Argos’ revolt against Sparta in the name of *libertas* (34.25.7–12), Aristaenus is depicted as the only Greek general to propose an attack on Sparta, a plan Flamininus approves (34.26.4–7). But most importantly, the set-piece ‘debate’ between Flamininus and Nabis during the subsequent siege of Sparta shows Aristaenus not only publicly supporting Flamininus’ condemnation of Nabis as a tyrant and oppressor of the whole Peloponnesian, but also urging Nabis to abdicate and thus to “restore freedom” to his subjects, like many Peloponnesian tyrants in the past (*restitutaque libertate*, 34.33.2). As Briscoe notes, Aristaenus refers to the Peloponnesian tyrants who, from the third century on, abdicated under pressure from the Achaean League and its foremost leader Aratus of Sicyon.⁴⁹ Thus Aristaenus’ speech, as it originally stood in Polybius,

⁴⁵ Cf. Polyb. 21.20.5, a retrospective on Attalus’ death verbally similar to 18.41.9 but specifying the Boeotian scene.

⁴⁶ Gruen (*supra* n.5: II 450–55) discusses the war’s propaganda and finds a likely factual basis in the emphasis on the liberation of Argos as a matter of honor for both Rome and Flamininus.

⁴⁷ One might speculate that Aristaenus’ re-election as *strategos* in the autumn after the Isthmian Declaration indicates Achaean satisfaction with both Roman policy and Aristaenus’ policy toward Rome.

⁴⁸ For the theme of liberty here cf. the Aetolian attack on the Athenians (who express gratitude for Rome’s services to Greece): *Athenienses, libertatis quondam duces et auctores ... communem causam prodentes* (Liv. 34.23.5); and the Aetolian attack directly upon the Romans: *fraudis Romanos quod vano titulo libertatis ostentato Chalcidem et Demetriadem praesidiis tenerent* (34.23.8).

⁴⁹ J. Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXIV–XXXVII* (Oxford 1981) 104.

placed the glorious mantle of Aratus, one of Polybius' special heroes,⁵⁰ around the war of 195: *i.e.*, Polybius' Aristaenus presents ἐλευθερία as a traditional *Achaean* policy.⁵¹

Two contemporary inscriptions complement this picture of Aristaenus, Flamininus, and freedom in the literary sources. An official Achaean dedication at Delphi, an equestrian statue of Aristaenus, reads: τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν Ἀρίσταινον Τιμοκάδεος Δυμαίων ἀρετᾶς ἔνεκεν καὶ εὐνοίας τᾶς εἰς τὸ ἔθνος καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλανας.⁵² The inscription thus presents Aristaenus as benefactor not merely of the Achaean League and its allies but of all Greece; indeed, the location of the statue at Delphi rather than in (say) Dyme shows the Panhellenic character of Aristaenus' benefactions. If one asks why Aristaenus merited this Panhellenic claim, a reasonable hypothesis would be his close association with Flamininus and hence the policy of *eleutheria*. This finds support in a fragmentary dedication by Aristaenus at Corinth, honoring the ἀρετὴ of Flamininus and his personal benefaction to Aristaenus and to either the Achaeans or all the Greeks.⁵³ The inscription, to be dated between spring 196 (Philip's surrender of Corinth) and Aristaenus' death *ca* 185, most probably (as Bousquet proposes) derives from Aristaenus' *strategia* in 196/5.⁵⁴ The inscription emphasizes Aristaenus' close personal relationship with the Roman commander; but a close association with this man implies an association with his benevolent policies, which Aristaenus acribes to Flamininus' ἀρετὴ. Clearly the most famous of these policies was *eleutheria*, and that connection is

⁵⁰ Polybius explains and defends (2.48–51) many of Aratus' accomplishments—even his most controversial acts, such as the volte-face in favor of Macedon in the mid-220's. See R. Urban, *Wachstum und Krise des achäischen Bundes* (Wiesbaden 1979) 159ff; F. W. Walbank, *Aratus of Sicyon* (Cambridge 1933) esp. 89ff (still useful).

⁵¹ See A. M. Eckstein, "Nabis and Flamininus on the Argive Revolutions of 198 and 197 B.C.," *GRBS* 28 (1987) 229f.

⁵² *FD* III.2 122. R. M. Errington (*Philopoemen* [Oxford 1969] 276–79) has convincingly shown that the Aristaenus of this inscription must be the Achaean statesman.

⁵³ *SEG* XII 214; cf. Bousquet (*supra* n.22) 607.

⁵⁴ Bousquet (*supra* n.22) 609; cf. G. A. Lehmann, *Untersuchungen zur Glaubwürdigkeit des Polybios* (Münster 1967) 224 n.157.

strongly suggested by the location of the inscription at Corinth—site of the Isthmian Declaration.⁵⁵

These inscriptions reflect the tone of the Achaean official tradition on Aristaenus and his course of action in 198–195, a tradition upon which Polybius drew in creating his portrait of the Achaean statesman. This tradition, emphasizing Aristaenus as benefactor to Achaëa and all the Greeks, associated him closely with Flamininus and his policy of freedom.⁵⁶ This was not, however, the only tradition on Aristaenus available to Polybius: the circle of Megalopolitan politicians among whom Polybius grew up certainly had a different view of the man, based on doubting the prudence of the Roman alliance and on personal enmity.⁵⁷ Why, then, did Polybius choose the favorable picture of Aristaenus? Perhaps it facilitated justifying to his Greek audience the great Achaean turnabout of autumn 198; but Polybius also personally thought that Aristaenus' detractors were simply wrong.⁵⁸

Polybius' depiction of the Achaeans in general between 198 and 194 resembles his treatment of Aristaenus: Polybius closely

⁵⁵ The political implication would be all the more dramatic if we assume with Bousquet and Lehmann that the inscription was dedicated immediately after the Isthmia. How far back in time did Aristaenus' personal relationship with Flamininus extend? According to Livy (32.19.1f; obviously from Polybius), one important reason why Flamininus in autumn 198 launched the Roman diplomatic effort in Achaëa was that he knew that Aristaenus personally favored an alliance with Rome. But how could Flamininus have known this? Previous contacts between the two are implied: see Aymard (*supra* n.29) 79; Eckstein (*supra* n.28) 142. Cf. Aymard's speculative but very perceptive suggestion (112) that from autumn 198 Aristaenus hoped to play a rôle of beneficial adviser to Flamininus parallel to that of Aratus from the mid-220's to Antigonos III and Philip V.

⁵⁶ It is interesting that in both places where Aristaenus' inscriptions were dedicated (Delphi and Corinth), Flamininus was explicitly and officially associated with *eleutheria*; for Delphi see Plut. *Flam.* 12.5f; for Corinth, Liv. 34.50.9, with Walbank (*supra* n.22) 613.

⁵⁷ For the policy differences see Eckstein (*supra* n.28) 145f. Personal enmity: in an Achaean assembly of 187/186 Aristaenus publicly humiliated Polybius' father Lycortas in debate over an alliance with Ptolemaic Egypt, a diplomatic mission that Lycortas had botched. See Polyb. 22.9.1–12, with the comments of Lehmann (*supra* n.54) 198–99.

⁵⁸ See Polyb. 18.13.8 (defense of Aristaenus' policy in 198), 24.13.8ff (general assessment of Aristaenus far more favorable than that of Philopoemen at 24.13.6f). On Polybius' independent judgment of Aristaenus, cf. Lehmann (*supra* n.54) 222f, a theme expanded by Eckstein (*supra* n.28) 145–62.

associated Achaëa with the theme of freedom, and possibly implied or indicated a specifically Achaean contribution to the development of Flamininus' concept of Greek freedom. Despite scanty and indirect evidence, a coherent picture emerges.

At Rome in winter 198/7, an Achaean aristocrat, Xenophon of Aegium, appears among the Greek ambassadors advocating liberation from Philip while also hinting at Greeks living in freedom after the war. But an Achaean among the envoys does not surprise, and Xenophon's presence is not underlined.⁵⁹ More interesting is Flamininus' conference with Nabis of Sparta at Mycenae (winter 198/7), where the new Achaean *strategos* Nicostratus, Aristaenus' political ally (*cf.* Aymard [*supra* n.29: 111]), becomes a prominent figure. Polybius has him standing next to Attalus of Pergamum (*cf.* Liv. 32.39.8) as Attalus demands from Nabis a free assembly (*liberam contionem*, 32.40.2) to determine the Argive preference for Nabis' rule or a return to the Achaean League. The incident shows an association of the Achaeans and Attalus with the ideals of *eleutheria*—underlined by Nabis' refusal to allow the vote.⁶⁰

Polybius evidently has Nicostratus again champion Greek freedom in summer 197. The context of his campaign against Macedonian forces based at Corinth emphasized the freedom theme as part of the long struggle to rid the Peloponnese of Philip's Corinthian *arx adversus Graeciae civitates* (Liv. 33.14.2), a struggle in which even ordinary farming people willingly took part (*cf.* 33.15.5). Polybius' detailed description of the Corinthian campaign (*cf.* Liv. 33.14f) apparently presented the

⁵⁹ Xenophon of Aegium accompanied Aristaenus at Nicaea: Polyb. 18.1.4.

⁶⁰ *Cf.* Eckstein (*supra* n.51) 221f. Argos seceded from the Achaean League in autumn 198 after the decision to join Rome; the Argives even accepted a Macedonian garrison (Liv. 32.35, from Polybius). After Nicaea, however, Philip turned Argos over to Nabis—an attempt to keep the Achaeans so distracted by Sparta's growing power that they would avoid attacking the Macedonian position in the northern Peloponnese. Although at Mycenae Nabis refused the Argives a free decision about his rule, he did agree—under pressure from Flamininus—to swear a truce with Achaëa in the person of Nicostratus (Liv. 32.29.10, 40.4).

eventual Achaean victory as a parallel to Flamininus' at Cynosephalae the same summer (*cf.* 33.14.1).⁶¹

Greek events in winter 197/6 thus offered Polybius an excellent opportunity to portray the Achaeans as not only influencing Flamininus but specifically turning him towards a magnanimous policy. Law and order collapsed amidst severe factional infighting and anti-Roman sentiment in Boeotia: hundreds of Roman soldiers traversing the region were murdered (Liv. 33.29). An angry Roman proconsul launched a full-scale invasion, crushing the Boeotian cities with a fine of 500 talents and refusing negotiations with the terrified populace. Athenian and especially Achaean diplomatic intervention saved the situation, for the Achaeans, influential with Flamininus (33.29.11), pleaded the Boeotian case and arranged a meeting of Boeotian envoys with the proconsul, who reduced the fine from 500 to 30 talents (a most unusual Roman act) and restored peace. A few days later, the senatorial commission arrived in Greece (33.30.1). Livy's account presumably follows the dramatic structure of Polybius' Book 18.⁶²

Nevertheless, the most important connection in Polybius between Achaëa and the freedom of the Greeks involves the origins of the Isthmian Declaration itself. Various historical models have been suggested: Antigonus the One-Eyed's declaration of 315, Polyperchon's *diagramma* of 319; the founding decree of the Second Athenian League (377); even the Peace of Antalcidas (the King's Peace, 387/6).⁶³ None of this is very convincing: the models are too remote in time and too obscure for Romans of the 190's, and perhaps even for most Greeks. As practical politicians, Flamininus and the Roman diplomats in

⁶¹ A detailed discussion of Nicostratus' victory in Aymard (*supra* n.29) 164–68; for Polybius as source for the synchronism (Livy's *quidam* at 33.14.1) see Briscoe, *Commentary* (*supra* n.3) 275. A Roman would hardly have mentioned this purely Greek, indeed purely Achaean, episode.

⁶² For the Achaean diplomatic intervention see Aymard (*supra* n.29) 155f.

⁶³ Antigonus Monophthalmus: Diod. 19.61.3 (τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἅπαντας ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, αὐτονόμους); Polyperchon: Diod. 18.55.2, *cf.* *Syll.*³ 317.25–31 (Athens); Second Athenian League: *Syll.*³ 147.20–33 (autonomous, ungarisoned, untaxed, one's own form of government); the King's Peace: Diod. 14.103, Isoc. 8.16, 68 (autonomous, removal of foreign garrisons). On these models see conveniently Ferrary (*supra* n.4) 83.

Greece would naturally seek to express their policy in contemporary terms immediately understandable to their audience.

Contemporary models existed. In fact, declarations of "freedom," "autonomy," and "government by one's own laws"—magnificent gestures by powerful (and even not so powerful) states in their relations with lesser ones—proliferated in the Greek world throughout the third century. The motto and the content of the policy would be quite familiar.⁶⁴ But one model seems uniquely parallel in content and even phraseology to the Declaration of 196: the Hellenic Symmarchy's declaration of war against Aetolia in 220, mandating that communities unwillingly under Aetolian control be henceforth ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, ἐλευθέρους ... πολιτείαις καὶ νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις.⁶⁵ Similar language appears in Flamininus' Isthmian Declaration (Polyb. 18.46.5, cited *supra* n.1). Several recent scholars have thus concluded that the declaration of 220 is the most likely model for Flamininus' declaration of 196; Ferrary even sees the Declaration of 196 as Flamininus' attempt to revive the Hellenic Symmarchy with Rome rather than Macedon at its head.⁶⁶

If the Romans modeled the Isthmian Declaration on that of 220, where did they—and Flamininus in particular—learn of it?⁶⁷ Hardly from King Philip. Although Philip had indeed headed the Hellenic Symmarchy in 220, he seems after Cynoscephalae an unlikely consultant for the terminology of Greek freedom. Rather, Flamininus' Greek allies probably supplied information about the motto and the policy of *eleutheria* (including perhaps details of the declaration of 220). But the Aetolians, targets of the declaration of 220 and soon after Cynoscephalae Flamininus' bitter enemies, seem unlikely advisers.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ A convincing list in Gruen (*supra* n.5) 138–41.

⁶⁵ Polyb. 4.25.6ff, *cf.* 4.84.4f: the specific case of Elis.

⁶⁶ Heidemann (*supra* n.10) 94f; Walbank (*supra* n.22) 612; Ferrary (*supra* n.4) 83f, 88–95 (Flamininus' informal Hellenic Symmarchy); *cf.* Gruen (*supra* n.5) 141 (somewhat ambiguous).

⁶⁷ The full terminology of the Isthmian Declaration appears not in the *senatus consultum* of spring 196, but only after Flamininus' meeting with the senatorial commission at Corinth: see *supra* 50f and n.21.

⁶⁸ On the origins and development of Flamininus' bitter dispute with the Aetolians see Eckstein (*supra* n.2) 287–93.

If the declaration of 220 provided a conscious model for the Isthmian Declaration, the Achaeans most likely supplied it. Flamininus' personal relations in 197–196 with crucial Achaean statesmen like Aristaenus gave them significant influence on Flamininus, as in the Boeotian episode. Moreover, the Achaeans cherished the declaration of 220, for Polybius, our only source, reports it in great detail.⁶⁹ Indeed, Polybius' account of the declaration attributes most complaints against the Aetolians to Achaea, and Aratus of Sicyon's policy apparently triumphs in the subsequent action of the Hellenic Symmachy. No wonder the Achaeans remembered the declaration of 200 with pride.⁷⁰

Nevertheless, it goes too far to suggest that Achaean statesmen referred emphatically to the declaration of 220 as a specific model, for this would assume that Flamininus was impressed by a declaration of war against the Aetolians a quarter-century earlier.⁷¹ But Polybius' evidence for 220 does show just how strongly the *eleutheria* doctrine reflected the *general* Achaean official outlook in this period. A general Achaean emphasis on *eleutheria*, combined with the Isthmian proclamation's similarity to the declaration of 220, is enough to support the probability that Achaean statesmen were the chief Greek source for Flamininus' ideas on Greek freedom.

Indeed, Polybius claims that such ideals were *always* part of the Achaean League's basic principles and goals. When he first introduces Achaea at 2.42.5f, Polybius carefully informs his audience that Achaean policy always upheld ἐλευθερία against kings and tyrants seeking enslavement of Greeks ("freedom," perhaps, in the negative sense) and extended ἰσηγορία and παρρησία as far as possible ("freedom" in its positive sense).⁷²

⁶⁹ Walbank (*supra* n.38: 472) suggests that a copy of the declaration was available in Achaea for Polybius to inspect. The decree is missing, for instance, in Plut. *Arat.* 47f on the outbreak of war in 220–217.

⁷⁰ Achaean complaints: Polyb. 4.25.3f (given more space than Boeotian complaints: 4.25.2); the declaration as triumph of Aratus' policy: Walbank (*supra* n.38) 471.

⁷¹ Flamininus might have found it amusing, given current tensions with the Aetolians, to model the Isthmian proclamation on an anti-Aetolian declaration, but he might equally have thought it impolitic and insulting to this Roman ally.

⁷² Polybius' emphasis on "freedom of speech" (παρρησία) as a traditional Achaean policy illuminates his remark at 18.14.10 (in defense of Aristaenus' policy in 198) on suppression of παρρησία as an integral aspect of treason: *i.e.*,

Further, the Achaeans subsequently accomplished the basic goals of their policy with the aid of allies (2.42.4). The rest of the passage merits quotation:

Though they took part in many projects in common with their allies, and especially in the brilliant endeavors of the Romans, they never showed any desire for any private profit from their success, but demanded, in exchange for the enthusiastic aid they provided their allies, nothing beyond the freedom of each state (ἐκάστων ἐλευθερίαν) and the harmonious union of the Peloponnesians (2.46.6).

That is, the Achaeans traditionally sought to impose the policy of *eleutheria* on all their allies—including (explicitly) the Romans. Thus Polybius' general introduction to the historic policy of the Achaean League would directly present the Achaeans as a major influence on Flamininus' policy of *eleutheria* in 196. This suggests how Polybius may have structured the development of the theme of Greek freedom in Books 17–18.⁷³

But how truthful is Polybius' emphasis on the Achaean contribution to Flamininus' proclamation of *eleutheria*? Polybius does not deny Achaean territorial ambitions (2.42, "the harmonious union of the Peloponnesians"), but his emphasis on the consistent Achaean concern for Greek freedom is easy to see as pro-Achaean bias. Further, not everyone viewed Achaean policies of the 190's favorably: Philip V considered Aristaenus' behavior of 198 as treachery to the Hellenic Symmachy, while the Aetolians claimed in 195 that greed for territory (first Corinth, later Argos) motivated the original Achaean change of policy and continued close cooperation with Rome. This propaganda shows the bitter response that Achaean policy could provoke.⁷⁴

Aristaenus (not a traitor) was not guilty of suppressing *παρρησία*. Such an assertion implies that Aristaenus in 198 attempted to maintain the basic principles of freedom in Achaean policy. On 18.13–15 *cf. supra* 58f; on *παρρησία* as a traditional Achaean ideal *cf.* 2.38.6, 4.34.4 with Ferrary (*supra* n.4) 280 n.59.

⁷³ *Cf.* Walbank (*supra* n.38) 234 (very brief).

⁷⁴ Philip's accusations: Polyb. 18.6.7 (ἄθεσία); *cf.* Liv. 32.34.14 (*perfidia*); Aetolian accusations: Liv. 34.23.6 (*Achaeos, Philippi quondam milites, ad postremum inclinata fortuna eius transfugas, et Corinthum recipisse et id agere*

Thus Polybius emphasized perhaps only one part of the story without concealing the other—a mode of presentation consistent with his historiographical principle (16.14.6) that a historian can show partiality for his native community so long as he does not contradict the facts.⁷⁵ Indeed, as already argued on separate grounds (*supra* 66) the Achaeans *are* the probable source for the terminology (and hence the specific content) of the Isthmian Decree. For Polybius, therefore, the Achaeans deserved the most credit for the evolution of Flamininus' thinking during 198–196 on Greek freedom—and probably with some justification.⁷⁶

Polybius evidently reiterated the close connection between Achaean policy and the Isthmian slogans in events of 195–194.

ut Argos habeant). Both sets of accusations may contain some truth, but both were obviously presented in politically self-serving contexts (Nicaea peace conference, Aetolian demands for more territorial rewards from the Romans). Certainly from autumn 198 on, the Achaeans wanted Corinth for themselves, although this prospect, missing in Aristaeus' speech in Livy, thus probably also did not appear in Polybius; otherwise, Livy would surely have emphasized the prospect of Roman generosity. On Achaea's reputation after 198 see Eckstein (*supra* n.28) 146–50.

⁷⁵ On this passage see T. J. Luce, "Ancient Views on the Causes of Bias in Historical Writing," *CP* 84 (1989) 20. Polybius does not hide Achaean territorial desires in the early 190's; on Corinth see Polyb. 18.2.5, 45.12, *cf.* Liv. 32.19.4. It is (again) a matter of emphasis. Also see Eckstein (*supra* n.28) 148ff.

⁷⁶ Possibly the constitutive charter of Macedon's Hellenic Symmachy (223) formally mandated the freedoms proclaimed at the Isthmia in 196 (*i.e.*, *eleutheria*, no garrisons, no taxes, one's own laws): thus Ferrary (*supra* n.4) 83 with n.135, summarizing earlier scholarship. If so, the Achaeans, who saw themselves as major beneficiaries of the Symmachy when it was working 'properly', would be the obvious candidates to point out this historical model to Flamininus. Still, doubts remain. The Achaeans were forbidden by the Symmachy's formal mechanism to communicate either in writing or by envoy with any king except Philip without the latter's explicit permission, and were under certain circumstances compelled to provide supplies and pay for Macedonian troops (Plut. *Arat.* 45.1f). The Achaeans were also forbidden to propose any measure contrary to the Macedonian alliance (Liv. 32.22.3), and every year they had to swear an oath of allegiance before Macedonian envoys without a reciprocal oath from the Macedonians (*cf.* 32.5.4). Although Achaea clearly was not forced to participate in every war of the Macedonian king (see *supra* 53 and n.29) none of this resembles *eleutheria*. As Aymard notes (*supra* n.29: 55), these were obligations "gravement restrictive de la souveraineté achaienne." *Cf.* Liv. 32.21.36 (from Polybius): *liberare vos a Philippo iam diu magis vultis quam audetis*.

He not only depicted Aristaenus, the Achaean *strategos* in 195, as throwing the glorious mantle of Aratus and liberation around Flamininus' war against Nabis of Sparta (*supra* 61), but apparently also displayed Achaean dissatisfaction with Flamininus for not pushing the policy of liberation further. Thus (to judge from Livy) Polybius presented the Achaeans' delight at the final expulsion of the Spartans from Argos in 195 (contemporary with the siege of Sparta), and Livy's language underlines the extent to which Polybius and his Achaeans viewed this event as a true liberation.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the outcome of the war left the Achaeans in 195 disturbed: Sparta remained still "enslaved" to her tyrant (*serva Lacedaemon relicta*: Liv. 34.41.4), a threatening neighbor. Roman politics (it seems) determined Flamininus' decision: he feared being superseded if the Spartan war dragged on and wanted the *gloria* of its completion, even at the cost of compromise.⁷⁸ The next year, Flamininus' decision still disturbed the Achaeans for the same reasons: *id minime conveniens liberanti Graeciam videbatur, tyrannum reliquisse non suae solum patriae gravem, sed omnibus circa civitatibus metuendum, haerentem visceribus nobilissimae civitatis* (34.48.5f).⁷⁹

Thus, insofar as Polybius depicted a divergence in policy between the Achaeans and Flamininus, the divergence (in Polybius' reconstruction) largely rested on the Achaeans' greater devotion to the ideals of *eleutheria*. And this makes sense. As early as Book 2 Polybius asserted that the ideals of *eleutheria*

⁷⁷ Liv. 34.41.3: *libertatem ex longo intervallo libertatisque auctores Romanos ... voce praeconis libertas est Argivorum*. The Argives rejoined the League—in the Polybian tradition a voluntary and beneficial act: Liv. 34.41.4; Eckstein (*supra* n.51) 222–28. The Aetolians, of course, had a different view (*supra* 68 and n.74).

⁷⁸ Liv. 34.33.14; cf. Plut. *Flam.* 13.1; Aymard (*supra* n.29) 229–34; Eckstein *supra* n.2) 306–08. Carawan (*supra* n.12: 232ff) sees partisan material hostile to Flamininus from an annalistic source or sources in the Livian narrative of 195; but the story of Flamininus' very similar political maneuvers in late 198 for prorogation Livy clearly derives from Polybius (cf. 18.12.1–5).

⁷⁹ The parallel in tone and content between this passage and 34.41.4 (specifically Achaean; cf. the much harsher Aetolian condemnation of Flamininus' decision at Sparta in 41.4) suggests that these remarks are meant to appear as primarily Achaean. Carawan (*supra* n.12: 234 n.45) again proposes that the criticism of Flamininus in 194 is not Polybian but a Roman source opposed to Flamininus. But Flamininus' defense of his policy at Diod. 28.13 (from a Greek source) closely resembles his defense at Liv. 34.49.1ff (cf. 34.48.5f for the criticism).

formed the core of Achaean policy throughout the history of the League; it was the Achaean tradition. But as we saw at the outset, the Romans' concept of freedom for the Greeks evolved gradually and hesitantly. From the Achaean perspective—both in terms of real ideals and (of course) practical interests in the Peloponnese—Flamininus did not completely absorb the implications of the doctrine of freedom, even in 194.⁸⁰

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⁸⁰ P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus (and presumably his many senatorial supporters) cared even less in 194 about the principles of the Isthmian declaration, since he wished to command a large Roman force in Greece to avert Antiochus III's potential aggression (Liv. 34.43.3ff). Scipio's position, rejected by the Senate, may have been politically wise: Liv. 34.43.3–7; Aymard (*supra* n.29) 371 n.13, 405 (*s.v.* "P. Cornelius Scipio"); *cf.* Eckstein (*supra* n.2) 309, 313ff. By contrast, and despite differences with Flamininus, Polybius has the Achaeans lead the Greeks in a magnificent gesture of gratitude to Flamininus for the extent to which he *had* adopted the policy of freedom. As Roman armies withdrew from Greece in spring 194, all Roman prisoners of war whom the Carthaginians had sold into slavery in Greece were searched out and ransomed (Liv. 34.50.5ff): *ne ipsis quidem honestum esse in liberata terra liberatores eius servire* (34.50.3). Polybius, Livy says (34.50.5f), presented only the Achaean financial expenditures on this project (an impressive 100 talents), no one else's. *Cf.* Plut. *Flam.* 13.6, only mentioning the Achaean effort. Once more, Polybius found a way to underline Achaean allegiance to the policy of *eleutheria*.

Completion of this paper was facilitated by a General Research Board grant from the University of Maryland. I wish also to thank E. S. Gruen and the anonymous referee, who provided helpful criticism.