

# Ten-Day Armistices in Thucydides

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THUCYDIDES OBSERVES that in the summer of 421/420, Athens and Boeotia were observing a ten-day truce (5.26.2: ἐκεχειρίαν δεχήμερον ἡγόν). But although he makes several other references to this and to other ten-day armistices (5.32.5, Corinth's failure to obtain one from Athens; 6.7.4, between Athens and the Thracian Chalcidice; 6.10.3, between Athens and some of Sparta's allies, presumably Boeotia and the Chalcidice), Thucydides does not provide specific details of the character of these truces. Andrewes' commentary, which supplements Gomme's initial work, postulates a definition for this type of cease-fire:

presumably a truce made in the first instance for ten days and thereafter terminable at ten days' notice by either side. A truce which needed explicit renewal every ten days would require an unconscionable amount of travelling by envoys ... and one tacitly renewed every ten days would involve risks of miscalculation.<sup>1</sup>

This interpretation misrepresents and incorrectly explains Thucydides' understanding of a ten-day cessation of hostilities, for the evidence suggests that during the Peloponnesian War poleis explicitly renewed truces every ten days; and it may be suggested that *proxenoi* may have been responsible for the formalities involved. If correct, this affects our understanding of *proxenoi* and the nature of diplomatic relations in the late fifth century.

A discussion of these truces in their historical and political contexts requires first a thorough understanding of the terms

<sup>1</sup> A. W. GOMME, A. ANDREWES, and K. J. DOVER, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* IV (Oxford 1978: hereafter 'Andrewes') ad 5.26.2 s.v. ἐκεχειρίαν δεχήμερον. This interpretation receives support from G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca 1972) App. XVII, esp. 336f; and J. A. O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History* (Oxford 1968) 73 n.1, 148 n.3, who follows A. B. West, *The History of the Chalcidic League* (diss. University of Wisconsin 1912) 90.

and their meanings in ancient commentators to refer to various types of agreements available to warring parties and the duration of these agreements. An examination of these issues should place Thucydides' notices of ten-day truces in their proper perspective.

## I. Terminology

*The Adjective δεχήμερος.* Because so much of the discussion regarding the meaning of a ten-day armistice hinges upon modern interpretations of the terminology of Thucydides and others to describe such short-term truces, my initial investigation focuses on analyses by modern commentators. Lexica of the early nineteenth century consistently translated δεχήμερος as "ten days" or "lasting ten days"; when the adjective modified such substantives as ἐκεχειρία and σπονδαί, they understood the phrases to mean "ten day truces."<sup>2</sup> Only in the mid-nineteenth century did English and American lexicographers cite some or all of the relevant Thucydidean passages in the entry for δεχήμερος, -ον and therefore expand the meaning of the adjective when it modified ἐκεχειρία or σπονδαί. The first publication of Liddell and Scott's *Greek-English Lexicon* presented the initial interpretation of ἐκεχειρία δεχήμερος as an armistice terminable on ten-days' notice.<sup>3</sup> The most recent

<sup>2</sup> F. W. Riemer, *Kleines griechisch-deutsches Hand-Wörterbuch* (Jena 1815); J. G. Schneider, *Handwörterbuch der griechischen Sprache*, ed. F. Passow (Leipzig 1819); C. Schreuel, *Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum et Latino-Graecum* (London 1825); B. Hederich, *Graecum Lexicon Manuale* (London 1826); B. C. F. Rost, *Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Erfurt 1829); F. Passow, *Handwörterbuch der griechischen Sprache* (Leipzig 1831); C. Alexandre, *Dictionnaire grec-français* (Paris 1835); K. Ramshorn, *Griechisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch* (Leipzig 1838).

<sup>3</sup> H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon Based on the German Work of Francis Passow*, ed. H. Drisler (London 1846; first American edition, New York 1864): "for ten days, lasting ten days; ἐκ. δεχ., a truce, from ten days to ten days, i.e., terminable at any time on giving ten days' notice," citing Thuc. 5.26; cf. J. Pickering, *Comprehensive Lexicon of the Greek Language* (Boston 1847) s.v. δεχήμερος.

The concept of an agreement terminable within x period of time, introduced to the discussion by Liddell and Scott in 1846, seems to drive from nineteenth-century British diplomatic parlance. A survey of British treaties since the beginning of the twelfth century collected in C. Parry and C. Hopkins, *An Index of British Treaties, 1101-1968 I-III* (London 1970) brought to light

edition of this lexicon (LSJ<sup>9</sup> *s.v.*) supplies a general definition of “for ten days, lasting ten days” and, as an adjective modifying ἐκεχειρία, σπονδαί, or ἀνοχαιί, δεχήμερος also means “terminable at ten days’ notice (or, renewable every ten days).” Clearly Andrewes accepted Liddell and Scott’s version and incorporated it into his discussion of the events following the Peace of Nicias.

Contrary to Andrewes’ position, the scholiast to Thuc. 5.26.2 defines δεχήμερον as πρὸς δέκα ἡμέρας,<sup>4</sup> which LSJ (*s.v.* III.4) interprets as the use of πρὸς plus a temporal accusative; *i.e.*, something “lasting for (ten) days.” A translation of δεχήμερος as “terminable within ten days’ notice” or “within ten days” is not possible with πρὸς and the accusative. Had Thucydides used the dative and the preposition ἐν (LSJ *s.v.* IV, of time) to describe this length of time, then that meaning would have been clear. In addition, Pollux, when addressing the division of months into days, describes the last third of a month as δεχήμερος (1.63). No indication from the ancient lexicographers suggests that this adjective means anything more than a period of ten days; nowhere do they propose that δεχήμερος implies an event to occur within ten days, or that anything shall result after ten days.

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only two agreements negotiated before the nineteenth century that might have terminated upon *x* years’ notice. Parry and Hopkins cite a treaty of truce and mercantile intercourse between England and France in 1471 during the War of the Roses as the first occurrence of this idea. A reading of the text reveals instead that the truce could be revoked only after the first five years of the twenty-year truce had elapsed. For the text see T. Rymer, *Foedera, conventiones, literae et cuiuscunque generis Acta publica inter Reges Angliae....* (London 1704–17) XI 683–90. Eleven years later England negotiated a mercantile agreement with the province of Guipuscoa in northern Spain, terminable on six months’ notice. The next instance of a treaty so described appears in 1813, an agreement between England and the U.S. providing for the exchange of prisoners during the War of 1812; after this the concept becomes fairly standard. I suggest that Liddell and Scott employed for their translation a diplomatic term that had fallen into disuse in the late fifteenth century and had not re-entered the language of diplomacy until more than 300 years later. Unfortunately, the conflation of a nineteenth-century British diplomatic convention with one mentioned by Thucydides and in use during the Peloponnesian War has had a profound effect on our understanding of ten-day armistices.

<sup>4</sup> C. Hude, ed., *Scholia in Thucydidem* (Leipzig 1927) *s.v.* Βοιωτοί (5.26.2). See also the *TGL s.v.* δεχήμερος; “Decem dies durans, spatio decem dierum constans, ut ἐκεχειρία, σπονδαί, Suid.”

A study of other numerical adjectives lends credence to a definition of δεχήμερος as “lasting ten days.” Ordinal adjectives ending in -ος mean only a duration of  $x$  (period of time).<sup>5</sup> Only when the adjective is formed by the addition of -αῖος can it mean ‘recurring every  $x$ ,’ ‘on the  $x^{\text{th}}$ ,’ or ‘within  $x$ .’<sup>6</sup> Hence it appears that Thucydides only uses δεχήμερος as an adjective that specifies explicitly a duration of ten days and that no implicit meaning accompanies this term. Andrewes adopted LSJ’s interpretation and dismissed the possibility that negotiated truces were either explicitly or implicitly renewed within any particular period of time.

*The Terminology of Truces and Treaties:* ἐκεχειρία, ἀνοχαί, ἀνοκωχαί, σπονδαί. According to Karavites, the terms Thucydides uses—ἐκεχειρία, ἀνοχαί, and ἀνοκωχαί—to describe “a cessation of hostilities” or “an armistice/truce” are all interchangeable and refer to truces of various lengths, with no one term used any more specifically than any other. So, the ten-day truce between Athens and Boeotia is ἐκεχειρίαν δεχήμερον (5.26.2), while such truces are also described as τὰς ... δεχημέρους ἐπισπονδάς (5.32.5), δεχημέρους σπονδάς (6.7.4), and δεχημέροις σπονδαῖς (6.10.3).<sup>7</sup> Since Thucydides draws no distinctions between ten-day armistices labelled (ἐπι)σπονδαί and those described as ἐκεχειρίαί (or, as we shall see, as ἀνοχαί or ἀνοκωχαί), then (ἐπι)σπονδαί can also signify a ‘truce’. In this last instance, however, there is the implication of a formal

<sup>5</sup> The references in this and the succeeding note are from LSJ *s.v.* τετραήμερος, Arist. *HA* 553a10; ἑξήμερος, Vett. Val. 369.24, Procl. *Hyp.* 3.56; ἑπταήμερος, Dio Cass. 76.1; ἑνδεκαήμερος, Gal. 7.510; δωδεκαήμερος, Eust. 128.13; δωδεκήμερος, *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 374.89; πεντεκαιδεχήμερος, Polyb. 18.34.5; τριακονθήμερος, Hdt. 2.4, Polyb. 21.13.12, *IG* IV.1<sup>2</sup> 532; πεντεκονθήμερος, D.H. 2.57.

<sup>6</sup> ἑβδομαῖος, Hp. *Epid.* 1.24; ὀγδοαῖος, Gal. 7.505; ἑνταῖος, Thuc. 2.49; δεκαταῖος, Pl. *Resp.* 614b; δωδεκαταῖος, *ibid.*; ἑκκαϊδεκαταῖος, Σ Ar. *Thes.* 86; ἑπτακαϊδεκαταῖος, Hp. *Aph.* 4.36; ὀκτωκαϊδεκαταῖος, Hp. *Morb.* 2.25; εἰκοσταῖος, Hp. *Prog.* 15, Antiph. 1.20; εἰκοστοεκταῖος, Gal. 7.501; ὀγδοηκοσταῖος, Hp. *Art.* 69.

<sup>7</sup> P. Karavites, *Capitulations and Greek Interstate Relations: The Reflection of Humanistic Ideals in Political Events* (Göttingen 1982) 26–29. So C. Phillipson, *The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome* (London 1911) I 376, links ἐκεχειρία and ἀνοκωχαί as “the suspension of arms” that were distinct from σπονδαί or a definite treaty. See also II 280f, where Phillipson outlines the differences between such terms as ἐπισπονδαί and ὑποσπόνδοι that are discussed *infra*.

act (the pouring of libations, the taking of oaths, *etc.*) that accompanies the implementation of σπονδαί.<sup>8</sup> The sources never state whether the other terms used for a truce also include libation-pouring and oath-taking; since σπονδαί, however, require these actions κατὰ τὰ πάτρια and Thucydides considers σπονδαί a synonym for ἐκεχειρία, it follows that all these types of agreements<sup>9</sup> were accompanied by formal religious acts.<sup>10</sup>

Other related terms appear in military or diplomatic circumstances and convey corresponding connotations. ὑποσπόνδοι usually refers to the dead retrieved from a battlefield after

<sup>8</sup> F. ADCOCK and D. J. MOSLEY, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (London 1975: hereafter 'Adcock and Mosley') 122, draw a clear picture of the meaning and use of σπονδαί: "Spondai, basically libations, then by extension the agreement solemnized by the libation, was used extensively first to denote a truce, then as a synonym for an agreement or treaty in general."

The term is perhaps best defined and discussed by J. Herrmann, "ΣΠΟΝΔΗ und ΣΠΟΝΔΑΙ," in *Studi in Onore di Edoardo Volterra* (Milan 1971) III 135–42, who uses the definition given by H. Étienne (*TGL*) *s.v.* σπονδή as the basis for his discussion of the political implications of σπονδαί: "Σπονδαί peculiariter de iis etiam libationibus dicuntur, quae foederibus et induciis sancientibus adhibentur; atque pro ipsis etiam foederibus, pactis, induciis, induciis accipiuntur, quae scilicet libatione intercedente sanctae sunt."

On the technical use of σπονδαί to indicate a cessation of hostilities and the accompanying formalities, see also H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* II (Munich 1962) 165ff; G. Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* Hft. 2, with H. Swoboda (Munich 1926) 1250–59; P. Graetzel, *De pactionum inter Graecas civitates factarum ad bellum pacemque pertinentium appellationibus formulis ratione* (diss. Halle 1885) 5–15; F. Hampl, "Thuc. III.75.1 and der Terminus 'Σπονδαί,'" *Philologus* 91 (1936) 153–60; A. Kirchoff, *Thukydides und sein Urkundenmaterial* (Berlin 1895) 150–75; C. Meyer, *Die Urkunden im Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (Munich 1955) 41–65; P. Karavites, "Spondai-Spendein in the Fifth Century B.C.," *AntCl* 53 (1984) 60–70, esp. 67, where he equates ἀνοκωχαί and ἐκεχειρίαί with short-term σπονδαί.

<sup>9</sup> Separate from this discussion is the sacred or Olympic truce (ἡ Ὀλυμπιακὴ ἐκεχειρία); on this see Thuc. 5.49.3, Plut. *Lyc.* 23, Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16, *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1126.48f; also P. Stengel, *Die griechischen Kultusaltertümer*<sup>3</sup> (Munich 1920) 192–95; and K. Latte, "Spondophoroi," *RE* IIIA.2 (1929) 1847–50. Note also Adcock and Mosley 11.

<sup>10</sup> A notice in [Ammonius] *De vocab. diff.* 129f states that σπονδαί are types of agreements that are inscribed (ὡς ἀναγράφονται). This is not to suggest that every truce, regardless of its duration, was inscribed and displayed on a stele; certainly armistices of short duration were not likely to be preserved on stone. Nevertheless, the late reference of Ammonius adds to the concept that σπονδαί and probably its synonyms, were formal agreements accompanied by traditional rituals. Cf. Karavites (*supra* n.7) 69f.

the negotiation of a brief armistice lasting a day or two.<sup>11</sup> Typically heralds conveyed the negotiating positions of each side prior to the issue's resolution.<sup>12</sup> Analogously, ἔνσπονδοί signifies those individuals party to an agreement,<sup>13</sup> and ἄσπονδοί those who have been excluded (Thuc. 3.113.2).

Thucydides calls the ten-day armistice between Boeotia and Athens agreed upon after the Peace of Nicias in 421/420 ἐπισπονδαί, *i.e.*, “a treaty made after another” (LSJ *s.v.* ἐπισπονδή).<sup>14</sup> As Andrewes points out, this notice should have appeared directly after the text of the Peace (5.19), for as a truce concluded as a series of “additional clauses to a treaty” (5.32.5, *s.v.* τὰς τε δεχημέρους ἐπισπονδάς) it would be natural for it to receive mention after the treaty between Athens and Sparta that Boeotia rejected. The apparent lack of connection between the Peace of Nicias and the Athenian/Boeotian truce termed ἐπισπονδάς makes sense if instead it means “a ten-day renewable armistice” totally separate from the Peace, and not as an appendix to it.

Also at 5.32 Thucydides states that Corinth, whose ἀνοκωχή with Athens was ἄσπονδος, sought one that was ἐπισπονδαί as Boeotia had. What does this imply? If an armistice was ἐπισπονδαί and thus, presumably, subject to the traditions suitable to the conclusion of σπονδαί and desirable, then one

<sup>11</sup> W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* IV (Berkeley 1985) 153ff, esp. 186–234, amasses all the literary and epigraphic evidence for the retrieval of corpses after battle. The earliest attested use of ὑπόσπονδοί in the context of a battlefield truce occurs in Thucydides (1.63.3). For τὰ ὑπόσπονδα as the truce itself see Thuc. 2.92.4. For the synonymous use of σπονδαί see Paus. 3.5.5–8; Thuc. 3.113; 4.14.5, 38, 98–101, esp. 98.8.

<sup>12</sup> Pritchett (*supra* n.11) 159 and *passim*.

<sup>13</sup> *E.g.* Thuc. 1.31.2, 40.4; Dio 38.10.1, but *cf.* 54.9.1, where τὸ ἔνσπονδον refers to an allied nation; *cf.* also Thuc. 1.31.2, 35.2, 40.3; 3.10.6; Eur. *Bacch.* 924, where ἔνσπονδοί signifies allies.

<sup>14</sup> J. Classen's commentary on 5.32.5 (J. CLASSEN, *Thucydides*, edd. J. Steup and R. Stark [repr. Berlin 1966–77: hereafter 'Classen'] *s.v.* ἐπισπονδάς) points out that at 5.22.2, regarding the context of the Spartan-Athenian fifty-years' peace of 421, Argos had not wished to renew (ἐπισπένδεσθαι) her treaty with Sparta: “einen neuen Vertrag schliessen, einen ablaufenden Vertrag erneuern.” But *cf.* LSJ *s.v.* ἐπισπένδω *med.*, “make a fresh treaty” (citing 5.22). Classen does not apply this meaning to the ἐπισπονδάς at 5.32.5, however, but simply equates it with the σπονδάς of 5.26.2. If the substantive ἐπισπονδαί can retain the middle-voice meaning of a renewed treaty, as opposed to additional negotiations, then the αἱ δεχήμεροι ἐπισπονδαί at 5.32.5 might signify a ‘ten-day renewable armistice’. See also E.-A. Bétant, *Lexicon Thucydideum* (Geneva 1843–47) *s.v.* ἐπισπονδαί: “foedus post alterum factum.”

that was ἄσπονδος (as Thucydides seems to imply at 5.32.7) was insufficient, at least for Corinth's purposes. The alpha privative suggests that a cease-fire negotiated under such terms lacked the ritual pouring of libations and the taking of oaths.<sup>15</sup> Corinth's desire to alter the terms of her arrangement with Athens by equating it with the one Athens had struck with Boeotia, and her unsuccessful efforts to compel Boeotia to break off her truce with Athens if the negotiations failed (which they did), suggests that Corinth sought a more permanent and religiously sanctioned arrangement. I accept as the most probable solution Grote's suggestion that the Corinthian-Athenian armistice was a de facto agreement lacking the appropriate oaths and libations.<sup>16</sup> The same holds true with a polis that is ἔκσπονδος in negotiations, not because the armistice is not ritually confirmed, but because the polis concerned is not party to an agreement at all.<sup>17</sup>

*The Duration of Armistices.* Truces and treaties of lengths from as little as one day's duration to as much as one made to endure forever occur throughout Greek literature.<sup>18</sup> Typically, those of relatively short duration (*i.e.*, of one year or less) either dealt with the removal of the dead from fields of battle or provided for negotiations to secure a longer, lasting peace.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>15</sup> So Andrewes *ad* 5.32.7 *s.v.* ἀνοκωχή ἄσπονδος.

<sup>16</sup> G. Grote, *A History of Greece* (London 1888) V 423f.

<sup>17</sup> LSJ *s.v.* ἔκσπονδος: "out of the treaty, not a party thereto," Thuc. 3.68.1; Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.32; Dem. 19.44; Polyb. 21.30.5. At Thuc. 1.37.4, τὸ ... ἄσπονδον, which the Corcyreans possessed in 433 prior to the outbreak of the war, seems to signify a policy of neutrality, in the sense that Corcyra had avoided making alliances prior to the conflict with Corinth; *cf.* 1.32.4 and R. A. Bauslaugh, *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece* (Berkeley 1991) 7, 26, and 9, where he shows that the political rhetoric of the Corinthian speech makes a pointed reference to the (so-called) policy of nonalignment pursued by Corcyra; *cf.* 13. See also Bétant (*supra* n.14) *s.v.* ἄσπονδος: "nullo foedere icto."

<sup>18</sup> The question of the terminology of treaties and their duration in Latin literature is similarly complex and will not be addressed here. Parallels with Greek political and military terms certainly exist, *e.g.* Liv. 9.41.5f (*indutiae*); *cf.* Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8.68.4, 9.43.6, 10.46.12, 24.27.4 (*indutiis*). For the Latin terms used to distinguish between types of truces and treaties see Liv. 34.57.7ff; F. De Martino, *Storia della costituzione romana*<sup>2</sup> (Naples 1973) II 63–68.

<sup>19</sup> The following excludes those truces enacted for the removal of the dead from the battlefield: Thuc. 4.39.1–3, 118.1–119.2; 5.60.1 (cited at 5.63.1); Plut. *Pel.* 29.6; Dem. 18.164; Diod. 11.80.6; 14.38.3, 80.8; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 2.1.8. On truces of short duration intended for various political reasons, such as negotiations or the encouragement of a change in the domestic or foreign

Those agreements concluded for a longer period of time generally should not be considered armistices but peace treaties and will not be discussed here, but several truces of various lengths of time merit special attention.

A decree of Argos that includes provisions for Cnossos and Tylissos refers to σπονδαί of five days' duration.<sup>20</sup> Unfortunately, the commentaries both of Meiggs and Lewis and of Volgraff do not address the duration of these provisions (col. II 18ff): σπ/ονδάνς θέσθο ἔν τοῖ δεομένο/ι πέντε ἀμέρανς. The making of a five-days' truce arises only if a battle takes place and one of the other signatories to the overall agreement is absent (lines 17f). The causal relationship between this provision and the legality (θέσθο) of entering into a five-days' cease-fire, which follows directly after provisions for meeting in the federal assembly to forge new *spondai* (col. I 6–11) or to establish new relations with other poleis (cols. I–II 11–17), implies that the five days' truce would allow Argos, Cnossos, and Tylissos to consult with each other and attempt to solicit assistance from the allies

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policy of a polis, see D. J. Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (Wiesbaden 1973) 68–74, esp. 68f.

Truces often appear in the sources with no specified duration: Thuc. 3.4.4, 109–111, 114.2; 4.16.1, 21.3, 23.1, 38.1, 58.1; 6.7.1; 8.17, 36ff, 57ff. (the three Spartan-Persian treaties); Diod. 14.39.6; Zonar. 8.17.3; *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 86 and 61, Athenian relations with Methone and Macedon in 430. Here, no truce is mentioned but reference is made to negotiated terms, and the language suggests a cease-fire may have been in force. Cf. Thuc. 3.114.3 (100-year peace), 5.18.9 (fifty years; see *infra*) 1.112.1 (five years).

B. Keil, cited by J. de Romilly ("Guerre et paix entre cités," in J.-P. Vernant, ed., *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne* [Paris 1968] 208), summarizes the function of a peace of specific duration, whether it is one lasting five years or a century: "La paix était une interruption contractuelle de la guerre, et non la guerre une interruption de l'état de paix." Karavites (*supra* n.7) 64–68, esp. 67, collates the uses of *spondai/spendein* in Thucydides and demonstrates that they could apply to treaties of various lengths, as well as to defensive alliances and truces.

<sup>20</sup> R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, ed., *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1988) no. 42, esp. col. II 18ff; I. Chatzidakis, "Κνωσίων καί Τυλισίων συνθήκη," *ArchEph* (1914) 94–98 (ed. prin.); *I.Cret.* I 307 (phot.). The most thorough commentary appears in W. Volgraff, "Le Decret d' Argos relatif à un pacte entre Knossos et Tylissos," *VerhAkWetAmsterdam* n.s. 51.2 (1948) 1–105.



not previously involved.<sup>21</sup> There is no indication that this potential truce provides for any other specific circumstance, such as the retrieval of corpses from a battlefield or of renewal.

In 423/422 Athens and Sparta concluded a one-year armistice.<sup>22</sup> Thucydides expressly states in the text of the truce the reason for this cease-fire's duration (4.118.13): ἐν τούτῳ χρόνῳ ἰόντας ὡς ἀλλήλους πρέσβεις καὶ κήρυκας ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους, καθ' ὅτι ἔσται ἡ κατάλυσις τοῦ πολέμου. This armistice clearly served as a hiatus during which negotiations towards a more lasting peace might proceed. No provision, however, existed for this truce's renewal, and after the year ended the truce expired.<sup>23</sup>

Polybius, in a number of passages pertaining to the events of the early second century, illustrates the purpose of a short armistice, specifically of ten or fifteen days and on one occasion of four months: the period of the cease-fire permitted negotiation toward a permanent peace. In 197 T. Flamininus granted Philip V a fifteen-day cease-fire in order to confer and settle the war (18.34.5). The same year saw Flamininus grant Antiochus and the Aetolians four months during which they were to work towards a peaceful settlement (18.39.5). When Phaineas and the Aetolians sought peace with Rome in 191 M'. Acilius Glabrio conferred upon them a ten-day truce for the purpose of negotiations (20.9.5); and when more time was needed, he renewed it for another ten days (20.10.12: πάλιν ἀνοχὰς αὐτοῖς δοθῆναι δεχνημέρους). The Aetolians rejected Glabrio's proposals and ὅθεν ἅμα τῷ διελθεῖν τὰς ἐν ταῖς

<sup>21</sup> The only discussion of this portion of the text, in Chatzidakis' initial publication, suggests this scenario: "[ὀρίζεται ὅτι] ... ἂν συμπλακῆ εἰς μάχην πρὸς ἐχθρὸν ἢ ἕτερα τῶν συμμαχίδων, μὴ παρόντων τῶν συμμάχων, οἱ ἔχοντες ἀνάγκην βοθηεῖας ὄφειλον νὰ συνάπτωσι πέντε ἡμερῶν ἀνακωχὴν, ἕως οὗ φθάσῃ βοήθεια."

<sup>22</sup> Thuc. 4.117ff; 5.1.1, 16.1.

<sup>23</sup> Thuc. 5.1.1. Note that during this armistice meetings took place to consider whether the period of one year could be extended (5.15.2). There were in most treaties no provisions for renewal but provisions that stipulated the abrogations that would cause the termination of an agreement—e.g. Thuc. 1.23.4; 4.16.2; cf. Meiggs and Lewis (*supra* n.20) no. 20.

A good example of a treaty's expiration can be found at Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1–4, on the Peace of Antalcidas and the thirty-years' peace of 418 after Mantinea. The only example in Thucydides in which a treaty or truce stipulates provisions of renewal occurs in the text of the Peace of Nicias (5.18.10f). This renewal occurred annually and the Peace was to endure for a considerable length of time.

ἀνοχαῖς ἡμέρας κατάμονος αὐθις ὁ πόλεμος ἐγεγόνει τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. Here Polybius explicitly states that a ten-day truce had to be externally renewed and if not, no renewal occurred.

In another passage Polybius refers to a truce of six months (21.5.11) and provides a reason for seeking a truce longer than one of ten or fifteen days. When the Aetolians learned that the redress sought could not be obtained from the Roman general in the field, L. Scipio, but only from the Roman Senate, the Aetolians asked for and received a six-month armistice in order to send an embassy to Rome (21.5.11).

These passages from Polybius demonstrate that by the mid-second century αἱ ἀνοχαί of specified duration were sought and/or granted to facilitate negotiations for peace, and the length of armistices depended upon the time needed for travel and discussion. In addition, the renewal of an armistice was not implicit but could be conferred or, perhaps, agreed upon jointly, if additional time was needed to establish a political or military response to a particular situation.

Similar circumstances arise in a number of passages in Thucydides. He describes in the events preceding the Spartan siege of Plataea in 429 a situation in which an armistice serves to facilitate negotiations. Archidamus offered the Plataeans conditions under which they would evacuate their city until the end of the war, at which time the Spartans would return it intact. Bound already by oaths to the Athenians and with the Spartan army encamped on the Plataean border, the Plataeans requested an armistice (2.73.1: σπείσασθαι ... ἐκέλευον), during which time Archidamus would not violate their territory: ὁ δὲ ἡμέρας τε ἐσπείσατο ἐν αἷς εἰκὸς ἦν κομισθῆναι, καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἔτεμνεν (2.73.1).<sup>24</sup>

A similar scenario arises immediately after the Athenian victory at Pylos in 425. In order to secure the release of the hostages on the island the Spartans decided to approach the Athenian strategoi and σπονδὰς ποιησαμένους τὰ περὶ Πύλον ἀποστεῖλαι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρέσβεις περὶ ξυμβάσεως (4.15.2).<sup>25</sup> The provisions of the σπονδαί are given at 4.16, including the stipulation that if either side breaks any portion of the truce the armistice shall terminate (4.16.2). The armistice, otherwise,

<sup>24</sup> "He gave them an armistice for the days during which it was reasonable to journey [to Athens] and did no damage to the land."

<sup>25</sup> "....concluding an armistice at Pylos, to send ambassadors to Athens with a view to ending the war."

remained in force until the Spartan *presbeis* returned from Athens.

Neither of these examples from Thucydides mentions the duration of the armistice but from the contexts the length of each truce must have been brief.<sup>26</sup> Armistices of short duration served particular political and military purposes. The ten-day armistice seems to have had very limited use outside the period of the Peloponnesian War; the only other recorded incident involved the Aetolians and Romans in 191, and in this case it is clear that renewal would have occurred only under external influence, not from some implicit understanding intrinsic to ten-day armistices. The type of ten-day truce negotiated by Athens with other Greek states in the late fifth century, specifically in the period just after the Peace of Nicias, seems to have been an institution unique to Athens that permitted a continuation of the status quo. Thucydides is curiously silent about the reason for, and advantages of, entering into such an agreement. Perhaps it served as a temporary expedient for the Athenians to maintain the cease-fire negotiated by Nicias with those Peloponnesian allies reluctant to become signatories to the Peace of 421. Were these ten-day armistices sufficient for travel, discussion, and the formulation of a response to a situation or did they signify something else?

## II. Thucydides and Ten-Day Armistices

As I noted earlier, Andrewes interprets Thucydides' references to ten-day cease-fires as those that are terminable at ten-days' notice and rejects the idea of an armistice renewed every ten days. The analysis of the adjective *δεχήμερος* (*supra* 330ff) indicates that a truce so described means "lasting ten days" and the definition offered by Andrewes must be rejected. It remains then to define further a ten-day armistice and establish that this definition suits the contexts in which they occur in Thucydides' account.

<sup>26</sup> Aulus Gellius (*NA* 1.25) quotes Varro's definition of a truce (*indutiae*), which is described as a peace lasting for a few days in a military camp, during which a state of war continues although fighting ceases. Gellius rightly points out that a truce can last longer than a few days, but that its general meaning connotes no fighting and no trouble up to a fixed time, after which all laws of war are again in force.

The end of winter and the beginning of spring of 422/421 saw the conclusion of the Peace of Nicias, a treaty that Thucydides labels σπονδαί (5.18.11), ξύμβασις, and εἰρήνη (5.17.2). Soon after the finalization of this treaty, just before the summer of 421/420 (5.24.2), Athens and Sparta negotiated a separate alliance (ξύμμαχία, e.g. 5.25.1).<sup>27</sup> Boeotia and Athens had concluded a ten-day truce shortly after this alliance, presumably at the beginning of the summer of 421/420 (5.32.5). The Corinthians approached the Boeotians and asked them to help them gain a ten-day truce from Athens—the same type of truce Boeotia had with Athens—in the same summer (5.32.1: τοῦ θέρους τούτου).<sup>28</sup> If the Boeotian-Athenian armistice began at the onset of the summer of 421/420, an examination of the chronological sequence of events concerning Corinth during this season reveals the following:

<sup>27</sup> For analyses of the relations between Athens and the allies of Sparta after this alliance see R. J. Buck, "The Athenian Dominance of Boeotia," *CP* 65 (1970) 217–27; H. D. Westlake, "Thucydides and the Uneasy Peace," *CQ* n.s. 21 (1971) 315–25; R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 338–50, 462; D. J. Mosley, "Diplomacy in Classical Greece," *AncSoc* 3 (1972) 1–16 and "Greek Perpetual Alliances in Macedon," *RivStorAnt* 2 (1972) 7–11.

<sup>28</sup> 5.26.2: καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης ξύμμαχοι οὐδὲν ἦσσαν πολέμιοι ἦσαν Βοιωτοὶ τε ἐκεχειρίαν δεχήμερον ἦγον. In Classen's text and commentary this phrase is bracketed as an insertion. Among the reasons offered for its unlikely Thucydidean origin is the author's failure to refer to the actual state of affairs between Athens and the Thracian Chalcidice (in the light of 6.7.4, on which see *infra* n.30), which admitted the same type of ten-day armistice Boeotia is described as maintaining. Yet, although they are πολέμιοι, Athens and the Thracian Chalcidice do not renew hostilities actively between 421 and 415 (although Dion reduces Thyssos in Acte, allied to Athens, in 421: see 5.35.1 with Andrewes *ad loc.* on the Ms. problems; and in the winter of this year, Olynthos took Meczyberna, which was garrisoned by Athens: see 5.39) and when Sparta sent to the Chalcidice to enlist their support against Athens by supporting Perdicas, they refused (6.7.4), thereby maintaining the armistice. Perhaps the seeming contradiction between the notices in 5.26.2 and 6.7.4 simply reflect an omission on Thucydides' part; it does not seem to reflect an error, for the parties to an armistice could with reason be described as πολέμιοι. Nicias' speech before the ecclesia in 415 confirms the hostile, if perhaps static, relationship still in force between Athens and the Chalcidice (6.10.5: Χαλκιδῆς γε οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης ἔτη τοσαῦτα ἀφροστῶτες ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἔτι ἀχείρωτοὶ εἰσι). The tenor of Nicias' remarks reflects the temporary nature of the armistices maintained with Sparta's allies who would revert to hostilities at the first opportunity (6.10.3f). Another solution would put the conclusion of the Athenian-Chalcidicean armistice sometime after 421 but before 415, and reference to it would not appear in 5.26.2.

(1) Corinth sends an embassy to Argos, discusses a possible alliance, and returns home (5.27).

(2) Corinth receives a deputation from Sparta, which tries to prevent Corinth from deserting Sparta and joining Argos. Corinth dismisses the Spartans with the promise to discuss the question. An Argive embassy present at Corinth urges the alliance but is put off until the next meeting (5.30).

(3) An Elean embassy arrives at Corinth and fashions an alliance with her. Corinth and the Chalcidice then join the Argive alliance while the Boeotians and the Megarians take no action (5.31).

(4) About the same time during this summer Athens reduces Scione and returns the Delians to Delos. Also, Phocis and Locris go to war (5.32.1f).

(5) Corinth and Argos send envoys to Tegea to urge her to revolt from Sparta. Corinth then approaches the Boeotians and attempts to convince them to join an alliance with Corinth and Argos.

At this point the Corinthians ask the Boeotians to accompany them to Athens and obtain for them a ten-day truce like the one Athens and Boeotia negotiated at the beginning of the summer. The Boeotians and Corinthians proceed to Athens but are unsuccessful in gaining a ten-day truce for Corinth. Boeotia refuses to denounce her armistice with the Athenians.

Due to the considerable number of negotiations that involved Corinth at this time, it is safe to assume that from the initial Boeotian-Athenian armistice until the arrival of the Boeotian-Corinthian embassy in Athens more than ten days had elapsed. In addition, the status that Boeotia had with Athens and that Corinth sought implies that a ten-day armistice did not provide enough time to negotiate peaceful terms.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, if the armistice was not somehow renewable, there would be no

<sup>29</sup> Note also that according to the "Old Oligarch" (*Ath. Pol.* 3.1ff) there were often delays, lasting as long as one year, in Athens for those wishing to consult with the boule and the demos (3.2). At 3.1 the author emphasizes the delays and difficulties of foreigners (which would include envoys) getting an audience in Athens. It seems unlikely that envoys involved in presenting testimony relevant to major foreign policy decisions could undergo considerable delay, to which *IG I<sup>3</sup> 40* appears to speak. In this text, in which Chalcis treats with Athens *ca* 446/445, hearings are granted within ten days to any deputation from Chalcis (lines 12ff). This certainly appears to confirm the Old Oligarch's observations. See also *IG II<sup>2</sup> 96, 128*; Adcock and Mosley 170.

reason why Corinth needed a ten-day truce unless battle had just recently been joined and time was required to regroup; no such event, however, had occurred.

Thucydides makes clear at the end of 5.32.7 the precise difference between the status of Boeotia and Corinth in terms of Athens. The ten-day truce between Athens and Boeotia, and for that matter between Athens and the Thracian Chalcidice,<sup>30</sup> probably gained religious sanction through the administration of oaths and the pouring of libations. This assumption derives from the juxtaposition of the description of Boeotia's truce (5.32.7: σπονδάς) with that of Corinth's (5.32.7: ἄσπονδος).<sup>31</sup> In other words, Corinth's present armistice with Athens, unlike the Boeotian-Athenian relationship, was not ratified according to custom. Corinth then eagerly sought the type of cessation of hostilities Athens maintained with Boeotia and the Chalcidice, one that was κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.

If ten days were insufficient for negotiations leading towards peace and yet there were no explicit provisions for the renewal of a ten-day armistice, a number of interpretations arise. Such a truce might have lasted only ten days; but then, surely Corinth would not seek so eagerly to engage Athens in a short term agreement whose termination approached so abruptly. Or, implicit in a ten-day cease-fire lay a perpetual, de facto renewal

<sup>30</sup> 6.7.4. In 416/415 Thucydides says that the Thracian Chalcidice was observing a ten-days' armistice with Athens, which the scholiast attempts to clarify (τουτέστιν οἰστίσιν μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπῆρχον αἱ δεχήμεροι σπονδαί). If the Chalcidice belongs to the group of Spartan allies mentioned at 6.10.3, who had had such an armistice since the Peace of Nicias, and who had not signed the Peace, as the Chalcidice did not, then this relationship had endured for five years (see *supra* n.28). Classen remarks that οἱ δὲ καὶ ... αὐτοὶ κατέχονται (6.10.3) refers to "namentlich die Böoter nach 5,26,2 und die thrakischen Chalkidier nach 6,7,4." The ultimate source for this notion, which seems correct, is Doukas, quoted by E. F. Poppo, ed., *Thucydidis De Bello Peloponnesiaco Libri Octo* (Gotha 1843–51) s.v. οἱ δὲ κατέχονται: "Οὗτοί εἰσι Βοιωτοὶ [5.26, 32] καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδεῖς ἐπὶ Θρᾷκης [6.7]." Poppo suggests that "Addendi videntur Megarenses. vid. V,17.31." Thucydides never explicitly states that Megara and Athens had entered into a ten-day cease-fire, but Poppo's suggestion is not unreasonable, especially in light of the unsuccessful offensive and defensive alliance between Boeotia, Corinth, Megara, and Thrace in 421 (5.38). For the complicated relationships between the Spartan allies who did not sign the Peace of Nicias see 5.17.2, 31, esp. 31.6, 47.

<sup>31</sup> See *supra* n.16. Grote draws from comments made by T. Arnold, *Thucydides*<sup>4</sup> (Oxford 1857); see also Andrewes *ad* 5.32.7.

that endured until one of the parties broke the agreement.<sup>32</sup> The latter scenario envisions an armistice renewed every ten days, and diplomatic convention precluded the necessity for this provision to be stipulated expressly in a negotiated ten-day truce. Andrewes rejected this latter suggestion because he envisioned risks of miscalculation that would render useless such an agreement. Thucydides makes some pointed remarks on precise chronological calculations that counter Andrewes' position. A consideration of the historian's discussion of the events surrounding the Athenian-Spartan truce of 423/422 will support this view.

The one-year truce between Athens and Sparta began on the fourteenth day of Elaphebolion at Athens in 423/422;<sup>33</sup> during the truce, πρέσβεις καὶ κήρυκες travelled between the two states to negotiate an end to the war (4.118.13). Thucydides provided the precise date for the beginning of the truce, in part to explain the events concerning the revolt of Scione in the spring of this same year (4.122.3): Ἀριστόνυμος ... Σκιωναίους δὲ αἰσθόμενος ἐκ λογισμοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν ὅτι ὕστερον ἀφεστήκοιεν, οὐκ ἔφη ἐνσπόνδους ἔσεσθαι. Βρασίδα δὲ ἀντέλεγε πολλά, ὡς πρότερον, καὶ οὐκ ἀφίει τὴν πόλιν.<sup>34</sup> Aristonymus then sent a message to Athens, which prepared to attack Scione. Sparta, trusting Brasidas, sent envoys to Athens to warn the Athenians that this constituted an abrogation of the armistice. Athens ignored Sparta's warning and resolved to destroy Scione, for εἶχε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια περὶ τῆς ἀποστάσεως μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδिकाίου· δύο γὰρ ἡμέραις ὕστερον ἀπέστησαν οἱ Σκιωναῖοι (4.122.6).<sup>35</sup> Although Thucydides rejected as imprecise dating systems that relied upon eponymous magistrates, he recognized that individual poleis throughout Greece employed calendrical

<sup>32</sup> See Classen *ad* 5.26.2 *s.v.* ἐκεχειρίαν δεχήμερον: "einen Waffenstillstand, 'den man alle 10 Tage erneuerte (erneuen musste)' Krüger: vgl. 32.5ff; 6,7.4.10,3." This interpretation accurately explains the meaning of the adjective δεχήμερος in the context of truces; unfortunately, Classen does not pursue the issue nor elucidate further.

<sup>33</sup> 4.118.12. Probably the same day when ratification by oath occurred at Sparta, on the 12<sup>th</sup> of Gerastios (4.119.2).

<sup>34</sup> "Aristonymus, finding on a calculation of the dates that the Scionians had revolted after the agreement, said that they would not be included in the truce. But Brasidas made many counter-arguments, that they had revolted before the agreement, and would not give up the city."

<sup>35</sup> "... moreover the truth about the revolt was rather as the Athenians claimed; for the Scionians revolted two days after the agreement."

calculations to conduct interstate relations. The confusion surrounding the truce of 423/422 proves that calendrical conflicts involving a specific date could be resolved, at least by the historian. If this truce had undergone a number of implicit renewals it is conceivable the confusion would have been substantially enhanced.

Thucydides' final reference to ten-day armistices supports the notion that such agreements were continually renewed. Nicias, addressing the Athenians in 416/415, warns them that if they depart for Sicily, considerable military threats will remain at home (6.10.3): ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἄντικρυς πολεμοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἡσυχάζειν δεχημέροις σπονδαῖς καὶ αὐτοὶ κατέχονται. τάχα δ' ἂν ἴσως, εἰ δίχα ἡμῶν τὴν δύναμιν λάβοιεν ... καὶ πάνυ ἂν ξυνεπιθοῖντο κατὰ Σικελιωτῶν.<sup>36</sup> In other words, among the states who would not accept the Peace of Nicias, some, presumably including Boeotia and the Thracian Chalcidice and perhaps Megara, were still preserving ten-day truces from 421 to 415 that they might abrogate. If enough disagreement could arise over the timing of a revolt with the inception of a truce that Sparta and Athens could prepare to break that truce, then it seems implausible that a tacitly renewed armistice could remain valid for six years.<sup>37</sup>

I suggest that although these cease-fires contained no explicit provisions for renewal, there was an understanding based upon diplomatic convention that they were renewed continually. I envision a system of renewal that would be mutually convenient and verifiable, and conducted by official representatives of a polis to guarantee validity.

### III. Heralds, Ambassadors, and *Proxenoι* and their Rôles in Diplomatic Relations

What steps did poleis employ to negotiate and maintain ten-day armistices? The literary evidence closely links heralds and

<sup>36</sup> "Some [of the states that did not sign the Peace] are openly at war [with us], and others, because the Spartans have continued to remain inactive, are maintaining ten-day armistices [with us]. It is very likely that if they should find our power divided ... they will be very eager to make war [on us] along with the Siceliotēs."

<sup>37</sup> Such an arrangement would require more than 200 implicit renewals!



ambassadors in their rôles as diplomatic representatives.<sup>38</sup> Typically one herald with an unspecified number of ambassadors negotiated terms of peace<sup>39</sup> and received safe conduct.<sup>40</sup> In Thucydides heralds usually act as negotiators for warring states during the Peloponnesian War.<sup>41</sup> The herald's participation in negotiations was limited to wartime. States imposed certain limitations on them and reserved for ambassadors the more extensive powers of negotiating during periods of peace.<sup>42</sup>

The duties of heralds on an international scale include "le déclarations de guerre,<sup>43</sup> les trêves,<sup>44</sup> l'enlèvement des morts sur

<sup>38</sup> Thuc. 4.118.13 (discussed *supra* 343ff). Included among the list of priorities that the Athenian ecclesia or boule addressed was the reception of heralds and ambassadors: Aeschin. 1.23, *cf.* 1.20; Dem. 19.185; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 30.5, 43.1, 6; Pollux 8.96. See also Σ Thuc. 1.29; Pl. *Leg.* 941A; *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 114.48f, I<sup>3</sup> 105 for the collection of laws dealing with the boule. P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford 1981) 398, 529, addresses the complications arising from the confusion in the sources as to which Athenian assemblies handled sacred or profane business.

<sup>39</sup> See *e.g.* Aeschin. 3.62. Mosley (*supra* n.19: 21–29) discusses the charges given envoys by a state "to achieve whatever benefits they could" (25); *cf.* *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 43.74f. Herodotus (7.9.2β) has Mardonius, in his condemnation of Greek behavior, observe that states might employ heralds to settle their differences rather than enter into open conflict.

<sup>40</sup> Aeschin. 2.18. On the inviolability of heralds see [Dem.] 12.2ff (note that in 12.2 both heralds and ambassadors possess sacrosanctity); Plut. *Per.* 30.3; Eur. *Heracl.* 271; D. Lateiner, "Heralds and Corpses in Thucydides," *CW* 71 (1977) 97–106, esp. 99; de Romilly (*supra* n.19) 207–20; P. Ducrey, "Aspects juridiques de la victoire et du traitement des vaincus," in Vernant (*supra* n.19) 231–44; on heralds and their inviolability see L. M. Wery, "Le meurtre des hérauts de Darius en 491 et l'inviolabilité du héraut," *AntCl* 35 (1966) 468–86, esp. 468 n.1, 480 n.43 for previous bibliography; Y. Garlan, *War in the Ancient World: A Social History* (London 1975) 529; for a succinct discussion and collection of the sources, see Mosley (*supra* 19) 81–92.

<sup>41</sup> *E.g.* 1.29.1; 2.2.4, 5.5, 6.2f, 12.2; 3.24.2, 52.2f, 113; 4.30.4, 37f, 68.3, 97.2–99, 114.2, 118.6, 13; 5.80; 6.32.

<sup>42</sup> LSJ *s.v.* κῆρυξ (I.1.a), distinguishes between κῆρυκες and πρέσβεις (*s.v.*: πρεσβεύς, "ambassador") by describing the former as "messengers between nations at war"; see *Suda s.v.* κῆρυξ ἐν πολέμῳ, πρέσβυς ἐν εἰρήνῃ; *cf.* Andoc. 3.23; Isoc. 4.177; Dem. 19.134. But *cf.* Lateiner (*supra* n.40) 100.

Thucydides depicts the herald as a messenger in times of conflict when he contrasts the herald's rôle in the periods before and after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War; *cf.* 1.146, 2.1.

<sup>43</sup> *E.g.* Paus. 4.5.8; Polyaeus *Strat.* 4.71.11. On a 'heraldless' war (ἀκήρυκτος πόλεμος) see Hdt. 5.81.2; Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.5; Plut. *Per.* 30.2; Aeschin. 2.37.

<sup>44</sup> Aeschin. 3.62; Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.3; *cf.* Aeschin. 2.13.

le champ de bataille, les négociations de tout genre.”<sup>45</sup> These responsibilities are supplemented by the herald’s rôle in the negotiations preceding an armistice<sup>46</sup> and in proclaiming it once it is concluded (Thuc. 4.117.1, 119.3, 122.1). Although never specified by Thucydides it seems logical to assume that ten-day armistices represent another type of truce that a herald would announce after assisting in the conclusion of such an agreement.

If heralds were actively engaged in the initial stages of this process, could states have charged them with the responsibility of renewing these armistices every ten days? In the case of Athens in the late fifth century, a corps of heralds would have been required, given that at least four states<sup>47</sup> might have been linked to her through ten-day truces. Epigraphic evidence indicates that on various occasions states dispatched a number of heralds to conduct business overseas. An Athenian decree from Eleusis (*IG I<sup>3</sup> 78.22ff*) ca 422 provides for the dispatch of heralds by the boule to the allies to inform them of the results of a vote of the demos.<sup>48</sup> A second document from the same period indicates the size of the corps of heralds employed by Athens for such purposes. The reassessment of 425/424 (*IG I<sup>3</sup> 71.4–7*) specifies that eight heralds—one to Ionia, one to Caria, and two each to Thrace, the islands, and the Hellespont—will travel to the corners of the empire to announce the new assessment. The availability of at least eight heralds at a given moment in Athens demonstrates that the boule had at its disposal a number of individuals who could, when required, conduct governmental affairs abroad.<sup>49</sup> Although the evidence is sparse, other states also apparently utilized a corps of heralds to conduct the preliminary stages of diplomatic business.<sup>50</sup> Athens then was not

<sup>45</sup> E. Pottier, “Praeco,” *DarSag* 4.1 (1907) 609.

<sup>46</sup> E.g. Dem. 19.163–65; Pollux 4.91, 92ff; 8.138.

<sup>47</sup> Boeotia, the Thracian Chalcidice, Megara, and Corinth; see *supra* n.30.

<sup>48</sup> An early but thorough commentary on this text is provided by P. Foucart, “Inscription d’Éleusis du V<sup>me</sup> siècle,” *BCH* 4 (1880) 225–56, esp. 235f; on the date of the inscription see B. D. Meritt, “First-Fruits at Eleusis,” *CW* 56 (1962) 39–41.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Meiggs and Lewis (*supra* n.20) no. 45, the Coinage Decree (Kos fr., sect. 9), where half as many heralds are dispatched by the boule.

<sup>50</sup> Two inscriptions from Nemea outline the dispatch of heralds for state business (S. G. Miller, “Excavations at Nemea, 1978,” *Hesperia* 48 [1979] 73–103 at 77–80 with pl. 22a–c): one indicates that at least twelve *theoroi* were dispatched to announce the Nemean games, while the other lists the *theorodokoi* of the festival at Nemea and the sacred truce who were sent throughout the Mediterranean.

alone in having a relatively large professional corps of heralds that could convey messages to all areas of the Greek world.

The sources are imprecise about the full complement of heralds available for diplomatic dispatch, although we do learn that various political organs operating in Athens retained their own heralds in addition to the aforementioned state representatives.<sup>51</sup> We do not know if Athens or any other polis enlisted the service of urban heralds for foreign affairs (or if such a distinction was drawn), but the epigraphic evidence cited *infra* suggests that a sufficient corps was available to handle diplomatic business abroad. Was it practical to dispatch a herald often enough to renew an armistice every ten days?

The problem with the frequent renewal of an armistice arises not from the available number of representatives that any state might dispatch but from the time taken by a herald's journey to and from a contractual party. More than 360 km., either by land or sea, separates Athens and the Thracian Chalcidice, the farthest state with which Athens negotiated a ten-day truce. Studies on travel in antiquity do not address precisely the time needed for diplomatic journeys to various regions of the ancient world; they focus either on leisurely visits by tourists<sup>52</sup> or on long-distance runners moving at a maximum speed of roughly 130–200 km. per day.<sup>53</sup> The latter pace finds some confirmation in two notices in Thucydides. At 3.3.5 a man clearly in a hurry

<sup>51</sup> The most prominent and active herald in Athens was that of the *boule* and *demos*; for a brief discussion of his duties see B. D. Meritt and J. S. Traill, *Agora XV* (1974) 14. J. Oehler ("Keryx," *RE* 11 [1922] 349–57) and Pottier (*supra* n.45) review the other official heralds in the city, including the herald (and flautist) of the nine archons (*Ath. Pol.* 62.2, *cf.* 56.2), the *logistai* (*Aeschin.* 3.23), the *Areopagos*, etc. Separate from these 'political' officials were the *kerykes* of the Eleusinian Mysteries, filled by a particular *genos* at Athens; see *Ath. Pol.* 39.2, 57.1; Rhodes (*supra* n.38) *s.v.*; *Pl. Pol.* 290a, *cf.* 260b; for a *genos* of heralds at Sparta see *Hdt.* 6.60.

In addition, *Ath. Pol.* 66.1, 68.4, and 69.1 state that each of the *dikasteria* had its own herald. Paus. 1.28.5, 8–11 and *Σ Ar. Plut.* 277 suggest nine or ten *dikasteria* (court buildings, not courts). The total number of courts can not be determined from the available evidence. *Cf.* Busolt (*supra* n.8) 1154f; E. S. Staveley, *Greek and Roman Voting and Elections* (Ithaca 1972) 96; R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle* (London 1930–38) I 234f, 239, 244–47; *Aeschin.* 1.79; *Ar. Vesp.* 752.

<sup>52</sup> See e.g. L. Casson, *Travel in the Ancient World* (London 1974).

<sup>53</sup> V. J. Matthews, "The *Hemerodromoi*: Ultra Long-Distance Running in Antiquity," *CW* 68 (1974) 161–69; H. M. Lee, "Modern Ultra-Long Distance Running and Philippides' Run from Athens to Sparta," *AncW* 9 (1984) 107–13.

travels from Athens to Geraetos in Euboea by land (πεζῆ), sails on a merchant ship<sup>54</sup> and arrives in Mytilene on the third day after departing from Athens. This constitutes a total of *ca* 360 km. and an overall average of 120–80 km. per day. Demosthenes and his army marched from Nemea to Potidania in Aetolia in one day (3.96.1f), a distance of approximately 130 km. In both instances the travellers appear to move at a maximum pace; if a herald on a diplomatic mission had to journey 360 km., the pace would presumably have been slower. Herodotus calculates a day's journey at 200 stades (37 km.) in flat territory (4.101.2) but only 150 stades (28 km.) through more mountainous terrain (5.53). Therefore, if a herald travelled at a standard, less than hectic pace through uneven territory he would cover 360 km in ten to thirteen days.

In other words, if a herald, charged with renewing an armistice, spent more than the total period of truce in transit, then a number of heralds were required. This would necessitate a series of heralds travelling to and from each contractual partner on a continual basis, which seems an unlikely scenario. The process of renewal might better be accomplished if each state could invest the power to renew pacts made between states upon local inhabitants, such as *proxenoi*, whose official obligations often limited their spheres of influence to the states in which they resided.

The status of a *proxenos* in the state in which he worked seems to have been considered 'official' in the sense that he was expected to perform services for the state he represented on a local as well as international level. Adcock and Mosley (122), on the basis of an etymological analysis, deduce that the *proxenos* did not have an official position in his own state of residence. That the *proxenos* did not participate in an 'official' function in

<sup>54</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 6.4.2 states that on a "long day" (ἡμέρας μακρῶς) a trireme could sail from Byzantium east along the Black Sea to Heracleia. J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships 900–322 B.C.* (Cambridge 1968) 309, calculate this distance at approximately 140 miles and the speed of the ship at less than eight to as many as twelve knots per hour. This calculation applies only to a trireme sailing twelve to eighteen hours per day; a merchant ship (ὄλκας) sailed day and night at a slower pace. Assuming a speed of four knots per hour, the distance from Geraistos to Mytilene would consume about thirty-one hours, leaving as much as forty-one hours to travel from Athens to Geraistos, and an average of *ca* 120–70 km. per day. See also Thuc. 2.97.1; Hdt. 1.72.3; and W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford 1912) I 93.

the sense of a state magistracy does not affect the notion that only the *proxenos* could be expected to serve a foreign power on a regular basis. For example, although not considered inviolable, *proxenoi* on occasion did receive guarantees of protection, a surety usually afforded heralds in their official capacity as interstate agents.<sup>55</sup>

Epigraphic and literary evidence reveals a handful of examples in which *proxenoi* assisted visiting envoys from the states the *proxenoi* represented.<sup>56</sup> Pherax of Sparta, the *proxenos* of Thebes in 391/390, offered to conduct visiting Theban envoys to the Spartan authorities (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.6). When Sphodrias was raiding Athenian territory in 378 with a Spartan force, an embassy from Sparta was found in the home of Callias, their *proxenos* in Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.22). An inscription from Mytilene, from perhaps the second century B.C., records honors awarded Cleosthenes son of Cleophon of Athens, who as the Mytilenean *proxenos* reported to the boule that he had served ably a delegation from Mytilene.<sup>57</sup>

*Proxenoi* frequently acted on behalf of the states they represented as diplomatic agents<sup>58</sup> and a considerable corpus of inscriptions records the honors subsequently received for their

<sup>55</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 156.14–17 records such a guarantee to Leonidas of Halicarnassos in ca 440–425; see R. Meiggs, “A Note on Athenian Imperialism,” *CR* 63 (1949) 9–12, esp. 11f, for a collection of epigraphic evidence addressing protection awarded *proxenoi*. On the judicial standing of *proxenoi* see P. Gauthier, *Symbola: Les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques* (= *MemAnnEst* 42 [Nancy 1972]) 137ff (on Athens), 230ff (elsewhere); F. Gschnitzer, “Proxenos,” *RE Suppl.* 13 (1973) 722–26.

<sup>56</sup> The consensus among modern scholars supports this view: see Mosley (*supra* n.19) ch. II, esp. 6, who cites examples from the fifth and fourth centuries when states provided guarantees of safety to their *proxenoi* to substantiate the claim that these agents actively assisted the states they represented; P. Monceaux, “Proxenia,” *DarSag* 4.1 (1907) 736f; K. von Fritz and E. Kapp, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts* (New York 1950) 161 n.4; see Adcock and Mosley 161.

*Ar. Av.* 1021 reflects the preeminence of the *proxenos* in the reception of visitors from the state he represents: when an *episkopos* arrives in one of the allied cities his first reaction is to ask the question, “Where are the *proxenoi*?” (ποῦ πρόξενου;). On the self-perceived rôle of a *proxenos* see Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.4.

<sup>57</sup> IG XII.2 18.1–5, esp. 3: πρεσβεύ]σαις εὐεργέτηκε. For another possible example of a *proxenos* receiving honors for assisting an embassy see IG I<sup>3</sup> 227 and J. Pecírka, *The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions* (Prague 1966) 22ff; cf. 352 with n.64 *infra*.

<sup>58</sup> Paus. 3.8.4; Lys. 19.19; Thuc. 2.29.1 (Nymphodorus; see 351 *infra*), 85.5; 5.59.4–60.1, 76.3; 8.92.8; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35; 4.5.6; 6.1.4, 3.4; cf. Hdt. 8.136.

services. On other occasions individuals performed services for foreign states and received grants of proxeny as a result.<sup>59</sup> In some cases ambassadors, upon their return from successful missions, were the recipients of such honors.<sup>60</sup> The financial value and political prestige gained through receiving a grant of *proxenia* led individuals to seek this honor and often resulted in political charges of currying favor with other states, particularly in the fourth century.<sup>61</sup>

The diplomatic sphere of responsibilities of a *proxenos* included the initial negotiations of armistices and treaties. The Athenian diplomat who worked out the details for the five-years' truce between Athens and Sparta of 451/450 was the Spartan *proxenos*.<sup>62</sup> When Alcibiades served as the Spartan *proxenos*, thus renewing a family tradition, he was affronted because the Spartans had not employed his services when they

<sup>59</sup> One limited but useful collection of such awards can be found in M. B. WALBANK, *Athenian Proxenies of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Toronto 1978: hereafter 'Walbank'). S. Perlman, "A Note on the Political Implications of *Proxenia* in the Fourth Century B.C.," *CQ* 52 (1958) 185–91, addresses the value of awards of *proxenia* and the internal politics that led to or resulted from such beneficences. For awards of proxeny and other honorific decrees, see A. S. Henry, *Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees: The Principal Formulae of Athenian Honorary Decrees* (Hildesheim 1983). Individual studies of awards of *proxenia*, *promanteia*, etc., generally do not address the more general topic of the value of such awards. See, however, H. Bouvier, "Honneurs et récompenses à Delphes," *ZPE* 30 (1978) 101–18, for honors awarded and the value they held at Delphi.

C. Marek, *Die Proxenie* (Frankfurt a.M. 1984) addresses the political, cultural, and religious function of *proxenoi* and focuses on the conditions under which individuals received grants of *proxenia*. He notes that *proxenia* often served as a political instrument used by poleis to facilitate relations with other poleis or with kingdoms (335ff). Although, as Marek sees it, *proxenoi* had few specific obligations, they did function as advisors and political and religious 'agents' for the poleis they represented, particularly during conflicts (355ff).

<sup>60</sup> See Perlman (*supra* n.59) 187; *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 80, 227, for which see 351 *infra*; M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford 1948) nos. 135 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 106+), 139 (II<sup>2</sup> 141+), and perhaps 182 record awards granted as the result of diplomatic missions. Also Marek (*supra* n.59) 354ff.

<sup>61</sup> One notable example is the accusation levied by Demosthenes against Aeschines, which the latter successfully refuted (Aeschin. 2.89).

<sup>62</sup> Aeschin. 2.172. Note, however, the author's confusion over the individual involved (Miltiades instead of Cimon), the length of the truce (fifty years), and its duration (thirteen years instead of five); the author has in mind the thirty-years' peace of 445, and this muddled account draws into question the reliability of this source; *cf.* Andoc. 3.3 for the same historical error.

had negotiated with Athens in the period between the Pylos campaign and the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 6.89.2; cf. 5.43.2). The period to which Alcibiades refers includes the one-year armistice of 422/421 and the assistance he had hoped to give may have included the negotiation of this truce.

Two inscriptions provide a glimpse into the assistance provided by *proxenoi* to the Athenian embassies involved in the discussions preceding the Peace of Nicias and the Spartan-Athenian alliance. Walbank (nos. 48–49) uses *IG I<sup>3</sup> 80* (honoring Asteas of Aleia) and 81 (honoring Polystratus [of Phleius?] and his brother [?]) as examples of two *proxenoi* who lent their services to embassies from the state they represented as the envoys travelled from Athens to Sparta, and perhaps stopped en route in both Phleius and Asteia.<sup>63</sup>

No direct evidence for the participation by *proxenoi* in armistice negotiations survives, yet indications remain that *proxenoi* were, on occasion, actively involved in either arranging treaties or assisting embassies on missions to secure terms of peace. Athens summoned Nymphodorus to the city in 431 to negotiate on her behalf with Sitalces (Nymphodorus' brother-in-law) after making him their *proxenos* (Thuc. 2.29.1), and as a result of Nymphodorus' efforts Sitalces allied with Athens (2.29.4). Athens hoped to take advantage not only of Nymphodorus' relationship with his kin but also realized the influence held by, and the obligations enjoined upon, a *proxenos*. Nymphodorus' situation seems exceptional because of the family ties to Sitalces, yet as the Athenian *proxenos* he also successfully negotiated with Perdiccas on behalf of Athens and secured an alliance between the two (2.29.6f).<sup>64</sup>

An inscription tentatively dated *ca* 424/423, which was probably inscribed in the early fourth century (*IG I<sup>3</sup> 227*), records grants of *enktesis* and *ateleia* (lines 21f) to Heracleides (of Clazomenae?) for the services he provided to an embassy returning from the Persian king to Athens (lines 15–19):

... ἐπ[ειδὴ δὲ οἱ πρέσβεις]  
[οἱ π]αρὰ βασιλέως ἤκ[οντες ἀγγελῶσι 'Η]-

<sup>63</sup> For the likely historical context see *IG I<sup>3</sup> 80.9–12* with Walbank's comments 276, 279. Cf. Henry (*supra* n.59) 119f (Asteas), 216 (Polystratus).

<sup>64</sup> See Marek (*supra* n.59) 335 on the political instrument of *proxenia* employed by Athens in its negotiations with the royal court of Sitalces.

[ρακ]λείδην συμπράτ[τεν ἑαυτοῖς προθύ]-  
 [μως] ἔς τε τὰ σπονδὰς [τὰς πρὸς βασιλέα ἔ]-  
 [ς τε ἄ]λλο ὅτι ἐπαγγέ[λειαν....

This text specifically states that Heracleides assisted the ambassadors in the negotiations for the σπονδαί that earned him the privileges awarded.<sup>65</sup> Athens awarded Heracleides the status of *proxenos* and *euergetes* for the services he provided.

Finally, the relationship between Artas, dynast of Messapia, and Athens that surfaced in the Sicilian expedition may find its roots in Artas' participation in the renewal of treaties earlier negotiated. Walbank (no. 70) observes that Artas<sup>66</sup> provided military assistance to the Athenians for the expedition to Sicily, and that the παλαιὰ φιλία (Thuc. 7.33.4) provided the Athenians by Artas may have originated in "the renewal of the treaties with Rhegion and Leontinoi in 433/432 or Laches' expedition to Sicily in 427/426 B.C." (Walbank 372). The participation of this Athenian *proxenos* in treaty renewals remains tenuous and at best shows the rôle of a diplomatic agent in the renewal not of short-term armistices but of long-term treaties.

#### IV. Conclusion

Until the publication of the first edition of Liddell and Scott's *Greek-English Lexicon* in 1846, commentators and lexicographers had maintained that Thucydides understood ἐκεχειρία

<sup>65</sup> See Walbank no. 47 for the text, and "Heracleides of Klazomenai; a new join at the Epigraphical Museum," *ZPE* 51 (1983) 183f, for a new restoration by means of a join with *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 65, which does not alter the interpretation of lines 15–19. As in the cases of Polystratus and Asteas, the home town of the *proxenos* (in this case possibly Clazomenae, an identification long disputed) was situated along the route the envoys may have taken, and Heracleides could have provided whatever assistance or hospitality they might have required. See also A. Gerolymatos, *Espionage and Treason: A Study of the Proxenia in Political and Military Intelligence Gathering in Classical Greece* (Amsterdam 1986) 10, 110. I exclude here the continuing controversy regarding the date(s) of the inscription and the peace in which Heracleides played a rôle, resulting in the honors accorded him in *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 227. For a recent discussion of these problems see H. B. Mattingly, "Methodology in Fifth-Century Greek Epigraphy," *EchCl* n.s. 7 (1988) 321–28, and M. B. Walbank, "Heracleides and the Great King," *EchCl* n.s. 8 (1989) 347–52. Cf. Henry (*supra* n.59) 119, 242.

<sup>66</sup> *Suda* s.v. "Ἀρτος, quoting Polemon, states that Athens made him their *proxenos*. See also Ath. 108F–109A and Thuc. 7.33.4 for the connection between Athens and Artas.



δεχήμερος to mean an armistice that lasted only ten days. The notion of an armistice terminable upon ten-days' notice was adopted as the standard interpretation by Andrewes and has since gained acceptance among scholars. The adjective δεχήμερος, however, does not signify anything other than a period of ten days, and this translation holds when the adjective modifies ἐκεχειρία, ἀνοχάι, ἀνοκωχάι, and (ἐπι)σπονδαί. The ineffectual nature of a truce lasting only ten days suggests one that instead was continuously renewed by the poleis participating in such an agreement. In order for poleis to renew, perhaps frequently, armistices of brief duration while negotiations proceeded towards a more lasting peace, they employed a convenient and simple mechanism that facilitated continuing discussions. The most feasible scenario requires the cooperation of local diplomats, *proxenoi*, who as agents for foreign powers would then have the responsibility of renewing the armistices between the states they represented and those in which they resided.<sup>67</sup>

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