

Icons and Relics: a Comparison

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TWENTY YEARS AGO an article appeared arguing that those who opposed the icons in the eighth century were not equally opposed to the holy relics. A considerable quantity of these had already been acquired by and deposited in the city of Constantine by that time; there is no reliable evidence that any of them were ever attacked or their efficacy called in question by the iconoclasts.¹ Implicit in the argument (though not examined in that article) was the assumption that relic and icon were distinguished from each other in some very basic way (or ways) at that time. The distinction(s) may not, however be immediately obvious to us who view the events all these centuries later. The issue, moreover, is confused by the existence of some few curious objects which seem to hold the middle ground by managing to pertain in some way or other to both categories: the portrait of the Mother of God allegedly painted by Saint Luke, for instance, is both an icon of the Theotokos and a secondary relic of the Evangelist. The sacred Mandyllion of Edessa imprinted (by contact) with the Dominical features is both icon and secondary relic of the Lord; so too in a sense is its little sister, the Keramidion. The Letter of the Lord to Abgar of Edessa might be included here, perhaps too the icons “not made with hands” and those drops of the “Blood” of Christ which exuded from an icon.

¹J. Wortley, “Iconoclasm and Leipsanoclasm: Leo III, Constantine V and the Relics,” *Byzantinische Forschungen* 8 (1982) 253–279. But twenty-five years earlier P. N. Trempelas had remarked: “χαρακτηριστικὸν τυγχάνει ὅτι οἱ εἰκονομάχοι δὲν ἐστράφησαν κατὰ τῶν ἁγίων λειψάνων,” *Megalê Hellenikê Egkyklopaideia*² 10 (Athens 1957) 899 col. 3.

These curiosities are exceptions, however, and should be set aside; for the most part the holy objects of Byzantium fall very clearly into one of two categories: icons (portrayals) and relics (things).

Since however both are undoubtedly material objects of one kind or another, why should the one have incurred the censure and hostility of the Isaurian emperors while the other apparently escaped them? What could have distinguished the one from the other in the eyes of our Later-Roman forefathers? These are intriguing questions in themselves, but there is also a very practical reason for attempting to answer them.

The debate concerning the icons raged fast and often furiously for most of the eighth and half of the ninth century. We know a great deal about that debate, for there is no lack of primary documents and maybe even a superfluity of secondary material.² Yet, as most writers on the topic lament, the arguments in favour of the icons are hugely over-represented in the extant documentation to the near total exclusion of the opposite point of view. This is generally thought, probably correctly, to be because the triumph of the partisans of the icons was so complete that they were able to suppress almost all the literature pertaining to the rival faction. Thus it is that almost everything we know about that iconoclast position is derived from the *Horos* of the Council of Hiereia in 754, and we only know that because it survives in the minutes of the Council of 787, at which it was read out point by point in order to be refuted (Mansi 13.356CD).

A note of disquiet concerning icons can be detected for a considerable time before the matter erupted in 726; it has been said that "clerical opposition to the artistic depiction of sacred personages had its roots in late antiquity."³ The general lines of

²See (most recently) Kenneth Parry, *Depicting the Word: Byzantine Iconophile Thought of the Eighth and Ninth Centuries* (Leiden 1996).

³ODB II 975, citing N. H. Baynes, *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (London 1955) 116–143, 226–239.

that opposition are well known: icons were in breach of the biblical prohibition of idolatry because they blurred the distinction between the portrait and what was portrayed.⁴ But, despite vigorous attempts to deduce more, that is almost the total extent of what is known of the iconoclasts' animadversions.⁵ It was partly in the hope that their animadversions might be brought into slightly sharper focus that one undertook this investigation of the distinction between the relics (of which they seem to have approved) and the icons to which they took definite exception.

Icons, with the possible exception of those few said not to have been made with hands, were (and are) wholly the work of human hands; whereas relics, being parts of human bodies are not: they are, in a sense, the handiwork of God. True, but this distinction only holds for *primary* relics, which are actual portions of a sacred body. From very early indeed *secondary* relics were also (and likewise) venerated. These are objects which are in some way associated with a sacred body: clothing, tools, instruments of torture, and so forth. Obviously, these must have been the work of somebody's hands. Even the most celebrated secondary relic of all, the Wood of the True Cross, must have been sawn and fashioned into a *patibulum* by human hands. Hence the distinction man-made/God-made will not suffice.

When however one turns to the pages of holy writ and looks at them through the eyes of (say) an eighth-century Roman, then a very sharp and altogether convincing distinction comes to light. It is this: that while icons are severely condemned in the Scriptures, the use of relics appears to be sanctioned.

⁴E. Kitzinger, "The Cult of Images in the Age before Iconoclasm," *DOP* 8 (1954) 82–150.

⁵Most recently Alain Besançon, *L'Image interdite: une histoire intellectuelle de l'iconoclasme* (Paris 1994), finds little more to say of the ninth-century iconoclast dialectic.

The incidence of the word *icon* in the Septuagint is, for the most part, one of a group of highly pejorative terms, but not entirely so. It is used in two quite different and highly contrasting ways, one of which is meliorative. Such uses occur exclusively in Genesis, where the word *icon* is used of that *likeness* to Himself in which the Divinity creates man: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν,⁶ "God created Adam: he created him in the image of God," κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ (Gen 5:1). This is why it is forbidden to take human life: because man is the *icon* of God, to slay him is decide: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made I man," ὅτι ἐν εἰκόνι Θεοῦ ἐποίησα τὸν ἄνθρωπον (Gen 9:6). (The word *icon* is used in this way once in the New Testament too, where Paul says that man does not need to cover his head because man "is the image and glory of God," εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων.)⁷

Clearly when it is used in this way the word *icon* refers to a unique act of creation and the exclusive prerogative of the Deity: the projection of the Divine likeness into creation. In this sense only God can make an *icon*, and that once only. Yet the implications of this unique act are many; not least that if man is the *icon* of God, then Christ, the perfect man, is the perfect *icon* of God—a point which Paul recognizes when he speaks of Christ "who is the image of God" ὃς ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ.⁸ For

⁶Gen 1:26 (and 27). Except where otherwise stated, biblical quotations are taken from the Authorised Version of 1611. Other translations are the writer's own work.

⁷1 Cor 11:7. Yet somewhat illogically Paul later speaks of this icon as a future (not a present) quality of man: "And as we have borne the image of the earthly, so we shall bear the image of the heavenly," καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου, 1 Cor 15:49.

⁸2 Cor 4:4. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews is much bolder, describing Christ as "the brightness of his [the Father's] glory and the express image of his person," ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, Heb 1:3.

Paul the Christian vocation is to be transformed into that same image: "We all with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord are changed into the same image (τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα), from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord" (2 Cor 3:18.). Paul had already said something similar in a much fought-over passage: "For whom he [God] did foreknow he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son," προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνης τοῦ Υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ (Rom 8:29).

But if for Paul man is only in the process of being brought into conformity with the divine *icon* which is Christ, for the pre-Christian writers there is no such process: man is created in the divine image, no matter how unworthy of it he might be, and in it he is. Probably the most remarkable statement of this conviction is the eighth Psalm. It is a breathless hymn in praise of man as the supreme accomplishment of the Creator (Ps 8:4–6):

What is man that thou art mindful of him,
and the son of man that thou visitest him?
Thou madest him lower than the angels
to crown him with glory and worship.
Thou makest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands;
thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet.

Let it be noted in passing that this extremely high "doctrine of man" carries with it as a corollary respect for his (or her) mortal remains. Hence the care with which Moses and Joshua transported the corpse of Joseph to the "promised land" (Ex 13:19, Jos 24:32). Thus even the severed head of the discredited Ishbosheth was given decent burial, as were the pieces of the wicked Jezebel which remained after the dogs had finished with her, not much more than "the skull, the feet and the palms of her hands" (2 Sam 4:12, 2/4 Kgs 9:35).

The occurrences of the word *icon* in the sense mentioned above are few. There are more (though not many more) occurrences of

the word in a pejorative sense and several more of its cognates (idol, image, likeness, etc.); and a very pejorative sense indeed it is. The obvious point of departure is of course the second of the Ten Commandments: "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image nor the likeness of anything," οὐ ποιήσεις σεαυτῷ εἶδολον οὐδὲ παντὸς ὁμοίωμα, "thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them," οὐ προσκυνήσεις αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ μὴ λατρεύσης αὐτοῖς (Ex 20:3, 5). The Deuteronomic text is explicit; using the word *icon*, it categorically forbids the making of "a graven image, the similitude of any figure, the likeness of male or female," γλύπτον ὁμοίωμα, πᾶσαν εἰκόνα, ὁμοίωμα ἀρσενικοῦ ἢ θηλυκοῦ (Deut 4:16).

Needless to say, the prohibition was often ignored. Idols were created and, when they were, frequently (though not by any means always) the word *icon* is used to characterise these man-made divinities. Thus when Jehoida and the people marched into the temple of Baal, "his altars and his *icons* brake they in pieces," καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ συνέτριψαν ἀγαθῶς (2/4 Kgs 11:18). Manasseh "set a carved image, the idol which he had made (εἰκόνα ἣν ἐποίησεν) in the house of the Lord" (2 Chron/Para 33:7, cf. Ezek 7:20). Paul uses the same word when he says the Jews "changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an *icon* made like to corruptible man," ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνοϋ φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου (Rom 1:23). There are many other condemnations of the Israelites for the making and worshipping of images in which some other word or expression is used for the offending object.⁹ Predictably, it is often simply said to be an *idol* (εἶδολον),¹⁰ but there are other expressions redolent of deep disgust. These range from "wooden handiwork" (τὰ ξύλινα χειροποίητα) through "inventions" (ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἐνθυμή-

⁹The Deuteronomist appears to have preferred the word ὁμοίωμα: Deut 4:16–18, 23, 25 (eight occurrences in all). He also uses it of the Divine likeness which no man saw at any time: 4:12, 15.

¹⁰E.g. Ez 18:12; "dumb idols" in Hab 2:18.

ματα) and abominations (προσοχθίσματα) to absolute abhorrences (βδελύγματα).¹¹

There is worse to come: *icon* is the word used of the strange figure of Daniel's vision with its head of gold and feet of clay. Then that great golden image which Nebuchadnezzar set up for all to worship when the music played is also called *icon*. Hippolytus was the first of a long series of writers who emphasised the resemblance between the Three Children who allowed themselves to be thrown into the fiery furnace rather than venerate that icon and the Christian martyrs who suffered a similar fate for rejecting the icon of Caesar,¹² which is clearly what is intended by the frequent references to "the beast and its *icon*" in Revelations 13–20.

There appears to be one and only one time the word *icon* is clearly used in the Bible to mean a picture rather than a statue (or a bas-relief as in "whose is the *icon* and superscription?"),¹³ when Ahilbah the sister of Aholah, saw *icons*, "men portrayed upon the wall, the images (εἰκόνας) of the Chaldeans portrayed with vermillion, girded with girdles upon their loins" (Ezek 23.14). This experience provoked altogether disastrous results which the reader must discover for himself.

But if icons, by whatever word they are known, are an abomination¹⁴ the Psalmist has even worse to say of those who create and believe in them:

Their idols are silver and gold
even the work of men's hands.
They have mouths and speak not,
eyes have they and see not.

¹¹ Lev 26:30, Ez 14:6 and 18:6, 2/4 Kgs 23:24, 2 Chron 15:8.

¹² Dan 2 *passim* and Dan 3 *passim*. Hippolyte, *Commentaire sur Daniel*, ed. and transl. Maurice Lefèvre (SC 14 [Paris 1947]) 145–171: 2.15–28 (note 2.21 on how a Christian faces martyrdom).

¹³ Mc 12:16, Mt 22:20, Lc 20:24.

¹⁴ καὶ εἰκόνας τῶν βδελυγμάτων αὐτῶν ἐποίησαν ἐξ αὐτῶν, Ezek 7:20.

They have ears and hear not,
 noses have they and smell not.
 They have hands and handle not;
 feet have they and walk not,
 neither speak they through their throat.
 They that make them are like unto them
 and so are all such as put their trust in them.¹⁵

And again:

They made a calf in Horeb
 and worshipped the carved image;
 Thus they turned their glory
 into the similitude of a calf that eateth hay.¹⁶

The point of all this is that an eighth-century churchman who had reservations about the use of icons in Christian worship would not *only* have been motivated by the second commandment. There is a great deal more in holy writ the total effect of which would be to anathematise anything which the word *icon* might describe. The making of such an object is condemned as an affront to, even an intrusion upon, the divine prerogative.¹⁷ Thus the very word *icon* (and any other that might be used in its stead) must have been poisoned and rendered distasteful in the minds of those (such as our churchman) who knew the Scriptures well. It must surely have been difficult for such a person to use those words with equanimity.¹⁸

¹⁵Ps 115:4–8 (= 135:15–18), LXX Ps 113:12–16 = Ps 134:15–18; cf Isaiah 40:18ff, μὴ εἰκόνα ἐποίησεν τέκτων κτλ.

¹⁶ἐν ὁμοιώματι μόσχου ἔσθοντος χόρτον, Ps 105/6:19–20.

¹⁷Clement of Alexandria says explicitly that he usurps the divine power who by carving, molding, or painting (διὰ τέχνης ἥτοι πλαστικῆς ἢ γραφικῆς) claims to be a creator of flora and fauna (καὶ λέγων ἑαυτὸν ποιητὴν εἶναι τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν): *Strom.* 6.16.377, quoted by André Grabar, *L'Iconoclasme byzantin*² (Paris 1984) 24–25.

¹⁸How such a person in Constantinople must have exulted when they sang that verse in the Psalms which says: “So shalt thou make their image to vanish out of your city,” Κύριε ἐν τῇ πόλει σου τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτῶν ἐξουδενώσεις, Ps 73:19b/LXX Ps 72:20b.

Turning now to relics (λείψανα): Here no such strictures and reservations would apply since the word itself is not found either in the Septuagint or in the New Testament; hence, in contradistinction to *icon*, it has no biblical associations. Human remains (as already noted) are to be decently, respectfully interred for they are the remains of that which was created in the *icon* of the Divinity.

There is however one particular mention of a corpse in the Septuagint; it is a *cause célèbre* for it came to be of considerable importance. Thus the anonymous chronicler of the Kings of Israel and Judah:

And Elisha died and they buried him. And the bands of the Moabites invaded the land at the coming of the year. And it came to pass that as they were burying a man, behold, they espied a band of men; and they cast the man into the sepulchre (τάφος) of Elisha. And when the man was let down, and touched the bones of Elisha he revived and stood up on his feet (καὶ ἐπορεύθη καὶ ἤψατο τῶν ὀστέων Ἐλισαίῃ καὶ ἔζησε καὶ ἀνέστη ἐπὶ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ) (2/4 Kgs 13:20–21).

We have two commentaries on this passage, both from the mid fourth century, one Syrian, the other Palestinian.

The Syrian, from *Apostolic Constitutions*, forms part of an argument clearly designed to combat the traditional Jewish teaching¹⁹ that one is in some way defiled by contact with a corpse and therefore must perform rituals to purge the defilement. Christians need not hesitate (the writer opines) to assemble at tombs of the saints, there to celebrate the Eucharist, offering prayers, hymns, and so forth. There follow a few scriptural citations in support of this sentiment: “Right dear in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints,” τίμιος ἐναντίον

¹⁹It was also Roman teaching, one which Julian tried to revive. He says the practice of carrying the dead through the street “pollutes the eyes of men by its ill-omened aspect. For what day is well-omened by a funeral? Or how can one come to the gods and temples from a funeral? ... the sight of all the people must be freed from this spectacle” (*Cod.Theod.* 9.17.5, A.D. 363, transl. C. Pharr).

Κυρίου ὁ θάνατος τῶν ὁσίων αὐτοῦ, “The memory of the just is to be celebrated” [our translation], μνήμη δικαίων μετ’ ἐγκωμίων.²⁰ Then comes the commentary on the passage in question:

The mortal remains [λείψανα] of those who lived with God are not to be held in dishonour. For the Prophet Elisha, after he had died, raised up a dead man who had been murdered by Syrian brigands. When this man’s corpse came into contact with the bones of Elisha he rose up and lived. This would not have happened if the body of Elisha had not been holy.²¹

Cyril of Jeruslaem (*ca* 315–386) speaking on this same passage in the Catechetical lectures which he delivered *ca* 350, goes considerably further:

[Consider] Elisha who twice raised somebody up (τὸν δις ἐγείραντα):²² once when he was alive,²³ again after his death. While he was alive he brought about a resurrection by means of his own soul. But lest the souls alone of the righteous be held in honour and that it might be believed that power (δύναμις) resides in the bodies of the righteous, when a dead man was thrown into the tomb of Elisha and came into contact with the dead body of the Prophet, it was vivified. The dead body of the Prophet performed a task of the soul. That which lay dead conferred life on the expired while that which conferred life remained dead. Why was this so? So that, since Elisha did not revive, the deed would not be attributed solely to his soul; also to show that, in the absence of the soul, a kind of power (τις δύναμις) resides within the bodies of the saints by virtue of the

²⁰Ps 116:13, LXX Ps 115:6; Prov 10:7.

²¹*Apostolic Constitutions* 6.30.5, *Les Constitutions Apostoliques*, ed. and transl. Marcel Metzger (SC 329 [Paris 1987]) II 390.

²²In *SynaxCP* col. 749.14, on his feast-day, 14 June, it is said of Elisha καὶ νεκρὸς ὢν νεκρὸν ἔγειρε. The twelve-page notice dedicated to Elisha in the so-called “Imperial Menologion” scarcely mentions the event in question: Basil Latyshev, ed., *Menologiū anonymi byzantini saeculi x quae supersunt* II (St Petersburg 1912) 49–62, esp. 62.5–7.

²³This refers to the raising up of the son of the Shunnamite woman, 2/4 Kgs 4.8–44.

righteous soul which [formerly] dwelt within them for so many years and at whose service they were.²⁴

Cyril was not of course by any means the first to speak highly of the relics of the saints (see below) but he may have been the first to enunciate the idea of an inherent (and communicable) power emanating from the physical remains of the holy dead. But what this passage establishes for present purposes is that, far from disapproving of relics or forbidding their use, the Scriptures allow a precedent (admittedly, only one) which could be—and indeed was—cited to justify the entire practice of relic-veneration. So much then for primary relics; what of the relics of derivative distinction, the secondary relics?

Here the Scriptures are more rewarding. There is the case of the “mantle” of Elijah: incidentally, the word here is *μηλωτή*, the same word used by the Desert Fathers for the sheepskin or rough hairy cloak they wore (Lampe *s.v.*). It was in such a mantle that Elijah wrapped his face when he heard “the still small voice.” It was by casting this mantle on the other’s shoulders that he identified Elisha as his successor (2/4 Kgs 19:13, 19). With this he smote the waters of Jordan and divided them (2/4 Kgs 2:8). But it is what comes after that concerns us here: after the ascension of Elijah “in chariots of fire,” Elisha needed to get back to the other side of Jordan:

He took up also the mantle of Elijah that fell from him and went back and stood by the bank of Jordan; and he took the mantle of Elijah that fell from him and smote the waters and said: Where is the Lord God of Elijah? and when he also had smitten the waters, they parted hither and thither: and Elisha went over (2/4 Kgs 2:13–14).

There is no further mention of this relic of Elijah which nevertheless appears to have functioned as a secondary relic on this one occasion. The New Testament however provides

²⁴Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catacheses* 18.16 (PG 33.1036B–1037A).

explicit sanction for and even a rationale of secondary relics. The matter is taken up in the continuation of the passage from Cyril of Jerusalem cited above:

For if handkerchiefs and aprons, things exterior to the body, raised up the sick when applied to the patient, how much more then would the body of the prophet itself raise up the dead?

Here Cyril is referring to a passage in the Acts of the Apostles:

And God wrought special miracles (δυνάμεις τε οὐ τὰς τυχούσας) by the hands of Paul: so that from his body were brought unto the sick handkerchiefs and aprons (ἀποφέρεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ χρωτὸς αὐτοῦ σουδάρια ἢ σιμικίνθια) and the diseases departed from them.²⁵

Cyril had already commented earlier on this passage:

So great was the spiritual grace upon [Paul] that not only did he heal by touch but even handkerchiefs and aprons brought away from his flesh healed the sick, giving them relief from spirits of the evil one.²⁶

Cyril could have cited the case of the woman in the Gospel, the haemorrhoussa, who said “If I may touch but his clothes I shall be whole,” and also the sick who were laid out at Jerusalem “that at least the shadow of Peter passing by might overshadow some of them” (Mk 5:28, Acts 5:15). Half a century later John Chrysostom was less reticent:

O how great is the virtue of the saints! Not only their words; not only their bodies, but even their very garments are always esteemed venerable by the whole creation. The sheepskin [of Elijah and Elisha] divided the Jordan! the sandals of the Three Children trampled down the fire! The word of Elisha changed the waters, so that it made them to bear the iron on their sur-

²⁵ Acts 19:11–12. Cf. what is said of Polycarp who, going to his martyrdom, could not loosen his shoes διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πιστῶν σπουδάζειν ὅστις τάχιον τοῦ χρωτὸς αὐτοῦ ἐφάπηται (Eus. *Hist.Eccl.* 4.15.30).

²⁶ *Catecheses* 17.30–31 (PG 33.1004A).

face! The rod of Moses divided the Red Sea and cleft the rock!
 The garments of Paul expelled diseases! The shadow of Peter put
 death to flight! The ashes of the holy Martyrs drive away
 demons!²⁷

Cyril however does not need to go to such lengths because his point is already well made: he has identified a solid, biblical precedent for the use of secondary relics.

If, on the other hand, our hypothetical eighth-century churchman was uncomfortable with the mere word *icon*, it is not difficult to understand why, given its biblical associations. True, what this investigation has discovered does not by any means amount to an iconoclastic dialectic, but in laying bare the emotive connotations which clustered around the word *icon* it may have revealed something of the inner strength and determination of the opposition. Let it be said in conclusion that there are hints here and there that such opposition may have been older and deeper than has been supposed (though this must be the subject of a subsequent investigation). Writing at Constantinople in the years 513–518 Romanos the Melode says in his magnificent *Kontakion on the Three Children* (5.3–4):

ἦν γὰρ ἄθεσμον ὄντως τὸ προσκυνεῖν τῇ ἀψύχῳ
 καὶ κτίσιν πᾶσαν ἐδόνει τὸ ἀντίθεον τιμώμενον.

In itself the couplet seems to be no more than a random statement about idolatry, but it may be more. It is worth comparing with this the first and last lines of the same poem:

incipit: χειρόγραφον εἰκόνα μὴ σεβασθέντες
 ἀλλ' ἄγραφον οὐσίαν θωρακισθέντες
 τρισμακάριοι [*sc.* the Three Children]

²⁷John Chrysostom, *Hom. 8.3 Concerning the Statues* (transl. W. R. W. Stephens).

desinit: λυποῦμεν γὰρ τοῦτον [sc. Θεὸν] ἐὰν αὐτὸν ἀφήςωμεν
καὶ τὴν πίστιν τὴν ὀρθὴν παρατρώσωμεν.²⁸

Romanos could here be warning his contemporaries that a certain way of grieving the Creator and wounding the true faith is to revere a hand-made icon. He could be playing upon some deep-sounding sympathetic strings in the *psychê* of the well-read churchman.

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²⁸ *Romanos le Melode, Hymnes*, ed. and transl. José Grosdidier de Matons, I (SC 99 [Paris 1964]) 360–403.