

The Government of Troy: Politics in the *Iliad*

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IN RECENTLY PUBLISHED STUDIES of Homeric formulae I have called attention, on the basis of statistical evidence, to two facts about Homer's Trojans in the *Iliad*:

(1) The nominative proper-name formulae used by the poet to refer to them display a remarkable lacuna: there are no frequently occurring, 'regular', formulae.¹ The other characters and peoples who are mentioned anything like as often as the Trojans all have regular formulae, usually more than one. We give the term 'regular formula' a quantitative definition, "exactly repeated six times or more," but the phenomenon is not merely quantitative; there are certain qualities that regular formulae have and that infrequently occurring formulae tend to lack. Most notable of these are their noun-epithet form (nominative proper-name *noun-verb* formulae all occur infrequently) and the occurrence of the formula in a major colon:² frequently occurring formulae are noun-epithet and occupy major cola; infrequent formulae fall in minor cola, and the less frequently they occur, the more likely they are to fall in minor cola and to be noun-verbal in syntax. Hence the distinction between regular and infrequent formulae is qualitative, and the Trojans in the nominative lack something they ought to have, noun-epithet formulae used regularly to fill metrical spaces that the other characters have formulae to fill. A lack of regular formulae is significant; and the significance is statistically demonstrable.³

¹ W. M. Sale, "The Trojans, Statistics, and Milman Parry," *GRBS* 30 (1989) 341-410.

² For the nominative proper nouns, I defined the major cola as those that run from the trochaic caesura, the hephthemimeral caesura, and the bucolic diaeresis to the end of the verse. Noun-verb formulae exist for oblique cases and common nouns.

³ More will be found on the nature and behavior of regular formulae in W. M. Sale, "Homer and the *Roland*: The Shared Formular Technique," *Oral Tradition* 8.1-2 (1993) 87-142, 381-412.

(2) There is a corresponding and equally striking deficiency in some of the place-phrases for Troy.⁴ All the places in the *Iliad* that are mentioned with any frequency—the Greek camp, Olympus, the battlefield, the Troad, Troy—have plenty of formulae for going *to* the place. Almost all of them have plenty of formulae for coming from it or being in it. The Greek camp is somewhat deficient in place-from-where formulae; but that deficiency is nothing compared with the almost total absence of formulae for ‘from Troy’, and the presence of only a few infrequent formulae for ‘in Troy’. Again, the lacuna is striking and statistically significant.

These two formulary gaps are demonstrable facts, not impressions. They cannot be dismissed as accidental: to do so is to ignore what we mean by ‘statistically significant’. They must be explained. The explanations I have offered are of course not the only ones possible; the study of history rarely vouchsafes us such certainties. But they will work and they afford a coherent picture of Homer engaged in his compositional task.⁵ In summary:

The absence of regular nominative proper-name formulae (no. 1 above) can be understood when we examine the few noun-epithet formulae in the nominative case that the Trojans do possess. Several epithets tend to express very negative qualities: arrogance, insolence, disdain for civilized values. The words are very similar in tone to, and indeed two of them are identical with, the epithets used of the suitors in the *Odyssey*. As the Trojans in the *Iliad* do not appear to be notably disdainful or insolent, it is predictable that these epithets are never ap-

⁴ W. M. Sale, “The Formularity of the Place-phrases in the *Iliad*,” *TAPA* 117 (1987) 21–50.

⁵ Here, and throughout the paper, I use the word ‘Homer’ ambiguously. I have in mind always “the eighth-century poet who composed the *Iliad* (but not necessarily the *Odyssey*), probably orally.” I am picturing an individual’s creation of a fixed oral text (*sit venia verbis*), something that was dictated, either to a scribe or to a person, or group of people, who could preserve it literally in their memories. But most of what I say is compatible with the picture of a whole generation of poets bringing about the changes I ascribe to just one man. Moreover the text as produced in the eighth century, even if it was written down, must have suffered alteration afterwards; I assume that this alteration was slight enough that the meanings I ascribe to Homer survived, and that any changes in the percentages of formulaic expression were random enough not to affect the statistics. The statistics are not affected, and no meaning I ascribe to Homer is altered, so far as I am aware, if we remove the lines that appear to have come into the tradition after Aristarchus.

plied to the Trojans by Homer—by the narrator—himself, or by the Trojans or their allies. They are used only by the Greeks and the gods who favor the Greeks. If now we assume that in the pre-Homeric tradition the Trojans were referred to by these unflattering epithets in *regular* formulae, just as the Suitors in the *Odyssey* are still, the lacuna in Trojan formulae is easy to understand. Homer avoided them because he wanted his listeners to feel sympathy for the Trojans. The Greeks and their gods are free to use them, because the Trojans are the enemy; but even they do not use them with any frequency.

That Homer wants us to sympathize with the Trojans, and that listeners and readers do so, is not a novel idea. Poets after Homer—Euripides, Vergil, Quintus, Chaucer, Shakespeare, for instance—have painted sympathetic portraits, even when they have been critical as well. The later poets are also not very flattering to the Greeks, to the people that Homer called Achaeans. Just how well the Achaeans in the *Iliad* come off is arguable, but the Trojans are as attractive in Homer as they are in later authors. We all feel the appeal of Homer's Priam, of his Andromache, and (with reservations, perhaps) of his Hector. We agree with Zeus, who says that of all cities in the world, sacred Ilium and Priam and Priam's people are "honored in my heart the most" (4.44-47). We may stand alongside the Greeks most of the time; we may even *be* Greeks for the nonce, however we feel about them; but much of the poem's depth is due to its ability to make us compassionate towards the Trojans in their tragedy. They are an essentially decent lot, but a flaw in their culture prevents them from returning Helen and making appropriate restitution. We do not feel this way about the Suitors as a group. They are not an essentially decent lot, though one or two of the Suitors may appeal at times. Nor is there, so far as I know, any large group of major later poets who sympathize with the Suitors; and I think that part of the reason for the relative popularity of the Trojans in later poetry is that Homer does not say, in regularly repeated formulae, how awful they are.

Homer, we are saying, changed the character of the Trojans from insolent and hybristic to decent though flawed. Such a change can help explain the other lacuna, the gaps in the formulae for the Trojan place-phrases (no. 2 above). First, we observe that when the *Iliad* says "in Troy" or "from Troy" (non-formulaically or formulaically) the passage usually occurs in the midst of narrative action set *inside* the city: such phrases are usually used in Trojan scenes. When the action is set out-

side, the phrases are found much more rarely (one-seventeenth as often).⁶ We infer that the decision to locate the action inside the city is what gives rise to the occasion to say 'in' and 'from Troy'. Now, in our *Iliad* the Trojan scenes are one of the main sources of our sympathy for the city. There we meet Andromache, there for the most part we come to know Priam, there we see Hector softened by intimate contact with his wife and child. If we were right (above) in supposing that Homer was first among the epic poets to paint the Trojans in compassionate colors, it would not be surprising if he were also the first to compose such a multitude of Trojan scenes, many of them quite long. He wants us to sympathize with Troy, and so brings us inside it frequently. His predecessors, who regularly called Trojans insolent and disdainful, probably had some Trojan scenes, but many fewer. As a result they will have said 'in Troy' and 'from Troy' much less often. And because formulae are normally developed only for ideas that poets refer to relatively frequently, they will not have developed formulae to express location in and egress from Troy. Despite what Parry sometimes suggests, the epic style is by no means 100% formulaic: even for those nouns that do display regular formulae, the average number of non-formulaic occurrences is 25%.

The tradition did develop plenty of formulae for being in, leaving, and going to the Greek camp, Olympus, and the battlefield, for that is where the action was. It developed some for 'from the Greek camp', though not as many, perhaps because this idea was usually expressed 'to the battlefield' or 'to Troy'. It developed them for going *to* Troy city, because this is something you do outside the walls. It created extensive and elaborate formulae for the future destruction of Troy, because you dreamt of this as you stood there outside the city alongside the Achaeans. Homer inherited and employs all of these; but he inherited no formulae for 'in' and 'from Troy'. As he composed his many and sometimes lengthy Trojan scenes, he either had to make up formulae (and we catch him doing this a few times), or

⁶ It is possible to make a more conservative calculation than the one I gave in "Formularity" (*supra* n.4) 37: if we count Trojan scenes embedded in speeches spoken outside the city as not being genuine Trojan scenes, the density of 'in Troy' spoken inside is one in fifty-eight lines, the density of 'from Troy' spoken inside is one in 109; the density of 'in Troy' spoken outside is one in 973 lines, of 'from Troy' spoken outside one in 1825. Even by this conservative calculation, for both 'in Troy' and 'from Troy' the density of occurrences inside the city is seventeen *times* as great.

else he had to employ non-formulaic references (something any good oral poet must be able to do).

Our explanations for the formulaic lacunae seem to propose a complex set of developments; but the essential hypothesis is really very simple. We have made two suppositions about the pre-Homeric epic tradition: that it had few Trojan scenes, and that it thought of the Trojans as villains. As the *Iliad* has many Trojan scenes and does not characterize the Trojans as villainous, the rest of the argument follows automatically. And the two suppositions give a highly coherent picture: the earlier poets gazed from the Trojan plain at the enemy city, with its fair walls and high towers and insolent denizens, and shared the Achaean desire to sack it. This is the picture offered by the formulae: by the place-phrases, by the nominative-formulae for the Trojans, by the formulae for the destruction of Troy. It is altogether suitable that the tradition should have looked at Troy this way; it accords not only with the way we all look at the Suitors in the *Odyssey*, but with the view of the enemy in such later epics as the *Song of Roland* and Avdo's *Wedding of Meho*. But it is not Homer's Troy. Homer wants us to come inside the city with him so that we may meet Andromache, who cannot leave the city, and Priam who can leave it only under extraordinary circumstances; and so that we may see Hector in his domestic setting. He wants us inside so that we can come to know the whole city, not just its citizen-warriors. And apart from such emotional needs, Homer must bring us inside to show us something of how the Trojans govern, or fail to govern, themselves, so that their *hamartia*—their inability to return Helen and achieve an honorable peace—can be made evident.

Once inside, we notice that the government and economy of Troy are not the same as the government and economy of the Achaeans (the Achaeans in the *Iliad*, that is, for the Trojans do bear some resemblance to the Ithacans in the *Odyssey*). The Iliadic Achaean states—the Myrmidons, the Pylians, the Mycenaeans—are absolute monarchies with a military economy and a warrior class. The city of Troy (perhaps unlike its allies) is an oligarchy or aristocracy with a weak king; it is dominated by a Council of Elders, and lacks a warrior-class: with rare exceptions its men all have peace-time occupations. The Trojan *hamartia* resides in the system: some members of the Council of Elders can be bribed, and this is why Troy falls. I wish to set out this state of affairs and to explain, by invoking the same hypothesis I have already adduced for the two formulaic

lacunae, Homer's desire to depict Troy as a tragic hero. We attribute yet another detail to the tradition: the pre-Homeric Trojans were not only insolent but were ruled, like the Achaeans, by an absolute monarch. As Homer cast the Trojans in a kindlier light, he also changed their form of government to one that permitted them to be the tragic victims of the city's *hamartia*, the corruptibility of their Elders.

There is nothing violent in this addition to our previous assumptions. Many formulae refer to the "city of Priam" and to "king Priam"; they speak of "Priam and the sons of Priam" as if they *were* the Trojans; so strident is the message of these formulae that I suspect most readers picture Priam as possessing much more power than the poem actually allots him. The gap between the Troy of the formulae and Troy as otherwise depicted needs to be explained. (A gap, not a contradiction: Troy is still the city of Priam, only Priam is now a very weak king.) We begin the explanation by supposing that the formulae give us the traditional government, a monarchy in which Priam ruled the Trojans with the same authority that Achilles has over the Myrmidons. As these are haughty and arrogant Trojans, we suppose them to be ruled by an equally arrogant Priam. Now Homer enters the scene. Seeking to make the Trojans tragic, he might have retained a villainous Priam and let Troy's inability to check Priam's insolence be its *hamartia*. But it is too easy for listeners to take a king as symbolic of the people, especially in an absolute monarchy; nor can Homer make Paris into the sole villain, unless Paris also has overwhelming political power—and this seems impossible to bring about in the "city of Priam." So instead Paris becomes one aspect of Troy's *hamartia*, a man who puts legitimate self-interest ahead of his fellow-citizens' equally legitimate interests, while Priam becomes Homer's vehicle for what is best in Troy: kindness, gentleness, sympathy, love—love even for the most reprehensible of his fellows, Paris and Helen. Homer cannot permit Priam to retain absolute authority, or else, despite his love for Paris, he must out of love for his people insist on Helen's return and deprive the poet of his *Iliad*. And so Priam becomes a good man sitting on a largely symbolic throne, and power is allotted to a Council of *demogerontes* that includes Priam but whose key members are corrupted by Paris' bribery. This weakness in the system—the corruptibility of the Council—makes an exceeding useful tragic flaw.

Again, by imagining alternatives and supplying reasoning, we seem to be proposing a complex process of change from the

tradition to Homer; but again the essential hypothesis is simple. We have already supposed that the poets before Homer depicted the Trojans as villainous; if so, their king was no doubt just as bad. The whole lot of them, from Priam on down, were what Menelaus (understandably from his point of view) thinks they still are (13.620–39), so arrogant and fond of war that they think nothing of stealing a man's wife and fighting to keep her. All we add now is the supposition, on the basis of analogy with the Achaeans and such formulae as "the city of Priam," that this insolent and haughty pre-Homeric Priam was an absolute ruler. As before, this is not what we observe in the *Iliad*; and again we attribute the difference to Homer's desire to create a tragic and sympathetic city. That Priam in the *Iliad* is a king without great political authority, and that the Trojan *demogerontes* are the real rulers of Troy, is a straightforward interpretation of the *Iliad* that this paper will set forth. It may appear to be a somewhat surprising—at least I have never seen it stated as such—though it cannot come as a total surprise, because every passage I discuss is similarly understood by some or all of the authorities I have consulted.⁷ Given this straightforward interpretation, the rest of the argument is extremely simple.

There are several reasons why the importance of the Trojan Elders has not been stated before. The formulaic lacunae were hitherto unobserved, and therefore the inference that Homer had changed the portrait of the Trojans remained undrawn. The old formulae, "city of Priam" and the rest, were taken to imply that Troy had a powerful absolute monarchy—as, in the tradition, it no doubt did. Also most scholars have tended to assume a uniform 'Homeric society', perhaps feeling that Homer, that oral poets generally, were not capable of the complexities entailed by the current interpretation. Because the Achaean states are manifestly monarchical, Troy was assumed to follow suit. Above all, the *intellectual* force of the creation of the polis has

⁷ For the poem as a whole these authorities are: R. J. CUNLIFFE, *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect* (Norman 1980) and *Homeric Proper and Place Names* (London 1931: hereafter 'Cunliffe, *Place Names*'); Thesaurus Linguae Graecae; *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* (Göttingen 1955–91: hereafter 'LfgrE'); LSJ; K. F. AMEIS and C. HENTZE, edd., *Homers Ilias*⁶ (Leipzig 1903–06: hereafter 'Ameis-Hentze'); G. S. KIRK *et al.*, edd., *The Iliad: A Commentary* (Cambridge 1985–92: hereafter 'Kirk'): Books 1–8 by Kirk, 13–16 by R. Janko, 17–20 by M. W. Edwards; W. Leaf, *The Iliad* (London 1900–02); P. Mazon, *Homère, Iliade* (Paris 1946–47); D. B. Munro, *Homer, Iliad* (repr. Oxford 1953); M. M. Willcock, *The Iliad of Homer* (New York 1978–84).

not been sufficiently appreciated, the fact that Homer could see that the minds of his contemporaries and their fathers had brought to birth a new political entity, and that a variety of social structures was therefore a human possibility.⁸

We now have three suppositions about Troy in the pre-Homeric tradition: villainous Trojans, few Trojan scenes, absolute monarchy. Let us note an important methodological difference between the process that leads to this third supposition as opposed to the first two. The formulaic lacunae are scientifically verifiable facts: visual signifiers of such-and-such a shape are wanting, and the lack is statistically significant. From these scientific facts we drew historical inferences: Homer added Trojan scenes and suppressed regular formulae. These inferences imply authorial intention—the desire to have us sympathize with Troy and see its fate as tragic—and the statement that Homer cherished this desire, though conjectural, is conjecturing a historical fact. In positing a change in Trojan government, we are still implying the same authorial intention. But we have been *led* to this third step not by scientific fact, but by literary interpretation. The statement that in our *Iliad* Troy has an oligarchical or aristocratic government does not yield to statistical demonstration; it emerges from the evaluation of signifieds, not the counting and comparing of signifiers. Like any literary interpretation, it is quite at the mercy of critical and scholarly response. Granted, some of the evidence it rests on is hard to dispute, such as the statement that Paris bribed Antimachus to oppose the return of Helen (11.123ff). Granted too, the fact that the interpretation suits a reasonable theory of authorial intention adds to its appeal. But a scholar could, without contradiction,

⁸ Of course Homer's Dark Age predecessors knew that the communities they lived in were very different from Mycenae rich in gold, and they believed that men of old could throw much larger rocks; but since they could not observe the mind at work in the creation of the polis, they are less likely to have been able to appreciate in depth the differences in political structure between then and now. They were politically naive, as Homer is not. I am suggesting, and will soon state, that I think Homer modeled Troy upon the newly created polis.

It is perhaps worth pointing out that the view that Trojan society differs from the Achaean was actually arrived at long before I knew anything about statistics (or indeed very much about the theory of oral composition), long before I saw the resemblance between Trojan and contemporary society, and long before I had evolved any theory of Homeric intention beyond the view that he added Book 9 and 19 to the tradition so that Achilles could question and reject the heroic code. See my "Achilles and Heroic Values," *Arion* 2.3 (1963) 96ff.

agree that Homer intended us to sympathize with the Trojans and still dispute the literary interpretation of Troy's political situation.⁹

The statement that Homer intended us to sympathize with Troy—does this not arouse certain literary inquietudes? Is the *Iliad*, despite its title, not a poem about the Wrath of Achilles? Are not its values heroic? How can we speak of a tragedy of Troy with Achilles occupying stage center so much of the time? To respond, perhaps too briefly: the plot of the poem (not its subject) is indeed given by the Wrath theme, and Achilles is the most important individual in the poem. And we are interested in heroism, though perhaps we are even more interested in the varieties of love that dominate Achilles' heroism after Book 9. If, however, Achilles is in stage center more than Hector, he is not on stage more than the Trojans generally. We can be deeply moved both by his tragedy and by his search for love, and still moved by Troy's plight. It is a long poem, with room for much more than heroism and wrath.

The tragedy of Troy may be somewhat harder for us to see, but I do not think that it was harder for Homer's initial audience. Troy—its physical features, its government, its economy—was much more familiar to them than it is to us. For them it would be perfectly natural for Homer to begin, as he does, with Achilles and end, as he does, with Troy. They can appreciate the Wrath, and also appreciate the City. For them the title of the poem would be perfectly apt.

To justify this last assertion, and to make clear why an *Iliad* was born where earlier an *Achilleid* may have stood, we need to take a further step, and assert that the government and economy of Troy in the *Iliad* reflects the government and economy of an eighth-century polis.¹⁰ This step, not without its perils, requires leaving the literary universe, with its facts about

⁹ Thus demonstrating the dangers in committing the intentional fallacy: not only are there good interpretations not intended by the author, but there may be a variety of interpretations consistent with a given intention. Still, if we have an interpretation that we like, and if it can be shown to fit what the author intended, it is only human to point that out. See also n.23 *infra*.

¹⁰ The recent arguments of H. van Wees for an early seventh-century date for the *Iliad* are not without force; see his "The Homeric Way of War I, II," *GaR* 41 (1994) 1–18, 131–55, and *Status Warriors* (Amsterdam 1992) 54–58, 157–62, 253–58. I do not think this date would affect my position much; indeed some historical parallels would be strengthened. But it is far safer to assume that the earlier date, and the numerous arguments for it, are correct.

the *Iliad*'s signifiers and its interpretations of the *Iliad*'s signifieds and its relatively simple assumptions about the pre-Homeric epic tradition and reconstruction of Homer's intentions, in order to turn to eighth-century physical and political history. This is a matter that we know much less about than we do about any later century in Greek antiquity, or about the late Mycenaeans, for the obvious reason that we have almost no writing dating to that century.

We have Homer, of course, and historians have tended to draw upon Homer freely in order to compensate for the absence of other sources. This procedure runs grave risks—except in one area, the Homeric similes. The similes depict a generalized present; they claim to refer to a world with which the audience is familiar; and as I read them, they do refer to such a world. "The warrior acted," says the poet, "like a lion descending upon the herd." This pretends to illuminate the less familiar from the more familiar; and if it did not, if it could be assumed that no one in the audience had any experience of predatory lions, the poet would be indulging a kind of irony that I find foreign to the oral epic style.¹¹ In contrast, the world that is being illuminated, the world of the epic narrative, is a composite of objects, events, and institutions that may belong to any era from the early Mycenaean down to the eighth century, or to a world entirely fictional. I shall develop this statement in a moment; for now I want only to insist that we cannot label a detail in the narrative world 'historical' unless additional evidence locates it in the world outside the text. The similes constitute such evidence. We also have some literary sources other than Homer, and we have archaeology. In the absence of evidence from at least one of these three outside sources, we are groping in the dark, and can easily assign a detail to the wrong century, or wrongly assume that a piece of fiction corresponds to fact.

The view that we cannot use Homer's narrative world for historical purposes without further corroboration may appear to be Pyrrhonian skepticism, but it in fact follows naturally from statements made recently by two British archaeologists. A. M. Snodgrass offers a careful discussion of the world of Homer, in which he maintains that there are only two "positively and

¹¹ In contrast, say, to the irony of *Od.* 13.248f, where the audience and Athena know what Odysseus knows in part (and the "shepherd boy" does not know at all) that Athena disguised as the shepherd is saying that Ithaca's reputation has reached Troy—saying it to the very man who brought the name of Ithaca to Troy.

widely identifiable historical 'strata' in the Homeric world, the full Mycenaean and the eighth century (for the *Iliad*).¹² Snodgrass surely means that this positive and wide identification has depended upon matching details of the Homeric world with archaeological (and perhaps other external) evidence. When he goes on to say that the "Homeric political system, like other Homeric pictures, is an artificial amalgam of widely separated historical stages," his position is very close to what my investigation will conclude, except that I shall speak of "political systems" in the plural, and attribute one, the Trojan, to the eighth century, and another, that of the Achaeans in the *Iliad*, partly to the Mycenaean age and partly to fiction. Snodgrass goes on to speak of the contribution of the Homeric poems as being "of priceless worth for eighth-century Greece if it is sifted carefully enough" (395); I agree, if by "sifting" we mean the process of corroboration that I think essential.

An effort to avoid the need for such corroboration and to assert that the institutions depicted in oral poetry are inevitably and necessarily contemporary with the poet and his audience was made in 1968 by Snodgrass' student, Ian Morris.¹³ This stance, ostensibly comparatist but in fact virtually *a priori*, is ironically similar to that of M. I. Finley when he states that the Homeric world "is to be placed in time, as everything we know from the comparative study of heroic poetry says it must"; or when he points to the gap between history and the events of the *Chanson de Roland* to argue against the historicity of Homer's picture of the Trojan War; or when he adopts the view that the *Roland* is "not contemporary in its social conditions, its politics, or its details of war and warriors" but depicts "the France of about a century before the poet's own time" as analogical support for his opinion that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* do *not* reflect contemporary conditions.¹⁴ Morris has some good criticism of Finley, but both of them say far too little about the details of oral poetry to claim legitimately that their positions really are comparatist. They are intuitive: Finley feels that heroic poetry avoids excessive contemporaneity out of a need "to retain the 'once upon a time' image" (48); and because oral poetry is "constantly recreated" (87), Morris is convinced that it must depict contemporary "institutions and modes of thought" (82);

¹² A. M. Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece* (Edinburgh 1971) 389.

¹³ I. Morris, "The Use and Abuse of Homer," *ClAnt* 5 (1986) 81-138.

¹⁴ M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*² (New York 1979) 47f.

and each points uncritically to oral poetry to support an essentially *a priori* stance. In looking away from ancient Greece, Finley scarcely goes beyond the *Roland* and Bowra's *Heroic Poetry*, while Morris discusses no demonstrably oral poems, preferring instead to cite authority, inaccurately and misleadingly.¹⁵ He does refer to the *Song of Roland*, which he thinks might be a problem for him if it were orally composed; he asserts that it was not, citing Bowra as his authority and revealing virtually total ignorance of discussions of the problem by medievalists, especially Joseph Duggan's statistical arguments for the oral composition of the *Roland*.¹⁶ He omits entirely any reference to Avdo Medvedovich's *Wedding of Meho*, which is an especial pity, for we know for certain that it was orally composed. The political institutions in this poem reflect those of Bosnia under the Ottomans, and bear very little resemblance to Yugoslavia in 1935. Morris is unaware of Sveto-

¹⁵ For instance: R. Finnegan in the course of reminding us that oral literature involves not just a text that we can examine at leisure, but also its performance, says: "Differently performed, or performed at a different time, or to a different audience or by a different singer, it is a different poem. In this sense, an oral poem is an essentially ephemeral work of art, and has no existence or continuity apart from its performance" (*Oral Poetry* [Cambridge 1977] 28). Morris (*supra* n.13: 87) omits the first sentence and the first three words of the second, and reports "an oral poem is an essentially ephemeral work of art, and has no existence or continuity apart from its performance," leaving the reader with the impression that Finnegan is denying even the existence of an oral tradition, which she is very far from doing. On the next page she says: "In this respect, oral literature differs from our implicit model of written literature: the mode of communication to a silent reader, through the eye alone, from a definitive written text. Oral literature is more flexible and more dependent on its social context." Therefore, she goes on, a discussion of oral poetry must always take account of its performance, its audience, its performer. Nothing is said here about oral poetry reflecting contemporary institutions. But these words are supposed to be testimony against the "long-term transmission of dead institutions within a tradition of constantly re-created oral poetry"; in an effort to make them into this, Morris strips the two sentences down to "oral literature is ... dependent on its social context," and hopes that we will take this to mean that oral literature cannot talk about any society except the one it is composed in.

There are other errors in this article, some of them very important; but its weaknesses should not affect our judgement of Morris' very interesting book, *Burial and Ancient Society* (Cambridge 1987), with its exciting effort to correlate the rise of the polis with the burial remains (171-210).

¹⁶ J. Duggan, *The Song of Roland: Formulaic Style and Poetic Craft* (Berkeley 1973). Recent mathematical work of my own goes a long way to confirm Duggan: see *supra* n.3. The latter was of course published too recently for Morris to use, but Duggan's book is a classic.

zar Koljevich's *The Epic in the Making*, which shows how a body of poetry, known to be oral, at times reflects contemporary society, at times earlier society, and at times a blend of societies. Koljevich is able to determine reasonably well what is contemporary and what is earlier, and how much earlier, because we have a fair amount of information about medieval and renaissance Serbia and are even relatively well-informed about later periods.¹⁷ It is just not the case that all oral poetry depicts contemporary institutions; *a priori*, Homer can be depicting any societies that he might reasonably know about, from Bronze Age Mycenae through the eighth century, as well as societies quite fictional: witness the 'society' of the Cyclopes in the *Odyssey*.

Morris' effort to obviate the need for outside evidence, and its failure, should make us all the more conscious of that need; it drives us back to Snodgrass' perception of what is positively and widely identifiable. Even when we do possess outside evidence, we can expect to make mistakes; but there turn out to be so many parallels between Homeric Troy and the eighth century that we are not likely to be wholly mistaken in seeing a likeness. Steven Scully singles out four aspects of Troy that suggest the contemporary Ionian polis: "the city enclosure of the entire population, city temples, wall as absolute visual boundary, contemporary (eighth-century) construction."¹⁸ To these physical features I would add the seated statue of the goddess in the temple.¹⁹ I also think it probable that the government and economy of the Trojans belong to the eighth century: we have parallels to the kingship, the Council of Demogerontes, the Assembly, the diverse peacetime occupations. I agree with Scully (100–13) that the idea of individual subordination to the interests of the polis is part of the picture of Troy; I would add to that picture the contrary idea, that the polis is unable to force its will upon its citizens, at least upon the members of powerful *oikoi*; and it seems to me likely that both these ideas were deeply ingrained in the political life of the emerging eighth-century city-state. Note carefully that we are not committed to the view that Troy reflects a contemporary *but not* an older culture. If any of these institutions can be shown to belong to the

¹⁷ S. Koljevich, *The Epic in the Making* (Oxford 1980).

¹⁸ S. Scully, *Homer and the Sacred City* (Ithaca 1990) 88.

¹⁹ Sale (*supra* n.4) 38; Kirk on 6.90ff.

Dark Ages or any other era, so be it, as long as they are not denied to the eighth century.

I spoke above of agreeing with Snodgrass that Homer reflects both the contemporary and Mycenaean worlds, and of the Achaeans in the *Iliad* as reflecting Mycenae: an idealized version of Mycenae, with many details missing, *i.e.*, Mycenae heroized. The opinion that there are two Homeric societies in the *Iliad* (and perhaps still others in the *Odyssey*) is unusual; most historians prefer to speak of a "Homeric society," a single entity found in both poems.²⁰ This has been thought to be cohesive and coherent, but not historical, a poetic fiction (A. MacIntyre).²¹ Or it has been thought to lack coherence and cohesiveness, and to be unhistorical (A. A. Long). It has been thought to lack cohesiveness and to be an amalgam drawn from several historical periods (T. B. L. Webster, G. S. Kirk, Snodgrass). It has been thought to lack cohesiveness and to reflect a historical situation that was not cohesive.²² And it has been felt to be cohesive and coherent and to belong mostly to a given era: the Mycenaean,²³ the years from 1200 to 1000 (A. Andrewes), the years from 1000–800 (M. I. Finley, A. W. H. Adkins), the eighth century (Morris: *supra* n.15), or later.²⁴

Those scholars (above) who sense a lack of cohesiveness in 'Homeric Society' have ordinarily not identified more than one society within the poems. Others, however, are convinced that the world of the *Odyssey* is different from that of the *Iliad*.²⁵ I myself think that there are both resemblances and dissimilarities, but I have deliberately postponed a full investigation in order to make sure that we do not allow the *Odyssey* to color our picture of the *Iliad*. We cannot be sure that the *Odyssey* was composed by the author of the *Iliad*; even if it was, it was

²⁰ Perhaps I should say 'three societies', for the Lycians and Trojans do not appear to have the same form of government. But the Lycians may not differ from the Achaeans; Sarpedon relates (12.310–21) the foundations of their society to the heroic code as we know it from Achaean culture.

²¹ Sources for this and most of the following views can be found in A. M. Snodgrass, "An Historical Homeric Society?" *JHS* 94 (1974) 114–25; I shall give full reference only for those opinions not to be found there.

²² A. J. M. Whitley, "Social Diversity in Dark Age Greece," *BSA* 86 (1991) 341–65.

²³ *E.g.* M. P. Nilsson, *Homer and Mycenae* (Philadelphia 1933) 218.

²⁴ M. Skafté Jensen, *The Homeric Question and the Oral-formulaic Theory* (Copenhagen 1980) 167–71.

²⁵ *E.g.* D. L. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* (Oxford 1955) 157.

probably composed later; and there is no necessary reason why its use of social history should correspond to the *Iliad*'s. When, for instance, we hear Odysseus boast about his skill at plowing (18.366–75), or with the bow and arrow at Troy (8.215–20), we are struck by the contrast with the heroic warrior in the *Iliad*; we can try to reconcile the data, but there is no good reason to do so (see also 49, 82 *infra*). Naturally when we try to reconstruct a total picture of the Achaeans in the *Iliad* our thoughts turn to the *Odyssey*, but we must resist, except to point out a likeness or a difference already established. After thoroughly studying the societies in both poems, we may decide that there are important likenesses; but it ought to be a strictly *a posteriori* decision.

In identifying social differences between cultures within the poems, my stance is close to Scully's (*supra* 17). For example, Scheria in the *Odyssey* bears a close resemblance to poleis of Homer's time, especially Old Smyrna and Oikonomos (Scully 87), but on Ithaca as the *Odyssey* gives it to us, the polis is relatively insignificant (102f) and the *oikos* predominates. Troy in the *Iliad*, as we saw earlier, is a polis. Scully does not say a great deal about the culture of the Achaeans in the *Iliad*. But he does stress that because they are the attackers of the polis and the Trojans the defenders, their values and psychology will be different; and indeed they live in a different community, one lacking wives and children (110).²⁶

That the Achaeans in the *Iliad* differ from the Trojans is far more important to my argument than the question of what society they may derive from. If they should one day prove to be wholly fictional, or to belong to the period of the Ionian migration, that makes no essential difference. But if they are not distinguished from the Trojans, then what the Trojans actually are will be lost, and the resemblances the Trojans bear to the eighth-century Greek polis will be less meaningful. The Achaeans, and especially Achilles, maintain an epic distance; the Trojans and Hector are closer to us and especially to the eighth-century audience. Thus certain apparent similarities—both have Elders, both have βασιλῆες and ἄνακτες—can be very misleading, and I shall therefore be discussing the Achaeans as well as the Trojans in great detail.

²⁶ I have slightly revised Scully's statement, which is that Achilles' community does not include "women and children."

Only after the picture of each society is fully drawn do we ask the question whether it resembles any particular period. Before that, we are doing literary criticism, and of a strictly new-critical sort. We cannot bring in political, social, or even physical history to support an interpretation; such a procedure would be an obvious *petitio principii*, because we are seeking to determine what historical period, if any, a given detail in the *Iliad* suits. We can hardly say, 'In this passage Homer resembles the eighth century,' when we have introduced the eighth century to interpret the passage. Nor can we bring in authorial intention; we are trying to *establish* authorial intention. Nor can we speak of initial-audience reaction; that too we are attempting, in part, to recreate. Nor can we refer freely to epic tradition, as we are engaged in isolating differences between Homer and the tradition. Granted, there are probably cases where we cannot proceed in literary interpretation without invoking history: in getting at the basic meaning, for instance, of such terms as βασιλεύς, γέροντες, βουλή, we may need to go outside the *Iliad*. But we want to reduce such egress to an absolute minimum; we "tread the circle warily," and only when we must.²⁷ Mostly we let the poem supply the data.

There are, I suspect, scholars who are convinced that *any* interpretation of the data within the poem must be supported by historical data from without: either by what the author intended, or by the response of the original audience, or by the epic tradition, or by the institutions of contemporary or earlier worlds. Threatened by the multitude of interpretative possibilities thrown open by post-structuralist theory, they naturally turn outside the text in the hope of objectivity. Certainly some places in the following pages present a choice of interpretations. But given the uses to which we wish to put our interpretations, we must go ahead and trust our judgements—aided by reason and by the opinions of other scholars (as in *supra* n.7). Most of us probably do this anyway: few are prepared to abandon an attractive interpretation in the face of a historical fact, even an

²⁷ See A. E. Housman, "The Application of Thought to Textual Criticism," *Proceedings of the Classical Association* 18 (1922) 67ff (= J. Carter, ed., *A. E. Housman, Selected Prose* [Cambridge 1961] 131–50; cf. 145). A good discussion of Housman's point may be found in D. Kovacs, "Treading the Circle Warily," *TAPA* 117 (1987) 257–70.

author's intention.²⁸ In the current enterprise, at least, we have no choice.

I. The Achaeans in the Field

Agamemnon is in charge of an alliance of individual contingents led by such chieftains as Nestor, Diomedes, Idomeneus, Menelaus, Achilles, and all the others who have brought groups of soldiers in ships to Troy. The Catalogue of Ships in Book 2 lists these contingents: they are drawn from twenty-nine separate regions of Greece, and all twenty-nine are presented as politically independent of each other. Agamemnon's contingent is the largest, and Agamemnon is the best of the heroes; but there is no suggestion that he rules anyone except the Mycenaean and the others mentioned at 2.569–80. These are Agamemnon's subjects; we have just heard about Diomedes' subjects, and next we shall be told about Menelaus' subjects. Not a whisper of any overarching authority.

But on campaign, during the life of the Trojan expedition, Agamemnon is, in some sense, the commander-in-chief. If the expedition fails, his will be the shame (2.285); if it succeeds, his will be the glory (4.415). We would like to define his rôle more precisely, and we would like to see whether this rôle actually does reflect a political situation back home that is obscured by the Catalogue. We would therefore like to know how much authority Agamemnon has in three relationships: over his own contingent, over the other chieftains' troops, and over the other chieftains. We shall find (stating the matter summarily) that in the first relationship, over his own contingent, Agamemnon's rule is absolute. In the second, over the troops of the other chieftains themselves, he has no *political* power at all, though we assume that he can give orders on the battlefield. In the third, over the other chieftains, there is uncertainty. At times

²⁸ It is precisely when someone seeks to rule out an interpretation because the author did not intend it that we should refer to the intentional fallacy, and listen to the wise words of Thomas Mann on the subject: "I consider it a mistake to think that the author himself is the best judge of his work.... Others, as time goes on, will know more and better about it than he." If Mann can say this about a work he labored over for many years, how much the more true must it be for a work produced in a few hours or days of composition in performance, where the poet cannot possibly intend everything he says. See T. Mann, *The Magic Mountain*, tr. H. T. Lowe-Porter (New York 1969) 725, in an author's note entitled "The Making of *The Magic Mountain*."

we are offered an ideal in which Agamemnon rules absolutely, at least during the course of the campaign, but mostly we can see that his authority is limited by a gentleman's agreement: any decision concerning the expedition as a whole must be made by Agamemnon, frequently after receiving advice from the others; but the other leaders are not necessarily expected to obey that decision if it undermines their own legitimate self-interest, or the interests of the expedition; and if one leader defies Agamemnon out of self-interest, the other leaders are expected to continue to support Agamemnon without condemning the defiant leader.

Let us look more closely at the data. The first relationship, Agamemnon vis-à-vis his own contingent, is never brought into question or tested, but we can infer, from analogy and from his power back home, that his authority is total. First the analogy: we see from the strict obedience given by the Myrmidons to Achilles, despite their grumbling (16.204–07), that Achilles' sway is complete. His men are bitterly unhappy over being left out of the fight, and make accusations and threaten to leave for home; some of these men are high-born indeed, sprung from the river Spercheius or the god Hermes; and yet there is never the least hint of their really disobeying, and returning either to battle or to Greece. Note that Achilles' decision to withdraw, and his later reversal, are political, not military: the men are under orders in and out of battle; for the life of the expedition, at least, Achilles is a monarch. Agamemnon's authority over the Mycenaeans must be no less than this. Second, Agamemnon's power back home is unchallenged: he can give away whole cities to Achilles if he chooses (9.149–56). His rule over his own contingent, like Achilles' over his, is thus not merely military, but political: he too is an absolute monarch.

The second relationship, Agamemnon vis-à-vis the troops of the other contingents, is also never brought into question, and must be indirectly inferred. Clearly he has no political authority off the battlefield; the Myrmidons obey Achilles, and no one remotely suggests that they could obey anyone else even if they chose. But while the troops are being arrayed for battle, they are grouped by contingent under their own leaders, inspected, and supervised by Agamemnon and at times the γέροντες (2.445–84). Agamemnon is the supreme commander in Book 4, during the *Epipoleis*. On the battlefield, we therefore assume that (so far as anyone is in charge) it is Agamemnon.

Van Wees, to be sure, has recently shown that preparation for battle is one thing, battle itself another:

In the preparation for battle we find a hierarchy of bands, sections and contingents, all with their respective commanders. On top of this there is a commander for the army as a whole: Agammemnon inspects all the Greek contingents. But in the battle itself the entire structure disappears, and only the leaders of the smallest units are visible.²⁹

Still, we hear Agamemnon urge on the men as a whole in 5.529, 11.154, 165 (though Nestor can do this also, when Agamemnon is busy killing, 6.67–71). Lines 11.264–79 show him ranging the army until his wound is too much for him, then giving a final order to all the Danaans. He does not appoint anyone to take his place; seemingly he is not doing a job that requires, or at any rate gets, a deputy. Still, he may have been filling a real need: Poseidon leads the Achaeans for most of Books 13 and 14; and in 14.133f Diomedes suggests that he and Odysseus and Agamemnon, though wounded, ought to drive the men on. In any case we infer from the battle-preparation scenes that if Agamemnon should give orders to anyone while the battle is raging, they would be expected to obey.

The third relationship, Agamemnon's power over the other chieftains, is not only brought into question, but in being questioned provides the main plot of the poem. On the one hand, Agamemnon can take away Achilles' γέρας, apparently implying that his authority is absolute. Agamemnon, says Nestor, is the ἄναξ of hosts, to whom Zeus has given a scepter and the right to issue ordinances (9.98f). Earlier Nestor admonishes Achilles: "Do not wish to strive against a βασιλεύς face to face, since a scepter-holding βασιλεύς never has a like share of honor, a βασιλεύς to whom Zeus traditionally (τε) gives κῦδος" (1.279).³⁰ "Let there be one κοίρανος, one βασιλεύς," urges Odysseus in 2.204ff.

²⁹ H. van Wees, "Leaders of Men? Military Organization in the *Iliad*," *CQ* n.s. 36 (1986) 292.

³⁰ Thus all the commentators I have regularly employed who discuss the sentence at all; Kirk's silence is presumably assent. But van Leeuwen's translation has the merit of not opposing "scepter-holding βασιλεύς" to Achilles, who is presumably a scepter-holding βασιλεύς as well (*cf.* 2.86): "nam inter reges, quos Iuppiter laude ornavit, nullus umquam tanto honore polluit" (quoted in *LdsfGE s.v.*).

On the other hand, Achilles can withdraw himself and his troops from the battle with impunity, implying that Agamemnon's authority is limited. Nor is this simply a matter of the might of the best warrior; it is his right. Phoenix, the other elder statesman, approves of Achilles' initial withdrawal: if Agamemnon were not offering gifts, he would not urge Achilles to return to battle (9.515–18). Agamemnon twice says later that he himself was at fault (ἄσάμην), and casts no blame upon Achilles (9.115–20, 19.134–41). He refers to the insults and abuse that the Achaeans leveled at himself, without blaming them, either; indeed he accepts the justice of their criticisms when he says that he was not really responsible, αἴτιος: it was the fault of Zeus, Moira, and an Erinys (19.85ff). He does not even say that Achilles was wrong to have turned down the gifts; he does not imply that Achilles was obligated to return to battle after the embassy in Book 9. He wipes out the very suggestion by giving all the gifts again (19.137–44); he even insists on waiting to go back to battle until Achilles has the gifts (19.190f). We think back to Phoenix's fears that Achilles' honor will be less if he delays his return (9.605), and ask why in book 19 Homer is undermining Phoenix. Amongst the various reasons, one is the poet's almost strident insistence that the moral relationship between Achilles and Agamemnon has not changed since the beginning of Book 9. Phoenix presumably thought that it would, that Agamemnon would withdraw his offer; but Phoenix was mistaken. Indeed his exemplum was not well chosen: Meleager was a citizen of Calydon, a subject of the Elders who offer the gifts (9.574–80); Achilles is not a subject of any kingdom of Agamemnon's.

Nestor too, for all his praise of a scepter-holding king, blames Agamemnon: he "dishonored the best of men, though the gods honored him" (9.110f). Athena concurs: Achilles has described the threat to take away Briseis as ὕβρις (1.203), and this is exactly what she calls it (1.214). He is not to kill Agamemnon, but she foresees, with approval, his withdrawal from the battle and the ensuring embassy: "Tell him in insulting words how it will be ..., " *i.e.*, go ahead and withdraw; "Some day you will have beside you three times as many shining gifts," *i.e.*, there will be an embassy (1.211ff). Zeus backs Achilles: whatever his motives, his support of Achilles after he withdraws cannot help endorsing that withdrawal. And Poseidon joins this chorus: it is altogether true, πάμπαν ἐτήτυμον, that Agamemnon is guilty, for he dishonored Achilles (13.111ff). And he says this *after* the embassy.

Achilles has the power to defy Agamemnon, and he has the right to do so. He has the right because he has been dishonored (1.356). Indeed Diomedes, threatened with dishonor, has the same right: he asserts that he will not leave the Troad no matter what Agamemnon says or does (9.42–49), because he feels that to run away would be shameful, an acknowledgement that he is ἀπτόλεμος and ἄναλκις (9.41), and also because “we came with God” (9.49); and this assertion is accepted and even praised by Nestor: “no one will disparage, no one will gainsay your speech” (9.55f). Odysseus too assumes that right in Book 14, when he replies to Agamemnon’s suggestion that the ships withdraw by telling him to shut up (14.90); he feels that Agamemnon is leading badly and the expedition is in jeopardy (14.84–89). Achilles is acting in his own self-interest; Diomedes and Odysseus are speaking partly out of self-interest, partly in the interests of the expedition as a whole. All three gestures appear to fall under the gentlemen’s agreement that permits defiance under certain circumstances.

Could we possibly read the Thersites episode in Book 2 as implying criticism of Achilles? Thersites assails Agamemnon for his treatment of Achilles and urges a return home; Odysseus berates him on the grounds that he is too inferior a creature to insult princes and the situation too uncertain to warrant retreat, then beats him. The men, “for all their distress” (2.270), laugh and give ironic compliments to Odysseus: he has done wonderful things before now, but this is his best effort. Thersites is a scapegoat, permitting a temporary resolution of the differences between the men, who want to return home, and Agamemnon.³¹ Ought we to see the men as condemning Thersites, the spokesman for Achilles, and therefore in effect condemning Achilles? After all, both have committed the same ‘crime’, that of speaking out defiantly against Agamemnon. Can the ugliness of Thersites be seen as the men’s perception of Achilles’ stance as an immoral (improper, inappropriate) one?

There two good reasons for rejecting this interpretation. First, the men are not unequivocally pleased with what Odysseus does to Thersites; they are distressed in 2.270, either at Odysseus’ brutality (in which case they are distanced from Odysseus, and we will associate them with Achilles’ cause) or because, as Leaf says *ad loc.*, Thersites is their spokesman (in which case

³¹ See the excellent discussion by W. G. Thalmann, “Thersites: Comedy, Scapegoats and Heroic Ideology in the *Iliad*,” *TAPA* 118 (1988) 1–28.

they entirely approve of Achilles).³² Second, they do not go on to criticize what Thersites said, but only how he said it. Seeing Achilles' position through the lens of Thersites may permit them to *set aside* any pro-Achilles sentiment they may entertain, but that is a far cry from allowing us to see here any *anti*-Achilles feeling that we can use to stigmatize his withdrawal. And in the ensuing speeches of Odysseus and Nestor there is plenty of criticism of the men, but not a word directed against Achilles.

In Book 9, Ajax is critical of Achilles for disregarding the wishes of his friends, of the ambassadors. But his criticism comes only *after* gifts have been offered and rejected, and *because* they have been rejected: the family of a murdered man accept recompense and forgive; why does Achilles not do likewise (9.632–39)? Achilles, in one of the most dramatic lines of the poem, agrees with this criticism (9.645). On the basis of Ajax's plea, he reverses his earlier decision to leave for home. He thereby leaves himself vulnerable to the harsh judgment of anyone who feels that now he ought to go back to battle. Patroclus reinforces this judgment when he bitterly criticizes Achilles in 16.31–35. It is unfeeling of Achilles not to return, perhaps—though it would have been wise of Agamemnon to have apologized in person.³³ But Achilles has the *right* to stay away even now: as we have seen, when he returns in Book 19, no one utters a word against him. *A fortiori* nothing said in 9 and 16 invalidates his right to withdraw in the first place.

Agamemnon has the *power* to take away Briseis: Achilles will not fight to prevent him since “You [plural] who gave her take her away” (1.199). But he does not have the *right* to do it. Achilles on the contrary has not only the power, but also the right to withdraw—gods and mortals agree on this. Unfortunately, there is nowhere in the *Iliad* a clear statement of the political structure (using ‘political’ in its modern and general sense) that enables this crisis to exist. There is, however, one visible body that might offer some guidance, a body that combines Agamemnon and the other chiefs, the Achaean Council of Elders (βουλή γερόντων, 2.53). The Council apparently does not include every leader of an Achaean contingent (which would give us over forty coun-

³² Kirk's account of 2.270, which rules out ambivalent feelings despite the obviously paradoxical quality of the language, seems to me exceptionally weak.

³³ As he probably would have done, had Odysseus not given such a disastrously abbreviated account of the Embassy—as if no one had spoken after his own speech (9.677–87).

cillors), but a selection: Nestor, Idomeneus, both Ajaxes, Diomedes, Odysseus, and Menelaus are mentioned in 2.404–08; 10.110, without using the term γέροντες, puts Meges on a level with these men, men who were later said to have been “summoned to a council” (10.195); in 4.344 we find Menestheus side by side with Odysseus among the γέροντες who are normally invited to a feast; in 9.168 Phoenix is among the γέροντες feasting with Agamemnon (9.89f), while 18.448 refers to all three members of the embassy as elders, and 19.311 includes Phoenix as one of the elders (cf. 19.303, 338). In 10.196f Meriones and Antilochus are asked along to help advise, but are distinguished from those who have just sat in the Council.

This Council meets twice in Book 2 (53, 404), once, apparently, in Book 7 (313–44), once in Book 9 (89; by inference they are still sitting at 669), once in Book 10 (195; they are still sitting at 532), once perhaps in rump session in 14 (27), and once perhaps in 19 (303). It meets to initiate policy or tactics: at 2.53–86, Agamemnon proposes to arm and test the men; at 2.404–46 they pray and feast, and Nestor suggests marshaling the men; at 7.313–44 Nestor proposes, and the others instigate, the embassy, and at 9.669–710 they hear the results; at 10.195–253 Nestor conveys Agamemnon’s desire for information, and at 10.532–78 they hear the results; at 14.27–134 Agamemnon proposes flight, Odysseus demurs, and Diomedes proposes supervision of the battle; at 19.303–39 (if we really ought to call this a Council meeting) they try to get Achilles to eat.

All their meetings concern the joint enterprise, the expedition as a whole. Even the effort to get food into Achilles’ stomach is (besides insurance that he will not faint on the battlefield) an attempt at unity, an effort to overcome the effect of Achilles’ alienation from them: earlier he withdrew, and even now he refuses food and drink, a most unprofessional stance. All the meetings concern action *to be* taken, future action; Nestor in Book 9 may criticize Agamemnon’s past misdeeds, but they have not met to evaluate and hold him to account. They are in search of a plan.

They never meet simply to take Agamemnon’s orders; he and others make suggestions that all agree to. But Agamemnon is paramount. As Nestor puts it (9.100ff),

Therefore you must, beyond all others, speak the speech
and hear it;
And bring matters to fulfilment for another man, too,
whenever

The heart bids someone speak to the good. Whatever
He begins, depends on you.

Sometimes the agreement is reluctant, as in Nestor's response at 2.79–82:

If some other one of the Achaeans had mentioned this
dream,
We would call it false and turn our backs upon it;
But as it is, the one who claims to be the best of the
Achaeans saw it.
Come, let us attempt to arm the sons of the Achaeans.

Nestor's hesitation would be more appropriate to Agamemnon's proposal to test the men than to the dream, for Nestor later seems eager for them to resume the battle (2.337–68).³⁴ Aristarchus wanted to excise this speech, but, as Kirk says in his note on it, "someone has to express agreement or disagreement with Agamemnon." Although they twice (9.89–181, 14.27–134) reject proposals made by Agamemnon to retreat, these are not assertions of independent authority: the Elders must persuade Agamemnon to change his mind. Nestor may call the meeting in Book 9, but Agamemnon is to take charge of it (*ἄρχε*, says Nestor, 9.69), for he is the *βασιλεύτατος* (9.69). The Elders are clearly an advisory body; the decisions are made, or endorsed, by Agamemnon.

The upshot is that the Council has no exceptional authority that goes beyond Agamemnon's. The embassy in Book 9 is, after all, an extension of a Council meeting, and Achilles' first response is even more defiant. He threatens to go home, and Ajax must talk him out of it; and even so he does not do what Agamemnon and the Elders want. And, as we have seen, even this second act of defiance is not condemned by the Achaeans when Achilles rejoins them in Book 19. No one says, "Defiance of Agamemnon is one thing, defiance of the Council another." The individual may defy both Agamemnon *and* the Council with impunity on personal grounds, provided presumably that society in general agrees with those grounds.

³⁴ Or perhaps he feels that they ought to have an embassy to Achilles right now. The passage is hard because Nestor ought to say something about the test, and, as Kirk says (123), "his concluding remark at 83, which is an exact repetition of Agamemnon's words at 72 (but come, let us arm the Achaeans), is most appropriate to a version in which that idea [the test] was never mentioned." Perhaps Homer originally told the story without the test, then reworked the passage to include it, leaving behind some traces of the revision.

The Achaeans occasionally meet in an Assembly; it appears to be powerless. Right at the beginning of the poem all the Achaeans are present at what must be a meeting of the Assembly (else why are all the Achaeans present?). All the other Achaeans want Agamemnon to return Chryseis; Agamemnon does not want to and does not (1.22–25). The Assembly that Achilles calls at 1.54 sees Nestor begging Agamemnon not to take away Briseis; and yet he does. The Assembly has even less authority than the Council; it exists in order to let views be expressed, and to keep the army informed.

We had reason to hope that by observing the relationship between Agamemnon and the Council we might have inferred formal limitations on Agamemnon's authority, some statement of the circumstances under which he may be defied. It is a tragic fact about the Achaeans that they lack such a principle, one that might permit the Council to insist on Agamemnon's restraining himself on penalty of dissolution of the alliance. All we see is that the Council is politically no more than an extension of Agamemnon: "Whatever anyone begins depends upon you" (9.102). No statement as to when Agamemnon has exceeded his authority, nor as to the proprieties in cases where individuals disobey him. We are back to the gentleman's agreement (*supra* 22).

Where did this agreement come from? Why does everyone act on this unexpressed understanding? When the Achaeans left Greece for Troy, they (presumably the contingent leaders) made a promise to Agamemnon that "he would come back, having sacked Troy" (2.286); there were libations and pledges "in which we put our trust" (2.341); Idomeneus refers to his having "promised and consented" to be a faithful companion (4.266f). To be a faithful companion, an ἐπίηρος ἑταῖρος, is ambiguous—the referent can be a follower, as in 9.220 (Patroclus to Achilles), or an equal, as in 10.235, 242 (Odysseus is ἑταῖρος to Diomedes)—and vague, without definition of rights and duties. It is reasonable to suppose that it was on the occasion of these libations and promises that the leaders arrived at the arrangement reflected in the *Iliad*, that Agamemnon would make the ultimate decisions, normally after consulting the others in a council or after hearing discussion in an assembly. The trouble is that this arrangement did not, probably could not, foresee all contingencies. After all, as Odysseus makes perfectly clear, these are promises *specific* to the Trojan expedition, stating that Agamemnon will come back having sacked Troy (2.287); they do not entail the foundation of a state. The various problems that

might arise were left to be resolved by our gentleman's agreement.

Note carefully that when Nestor and Odysseus in Book 2 are chiding the Achaeans, they do not make mention of any *other* arrangement than this, any political structure or understanding indicating subordination to Agamemnon. Of course the poet does not and cannot tell us all he knows; we can picture, for instance, that the epithet "wide-ruling Agamemnon" might have meant to the audience that Agamemnon was a Great King.³⁵ But there are so many places in the *Iliad* where the characters could have had recourse to a statement like, "As Great King, Agamemnon has the right to this but not to that," that it is hard to see why we never hear it. We shall return to the Great King presently.

The Achaean political reality on the Trojan plain appears therefore to be a vaguely defined overlordship of Agamemnon, founded on oaths taken at Aulis that the soldiers would follow him in his pursuit of the sack of Troy. Nothing we have seen so far contradicts the impression given by the Catalogue, that the expedition is a coalition of essentially independent states. A Council has been temporarily created to exchange ideas and to enable Agamemnon to make good decisions, and assemblies are held in response to various needs. There is no formal limitation on Agamemnon's power, though there is an informal understanding that he can exceed his authority, and be defied with impunity if he does.

This absence of formal limitations, together with several statements made by Odysseus, Nestor, and Homer himself, have combined to persuade some scholars that Agamemnon must have more authority than I have just allotted him, that the Catalogue is misleading and Achilles is, perhaps justifiably, defying his king. This additional authority is seen in two ways: either Agamemnon is a Great King, the other chieftains vassals, and the Achaean host members of an empire; or the relationship between Agamemnon and the Achaeans generally is similar to the relationship between king, council, and assembly *within* a contemporary Greek polis or *ethnos*. It is vital to our understanding of the government of Troy that we discuss these possibilities, but first let us merely look at the passages they are based

³⁵ For similar possibilities, see J. M. Foley, "Word-Power, Performance, and Tradition," *Journal of American Folklore* 105 (1992) 276-301.

upon, in order to see whether they compel us to abandon the theory of Agamemnon's vague overlordship.

At 2.108 Agamemnon is said to rule in (or over) many islands and all Argos, and some want to choose the meaning 'rule over' and take Argos here to mean the "whole of the mainland" (Leaf on 2.108). Before jumping to an interpretation that obviously conflicts with the Catalogue, we should look to other possibilities. First, the word Ἄργος has several meanings: the phrase here, Ἄργει παντί, rules out the city, but that leaves the Argolid, or else a larger area including the Argolid,³⁶ or the Peloponnesus, or all of mainland Greece. If we take the verb ἀνάσσειν here to mean 'rule over', we must take Agamemnon to be ruling over Diomedes, or Diomedes and the other leaders from the Peloponnesus, or over all the leaders, by virtue of his scepter. Now we have just heard, twenty-two lines before this, of scepter-holding βασιλῆες who are members of the Council, and these would normally include Diomedes, Menelaos, and Nestor, all leaders from the Peloponnesus. Agamemnon's scepter is elaborate, and no doubt elevates him above the other scepter-holders; but we are not prepared for the idea that it gives him suzerainty over them. Hence we naturally take the dative endings in πολλῆισιν νήσοισι καὶ Ἄργει παντί to be locatives, "rule *in* many islands and Argos in the wider sense." When ἀνάσσειν takes the dative ending elsewhere, it usually (not always) means 'rule over'; but in all those cases the other dative endings are all true datives, referring to people (as of course most true datives do).³⁷ Dative endings attached to place names will normally not be true datives but locatives. Usually Homer uses the

³⁶ "The Argolic plain in the Peloponnesus stretching inwards from the Argolic gulf and, apparently, adjoining lands": Cunliffe, *Place Names s.v.* Ἄργος. Agamemnon is frequently said to live in Argos. This cannot be the city, which belongs to Diomedes; it is a region that must include the cities of Argos and Mycenae and therefore encompass the territories of both Agamemnon and Diomedes. Agamemnon lives in it; he does not rule it. Now *Il.* 6.512 locates Ephyra (=Corinth) μυχῶι Ἄργεος "in an inner part of Argos." Aristarchus wants this Argos to be the whole Peloponnesus, as it must be in other passages; but this makes the word μυχῶι difficult. If, however, we take Argos here to be the Argolid plus Agamemnon's possessions outside the Argolid, then μυχῶι can mean "inner from the point of view of the Argolic gulf." We cannot bring in the *Odyssey* to demonstrate the validity of this interpretation, but it is worth calling attention to the fact that *Od.* 3.263 locates Mycenae μυχῶι Ἄργεος, where again μυχῶι is difficult if Argos is the Peloponnesus, but makes sense if our standpoint is the Argolic gulf, Mycenae being at the other end of the Argive plain from the gulf: see Merry and Riddle on the line.

³⁷ At 20.180 it means 'rule among'; see 80 *infra*.

partitive for the locative after ἀνάσσειν, but the meter here prohibits it.

Why does Homer say “Argos in the wider sense” here? Why does he not choose to mean “the Argolid, Corinth, and Achaea,” as he might well do by omitting the παντί? The fact is that in the *Iliad* generally, Agamemnon is the king of more than what he is specifically allotted in the Catalogue; not only are there “many islands,” but his domain includes other cities in the Peloponnesus that do not even adjoin the area allotted to him in the Catalogue: they are found along the Messenian gulf (9.149–53). Hence he really does rule “in Argos in the wider sense.” Perhaps he communicates with these as well as his islands by means of his huge navy (160 vessels counting those given to the Arcadians, 2.612–13). Scholars are legitimately puzzled that the cities and the islands are not mentioned in the Catalogue, but there is no fundamental conflict between it and the rest of the *Iliad* on this point.³⁸ And we ought to have no problem with his ruling cities that do not fall within his primary borders, for this is exactly what in Book 9 he is proposing that Achilles do.

At several places Nestor and Odysseus make an effort to give Agamemnon a higher status than any visible political structure would warrant. The first occurs in Book 1, in the middle of the crisis, as Nestor attempts to reconcile the antagonists. He tells Agamemnon not to take away the girl, because she is the gift of the Achaeans—*i.e.*, she marks Achilles’ status in society’s eyes, his τιμή. So far, so good. Then he tells Achilles not to wish to strive with a βασιλεύς face-to-face, since a scepter-holding βασιλεύς has a very different share of τιμή (1.278f). These words could of course mean, “Don’t come to blows with a βασιλεύς,” but such advice has no relevance at this point, and potential assault is not the behavior that Agamemnon complains about in his ensuing speech. Interpreting instead, “Don’t quarrel with a βασιλεύς,” preserves relevance, but puts Nestor on shaky

³⁸ See Kirk I 182. Similarly, Odysseus rules over areas geographically separated by Meges’ Doulichium: see D. L. Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Berkeley 1959) 125. Agamemnon also is separated from his “many islands,” perhaps by a considerable distance. These could be the smaller islands of the Saronic gulf, near Agamemnon’s mainland kingdom but mingled with Aegina, which belongs to Diomedes. (But Diomedes’ Aegina could be a town near Epidaurus mentioned in Strabo 8.375; Kirk’s assertion that the island was “continuously inhabited from the neolithic age onward” does not tell us when it was named ‘Aegina’ or that it was the only place so named.) Or they could be further afield; there are many islands that Homer does not mention by name.

ground. Athena has just told Achilles to “insult him all you want” (1.211); we can sympathize with Nestor’s intentions, but why should we prefer his authority to Athena’s? And again, if all the Councilors are scepter-holding kings (2.86), Achilles must be one too, and therefore logically should have the *same* τιμή. Nestor might well answer by referring to Agamemnon’s special scepter (2.100–08) that Odysseus wields (2.186f, 198, 165, 279) as a symbol of Agamemnon’s overlordship. This scepter was once owned by Zeus, and Nestor may have this in mind when he speaks of Zeus giving κῦδος to the βασιλεύς (1.279). He is in any case attempting to suggest that there is a mystical relationship between Zeus and Agamemnon such that Achilles should not quarrel with him. But Nestor is badly misled: in what follows, Zeus supports Achilles. Agamemnon indeed later acknowledges this (9.117) and says that it was Zeus who caused him to behave so insanely (19.137).

The religious authority conveyed by Agamemnon’s scepter, though real enough, obviously does not preclude Achilles’ attacking Agamemnon verbally or withdrawing from battle. It therefore does not correspond to absolute political authority, but rather to the relative political power conferred by Agamemnon’s status as commander-in-chief. Indeed Nestor goes on to say that Agamemnon is “better” (φέρτερος, 1.281) than Achilles (and by implication everyone else) because he fields more troops (πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει). This is not only true, but the poet agrees that Agamemnon is ἄριστος for the same reason, πολὺ δὲ πλείστους ἄγε λαούς (2.580, where δέ should be translated “for”; cf. Denniston 169). This is a warrior culture, a military economy, at least while in the Troad (see 45 *infra*); though it must value the great warrior, it must value even more the leader of the most soldiers. Therefore Agamemnon is φέρτερος and ἄριστος; and this no doubt is the measure by which the peculiar comparative and superlative forms, βασιλεύτερος and βασιλεύτατος, become meaningful. Indeed we cannot avoid the inference that this is why Agamemnon is the commander-in-chief. As Nestor says later, “Take the lead, Agamemnon, for you are βασιλεύτατος” (9.69). But these comparatives and superlatives imply a relative status: if Agamemnon has the most of this quality, others must have some of it. Which is why they too are called βασιλῆες. And this relative status is expressed by the fact that they follow Agamemnon, except when he is dishonoring them or threatening the success of the expedition.

And so a scepter-holding βασιλεύς, even when the scepter is Zeus', even if he is φέρτερος, or βασιλεύτατος, does not have the right to take away a man's γέρας, and Nestor does not pretend that he does. It is therefore not wrong for Achilles to strive with Agamemnon, however much Nestor might wish that it were. Nestor is at an impasse. Note that it would be useless of him to call a meeting of the Council; if Nestor cannot persuade Agamemnon here, he would fare no better at a Council meeting.

But the image of the scepter-holding βασιλεύς who might command absolute authority persists. It lurks in Odysseus' words to the leaders when, in Book 2, the army is in flight to the ships (2.190–97):

My friend, it is not proper to frighten you as if you were a coward,

No, but sit down yourself and make the rest of the army sit.

For you don't yet see clearly Agamemnon's intentions.

Now he's making trial, soon he will bear hard upon the Achaeans.

Didn't we all hear what he said in the Council?

Don't let him get angry and wreak some evil upon the Achaeans!

For the passion of Zeus-nurtured βασιλῆες is great,

For their honor comes from Zeus, and counsellor Zeus loves them.³⁹

Odysseus' listeners, just labeled βασιλῆες at 2.86, seem here called upon to look upwards towards a special βασιλεύς whose wishes must be obeyed for fear of their anger and for awe of their special relationship to Zeus. This seems to develop Nestor's effort to give Agamemnon mystic authority, authority derived from divinity, and approaches doing violence to the political independence of the γέροντες. Of course we must remember that in Book 2 Odysseus has reason to worry; there must be no repetition of the events of Book 1, and he knows only too well how Agamemnon is capable of getting angry and violating the normal relationship. He might merely be dressing up in mys-

³⁹ Aristarchus says that 193–97 are unseemly and not conducive to restraint, and wants instead to place 203ff here; Leaf complains that these latter lines would certainly not lead to restraint, but to independence and opposition (they sound almost like a pleas for monarchy). Both are right, I feel, in that both sets of verses seem to do violence to the relationship between Agamemnon and the other chieftains; I shall attempt to justify 193–97 below.

tical clothing a reminder to his colleagues of the horrible consequences of Agamemnon's irrational anger.

When he goes on to address the common soldiers, however, Odysseus is definitely wishing that they were all led by a powerful monarch (200–06):

Sit still, and hear the speech of others
 Who are better than you....
 In no way whatever shall all of us Achaeans be βασιλῆες
 here.
 The rule of many is not a good thing. Let there be one
 ruler,
 One βασιλεύς, to whom Zeus traditionally (τε in line 206)
 gives
 Scepter and rights of ordinance (θέμιστας), to plan for his
 people.⁴⁰

Interpretation of this passage must be subtle, because the men are, of course, doing what Agamemnon told them to do; they are treating Agamemnon as the exclusive βασιλεύς. We take Odysseus to be saying, without saying it, “You know perfectly well what Agamemnon wants, and you are using Agamemnon’s words as an excuse to give orders to yourselves.” Perhaps we should picture him sensing that the men are in effect voting with Achilles: “angered about Achilles, they wish to be their own commanders,” as an exegetical scholiast suggests.⁴¹ But the deeper problem remains. What Odysseus really wants is for the men to listen to their individual leaders (who are supposed to be restraining them [2.75], and have just been recalled to their duty). This is what, in effect, Agamemnon had told the chieftains in the council: “Let the men *not* regard me as the exclusive βασιλεύς, let them obey you, not me.” No wonder Aristarchus transposed lines 203ff to follow 192, as being more appropriately addressed to leaders—“we can’t all be βασιλῆες here [ἐνθάδε, a significant qualification if addressed to the leaders, who would never agree to Agamemnon’s being a Great King at home]; so let there be one βασιλεύς.” By not restraining the men, the contingent leaders have been acting like independent βασιλῆες.

⁴⁰ I would retain this line as emended from Dio Chrysostom against the objections of Leaf and Willcock; with Kirk I feel that δῶκε in the previous line requires an object. Note that when this same line appears at 9.99, quoted 36 *infra*, the τε is no longer the epic particle, but simply means ‘both’. I have translated σφίσι as “people,” which is what it means at 9.99.

⁴¹ Σ b²; see H. Erbse, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem* I (Berlin 1969) 224.

Odysseus could merely be reminding the captains that they do have a single commander-in-chief, and should obey him.

If we leave the lines where they are, Odysseus seems to be expressing a wish: as rule of many is not good (witness the defection of Achilles), let there be one ruler; let there be one leader, with scepter and rights of ordinance from Zeus, who plans for his people (as Agamemnon has not been doing). Because the men, in obeying Agamemnon literally while disobeying his unexpressed wish, have not really argued for the ‘rule of many’, it empties the passage of meaning to make Odysseus claim that they have. But the lines are fully meaningful (if not wholly appropriate) if they are seen to express a fantasy: let us have a ruler with the authority that Nestor and I have tried to allot to Agamemnon—only let him be a better ruler. Such a man would not drive Achilles away, or test the men at a time when they are apt to fail, “angered about Achilles.” We can agree with Aristarchus that the lines are pointless as advice to the common soldiers, but we can defend them as expressing Odysseus’ feelings about the chaos that Agamemnon and Achilles have created.

Odysseus says something similar to Agamemnon at 14.90–95:

Be silent, lest some other one of the Argives hear this
speech,
Which no man could even let pass his lips, if at least
In his heart he knew how to speak fittingly,
And if he held a scepter, and if as many hosts obeyed him
As you now rule among the Argives.
As it is, I utterly condemn your mind for what you have
said.

Agamemnon rules a multitude of hosts and ought to be a decent ruler with supreme authority; but with the reality that stands before him being so disparate from the ideal, Odysseus tells Agamemnon to be quiet—yet another instance, ironically, of a leader defying Agamemnon with impunity.

Nestor reiterates Odysseus’ wish in a passage we have already looked at (9.98f) and indeed states that the wish is reality:

You are the ἄναξ of many, hosts, and Zeus has put into
your hands
Both the scepter and the decrees (θέμιστας), to counsel them
(9.98f).⁴²

⁴² The idea that the scepter implies that the scepter-holder shall “counsel them well” is, I believe, also used in connection with Agamemnon in 2.206, though the reading is disputed.

This sounds like an effort to say with an imperfect vocabulary (see 38 *infra*) that Agamemnon actually is a Great King, and a good one, with divine right. From this is supposed to follow the state of affairs that we have said is much closer to reality (9.100ff):

Therefore you must, beyond all others, speak the speech
and hear it;
And bring matters to fulfilment for another man, too,
whenever
The heart bids someone speak to the good. Whatever
He begins, depends on you.

When Nestor earlier says that Agamemnon should take the lead because he is βασιλεύτατος (9.69), he may be headed in this idealistic direction. Though this need mean nothing more than that as "leader of the most troops," Agamemnon should act like a commander-in-chief, the line seems to take us up to 9.98f, and to suggest that because Agamemnon is the "most leaderly" he should rule as good monarchs (Odysseus' "one βασιλεύς") rule. Again, when Agamemnon says that Achilles should tame himself and admit how much βασιλεύτερος Agamemnon is (9.158ff), he comes close to claiming that Achilles ought to recognize his absolute authority.

Those are all the passages in the *Iliad* known to me where scholars have been tempted either to find a Great King, or to identify Agamemnon as a βασιλεύς whose authority over all the Achaeans is comparable to that of a βασιλεύς in a Greek polis or *ethnos*. We have not found such a king. Let us therefore consider some reasons why we ought not to look for one. First, and most important, is that if he were, we would surely not be talking about 'gentlemen's agreements' as to when Agamemnon had exceeded his authority. It is unimaginable that there should be *no* statement corresponding to the fact that Achilles (or Diomedes or Odysseus) can defy this Great King with impunity. I am not saying that he should or should not be able to defy, only that there has to be some understanding as to *whether* he should. If Homer gives us none, how are we to conceive of Agamemnon as Great King?

Second, we have encountered no suggestion in the *Iliad* that there was a Panachaeian Council back home, or any other instrument *whereby* Agamemnon might rule the rest of Greece.⁴³

⁴³ Nor do we hear of any Council for the individual states represented by the contingents in the Catalogue. We might note in passing that even the *Odyssey* knows of no Council anywhere in Greece, and is just barely aware

And what we do learn about the Achaeans back home suggests that the regional leaders act entirely independently (see 47–54 *infra*). As we read the Catalogue of Ships, we see no sign of a Council, not even a hint that one contingent might have lordship over another, no trace of an institution whereby they might even come together to form common policy. Nestor and Odysseus in Book 2 make no reference to Agamemnon's being a Great King, though this is precisely the occasion when it would be most relevant, and where promises, libations, oaths and omens all do find mention. The Achaean Council, as we have seen, is evidently formed for the purpose of assisting the direction of the Trojan expedition, and discusses only matters concerning the campaign.

Third, there is no way to refer to Agamemnon as the King, in the required sense or indeed in any other. We have already (*supra* 23, 36) heard Nestor call Agamemnon the ἄναξ of many hosts (9.98f), in an effort to define Agamemnon as a Great King, but the word ἄναξ in Homer cannot have the meaning 'king': Helenus (13.582, 758, 770, 781) is not a king, nor Poulydamas (15.453), nor Teiresias at *Od.* 11.144, 151 (in linguistic matters it is probably wise to listen to the voice of both poems); and we are not βασιλῆες over our horses. It is used of gods, both exalted (Zeus, Apollo, *etc.*) and not (Sleep, 14.233, the Scherian river at *Od.* 5.445, 450). Applied to them, and to Helenus and Teiresias, it suggests a religious and mystical power that we heed and obey, and perhaps this sense is intended in its application to Poulydamas, the wise chief-of-staff, though I am reluctant to carry it over to our relationship to our horses. It may be that the general sense is 'authority that inspires awe and obedience', where the *quality* of awe is a function of the being of whom the word is used. This suits well Nestor's coupling of the word with the scepter and *themistas* in 9.98f. *LfgreE* gives "Herr," and "lord" suits pretty well (the 'lord and master' of one's horses?). Of course the word is *used* of men who, within their particular spheres, may legitimately be called monarchs: Achilles (9.164, 276, *etc.*) is, in effect, βασιλεύς over the Myrmidons; Agamemnon, the undeniable βασιλεύς of the Mycenaeans. We have seen that Nestor appears to be trying in 9.98f to make Agamemnon into a βασιλεύς over the Trojan expedition, or at least someone

of Achaean elders with authority (*Od.* 2.14, 21.21). Nor does the *Odyssey* show any trace of an overlordship of the King of Mycenae.

whose authority is royal. But the word ἄναξ alone cannot convey the *meaning* 'king', 'monarch'. Not even λαῶν ἄναξ at 9.98 can; it is best translated "awe-inspiring authority over the hosts."

Nor can ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν. It is a convenient shorthand to use this term to refer to Agamemnon in his rôle as commander-in-chief;⁴⁴ but this can hardly be a formal title: the phrase is used as a generic epithet with other proper nouns possessing the same meter and beginning with a vowel, such as Anchises, Aeneas, Augeas, Euphetes, and Eumelus. We cannot argue that it is meaningful when used of Agamemnon but loses its meaning when used of the others: the view that if an epithet is formulaic it loses its meaning is in my opinion quite false (see *supra* n.1: 379); and this false theory is in any case based on the experience of hearing an epithet used with the *same* noun over and over again. When we hear it with Anchises and the others, our attention is arrested until we remind ourselves that it does not mean 'commander-in-chief', (let alone 'Achaean commander-in-chief'), but is vaguer and slightly ambiguous: 'ἄναξ over men' (not specifying any particular place) and 'ἄναξ among men' (not, like ἄναξ Apollo, among gods). And if this is what it means with Anchises, we cannot say that it has a different meaning when used of Agamemnon.

Nor can βασιλεύς; the Homeric word is, like ἄναξ, vague. M. Schmidt (*LfgrE*) tries to group all the instances of βασιλεύς under "König," and not being a native speaker of German I cannot contest this, though I wonder if the German ear can really be happy with 'der König Alexandros' (4.96). Of this Schmidt says (1a α), "Alex. hier β als Sohn des Priamus"; for this meaning my ear requires in English, 'Prince Alexander'. And what of 'der König Antinoos' (*Od.* 18.64)? Schmidt's argument here (2a β) is that as a member of a leading Ithacan family Antinous has a claim to the "monarch. Königsamt" if it should fall vacant, but my ear will not tolerate 'King Antinous' for a man who might conceivably be βασιλεύς some day. Schmidt is not altogether happy with it: "Allgemeine Bedeutung 'Vornehmer, Adliger' hier allenfalls möglich." One difficulty with Schmidt's approach is that he makes "monarchical king" the primary meaning because he is convinced that monarchy in archaic (*sic*) Greece is historically older than aristocracy (441.13f). This view is not universally maintained today (to say

⁴⁴ "Meist von Agam. als oberstem Herrführer vor Troja," J. Grimm, in *LfgrE* 787 2αα.

the least): Schmidt mentions Gschnitzer as an exception;⁴⁵ Robert Drews rules out monarchy for the archaic Greek polis; Walter Donlan holds that in the eighth century “stable, centralized kingship eluded the grasp of even the most successful basileus”; Morris sees the fundamental pre-polis division as lying between *agathoi* and *kakoi*.⁴⁶ Whoever is right, the deeper problem is that Schmidt is using history to determine the meaning of a literary text, a procedure that we decried above even as we allowed that it must sometimes be necessary (*supra* 20). When, as here, there is legitimate scholarly disagreement over the history, the danger of the procedure is particularly apparent, in that even if Schmidt’s history is wrong, he may still be right about the text of Homer. We must look at what the text says.

When we do, we note that the word is often used of men who are, in my opinion, monarchical kings—males occupying a position in a political institution called kingship. Mycenae is ruled this way: Atreus held the position, then Thyestes, then Agamemnon (2.106f); Agamemnon is βασιλῆα πολυχρῦσοιο Μυκῆνης (7.180, 11.46). Nestor holds an office that Neleus held before him, Achilles an office that Peleus has held and presumably holds still back home. Technically Achilles may not be a monarch with Peleus still alive, but he is certainly *in loco regis* in the Troad (*supra* 22) and to call him king seems to me a permissible stretch of the English word. The members of the Achaean Council are all βασιλῆες. But this does not mean that the word βασιλεύς means ‘king’, any more than ‘cattle’ in a text written 150 years ago meant ‘cow’. If it can be used of Paris, Antinous, and Eurymachus (*Od.* 18.64), βασιλεύς means something more general. Gschnitzer’s “der Erste” is good (105). The word can be used of groups of people, as well as individuals: when a number of people each called “der Erste” come together, they are “die Ersten,” and they may in turn recognize one of their number as “der Erste.” Drews’ suggestion, “high-born leader,” also works reasonably well, though Drews does not demonstrate the “overtones of high birth that resonate in the Homeric

⁴⁵ F. Gschnitzer, “ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ,” *Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft* 11 (1965) 99–112.

⁴⁶ R. DREWS, *Basileus* (New Haven 1983: hereafter ‘Drews’) *passim*; W. Donlan, “The Pre-state Community in Greece,” *SymbOslo* 64 (1989) 5–29; Morris, *Burial* (*supra* n.15) *passim*.

word βασιλεύς.”⁴⁷ In the various societies that we see in Homer it appears that βασιλῆες are high-born, but the term need not *mean* that.

Gschnitzer thinks that there are some places where the word does mean ‘König’ after all; he points, for instance (101), to βασιλῆι χολώθεις in 1.9. The word has to single out Agamemnon somehow, though Achilles too has just been mentioned and Achilles is a βασιλεύς (1.133, 16.211); it cannot do this unless there is an understanding that when the context is indeterminate, the word refers to some special βασιλεύς, the highest-ranking βασιλεύς present. The term here cannot just mean ‘leader’ or else it would not single out Agamemnon; it must mean ‘superior leader’, even ‘exclusive leader’.⁴⁸ But it does not mean ‘king’. To show this, let us adopt the theory that most scholars today accept and that I have been putting forth, that Agamemnon occupies the temporary rôle of commander-in-chief of the Greek forces before Troy. These scholars and I would then argue that βασιλεύς here means ‘highest-ranking leader’ or ‘exclusive leader’ or perhaps even ‘commander-in-chief’. There is no reason to take the further step to ‘king,’ holder of a permanent office in a certain political institution. Never mind whether these scholars and I are certainly right or not; to show that the word does not *mean* ‘king’, it is enough that we could be. Gschnitzer’s argument is that the context shows that the word has *changed* its meaning from “der Erste” to “König,” but since the context comfortably permits ‘commander-in-chief’, it cannot do this. Similarly for the other passages concerning Agamemnon as highest ranking βασιλεύς (1.231, 441; 4.402; 19.256); in the remaining places I agree with Drews’ criticism (103).

⁴⁷ Drews 100–03. Paris, not only high-born, is the leader of a Trojan contingent: cf. 12.93, 13.490. I feel that in several of the passages that Drews cites from Gschnitzer (*supra* n.45: 103 n.14), claiming that they are ambiguous, Gschnitzer is right to feel that an exclusive leader is being designated.

⁴⁸ The term is Drews’, though he does not see that it belongs here. He finds (103) just three places in the *Iliad* where βασιλεύς means an exclusive leader: 7.180 and 11.46, “βασιλεύς of Mycenae rich in gold,” and 1.277ff, the “scepter-holding βασιλεύς” whose share of honor is not the same. The first two of these he thinks may be post-Homeric because one of them occurs near the description of the Gorgon’s head—not a very convincing way to argue—and in the third βασιλεύς means ‘commander-in-chief’. But he does not do justice to the semantics of 1.9 and several other places where Gschnitzer finds the meaning ‘König’.

The word βασιλεύς then, does not mean ‘king’ in Homer, but ‘leader’, ‘exclusive leader’, or ‘highest-ranking leader of those present’; it often refers to men who are βασιλῆες, but it does not *say* that they are. Some βασιλῆες are monarchs, while other βασιλῆες are not; βασιλεύς is used of Agamemnon in his rôle as βασιλεύς, and his rôle as commander. The idea that “scepter-holding βασιλεύς” is an attempt to narrow the word to the meaning ‘king’ is attractive for the *Iliad*; it might be a way of saying, somewhat imprecisely, that the contingent-leaders are in fact monarchs (2.86). (Nestor’s attempt to confine it to Agamemnon in 1.278f of course fails.) This idea will not work at all for the *Odyssey*, where the Councilors of Alcinous are all scepter-holders (8.41, 47). The word βασιλεύς unlike ἄναξ is not used of gods, or of men with exceptional mystic powers; it appears to be a secular term.⁴⁹

There is therefore in Homer no really good way to say ‘king’, let alone ‘Great King’, which makes it very hard to see how Homer could have imagined Agamemnon playing such a rôle. A Great King is a political entity, a man who occupies a place in a structure; there ought to be some way to refer unambiguously to such an important person or his place, if he and it exist. The struggle that Nestor and Odysseus have to find a term for ‘Great King’—“scepter-bearing βασιλεύς to whom Zeus gives *kydos*,” “let there be one βασιλεύς to whom Zeus gives the scepter”—proclaims not only a lexical gap, but an empty space in reality. *Because* Agamemnon’s position is temporary, commander-in-chief of this expedition, there is not even a word for *this* position—let alone ‘Great King’.

Finally, we have seen that in the *Iliad* the Myrmidons are not Agamemnon’s subjects. When the men complain about Achilles’ behavior, they do not imply that they should be getting orders from Agamemnon; they threaten, not to go to Agamemnon or even to battle, but to go home (16.205). When Patroclus wants to return to the war, he goes to Achilles; when Achilles says that he may re-enter, he re-enters. Agamemnon has nothing at all to do with this transaction, though it is absolutely vital to his life-work. Granted, Agamemnon wants Achilles to admit that Agamemnon is βασιλεύτερος (9.160); Nestor says that Agamemnon is βασιλεύτατος (9.69). And these are mea-

⁴⁹ A recent discussion of Homeric kingship may be found in J. R. Lenz, *Kings and the Ideology of Kingship in Early Greece* (diss. Columbia University 1993) 175–255, together with references to important earlier work by Y. A. Andreyev, P. Carlier, and C. G. Thomas.

tures of political power, since Agamemnon does in fact rule more people. On the other hand, they are comparative and superlative forms. If I am the most leader-like, you must still be leader-like, which must mean that you, and not I, rule over your men. Similar, if I am better (1.281) because I rule over more, and the best (2.580) because I rule by far the most, you must therefore rule over some, and those you rule over, I do not rule over. And Achilles *does* rule over his men: he could take his contingent home if he wanted. If a man must stand and watch while a whole nation deserts his cause, can we call him a Great King?⁵⁰

Much support for seeing Agamemnon as a Great King no doubt arises from an analogy that some scholars perceive between the Achaeans in the *Iliad* and the Mycenaeans. If Mycenae is the center of a Mycenaean Empire occupying most of Greece and many islands, and if Agamemnon once led an expedition of Mycenaeans to Troy, then the Achaeans of the *Iliad* ought to reflect that Empire—so that argument goes. Now I do not want to cast out all analogies between the *Iliad*'s Achaeans and the Mycenaeans. The power of the *wanax* at Mycenae and Pylos is very similar to the power of Agamemnon, Nestor, and the others over their *own* contingents and their own regions in Greece. But it is far from certain that the *wanax* of Mycenae was a Great King; and even if he was, we have no right to import that fact into the *Iliad*. As we have seen, the *Iliad* must be assumed to preserve traces of several eras, and we are secure in identifying such a trace only if *both* the *Iliad* and *also* independent sources for the history of a given era offer the same picture.⁵¹

Curiously enough, support for the view of Agamemnon as Great King has arisen from a perceived analogy with an era much later than the Mycenaean. We have seen that the polis as city-state was beginning to emerge in Homer's time, and it is thought that the political structure of the polis consisted, in its earliest form, of a king, his council, and an assembly. Even if the

⁵⁰ But do we not see this happen in the *Poema de Mio Cid*? Is not Alfonso the Great King, and can the Cid not take men with him into exile? Yes, but not a whole nation: sixty knights, and then a number of others who in joining him are clearly disobeying Alfonso's orders, that the Cid is not to be helped in any way, not even given food and lodging.

⁵¹ A good discussion of the supposed Mycenaean Empire and its analogies with Homer, fancied and real, may be found in J. T. HOOKER, *Mycenaean Greece* (London 1976: hereafter 'Hooker') 132–37.

king's power was not absolute, at least everyone in the state was subject to his authority; by analogy Agamemnon's Council and the members of his Assembly ought to be his subjects. Hence he ought to rule all the Achaeans. The leaders of the various Achaean contingents may *appear* to be independent, but perhaps we can infer from the powerlessness of the Council that this is a mirage: they must be aristocratic subjects. Recent historians (e.g. Drews) have rightly questioned this tidy picture of king, council, and assembly, and have also questioned whether we ought to translate βασιλεύς as 'king'. Still, the three institutions often coexisted in some form or other. The analogy ought rather to be questioned on other grounds.

First, the scale is all wrong. The king, council, and assembly belong either to a polis, an *ethnos*, or a state of similar size, not to an empire that includes all the Greek mainland and many islands, and can send an army of at least 63,000 troops on a protracted expeditionary campaign. Many of the individual *contingents* are the right size, allowing for poetic exaggeration of the numbers. If these had councils and assemblies, we could analogize them to the contemporary polis, but they do not. And an analogy between a single polis and the entire army is grotesque.

Second, we return again to the fact that the Myrmidons are not Agamemnon's subjects, but Achilles'. If he is sufficiently displeased, he will pack them up and take them home. Would even the most unruly aristocrat in a polis have this kind of power? If he did, what real authority would the king have left? And how do we analogize the fact that Agamemnon has the power he does have over the other chieftains on campaign but not, so far as we can tell from the Catalogue or anywhere else, back home?

Now of course it can be asserted that only the king-council-assembly structure of the *expeditionary* force is to be seen as analogous to the earlier polis. But as the politics of an expeditionary alliance of twenty-nine independent states is radically different from the politics of a polis, this amounts to saying that the analogy is formal, an analogy in name only. It would be ridiculous to claim under such circumstances that the members of other chieftains' contingents are Agamemnon's subjects. But given this demurrer, the idea of a nominal analogy has one very attractive feature. As the Achaean elders are not in fact elderly, except for Nestor and Phoenix, their name seems an imposition from outside, and the institution of elders in the polis may well

be the external source.⁵² And indeed the disparity between the name and the reality of the Councillors' age ought to warn us not to push the analogy further. There may be many other disparities.

Third, even the names defy analogy, or at least one of them does. The early polis distinguishes the Council and/or the Elders from the βασιλεύς. By analogy, we must call Agamemnon the βασιλεύς. But all the other chieftains are βασιλῆες and the councillors, at least, are scepter-holding βασιλῆες. What word, what term do we have to distinguish Agamemnon? If we use ἄναξ, the analogy with history disappears because this is not the term used in the polis. If we stick to βασιλεύς the analogy disappears because history makes a terminological distinction that the *Iliad* eschews when the latter calls all the chieftains βασιλῆες. I would suggest therefore that only the terms "Council of Elders" and perhaps "Assembly" be seen as drawn from the polis structure specifically, with the *Iliad's* Council having only the vaguest political resemblance to the Council in the polis.

Returning now to the point of departure (*supra* 23) for our discussion of the Great King and the king-council-assembly analogy: we have still found no political structure corresponding to the moral state of affairs whereby Agamemnon has the power, but not the right, to take away Briseis, while Achilles has the power and the right to withdraw. We have seen instead that this state of affairs comes from a gentleman's agreement that arose when the expedition was organized and oaths taken to fight until Troy was taken. Achilles is not in violation of any such oath, because Agamemnon has violated a basic understanding of the conditions under which such oaths were sworn. The Achaean *government*, as such, consists of the monarchical rule, by the individual leaders, of the individual contingents and the states from which they come. The Council of Elders is merely a means whereby selected leaders of the contingents can exchange ideas for the expedition, with the assumption that Agamemnon must be satisfied. And the same is all the more true of the Assembly. If the Council exists back home, and there is no reason to think that it does, it is a convocation of independent monarchs who may seek common action from time to time.

Thus far the political picture; let us add the economic. The Achaean soldiers are not just a culture at war; they are the war-

⁵² J. R. Lenz is responsible for making this excellent point to me in private communication.

rior class of a warrior culture. As Odysseus says, "To the Achaeans Zeus has given the carrying out of arduous wars, from youth to old age" (14.85ff). They are sackers of cities: Achilles has captured twenty-three already (9.328f). They are forever distributing γέρατα, prizes taken in war, symbolizing heroism or success or military authority; they are forever plundering, to sustain themselves and to trade for such necessities as wine (e.g. 7.467). As Schein says excellently, to these people "winning honor and glory alone make a brief life meaningful," and honor and glory are won by heroic deeds in battle; "to be fully human means to kill or be killed."⁵³

Honor and glory, it may be objected, can only go to a relative few; what of the warriors of the lower ranks? Odysseus, not unexpectedly, has the answer: "Always it is disgraceful to wait long and return home empty-handed" (2.298) is addressed to all the Achaeans and is a code for all of them. When Troy is sacked, the glory will be Agamemnon's, but the plunder will be shared by everyone. Odysseus is the professional philosopher for all warriors at 19.225-33: "Achaeans cannot lament a corpse by denying the belly, too many men fall every day.... Mourn on the day whatever man died on that day, then eat and drink, so that all the more we may fight our enemies always without cease." You must think this way, if your existence is based upon war. We feel the contrast with Achilles, whom Odysseus is vainly trying to persuade to eat, and who is now guided not by professionalism but by passion.

This is why we must stress that winning booty is meaningful in a material as well as a symbolic way. Plunder symbolizes honor, but plunder also keeps the people fed and housed and clothed, directly and indirectly. Directly, by taking the goods of others; indirectly, by trading some of those goods for other commodities: bronze, iron, tin, oxen, and slaves (7.467-74). The Achaean warriors are a class of professionals who know how to live by plundering.

Of course there is an Achaean serving class. They have men on hand to steer their ships, and there are stewards and dispensers of bread (19.41-44); but these stay behind when there is an assembly and by implication when there is fighting to do. They have woodcutters, whom we see under Meriones' leadership cutting logs for Patroclus' funeral pyre (23.112-23). They have a seer, Calchas, who never appears in battle (when Poseidon takes

⁵³ S. Schein, *The Mortal Hero* (Berkeley 1984) 70, 71.

his shape near the battleline, 13.45, he is making no attempt at realism and reveals his divinity as the words leave his mouth). There must be someone on hand to tend the horse-herds (19.281) and captured cattle that the warriors eat and trade for wine, and perhaps to prepare cowhides (7.474); but even if these are not the stewards of 19.43, they are surely non-combatants. And there are heralds, κήρυκες, who perform a variety of duties, from boiling water (23.40) to fetching Briseis (1.321) to valeting (2.183) to serving at religious functions (3.268, 273) to being a messenger (4.192, 198) to heralding (11.685). (These are not to be confused with θεράποντες, who can be warriors—Patroclus, Meriones—as well as aides.)⁵⁴

II. The Achaeans at Home

We are not offered a great deal of information about the Achaeans when they are back home on the mainland and in the islands: Nestor and Phoenix tell some tales, Homer gives sketch-portraits of the previous life of some of the leaders, and we can make some inferences from the way the Achaeans act while on campaign. We must, of course, continue to resist the temptation to turn to the *Odyssey*, except for purposes of comparison (*cf. supra* 19).

The passage that tells us the most about rule at home is *Il.* 9.149–56, which mentions that Agamemnon is able to give away seven cities to Achilles, cities that will “honor Achilles like a god, and fulfill his ordinances under his scepter for his benefit” (9.1f). In other words, Achilles will be their absolute monarch;⁵⁵ and the fact that Agamemnon can give them away indicates that at the moment they are under Agamemnon’s absolute sway. He owns them just as he owns the tripods and horses and other gifts he is prepared to bestow. Achilles in the field does not rule

⁵⁴ For the θεράποντες see W. Donlan, “The Homeric *therapon*: Follower or Servant,” *APA Abstracts* (1991) 93.

⁵⁵ It seems unlikely that he would even be under Agamemnon’s suzerainty. Achilles is at the moment free of Agamemnon’s dominance; if he goes home, he will surely be equally free; why would he be tempted by an opportunity to come under Agamemnon’s political authority? When Peleus makes Phoenix the ἄναξ over the Dolopes (9.484), we would expect the word to imply that he was not under Peleus’ sway, even though Phoenix remained at least emotionally bound to Peleus and seemingly continued to reside in his court so as to raise Achilles (9.483); however this confusing situation is clarified, Phoenix’s moral relationship to Peleus is unlike Achilles’ to Agamemnon.

with more authority than this. Agamemnon's absolute rule of Sicyon and Corinth is strongly implied by 13.663–70 and 23.296–99, where we read that Euchenor of Corinth and Echeolus of Sicyon paid, or might have paid, a fine to avoid serving in the Trojan War; the independent heroes had no stated obligation and had to be persuaded (see 51 *infra*).

Peleus too is—or at least was—able to give away whole peoples: he assigned the Dolopes, dwellers in a remote part of Phthia, to Phoenix, who is their ἄναξ (9.482f). We do not possess much evidence for the internal structures of the other kingdoms. There is a passage, however, which suggests that Neleus is to be thought of as an absolute monarch in Pylos, before Nestor came to the throne. Nestor as a lad once brought back the spoils of a cattle raid in Elis. These were apportioned by the leading men, ἡγήτορες ἄνδρες, who were owed a debt by the Eleans—but only after Neleus, who had not engaged in the fighting, had drawn off an enormous share for himself and had given the rest to the common stock to apportion (11.687–705). This smacks of total authority.

We learn something of the internal structure of the Myrmidons in *Il.* 16, though part of what we see is not relevant to the situation at home. There are 2,500 men in all: they came over from Phthia and Hellas in fifty ships (2.685, 16.168), fifty men to a ship (16.170). They are divided into five στίχες, presumably of 500 men each, since the division and assignment of leaders were made for military rather than political reasons. We infer this from the fact that it was done by Achilles (16.171), not Peleus, and need not reflect geographical and political boundaries in Thessaly. The leaders of the στίχες are called ἡγέμονες (16.171, 198), and are probably a selection from the ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες—at least lines 155–67 give the impression of a larger number of the latter than five. This permits us to infer that the Myrmidon state, and not just the contingent, had a certain number of men who, though under the absolute authority of the monarch, were themselves in charge of other men.⁵⁶

Moreover, the five ἡγέμονες are an impressive lot: we have already noted that two, Menesthus and Eudorus, have divine genealogies (6.174, 180–92); Pisander is the third best Myrmidon spear-fighter after Achilles and Patroclus; Phoenix will be offered equal rank with Achilles (9.616); and Alcimedon, best

⁵⁶ Van Wees (*supra* n.29: 287f) calls attention to the presence of ἡγέμονες in other contingents; we assume therefore that the Myrmidon structure is typical.

horsemen after Patroclus (17.475–78), is noble enough that we know his father's father (17.467). Patroclus too is evidently well-born.⁵⁷ If men of this rank readily take orders from Achilles here in the Troad, orders that are political in import (whether to fight) rather than military (when, where, and how to fight), it is hard to imagine them any more independent back home. Of course the orders back home will presumably be given by Peleus, not Achilles, but the structure will be the same.

As no Achaean warrior is ever said to do anything except fight and raid cattle, the chances are that Homer conceives of them as a warrior *class*; they are probably superior to others in society, such as the shepherd, plowman, and shield-maker that we hear of from time to time, men who have stayed behind (23.835, 7.221, and the wheat, orchards, and herds of 14.121ff).⁵⁸ It is useful here to compare Odysseus in the *Odyssey*, who is an expert carpenter (5.243–62) and farmer (18.366–75). He is also an expert archer who says that he fought with the bow and arrow at Troy and boasts that he was second only to Philoctetes (8.215–20). This is not true in the *Iliad*, nor can we imagine Odysseus saying it there; the bow and arrow, despite their seeming effectiveness, were despised by the great Achaean heroes and employed by secondary fighters such as Teucer, Meriones on occasion, and the Locrians (*cf.* Diomedes' harsh words in 11.385–90). Similarly it is difficult to imagine the Achaean heroes boasting of being able to plow a field exceptionally well. The Trojan warriors, to be sure, are mostly men with civilian peacetime occupations, as

⁵⁷ Patroclus' rank is surprisingly hard to determine. That we know his grandfather is an index of stature; he is originally from Opoeis, a town subject to the lesser Ajax (2.531), whither Achilles would have brought him had he lived (18.326); Menoetius brought Patroclus to Peleus after he had killed a companion (23.85ff), suggesting that he was at least a man of means.

⁵⁸ If the Achaean warriors do nothing except fight and raid cattle, what about the Calydonian boar hunt (9.538–49)? Two points: I have no difficulty with the idea that a heroic warrior class should engage in a mighty hunt to protect orchards that it did not engage in cultivating; and the culture of Calydon looks very different from that of the Achaeans we see fighting on the Trojan plain, even when they are back home. Neleus, Nestor, Tydeus, Oeneus in other passages, and Peleus are presented as rulers, kings, so far as we can see absolute monarchs; but the real rulers in Calydon appear to be the Elders, who send the best priests to supplicate Meleager and are in a position to offer him a *temenos* of the richest land in the nation. True, Oeneus is a later supplicant, further along in the order of accession, but he makes no offer of his own, and seems to be acting strictly as a father. The hunt may be an initiatory hunt in any case, a rite of passage: see N. F. Rubin and W. M. Sale, "Meleager and Odysseus," *Arethusa* 16 (1983) 137–71.

we shall see—cowherds such as Aeneas, shepherds such as Paris. But never is such a thing imputed to the Achaeans. We hear instead of an alarmingly large number of Achaean murderers in exile: Epeigeus (16.571–74), Lycophron (15.430ff), Medon (13.694ff, 15.333–36), Tlepolemos (2.661ff), even Patroclus, the most likeable of the Achaeans, who killed a childhood playmate in anger (23.84–90); all are men apparently quick to settle matters with the sword, a natural concomitant to a military society.⁵⁹ Hence it is appropriate to picture Achaean society as hierarchical: the monarch and his retinue (comparable to Achilles and Patroclus, or the *πρόμαχος* and his *ἑταῖροι*); the warrior class; and the tradesmen and farmers.

Some of the contingents in the Catalogue of Ships suggest the possibility of alternatives to absolute monarchy. Of the twenty-nine Achaean contingents, twenty have one leader, and it can be assumed that Homer thought of these twenty, at least, as structured exactly as the Mycenaean, Pylian, and Myrmidon contingents are, with the leader as monarch. The warriors of the Argive region (in the narrow sense) are led by three men, Diomedes, Sthenelus, and Euryalus (2.563–66); but Diomedes is specified as the one who “led all of them together” (2.567), and the other two are probably members of the monarch’s retinue. Certainly in 9.32–49 Diomedes seems to speak for his contingent in threatening to stay in the Troad even if the others go home. Six contingents have two leaders. Of these six pairs, four are brothers: Ascalaphus and Ialmenus, sons of Actor (and Ares), leaders of the Minyans (2.512); Phidippus and Antiphus, sons of Thessalus, leaders of Cos and the islands (2.678); Podalirius and Machaon, Asclepiads of Thessaly (2.732); and Schedius and Epistrophus sons of Iphitus of Phocis (2.517). Schedius appears, from 17.306, to have been more powerful than his brother Epistrophus (who indeed disappears from the text after 2.517), but it is not possible to guess how power was distributed between the members of the other pairs. Another pair, Polypoetes and Leonteus, also of Thessaly (2.740, 745) but not related by blood, likewise defy analysis. Of the sixth pair, Idomeneus appears to dominate Meriones (2.645, 650f); Meriones comes almost as an afterthought in 651; he is Idomeneus’ *ὄπᾶων* (7.165, 8.263, 17.258, 10.58) and *θεράπων* (13.246, 23.113, 124, 528, 860, 888), and he

⁵⁹ Phoenix too is in exile, for a lesser crime (9.447–80); indeed it is striking that no fewer than three of these exiles (Epeigeus, Patroclus, Phoenix) sought refuge with Peleus. If he was at all typical, the courts of the Achaeans were well-populated with wrongdoers.

occasionally fights with the bow and arrow (13.650). But he is second-in-command in 4.253, and he is among the nine who respond to Hector's challenge (6.166); Janko compares him to Patroclus and Sthenelus (in Kirk IV 78). It seems reasonably safe, therefore, to consider Idomeneus a monarch.

The Epeans have four leaders in the Catalogue, Thalpius, Amphimachus, Dioces, and Polyxeinus, each of them equal and independent (2.620–24).⁶⁰ It is hard to know what political arrangement this implies. The Boeotians of the Catalogue have no fewer than five leaders, of whom two, Peneleus and Leitus, are the most prominent (2.494–510). The Boeotian contingent as given in the Catalogue is very large—6,000 men—and since the Catalogue and the rest of the *Iliad* agree that Agamemnon ruled the most people (but not that the Mycenaeans *et al.* were the largest contingent), it is reasonable to suppose that Homer imagined the Boeotians as divided into two (possibly five) units—especially as there is no indication that the Boeotian leaders were related to each other by blood (see also 55 *infra*). Presumably we are to picture each unit as a monarchy.

Agamemnon is the most powerful ruler in Greece, and this may give him some edge over the others; but we never hear that any of the other rulers is subordinate, is a vassal, or acknowledges the suzerainty of Agamemnon. Nestor tells Achilles and Agamemnon that he has consorted with “better men than you” (1.260); he speaks of cattle raids and quarrels with the Epeans, and the sufferings of the Pylians at the hands of Heracles, and never offers the slightest suggestion of a rôle for Mycenae in the political life or foreign affairs of Neleian Pylos, either in his lifetime or this father's (11.670f). The situation in Phthia is much the same. When the expedition to Troy was being mustered, Odysseus and Nestor went to Pyleus' kingdom to recruit Achilles; they feasted, and Nestor spoke to Achilles and Patroclus, inviting (κελεύω) them to join the expedition. “And the two of you were very willing, and they [your fathers] enjoined many things upon you both” (11.782). (I translate κελεύω as “invite” because if orders had been given they would have been given to Peleus and Menoetius.) The entire scene is quite lacking in coercion: there is no suggestion that the ἄναξ of Phthia owes anything to

⁶⁰ Elsewhere in the *Iliad* the Epeans, while retaining Amphimachus and Dioces, seem to acquire also four different leaders: Meges, Amphion, Dracius (13.692; but these Epeans may be thought of as coming with Meges' father to Dulichium: see Janko on 13.685–88), and Otus of Cyllene (15.518; companion of Meges, and thus perhaps another Epean in Dulichium).

Mycenae. We may contrast the fate of Euchenor of Corinth, who would have had to pay a penalty (θωή) if he had not gone with Agamemnon (13.669), or that of Echepolus of Sicyon, who gave Agamemnon a mare as a penalty, and stayed behind (23.296–99). Both these places are assigned to Agamemnon in the Catalogue as part of his proper domain, so it is no wonder that Euchenor and Echepolus had to pay if they wished to remain behind. Language reinforces these observations: Nestor, for example, is both the ἄναξ and the βασιλεύς of the Pylians, and he is the ἄναξ in Pylos as well as in the Troad (23.302, 2.54, 1.252). The words do not mean ‘king’, of course, but they do make it very unlikely that Nestor was vassal to another ἄναξ or βασιλεύς.

If we stand at a kind of aesthetic distance from all that we have said about the Achaeans, we may be able to summarize them as the social expression of the heroic code. Heroism (by which I mean the choice of a life, probably short, of κλέος ἄφθιτον) was deeply intertwined with the practice of honoring the hero with gifts and γέρας; Book 1 of the *Iliad* is unintelligible unless we see Achilles as suffering overwhelming dishonor from the taking away of his γέρας. Granted, this idea is virtually deconstructed in Book 9, where Achilles says that he does not need such honor as this, and speaks of being already honored by the αἴσηι of Zeus; he says this because he has called heroism into question and elevated other values, such as love and life, above it.⁶¹ But such statements as this alienate him from Achaean culture, to which he never entirely returns; his penultimate speech to Agamemnon at 24.649–53 stresses his closeness to Priam and distance from Agamemnon and the others, and his tone mocks Agamemnon. In Book 1 he is still an Achaean and the code is still in place, only Agamemnon is trampling all over it. What I call the social expression of the code is the structure whereby each hero is also the head of a state, or perhaps the joint-head, or the companion of the head, or one of the companions. This social expression is embodied in Sarpedon’s question to Glaucus: Why are we honored by the Lycians? Because we fight at the front of the battle, and win glory (12.310–21).⁶² The implication is that the heroic head of state is a man who ought properly

⁶¹ Cf. Sale (*supra* n.8) 86–100; Schein (*supra* n.53) 105–10, with references to previous work.

⁶² We must stress that the Lycians resemble the Achaeans and not the Trojans; there is no suggestion that they live in a polis. Indeed I cannot find any sign of a town; the Lycians come from Lycia by the Xanthus.

to be obeyed implicitly by the others: the heroic βασιλεύς wields the sceptre and knows what is good for his people. The concept of heroism and of absolute monarchy are deeply intertwined in a single concept, the *heroic warrior-king*.

It is reasonable to suppose that the oral epic tradition always sang about heroes and heroism, that these values go back to time immemorial. It would be perfectly natural for the essence of the Achaeans society we see in the *Iliad* also to go back that far. I see no reason why this heroic society cannot be a reflex of the Mycenaean state were directed from the palace by the palace-bureaucracy under the orders of the *wanax*; among those affairs are military activities presided over by officials of high standing.⁶³ Whether or not this *wanax* was an absolute ruler, he could readily have been transformed into one as poets began to create a heroic society. Of course we do not see the Mycenaean bureaucracy in Homer; it is not relevant to the action of the *Iliad*, and indeed the poets from the early Dark Ages on are likely to have left such matters out. But even if these features were preserved down to the time of the *Iliad*, the poem had little occasion to mention them. There were cattle to be raided by the warrior-class; cattle and sheep had to be tended, vines grown, shields made, and so on, all by those who were not members of the warrior class; whether Homer imagined such economic activity as highly organized by a palace bureaucracy is impossible to say. What we can say is that the *Iliad* pictures a group of independent kingdoms, some of them relatively very large, led by powerful rulers who live in places back home (*cf. e.g.* 11.768–88), who have under their supervision officers of high standing, and who are wealthy enough to support expeditionary armies on prolonged campaigns and keep the economic wheels turning at home. This picture could be an idealization of the Mycenaean kingdoms, a view of what the Mycenaeans might have looked like on campaign, and it does not suit well the societies of the Dark Ages. The little we see of the Iliadic Achaeans at home on the mainland is consistent with what

⁶³ *Cf.* Hooker 88: "The decisive role of the palace as intermediary in the economic process is plainly brought out ... a named e-qe-ta is present with [each] detachment. If the e-qe-ta corresponds to the later Greek hepetas ('follower'), he is probably of high status: an inference in keeping with the occasional attachment of a patronymic to the name of an e-qe-ta." Other authorities could be cited; I have chosen Hooker because he is much more skeptical than most.

we know of the Mycenaeans (Hooker 136f). Two words of caution, though. The Mycenaeans for much of their existence were heavy traders, and—despite the appearance of extreme belligerence—we cannot show that there was a warrior class such as we see in Homer. Naturally the presence of such a class in Homer can be an idealization of a society able to send large armies on campaign abroad.⁶⁴

III. The Alliances

If we are to compare the Achaean alliance with the Trojan, we first need to establish comparability in size. To do this, we must make some calculations, an activity that Homer, like other oral poets, invites us to indulge in.⁶⁵ Everyone admires Agamemnon's beautiful image of the Trojan wine-pourers pouring wine for decades of Achaean soldiers (2.123–30), or the equally famous picture of the Trojan fires like stars at the end of Book 8; from these lines we can calculate the relative sizes of the Achaean army, the army of Troy-city, and the absolute size of the army of the Trojan allies. It is as if the poet must sugar the numerical pill for an audience reluctant to calculate, though probably delighted when the calculations give them a lively picture. Homer says at 2.122 that there are more Achaeans than Trojans-plus-allies; he then leads up to the enumerations of the Achaean ships in the Catalogue by saying "Troy-city fields

⁶⁴ The impression that Mycenae makes upon modern scholars might well be identical with the impression left upon the poets. "From the end of the Middle Bronze Age, militarism was so congenial to the mainland temperament that both its aesthetics and its technology focused on the trained soldier with his equipment," E. Vermeule, *Greece in the Bronze Age* (Chicago 1972) 260. Cf. Lord William Taylour, *The Mycenaeans?* (London 1983) 135: "A strong impression created by the monuments is of the dominant accent placed upon war by the Mycenaeans. It would almost seem as if they loved strife for its own sake."

⁶⁵ The beauty of the imagery invites us; and we feel we have been invited after we accept the invitation and come up with consistent results. Avdo Medjedovich was also astonishingly accurate with numbers in *The Wedding of Meho* (tr. A. Lord [Cambridge (Mass.) 1974]). After much calculation of the number of ships, Kirk (on 2.509–10) bursts out: "Such calculations are, needless to say, of very little relevance," but does not tell us what they are irrelevant to. If they are not relevant to poetry, why are we—Kirk and all the rest of us—encouraged by Homer to make them? If fact Kirk very acutely points out (on 2.491ff) that Homer has called upon the Muses in order specifically to tell "how many" troops there were (emphasis Kirk).

fewer than one-tenth of the enormous contingent whose approximate size I am soon going to give you." He adds at 2.130ff that of course with their allies the Trojans are closer in size, and at 8.652f he tells us how many Trojans there are.

And he does, with the Muses' inspiration, give the approximate size of the Achaean army, though we must do the calculations; the task of actually stating the total is apparently beyond the Muses' arithmetic capabilities. Instead they state the numbers of ships per contingent, in order to tell us the relative size and theoretical importance of each. We are allowed, for instance, to appreciate how Odysseus and Ajax had won their high positions as Councillors through their individual qualities (Odysseus as clever speaker—*cf.* 3.216–25—and Ajax as best fighter after Achilles, 2.768f); it must have been via such virtues, because it was not through the numbers of troops they commanded (twelve ships each). All we need to do is multiply the number of ships by the number of men per ship to get the size of the entire army. Unfortunately the Muses do not give us the default figure for men per ship: the Boeotians have 120, Philoctetes has fifty, and Achilles (in 16.168ff) has fifty. The figure we want is very likely to be traditional, but even Thucydides was not privy to this tradition, because he had to guess that the figure was the mean between 50 and 120 (1.10.5). Kirk feels (168) that the figure of fifty is "realistic," and thinks it very likely to be the "standard complement" (on 2.509f); I find this persuasive. We are somewhat thwarted by the fact that the Boeotians, with fifty ships at 120 men per ship (2.509f), seem to be more numerous than the Mycenaean, 100 ships at fifty men per ship if we regard fifty as the default figure; yet Agamemnon is said to lead the most hosts (2.580). But we have seen the solution (*supra* 51): the 5,000 Mycenaean have just one leader, Agamemnon, while the Boeotians must distribute their 6,000 men among two, or possibly five, commanders. Inquietudes may remain—if fifty is the default figure, why does the Catalogue give it only apropos of Philoctetes' contingent? Why does it give it at all? The fact remains that, using the default figure of fifty for all contingents save the Boeotians, we come up with an army of 63,000 (62,880) men, which is just perfect. It is enough more than the total figure for the Trojan alliance (50,000 in 8.562f) to justify Agamemnon's saying that they fight against fewer men (2.121f),

yet not so many that it is incredible that the Trojans should nearly defeat the Achaeans in open battle in the *Iliad*.⁶⁶

It is worth noting in passing that Mycenaean Greece was able to field an expeditionary force of 63,000. When Thucydides chose a figure of 85 men per ship, and rounded off 1,186 ships to 1,200, so as to calculate the size of the Achaean host at 102,000 men, he may have been trying to get as big a figure as he reasonably could; even then he found the total surprisingly small, so small, indeed, that it warranted explanation. Greece must have sent out considerably fewer troops than it was capable of sending. He is probably mistaken: Mycenaean Greece would probably have been hard-pressed to send an army of 102,000 overseas. But an army of 63,000 seems altogether possible. Chadwick calculates at least 50,000 for the Mycenaean population of the kingdom of Pylos, and a nation of this size ought to be able to send 4,500 men overseas.⁶⁷ And this is the size of Nestor's contingent in the Catalogue, at fifty men per boat. The city population of Thebes was 6,000–9,000 *ca* 1300 B.C., and Boeotia was a major Mycenaean kingdom. If the ratio of Thebes' city population to total Boeotian population was anything like what it was later, Boeotia at this time must have had at least 75,000 inhabitants, and could easily have supplied 6,000 troops.⁶⁸ Now in legend, Thebes was destroyed shortly before the Trojan War (in fact the date appears to be around the middle of the thirteenth century, about the same time as the generally accepted period for the destruction of Troy VIIa). And the Catalogue respects this legend, mentioning Hypothebes, the smaller settlement re-

⁶⁶ It is characteristic of Homer to lead up to a total figure but to avoid stating it. "Lo, 1,000 fires burned on the plain, and beside each sat 50 [men] in the glow of the shining fire" (8.652f); in effect, "Please multiply 1,000 times 50" (and you will see that the army of the Trojan alliance contains 50,000 men). Similarly, "There were 50 swift ships which Achilles, dear to Zeus, had led to Troy, and in each there had been 50 men, his comrades, at the oarlocks. And lo, he had appointed 5 leaders whom he trusted to give commands, and he himself was the ἄναξ in supreme command" (16.168–72). In effect, "Please multiply 50 times 50; after that, divide the total by 5." The language may have difficulty stating large numbers intelligibly; even Thucydides uses the Homeric technique. He tells *us* to calculate the mean of 120 and 50, then multiply it times 1,200 (1.10.4, rounding off 1186), never stating his total of 102,000 (1.10.5).

⁶⁷ See J. Chadwick, *The Mycenaean World* (Cambridge 1976) 68.

⁶⁸ S. Symeonoglou, *The Topography of Thebes* (Princeton 1985) 153f, 203–25. Symeonoglou gives a minimum population for Hellenistic Boeotia of 60,000, with a Theban population of around 4,000 and an army of about 15,000; I am arguing that a population for Boeotia as a whole of 75,000 ought to be able to send at least 40% of 15,000, or 6,000 men abroad.

maining after the destruction, but not Thebes. But even if we imagine that the city of Thebes was reduced to 2,000 inhabitants, it would still appear that the twenty-nine Boeotian settlements mentioned in the Catalogue could have raised an army of 6,000. Similar arguments can be used for Mycenae, with its territory stretching north through Corinth, Sicyon, and the southern coast of the Corinthian Gulf, and for Tiryns, with Argos, most of the Argive plain, and the Acte peninsula (with Nauplia, Hermione, Troezen, and Epidaurus). I have no desire to wed myself to the position that the Mycenaean kingdoms were in fact divided in this way; I only want to assert that in Mycenaean times these regions could probably have fielded as many troops as the catalogue allots to them. Nor am I claiming that Homer's figures were *historically* accurate, in the sense that 63,000 men actually fought under Agamemnon in the siege of Troy, and that 1,186 ships carried them thither. But—at least as regards Pylos, Boeotia, Mycenae, and Tiryns—Homer was not *exaggerating* the size of an army that Mycenaean Greece could raise. If this figure is realistic (not necessarily historical) for the era that Homer was putatively describing, and if it is also the result of a reasonable calculation based on the numbers supplied by the poem, we ought to accept it as providing a sense of how many men were engaged in the Homeric battles, and also as providing access to the size of Homer's Troy.

The Trojan army must number about 5,000. We learn this from the image of the wine-pourers: the Troy-city contingent is significantly less than one-tenth of the entire Achaean alliance (2.123–30). “Significantly less than one-tenth” is vague, of course, but (calculating $63,000 \div 10 = 6,300$) we cannot be far off if we suppose that Homer pictures Troy-city as fielding around 5,000 troops.⁶⁹ With 5,000 men, Troy-city accounts for a tenth of the entire army of Troy and its allies. This fits the Trojan Catalogue nicely, in that, besides the soldiers of Troy-city, there are fifteen other contingents supplying a total of 45,000 troops, 3,000 troops per allied contingent on average. The Achaeans have

⁶⁹ With Thucydides' 102,000 we should have to give the Trojans about 9,000 warriors (we need a number significantly less than $102,000 \div 10$), somewhat more than Agamemnon's 8,500 by Thucydides' reckoning (100×85). Thucydides' 102,000 Achaeans is so much larger than 50,000 Trojans that, if we accepted it, we would probably have to accept into Homer's fictional landscape Thucydides' explanation for the length of time it took Agamemnon to conquer the city, *i.e.*, that much of the Achaean force had to be continually diverted in the quest for food (1.9, 11).

more contingents (twenty-nine to sixteen), but on the other hand Troy boasts some allies (such as the Phrygians and Lycians) who live in quite sizable spaces. This puts the entire population, men, women, and children, of Homer's Troy, both the city and its peacetime environs, at a minimum of 20,000; let us allot 10,000 to the city and 10,000 to the suburbs and surrounding farms.

The geographical area of the city must be large enough to garrison an army of 50,000 (5,000 Trojans, 45,000 allies) plus the 15,000 Trojan elders, women, and children. The acropolis contains Priam's huge palace, the houses of Paris and Hector, the large temples of Athena and Apollo, some altars, and perhaps a temple of Zeus (22.172). The rest of the city we picture lying below. Before Priam's doors there is a vast agora where the 50,000 men of the entire army can assemble (7.348); this space must adjoin the acropolis. Streets lead from Hector's house through the city to the Scaean gates (6.390ff). Along these and other streets must lie the houses where our conjectured 10,000 urban Trojans live, and where the 10,000 rural Trojans and the 45,000 allied soldiers are quartered; others presumably camp (22.47) in the agora (18.274). Homer is evidently picturing Troy as an enormous walled city, the walls encompassing an agora, streets, and houses as well as the acropolis.

Even here, though, we must hesitate to speak of Homeric exaggeration. Homeric Troy, to be sure, cannot be modeled on the *citadel* of Late Helladic Troy, which is a walled acropolis whose population was no more than a thousand people.⁷⁰ Homer's acropolis alone would occupy most of this space. A much larger area south of the citadel, however, was enclosed by a recently discovered ditch, presumably dug for defensive purposes, within which 5,000 people may have lived (Korfmann [*supra* n.70])—giving a total population of 6,000. This is almost big enough for the Homeric city, provided we can picture an additional 10,000 Trojans living outside in peacetime. Mycenaean Thebes, which was walled, was about the same size as Korfmann's Late Helladic Troy.

We can superimpose the Homeric acropolis on the four modern city blocks of Mycenaean Thebes between Epameinondas Street and Pelopidas Street, and between Antigone Street on the

⁷⁰ Page (*supra* n.38) 66; M. Korfmann, cited in *Archaeology* 46 (1993) 20, allots 900 to it. An updated report of Korfmann's excavation in *Archaeology* 47 (1994) 18.

north and Dirke Street on the south. We can let Priam's palace be equal in size to the vast Second Palace, and fit the rest of the buildings of the Homeric acropolis in the area south of the palace. We can put the Homeric agora where the modern market is. That probably leaves room within the walls as drawn by Symeonoglou (*supra* n.68: 30) for the streets and houses we need to accommodate 10,000 Trojans. (Symeonoglou [205] puts the actual population of Mycenaean Thebes at 5,760, a "conservative estimate.") We can quarter here with their Trojan relatives and guest-friends some of the remaining 10,000 who live outside plus a good many allied troops, and turn over the agora to the rest. Troy is larger than any polis Homer knew, but not a city that Homer need have considered unreasonably—or impossibly—or mythically large (in the way that the men of the heroic age had the mythical strength to hurl huge boulders that men of our age could hardly lift).

Let us feel free, therefore, to imagine an Achaean alliance of 63,000 troops engaged with a Trojan alliance of 50,000. Let us picture the strength of Agamemnon's Mycenaean contingent as 5,000 (100 ships times fifty men per ship) and thus as approximately equal to the army of Troy-city, 5,000 men. It is vital to our understanding of the government of Troy that we keep this equation in mind: the population that acknowledges Agamemnon's direct rule is about the same as the population of Troy-city; each state is part of a total alliance much bigger than itself.

Agamemnon is the Greek commander-in-chief over his alliance, Hector the commander-in-chief for the Trojan alliance. We see Hector acting as commander-in-chief in Book 18, *e.g.*, where he and Polydamas debate policy before the entire army, and the army approves of Hector's advice (18.310–13):

Thus Hector spoke in assembly, and the Trojans shouted assent,

The fools! for Pallas Athena had taken their wits away.
For they concurred with Hector, whose planning was bad,
And no one agreed with Poulydamas, who had offered excellent advice.

The impression we are given, that the army could choose between the views of Hector and his chief of staff, suggests that Hector's authority is not absolute, that he must persuade the army, an impression that is reinforced by the statement that Athena went to the trouble of taking their wits away. Even if this is just a metaphor for 'they spoke witlessly', it tells us that the state of their wits was important. Indeed Hector gives en-

couragement fully as often as he gives orders: in 5.495 he “ranged everywhere throughout the army, stirring it up to fight,” and in 11.64f “Hector appeared now among the first, at other times among the last, giving orders.” On the first occasion, Sarpedon has just chided him: ‘I, your ally, am stirring on the Lycians and seeking to fight; you, who once said you needed no allies, are just standing around, not even giving orders’. Later, after Sarpedon’s death, his companion Glaucus threatens to abandon Hector and take the Lycians home, because Hector has run away from Ajax. Both Lycians are evidently addressing their commander-in-chief in much the same way that Diomedes at 9.32–49 and Odysseus at 14.83–102 address Agamemnon, as leaders capable of displaying considerable independence. Indeed Sarpedon’s words to Hector contain echoes of Achilles’ first tirade against Agamemnon (5.483f, 1.152f). Neither Hector nor Agamemnon has the authority of a Scipio or a Napoleon, but when orders are given, they are the men who must give them.

There are some important differences. Agamemnon is expected to listen to and be advised by his Council of Elders, but he is beholden to, answerable to, no one. Nor does he appear to take advice while actually engaged in battle. Hector, by contrast, has a chief of staff while he is fighting: he listens to Poulydamas, and follows his counsel or does not. Moreover, he is beholden to political power within his own city. Not the power of Priam, but that of the Elders (γέροντες) of Troy, who “when I wished to fight at the prows of the ships, used to hold me back, and used to restrain the army” (15.722ff). In other words, the Trojan Elders even have power to direct action on the battlefield. At this point in the action Hector accuses the Elders of cowardice, and urges the troops upon the ships; previously he had been obedient, because “Zeus did injury” to the mental powers of the Elders and himself (15.724f). In Book 6 he says that he is going back inside the city “in order to speak to the Elders, the Councillors” (113f).⁷¹ In the event he does not do this; but we

⁷¹ Reading εἶπω zeugmatically, “in order to *speak* to the Elders, the Councillors, and to *tell* our wives to pray to the gods.” I prefer this translation to the alternative, “to tell the Elders and our wives to pray,” not so much because the Elders fail to participate in the ceremony, as because even the suggestion that they might do so seems inappropriate. Helenus has told Hector in 6.86f to have Hecuba assemble the women; and the ceremony of offering a *peplos* to Athena looks like a women’s ritual.

can read his words as intending a normal process of consultation.

Hector's relationship to the Elders underlies two passages referring to Trojan support for their mercenary allies: in 18.290ff he reminds Poulydamas that wealth is flowing from the homes of the Trojans to Phrygia and Maeonia; and in 17.225f he reminds the allies that he "wears out his people for gifts and food" to give to them. It must be the homes of the Elders that are bearing the brunt of this, and Hector will have arranged with them to pay the allies this way. Agamemnon can offer his Achaean allies the fruits of plunder of towns near Troy; Hector must draw upon the wealthier Trojans to support and reward his allies.⁷²

It is obvious that Agamemnon's γέροντες have much less authority than the Trojan γέροντες. Naturally, since there is no real parallel between the two groups. The Trojan Elders are Trojans, citizens of Troy-city, part of a single state; as we shall see, they really are elder. None of the Achaean Elders except Agamemnon belong to Agamemnon's contingent; they are heads of different states who have formed a temporary Council to conduct the war; and for the most part they are not old.

We have no convenient name for the Trojans and their allies collectively, comparable to "the Achaeans" or "the Danaans" or "the Argives," though Homer occasionally uses Τρῶες for the lot of them (e.g. 18.310). This leaves us convinced that the Achaeans, despite their three names, belong to a single nationality, even though their individual states are independent, while the Trojans and their allies do not. The Achaeans all speak the same language; the allies of the Trojans are polyglot (2.803f; Homer sometimes forgets this fact, e.g. 18.245–313). The individual Achaean states all appear to rule themselves in the same way, absolute monarchy; the Trojan allies are diverse in their politics. The Lycians appear to be very similar to an individual Achaean state. They are ruled by two βασιλῆες, Glaucus and Sarpedon, who are looked upon as immortals, honored before all others, and have great holdings of land (12.310–14). Sarpedon suggests,

⁷² J. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago 1975) 152f, puts forward the attractive suggestion that it is the depletion of Troy's wealth that forces Hector to seek victory in the field and not fight a defensive war. The motivation of the allies was not entirely mercenary, though: Sarpedon encourages Glaucus to fight, not for the sake of Troy, or recompense from the Trojans, but for immortal glory (12.322–28)—and because if they do, the Lycians will continue to honor them (310–21).

though, that this state of affairs might be altered if he and Glaucus were not brave warriors: "Why are we honored as we are? ... Because we are honored, we ought to fight." Not entirely logical, but obviously implying that such honors might cease if the two of them proved cowardly. As we shall see, the Trojans of Ilios present a different picture indeed from this. But they live, of course, in a πόλις.

IV. The Government of Troy

As leaders of the opposing war efforts, Agamemnon and Hector occupy roughly parallel positions. It is natural to ask whether their rôles within their respective states are similar. Hector is never called either ἄναξ or βασιλεύς, but that may be accidental, related to the metrical properties of his name. In one passage he suggests that he is an ἄναξ: he prays that Ἄστυαναξ may be as splendid "as I am" (ὥδε) with respect both to βίη and to Ἰλίου ἱφι ἀνάσσειν (6.478).⁷³ Because he is picturing Astyanax here in a purely military context, and we have seen that ἄναξ is a vague word, used of several leading Trojans—Helenus, Poulydamas, and Priam—we naturally take Ἰλίου ἱφι ἀνάσσειν here to mean 'be the leading warrior' in Troy. Hector, unlike some of his relatives, has no peacetime occupation: Paris *e.g.* is a shepherd (24.29f), Aeneas (20.188) and Anchises (5.13) neatherds; but Hector, so far as we can tell, is a soldier. He has 'learned' to be a πρόμαχος (6.444); war is his concern especially (6.493), and he is consistently regarded as the best Trojan warrior. Hence the wish that Astyanax should follow in his footsteps is perfectly natural, however bizarre it seems to us that Hector should expect Andromache to rejoice at such a fate (6.481) after her earlier plea (6.431f).

⁷³ 6.478, a difficult line. My translation makes the whole line epexegetic of ἀριπρεπέα Τρώεσσι in the preceding line, with ἀνάσσειν in 478 as an accusative of respect after ἀγαθόν—'pre-eminent among the Trojans, *viz.* as splendid as I (ὥδε) both in physical strength and in my position as powerful ἄναξ in Troy.' Kirk does not discuss the line's relationship to what precedes, though he does take ἀνάσσειν with ἀγαθόν. Leaf, Munro, and Ameis-Hentze make the line epexegetic, as I do, but take ἀνάσσειν as an anacoluthon, "as though for ἀνάσσουντα" (Leaf). Instinctively we want to take the whole line with δότε—"grant ... that he be pre-eminent among the Trojans, and that he be as splendid as I in physical strength, and also that he be the powerful *anax* of Troy"; but the position of τε after βίην makes such a construction very unlikely.

Indeed he claims no political authority. He is not superior to the Elders, but takes orders from them, as we have seen; he is not even an Elder himself, because he is not old enough: the Trojan δημογέροντες have ceased from war, because of old age (3.149f). Hector cannot force his brother to return Helen; when he upbraids Paris with the most appalling language at 356f, it is the Trojans in general, not Paris whom he accuses of inaction:

No, the Trojans are great cowards, or they would surely ere
 now
 Have dressed you in a stone chiton for the ills that you
 have wrought.⁷⁴

This accusation would make little sense if Hector ran the state, but it sounds just fine if we suppose that some *group* of Trojans, or perhaps all of them, were responsible. Hector is silent in the Assembly at 7.368–78, where the Trojans decide to continue the war and not force Paris to return Helen, and where Priam makes the deciding speech.

Hector's authority ceases off the battlefield; once inside the city, he ceases to be comparable to Agamemnon. Indeed the reason why they hold their positions is very different. Agamemnon is ἄριστος with respect to power, in that he rules over the most troops. Hector leads the most and the best (2.817); moreover this is the siege of Troy, and we might expect the Trojan general to be the commander-in-chief. But why is Hector the Trojan general? He is ἄριστος with respect to military prowess; is it this that makes him the commander? We are denied direct access to Homer's imagination here, but it is hard to overlook the fact that Hector is a Priamid, and that Priam is in some sense βασιλεύς of the Trojans. Priam ἀνάσσει them (24.202), and is their ἄναξ (2.373, 4.18, 6.451, *etc.*); Troy is the city of lord Priam (2.373; 4.18, 290; 7.296, *etc.*). Now, we shall see that Priam lacks overriding political authority, that his dominance is moral, religious, symbolic; he resembles Elizabeth II, not James I. But it is possible that the poet pictures the βασιλεύς of Troy as leading the army, just as the βασιλῆες of the Achaean states lead their armies. And just as some Achaean βασιλῆες (such as Peleus and Laertes) turn over their armies to their sons if they feel too old to fight, so too we might picture Priam as turning over the Trojan army to Hector. This may be why Hector, unlike so many

⁷⁴ A problem in interpreting these lines is our ignorance as to whether Hector is proposing a stoning or is implying that they had the ordinary political power to execute Paris but were not using it.

of his brothers, “learned to be a πρόμαχος” (6.444); he was being groomed for the generalship, and the general ought to be an excellent warrior.⁷⁵ Thus when Hector prays that this son may ἀνάσσει as he does, he may be hoping that Astyanax will simply grow up to be the ἄναξ over the army, as his inherited right.

The war effort, then, is directed by the Elders, who supervise Hector as commander-in-chief of the alliance, who occupies the office because he is the general of the army of Troy-city, a position that may well be the hereditary right of the Trojan βασιλεύς. If Hector were βασιλεύς, he would presumably still be subject to the Elders. From this it is natural to suppose that Priam, right now, is subject to the Elders—or rather, that he is one of them, beholden to the opinion of the majority, or a consensus, or whatever their procedure may be. Of course this is just a supposition so far, based on the conjecture that the βασιλεύς of Troy is the hereditary leader of the army; but we shall find a good deal of evidence in the poem to confirm it, and nothing to contradict it.

We begin the process of confirmation with a fundamental question: why are the Trojans fighting this war, and why do they not force Paris to give Helen back? Either they simply lack the political institutions to carry this out, as the Achaeans lack an institutional means to reconcile Agamemnon and Achilles early on, or their institutions are malfunctioning, or else they want to fight. Despite Menelaus’ words at 13.620–39, the Trojans in general are not war-loving (though it must seem that way to Menelaus, for they continue to fight in an unjust cause). At 3.111f the Trojans rejoice over the prospect of coming to the end of war; Priam blames the “war with the Achaeans, with its many tears” not on Trojan eagerness or even Helen, but on the gods (3.164f); the days of peace, “before the sons of the Achaeans came,” carry intense nostalgia (22.156), partly because they were days of prosperity (9.402f, 18.288f); even Hector can long for peace (22.111–21); the passages might be multiplied. The Trojans do not lack institutions: we have already seen that they have Elders who direct the course of the war even on the battlefield. These Elders form a Council—not that the word βουλή is ever used, but we have βουλευταί in 6.114, who are also in the passage

⁷⁵ Polites, too, is a Priamid who has had a military career, 2.798. If the generalship is hereditary, it is obviously a good idea that more than one brother should be trained to fill it.

called Elders, γέροντες. That the Elders are institutionalized is confirmed by Hector's reference to an oath of the Elders (γερούσιον) in 22.119. We see them in session (εΐατο, ἦντο) in 3.149, 153, where they are called by the more technical name of δημογέροντες. The Trojans have not only a Council, but also an Assembly, an ἀγορή (7.345, 11.139, 18.274). And Priam is a βασιλεύς in some sense, despite the lack of analogy to James I.

One or another of these institutions has failed. And we can spot the point of failure; it is brilliantly clear, even though we have to rely on inference to name the institution. The most important political decision ever made by the Trojans was made before the action of the *Iliad* begins. It is referred to in the *Iliad*, but only in passing, at 11.122–42; it is foreshadowed at 3.204–24. As I propose to lay a good deal of stress on these two short passages, a word of justification may be suitable. Not that there is anything we need that is not in the text; but because the implications of these passages have not been thoroughly observed among critics familiar to me, they must have seemed to others to be *obiter dicta*. It has long been noted that Book 3 recovers the feelings and circumstances of the first year of the war, when Priam would not have recognized the Achaean leaders, when Helen would not have known whether her brothers had come to Troy (*cf.* 3.236–42), when a duel between Menelaus and Paris would have been thoroughly appropriate. Given what we know about the size of the repertoires of oral poets, there is every reason to think that Homer possessed a poem on the first year that he adopted to the needs of the *Iliad*. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that this poem included the embassy of Menelaus and Odysseus that Antenor describes at 2.204–24, an embassy for Helen's sake, where the two spoke powerfully and persuasively at a meeting of the Trojan assembly (3.209). In 11.139 we hear of a Trojan Assembly at which a wealthy Trojan named Antimachus proposed that Menelaus be put to death, which could not happen, of course, unless Menelaus were right there, available for assassination. Surely this is the same Assembly; Homer is probably drawing again upon his earlier poem. This poem may well have included the Judgment of Paris, which Reinhardt has so effectively shown to be lurking in the background of the *Iliad*.⁷⁶ Now, we do not need to assume the existence of this poem in order to say what we need to say; the de-

⁷⁶ K. Reinhardt, "Das Parisurteil" (1938), reprinted in *Tradition und Geist* (Göttingen 1960) 16–36.

tails are all right there in the *Iliad*. But it is much easier to understand Homer's failure to present this all-important occasion in the foreground if we assume that he is referring to a familiar event in the oral tradition that he has elsewhere described in his own way.⁷⁷

Antimachus, of course, did not persuade the Trojans to kill Menelaus. But—on this or a similar occasion—lured by the promise of a bribe from Paris, he “most of all did not allow the return of Helen” (11.123ff). That “most of all” (μάλιστα) indicates that others joined Antimachus in not allowing this. These must have been powerful men. For one thing, their voices carried the day, on this day of days, and Helen's return was disallowed. For another, as Paris cannot have bribed the entire Trojan citizenry, he must have chosen a few men with great influence.⁷⁸ These men were worth bribing; if you bribe them, you will get what you want.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ For the reliance of the oral poet on his tradition, and indeed our inability to understand him fully if we do not possess that tradition, see Foley (*supra* n. 35).

⁷⁸ It is probably not a good idea to bring in the Shield of Achilles to illustrate Troy, though there are plenty of similarities between Troy and the cities on the Shield. One of the similarities is that on the shield we have Elders “in session,” “on polished stone in the sacred circle,” and two talents of gold are set out between the litigants to give to the one who judges most fairly (18.503–08). It is a familiar suggestion that the litigants are responsible for the presence of the gold, which would then be a kind of bribe; not the buying of a particular Elder or Elders, as at Troy, but rather a necessary gift to the court. If you donate, you will not necessarily win, but if you fail to donate, you will lose. The parallel is not exact, but both situations include the venality of Elders. On bribery in Greece generally, see D. Harvey, “*Dona ferentes*. Some Aspects of Bribery in Greek Politics,” in P. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey, ed., *History of Political Thought* 6 (London 1985) 76–117.

⁷⁹ Cunliffe offers a softer translation of οὐκ εἶασχ', “did not approve of the return of Helen,” implying, I think, that the opinion of Antimachus cannot have been decisive. This rendering was made up by Cunliffe for this occasion, and is I suppose based on a preconception of how much power ought properly to be allotted to a man mentioned only thrice elsewhere (11.132, 138; 12.188). In support he refers to 8.428, where Hera says to Athena, “No longer do I ἐὼ us to fight for the sake of mortals in opposition to Zeus”; but the relationship between Hera and Athena permits, nay encourages, the translation ‘allow’ here. Cunliffe says (*Place Names s.v.* Ἀντίμαχος) that Antimachus “corrupted by Paris opposed the restoration of Helen,” which is a little stronger. When we reflect that Antimachus was worth corrupting, and when we examine all other uses of the verb with the negative and infinitive, we are justified in making it even stronger: the word ἐάω implies that Antimachus together with the others who were bribed were in a position to disallow the return of Helen. H. W. Nordheider in *LdfgE* gives “nicht zuverlassen.”

Now, Antimachus is not the political head of the city of Troy. He and his cronies must exert their influence upon some larger political body or bodies. We have already (*supra* 65) identified the Assembly meeting mentioned at 3.209, at which Menelaus and Odysseus spoke, with the Assembly meeting of 11.139 where Antimachus' unsuccessful motion to assassinate Menelaus was introduced. Perhaps Antimachus' successful motion, that Helen be retained, also belongs to that occasion. We might picture the Greeks (with Antenor's support) refusing, Antimachus' asking for Menelaus' death, Priam proposing a compromise, and the Assembly assenting to Priam. But there could have been two occasions: one (11.125) a Council meeting, at which Antimachus was successful; and another (3.209, 11.139), definitely an Assembly meeting, at which he pleaded unsuccessfully for assassination in addition to refusal. Either picture suggests that Antimachus and his allies were Elders, who could dominate the Council and therefore coerce the Assembly, but who could not lure it to murder. Before we explore this further, let us look at some other meetings of the Assembly and the Council.

The assembly of the army in 18.246–313 includes the entire alliance, and therefore can only suggest how the Trojan Assembly might work. Poulydamas and Hector speak; Hector proves persuasive, and under the influence of Athena all the soldiers shout assent to him. Unfortunately we have not the least notion as to what Hector would have done had the army opted for Poulydamas' advice. Note carefully that the assent of the army is not automatic: the members of the Assembly had enough independent authority to make it worth while for Athena to take away their wits, and the poet dwells upon their folly: "They concurred with Hector and his bad advice; no one praised Poulydamas, though his counsel was good" (18.312f). These lines give the firm impression that what the army decides is what will be done.

The Assembly at 7.345–420 also includes the members of the alliance (see 7.348). Antenor speaks out for the return of Helen, Paris refuses and offers instead to return all the stolen property and more, Priam urges that Paris' message be conveyed to the Achaeans along with a proposal for a truce, and the listeners assent to this. Idaeus reports this result to the Achaeans, adding a wish that Paris had died young (7.390), and reporting that "the

Trojans, at least, bade” Paris to give Helen up.⁸⁰ Presumably there was considerable acclaim for Antenor’s proposal. We have long known that the Trojans hate Paris and would be happy to betray him to Menelaus (3.454). In assenting to Priam they are going against their own wishes and assenting to necessity. They must realize that Paris cannot be forced to give Helen back, and we find out at 11.123ff why: Paris has bribed too many important men. This suggests that the ordinary members of the Assembly cannot inaugurate action: they assent to, or dissent from, authority. And they must feel that if Priam says, or implies, that Paris cannot be compelled, then he cannot, and dissent from Priam is pointless. (More on Priam’s rôle here *infra*.) There is another assembly of the whole army at 8.489–542, where Hector urges them to remain outside the wall for the evening and take the appropriate precautions; there is no other speaker, and again the army cries out in assent. The Trojan Assembly meets at 2.788–808.⁸¹ Unfortunately it takes no action, so we learn nothing of its power from this scene.

Five assembly meetings (11.139–42, 18.246–313, 7.345–417, 8.489–542, 2.788–808), taken together, convince us that the assembly of the alliance (and probably the Trojan Assembly proper) has the power of assent or dissent, but no power to assert itself independently. And we have some evidence that their dissent is important: when Antimachus proposed the killing of Menelaus, the Assembly turned this down (no doubt assenting to some other speaker, but still probably expressing its own revulsion).

We also note that the speakers at the assemblies that we see first-hand (as opposed to the pre-war assembly) are all either Councillors—Antenor and Priam—or young men whose fathers are Councillors—Paris, Hector, Poulydamas son of Panthoos, Polites son of Priam (Iris in disguise, 2.791). This suggests that Antimachus is a Councillor as well. We are never told this; he is not named among the eight δημογέροντες mentioned at 3.146ff, though we do not know how many were present. We

⁸⁰ The “at least” (γε) might mean “the Trojans but not their allies” (who are being paid to fight, 17.225f); but in a situation where Idaeus is calling attention to Trojan sentiment that has been thwarted, it probably means “the Trojans but not their leaders.”

⁸¹ I call this a meeting of the Troy-city Assembly because when Iris refers to the allies (803) she seems to be reminding Hector of their presence in the city, as if they were not present on this occasion; the emphasis here on their polyglot nature reinforces their separateness.

know that he is very wealthy (11.132f) and that he is too old to fight; and as we know that the δημογέροντες are too old to fight (3.150), he is at least eligible for the Council. Moreover, he is one of the most powerful men in Troy; it was he who “most of all did not allow the return of Helen” (11.125). The very words “did not allow” (οὐκ εἴασχ’) suggest that his power is not informal, that he occupies a position of authority. We shall see that the Council is in fact hopelessly divided on the question of the return of Helen, implying the existence of a faction favoring her retention—Antimachus would be a suitable member of this faction. Moreover, if he and the other bribe-takers implied by “most of all” (μάλιστα) were not on the Council, we are confronted by the existence of *two* bodies of influential Trojans. Now contemporary politics might have offered Homer a parallel to this: some powerful aristocrats—comparable to Priamids and Antenorids—on a Council, and some very wealthy arrivistes—comparable to Antimachus—who have amassed great, if informal, influence upon the Assembly. In Troy, we might picture the Antimachus group allied with certain disaffected aristocrats, such as Aeneas (13.460f). Such speculations are entertaining; but given that the Council is divided, it seems simplest to imagine that Antimachus is an Elder and a member of the ‘retain Helen’ faction.

We shall return to this question after attempting to answer another: was the first decision to retain Helen taken at the Assembly of 11.339–42 or at a Council meeting? Let us look at the Council more closely. Its members are known technically as δημογέροντες. Beyond 3.149, this term is found just once in the *Iliad*: in 11.372 it is used of Ilus, descendent of Dardanus, the eponym of Ilos and the grandfather of Priam, Lampus, Clytios, Hicetaon, and Tithonus. Ilus is the παλαιοῦ δημογέροντος, which means that Homer wants us to imagine the institution of Elder of the Community going back to the time of Priam’s grandfather. Also, as Leaf notes (on 11.372), “the name thus indicates the identity of royalty with the patriarchate of the village community.” “Village community” is Leaf’s translation of δῆμος, and “village” is not the *mot juste*, but the idea is sound: the βασιλεύς is a δημογέρων or—if there are more than one, as there may have been in Homer’s conception of Ilos’ generation, and as there certainly are in his depiction of Priam’s Troy—is a member of the δημογέροντες. The term also occurs at Eur. *Andr.* 300, where the Chorus refers to Cassandra’s beseeching each of the elders to put the infant Paris to death. Obviously Euripides was

enormously impressed with the importance of the Elders in Trojan politics, whether he read about them in the *Iliad* alone or had some other source, such as our hypothetical Homeric poem on the first year of the war.

The δημογέροντες are sitting at 3.146–49:

Priam and Panthous and Thymoetes
 And Lampus and Clytius and Hicetaon
 And those with them, [and] Ucalegon and Antenor, both
 men of wise counsel,
 Were in session as δημογέροντες beside the Scaean gates.⁸²

In Greek: οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρίαμον καὶ Πάνθοον ἠδὲ Θυμοίτην ...
 Οὐκαλέγων τε καὶ Ἀντήνωρ ... εἶατο δημογέροντες.

As commentators and lexicographers have handled these words in various ways, we must take a moment to discuss them. Cunliffe (*Place Names s.v. ἀμφὶ*) gives “οἱ α. τινα, a person and those with him, a group of which the person named is the chief ... With several persons named Γ 146.” That is, Priam is not distinguished from any of the others in the accusative; they are all chiefs. Munro in his note on these lines agrees: “The phrase οἱ ἀμφὶ τινας (plur.) implies a group, of which the persons [*sic*] mentioned are the most important: cp. 4.295ff.” For Leaf too, the phrase “means ‘the party consisting of’ Priam and the others.”⁸³ Mazon concurs: “Or, Priam, Panthoos et Thy-

⁸² This is probably the most literal translation. I shall discuss the οἱ ἀμφὶ construction presently; as for Οὐκαλέγων τε (“and Ucalegon,” implying an indefinite number of δημογέροντες), rather than “both Ucalegon,” (implying just eight), I take my cue from the half-parallel with other such strings: Καϊνέα τ’ Ἐξάδιόν τε καὶ ἀντίθεον Πολύφημον (1.264) must be rendered, “Caeneus and Exadius and god-rivaling Polyphemus.” But the parallel is imperfect, because putting Ucalegon and Antenor in the nominative (thus taking them out of the οἱ ἀμφὶ construction except as appositives to οἱ) may also take them out of the string. Munro says no, the “change to the nominative in l. 148 has no significance. Cp. 15.301.” In 15.301 there are no names in the nominative, but Munro apparently means, ‘Translate as you would 15.301’, so that we get, “... Hicetaon and Ucalegon and Antenor and those with them,” giving the same picture as my translation. Similarly, Leaf feels that the last two names are put in the nominative merely “for the sake of variety.” Ameis-Hentze and Willcock apparently think otherwise, as they refer to only seven Councilors (they omit Priam, on which see *infra*); Kirk does not make his view clear. Mazon’s translation (given in the next paragraph) suggests, by its dashes and use of “sont là qui,” that more than these eight are present.

⁸³ He continues: “so that Panthoos etc. are all included among the δημογέροντες”; Leaf cannot quite bring himself to utter what his own logic compels him to say, that Priam is also one of the δημογέροντες. Ironically, his note ends “δημογέρων recurs only Λ372, and there it is used of a *king*.” Yes; and on Leaf’s own interpretation of the passage it is so used here as well.

moitès—Lamos et Clytios et Hikétaon, reje-ton d'Arès—Oucalégon et Anténor, deux sages—sont là qui siègent, en Conseil des Anciens, près des portes Scées.” All five of us agree on the two most important points: Priam is one of the δημογέροντες and he is not elevated above the others mentioned, though he catches our attention by being mentioned first.

The other scholars I have consulted, however, go in different directions. Hans-Friedrich Bornitz, in the *LfgE*, groups it under the heading “B II 1 ... Lebewesen ... sitzen *rings um* eine Person *herum* [emphasis Bornitz’s]” and quotes it in Greek about as I have done, only omitting Ucalegon and Antenor. He presumably translates, “The Elders, Ucalegon and Antenor, were sitting around Priam and Panthous, *etc.*” This would mean that Priam, Lampus, Clytius, and Hicetaon were *not* δημογέροντες, even though their grandfather Ilus (20.238) was one (7.362), and the relative outsiders Antenor and the mysterious Ucalegon now are. This seems bizarre, even though Döderlein (cited by Leaf on this passage) also argued that Ucalegon and Antenor were the only δημογέροντες, and were representatives of an anti-Priam party (*cf.* 7.747).⁸⁴ Willcock varies this approach, saying that “by a slight illogicality, five of the seven [*sic*] councillors who were with Priam are attracted into the accusative with him,” which means that he must want to translate, “Those around Priam, *viz.* Panthoos and Thymoetes ... and Ucalegon and Antenor, were sitting...” (He cannot mean, “Priam and those around him ... were sitting,” because that gives us eight Councilors.) The οἱ ἄμφω idiom is lost; and an interpretation that requires us to accuse the author of illogicality is not persuasive if good alternatives exist. Ameis-Hentze (on 3.149) also speak of seven Councilors, though they refer us (on 3.146) to 2.445, where they say, “οἱ δ’ ἄμφω Ἀτρείωνα, den Atriden mit einbegriffen”; Priam thus ought to be included, and we ought to have eight Councilors.

⁸⁴ He considered them *tribuni plebis*, and their opposition, Priam, Panthous, Thymoetes, and Priam’s three brothers Lampus, Clytius, and Hiketaon as royalists. This is probably making too much of the shift to the nominative, and suggests that Priam has more political authority than he turns out to possess; but it is true that at 7.347 Antenor speaks out for Helen’s return, and Priam does not endorse him. In the rest of the *Teichoscopia* Antenor and Priam seem friendly enough, though when Antenor says that he entertained Menelaus and Odysseus and learned their counsels (3.207f) he may be saying that he was on their side, that he wanted Helen returned then as well as now, while Priam appears to have waffled. Antenor accompanies Priam for the oath-taking, as if here too the feeling is that both sides need to be represented.

Those who take the third direction feel that the lines should be read according to the Attic idiom, "so-and-so and those around him (them)," but want to translate, "Priam and those around him (*sic*), namely Panthous and Thymoetes ... and Ucalegon and Antenor ... were sitting as δημογέροντες." Thus Kirk, LSJ, and Chantraine (88). This at least makes Priam one of the δημογέροντες.⁸⁵ But why does Homer put Panthous and the others in the accusative, Ucalegon and Antenor in the nominative? Does this not specifically place Priam on the same level as the others in the accusative? The difference is subtle, since if Priam is included with the rest among the δημογέροντες, there is a leveling effect in any case. But if Priam were the only one in the accusative, we would feel that he was definitely *primus inter pares* politically. Homer *could* have put the others into the nominative; that is certainly the more obvious and the easier construction; he seems to have avoided doing that in order to avoid singling out Priam, in order to make him *primus inter pares* only by virtue of being the first one mentioned, the one to arrest our attention, to give us our bearings in the midst of less familiar and unfamiliar names.⁸⁶

Let us look at some parallel passages. If we translate 15.301ff by the model, 'So-and-so and those around him (them),' it comes out, "Ajax and Idomeneus, Teucer, Meriones, and Meges [all these names are in the accusative in Greek] and those around them, summoning the [other] leaders, formed a battleline." Without using this model, we render, "Those around Ajax and Idomeneus ... summoning the leaders, formed...." Both make sense; what does not make sense is to translate, "Ajax and those around him, *viz.* Idomeneus, Teucer, *etc.*" Idomeneus, Meriones, and Meges are not part of Ajax's entourage. Similarly there is no temptation to translate 4.294ff, "arranging his companions and urging them to fight, namely, tall Pelagon and those around him, *viz.* Alastor and Chromius and Haemon the mighty (κρέον-

⁸⁵ At least it should, although Kirk goes on to say that "these are the Trojan elders and Priam's contemporaries, δημογέροντες," leaving us confused as to whether he includes Priam among the Elders.

⁸⁶ It is only fair to ask, "Why are *any* of the names in the nominative?" Ameis-Hentze (on 3.148) think that Ucalegon and Antenor are deliberately stressed because of the important rôle of Antenor in the ensuing scene, and this can hardly be wrong; indeed Antenor and Priam are paired both in the Teichoscopia and oath-taking. For K. Stanley, the nominative emphasizes the contrast between the 'perceptive' Antenor and Ucalegon (= 'heedless'), symbolizing the overall Trojan ability to grasp reality, together with their inability to act accordingly. See *The Shield of Achilles* (Princeton 1993) 66.

τα) and Bias, shepherd of the hosts.” Why should Haemon and Bias, especially in view of their epithets, be part of Pelagon’s entourage? In both passages, however we take them, it is clear that all the names in the accusative are on the same level. At 6.435 it is especially clear: Andromache refers to an assault by οἱ ἄριστοι ἀμφὶ Αἴαντε δύω καὶ ἀγακλυτὸν Ἴδομενῆα ἠδ’ ἀμφ’ Ἀτρείδας καὶ Τυδέος ἀλκίμον υἱόν, which no one would translate, “their best, the two Ajaxes and those around them, *viz.* Idomeneus, and the two sons of Atreus and those around them, *viz.* Diomedes.” First, it is exceedingly bizarre to reduce “those around them” to one person each time. Second, we cannot single out the Ajaxes as the ἄριστοι from a list including Agamemnon; we cannot even single out the Ajaxes and the Atreidae here in Book 6, where Diomedes is so much the superior Greek warrior that the Trojan women have just prayed for release from his valor. Nor can it mean, “the best men around the Ajaxes ...,” as if it were not the Ajaxes and Idomeneus and the Atreidae and Diomedes who were the best men. We must of necessity translate, “the best men, the two Ajaxes and Idomeneus and those around them, and the Atreidae and Diomedes and those around them.”

Render οἱ ἀμφὶ idiomatically, or do not; it never singles out the first in a string of accusatives. Hence in 3.146–49 both logic and the parallel passages require, “Priam and Panthous and Thymoetes ... and those about them, and Ucalegon and Antenor [or, “both Ucalegon and Antenor”], were sitting....” Doubtless Kirk, LSJ, and Chantraine would have translated it this way if it had not been for a preconception: we all know that Priam is the king of Troy; surely it is improper to put a βασιλεύς on the same rank as the other δημογέροντες.

Of course he is the βασιλεύς; in a sense he is *not* on the same rank. That is why, in order to show us that Priam does not have exceptional political power, Homer must use this striking construction, the succession of accusatives: Priam and Panthous and Thymoetes *etc.* In the company of the δημογέροντες, Priam is merely one of a number of them. Not that he is powerless; unlike Elizabeth II, he sits with the ruling body. But he is only one member. The one most familiar to us, no doubt; the one we are most interested in, which is why he is mentioned first. But no more powerful politically than the others.

With Mazon I have given the phrase εἶατο δημογέροντες (3.149) an institutional translation, “were in session,” though it could, of course, be rendered, “were sitting [by the Scaean

gates], Elders”; I prefer the interpretation, “were sitting *as Elders*,” partly because the word δημογέροντες has the feel of a technical term, and a technical term is appropriate if they are actually in session; and partly because the repetition of ἦντ’ at 3.153 seems to lay such stress on their being *leaders* who sit: τοῖσι [like clear-voiced cicadas sitting on a tree] ἄρα Τρώων ἡγήτορες ἦντ’ ἐπὶ πύργῳ (3.153), and such stress is appropriate if they are actually engaged in leading. Also, this third book is our real introduction to Troy-city; up to now we have heard about Troy from the Achaeans, seen an Assembly react to the approach of the Achaean army, and met the army of the Trojan alliance. It would make sense for Homer to put before us now the people responsible for the decision to fight this war, and to be exposed to their reasoning as they engage politically. If we take it as a formal Council meeting, then we are watching Troy being governed; and even if we do not, we are still in the presence of the *governors* of Troy, the γέροντες and βουλευταί who elsewhere determine battle strategy for the Trojans. If it is a meeting, we do not know why it was summoned to meet; but when Helen appears, she becomes the agenda if she was not so already. When the Elders look at her, their minds are divided (3.156ff):

No blame befalls the Trojans and Achaeans with their
 excellent shin-guards
 For suffering woes so long a time for such a woman;
 Her face bears dread resemblance to immortal goddesses.

That is the judgment of half the Elders, or of half the minds of all of them. But (159f):

Even so, though she is such, let her go home in the ships;
 May she not remain, a calamity for us and our children.

That is the judgment of the other half. However we interpret, the Council is exactly divided, and that is why Helen remains in Troy. And that is why we have a Trojan War.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ The importance of the Trojan Council, and indeed of politics in the *Iliad*, is well brought out by W. Nicolai, “Rezeptionssteuerung in der Ilias,” *Philologus* 127 (1983) 3–12. It is a pity that Nicolai does not discuss the difference between the Achaean and Trojan Councils, and that he concentrates so much on individual error that he does not do full credit to institutional failure; but his sense of the dual purpose of the poet, to set forth heroism in the traditional mode, and to offer his own political insight and criticism, corresponds roughly to my sense that the poem is about the tragic growth of Achilles and the tragic death of Troy.

Such an interpretation allows us to see why Priam tells Helen that he does not blame her, but the gods, for the war (3.164f). The division on the Council reflects a real moral dilemma. A woman as beautiful as Helen is simply worth fighting for; but the war is disastrous for the nation. The first position is highly romantic, and we may doubt whether it could have been maintained in any real society, except one where an absolute monarch was also the lover; even in fictional Troy such a stance requires the support of bribery. But one of the things we like about the fictional Trojans is they can feel that intense human beauty has a quality of divinity in it ("her face bears dread resemblance to immortal goddesses"), and that for this one *ought* to fight. We are never told, but we feel that Priam either agrees with this, or at least feels the force of the dilemma. If he did not, he could not very well talk of the gods' responsibility for the war; responsibility would lie with an errant son and a corrupt Council. The gods are responsible because they gave a woman godly beauty that one must fight to possess, and gave it to a woman from another nation.

Putting together now what we know for sure: years ago, Paris bribed certain men, including Antimachus; the Council is still hopelessly divided; Helen is retained and the war goes on. Surely the easiest way to link these facts is to suppose that it was Council members whom Paris bribed, that Antimachus who "did not allow the return of Helen" (11.1243ff) is an Elder, a Councilor, someone in a position not to allow things. The other possibility, that Paris bribed some influential Trojans, not Elders, who were able to dominate the Assembly, looks unattractive in view of the division on the Council that we observe in Book 3. It is really making matters too complicated to think of idealistic Councilors who are pro-Paris and the erotic value-choice, allying themselves in that Assembly with a party of greedy nouveaux whom Paris has gotten to.

We still have not answered the question whether it was an Assembly meeting or a Council meeting at which Helen's return was rejected. Menelaus and Odysseus request it from the Assembly (3.209), but if we agree that Antimachus was an Elder, and *as such* did not allow Helen's return, we feel that the Council must have met first, and then taken its position to the Assembly. It is a small point, perhaps, but if we attribute a decisive Council meeting long ago to our hypothesized poem on the first year of the war, we can see in the Council meeting in Book 3 yet another borrowing from—another imitation of an event

in—that poem. Book 3 does not mention Antimachus, because his rôle belongs strictly to the past. Moreover, here towards the beginning of the *Iliad*, Homer wants to give an idealized picture of Troy; her *hamartia* can unfold in due course.

That is speculative; but that Homer pictured Antimachus and his group as Elders is not just speculation, and it is virtually certain that he regarded the Elders, the *δημογέροντες*, whether meeting in Council or in Assembly, as the rulers of Troy. We are already prepared for this: we have heard the Elders giving orders to Hector (15.721ff), we have heard Hector propose to consult with them at 6.114; we know of the oath of the Elders at 22.119. When we add the deadlocked meeting in Book 3, and the power of Antimachus *et al.* to force Troy to go to war, we complete a consistent and reasonable picture.

This confirms our conjecture (*supra* 63f), that Priam is a weak king, an Elder whose political power is subject to the consensus of the other Elders. A weak king, and a very gentle man, but not a weak one. The man who can go to the Greek camp and encounter Achilles with humility and pride in Book 24, as a father to a son, a human being to a human being, and return successful, is not a weak person. Nor is the man who can tell Helen that he does not blame her for the war (3.164), or who can openly acknowledge that he loves his son Paris too much to look on his probable slaughter at Menelaus' hands (3.306). Menelaus perceives him as strong: he wants Priam to witness the oaths in Book 3, not on the grounds that he is the βασιλεύς of Troy, but because old men "look before and after, so that far the best things may befall" (109f).

Priam takes no step thereafter to justify Menelaus' faith in him; he cannot. In the assembly of the Trojan alliance before Priam's palace in Book 7 Antenor, who had witnessed the oath-taking in Book 3 along with Priam, says that the Trojans are fighting ὄρκια πιστὰ ψευσάμενοι (7.351f)—having falsified their sworn oaths, having broken the treaty. Paris, who speaks next, might have argued that the oaths specified that there would be peace, and Helen would be returned, only *if* he died (3.284–91). He does not, and we are relieved; this would be an equivocation, and we prefer to have the Trojans admit their guilt. Paris merely exclaims that Antenor is crazy if he thinks that he will give Helen back (7.360), and then offers financial restitution—double restitution. Priam, who speaks last, makes no effort to refute Antenor's charge of treachery. Nor does he attempt to dissuade Paris. He merely urges the Trojans to take their dinner, and

Idaeus to tell the Greeks what Paris has offered and suggest to them a truce for burial.

The effect on us, I think, is that Priam can do nothing.⁸⁸ Paris is holding all the cards, and if he says he will not return Helen, Priam is helpless. We have already been told why: the Council of Elders, which rules Troy, is divided. Later we shall learn more: Antimachus and others are “not allowing” the return of Helen. The initial audience may well know this second fact already, but we must be patient. We know enough, though, to rule out certain possibilities. We do not conclude that Priam is a bad man, perfectly willing to break his own oath, indifferent to the wishes of his people (3.454, 7.393), able but unwilling to instruct Paris that the crown demands the return of Helen. Nor do we conclude that though he is a good man, sensitive to his oath and to Trojan popular opinion, free to constrain Paris, he is too weak to do so. Indeed Homer warns us against drawing any such wrong-headed conclusions by preceding Priam’s speech with the words θεόφιν μῆστωρ ἀτάλαντος, ὃ σφιν εὐ φρονέων.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ His powerlessness is in fact foreshadowed by Zeus’. Hera savagely demands that the truce be broken; Zeus protests his love and honor for Troy and for Priam, but yields (4.43–68). Zeus cannot override Hera, and Priam cannot override the wishes of Paris and the Elders who support him. I stress the human source of Priam’s frustration. Of course we can say that Hera bedevils him through Pandarus’ arrow shot at Menelaus, but it is un-Homeric to let events proceed simply from Olympus. Beauty, talent, riches are the gifts of the gods; but all the major decisions of the poem are made by mortals, usually without divine intervention: Agamemnon’s rejection of Chryses and seizure of Briseis; Achilles’ withdrawal (even his failure to kill Agamemnon is a free choice *inspired* by deity); the Embassy; Achilles’ decision to go home and his reconsideration; Patroclus’ re-entry into battle and Achilles’ assent to it; Achilles’ re-entry; Hector’s two decisions to remain outside the walls. Even Achilles’ decision to return the body of Hector is free; it might have gone awry, and he have “sinned against the commands of Zeus” (24.586), if he had not taken measures to protect himself from his own anger. It might well seem to Priam that an arrow fired at Menelaus by a misguided Zeleian (or perhaps Lycian) had to have been inspired by a hostile god; but Priam cannot thereby avoid responsibility for the breaking of the truce, any more than Agamemnon can (or wishes to) avoid it by claiming that Zeus must somehow be responsible for his calamity. If Priam has the power to uphold his oath, he must exercise it. And if he is powerless, then there must be a human reason for it. As we have seen, there is—the nature of the Trojan constitution.

⁸⁹ Nicolai (*supra* n.87: 4 n.6) calls attention to this “positive ‘auktoriale’ Würdigung des Sprechers,” and in its light gives four possible reasons for Priam’s backing of Paris: sympathy for Helen (but Helen has conveyed a willingness to return, 3.176), proud self-assertion against the hostile demand to surrender (but Antenor’s suggestion was not hostile, and the Achaeans have not made a

We see the limitation on Priam's power again when he cannot force or persuade Hector to come inside the city in Book 22. This is not the result of *personal* weakness: he uses every imaginable argument, culminating in a reference to his own genitals (22.75), pleading as a father, just as Hecuba then bares and holds out her breast, appealing as a mother (22.80). The one thing Priam does not do is to order him, as his βασιλεύς; only the Elders collectively can give such orders. Even when Priam appeals to duty—"Come inside and rescue the Trojans" (22.56)—he speaks as a father, and calls Hector ἐμὸν τέκος.

Priam, as βασιλεύς, still retains a good deal of authority, only not political. He says that the gods drove war on him (μοι, 3.165), perhaps identifying himself with the Trojans as a βασιλεύς identifies with his people. As he should: he is the βασιλεύς, his is the "city of Priam"; similarly we refer to 'Victorian England'. At 7.345 Idaeus tells us that the Trojans "bade Paris to return Helen," and yet Priam is able to persuade them to accept his refusal, to "listen carefully and obey" (7.379). This does not sound like blind obedience, but rather a recognition that Priam can do nothing and that therefore nothing can be done. If Priam really could intervene but is too bad or too weak to do so, we would expect some expression of dissent—or might expect Athena to be taking their wits away. Instead they are trusting him, as Menelaus did in Book 3, because he is trustworthy. Late in Book 7, when the Trojans are collecting their dead upon the battlefield, Priam "does not allow his people to cry out" in mourning (7.425). Here he is the βασιλεύς, in action if not in name, but his authority is of a religious or moral, not a political nature. In Book 21, Priam has been watching from the tower as the Trojans come streaming in flight towards the city; he rushes down and orders the guards to open the gates, which they do (21.526–38). This is a practical, a military decision; Priam, as one of the Elders (who have, after all, stated military authority over Hector) would naturally have the right to give such orders, and we would not have been astonished if some other Trojan elder had given it. In Book 24, Priam tells his citizens to gather timber

demand), honoring his son's wilfulness (but why should he, in view of its consequences for them all?), and religious scruples against deportation (but what about scruples over violating one's oath?). Nicolai later (10) calls attention to the failure of the Trojan Council, accusing it of collegial "laissez-faire"; is "honoring his son's wilfulness" an example of this? In any case, Nicolai has missed the importance of Paris' bribery.

for Hector's funeral; he does this partly as father of the beloved hero, and partly as a man of moral and religious authority.

These are all the public *actions* he takes; but there is an interesting reference to his status in Book 20. Achilles asks Aeneas if he hopes to be master of the dignity of Priam in the eyes of (or among) the Trojans, Τρώεσσι ἀνάξειν ἱποδάμοισι τιμῆς τῆς Πριάμου (20.180f). Let him not hope for this, "because Priam has sons." My translation is from Cunliffe, and agrees exactly with Munro and Leaf, and very nearly with Ameis-Hentze ("in den Besitz der Königswurde gelangen"). We cannot take Τρώεσσι as the object of ἀνάξειν, because τιμῆς cannot then be construed; I can find no parallel for Mazon's "avec le rang," nor does any commentator I have consulted.⁹⁰ For τιμή M. W. Edwards says "power, prerogative," which is unattractive. Not that Priam lacks power—we have seen examples of it in the pre-

⁹⁰ He is followed by Benveniste, though, in a very unsatisfactory discussion of τιμή: E. Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society*, tr. E. Palmer (Miami 1973) 342; earlier (336) Benveniste translates "and win the rank which Priam holds." I say "unsatisfactory" not merely because no attention is paid to the views of commentators and lexica on individual passages, but because so many apparent confusions lurk. For example, on this passage, he says, "the expression associates the τιμή with the exercise of royal power." Now no one will dispute that there is an *association* between τιμή and power; but Benveniste goes on to assert that τιμή *comprises* royal power, as if power were denoted by the term. Again, in the same discussion he claims that τιμή, or at least this notion of τιμή (he is not clear on this matter) is of divine origin. He cites 2.197, where Odysseus says that the τιμή of a king comes from Zeus, and says that there are more examples—puzzlingly, because we think back to 1.278f, which he has indeed discussed, and where Nestor connects the βασιλεύς and τιμή but says that Zeus gives κῦδος, not τιμή. Or we think of 12.310–21, which he has just cited, and where Sarpedon asks, "Glaucus, why are we above all honored with a special seat, and meat, and full cups, in Lycia? And why do all men look on us as gods? ... Therefore we must take our stand among the first-fighters ... so that Lycian warriors will say, 'Our βασιλῆες are not without glory, they eat and drink well, but look, their strength is also noble, since they fight among the first-fighters'" (I have compressed slightly; Benveniste's translation [337] is more elaborate, but the difference is not important here). Now the beings who are doing the honoring here are clearly mortals; it is mortals who look upon Sarpedon and Glaucus as gods; and the answer to the question "Why?" is not, "Because these are privileges that belong to us because we are kings." Sarpedon might have said, "Because a scepter-holding king has a greater share of τιμή" (1.278f), but he did not. The implied answer to his question is, "They treat us this way in the expectation that we will fight among the first; *therefore* let us live up to their expectations." I would not dream of using this passage to refute the view that τιμή is of divine origin; but the assertion that it is requires a careful consideration of this passage that Benveniste does not give.

ceding paragraph, and wealth confers power. And even the specifically political power of a very wealthy δημογέρων might well be coveted by an outsider, a poor cousin, a Dardanian who makes his living herding cows and has long resented Priam (13.460f). But τιμή does not really mean 'power' in Homer, though the possession of a certain kind of dignity can also *entail* the possession of power. Power (of various sorts) is κράτος, κρατέω. If by 'prerogative' we mean the physical objects that accompany τιμή a better word is γέρας. Thus Achilles' loss of τιμή in Book 1 is not a loss of power but of standing, dignity, self-respect, which has come because Agamemnon has seized his γέρας (1.352–56). But Bellerophon's receipt of half the royal τιμή in 6.193 carries *with* it a certain amount of power (so too 2.197; 9.616; 15.189; *Od.* 1.117; 11.495, 503; 24.30, the other places where Cunliffe allows the possibility of the translation 'prerogative'). Willcock's "rule over the domain of Priam" changes the meaning of τιμή even more. I labor this point because it seems to me that the words, "be master of the dignity of Priam," as given by Cunliffe, Leaf, and Munro are so very apt. Priam is a king, as Elizabeth II is a queen, without much royal power, but with immense status—and immense wealth, to which Achilles goes on to refer (20.182).

The real rulers of Troy, then, are the δημογέροντες, one of whom is the βασιλεύς, who meet in Council and are the speakers at the Assembly. The Elders determine foreign policy, in that they let the nation go to war over Helen (11.125); they are involved in determining the strategy of the commander-in-chief of the Trojan alliance, Hector (*cf.* 6.113f, 15.721ff). One swears the solemn "oath of the elders" (22.119; perhaps the Council has the legal power to enforce this oath). Grounds for membership in the council, apart from age, are not clear. The names in Book 3 that we recognize all clearly mark out the old aristocracy: Antenor, Panthoos, Priam, and his brothers; but we do not know enough about Antimachus to know whether to speak of aristocracy or oligarchy. Troy bears an obvious resemblance to the city at peace on the shield of Achilles, with its elders in session to adjudicate a case of restitution for homicide; we do not, however, hear of any such action on the part of the Trojan δημογέροντες.

V. The Economy of the Trojans

In discussing the Achaeans at home, we called attention to the sidelights upon their lives that we get from time to time and noted that a good many Achaeans were murderers in exile. To

this the Trojans offer startling contrast. In the vignettes of their pre-war lives we hear not of crimes but of occupations that were, or could be, pursued in time of peace: Phereclus the carpenter and shipbuilder whom Athena loved (5.59–64);⁹¹ Paris the shepherd (24.29f), trader (6.289–96), and home builder (6.314f, and see *infra*); Lycaon, a chariot-maker (21.37); Melanippus (15.547f), Aeneas (20.188), and his father Anchises (5.313), all cowherds;⁹² Bucolion (6.22, the father of two Trojan warriors) and perhaps Iphidamas the Antenorid (11.221, 245), both shepherds;⁹³ Antiphus and Isus, Priamids who, like Aeneas, followed their flocks even in wartime (11.106); Helenus, also a Priamid, the seer (6.75); and Scamandrius the huntsman (5.50f). (I do not include here such men as Phorbas, who are merely described as rich in flocks, 14.490; I am including only those who perform the labor.)

The Achaean culture has all or most of these pursuits, but they are engaged in by other men, not by warriors, many of whom are said, or presumed, to be back home; Calchas the Achaean seer, for example, does not fight, though Helenus the Trojan seer kills and is wounded. The Achaeans raid cattle, but they are not seen tending cattle. It is important to note the high rank of

⁹¹ The passage could be read so that Phereclus' father, not Phereclus, built the ships; Kirk (on 5.59–64) goes in this direction, while Leaf, Munro, and Ameis-Hentze go in the other. Ameis-Hentze refer to 2.872 and 5.44, where the pronoun must jump over the name of the father in order to find its antecedent, and until this parallel is refuted I prefer to follow them. Even if we go along with Kirk, and as a result cannot say that Homer *calls* Phereclus a carpenter, we are left with the impression that he must *be* one, as the carpenter's son. And grandson, as I and most others read the passage. Kirk wants τέκτονος to be lower-case, thus eliminating a generation, but this suggests that we need to be told that a man named Harmonides is a carpenter.

⁹² The latter two are Dardanians, not Trojans, but they are cousins of Priam, and Aeneas of course is destined to rule the Trojans (20.307). Aeneas goes into battle accompanied by Antenorids (2.823), which makes the tie even closer.

⁹³ 11.245 speaks of goats and sheep, τὰ οἱ ἄσπετα ποιμαίνοντο where the dative can mean either "by him" or "for him." Even if it means "by him," we assume that he had assistance. Iphidamas came back to his native Troy from Thrace μετὰ κλέος Ἀχαιῶν (11.227), "pursuing the report of the Achaeans," with Leaf and Ameis-Hentze (not "looking for glory from the Achaeans," Lattimore); he died "apart from his wife, helping his fellow-citizens" (242). The pathos of his death depends upon the contrast between it and the young wife and the flocks he had left behind, the gentleness and vitality of peace and the brutality of war. We therefore do not see him as *essentially* a warrior, a man who regularly spends his time fighting, while others tend his flocks. Hence I am inclined to count him as a shepherd, but of course line 245 remains ambiguous.

most of the Trojans we have mentioned; the ordinary Trojan aristocrat had another job besides fighting. We must be very careful not to suppose that Hector is typical: he resembles rather his Lycian ally Sarpedon in his self-definition as a warrior-hero (6.446, *cf.* 12.310–28).

The picture of the sons of the royal and enormously wealthy Priam occupied with flocks, sea-trading, and house building is a startling one, but it is not to be gainsaid. Perhaps it is appropriate to recall the *Odyssey* here, not to prove anything, but merely to reassure. Not only do we see Odysseus build a ship with his own hands (5.229–61) and hear about how he built his bed (23.189–201), but we hear him boast of his prowess at harvesting, plowing, and fighting, as if all three accomplishments were equally honorable (18.366–86). As with Odysseus' skill at the bow, a weapon he does not use in the *Iliad* (he borrows Meriones' bow [10.260], against what contingency we never learn), we have features here that markedly distinguish the Odyssean Odysseus from the Iliadic;⁹⁴ but the *concept* of the aristocrat who works with his hands at tasks that other cultures have seen as menial is perfectly familiar to the *Iliad*. And the Trojans embody it.

We had a close look (*supra* 46) at the Achaean warrior class who do not work with their hands, for whom “always it is disgraceful to wait long and return home empty-handed” (2.298), for the upper crust of whom, at least, “winning honor and glory alone makes a brief life meaningful.” Most of the Trojans, even the aristocrats, do work with their hands. Troy cannot therefore have a warrior class in the same sense; its values must be more pluralistic: winning honor and glory cannot *alone* make a brief life meaningful. They were a nation at peace before the Achaeans came (9.403, 22.156). Therefore we expect them to look different when they go to war. And indeed they do. As the armies are approaching each other (3.1–9),

Now after all the units had been arranged in order together
with their leaders,

⁹⁴ For other differences, *cf.* P. Pucci, *Odysseus Polytropos* (Ithaca 1987) 25 n.19, 41. I do not recall a reference to the bow in Pucci, but it would be in the spirit of his book to say that of course Odysseus must borrow Meriones' bow, as we all know from *Od.* 21 that he left his own at home. But he has left behind his persona as archer as well; in the *Iliad* he could hardly boast to be an archer in battle better than all the others except Philoctetes (*Od.* 8.215–21), as Teucer and Meriones might attest.

The Trojans came on with clamor and shouting, like birds,
 As when the clamor of cranes arises in the face of heaven.
 Now after they flee the bitter winter and dread storm
 snowstorm,
 With a clamor they fly to the streams of Oceanus
 Bringing murderous death to the Pygmaean men.
 And lo, high in the air they carry forth their horrible strife.
 But look, the other side came in silence, the Achaeans
 breathing energy,
 Eager in their hearts to come to each others' aid.

The Trojans are noisy, the Achaeans quiet.⁹⁵ The Trojans move independently, and attack instinctively; the Achaeans have mastered the tactics of fighting cooperatively. The Trojans are amateurs, the Achaeans professionals. We expect this of the Trojans here in Book 3 where, as we saw (*supra* 65), we are frequently back in the first year of the war. It is arresting that the Achaeans are already professionals; but such is the nature of a warrior class. Again (4.422–39):

As when upon the shore rich in echoes the waves of the sea
 Are stirred up one after another as the west wind moves
 down upon them.
 On the sea they first rise in crest, but afterwards
 Broken by the dry land they give out loud cries, and going
 around the capes
 Curved, they come to a head, and spit out the foam of the
 sea,
 So then, one after the other the ranks of the Danaans were
 stirred up
 Unceasingly to battle. For each leader was giving orders
 To his own men; but the rest came on in silence, and you
 would not have thought
 That so great a host, with speech in its chest, could follow
 In silence, fearing their officers. And about them all
 Shone their intricate armor, the clothing they wore as they
 marched.
 But as for the Trojans, just as sheep in the court of a man
 rich in acquisitions
 Stand in the tens of thousands, giving white milk
 And bleating incessantly, hearing the voices of the lambs,
 Thus the shout of the Trojans arose throughout the wide-
 spread army,

⁹⁵ See L. Muellner, "The Simile of the Cranes and Pygmies," *HSCP* 93 (1990) 59–102.

For the speech of them all was not the same, nor was there
 one voice,
 But their languages were mixed together, for the men were
 summoned from all over.
 And Ares stirred the Trojans, and grey-eyed Athena the
 Achaeans.

The Achaeans are like waves: just as each individual wave crests, and breaks loudly, and forms a head and spits foam, so each individual unit changes as it moves, as the leaders give orders; but just as the succession of waves is wholly regular, each resembling the one before it, so each unit resembles the one before it, the masses moving silently in response to their leaders' commands. The incessant silent movement of the men answers to the incessant regular movement of the waves. The Trojans, on the other hand, are like noisy sheep crowding irregularly into a courtyard. The silence of the Achaeans, their ability to move so regularly, is obvious testimony to their training and discipline; each Trojan unit seems to have its own movement, uncoordinated with its neighbor's except that the mass as a whole moves, when it moves, in the same direction, and makes a great deal of irregular noise as it does. The Trojan army—that is, the army of the alliance—is hampered by its variety of tongues, but this alone cannot account for their clamor, for if they were as well disciplined as the Achaeans, only their leaders would have to make noise. Homer is pinpointing a major difference between the Trojan and Achaean armies, and the difference is that the Achaean troops are silent, and resemble the regular movement of waves; the Trojans are noisy, and resemble the movements of cranes and sheep: the whole mass moves to the same place, but the units are not coordinated with each other.

Such images as these absolutely rule out the explanation, frequently offered, that the difference between the Trojans and the Achaeans is merely the difference between the defense and the offense. It is not a feature of defensive warfare to be especially noisy, or to engage in significantly less disciplined and less regular maneuvers. The difference, rather, lies in the fact that the majority of the Trojans proper, and no doubt many of their allies, are not professionals; they have civilian occupations. The Achaeans belong to a warrior culture, the Trojans do not. When Menelaus accuses the Trojans of being "insatiate for battle," he is speaking from his own aggrieved position (13.621): because the Trojans need only have returned Helen and the property to him as victor in the duel in Book 3, and yet chose war instead, they must, it would seem, love war. The adjective φιλοπτόλεμος is

used of the Trojans three times: once Achilles uses it when cautioning Patroclus (16.90); once Hector (one side of whom really does love war, or at least the glory that comes with it) uses it in his foolish boasting over the dying Patroclus, in order to stress his own valor ("I am conspicuous even among the war-loving Trojans," 16.835); and once Homer uses it while speaking from Hector's perspective (17.294).⁹⁶ But the behavior of the Elders in Book 3, of Antenor in Book 7, of Priam and Paris throughout, together with the civilian and peacetime occupations of so many other Trojans, all combine to refute Menelaus' inference. And even Hector at times values fighting as a defense of the fatherland rather than a source of immortal κλέος, the only rational justification for loving war (12.243, 15.496ff).

As for the Trojan women: when we first meet Helen, she is weaving a purple robe, and introducing the battles being fought for her (3.125f); when we encounter Andromache (22.440f), she too is weaving such a robe; Hector urges her to such a task at 6.490f. I am not aware of any reference in the *Iliad* to an Achaean woman weaving; if Chryseis or Andromache are taken to Greece in captivity, they can expect to work at the loom of another woman (1.31, 6.456). But our opportunities for seeing Achaean women is so slight that it may be best to avoid inferring a difference and merely stress that the female Trojan aristocrat, at least, was employed. She supervised others, of course (6.324, 491; 22.442ff), but she worked with her own hands just as her husband did. We assume that she made the really elegant woven objects for the household (certainly what Helen is weaving in Book 3 requires the very highest art).⁹⁷

⁹⁶ It is hard to give the epithet a convincing meaning in this line, since the Trojans are being asked by Hector to take his old armor back to Troy-city, an action to which love of war seems irrelevant. I cannot hear the implication, "These Trojans were so fond of fighting that they resented leaving the fray for even an hour," especially since these men were already engaged in taking *Patroclus'* (i.e., Achilles') armor back to Troy. I find no refuge in the fact that it is a generic epithet in the dative plural for a number of peoples and therefore supposedly not meaningful; only the epithets that are inherently vague and general (e.g. δῖος) lend themselves to being downplayed, and then not always. I suspect therefore that Homer chose the epithet here in order to recall the occasion of Hector's boast over Patroclus: that boast is followed by Patroclus' prediction of Hector's death; the recollection here, as he puts on Patroclus' armor, is followed by *Zeus'* prediction of Hector's death.

⁹⁷ It goes without saying that this art is exactly paralleled by Homer's art, that in the *Iliad* he too is weaving the battles fought for Helen's sake, so that Helen and Homer are in effect paying each other compliments; I would not call attention to this, except that I do not find it mentioned in any of the commentators I have consulted on 3.126ff.

Theano, the priestess of Athena, is the wife of Antenor and therefore highly placed in Trojan society. H. L. Lorimer's remarks are worth citing as an example of how an Analyst reading can lead to conclusions different from my own: "She holds her office by appointment of the Trojans, an improbable method in a city governed by a king. No other priestess is mentioned in either *Iliad* or *Odyssey*."⁹⁸ This is one of several places that cause Lorimer to label the Supplication in its present form post-Homeric, an Athenian addition: "There is no justification for the presence of the goddess in the city of which she is a bitter and consistent enemy and where she never again appears" (442). Kirk's reply (on 6.88) is true, if incomplete; he points out that Athena is by nature a city-goddess, that she became hostile only at the Judgment of Paris, that in the Epic cycle she was present in the city in the Palladium, and that in the Troy of the seventh century there was a temple on the acropolis. But this is not likely to be enough to resolve Lorimer's inquietudes about the seeming contradiction within the poem; we need a deeper literary analysis. First, if it is really an "improbable method" for the Trojans to appoint a priestess in a city governed by a king, then that is grist for our mill: Homeric Troy is not governed by a king.⁹⁹ Second, along with the elevation of the Trojans, Homer is universalizing the Olympian gods, and for both reasons Athena must have a temple in Troy.¹⁰⁰ He cannot ignore the myth of Athena's anger, nor is there any particular reason to; the gods have no trouble getting angry with and devastating their own worshipers. Witness the Caledonian boar (9.533-46); witness Apollo's wrath in Book 1. (Apollo is not punishing a people that does not worship him: they have sinned, but when they make compensation, he is satisfied, 1.446, 474, 479; this is an Achaean god, for "O father Zeus, Athena and Apollo" is an Achaean prayer, 2.372, 4.288, 7.132, 16.97; and yet he fights for the Trojans.) Witness countless Delphic responses. Just so, Athena is angry with her people, the Trojans. Paris has elevated the value of erotic love, Aphrodite's sphere, over her own realm—whether we see that as heroism in war, or domestic destiny and the sacredness of the household—and the Trojan nation has

⁹⁸ H. L. Lorimer, *Homer and the Monuments* (London 1950) 442.

⁹⁹ From Archaic times on, the community normally appointed priests; see W. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, tr. J. Raffan (Cambridge [Mass.] 1985) 96.

¹⁰⁰ On the universalizing of the Olympians, cf. W. M. Sale, "Homeric Olympus and its Formulae," *AJP* 105 (1984) 1-28, with references to earlier scholarship.

backed him up. Hence the temple and the priestess are thoroughly appropriate.

Apart from the seer Helenus and the priestess Theano, we also hear of a priest of Hephaestus (Dares, 5.10) and a bird-seer (Eurydamas, 5.149f), both too old to fight, as well as a priest of Scamander (Hypsenor, 5.76–83), and a priest of Idaean Zeus (Laogonos, 16.604). As I read the text, the last two do fight and indeed fall in battle, in which case there are three religious figures, Helenus in addition to these, who fit the pattern of Trojan warriors with civilian occupations.¹⁰¹ But even if this reading is mistaken, we observe a large number of Trojans, six, who are deeply involved in—who are identified with—matters religious, if we may call the Idaean priest a Trojan. (It makes sense, because dwellers on Ida will be Dardanians, cousins of the Trojans, or Zeleians, who *are* Trojans, 2.826). Moreover the temple of Apollo on the Trojan acropolis (5.446, 7.83) is presumably served by a priest, though no priest is mentioned. Religion forms a considerable segment of the Trojan economy.

Not only do aristocratic Trojans engage in civilian occupations, but the city also has specialized artisans who can help them. Paris, we have said, can build a house, and an elaborate one at that, fancy enough for him to dwell in; but he has professional help (6.313ff):

He made it himself (αὐτός with his own hands), together
with
The best craftsmen of the time in the fertile Troad,
Who made him a bedroom, a house and a courtyard.

It is legitimate to consider Paris an amateur—though not to disregard his willingness to work with his hands—but his associates must have been paid professionals. They resemble Phereclus the carpenter, son of a carpenter and (as most read the passage) grandson of a carpenter, who is probably not an aristocrat at all: his father's name is Tecton, his grandfather's Harmon, named after their profession, like Smith and Baxter and Wainwright. If so, he must have been paid.

¹⁰¹ Though it is possible to read the last two passages as identifying the *fathers* of the Trojans who die as the priests. The construction is exactly the same as with Phereclus; I am reading here, as there, the relative pronoun as jumping over the father to the son (see *supra* n.91). Leaf, who takes the Phereclus passage as I do, changes his procedure with 5.149 and 16.604 on the grounds that priests in Homer do not fight. This is not only question-begging, but false, unless we can argue that in a technical sense Helenus is an οἰωνοπόλος (6.76) and seer (7.43–53) but not a priest.

This observation allows us to make the concept of the aristocratic working-man a little more intelligible. The house-builders who helped Paris, the metalsmiths and potters we do not hear about but who must have been there, and Phereclus the ship-builder, are people who sell (in some sense) goods they produce. But we do not imagine that the Trojan princes raised livestock for anyone other than their own households, or that their wives sold the products of their looms. There were, it would seem, gentlemen's and ladies' occupations—animal husbandry and weaving—alongside the tasks performed by an artisan class—house-building, ship-building, metal-working. Some occupations are pursued by both classes: war is fought by Phereclus and by Hector; houses are built by Paris and by house-builders. Again we may compare Odysseus in the *Odyssey*, whose carpentry, and whose archery, are comparable to Paris' house-building and arrow-fighting. (While we have the *Odyssey* open, let not overlook a striking difference between it and the Trojans of the *Iliad*: Odysseus is a farmer who is served by herdsmen, the Trojans are herdsmen who belong to a social class that, we shall see, seems to be served by farmers).

The high birth of the Trojan herdsmen suggests strongly that Homer did not imagine them living, or living solely, inside the walls of Troy-city. Admittedly, in the small Dark Age communities it was not unusual to have people living in the central village and working outlying farms, and indeed Priam has an orchard outside the city (21.36); but the flocks of a shepherd or cowherd require much more land, so that a rural steading and an adjoining dwelling-place seem inevitable. And in the case of Paris we are told in so many words that he had a stable in the countryside: the goddesses, presumably Hera and Athena, were abused by him in his μέσσαιλος, a word used only of a herdsman's steading; and Paris certainly did not keep his herds near his house on the acropolis, at least in peacetime (Cunliffe, *Lexicon s.v. μέσσαιλος*). The stables of Aeneas and Anchises were on Mt Ida, probably in the region called Dardanie (20.216). Their city house will presumably have been in Lyrnessos, not Ilios, for that is where Aeneas ran in flight from the assault of Achilles.

There is one occupation that we hear very little about and would like to have heard more: agrarian farming. We do hear of plowland and orchards, but, unless I have missed a reference, we get no clear indication of who works them (7.421; 20.185, 226f; 21.63 [owned by Priam], 77, 232, 405). Similarly we hear of

plowland and orchards in allied states: Paisos (5.612), wherever that is exactly, and Lycia (12.314). It is tempting to take this paucity of references together with the large number of Trojan herdsmen as suggesting that the economy is to be thought of as primarily pastoral rather than agrarian, but we ought not to yield. Trojan farming may well have been the prerogative of the lower orders. The picture of agriculture on the Shield of Achilles could very well reflect what Homer imagined as the Trojan practice. We have first a large number of plowmen plowing a single field (18.542), then hired farm-hands (ἔριθοι, 18.550) harvesting while a βασιλεύς stands and watches (18.556f), finally grape-bearers and carriers, young men and maidens "with childish feelings" active in a vineyard to the tune of a young singer (18.566f). If Trojan agriculture resembled this, then we can easily understand why no Trojan aristocrat, and probably no Trojan warrior, would be a farm-worker. The harvesters certainly, the plowmen most likely, will not be high enough up the economic scale to be able to supply themselves with arms; and the youthful grape-bearers and carriers in the vineyards seem to be here for the occasion, are probably amateurs, and the men among them probably too young to be on the battlefield. The depiction of the herdsmen at 18.577–86, on the other hand, gives a different impression: there are only four of them, and they are confronted with marauding lions. We cannot, of course, *infer* that these four neatherds, or any one of them, belonged to the upper strata; but the relatively low number, and the risk that their work entails, is certainly *compatible* with our seeing at least one, and perhaps all, of them as being high-born.¹⁰²

We saw above that the Achaean value-system is very closely related to their military economy. The variety of occupations pursued by Trojan warriors argues, in contrast, for pluralism. Heroism, embodied especially in Hector, is certainly appreciated. But the arts of peace are valued highly as well: not just the feminine art of weaving, but the masculine arts of animal husbandry, carpentry, and home-building. If princes of the royal blood elect to pursue a certain calling, then it must, in the eyes of society, be a good thing to do. The contrast between the two brothers, Hector and Paris, reinforces this pluralism. Hec-

¹⁰² To complete the picture of the Trojan occupations, we might add the heralds, κήρυκες, whose duties seem to be the same as the duties of the Achaean heralds. They are performers of tasks that are neither menial nor military (mule-drivers, e.g., at 24.149 *etc.*). They have θεράποντες as well, mostly to be chariot drivers.

tor pursues heroism, and is loved; Paris pursues eros, and is hated. But though the sinner may be hated, the 'sin' is not; half the Elders, let us remember (or half the minds of all the Elders), find it impossible to blame the Trojans for fighting for a woman as beautiful as Helen. Whether these men were bribed or not, they can say publicly that the values that Paris lives for are honorable.

VI. The Trojans and History

Homer's Troy, in sum, is governed formally by a Council of Elders, which includes in its membership the βασιλεύς and his brothers. It has a popular Assembly that meets in a designated place to discover the decisions of the Council; to hear views put forward by members of the Council, by members of their families, and perhaps by other wealthy men whose power challenges the Council; and to express assent or dissent. Its economy is diverse: its leading citizens are expert at weaving, house-building, chariot-making, animal husbandry, and war; it has an artisan class known to be skilled at ship-building, and probably good at metal-working. Its values are pluralistic.

We have reached the point now where we can ask what historical society or societies, if any, the Trojans reflect. We have already mentioned the physical similarities between the Trojans and an eighth-century polis: the city-walls surrounding the large residential areas as well as the acropolis and agora, the temples on the acropolis, and the seated statue in one of them. For the first three of these I shall let Scully speak (*supra* 17f); on seated statues see 98f *infra*. City walls on such a scale are not, of course, confined to the eighth-century, for they are found at Mycenaean Thebes and Gla (the walls at Mycenae and Tiryns have much smaller perimeters); they may have existed in Mycenaean Troy as well, adjunctive to Korfmann's ditch, though he has so far found none (*supra* n.70). For us it is not vastly important whether Troy's long walls existed in the tradition from the beginning or came later; we care only that they may indeed be found in the eighth century, that they are contemporary. The temples on the acropolis, though, seem to be more particular to the eighth century and later; and a seated statue of a god in a temple is certainly an innovation. A peacetime population of 20,000, far too large for the eighth century, may belong to the epic tradition or come from Homer's imagination; and Priam's

palace is much too big for the eighth century and is almost certainly as traditional as his nineteen wives.

On the *principle* of individual subordination to the welfare of the city, the principle of the polis, I shall again defer to Scully. The question for us is whether or not the government and the economy of Troy belong to the eighth century.¹⁰³ Evidence for the existence of a Council of Elders in a Greek state in the eighth century is somewhat scanty; historians ordinarily use the *Iliad* as a source, and we are avoiding this procedure. The Spartan Gerousia appears to go back at least to the early seventh century: the case against the genuineness of the Great Rhetra (which mentions the Gerousia) and against a date this early appears to me weak, and certainly the reference to γέροντες in Tyrtaeus attests the existence of the Gerousia, whatever its powers may have been. Drews in fact pushes the date of the Spartan *eunomia* back to around 750.¹⁰⁴ As the Spartan βασιλεῖς were members of the Gerousia, and Priam a member of the Council, the Spartan constitution gives a useful possible parallel to Troy if Drews' (rather speculative) date is right. Granted, these βασιλεῖς cannot be monarchs, for there are two of them; granted too that they have political power independent of the Gerousia, as Priam does not. Still, the positions are similar. The Spartan kings led armies to war; as we suggested above, Hector may owe his position as general in command of the Troy-city forces to his being the king's son, so the parallel may be reasonably close. Sparta is an *ethnos*, not a polis, and bears little physical resemblance to Troy; but we are not trying to say that Sparta was Homer's precise model, only that it reflects a political form that can be found in the eighth century.

The Areopagus at Athens existed before the time of Solon, who reformed it, but we do not know how long before, nor do we know exactly what its powers were before the Solonic reformation; it may have been merely a homicide court.¹⁰⁵ The earlier governing council may have been the Prytaneum, and this may indeed have been an advisory board for the βασιλεύς

¹⁰³ The following argument would be much easier if we could accept van Wees' seventh-century date for the *Iliad* (*supra* n.10) and claim a seventh-century model for Troy. But quite apart from whether one accepts the evidence for eighth-century composition, it would obviously be most incautious to *wed* the argument to the later date.

¹⁰⁴ R. Drews, "Phoenicians, Carthage and the Spartan Eunomia," *AJP* 100 (1979) 45-58.

¹⁰⁵ R. W. Wallace, *The Areopagus Council* (Baltimore 1989) 3-47.

before the annual archonship began in 682. But we are on very uncertain ground. We have some reason to think that the Council of the Aesymnetae at Megara was in existence in the eighth century, because there is evidence for Aesymnetae at the colony of Megara Hyblaeus, founded in the eighth century.¹⁰⁶ We also have some reason to think that there was a βασιλεύς whose power was overthrown when the Council of the Aesymnetae was established; the word βασιλεύς is used of an eponymous magistrate as early as the beginning of the seventh century (Legon [*supra* n.106] 55). But the relationship between this βασιλεύς and the Council is unknown, and of course an eponymous magistrate is a very different thing from a βασιλεύς. In Crete the law of Dreros in the late seventh century mentions *kosmoi* holding office periodically, and as we know from Aristotle that Cretan cities had Councils of Elders consisting of *ex-kosmoi*, it is reasonable to suppose that Dreros had a Council of Elders in the seventh century. A city in Crete is thought to have been the model for Lycurgus' reforms in Sparta (*i.e.*, for the constitution of the Rhetra); Paula Perlman makes out a very good case for Lyctus as the Cretan city most likely to have been regarded as Sparta's inspiration. Whether it actually was or not does not matter for our purposes, only whether we can trust our sources enough to believe that the Lyctian constitution was in fact the same as the Spartan (which seems very likely) and was at least old enough to make it possible that the Spartans based a seventh-century reform upon it. If it was, and if Aristotle (*Pol.* 1272a3) is right in saying that the Cretan Council of Elders was the same size as the Spartan, we can plausibly put a Council of Thirty Elders in Lyctus in the eighth century.

The most tantalizing information concerns Chios, one of the places mentioned as Homer's birthplace. We hear of a Council there actually called the δημοσίη βολή around 575. Historians have taken this to mean a Council of the People and to imply the existence of another Council, a body of aristocrats, and that may well be.¹⁰⁷ Since in 575 it had fifty members from each tribe and thus probably between 150 and 300 members, it would appear to be too large for a Council of Elders, if that means high-born and/or wealthy men too old to fight. We have seen, how-

¹⁰⁶ See R. P. Legon, *Megara* (Ithaca 1981) 56.

¹⁰⁷ L. H. Jeffrey, "The Courts of Justice in Archaic Chios," *BSA* 51 (1956) 166; J. H. Oliver, "Text of the So-called Constitution of Chios," *AJP* 80 (1959) 296-301.

ever, that the prefix δημο- need not mean 'popular' in Homer—or at least not 'popular as opposed to aristocratic'—as the term δημογέρων is used of βασιλεύς Ilus as well as the royal and aristocratic members of the Trojan Council. It is at least theoretically possible that a person who served on a δημοσίη βολή would be called a δημογέρων. And there is no reason why the Chian Council could not have been enlarged in the course of time, and have been a small group of aristocrats once. Of course we cannot show that this Council was in existence in the eighth century. And even if we take it to be a popular council and assume the existence of another, aristocratic council, we cannot safely push the latter back to the eighth century—we simply do not know enough.

Chios in 575 also possessed βασιλεῖς, who appear to have been magistrates with specific duties; it is not clear whether any of them were on the Council. We hear of a King Hector on Chios, but he seems to have belonged to the same generation as Codrus' sons, traditional leaders of the Ionian migration; he falls six generations after Theseus (Drews [*supra* n.46] 22). If he existed, he was already ruling on Chios when the various Codrids (if they existed) came to Ionia, some 200 years before the eighth century opened. During those years, Chios no doubt went through changes of government that we cannot trace. We know of a (probably) seventh-century βασιλεύς named Hippoclus who was almost certainly not a monarch and who might well have been one of a number of such as those referred to on the inscription of 575, as Drews suggests. A building on the acropolis of Emporio can plausibly be called the house of a βασιλεύς, if we may take the term to refer to a leader of a relatively small local community. But none of this gives a satisfactory model for Priam as βασιλεύς and δημογέρων because it does not point to established royalty.

There are other βουλαί and colleges of βασιλεῖς, but none that I know will give more precise potential models for Homeric Troy than these. As for Assemblies: we know of early ones at Sparta and Lyctus, accompanying the Councils already mentioned. The Chian inscription refers to the 'demos assembled'. That there was an Assembly at Athens in the time of Solon seems reasonably clear, however much scholars may dispute the extent of Solon's political reforms.¹⁰⁸ Pursuit of the

¹⁰⁸ Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 7.3) says that Solon limited the rôle of the Thetes to the Ecclesia and Dicasteria, and (*Pol.* 1274a16ff, 1281b32–35) assigned election and audit of the rulers to the demos, processes that can only have occurred in

actual evidence here (which is slightly less than one would wish) is probably not necessary, because most historians, reasonably enough, assume that popular Assemblies existed when poleis began to form. Even if they had no power at all, there had to be a way in an oral culture for the populace to be informed; and it was surely helpful for the rulers, in turn, to be informed about the feelings of the people they ruled.¹⁰⁹

We have therefore seen enough to make it probable that when Homer talked about a Trojan Council of Elders, consisting largely of aristocrats, governing a city together with a weak βασιλευς and an Assembly, he was referring to institutions familiar to his audience in their own experience, even if they knew of no one polis that matched Troy point for point. Turning to the economy of the eighth century, we go, in part, to a different source, the similes. These are necessarily drawn from, or could have been drawn from, the world contemporary with Homer. It is in the nature of a Homeric simile to use the generalizing present or aorist tenses, usually with the particle τε, to add meaning to the narrative set in the distant past, the long-ago time when men threw rocks that we could barely lift. Some of the similes are no doubt traditional, and may even be quite old. But I do not think that any of them could refer to events or situations that could not be found in the poem's present; they function to bridge a gap between our time and the age of the heroes, between a world mostly at peace and a world at war. Naturally we shall also employ archaeological evidence to reinforce what the similes tell us.

a formal Assembly. For the dispute over the actual power, and a sensible defense of Aristotle's testimony here, see Wallace (*supra* n.105) 53ff with notes.

¹⁰⁹ I have refrained from calling attention to states governed in the eighth century by one aristocratic family that ruled as a family (e.g. Corinth, Lesbos), because the Priamids of Troy, though certainly very powerful, are not the only source of δημογέροντες. The Antenorids are also powerful, and Antenor is on the Council. Even states governed by more than one such family (e.g. Athens, Sparta) may not be precisely parallel, since there is a good chance that Homer thought of Antimachus as a δημογέρων, and we do not know whether he was aristocratic or just wealthy. Moreover, we have no reason to regard Phereclus as of lower political status than any other Trojan warrior, though he comes from an artisan family. Still, the impression we have is that power is largely in the hands of aristocrats and indeed that the Priamids dominate. These are not quite comparable to the Bacchiads, but they dominate more than do any one of the Eupatrids, Eteobutads, Alcmeonids, Eumolpids, or other Athenian clans. On the existence of an Athenian clan named Εὐπατρίδαι see the persuasive discussion of F. Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford 1949) 263 n.156.

The commonest source of similes in the *Iliad* is the world of the herdsman. A rough count gives over thirty-five of these, including similes drawing upon the lion-hunt (e.g. 5.476, 12.41-48, 17.133-36, 20.164-73), which is undertaken to protect the herds; without the lion-hunt, there are about thirty-two pastoral similes (e.g. 2.469-75, 478-83; 3.11, etc.). The life of the herdsman is presented as difficult and dangerous, a constant battle against predators; the herdsman-hunter is a domestic hero, and, though the class status of a herdsman is never given, it would not be surprising if it were high. There are over twenty similes that pertain to agrarian farming, counting the hunting similes that include the boar (e.g. 11.292f [boar or lion], 11.413-18 [boar]), who is threatening the orchards and grain (as well as providing edible meat); without the boar hunt I have counted twelve farming similes (2.147f; 5.87-92, 499-502; 10.5-8, etc.). The preponderance of pastoral similes arises partly because the lion descending on the herd gives a more precise parallel to events in battle than a boar ravaging an orchard, and a boar is normally not a threat to standing livestock. Still, we should note that this imbalance also matches the preference of Trojan aristocrats for the pastoral life, and the virtual absence of any mention of Trojan agrarian farming even though we are reminded often enough of their having plowland and orchards. It would certainly make sense to imagine that Homer's audience included a number of aristocratic herdsman who could readily respond to similes relating the perils of their lives to the risks run by heroes of old—particularly if some of those old heroes were also herdsman, and if they were on occasion warriors. For we must not forget that the Trojan aristocratic herdsman is a fact of the *Iliad*, not a conjecture; the conjecture resides only in the hypothesis that they were drawn from real life, from the everyday world of the eighth century. As for the Trojan agrarian farmer, who is not a fact of the *Iliad*, we and Homer's early audience have the *Shield*, where the multitudes plow and the βασιλεύς looks on, to explain the poet's silence.

Archaeology can affirm that animal husbandry and agrarian farming were certainly practiced in the eighth century. Snodgrass, following Thalia Howe in part, has offered the theory that the Mycenaean Greeks had large amounts of meat in their diets, that this remained the practice in the early Dark Ages, but that with the Geometric period came a shift to a more vegetarian

diet, with grain replacing meat.¹¹⁰ This theory almost cries out for another theory: the *Iliad*, with its upper-class Trojan herdsmen, is no doubt earlier than the *Odyssey*, where Odysseus the experienced agrarian farmer is served by herdsmen-slaves, and this progression imitates history. This could be true, but even Snodgrass' theory is not proven, and has been criticized—not decisively, in my opinion—by Coldstream.¹¹¹ Moreover, we have seen good reason why Homer might have conceived Troy as highly agrarian without mentioning the fact; the farmers may belong to the lower orders, men too poor to provide armor for themselves. If we argue a progression, we apparently have to speak not only of a shift from animal husbandry to agrarian farming, but also of a class-shift: the farmer has risen in the social scale, the herdsman has fallen. But the situation in the *Odyssey* is sufficiently topsy-turvy to block convincing analysis: Eumaeus is a king's son, and is called ὄρχαμος ἀνδρῶν, an epithet also used for Philoetius; Philoetius was in a position to take his flocks to someone else had he chosen to (*Od.* 20.218–23); both distinguish themselves in the fighting against the Suitors. There is much material here for literary interpretation, but historical inference is risky. We are able to say that the archaeological evidence reveals that animal husbandry was certainly practiced in the eighth century; but as far as I can see it does not reveal whether or not aristocrats practiced it.

The *Iliad* also includes similes from hunting such food-animals as boar, stag, and goat (e.g. 3.23–26 [stag or goat], 12.146–50 [boars], 15.579ff [fawn], 22.189–22 [deer]). This reminds us of the career of the Trojan Scamandrius, who could kill all manner of wild beasts (5.50ff). There are hunting scenes on Late Geometric objects; some are orientalizing, but others seem local in inspiration (Coldstream 198).

The similes also include chariot-making (4.482–87), the activity practiced by Lycaon (21.380). Chariots were especially used in burial in the eighth century: see Coldstream 350; Snodgrass (*supra* n.12) 433. Ship-building occurs in at least six similes (3.60–63, 13.389ff, 15.410ff, 16.482ff, 17.742–45, 18.161f), reminding us of the Trojan Phereclus (or his father) at 5.59–63. I do not know how to point to real artisans who are counterparts to Phereclus,

¹¹⁰ Snodgrass (*supra* n.11) 378ff; T. P. Howe, "Linear B and Hesiod's Bread-winners," *TAPA* 89 (1958) 44–65.

¹¹¹ J. N. COLDSTREAM, *Geometric Greece* (New York 1977: hereafter 'Coldstream') 314.

but they must have existed, because there are plenty of pictures of ships, and because the eighth century had to have ships for trading and colonization. As Chios is one of the places named as Homer's birthplace, it is interesting to note eighth-century exports of wine from Chios attested at Old Smyrna. Homer speaks of the wine of Maron, *i.e.*, Maroneia, an early colony of Chios in Thrace (*Od.* 9.196ff; Thracian wine is mentioned also at *Il.* 9.71f).¹¹² The Chians therefore had ships, and shipbuilding (as well as vineyards). Seafaring occurs in at least three similes (7.4–7, 15.624ff, 19.375–78), reminding us of Paris' voyage. Homebuilding is mentioned by one simile (16.212–23), recalling Paris and his assistants (6.314ff). That the eighth century had housebuilders goes without saying, since they had houses; but whether individuals built their own houses and hired professional assistance is not clear from any evidence I have seen. A βασιλεύς is mentioned in a simile, a man who owns a horse and will receive a purple-stained ivory cheek-piece; the dyeing is done by a Carian or Maeonian woman, suggesting that the βασιλεύς lives in southern Asia Minor and therefore near Homer (4.141–45).

Finally, though almost all the similes draw upon a world at peace, two of them mention war on a city (18.207–13, 219f). These do not say anything about the occupations of the warriors, so we turn to other evidence, and here we encounter a difficult problem of dating. The citizen warrior of the polis, with his civilian occupation is an obvious model for the civilian occupations of Trojan warriors. And this model was clearly in place by the beginning of the seventh century, the time of the so-called hoplite revolution, when warfare was conducted in massed infantry formations requiring a relatively large percentage of the citizen body. Archaeologists are not in agreement as to whether such formations came into being in the seventh century, or had long existed. Snodgrass, among many others, argues for the beginning of the seventh century; Morris puts it much earlier, saying that "as far back as it can be traced Greek warfare always relied on massed formations of infantry."¹¹³ If

¹¹² See C. Roebuck, "Chios in the sixth century B.C.," in J. Boardman and C. E. Vaphopoulou-Richardson, edd., *Chios* (Oxford 1986) 81–86.

¹¹³ A. M. Snodgrass, *Arms and Armour of the Greeks* (Ithaca 1967) 45–49; Morris (*supra* n.14) 25. Morris derives much of the support for his position from J. Latacz, *Kampfsparanäse, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit in der Ilias, Kallinos und Tyrtaios* (Munich 1977) and W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, Part IV (Berkeley 1985). Some important criticism of Latacz and

Morris is right, and we can imagine a large percentage of the population of Old Smyrna, say, fighting in massed formation, aristocrats and wealthier artisans side by side, the resemblance to Troy is clear. Snodgrass (*supra* n.12: 415f) paints a convincing picture of the community of Old Smyrna cooperating in building the fortification walls and the houses, and leading in the development of the polis; we add to this their fighting side-by-side. We would like to imagine this, because we have conceived of a large percentage of the Trojan population engaged in battle; to suppose a Trojan army of 5,000 as a small proportion of a huge population, 50,000 or more, most of them engaged in non-military activity, feels wrong.

But it may not be wrong; and it may also be true that eighth-century warfare was more haphazardly fought, with a relatively small percentage of the population. Still, it was surely true that the warriors were mostly the wealthy landowners. And it seems improbable that these warriors formed a class that was otherwise unoccupied: such a social organization in a settled community requires more wealth and power than most cities of the eighth century appear to possess. Wealthier landowners will of course have had people working for them, but they will have been *occupied* with their farms or pastures even if they did not actually plow or tend the herds.

Most of the Trojan religious institutions are replicated in the polis, though the dates are not always easy to establish, and the similes are of no help on this point. The cult of Athena Polias, with its priestess and seated statue on the acropolis of Athens, probably goes back to the eighth century;¹¹⁴ an offering of a *peplos* to the statue dates to at least 566/565, when the Greater Panathenaia was established, and may well be much older;¹¹⁵ the temple is mentioned by Homer at 2.549. The seated Athena at Lindos probably belongs to the eighth century, as Lorimer, who

Pritchett is offered by van Wees, (*supra* n.10). See also A. M. SNODGRASS, *Archaic Greece* (Berkeley 1980: hereafter 'Snodgrass, AG') 100-07.

¹¹⁴ Kirk on 6.90ff (p.168); D. D. Feaver, "The Priesthoods of Athens," *YCS* 15 (1957) 132; see also Burkert (*supra* n.99) 90; J Herington, *Athena Parthenos and Athena Polias* (Manchester 1955) 22; H. W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (Ithaca 1977) 17.

¹¹⁵ See W. Burkert, *Homo Necans*, tr. P. Bing (Berkeley 1983) 156 n.92; Parke (*supra* n.114) 33. L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Hildesheim 1966) 30, denies that the handing over of the *peplos* was older than the institution of the Greater Panathenaia.

would not wish it so, admits (*supra* n.95: 144). The seated Hera of Tiryns, later housed in the Argive Heraeum, was served by a priestess at least as early as the seventh century, and probably earlier (Lorimer 114). Pausanias (2.17.5f) says that this was one of the oldest images in existence, presumably because of its extremely primitive appearance; he “has a real feeling for early Greek art” (Herington [*supra* n.114] 17), and his testimony makes an eighth-century date not unlikely. A *peplos* was offered to the seated statues of Hera at Olympia and at Argos; we do not know the founding dates for these festivals, though they easily could be very ancient.¹¹⁶ The standing Apollo at Amyclae also received a *peplos* (Paus. 3.16.2, 19.2).

A priest of Hephaestus is attested in Lemnos: the date is very late, but the priesthood may well be as old as the city of Hephaestia and go back to pre-Greek times. There were priests, or at least *ἱεροποιοί*, of Hephaestus at Athens in the fifth century, but the date of his introduction to Athens is not known (Deubner [*supra* n.115] 212f). He is virtually neglected elsewhere on the mainland, and though his worship must have been widespread in Asia Minor and the eastern islands, it was mostly confined to private cult, and therefore lacked priests. I can find no trace of a polis with a cult of Hephaestus in the Archaic period, and it seems most probable that Homer knew of the worship of Hephaestus from the pre-Greek inhabitants of Lemnos, his *Sinties* (*Il.* 1.594). Apollo is another matter: he has a temple in Eretria just after 750, another in Corinth around 700, another (probably Apollo’s) at Dreros 725–700, and perhaps one in Thermon.¹¹⁷

Religion as an economic activity was certainly prominent in the Archaic period (Snodgrass, *AG* 131). It was becoming so earlier; in the words of Coldstream (317):

As prosperity gradually returned to the Greek world, the gods received an increasingly generous share of its fruits. During the ninth century, hardly more than a dozen sanctuaries had been receiving votive offerings, and at none of

¹¹⁶ See J. V. O’Brien, *The Transformation of Hera* (Lanham [Md.] 1993) 137, 143, 232; Burkert (*supra* n.115) 161f. Speculations on the origin of the Athenian rite are recorded by Stanley (*supra* n.86) 416f; they seem inconclusive, but testify to a general scholarly tendency to attribute high antiquity to the practice.

¹¹⁷ For Thermon see Snodgrass (*supra* n.11) 409, and the reports of I. A. Papapostolou’s excavations in Τὸ Ἐργοντῆς Ἀρχ. Ἐταιρείας (Athens 1992) 41–52, (1993) 44ff.

these places can we be sure that the resident deity was honoured with a temple. By 700 B.C. we know of at least 70 places of worship all over the Greek world, of which nearly half already possessed temples.

This corresponds well with the amount of religious activity we have noted among the Trojans: the two temples on the acropolis, one with a named priestess and the other assumed to have at least one priest; the five other religious figures: priests of Zeus, Hephaestus, and Scamander, and two prophets.

It is a commonplace that the eighth century was a time of vigorous commerce, though Snodgrass warns us (*AG* 136) not to exaggerate its importance even in Archaic Greece. To the aristocrat Paris as trader, and to nameless traders who amassed Troy's fortune in times of peace, we may compare such men as Demaratus of Corinth (*Polyb.* 6.11a.10) and Colaeus of Samos (*Hdt.* 4.152.1). They belong to the seventh century, but they probably had counterparts in the eighth; the Corinthians at that time were so active in commerce that it is unthinkable that the Bacchiads should not have been profiting from it.¹¹⁸ To find an exact parallel to the *πέπλοι* that Paris brought from Sidon can hardly be our portion, since they are perishable; and eastern Greeks—more likely as models for Homer—were less in touch with the Levant than the others. Still, Lindos and the Heraeum at Samos are rich in North Syrian ivories and bronzes, some of which belong to the eighth century. Where there is trade, there are ships, and ships must be built by someone.

There is a good deal more evidence from the eighth century that we could sift through, but this should be enough to show that Homer's Troy owed a great deal to that century, both politically and economically, and especially to the emergent polis. By the same token, the Achaeans do not seem contemporary. Not only are their form of government and their economy different from that of the polis, but they retain an epic distance; their culture is out of the heroic past. As individuals, to be sure, they are recognizably human, though it is legitimate to wonder how many members of Homer's audience could have felt the immediacy of Achilles' wrestling with the heroic code in Book 9. Indeed in Books 20–21 Achilles transcends humanity altogether, becoming more than ourselves, and also, in his brutality, less (at least than we like to think); it is the Trojan βασιλεύς in Book 24 who makes him human again. No Trojan, least of all Hector,

¹¹⁸ Coldstream 187f with references to Strabo.

achieves Achilles' remoteness. Naturally, as Homer wants the city to seem human, to seem familiar, so that this audience can sympathize with it: politically and economically it resembles cities it knew.

Not merely familiar; a rusty lawnmower and a worn doormat are familiar. By putting shrines and temples and a statue of Zeus, Apollo, and Athena on the Trojan acropolis, Homer is showing his audience something familiar, but also majestic. Majestic not merely because no acropolis he knew can have been quite so grand as this, but because these are the gods the Achaeans worship and that the audience worships, the universal gods, God; a majestic familiarity. Priam is a not very powerful βασιλεύς, a frustrated and (as he pleads with Hector) pitiable human being, a thing familiar to us; but he conquers Achilles out of his love for Hector, and this elevates him to the level of a universal gentle father. The picture of Helen weaving is a common enough domestic sight, but her extraordinary subject matter, and her extraordinary ability to weave it into the loom, raise domesticity to the height of creative genius. The ability of Astyanax and Andromache to soften Hector so that he can speak kindly of his brother and entertain hope for his city (6.521–29), though earlier he was abusive (3.39–57) and dwelt at cruel length on impending disaster for his wife (6.447–65)—this too is creative genius in a domestic setting.

There are, of course, some real differences between Troy and the eighth century. Its population, and the area enclosed within the walls, is greater than that boasted by any eighth-century polis. It—or at least Priam—is richer, and the size of Priam's palace far exceeds that of any dwelling the audience was likely to be familiar with. No polis could match the two temples on the acropolis. But after all, the tragic hero, though not unlike ourselves, should be someone more elevated, more splendid, and it is altogether fitting that Troy should be grander than the cities known to the audience.

We said at the outset (*supra* 12) that one reason why the interpretation of Troy set out in this paper had gone unobserved, or at least unstated, before, was that scholars had neglected the *intellectual* force of the creation of the polis. This is a structure that the mind must create, whatever social forces it may be accommodating as it does so. Even as a physical entity, Old Smyrna is a product of new thought: its citizens collectively created a new thing, a city. The result is that the mind is now aware of the difference between the city, the polis, and what came before it.

Homer was the first, or in the first generation, of the poets who were in a position to appreciate this difference. It was this that enabled him to see heroic society as a structure capable of flaws. This does not mean that in depicting Troy Homer was guilty of anachronism. He may very well have supposed that the city of Troy in olden times was much as he describes it, and that the recent creation of the city and the polis was a re-creation. He could have said to himself, "My predecessors saw Troy as Menelaus sees it [at 13.620–39] because they stayed outside the walls. If we go inside it, we shall find it immensely wealthy—for the wealth of Priam is legendary. We shall find a large population—for there had to be enough people to hold off an army of 63,000 for ten years. Troy must have been a *city*, not an overgrown village, or a place surrounded by a few houses and fields. A city is a city; and though Troy was larger and more magnificent than Old Smyrna and the other cities around us, it must have been essentially the same."¹¹⁹

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¹¹⁹ Many people over the years have helped to mould this paper, and I hope not to seem ungrateful to the others if I single out just a few here: John Lenz (Drew), Ann Perkins (Webster), James Redfield (Chicago), Nancy Symeonoglou (Washington/St Louis), and Keith Stanley (Duke).