

Some Passages in Polyaeus *Stratagem*s concerning Alexander

N. G. L. Hammond

IN THIS ARTICLE I am concerned with the historical worth of some passages in Polyaeus concerning Alexander, and therefore with the sources from which these derive, whether directly or through an intermediary.¹ It should be noted that Alexander's stratagem)s were of greater importance to Polyaeus than any others, for the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, to whom Polyaeus dedicated his work, were about to campaign against the Parthians in the very parts of Asia where Alexander and his Macedonians had defeated the Persians; and they would be able to learn from the prowess of Polyaeus' ancestors and from their ability to defeat

¹ I use the standard English version of the title. It is uncertain whether the Greek title was Στρατηγήματα, implied in Polyaeus' prefaces, or Στρατηγικά, as in some codices, summarised in the Teubner edition of I. Melber (n.1; cf. Krentz/Wheeler 4), whose Greek text I cite here. The following abbreviations are used: AG=N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman*³ (Bristol 1989); Arr.=Arrian *Anabasis Alexandri* (Teubner ed. by G. Roos, 1967); ATKINSON=J. E. Atkinson, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 3 and 4* (Amsterdam 1980); BOSWORTH C=A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander I-II* (Oxford 1980-95); BOSWORTH, *Conquest*=idem, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1988); BURASELIS=K. Buraselis, "The Roman World of Polyainos. Aspects of a Macedonian Career between Classical Past and Provincial Present," *APXAIΟΓΝΩΣΙΑ* 8 (1993-94) 121-40; DEVINE 1986=A. M. Devine, "The Battle of Gaugamela: A Tactical and Source-Critical Study," *AncW* 13 (1986) 87-116; DEVINE 1987=A. M. Devine, "The Battle of the Hydaspes: A Tactical and Source-Critical Study," *AncW* 16 (1987) 91-113; HAMILTON=J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary* (Oxford 1969); KRENTZ and WHEELER=P. Krentz and E. L. Wheeler, *Polyaeus, Stratagem)s of War I-II* (Chicago 1994); PA=Plutarch, *Life of Alexander* (after the Loeb edition); SOURCES=N. G. L. Hammond, *Sources for Alexander the Great: An Analysis of Plutarch's Life and Arrian's Anabasis Alexandrou* (Cambridge 1993); TARN=W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great II* (Cambridge 1948); THA=N. G. L. Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander the Great: The So-Called Vulgate Authors, Diodorus, Justin and Curtius* (Cambridge 1983).

the Persians (4 *praef.*, τὰς ἀρετὰς τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων; 1 *praef.*, τὸ κρατεῖν Περσῶν πολεμούντων δύνασθαι). We may therefore be confident that Polyaeus took special pains to understand and present Alexander's stratagems to the emperors.² For our part many ancient accounts of Alexander have survived, and we are therefore better able to study the methods of Polyaeus in *Strat.* 4.3 than elsewhere in his work. In Part I an attempt is made to identify Polyaeus' sources for each stratagem, and in Part II my conclusions are summarised and then compared with the conclusions of other scholars.

I. The Sources of Some Stratagems

4.3.27. Alexander defeated Darius at Arbela. Phrasaortes, a relative of Darius, with a large Persian force was guarding the Susian Gates; and they are indeed narrow, high mountains. The Macedonian attack on them was easily repelled by the barbarians, who shot at them with slings, arrows, and rocks, so that Alexander recalled them and at a distance of thirty stades [*ca* 6 km.] was making the palisade [of his camp]. There was an oracle of Apollo that an alien wolf [*Lykos*] would indeed become his guide on the road against the Persians. There came in fact to Alexander a herdsman wearing a wild beast's skin, admitting that he was a Lycian [*Lykios*], and [saying] that there was a path round the mountains, a path concealed by the dense canopy of the forest, and known to him alone because he pastured his cattle. Recalling the prophecy, Alexander trusted the herdsman. Indeed he ordered the entire army to stay in camp and kindle many fires, attracting the eyes of the Persians.³ But he issued a secret order to Philotas and Hephaestion, to the effect that whenever they should see the Macedonians appear on the top of the mountains they should attack from below, and he himself leading the Hypaspists, one brigade [phalanx] of heavy infantry, and all the Scythian archery along the slight pathway advanced eighty stades [*ca* 16 km.] and camped where he was covered by a close-set forest. And going round during the midnight hour he came upon the enemy asleep; and at daybreak the trumpets were sounding the signal from the top of the mountains. Hephaestion and Philotas began to lead forward their Macedonians from the palisade. The Persians were caught between the

² At 5 *praef.* Polyaeus indicates that the emperors were reading his work.

³ The contrast between this order and the secret order that follows was part of Alexander's deception, for the order to "the entire army" to stay in camp, if leaked to the enemy, would mislead him, even as the many fires were intended to do. One may compare similar deceptions: Arr. 5.10.1, 11.2 *fin.*

troops from above and the troops from below. Some were killed, some flung themselves over the cliffs, and some were taken alive.⁴

For Alexander's attack on the Persians at the Susian Gates, Polyaeus could have read the accounts of Diodorus, Plutarch, Curtius, and Arrian. If he did so, he could have derived the oracle of Apollo about a Lycian from PA 37.1f and/or Curt. 5.4.4, but not from Diod. 17.68.5, who described the Lycian but did not mention an oracle, nor from Arrian, who did not include either the Lycian or the oracle in his narrative. Even as regards Plutarch and Curtius it is probable that the resemblances in the matter of the oracle between them and Polyaeus were due to a common source.

Polyaeus chose not to follow the account of Arrian, for he named different officers: the Persian Phrasaortes and Hephaestion and Philotas in charge of the base camp, whereas Arrian had named Ariobarzanes and Craterus (3.18.2, 4, with Philotas accompanying Alexander for part of the circuitous route).⁵ Plutarch had nothing to offer except the oracle (PA 37.1f), and Diodorus was much briefer than Curtius, with whom he had some points in common (*THA* 131). We turn therefore to a

⁴ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Ἀρβήλοις Δαρείου ἐνίκησεν. Φρασαόρτης, Δαρείου συγγενῆς, πολλὴν χεῖρα Περσικὴν ἔχων ἐφύλασσε τὰς Σουσιῶν πύλας· αἱ δὲ ἄρα εἰσὶν ὄρη στενὰ καὶ ὑψηλά. τούτοις προσβάλλοντας τοὺς Μακεδόνας εὐκόλως ἀπεκρούοντο οἱ βάρβαροι σφενδόνας, βέλη, πέτρους ἀφιέντες· ὥστε ἀνακαλέσας αὐτοὺς Ἀλέξανδρος ἀπὸ τριάκοντα σταδίων χάρακα ἐβάλλετο· ἦν δὲ λόγιον Ἀπόλλωνος, ὡς ἄρα ξένος λύκος ἡγεμὼν αὐτῷ τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς κατὰ Περσῶν γένοιτο. πρόσεισι δὴ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βουκόλος θηρείαν ἔχων στολὴν, ὁμολογῶν ὅτι Λύκιος ἦν, καὶ ὡς κύκλῳ τῶν ὀρῶν ἀτραπὸς εἶη τῷ συνηρεφεῖ τῆς ὕλης ἀποκεκρυμμένη, αὐτῷ δὲ μόνῳ γινώσκοντο διὰ τὴν νομὴν τῶν βοῶν. ἀναμνησθεὶς Ἀλέξανδρος τοῦ μαντείου πιστεύει τῷ βουκόλῳ. τὴν μὲν δὴ πᾶσαν στρατιὰν ἐκέλευσεν ἐν στρατοπέδῳ μένειν καὶ πολλὰ πυρὰ ἀνακαίειν, ἐφελκομένους τὴν τῶν Περσῶν ὄσιν. Φιλῶτα δὲ καὶ Ἡφαιστῖωνι παραγγέλμα δούς ἀπόρρητον, ὅποταν κατὰ κορυφῆς τῶν ὀρῶν ἴδωσι τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐκφανέντας, αὐτοὺς κάτωθεν προσβάλλειν, αὐτὸς τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς ἄγων καὶ μίαν ὀπιτῶν φάλαγγα καὶ τὸ Σκυθικὸν τοξικὸν ὄσον ἦν διὰ τῆς ἀτραποῦ τῆς λεπτῆς ὀδοῆκοντα στάδια προελθὼν ἠύλισατο πυκαζόμενος ὕλη δασυτάτη. μέσης δὲ νυκτὸς περιελθὼν ἐπέστη τοῖς πολεμίοις καθεύδουσιν· ἀρχομένης δὲ ἡμέρας αἱ σάλπιγγες ἐσήμαινον ἀπὸ τῆς κορυφῆς τῶν ὀρῶν· Ἡφαιστῖων δὲ καὶ Φιλῶτας τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος Μακεδόνας προσῆγον· οἱ Πέρσαι μέσοι τῶν ἄνωθεν πολεμίων καὶ τῶν κάτωθεν ἀποληφθέντες οἱ μὲν ἐκτείνοντο, οἱ δὲ κατεκρημνίζοντο, οἱ δὲ ἐζωγρεύοντο.

⁵ The Ptolemy at Arr. 3.18.9 is probably Ptolemy, son of Lagus (so Bosworth, C I 328f, to which add that Ptolemy, son of Lagus, had just been mentioned at 3.17.6). If that is so, he will have known the names of the Persian commander and of the other officers in the operation.

comparison of Curtius and Polyaeus. The following points are in common: "Susian Gates" (C. 5.3.17), Persian slingers (5.3.19), a withdrawal of thirty stades (5.3.23), the oracle (5.4.11), many fires at night to deceive the enemy (5.4.14), dense foliage *en route* (5.4.24f), and the arrival of Alexander at a high peak at dawn (5.4.27). These points are sufficient to indicate that Polyaeus drew this part of his account from Curtius.⁶ Who was Curtius' source? The probable answer is Cleitarchus, who, writing for a Greek audience, may well have introduced the oracle of Apollo, which was clearly an invention *post eventum*.⁷

In other matters, however, Polyaeus differed from Curtius. Thus Polyaeus gave different names for the officers. He described the turning movement by Alexander as lasting a day and a night, whereas Curtius extends it over a night, a day, and a night (5.4.17, 19, 22, 26).⁸ He reported that Alexander came upon the enemy at midnight, whereas Curtius had Alexander reach the summit at dawn unopposed and then see the enemy's position (5.4.26f). Polyaeus had the base camp alerted to Alexander's arrival on the summit by trumpet blasts, whereas Curtius said that the shouting reached the camp (5.4.29).⁹ We conclude, then, that Polyaeus followed Curtius, using Cleitarchus, for some parts only. Whom, then, did Polyaeus follow for the other parts?

The derivation of Arrian's account now becomes relevant. He named Ptolemy as holding the minor command during the turning movement, and the inference is that Arrian was following Ptolemy, who had mentioned his own participation (see

⁶ See *Sources* 70, where I argue that Cleitarchus was the source for the oracle.

⁷ So Hamilton 97, agreeing with H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* (Oxford 1956) I 241, and W. Heckel, "Alexander at the Persian Gates," *Athenaeum* 58 (1980) 171.

⁸ Bosworth, *Conquest* 91 ("probably over two nights"), follows Curtius. But the distances are such that a day and a night are likely to be correct, for the Persian position and the Macedonian base camp were only thirty stades (some 6 km.) apart. That distance suits the geographical identification of A. Stein, *Old Routes of Western Iran* (London 1940) 25. Diodorus (17.68.6), like Arrian, mentions only one night. For my account of the whole operation see AG 167f with Fig. 15 inset and n.105.

⁹ As the two positions were some 6 km. apart, it is impossible that the Macedonians could have seen their compatriots or heard their shouts. Arrian's account is to be preferred with Alexander attacking during the darkness before dawn and giving the signal to those in the base camp by trumpet-call (3.18.7).

supra n.5). It was characteristic of Arrian to prefer the account of a participant. The features of Polyaeus' account not found in Curtius and Arrian are as follows. Polyaeus used *φάλαγξ* for a brigade of heavy infantry and *χάραξ* for an encampment. These words came from a source conversant with Macedonian terminology.¹⁰ Then the defeat of Alexander at the Susian Gates was minimised, and a smaller force was given to Alexander by Polyaeus than by Arrian (the hypaspists, one phalanx of infantry, and all the Scythian archers in Polyaeus, as compared with Arrian's force, which added the Agrinians, the Royal Squadron of Companion Cavalry, and a tetrarchy of cavalry). The probability is that Polyaeus was following Aristobulus for these features.

To summarise, Polyaeus probably took his account in part from Curtius (who had drawn on Cleitarchus) and in part from Aristobulus. The merit of Polyaeus' account is that it is clear, relatively concise, and at several points corrective of the sensational and sometimes clearly false narrative of Curt. 5.3.17–4.33.

4.3.22. In the battle against Porus, Alexander drew up the cavalry on his right wing so that half of it faced the enemy and the rest was at an angle, while he placed the phalanx and the light-armed [infantry] on the left wing and from them at an angle a force [of cavalry]. Porus formed a line of many elephants opposite [the Macedonians] and he himself was on the left, riding the leading elephant. He placed the other elephants at intervals of fifty feet as far as the right wing. The spaces between the elephants he filled up with infantry, so that the formation resembled a great wall, the elephants being like towers and the infantry like curtain walls between the towers. This was indeed the position when Alexander gave the order to lead the infantry against the enemy, and himself drove the cavalry more impetuously rightwards, his aim being to outflank those opposite. Guarding against this, Porus led [the infantry] against him, but because the beasts could not keep up he was breaking his formation at many points. With the Macedonians

¹⁰ The same usage appears in Arr. 1.14.2f; 5.20.3, 21.5. At 3.9.6 *τάξις* refers presumably to a hypaspist brigade, and *φάλαγξ* to a pikemen brigade. These passages in Arrian were derived from Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus (Arr. 1 *praef.*). Bosworth argues (*HSCP* 81 [1977]; C I 118) that Ptolemy wrote *τάξις* and Aristobulus *φάλαγξ*. But it is most unlikely that officers in Alexander's army used different terms; further, if the Macedonian term was *φάλαγξ*, then we should expect Ptolemy as a Macedonian to have used it and Aristobulus as a Greek to have used *τάξις*. I suggest that Arrian wrote *τάξις* as the normal term of his day, but that he occasionally reproduced *φάλαγξ* from his source (Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus).

charging into the gaps he was compelled to turn and fight face to face. Meanwhile the cavalrymen with Alexander were first in their encircling movement, and driving the Indians together from behind won a most complete victory, which made Alexander king of Indian territory.¹¹

It is necessary to add a note about my translation in response to A. M. Devine (1987). We agree well enough on the translation of the end of the first sentence, where Devine writes “and adjacent to these he posted [another] ‘angled formation’ (ἐπικάμπιος).” Where we differ is that he assumed that this “angled formation” consisted not of cavalry but of infantry. If this were so, Alexander’s left wing would have been exposed to attack by Porus’ cavalry, whereas in other set battles Alexander had protected the left flank of the phalanx with cavalry as well as with light-armed infantry. Polyaeus will have read the accounts of the battle order in Curt. 8.14.15¹² and Arr. 5.16.3, in which Alex-

¹¹ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Πῶρον μάχῃ τὸ μὲν ἱπικὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιῦ κέρως ἔταξεν ἐν μετώπῳ τὸ ἥμισυ, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν ἐπικαμπίῳ, τὴν δὲ φάλαγγα καὶ τοὺς ἐλαφροὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ κέρως ἔστησε καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπικάμπιον ἔταξε. Πῶρος δὲ πολλοὺς ἐλέφαντας ἀντιπαρατάξας αὐτὸς μὲν κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου ἐλέφαντος ἦν· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐλέφαντας ἐκ διαστήματος πεντήκοντα ποδῶν μέχρι τοῦ δεξιῦ κέρως ἔστησε· τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν θηρίων ἀνδράσι πεζοῖς ἀνεπλήρωσεν, ὥστε ἦν τὸ σχῆμα τεῖχει μεγάλῳ παραπλήσιον, οἱ μὲν ἐλέφαντες εἰκότες πύργους, οἱ δὲ πεζοὶ μεσοπυργίους. ἔνθα δὴ παραγεύλας Ἀλέξανδρος τοὺς πεζοὺς ἀντιπαράγειν τοῖς πολεμίοις, αὐτὸς τὴν ἵππον ἐπὶ δόρυ σφοδρότερον ἤλασεν βουλόμενος ὑπερκεράσαι τοὺς ἐναντίους. τοῦτο φυλασσόμενος Πῶρος ἀντιπαρήγε. τῷ δὲ μὴ φθάνειν τὰ θηρία διέσπα κατὰ πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν. τῶν Μακεδόνων τοῖς διασπάσμασιν ἐμπιπτόντων ἠναγκάζετο κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐπιστρέφων ἀγωνίζεσθαι. ἐν τούτῳ φθάνουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἵππεις ἐκπεριελθόντες καὶ κατὰ νότου συνελάσαντες τοὺς Ἰνδοὺς τελεωτάτην νίκην ἀνείλοντο (μεθ’ ἣν βασιλεὺς Ἰνδικῆς Ἀλέξανδρος ἦν).

My translation agrees with that of Krentz, except that ἀπὸ τούτων seems to me to depend on ἐπικάμπιον ἔταξε (*cf.* ἀπὸ τοῦ λαιοῦ at 4.3.17), Porus to be the subject of διέσπα (*cf.* διέσπα at 4.3.17), and συνελάσαντες to mean “driving the Indians together.” Further, at 4.3.6 (discussed below) I take τὰ σκευοφόρα to mean “baggage” (see “Army Transport in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries,” *GRBS* 24 [1983] 31=*Collected Studies* [Amsterdam 1993] I 429), and at 4.3.17 (see below) I take τοῖς διασπάσμασι to mean “gaps” as at 4.3.22.

¹² The ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπικάμπιον on the left of the light-armed infantry in Alexander’s battle order was commanded by Coenus, who was ordered to move towards the enemy’s right wing (Arr. 5.16.3, where ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιόν is contrasted with ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας τῶν πολεμίων). When the cavalry of the Indian left wing turned left to face Alexander’s cavalry, Coenus was to turn to his right (Curt. 8.14.15, *dextrum move*) and attack that cavalry from behind (Arr. 5.16.3, κατόπιν). The supposition of Devine (Fig. 1) and of Bosworth (C II 296 Fig. 4; confused in *Conquest* 128f), that Coenus drove back

ander moved "with the bulk of the cavalry" towards Porus' left wing and Coenus in command of two hipparchies was sent "as towards Porus' right wing." He will have assumed that his reader would understand the "angled formation" on the Macedonian left wing to consist of cavalry. Some sentences later Devine has Alexander "lead on the right-wing cavalry more vigorously"; but this is not a correct translation of τὴν ἵππων ἐπὶ δόρυ σφοδρότερον ἤλασεν.¹³ In the next sentence τοῦτο φυλάσσομενος Πῶρος is mistranslated as "at this point, Porus, standing on guard, also advanced," for the middle form of φυλάσσω means "be on one's guard against" (see LSJ *s.v.* C.II.1), and "advanced" misses the force of the compound verb. Devine continues: "Lest the elephants should overrun it, the phalanx divided itself into many parts; and when the Macedonians counterattacked in sections, the enemy formation was compelled to keep wheeling about in order to fight face to face" (see *supra* n.11 for the Greek text). This is entirely mistaken.

Polyaenus presents the victory over Porus as a victory by Alexander's cavalry, which encircled the Indians and drove them into a confined space from the rear.¹⁴ In this Polyaeus differed fundamentally from Diodorus and Curtius, for whom the phalanx's victory over the elephants was the turning point. Polyaeus agreed, however, with Arrian, who concluded his account in a similar manner (5.17.7): "Alexander threw his cavalry in a circle round their whole formation ... and thus the Indian cavalry were cut down in the action with few exceptions."

Polyaenus gives a fuller account of Alexander's original battle order than any other surviving writer. It enables us to understand the opening actions of Alexander's forces in Arr. 5.16.2f and the instructions given by Alexander at Curt. 8.14.15, for the

the cavalry of the Indian right wing and then pursued it behind Porus' line to the Indian left wing, is without foundation in the ancient evidence. Bosworth's supposition that *dextrum move* can mean "assail the right" is not supported by Lewis and Short. They do, however include an elliptical meaning (*s.v. moveo* I.A.1): here "move yourself" or "move your troops." My account of the battle is in *AG* 211ff with Fig. 20 and nn.141-44.

¹³ The spear being held in the right hand, the expression ἐπὶ δόρυ means "toward his right." Here it goes not with τὴν ἵππων but with ἤλασεν.

¹⁴ From that position the Macedonian horses did not face the elephants, of which they were terrified (Arr. 5.10.2, 11.4, 15.5f; Curt. 8.14.23). Despite these passages Bosworth (*Conquest* 128) supposed that "the Macedonians had acquired experience of elephants over the previous months and could cope with them."

formations of cavalry drawn up at an angle to the line of the infantry (ἐν ἐπικαμπίῳ and ἐπικάμπιον ἔταξεν) were evidently at a forward angle in each case, with Alexander commanding "the main cavalry force" (τὴν πολλὴν τῆς ἵππου) on the right and Coenus the cavalry on the left (Arr. 5.16.3; Curt. 8.14.15 *init.*). With this disposition of his forces Alexander was ready to make the cavalry forces under his own command advance impetuously and to bring forward his infantry line *en retard* (Arr. 5.16.3 *fin.*). Polyaeus does not mention the action of Coenus, but we learn from Curt. 8.14.15 and Arr. 5.16.3 that Coenus was to advance "as towards the right,"¹⁵ and then on "seeing" Alexander already engaged against the enemy cavalry and that cavalry in confusion, he was to attack "from behind."¹⁶

Polyaeus turns immediately to the position of the elephants in the battle order of Porus. Herein he differs radically from Arrian, who has the elephants in front of the phalanx of infantry (5.16.2), but he agrees with Diod. 17.87.4f and Curt. 8.14.13, who fill the spaces between the elephants with armed men (ἀνὰ μέσον, *inter armatos*) in order to protect the flanks of each elephant. Polyaeus' comparison of the Indian battleline to a walled city with towers and curtain walls was the same as in the accounts of Diodorus and Curtius. Arrian was clearly correct, for the purpose of placing the elephants just ahead of his own infantry (but not out of contact with the infantry line, as in Devine's plan [1987: 113]) was to break up the dreaded phalanx of pikemen.¹⁷

¹⁵ Devine (1987: 110) has an interesting note in which he regards ὡς ἐπὶ as interchangeable with ἐπὶ. But there is no sense in using the two expressions in consecutive sentences unless there was some difference in meaning.

¹⁶ It is important to note that Coenus had to be able to see what was happening around Porus' left wing, implicitly in Arrian and explicitly in Curtius' *viderisque me in medio ardore, ipse dextrum move et turbatis infer signa*, and that the enemy Coenus was to attack was already thrown into confusion. These passages alone prove that the reconstructions of the battle by Devine (1987: 113 Fig. 1) and by Bosworth (C II 296 Fig. 4) are incorrect in making Coenus attack or just follow the cavalry on the right wing of Porus' army. So too they both disregard Arr. 5.16.2, where Alexander decided not to advance against the centre of the Indian phalanx, for they show the Macedonian phalanx attacking the entire length of the Indian phalanx in their plans.

¹⁷ Porus' disposition was made for defense only. Bosworth's statement (C II 293) that "Arrian gave Porus an offensive strategy" seems to rest on a misunderstanding of Arr. 5.15.6, where Porus argues that the Macedonian infantry would not make a frontal attack on his own phalanx, "for they would be barred by the Indian infantry engaging them frontally and would be trampled on by the elephants turning upon them" (κατὰ στόμα τε γὰρ ἄν

When the action developed beyond his left wing, Porus led his infantry from line into column, moving to its left. But gaps now arose in the right flank of the column, because the elephants proceeded slowly and irregularly. Into the gaps the Macedonian infantry charged. Porus was compelled to halt his column and turn it back into line, facing the Macedonians. Thus the infantry battle started not in the centre, which Alexander had decided to avoid (Arr. 5.16.2, *κατὰ μέσον*), but in the left part of Porus' line.

Polyaenus must have obtained his opening description of Alexander's battle order from a source not used by Diodorus, Curtius, and Arrian. Polyaenus might have deduced the development of the battle from these three authors, but it is more likely that he continued with the initial source. He differs from Arrian in making the distance between the elephants fifty paces¹⁸ and in having the Macedonian infantry charge into the gaps that developed in the Indian infantry. Therein he is probably correct, for Arrian became so absorbed in describing the infantry's attacks on the elephants that he mentions the Indian infantry only as being trampled by the retreating elephants and finally cut down from all sides (5.17.6f). Arrian's source was certainly Ptolemy, a participant accompanying Alexander (Arr. 5.13.1).¹⁹ It is probable that Polyaenus based his version on Aristobulus' account, which was well charged with military detail as we see from Arr. 5.14.3; and it was Aristobulus who reported Darius' order of battle at Gaugamela.

4.3.20. Alexander besieged a strong place in Indian territory. Being terrified (the) Indians made an agreement to come out with their weapons. On coming out they occupied another [a second] hill and set up their guard-posts. Alexander was leading his forces against them while the Indians were shouting out "the agreement." He admitted that he had made an agreement about their coming

πρὸς τῶν ὀπλιτῶν προσβαλλόντων εἶργεσθαι καὶ καταπατηθῆσεσθαι ἐπιστρεψάντων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς τῶν ἐλεφάντων).

¹⁸ Polyaenus is probably to be preferred, for when we combine Arrian's figure of 200 elephants with his interval between elephants of 100 paces, we would have a phalanx some 6 km. in length. See my arguments in *AG* 212.

¹⁹ See my analysis of the sources in *AG* 215f. Bosworth (*C* II 262) gives the overall view that much of Arrian's account was based on Ptolemy, "but it remains uncertain how much material is added from Aristobulus."

out, but [he said that] nothing at all had been promised about release.²⁰

This account is very similar to Diod. 17.84.1f. The Indians, named there as mercenaries, are contrasted with the native people (the Assaceni of Massaga) by Plutarch (PA 59.6; see *Sources* 106). It was as mercenaries that the Indians were to come out “with their weapons,” for they depended on their weapons for further employment. Now, according to Diodorus, “they advanced for eighty stades [*ca* 16 km.] and encamped without interference, unaware of what was about to happen.” When Alexander attacked them, “the mercenaries at first kept shouting that the attack was contrary to the sworn agreement ... but Alexander shouted out to them in a loud voice, that he agreed to their leaving the city but not to eternal friendship with the Macedonians” (17.84.2). It is apparent that Polyaeus and Diodorus both drew on a longer account in which both the destination—the second hill—and the distance had been stated. I have argued elsewhere that Diodorus’ source was an account by Cleitarchus (*THA* 53, 79, 149; *Sources* 106). It is therefore probable that Polyaeus too drew on that account.

Where was the first hill? In the long and largely different account by Arrian (4.26.1–27.4) a hill was mentioned at the start of the action. Then Alexander intended to make his camp close to the walls of Massaga, but when the defenders made a sortie he withdrew a distance of some seven stades “towards a hill” (4.26.2, πρὸς γήλοφόν τινα). This hill was presumably the first hill to be mentioned in any full account. I suggest that Alexander made his camp there when he realised how aggressive the defenders of Massaga were. Later, when under the agreement the Indian mercenaries left the city, they were sent to encamp farther away from the city and did so according to Polyaeus on “a second hill” (λόφον ἕτερον). This hill cannot be the first hill, as Bosworth (*C* II 175) presumed in ignoring Polyaeus’ “second hill.” Rather, Alexander’s camp was between the city and the mercenaries’ camp on the second hill.

²⁰ Ἀλέξανδρος χωρίῳ τῆς Ἰνδικῆς ἐχυρῶ προσεκάθητο· φοβηθέντες Ἴνδοι συνέθεντο μεθ’ ὄπλων ἐξελθεῖν. οἱ μὲν ἐξελθόντες λόφον ἕτερον κατελάβοντο καὶ φυλακὰς καθίσταντο. Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπῆγε τὴν δύναμιν τῶν Ἰνδῶν ἐπιβοωμένων τὰς συνθήκας. ὁ δὲ περὶ ἐξόδου μὲν ὡμολογεῖ συντεθεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ ἀφέσεως μηδὲν ὑπεσχῆσθαι.

In case there was treachery by the Assaceni and the mercenaries, Alexander was anxious not to be at close quarters with either. If I am correct in supposing that the Macedonian camp was on the first hill, it was seven stades from the city. Diodorus (17.84.1) says that the mercenaries encamped "eighty stades from the city." This is not the impression given by Arrian (4.27.3), who places the mercenaries on a hill "opposite" (ἀντίπορος) the Macedonian camp," and by the *Metz Epitome* 43, in which the mercenaries' camp was "at no great distance" from the city (*ab oppido haud longe*).²¹ The differences are much more radical in regard to the fate of the city, relations with the queen Cleopis and the allegations of treachery in the behaviour of Alexander and of the mercenaries. Polyaeus' merit is that he gave a clear summary from a detailed account in which Alexander behaved in a treacherous manner. Similar forms of deception were attributed to Philip by Polyaeus at 4.2.4f. Polyaeus' source was neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus (they underlay Arrian's account), but it was very probably Cleitarchus.

4.3.17. Alexander was drawing up his army at Arbela. Darius was planting with caltrops the space of the engagement between the armies. The Macedonian indeed realised this. Leading his right wing he gave the order to follow rightwards, in order that he should pass round the area planted with the caltrops. As the Persian endeavoured to oppose Alexander by leading his own army leftwards, he was continually disrupting his own cavalry's formation. Charging into the gaps, Alexander—and equally Parmenio too on the left—avoided the caltrops and compelled the enemy to flee.²²

Polyaeus wrote as if the caltrops covered most of the space between the enemy lines, and the avoidance of them was the main consideration in Alexander's course of action. In these respects Polyaeus exaggerated, for Darius had to leave clear of

²¹ It is possible that the number "eighty stades" is an error of Diodorus or his copyists (so e.g. Bosworth, *C* II 175), but it may have been a figure added for verisimilitude by Cleitarchus to his very sensational account, as reflected in *Diod.* 17.84: *THA* 53.

²² Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Ἀρβήλοις παρετάσσετο. Δαρείος τὸ μεταίχιμον τῆς συμβολῆς τριβόλους κατέσπειρε. Τοῦτο δὴ συνιδὼν ὁ Μακεδὼν τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως ἡγούμενος ἐπὶ δόρῳ παρήγγειλεν ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅπως περιέλθοι τὸν τόπον τὸν κατεσπαρμένον ταῖς τριβόλοις· ὁ δὲ Πέρσης ἀντιπαράγειν πειρώμενος ἐπ' ἀσπίδα διέσπα συνεχῶς τὴν ἵππον. τοῖς διασπάσμασιν ἐμβαλὼν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Παρμενίων ἀπὸ τοῦ λαιοῦ, τὰς μὲν τριβόλους ἐξένευσαν, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους φεύγειν ἠνάγκασαν.

caltrops not only pathways for his three groups of scythed chariots, so that they could charge across "the space of engagement" (τὸ μεταίχμιον τῆς συμβολῆς), but also the ground in front of his own right wing for his cavalry to launch an attack.²³ During the action the ground in front of Darius' left wing was crossed without difficulty by Alexander's troops and by Darius' cavalry. The only place where caltrops could have been was in front of the centre where Darius was, and then only in a small area somewhere between the runways for two groups of chariots.

Polyaenus was not alone in attaching great importance to caltrops. They figured prominently in Curtius' account, as follows. A deserter informed Alexander that "Darius had spread iron caltrops planted in the ground over which he believed his enemy would send forth his cavalry" (4.13.36; tr. Rolfe). Alexander summoned a meeting of commanders and warned them of the area with the caltrops. When he advanced, he did so in oblique formation, "in order both to pass round the place of the snares (*insidiarum locum*) and to engage Darius, who was guarding his [left] wing" (4.15.1; cf. 4.14.8).

That caltrops could have been planted in advance was envisaged in Arrian's account (3.9.4). At a conference of commanders, which Alexander convened on first seeing the enemy, Parmenio advised him to undertake a full reconnaissance, in case there were impediments or "spikes hidden in the ground" (σκόλοπες καταπεπηγότες). As this passage was based on an account by Ptolemy, who in my opinion consulted the *Journal of Alexander* (see *Sources* 228f), the thought that there might be such spikes is to be regarded as historical. It was worth recording in Ptolemy's history presumably because such caltrops had been planted. Where then could they have been? When we consider a Persian battle order, preserved in Arrian, we see that Darius in the centre with his Royal Cavalry Squadron, 1,000 strong, was heavily protected against any frontal attack, for ahead of him were four groups of cavalry in line. Then in front of one of them—the Indian cavalry²⁴—some elephants were

²³ I refer to my plan of the battle in *AG* 142 Fig. 14 and to that of Devine (1986: 114 Fig. 2), which is generally in agreement with mine. They are based on the captured order of battle of the Persian army (Arr. 3.11.3), which Aristobulus cites.

²⁴ The Indian cavalry's horses were trained to act together with elephants, and it was in the company of the Indian cavalry that the elephants were mentioned in Arr. 3.8.6. In the course of the battle the Indian cavalry were

posted, let us say on the left of the line (Arr. 3.8.6, 11.6); then in front of the central group were fifty scythed chariots with a prepared runway; but there were no troops in front of the right of the line. It is here that a nest of caltrops would have protected Darius. If they were there, we can see what Darius had in mind. His expectation was that Alexander would deliver a frontal attack on the centre in the hope of capturing or killing him. If Alexander should do so, his forces would be disrupted by the charge of the chariots; and if they advanced again, they would hit the spike-field on their left and be up against the elephants on their right. Darius' policy in this central area was entirely defensive, for his fine cavalry had only one route for an advance, namely along the runway after the chariots had charged. On the wings he expected that his much more numerous cavalry would be able to take the offensive, outflank, and defeat the Macedonian army.

Scholars have generally rejected the planting of caltrops as "surely a fiction" and as "a legend."²⁵ How then did they first enter the tradition? For his description of the battle Curtius in my opinion used several sources but principally Cleitarchus, an unreliable writer.²⁶ Arrian followed the accounts of Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus, who knew Cleitarchus' work and at times corrected it. I have inferred from Arrian's account that Ptolemy mentioned the fear of caltrops because they had in fact been planted. Polyaeus did not follow the account of Curtius, for Curtius (4.15.1) placed Darius on the Persian left wing and had Alexander move to his right in order to engage Darius, whereas according to Polyaeus Darius moved his own troops to their left. It is more likely that Polyaeus drew on the account of Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus either via Arrian or directly, and that he found there the mention of caltrops. This suggestion is supported by Polyaeus' attribution of the victory to Alexander's exploitation of gaps in the enemy formation, precisely as Arrian did (3.14.1f, κατὰ τὸ διέχον).

close to Darius (Arr. 3.13.1). Devine (1987: 114) placed the elephants in front of Darius' Persian cavalry, but it is doubtful whether their horses had been trained to act close to elephants.

²⁵ So Devine (1986) 89; Atkinson 437, who reports (428) the views of some other scholars.

²⁶ I have discussed Curtius' sources in *AG* 138f and *THA* 100, 122f, and 128; see also Atkinson 447f ("Cleitarchus may have been the common source [of Diodorus and Curtius]"); Devine (1986) 91f.

It is probable then that Darius planted caltrops, that Alexander knew where they were, and that he did in fact avoid them. Polyaeus was providing not an account of the battle but an example of a use of caltrops; and he therefore seized on the stratagem of Alexander's incidental avoidance of the spike-field. Polyaeus made the same point and used the same terms in his account of the battle against Porus (4.3.22).

4.3.6. Alexander was engaged in his last battle against Darius at Arbela. No small force of Persians, going round [the Macedonians], were plundering the baggage of the Macedonians. Parmenio advised Alexander to go to the help of the baggage-bearers. Alexander said: "No need at all to break the formation of our phalanx. Our need is to fight our enemies themselves. If defeated, we have no longer any use for our baggage; and if victorious, we shall have both our own baggage and that of our enemies."²⁷

In making the Persians "go round" the Macedonian wing Polyaeus agrees with Diod. 17.59.5 (περιπίπεῦσαι), PA 32.5 (περιπέμπαντος), and Curt. 4.15.5 (*circumvehi*). On the other hand, he differs from Arrian, who had the Persian cavalry pass through a gap in the Macedonian phalanx (3.14.5, κατὰ τὸ διέχον). We infer then that Polyaeus shared a common source with the first three writers, who in my opinion were following the version of Cleitarchus.²⁸ As Polyaeus differs from Arrian, he also therefore did not here use Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus, Arrian's sources. As for Parmenio's advice to Alexander, we find similar versions in PA 32.5ff and Curt. 4.15.5–9, for which I have argued that Cleitarchus was the main source.²⁹

Polyaeus' choice was unwise, for the account of the attack on the baggage-camp,³⁰ which Arrian derived from Ptolemy

²⁷ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Ἀρβήλοις τὴν ὑστάτην μάχην Δαρείῳ παρατάσσειτο. μοῖρα Περσῶν οὐκ ὀλίγη περιελθόντες τὰ σκευοφόρα τῶν Μακεδόνων διήρασαν. ὁ Παρμενίων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συνεβούλευε τοῖς σκευοφόροις βοηθεῖν. ὁ δὲ 'οὐδὲν', ἔφη, 'παραλύειν χρὴ τῆς φάλαγγος, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις αὐτοῖς μάχεσθαι· ἠττηθέντες μὲν γὰρ οὐκέτι τῶν σκευοφόρων χρῆζομεν, νικῆσαντες δὲ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἔξομεν.'

²⁸ See *THA* 20ff, 27 (Diodorus), 122f (Curtius); *Sources* 38–42 (Plutarch).

²⁹ See *supra* n.28 and *AG* 138ff for a general view of the sources for the battle of Gaugamela; sources of Curtius: Atkinson 446ff; Devine (1986) 91.

³⁰ This part of the battle has been the subject of much controversy, not to say confusion. I gave my version in *AG* 143, 146f in 1980—the same year as the versions of Atkinson (438f) and Bosworth (*C I* 308). Devine's view (1986: 99, 105 with nn.71ff, 105, 124f) is on much the same lines as mine, but see *GRBS* 24 (*supra* n.11) 31 on *skeuophora* and "Arrian's Use of Callisthenes?" in *ClBull* 68 (1992) 89f.

and/or Aristobulus, is factual and not sensational: "some of the Indians and of the Persian cavalry" (3.11.5) broke through a gap in the infantry, reached the baggage-camp and were then defeated by a detachment from the rear rank of the double phalanx. These cavalrymen came from the Persian centre, as I noted above (*ad* 4.3.17). The Persians whom Arrian next mentioned were from the Persian right wing; they outflanked and attacked Parmenio's troops (3.14.6 *fin.*). There they were joined by the defeated members of the first group, so that Parmenio's men were attacked from both sides (ἀμφιβόλων) and Parmenio sent for help. Alexander, now victorious in the enemy centre, brought his Companion Cavalry from there towards the Persian right wing, clashed with the retreating "Parthyaean, some of the Indians, and the largest and strongest force of Persians" (3.15.1), who were in formation, having broken off their action against Parmenio's Thessalians (3.15.3).³¹ Polyaeus, or rather his source, conflated the two Persian attacks and made Parmenio ask for help to be sent to the baggage-camp.

4.3.11. The Thracians having prepared many heavy-laden wagons to let loose on the Macedonians, Alexander ordered them to avoid as many [wagons] as possible, and should they be caught to go down on the ground and hold their shields overhead, so that it would happen that the rushing wagons would leap over them. As this was done in the actual event, the Thracians' preparation of the wagons proved useless.³²

The only other extant account of this campaign is in Arr. 1.1.4f and I have argued that Arrian derived it from Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus. Thus Polyaeus could have obtained his version either from Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus or from Arrian. There are striking verbal echoes³³ between Arrian and Polyaeus, so much so that we should conclude that Polyaeus made direct

³¹ For this interpretation see AG 147, where ἔτι is taken not with διώκειν but with ἀπετράπετο in Arr. 3.15.1; for the confusion see Bosworth, C I 309ff.

³² Ἀλέξανδρος Θρακῶν παρεσκευασμένων καταγόμεους ἀμάξας πολλὰς ἐπαφιέναι τοῖς Μακεδόσι παρήγγειλεν αὐτοῖς ἐκκλίνειν μὲν ὅσας δύναιντο, εἰ δὲ καταλαμβάνοιντο, καθιέντας αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὑπερτιθέναι τὰς ἀσπίδας, ὅπως συμβαίνοι φερομέναις ταῖς ἀμάξαις ὑπερπηδᾶν. τοῦτο τοι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πείρᾳ γενόμενον ἤλεγξε τοῖς Θραξίν ἀχρηστον τὴν τῶν ἀμαξῶν παρασκευήν.

³³ These include παρεσκευασμένων, ἐπαφιέναι, καταλαμβάνοιντο, πρὸς τὴν γῆν, φερομέναις ταῖς ἀμάξαις, and ὑπερπηδᾶν. My account of the action is in AG 46.

use of Arrian. The only difference is that Polyaeus said that the wagons were "heavy-laden" (καταγόμεους). He probably invented this detail in order to make the stratagem more impressive, for Arrian merely said that the Thracians collected wagons initially to form a defensive laager.

4.3.12. Alexander took Thebes by concealing a sufficient part of his force and putting Antipater in command of it. He in person led the visible force against the strong part of the [Theban] positions (ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐχυροὺς τῶν τόπων). The Thebans came out against him, and they fought not ignobly against that visible force. At the crisis of the battle Antipater raised up his hidden force, went round in a circle to where the wall was rotten and unguarded, and at that point he occupied the city and raised the signal. Alexander saw it. He shouted out: "Thebes is already mine." The Thebans were fighting stoutly, but when they turned and saw the city captured, they fled.³⁴

There are three accounts elsewhere of the capture of Thebes: Diod. 17.12; PA 11.9f; Arr. 1.8.12–17. The first two have points in common, which are best explained if they drew on a common source, namely Cleitarchus.³⁵ Arrian's version is completely different: his source was Ptolemy with touches of Aristobulus (*Sources* 205f). Where does Polyaeus' version stand? It is incompatible with Arrian's account, which attributes the break into the city to Alexander. It resembles that of Diodorus in that it is a Macedonian officer who first led a detachment into the city (17.12.3); but while Polyaeus provides a concealed force under Antipater, Diodorus has Perdiccas lead a force through an unguarded postern gate. Nor does Polyaeus chime in with Plutarch, in whose short account the Macedonian garrison of the Cadmea made a sortie and overcame the Thebans from behind (PA 11.10).

Arrian's version, based on Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus, is to be regarded as true to the facts. Diodorus and Plutarch have

³⁴ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔλαβε Θήβας τῆς δυνάμεως ἰκανὴν ἀποκρύψας καὶ τάξας ἐπ' αὐτῆς Ἀντίπατρον· τὴν δὲ φανεράν αὐτὸς ἤγεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐχυροὺς τῶν τόπων. Θηβαῖοι δὲ ἐπεξῆλθον καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀρωμένην δύναμιν οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο. Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς μάχης τὴν κεκρυμμένην δύναμιν ἀναστήσας, κύκλῳ περιελθὼν, ἧ σαθρὸν καὶ ἀφύλακτον ἦν τὸ τεῖχος, ταύτην κατελάβετο τὴν πόλιν καὶ σημεῖον ἤρεν. Ἀλέξανδρος ἰδὼν ἀνεβόησεν, ὡς ἦδη τὰς Θήβας ἔχει· Θηβαῖοι δὲ εὐρώστως μαχόμενοι, ὡς εἶδον ἐπιστραφέντες ἐαλωκυῖαν τὴν πόλιν, ἔφευγον.

³⁵ For the points in common see *THA* 195 n.17; for Cleitarchus as the source, *THA* 13f, 26ff; *Sources* 25ff.

points in common that seem due to a common source, namely Cleitarchus. Polyaeus followed a source that represented the Thebans as "fighting stoutly." He had that in common with Cleitarchus, but he must have obtained his report of the hidden force from a source other than Cleitarchus—a source for which one cannot offer a name. In any case, Polyaeus unwisely chose an account that did not rest on historical fact.

4.3.16. While crossing the Granicus Alexander outflanked the wing of the Persians, as they were about to attack from a commanding position, by himself leading them, the Macedonians, upstream to the right [literally, "towards the spear"]. The phalanx charged and routed them.³⁶

Polyaeus did not derive this passage from the author followed by Diodorus (17.19.3; almost certainly Cleitarchus: *THA* 16f, 23f, 26) in making Alexander cross the river unopposed. On the other hand, Arrian agreed with Polyaeus in describing a move in the riverbed by Alexander, "continually extending his formation at an angle where the stream was pulling," *i.e.*, against the current (1.14.7).³⁷ A further point of agreement is the part played by the phalanx in the centre of Alexander's formation, for Arrian also had the Macedonians of the centre break through first and then the Persian wings collapse (1.16.1). Moreover, Polyaeus' statement that Alexander outflanked the Persians enables one to understand in Arrian's account how his "light-armed infantry" inflicted heavy casualties on the Persian cavalry (1.16.1), for these infantry were the Archers and the Agrianians stationed on Alexander's right wing (1.14.1), and they now overlapped the Persians' left wing and attacked the flank of that wing.

³⁶ Ἀλέξανδρος Γράνικον διαβαίνων Πέρσας ἐξ ὑπερδεξιῶν ἐπιόντας (αὐτοὺς) αὐτὸς ἐπὶ δόρυ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἀναγαγὼν ὑπερεκέρασεν· ἡ δὲ φάλαγξ προσπεσοῦσα τοὺς πολεμίους ἐτρέψατο.

I have translated Korais' emendation, ἐπὶ δόρυ as printed by Melber, instead of the reading of the archetype, ἐπὶ ὕδωρ, which I prefer. The sense is the same, as "waterwards" and "spearwards" both lead one upstream, which is the meaning also of the compound ἀναγαγὼν (*cf.* ἄνω τοῦ ποταμοῦ at 4.3.9). The text was misinterpreted by E. Badian (*Ancient Macedonia* II [Thessaloniki 1977] 288 n.51), for he makes Alexander move his men downstream, which would have led to confusion in the centre and not to an outflanking of the enemy.

³⁷ See my "The Battle of the Granicus River," *JHS* 100 (1980) 75 (= *Collected Studies* III 95).

Arrian's sources were Ptolemy and Aristobulus, as he proclaimed in his Preface, and in this case we know that he followed Ptolemy, because Plutarch cited Aristobulus when reporting the number of Alexander's losses, which were given differently by Arrian (PA 16.15; Arr. 1.16.4).³⁸ We conclude, then, that Polyaeus derived his account at 4.3.16 from a long account by Ptolemy, whether directly or indirectly. It is of crucial importance for understanding the battle.³⁹

4.3.29. Alexander invaded the land of the Sogdians. It is all rough and hard to traverse. In the centre of it a rock rises up which is accessible only to birds that fly. Around the rock a thick forest of close-packed trees made the unscalable cliffs even more unscalable. The rock was occupied by Ariomazes with a large, powerful force of Sogdians, and he had springs of water inside the rock and an abundant supply of foodstuffs. After riding round the rock and noting its natural features Alexander issued his orders. Three hundred young men were to be selected who had experience and skill in rock-climbing, and they were to make their way unarmed up through the thick forest and to pull one another up with fine ropes. Once they gained the summit, they were to take off the white waistbands which they were wearing, tie them to very long poles and raise them up above the foliage, so that the intensive waving of the bright waistbands all together would be visible to the enemy above and to the Macedonians below. Well, the rock-climbers with great exertions reached the top, and as the sun rose they waved their waistbands. The Macedonians below raised a mighty, resounding shout. Ariomazes, astounded that all the army was on the way up and that he was already caught from above, surrendered himself and the rock to Alexander in the belief that Alexander's power and fortune were more than human.⁴⁰

³⁸ Hamilton 38: "it is clear ... that Plutarch uses Aristobulus."

³⁹ My account of the battle (*supra* n.37: 73–88) differs from the accounts of, for instance, K. Lehmann, "Die Schlacht am Granikos," *Klio* 11 (1911) 230–44; R. Lane Fox, *Alexander the Great* (London 1973) 122; Badian (*supra* n.37); and Bosworth, *Conquest* 40ff.

⁴⁰ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Σογδιανῶν χώραν. ἡ δὲ ἐστὶ πᾶσα τραχεῖα καὶ δύσβατος· πέτρα δὲ κατὰ μέσην ἀνατείνει (ὄρνιθων) τοῖς πτηνοῖς [μόνοις] βάσιμος· ἐν κύκλῳ δὲ ὕλη δασεῖα καὶ πυκνὴ τοὺς ἀβάτους κρημονοὺς ἀβατωτέρους εἰργάζετο. τὴν πέτραν Ἀριομάξης μετὰ πολλῆς χειρὸς καὶ καρτερᾶς Σογδιανῶν κατελάβετο πηγὰς ὕδατος ἔχων ἔνδον καὶ παρασκευὴν σιτίων ἄφθονον. Ἀλέξανδρος περιπασάμενος καὶ καταμαθὼν τὰς φύσεις τῆς πέτρας ἐκέλευσε τριακοσίους λογάδας νεανίας, οἷς ἦν ἄσκησις καὶ τέχνη κρημονοβατεῖν, ἀόπλους κατόπιν τῆς πέτρας διὰ πυκνῆς ὕλης ἀνέρπειν καὶ λεπτοῖς κάλοις ἀνιμῶν ἀλλήλους· ἐπειδὴν δὲ τῶν κορυφῶν κρατήσωσιν, ζώνας λευκάς, ἃς εἶχον, λυσαμένους κοντοῖς εὐμήκεσι περιᾶσαι καὶ τούτους ὑπὲρ τὴν

Polyaenus did not follow Arrian's account, for there is no mention in Arrian of the thick forest, the approach through the forest, the foliage on top of the rock, and the springs of water on the rock. Polyaenus does not mention the snow, which in Arrian's account provides a supply of water and makes the ascent so difficult that, when some thirty men fell to their death, the bodies were lost in the snow, nor the exchange of jibes about "flying men." On the other hand, Polyaenus and Curtius have some points in common: copious springs of water inside a cavern on the rock (Curt. 7.11.3); the king rode round the rock (a distance of some 30 km; 7.11.2); his orders were reported at some length (expanded into a speech at 7.11.7-12); 300 young men were to be selected (7.11.7); on gaining the summit they were to signal with white garments (7.11.11, *evadite in cacumen; quod cum ceperitis, candidis velis signum mihi dabit*); these garments were raised aloft on their spears (7.11.19); and when that did happen, there was shouting by the entire army (7.11.25, *totius exercitus clamor*). Whereas Arrian limited the operation to a single night (Arr. 4.19.1, τῆς νυκτός), Polyaenus and Curtius made it cover at least a day and a night (Polyaenus having the men proceed through the dense forest to the back of the rock; Curt. 7.11.14, 16 [*diem*], 21 [*postero die*]).

It is evident that Polyaenus disregarded Arrian's account, no doubt based on Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus (Arr. 1 *praef.*). He chose to follow Curtius, or alternatively to go back to Curtius' source or rather sources, for I have argued elsewhere⁴¹ that Curtius followed Aristobulus for the actual ascent of the rock and Cleitarchus for the background and the finale, the scourging and crucifying of the Sogdian leaders (7.11.28). There are interesting parallels between what we have ascribed to the influence of Cleitarchus and the account of the operation at the Suisian rocks in Polyaenus 4.3.27 and in Curt. 5.3.17-4.33, which derived from Cleitarchus (*supra ad* 4.3.27). In each case Cleitar-

ὑλην ἀνατείνειν, ὥστε ἀθρόας καὶ λαμπρὰς τὰς ζώνας ἐπὶ πλείστον τινασσομένας καὶ τοῖς ἄνω βαρβάροις καὶ τοῖς κάτω Μακεδόσιν ὄρασθαι. οἱ μὲν δὴ κρημνοβάται σὺν πολλῷ πόνῳ κατὰ κορυφὴν [γενόμενοι] ἀνίσχοντος ἡλίου τὰς ζώνας ἀνέσεισαν· οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες μέγα καὶ λαμπρὸν κάτωθεν ἠλάλαξαν· ὁ δὲ Ἀριομάξης ἐκπλαγεῖς, ὡς πάσης τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀναβαιούσης καὶ ὡς ἦδη κατὰ κορυφῆς ἔαλωκώς, αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὴν πέτραν παρέδωκεν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ θειοτέραν αὐτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν τύχην ἡγούμενος.

⁴¹ *THA* 144f. Bosworth (*C* II 125) has criticised me for believing in these two sources and called it "contamination," but his own theories involve what he calls "two complicated contaminations" (126).

chus has expanded an operation to cover at least a day and a night instead of Arrian's single night; he has had the troops take provision for two or three days; he has added a thick forest and dense foliage; he has invented conversations and a speech by Alexander; and he has exaggerated the exhaustion of the troops (e.g. Curt. 5.4.18; 7.11.17). For his part Polyaeus exaggerated the boldness of the stratagem by stating that the climbers went "unarmed" (ἀόπλους), whereas Curtius had them *armati* "with swords and spears only" (7.11.14) and Arrian implied that they were lightly armed and not, as the defenders supposed, "exactly fully-armed" (4.19.4, ἀκριβῶς ὀπλισμένους).

In his account of the two very strong rocks that Alexander captured, Strabo reports the one was "in Sogdiane the rock of the Oxus," but some say "the rock of Ariamazes (517C= 11.11.4). Polyaeus agrees with Strabo, for he places his rock in Sogdiane and has it defended by Ariomazes—thus in agreement with Curt. 7.11.1—whereas Arrian (4.17.4) called it just "the in-Sogdiane rock" and did not name a defender.⁴²

4.3.30. The Cathaei, a division of the Indians, made a desperate opposition to Alexander. He killed them from the youth upwards and razed their strongest city, Sangala. India was pervaded by the bad report that Alexander was waging war in a murderous, barbarian manner. As he wished to change his reputation, when he captured another city in Indian territory, he took hostages and made a treaty; and then on coming to a third city, which was very large and well-populated, he placed the hostages—old men, women, and children—in front of the phalanx. The inhabitants, recognizing those of their own race and seeing the evidence of Alexander's clemency, opened their gates and admitted him as suppliants (μετὰ ἱκετηριῶν). The report spreading at once persuaded the Indians to accept Alexander willingly.⁴³

⁴² So also Strabo's other rock, "the in-Bactriane rock of Sisimithres," was also called "the rock of Sisimithres" (PA 58.3), "the in-Pareitacae stronghold, another rock, named after Chorienes" (Arr. 4.21.1), but just "a rock" in the list of contents of Diodorus 17 KE' and at Curt. 8.2.20. See Hamilton 129, who is clearer than Bosworth, C II 124ff.

⁴³ Ἀλέξανδρος Καθαίους, μοῖραν Ἰνδῶν ἐξ ἀπονοίας ἀντιστάσαν ἠβηδὸν ἔκτεινε καὶ πόλιν αὐτῶν Σάγγαλα τὴν καρτερωτάτην κατέσκαπεν. διήκε τοὺς Ἰνδοὺς φήμη πονηρὰ ὡς Ἀλεξάνδρου φονικῶς καὶ βαρβαρικῶς πολεμοῦντος. ὁ δὲ μεταβάλλειν τὴν δόξαν βουλόμενος ἄλλην πόλιν (διὰ) τῆς Ἰνδικῆς ἔλῶν, ὁμήρους λαβῶν, σπεισάμενος ἐπὶ τρίτην πόλιν ἦλθεν εὐμεγέθη καὶ πολυάνθρωπον, τάξας πρὸ τῆς φάλαγγος τοὺς ὁμήρους, γέροντας, παῖδας, γυναῖκας. οἱ δὲ τοὺς ὁμοφύλους γνωρίσαντες καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου φιλανθρωπίας ὀρῶντες ἀνοίγουσιν τε τὰς πόλεις καὶ μετὰ ἱκετηριῶν αὐτὸν ἐδέξαντο. αὐτίκα ἡ φήμη διαδραμοῦσα ἐπεισεν Ἰνδοὺς ἐκόντας Ἀλεξάνδρον δεχέσθαι.

Diodorus mentions briefly (17.91.4) the costly siege of "the largest and strongest city" of the Cathaei and Alexander's burning of it. Curtius describes the city as "great by the standards of the region," the escape of only a few men, and the destruction of the city (9.1.18, *excidium urbis*). Arrian gives a long description of the siege of Sangala (5.22.4–24.5), the capture of 70,000 persons, and the razing of the city, of which the territory was given to Indians who came over to Alexander voluntarily (5.24.8). The ultimate source of all these accounts was the description by Ptolemy (holding a command during the siege) and/or Aristobulus.⁴⁴ The opposition was, as Arrian makes clear and as Polyaeus says, "desperate" (ἐξ ἀπονοίας ἀντιστᾶσαν), and the casualties were very high for the Cathaei⁴⁵ and higher than usual for the Macedonians (Arr. 5.24.5).⁴⁶ It is probable that Polyaeus exaggerated the "murderous" element in saying that Alexander killed the inhabitants "from youth upwards," for Arrian's full account (5.24.5) has Alexander take over 70,000 prisoners.

The taking and parading of hostages⁴⁷ are described also at Curt. 9.1.23 (*obsides ducebantur ante agmen*). The surrender of Indians as "suppliants" also occurs at Diod. 17.91.4 (μεθ' ἱκετηριῶν). Arrian reports only incidentally that, at the time of the razing of Sangala, Indians of the region were coming over voluntarily (5.24.7).⁴⁸ The further effect of Alexander's policy of clemency (τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου φιλανθρωπίας, as Polyaeus puts it) was described not by Arrian but by Diodorus (17.91.7, 93.1) and by Curtius (9.1.30, 36). Polyaeus may have drawn his final

⁴⁴ It is generally agreed that they were Arrian's sources, with Ptolemy predominating: *Sources* 256f; Bosworth, C II 327, citing the views of earlier authors.

⁴⁵ As at Thebes and at Tyre, when there was opposition and fighting within the city, the casualties were respectively 6,000 (Diod. 17.14.1) and 8,000 (Arr. 2.24.4), as compared with 17,000 at Sangala (Arr. 5.24.5), where the Cathaeans and their neighbours had congregated (5.22.4f).

⁴⁶ Bosworth (C II 334: "the military population [of Sangala] was clearly massacred *en bloc*") disregarded the statement that over 70,000 were captured (Arr. 5.24.5). Presumably he took Polyaeus as his authority, although he did not mention him.

⁴⁷ The taking of hostages indicates that a treaty had been concluded, for the hostages were intended as a guarantee that the treaty would be kept.

⁴⁸ Arrian abbreviates a great deal, and this is a good example. See Bosworth, C II 336f.

remark from reading either Diodorus or Curtius or their source, Cleitarchus.⁴⁹

4.3.31. Alexander observed that the land of the Cossaei was rough with high, inaccessible mountains and that there was a multitude of notable warriors in the mountains; there was therefore no expectation of taking it. Someone came reporting "Hephaestion has died in Babylon." He [*i.e.*, Alexander] proclaimed universal mourning and was hurrying away to the burial of Hephaestion. The scouts of the Cossaeans, as they saw men departing, scattered themselves. Alexander, sending cavalymen by night, captured the unguarded approach-route to the mountains, and [himself] turning back from his march and appearing (in support of) the cavalymen, together with them subjugated the land of the Cossaei. This action, they say, was a consolation to Alexander for his grief over Hephaestion.⁵⁰

A similar description of the land and its warriors at Arr. 7.15.1f explains more fully than Polyaeus that a regular force could not capture the territory, because the Cossaei left their villages and took to the high mountains, from which they later returned and resumed their practice of brigandage.⁵¹ Arrian had earlier mentioned (7.14.9) that mourning was ordered throughout the whole barbarian country, and he placed "a considerable time" of mourning (7.15.1, χρόνος συχνός) before Alexander's expedition towards the Cossaei. Diodorus too has an interval of time between the death of Hephaestion (17.110.8) and the invasion of Cossaea (17.111.4). He describes the country and the warriors in similar terms. Strabo (524C=11.13.6) cites Nearchus' report that the Cossaei were a tribe of brigands, exacted tribute from Persia, and were checked from their audacious way of life by Alexander in a winter campaign. Such remarks recur at Arr. *Ind.* 40.6f, who gives Nearchus as his source (*Ind.* 20.1; 40.5, 9).

⁴⁹ Alexander's policy of harshness followed by clemency succeeded also in southern Pakistan; see AG 230.

⁵⁰ 'Ἀλέξανδρος τὴν Κοσσαίων χώραν ἑώρα τραχεῖάν τε καὶ ὄρη ὑψηλὰ καὶ ἀπρόσιτα καὶ πλῆθος ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἀνδρῶν δοκίμων· οὐ τοίνυν ἐλεῖν ἐλπίζ. ἤκέ τις ἀγγέλλων 'Ἡφαιστίων ἐν Βαβυλῶνι τέθνηκεν'. ὁ δὲ κοινὸν πένθος ἐπαγεῖλας ἐπὶ τὴν 'Ἡφαιστίωνος ταφὴν ἠπεύγετο· οἱ σκοποὶ τῶν Κοσσαίων, ἀναζευγνύοντας ὡς εἶδον [αὐτοῦς], αὐτοὶ διεσπάρησαν. Ἀλέξανδρος νύκτωρ ἰπέας πέμψας τὴν ἐς τὰ ὄρη πάροδον ἀφύλακτον κατελάβετο καὶ τῆς ὁδοπορίας ἀποκλίνας, ἐπιφανεῖς τοῖς ἰππεῦσι σὺν αὐτοῖς τὴν Κοσσαίων χώραν ἐχειρώσατο. τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἐπὶ 'Ἡφαιστίωνι λύπης παρηγόρημα φασὶν Ἀλεξάνδρω γενέσθαι.

⁵¹ These tactics were employed by resistance groups in the Balkans in World War II.

Plutarch places Alexander's order for mourning some time before the campaign against the Cossaei (PA 72.3f). It is clear that Polyaeus drew on the same source or sources as these writers, namely Ptolemy, who took part in the campaign (Arr. 7.15.3), and Nearchus. Polyaeus dramatises the stratagem on his own initiative by moving the proclamation of mourning down to the start of the campaign.

The preliminary capture of the 'approach-route', which Polyaeus describes, occurs in the plural in Diodorus (17.111.5, προκαταλαβόμενος τὰς παρόδους). Polyaeus' final comment, that the campaign was said to be a consolation to Alexander in his mourning, is echoed in Plutarch's remark that "this was called a death-offering to Hephaestion" (PA 72.4). The παρηγόρημα in Polyaeus and the ἐναγισμός in Plutarch imply in each case a turn to a new source that they shared in common. If so, Polyaeus stopped short of Plutarch's statement that Alexander "slaughtered all Cossaeans from the youth upwards," even though Polyaeus (4.3.30) had used that phrase of the Cathaei. In the present case Polyaeus was wise, for the statements by Diodorus, that Alexander took very many prisoners and by liberating them obtained the submission of the Cossaeans, and by Arrian (*Ind.*), that Alexander founded cities so that the Cossaeans should adopt a settled life, are to be accepted as historical,⁵² as their sources were respectively Ptolemy or Diyllus and Nearchus.⁵³

4.3.24. When Alexander was administering justice in the presence of Macedonians or Greeks, he thought fit to keep the court modest and democratic, but when he did so in the presence of the barbarians he thought fit to have it brilliant and fit for high command, thereby astounding the barbarians even with the form of the courtroom. At any rate, when he was administering justice in the presence of Bactrians, Hyrcanians, and Indians, he had his marquee set up as follows. The marquee was of a size for 100 couches; it was supported by fifty gold columns; the upper part was covered by extensive canopies overhead, which were interwoven with gold and decorated with embroideries. On the inner side round the marquee there stood first of all 500 Persian Apple-bearers, in full dress uniforms of purple and quince-yellow cloth.

⁵² See my account in *AG* 242 with n.167. Alexander and Peucestas recruited Cossaei: Arr. 7.23.1.

⁵³ For these writers see *Sources* 140, 298; *THA* 74 (Diyllus). I suggested (*Sources* 298) that the idea of a death-offering may have been taken over from an account by Cleitarchus.

After the Apple-bearers there were archers up to the same number; they differed in their uniforms, some being clad in flame-coloured garments, others in dark blue, and others in deep-dyed scarlet. In front of them stood Macedonians, silver-shielded, 500 of the tallest men. At the centre of the marquee the golden throne was placed, on which he presided and conducted his business; the Bodyguards stood by the king on either side as he was giving judgment. The marquee was encircled by the Guard of elephants, fully equipped, and by 1,000 Macedonians, wearing Macedonian uniforms. Next to them 500 Susians in purple dress, and after them, encircling the entire parade, 10,000 Persians, the most handsome and the tallest of their race, adorned with every Persian finery, all carrying their short swords. Such was Alexander's court of justice when he was judging in the presence of the barbarians.⁵⁴

Anecdotes about Philip as the final judge in Macedonia show that proceedings there were almost informal, and appellants were completely outspoken in addressing the king. As Poly-aenus indicates, this continued to be so in Asia when Alexander judged the cases of Macedonians and Greeks, for he kept one ear ready to hear the words of the defendant (PA 42.2ff). We

⁵⁴ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν μὲν τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι δικάζων μέτριον καὶ δημοτικὸν ἔχειν τὸ δικαστήριον ἐδοκίμαζεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις λαμπρὸν καὶ στρατηγικόν, ἐκπλήσων τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ τῷ τοῦ δικαστηρίου σχήματι. ἐν γοῦν Βάκτροις καὶ Ὑρκανίοις καὶ Ἰνδοῖς δικάζων εἶχε τὴν σκηνὴν ὡδε πεποιημένην. ἡ σκηνὴ τὸ μέγεθος ἦν κλινῶν ἑκατόν· χρύσειοι κίονες ὑπετίθεντο αὐτῇ πενήκοντα· ὑπερτείνοντες οὐρανίσκοι διάχρυσοι, ποικίλμασιν ἐκπεποιημένοι, τὸν ἄνω τόπον ἐσκέπαζον. Πέρσαι μὲν πρῶτοι πεντακόσιοι μηλοφόροι περὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ἐντὸς ἴσταντο πορφυραῖς καὶ μιλίναις ἐσθῆσιν ἐξησκημένοι. μετὰ δὲ τοὺς μηλοφόρους τοξῶται τὸν ἴσον ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντες ταῖς ἐσθῆσι διήλλαττον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φλόγινα, οἱ δὲ κυνάεα, οἱ δὲ ὑγινοβαφῆ περιεβέβληντο. τούτων προίσταντο Μακεδόνες ἀργυράσπιδες πεντακόσιοι τῶν μεγίστων ἀνδρῶν. κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέσον τῆς σκηνῆς ὁ χρυσοῦς ἔκειτο θρόνος, ἐφ' οὗ προκαθήμενος ἐχρημάτιζεν· οἱ σωματοφύλακες ἐφεστήκεσαν ἐκατέρωθεν τοῦ βασιλέως δικάζοντες. ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς σκηνῆς τὸ τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἄγγμα διεσκευασμένον ἐφεστήκει καὶ Μακεδόνες χίλιοι στολὰς Μακεδονικὰς ἔχοντες. ἐπὶ τούτοις πεντακόσιοι Σούσιοι πορφυροσχήμονες, καὶ μετὰ τούτους ἐν κύκλῳ πάντων Πέρσαι μύριοι (Περσῶν) οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ μέγιστοι, κεκαλλωπισμένοι παντὶ κόσμῳ Περσικῷ, πάντες ἀκινάκας ἔχοντες. τοιόνδε ἦν Ἀλεξάνδρου τὸ δικαστήριον ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις.

See Griffith in G. T. Griffith and N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Macedonia* II (Oxford 1979) 393f. W. L. Adams (in *Ancient Macedonia* IV [Thessaloniki 1986] 48ff) discusses freedom of speech in Macedonia without mentioning this passage in Poly-aenus. It seems that Alexander presided as Hegemon in some cases tried in the court of the Greek League, before he left for Asia. The trials of Cleander, Sitalces, and Heracon were instigated by *accusatores ... e provincia* (Curt. 10.1.2), who were exercising the right of appeal that Alexander as King of Asia had granted to all his subjects.

know little of trials when barbarians were defendants or appellants; the best example is probably the trial of Heracon, first acquitted and later "convicted by men of Susa" (Arr. 6.27.5).

A marquee was probably customary at Macedonian festivals. In 335 B.C. a marquee for 100 couches was set up for Alexander at Aegeae, not for administering justice but for entertaining guests at a state banquet "with splendid equipment" (Diod. 17.16.4). On the other hand, the gold columns, the canopies decorated with gold, the embroideries, and golden throne were Asiatic features in the Persian manner.⁵⁵ Alexander marked this combination of Macedonian and Persian royal customs by parading élite forces of both Macedonia and Persia.

The Bodyguards, standing by the king, were Macedonians of high rank, usually seven in number. The 500 "Macedones" constituted the Royal Infantry "Guard of the Macedonians" (Arr. 1.8.4), drawn from the tallest men, as already in Philip's time (Theopompus, *FGrHist* 115 F348). The 1,000 Macedonians wearing Macedonian uniforms constituted the Royal Hypaspist Guard (Arr. 1.8.4).⁵⁶ The Persian units, parallel to these, were the 500 Apple-bearers,⁵⁷ and two groups of 500 each, namely the Archers and the Susians. The number of Apple-bearers was reduced from the 1,000 of the Persian King's Guard, in order to equal the size of the Macedonian Infantry Guard. The Susians were also armed with bows, as Phylarchus (Ath. 539E) placed after the Apple-bearers a force of 1,000 archers. These Susians wore purple uniforms because, according to Phylarchus, Alexander had granted them that colour of uniform.⁵⁸ The 1,000 archers were equal in number to the Royal Hypaspist Guard. On the other hand, there was no Macedonian equivalent to the Guard of Elephants and the 10,000 Persians, for they indicate

⁵⁵ Plutarch (PA 37.7) tells the story of Alexander sitting for the first time "on the throne of Darius under the golden canopy"; and the marriages of Alexander and his Companions to Asiatic women were celebrated "in the golden-canopied marquee" (Plut. *Mor.* 329D), appropriately because they were conducted in the Persian manner (Arr. 7.4.6).

⁵⁶ These two guards are defined in my "The Various Guards of Philip II and Alexander III," *Historia* 40 (1991) 403ff (= *Collected Studies* II 186ff).

⁵⁷ When the Apple-bearers formed the Guard of the Persian king, they had numbered 1,000 (Hdt. 7.41.1f; Heracleides of Cumae, *FGrHist* 689F1=Ath. 514B). On the funerary car of Alexander a tablet showed as attendant on the king a Guard "of Macedonians" and a Guard of "Apple-bearers" (Diod. 18.27.1).

⁵⁸ Phylarchus, *FGrHist* 81F4. So too Eumenes granted the wearing of the purple: Plut. *Eum.* 8.7.

that the reception was for the Asiatics. We may note that a Guard of Macedonians, a Guard of Apple-bearers, and a group of Elephants were portrayed on the tablets that accompanied the funerary car of Alexander (Diod. 18.27.1).

Polyaenus' account presents striking similarities (even in precise phrases) to the account of Phylarchus, writing in the latter third century B.C.,⁵⁹ but differences indicate that Polyaeus did not draw entirely from Phylarchus. The likelihood is that both were familiar with an account written near the time of Alexander, *i.e.*, in the latter fourth century B.C., presumably by the court historian Chares.⁶⁰

The most prestigious place in the marquee, after the Bodyguards, was accorded to the Μακεδόνες ἀργυράσπιδες by Polyaeus and to ἀργυράσπιδες Μακεδόνες by Phylarchus. Polyaeus alone dates this form of ceremonial to within the time when Indians were present, *i.e.*, in 326-325 B.C. It is then understandable that such features of the marquee as the golden columns were inspired by those of the palaces of the Indian kings where they administered justice (Curt. 8.9.23-27).

An explanation of the term ἀργυράσπιδες appears just before the invasion of India:⁶¹ because the equipment of Indian soldiers was said to be enriched with gold and ivory (Curt. 8.5.4), Alexander adorned his cavalry with gold and silver, and "he added silver plates to the shields" (Curt. 8.4.3) and "called his army (*exercitum*) 'Argyraspides' after the silver shields" (Just. 12.7.5). As I have argued elsewhere (*THA* 104, 147f, 151), the common source of Curtius and Justin in these passages was very probably Cleitarchus. Although Cleitarchus may well

⁵⁹ Phylarchus, *FGrHist* 81F4. For instance in both accounts ὑπερτείνοντες οὐρανίσκοι διάχρυσοι ποικίλμασιν ἐκπεπονημένοι, πορφύροις καὶ μηλίαις ἐσθῆσιν ἐξησκημένοι and ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς σκηνῆς τὸ τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἄγμα διεσκευασμένον ἐφειστήκει.

⁶⁰ Chares mentioned the marquee for 100 couches in his account of the mass wedding (Ath. 538c). Aelian (*VH* 9.3) gave a similar version, but it is not relevant here, as Aelian wrote after Polyaeus.

⁶¹ It is generally agreed that mention of Argyraspides in the battle order of the Macedonians at Gaugamela in 331 B.C. at Diod. 17.57.1 and Curt. 4.13.26 are anachronistic: see my view cited above (n.56: 416). Tarn (II 149-53) maintained that all references to Argyraspides as existing in the reign of Alexander were anachronistic, but he failed to mention the Argyraspides of Phylarchus, Polyaeus, and Aelian. His view has been supported by D. Kienast, *Philip II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden* (Munich 1973) 287; R. A. Lock, "The Origins of the Argyraspids," *Historia* 26 (1977) 377.

have exaggerated, it is to be noted that Curtius and Justin were not restricting the addition of gold and silver ornamentation, and in Justin's case the name "Argyraspides," to any individual unit or units.⁶² We may, however, be confident that Alexander would have issued such shields first of all to his Infantry Guards. That may explain why Chares, if he was the ultimate source of the statement in Polyaeus, described one of the Infantry Guards in the court of Alexander as "argyraspides" within the years 326-325 B.C., and why Alexander created "a Persian unit of Argyraspides" at Opis in 324 B.C. (Arr. 7.11.3).

II. Conclusions and Comparisons

As argued above, the writers whose accounts Polyaeus used for his own versions were in all probability the following:

Cleitarchus:	4.3.27 in part (Susian Gates) 4.3.20 (mercenaries at Massaga) 4.3.6 (camp at Gaugamela) 4.3.30 final remark only (Sangala)
Ptolemy:	4.3.16 (Granicus) 4.3.31 in part (Cossaei)
Aristobulus:	4.3.27 in part (Susian Gates) 4.3.22 (Hydaspes)
Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus:	4.3.17 (caltrops at Gaugamela) 4.3.30 the main source (Sangala)
Nearchus:	4.3.31 in part (Cossaei)
Phylarchus:	4.3.34 the main source (court of justice)
Curtius:	4.3.29 (Sogdian rock)
Arrian:	4.3.11 (Thracian wagons)
X (unidentified)	4.3.27 in part (Susian Gates) 4.3.12 (Thebes).

Of these the original writers were Cleitarchus, Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Nearchus; the secondary writers Phylarchus, who had probably used Chares, an original writer; Curtius, who had

⁶² Bosworth's "this new term was reserved for the hypaspists" (*Conquest* 270) is his own *ipse dixit*. Tarn (II 151) had given some reasons for advancing a similar view.

probably relied on Cleitarchus and Aristobulus; and Arrian, who had used Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus. In each case Polyaeus presumably chose a writer, because he found in his work the most striking version of a stratagem (most clearly the choice of Curtius for 4.3.29, the Sogdian rock).

The secondary writers may be called intermediate or *Zwischenquellen*. The clearest example of Polyaeus using such a writer is at 8.35–42, where Polyaeus took his versions of the acts of eight courageous women from Plutarch's *Mulierum virtutes* 16–27 (*Mor.* 253F–63C). Polyaeus abbreviated accurately and wrote in his own style. He even kept the same order, although it was haphazard. Plutarch had given his reason for doing so: "Cases of individual bravery I will put down as they come to me, not in any order, because I think that the record of the present subject does not at all require a chronological arrangement" (tr. F. C. Babbitt).⁶³ Polyaeus evidently thought likewise, not only in this context but also in recording the stratagems of Alexander at 4.3, for the emperors were interested in the subject of each stratagem and not in its date. But when we try to assess the historical worth of each item, the *Zwischenquelle* does not usually help; Plutarch, for instance, rarely named his source.⁶⁴

For Alexander's stratagems Polyaeus added 'improving' touches to make a stratagem more striking still: 4.3.11, "heavy-laden" wagons, 4.3.29, "unarmed" warriors, 4.3.17, caltrops covering "the space between the armies," 4.3.30, the inhabitants of Sangala "slain from the youth upwards," and 4.3.31, the proclamation of mourning at the start of the campaign against the Cossaei. We owe to Polyaeus some points not in the surviving accounts of other authors: the use of slings at the Susian Gates (4.3.27), the 'outflanking' at the Granicus (4.3.16), the 'second' hill at Massaga (4.3.20),⁶⁵ the position of Porus on

⁶³ P. A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Method: An Analysis of the Mulierum Virtutes* (Cambridge [Mass.] 1965) 16, commented on this repeated order.

⁶⁴ On the other hand, the unknown author of the *Mulierum Virtutes* named as sources Herodotus, Ctesias, Timaeus, Hellanicus, Aeschines Socraticus, Xenophilus, and Meneclis, no doubt truthfully. See A. Westermann, *Paradoxographoi, Scriptorum rerum mirabilium Graeci* (Braunschweig 1839) 213ff.

⁶⁵ A. Abramenko, "Alexander vor Mazagae und Aornus," *Klio* 76 (1994) 203 n.71, argues that Polyaeus was referring to Indian mercenaries leaving not Massaga but Aornus. He did not notice the 'second hill', which on my interpretation places the episode at Massaga.

the leftmost elephant⁶⁶ and the space of fifty feet between the elephants (4.3.22), and the Indians among those to whom Alexander administered justice (4.3.24). Another contribution by Polyaeus was his own clear, factual, and uniform style, which overlaid and concealed the style of his sources.

On my interpretation of only some passages on Alexander, it is apparent that in 4.3 Polyaeus had read the works of original and secondary writers before he made his own choice, and that he consulted quite a wide range of such writers. This interpretation indicates that Polyaeus was justified—at least in the passages here considered—in claiming that he had engaged in much original and laborious enquiry (2 *praef.*: ἀφ' ὅσης ἱστορίας καὶ ὄσῳ πόνῳ τὰδε συλλεξάμενος).⁶⁷

My conclusions may be compared with those of nineteenth-century scholars, whose views were epitomised by J. Melber ("Über die Quellen und den Wert der Strategemensammlung Polyäns, *NJbb* Suppl. 14 [Leipzig 1885] 417–688). His conclusions for Alexander's stratagems, with which alone we are dealing, may be summarised as follows. Polyaeus did not arrange the thirty-two stratagems of 4.3 in their chronological sequence, *i.e.*, from 336–323 B.C. Melber did observe such a sequence, however, within three separable parts of 4.3, which he called "Groups": namely, items 1–10, 11–22, 23–31. In fact his observation was less than accurate, for in his Group 1 items 1–2, 5 are undatable; in Group 2 items 7–10 are not in chronological sequence, and items 13–14 are undatable; and in Group 3 items 24–25 are out of chronological sequence, and item 28 is undatable. The next step in Melber's argument was that each Group, its content being (he thought) in chronological order, must have been drawn from a separate source (on the assumption that the source had arranged its material in chronological order). He proceeded next to identify those separate sources as follows: for Group 1 an *Anekdotenversammlung*, an *Apophthegmen-sammlung*, and for item 9 an excerpt from a *Sammlung*; for

⁶⁶ This is probably correct, as in Devine (1987) 108, for from this position Porus would have been able to order and to direct the left part of his phalanx to turn left and move to the left and he would have been in the thick of the fighting. Had he been in the centre, he could not have seen the course of the action beyond his left wing, and he would have been on the periphery of the fighting, for the centre was at least 1.5 km. from the left wing.

⁶⁷ Buraselis (121) has shown that the *Prefaces* addressed to the two emperors are to be treated as "basic evidence." I am grateful to him for sending me an offprint.

Group 2 the history of Cleitarchus, whether directly or indirectly (p.615); and for Group 3 a *Sammelwerk* (p.616).⁶⁸

Melber's derivation of his Groups 1 and 3 from already existing 'Collections', which Polyaeus would merely have copied, is not compatible with the emphasis that Polyaeus placed on his own research and his own labours. Nor when we consult the available 'collections' do we find any significant use of them by Polyaeus for the stratagems of Alexander. Thus the thirty-four items in Plutarch's *Apophthegmata* of Alexander (*Mor.* 179D–81F) and the thirty-two items of Polyaeus 4.3 share only one in common, namely the order that the Macedonians should shave their beards, so as not to afford a handhold for their enemies (Plut. no. 10, *Mor.* 180B; Polyaeus. 4.3. 2)—an order ascribed to Alexander also at Plut. *Thes.* 5.4.⁶⁹ The gap between Frontinus' collection of stratagems and that of Polyaeus was some eighty years, and it would have been easy for Polyaeus to have simply copied items from Frontinus. The relation between them is very different. Only one item, namely Alexander's refusal to drink water from a helmet when it was not available for his men, is shared (Front. 1.7.7; Polyaeus. 4.3.25), but Polyaeus might have taken it from elsewhere, as Arrian remarks (6.26.1) that "some others" told the story (e.g. Curt. 7.5.10; PA 42.7). In three instances it seems that Polyaeus corrects Frontinus without naming him.⁷⁰ At 1.11.14 Frontinus ascribes to Alexander the trick of transferring onto a liver the words "victory for the king" and then showing the liver to his men. Polyaeus gives a fuller account of the trick but ascribes it to Attalus (4.20). No doubt Polyaeus is right, for Alexander respected the omens of sacrifice that his seer Aristander interpreted (e.g. Arr. 4.4.3). Frontinus (3.7.4) attributes a stratagem during a siege of Babylon to Alexander, which Polyaeus attributes to Cyrus—correctly, for Alexander never besieged Babylon, whereas Cyrus did and used that stratagem

⁶⁸ Wheeler (Krentz and Wheeler viii) make the point that "the practical aim of the military type of stratagem collection ... sets stratagem collections apart" from other collections.

⁶⁹ Also in Synesius 16, p.79 C. E. Rohde, *RhM* 38 (1883) 303f, held the view that Polyaeus used Plutarch directly and that the ultimate source was Ptolemy.

⁷⁰ One reason for the silence of Polyaeus may have been the relationship between Frontinus and Marcus Aurelius, as Wheeler (Krentz and Wheeler xiii) remarks, for "Marcus Aurelius' great-great-grandfather had married Frontinus' sister."

(Hdt. 1.191.3; Xen. *Cyr.* 7.6.16). At 1.4.9-9a Frontinus gives two accounts of a stratagem in crossing a river, namely the Hydaspes (1.4.9) and the Indus (1.4.9a); of these the first is very brief, and the second, naming the Indus instead of the Hydaspes, is inaccurate (cf. Arr. 5.12.4-14.6). Polyaeus (4.3.9) puts matters right in a full account derived from Arr. 5.10.3 or Arrian's sources. So much for Polyaeus' use of such 'collections' as have survived for his stratagems of Alexander.

Modern scholarship lays less stress on 'collections'. Thus, writing generally of Polyaeus' work, Wheeler (Krentz and Wheeler xv) writes: "No doubt he did consult other stratagem collections ... it is improbable that he could have hoped to gain the well-read Marcus Aurelius' attention merely by reworking another *exempla* collection." Whereas some writers had had doubts, Wheeler states firmly that "as a pleader in Roman courts Polyaeus had to know Latin" (xiii), and in consequence could have read the works, for instance, of Frontinus and Curtius. That is clearly correct. There is also more readiness to believe that Polyaeus did sometimes consult the works of earlier authors. Thus in a dissertation of 1970, R. J. Phillips⁷¹ maintained that Polyaeus consulted Theopompus, Hieronymus, Phylarchus, Duris ("possibly"), and Plutarch. In 1987 D. M. Lewis⁷² argued that Polyaeus (4.3.32) used Ctesias, possibly through Cleitarchus, for the list of foods for the Persian kings. In 1994 Wheeler (Krentz and Wheeler xv) went further. He named seventeen authors of whom "traces have been found ... with much debate over their direct or indirect use." I have tried to show here that for some passages concerning Alexander Polyaeus consulted six identifiable authors.⁷³

CLARE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
June, 1996

⁷¹ *The Sources and Methods of Polyaeus* (diss. Harvard University 1970), summarized in *HSCP* 76 (1972) 297f.

⁷² "The King's Dinner (Polyaeus IV 3.32)," in H. Sancisi-Weedenburg and A. Kuhrt, edd., *Achaemenid History II: The Greek Sources* (Leiden 1987) 81: "On the whole the case is strongest for Ctesias."

⁷³ This paper has been extended and improved as a result of suggestions by the Editor's reader to whom I am very grateful.