

Health, Harm, and the Civic Body: Medical Language in the Speeches of Demosthenes

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DURING HIS LIFETIME, Demosthenes saw the meteoric rise of Macedon under Philip II. Eventually, he would also witness its ascendancy under Philip's son, Alexander. Throughout the course of his political career, Demosthenes took a hard line, aggressive stance towards Macedon. But for years he would face considerable pushback from fellow politicians for his dogged pro-war policies, notably because of Athens' participation in a series of unsuccessful and expensive military campaigns, which left its citizens hesitant to openly embrace yet another war.¹ Facing what he perceived to be an apathetic public response, Demosthenes aimed to persuade the Athenian people that war with Macedon was necessary. In this paper, I examine one of his persuasive (and ultimately defensive) strategies: medical language and imagery.

First, I turn to Demosthenes' deliberative speeches. Inspired by and working in a rich tradition of analogizing politics and medicine, Demosthenes, I argue, uses medical language and imagery to shame the Athenians into supporting his policies. In the second half, I look at Demosthenes' defense of these same policies in arguably his most famous forensic speech, *On the Crown* (Dem. 18). To accomplish this, I argue, Demosthenes appropriates the Hippocratic medical concept of *prognôsis*. In doing so, I contend, he moves the definition of political excellence

¹ I. Worthington, *Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece* (Oxford 2013) 65–67.

away from victory in battle to foresight.² Lastly, I hope to show that Demosthenes' medical language should be seen as engaging in a broader dialogue on civic duty in which *andreia*, "manly courage," plays an important role.

1. *Contextualizing Demosthenes' medical language*

Before turning to his deliberative speeches, it is essential to briefly consider how Demosthenes might have come into contact with Hippocratic theories. The answer, I contend, is that empirical medicine had become part of the cultural landscape of Athens.³ This may have been the case even as early as the fifth century, as the literature of the period suggests.⁴ Tragedy was the first to pervasively use Hippocratic medical language, perhaps because of a shared concern with human suffering.⁵ What the Hippocratic medical writers offered the tragedians was a rich, new vocabulary of suffering that encouraged the audience to relive their own experiences with illness and disease.⁶

² H. Yunis, "Politics as Literature: Demosthenes and the Burden of the Athenian Past," *Arion* 8 (2000) 104.

³ By empirical medicine, I refer to medical systems reliant on observation and empirical evidence, to which the Hippocratic writers adhere; see L. Dean-Jones and R. Rosen (eds.), *Ancient Concepts of the Hippocratic* (Austin 2015) 37.

⁴ L. Dean-Jones, "Literacy and the Charlatan in Ancient Greek Medicine," in H. Yunis (ed.), *Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge 2003) 97–121, esp. 98.

⁵ J. C. Kosak, *Heroic Measures: Hippocratic Medicine in the Making of Euripidean Tragedy* (Leiden/Boston 2004), esp. 1.

⁶ For a general treatment of the tragedians' use of Hippocratic medical language see J. Jouanna, *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen: Selected Papers* (Leiden/Boston 2012) 55–80, esp. 55, and H. W. Miller, "Medical Terminology in Tragedy," *TAPA* 75 (1944) 156–167. For Euripides' use of Hippocratic medical language see Kosak, *Heroic Measures*, and E. M. Craik, "Medical Reference in Euripides," *BICS* 45 (2001) 81–95. For Sophocles see W. Allan, "The Body in Mind: Medical Imagery in Sophocles," *Hermes* 142 (2014) 259–278, and G. Ceschi, *Il vocabolario medico di Sofocle* (Venice 2009).

Similarly, the prose writers of the fifth and fourth century show an equal, and in some cases more invested, interest in medical language. Notable are Thucydides and Plato.⁷ Thucydides' historical method (*autopsia*) that focuses on recurring patterns of human behavior and his description of the Great Plague show profound Hippocratic influence.⁸ The same holds true for Plato's *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*.⁹ In the *Gorgias* a discussion of contemporary medicine frames the entire dialogue, which begins with the title character's assertion that the *techné* of medicine is subordinate to rhetoric. It closes with Socrates presenting medicine as a model for rhetoric on the grounds that it investigates the nature of its subject and gives an account of its

For Aeschylus see A. Karp, "The Disease of Inflexibility in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*," *Mediterranean Studies* 6 (1996) 1–12.

⁷ For medical language in Thucydides see J. Jouanna, *Hippocrates* (Baltimore/London 2001) 208, and S. Swain, "Man and Medicine in Thucydides," *Arethusa* 27 (1994) 303–327. For Plato see D. S. Hutchinson, "Doctrines of the Mean and the Debate Concerning Skills in Fourth-Century Medicine, Rhetoric and Ethics," *Apeiron* 21 (1988) 17–52, esp. 18.

⁸ For Hippocratic influence on Thucydides' methodology see S. Hornblower, *Thucydides* (Baltimore 1987) 133. For Thucydides' treatment of the plague see D. L. Page, "Thucydides' Description of the Great Plague at Athens," *CQ* 3 (1953) 97–119; A. Parry, "The Language of Thucydides' Description of the Plague," *BICS* 16 (1969) 106–118; and L. Kallet, "Thucydides, Apollo, the Plague, and the War," *AJP* 134 (2013) 355–382. For Thucydides' use of Hippocratic language in his description of the Corcyrean *stasis* see E. L. Hussey, "Thucydidean History and Democritean Theory," *History of Political Thought* 6 (1985) 118–138. L. Kallet, "The Diseased Body Politic, Athenian Public Finance, and the Massacre at Mykalessos (Thucydides 7.27–29)," *AJP* 120 (1999) 223–244, observes a similar phenomenon in the massacre at Mykalessos.

⁹ *Phdr.* 270C contains a direct reference to Hippocrates, suggesting that Plato was aware of Hippocrates' existence and perhaps his ideas; for more on this see H. Herter, "The Problematic Mention of Hippocrates in Plato's *Phaedrus*," *ICS* 1 (1976) 22–42. For a fuller discussion of medical language in Plato's dialogues see Hutchinson, *Apeiron* 21 (1988) 17–52; Jouanna, *Hippocrates* 256–258; and S. B. Levin, *Plato's Rivalry with Medicine: A Struggle and its Dissolution* (Oxford/New York 2014).

proceedings (501A). Rhetoric, on the other hand, falls short because it aims at gratification rather than what is beneficial (462E). In the *Phaedrus*, the physician is presented as the model for the orator:¹⁰ the good orator adapts his speeches to his audience like a good physician, who prescribes different regimens for his patients based on their idiosyncratic natures (271B).¹¹

What relevance might these writers have to Demosthenes? He is fond of using tragic language to give weight and authority to his speeches, especially in the depiction of disease.¹² Like the tragedians, he associates an individual's, most often a leader's, moral failings with disease and consequently presents him/her as an infectious threat to the community.¹³ For example, in *On the False Embassy* (Dem. 19) Demosthenes warns the Athenians about Philipizers, that is, Greek politicians who have been bribed to advance Macedonian interests. He vividly compares them to a fearsome disease (νόσημα δεινόν) spreading throughout Greece (259–262). In *Against Aristogeiton I* (Dem. 25) the speaker emphatically calls on the jury to act like *iatroi* (ὡςπερ οἱ ἰατροί). He urges them to excise and cauterize Aristogeiton, who

¹⁰ S. Pender, “Between Medicine and Rhetoric” *Early Science and Medicine* 10 (2005) 36–64, esp. 44. Although Plato makes frequent use of the physician analogy, Thucydides is the first to explicitly compare the politician to the physician (6.14.3). But if one were to trace the analogy further back, Pindar holds the distinction of being the first to equate a ruler with a physician: *Pyth.* 4.269–274 describes King Arkesilaos of Cyrene as ἰατὴρ ἐπικαιρότατος, “a physician most helpful in a time of need.”

¹¹ See below for discussion of regimen in Demosthenes’ *Second Olynthiac*.

¹² On Demosthenes’ fondness for tragic language see W. J. Slater, “The Epiphany of Demosthenes,” *Phoenix* 42 (1988) 126–130, esp. 126, and R. B. Rutherford, *Greek Tragic Style: Form, Language and Interpretation* (Cambridge 2012) 68.

¹³ Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus* exemplifies this paradigm. Because of Oedipus’ blood pollution (i.e. patricide and incest), his city is infected with disease. In the end, the only way Thebes can be cured is through Oedipus’ removal from the community. In tragedy the cure for blood pollution can be accomplished in three ways: by the gods (Eur. *Or.*), death (Soph. *Aj.*, Eur. *HF*), or, as in the case of Oedipus, expulsion from the city (*OT*).

is labeled as an incurable cancer (ἀνίατον ... καρκίνον) and ulcer (φαγέδαινα), from the civic body before it is too late (95). Unless he is punished to the full extent of the law, Demosthenes warns, Aristogeiton will infect other citizens with his bad behavior (101).¹⁴ The prominent role of infection in both examples is likely evidence of a tragic influence: the Hippocratic medical writings, although varied and at times even contradictory, vociferously reject the concept of infection because it allows for a divine etiology of disease.¹⁵

The ancient biographical tradition hands down that Demosthenes consciously imitated Thucydides, despite the absence of direct quotations or references (Ps.-Plut. *X Orat.* 8).¹⁶ His political vision, style, and language¹⁷ may be evidence of such a Thucydidean influence. In an examination of Demosthenes' medical language, C. W. Wooten draws attention to his use of *prophasis* in the *Second Olynthiac* (2.9).¹⁸ He remarks that Demosthenes may be imitating Thucydides' innovative use of *prophasis* by drawing

¹⁴ The premise (*endeixis*) of this trial is that Aristogeiton spoke illegally in the Assembly: as a state debtor, he was disenfranchised (*atimos*) and thus prohibited from participating in Assembly, Council, or courts until his debts were resolved; cf. D. Kamen, *Status in Classical Athens* (Princeton 2013) 71. The most extreme penalty for those who violated the conditions of their *atimia* was death, which the speaker here seems to be demanding.; cf. M. H. Hansen, *Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes* (Odense 1976) 60.

¹⁵ O. Temkin, "Greek Medicine as Science and Craft," *Isis* 44 (1953) 213–225, notes that before the proliferation of Hippocratic medicine, disease was largely believed to be the byproduct of divine transgression: criminal behavior instigated the anger of the god(s), which manifested itself in disease.

¹⁶ Cf. S. Hornblower, "The Fourth-Century and Hellenistic Reception of Thucydides," *JHS* 115 (1995) 47–68.

¹⁷ See C. W. Wooten, *Cicero's Philippics and their Demosthenic Model: The Rhetoric of Crisis* (Chapel Hill 1983).

¹⁸ C. W. Wooten, "Unnoticed Medical Language in Demosthenes," *Hermes* 107 (1979) 157–160.

on its medical connotations.¹⁹ There is a similar case for Plato. As with Thucydides, a biographical tradition exists for Plato as Demosthenes' teacher (Ps.-Plut. *X Orat.* 8). In regard to medical language, Demosthenes' use of the physician analogy (18.243, 25.95) and his portrayal of judicial punishment as a form of medicine could be Platonic inheritances.²⁰

Even taking all this into consideration, an inquiry into the origin of Demosthenes' medical language will always be open-ended. There is also the question of whether certain medical terms or analogies had become rhetorical *topoi* by Demosthenes' day.²¹ What I have outlined above *may* account for some interesting parallels.²² However, before proceeding I will briefly consider the popular response to Hippocratic medical language, which is still relevant to the inquiry. As mentioned, medicine had become part of the cultural landscape of Greece.²³ In other

¹⁹ For the medical connotation of *prophasis* in Thucydides see G. Rechenauer, *Thukydides und die Hippokratische Medizin* (Zurich 1991), esp. 38–109, and C. Tuplin, "Demosthenes' *Olynthiacs* and the Character of the Demegoric Corpus," *Historia* 46 (1998) 276–320, esp. 285 n.11.

²⁰ For a general overview of the fourth-century orators' debt to Plato see R. Brock, *Greek Political Imagery from Homer to Aristotle* (London 2013), esp. 73. See Levin, *Plato's Rivalry with Medicine* 120–121, for an in-depth discussion of Plato's analogizing of medicine and justice in the *Republic*.

²¹ See N. Demand, "Medicine and Rhetoric: The Attic Orators," in R. Wittmann et al. (eds.), *Hippokratische Medizin und antike Philosophie* (Hildesheim 1996) 91–99, and Brock, *Greek Political Imagery* 147–196, for detailed discussion of medical language in the fourth-century orators.

²² Another potential source of inspiration for Demosthenes' medical language is his fellow orators, but the fragmentary nature of the extant material makes tracing any influence a challenge. Isocrates is an exception, but he never set foot in the Assembly or courtroom, but instead worked as *logographos* before opening his own school for rhetoric. See G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 176–177. More significantly, Isocrates may have had an open (and mutual) animosity with Demosthenes, cf. G. O. Rowe, "Two Responses by Isocrates to Demosthenes," *Historia* 51 (2002) 149–162.

²³ Dean-Jones, *Written Texts* 98.

words, medicine had become part of public life with an existence outside of intellectual circles. This may be due to a harsh truth: health and disease were (and are) a reality of life; thus, the need for healers. In fourth-century Greece, competition for patients could be stiff.²⁴ In order to gain new patients and/or pupils, a Hippocratic *iatros* would give public presentations of medical treatises when he entered a new city.²⁵ Demosthenes and his fellow Athenians may have heard such declamations, or they may even have had access to the treatises themselves.²⁶ Medicine was one of the first *technai* to use treatises to spread its knowledge, with many specifically designed for public consumption.²⁷ Alternatively, some may have visited a public physician to receive treatment, for certain Greek *poleis* employed these physicians to care for their citizenry, a testament of empirical medicine's success.²⁸ The *polis* had sanctioned this brand of medicine.

Ultimately, what made Hippocratic medicine attractive was

²⁴ The Hippocratic treatise *Sacred Disease* is a testament to the vitriolic rivalry between different healing modes, cf. Jouanna, *Hippocrates* 42; W. Burkert, "ΓΟΗΣ: zum Griechischen 'Schamanismus'," *RhM* 105 (1962) 53–54; and F. Graf, *Magic in the Ancient World* (Cambridge 1997) 21–22. For the competition between Hippocratic *iatroi* see Dean-Jones, *Written Texts* 118.

²⁵ See J. Kollesch and D. Nickel, *Antike Heilkunst* (Leipzig 1979) 5–39. For the itinerant nature of Hippocratic *iatroi* see Jouanna, *Greek Medicine* 45.

²⁶ On literacy see J. A. Davison, "Literature and Literacy in Ancient Greece," *Phoenix* 16 (1962) 141–156; R. Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge 1992); K. Robb, *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece* (Oxford 1994); and I. Worthington, *Voice into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece* (Leiden 1996).

²⁷ Dean-Jones, *Written Texts* 112–116, lists *On Ancient Medicine*, *On the Sacred Disease*, and *On the Nature of Man* as texts intended for a wider audience. Thomas, *Literacy* 24, argues that technical medical treatises might be the earliest Greek prose works.

²⁸ Dean-Jones, *Written Texts* 102. For the debate concerning the existence of public physicians see L. Cohn-Haft, "The Public Physicians of Ancient Greece," *Smith College Studies in History* 62 (1937) 1–99, and R. Flacelière, "Medicine," in *Praeger Encyclopedia of Ancient Greek Civilization* (New York 1967) 288–290.

its optimism. Hippocratic *iatroi* believed that almost any disease could be cured if caught in time and treated in the right way. The effectiveness of Demosthenes' analogies, particularly his appropriation of Hippocratic *prognōsis* (see below), largely depends on it. His audience, exposed to Hippocratic ideas or terminology whether through public declamations, medical treatises, or personal experience, must have reacted strongly, since it is a frequent feature of his political speeches. In what follows, I look at some of these examples.

2. *The deliberative speeches*

It is with the *First Philippic* in 351 that Demosthenes would turn his oratorical skills against Macedon; henceforth, all but two of his extant deliberative speeches would center on the threat of Philip.²⁹ But by this time Philip had already become an unstoppable force. In the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes draws on themes that would become typical of his subsequent deliberative speeches, especially the medical language used in them: Philip is restless; therefore, the Athenians must take action before it is too late. Although there are no explicit examples of medical language in the *First Philippic*, this speech represents a shift in Demosthenes' style. In comparison with his first two deliberative speeches, *On the Symmories* (354) and *For the Megalopolitans* (353/2), the *First Philippic* contains more circular expositions, a feature of his mature style.³⁰ Significantly, it also

²⁹ Worthington, *Demosthenes* 93, 116.

³⁰ See C. W. Wooten, "On the Road to *Philippic* III: The Management of Argument and the Modulation of Emotion in the Deliberative Speeches of Demosthenes," *Rhetorica* 28 (2010) 1–22, esp. 6–7. L. Pearson, "The Development of Demosthenes as a Political Orator," *Phoenix* 18 (1964) 95–109, deems Demosthenes' early deliberative speeches of lesser quality than his subsequent speeches. Wooten (2–6), however, interprets these speeches as an "an experiment in finding the proper mixture ... between emotion and logic and between too many and too few arguments" that culminates in Demosthenes' deliberative triumph, the *Third Philippic*. He attributes the failure of *On the Symmories* and *For the Megalopolitans* to many underdeveloped arguments.

has more ornamentation, especially metaphors and similes. Despite Demosthenes' failure to convince the Athenians of the necessity of war, he undoubtedly rose to the front rank of Athenian politicians with this well-crafted speech.³¹ In the *Olynthiacs*, he would expand on this style, in which medical language would play a part.³²

Demosthenes delivered the *Olynthiacs* in 349 as a series of three speeches with the purpose of persuading the Athenians to send military aid to Olynthus, which Philip was besieging at the time.³³ By aiding Olynthus, Demosthenes hoped that the Athenians could stop Philip's advancement into mainland Greece. The first explicit example of medical language in the Demosthenic corpus appears in the *Second Olynthiac* (Dem. 2). By way of a simile, Demosthenes equates the effect of a war fought on a domestic front to a body that re-experiences the pain of an old injury when sick (21):³⁴

³¹ Cf. MacDowell, *Demosthenes* 218.

³² Wooten, *Rhetorica* 28 (2010) 7–8, traces Demosthenes' return to "linear" arguments in *On the Freedom of the Rhodians* to the *First Philippic's* failure. Nonetheless, Wooten notes that even this speech "experiments with [a] broad, full, circular presentation of ideas" that would eventually be elevated to the level of technique in the *Olynthiacs*.

³³ The order of the *Olynthiacs*, as preserved, is a subject of uncertainty. Notably, C. Tuplin, "Demosthenes' Olynthiacs and the Character of the Demegoric Corpus," *Historia* 47 (1998) 276–320, esp. 279–280, concludes that the only definitive statements one can make about the *Olynthiacs* are that they are "contemporary and afford an example of the same situation being rhetorically addressed three times and in three different ways." Thus, in this paper I follow the traditional order. See further R. Sealey, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Some Demosthenic Dates," *REG* 68 (1955) 77–120, esp. 92–93; H. Erbse, "Zu den Olynthischen Reden des Demosthenes," *RhM* 99 (1956) 364–380; J. R. Ellis, "The Order of the Olynthiacs," *Historia* 16 (1967) 108–111; C. Eucken, "Reihenfolge und Zweck der Olynthischen Reden," *MusHelv* 41 (1984) 193–208; E. I. McQueen, *Demosthenes' Olynthiacs* (London 1986) 51–52.

³⁴ Demosthenes took great pride in this simile because it appears twice more in the corpus of his speeches. An almost verbatim copy is found in

ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, τέως μὲν ἂν ἐρρωμένος ἦ τις, οὐδὲν ἐπαισθάνεται, ἐπὰν δ' ἀρρώστημά τι συμβῆ, πάντα κινεῖται, κἂν ῥήγμα κἂν στρέμμα κἂν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σαθρὸν ἦ, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν τυράννων, ἕως μὲν ἂν ἕξω πολεμῶσιν, ἀφανῆ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴν δ' ὄμορος πόλεμος συμπλακῆ, πάντ' ἐποίησεν ἕκδηλα.

For just as in our bodies, so long as a person is strong things go unnoticed, but when some weakness befalls him, be it a fracture or sprain or some other underlying problem, everything is disturbed; so in the case of cities and tyrants: as long as they wage war abroad their troubles are invisible to most people, but when they are entangled in a war on their own borders, everything is exposed.³⁵

This passage is replete with language that either appears for the first time in the Hippocratic Corpus or commonly occurs there. For example, ἀρρώστημα, “underlying problem,” first appears with frequency in the Hippocratic medical writings (*Diaet. Acut.* 22; *Epid.* 6.8.31, 7.1.93; *Flat.* 9, 15; [*Ep.*] 24). Its next appearance is in the passage from the *Olynthiacs*. Likewise, the words used to denote “fracture” and “sprains,” ῥήγμα and στρέμμα, seem to be Hippocratic. The former is used for the first time in the Corpus to refer specifically to lesions in the body (*Aer 4*, *Epid.* 7.1.2, *Aph.* 6.22, *Flat.* 11, *Morb.* 1.20) while the latter’s first appearance is in the Hippocratic Corpus (*Epid.* 5.1.75, *Off.* 23). The precision of the terminology employed here is suggestive of real Hippocratic knowledge, if not of the medical

Response to Philip’s Letter 11.13–14, whose authenticity is debated on the grounds that it shares many passages with the *Second Olynthiac*, including the fracture and sprain simile above (cf. J. H. Vince, *Demosthenes* I [London/New York 1930] 316–317; R. Sealey, *Demosthenes in his Time* [Oxford 1993] 239). MacDowell, *Demosthenes* 361–363, does not view these shared passages as a barrier to Dem. 11’s authenticity. He points out that the reuse of phrases/passages is a common phenomenon in Demosthenes’ speeches. The final occurrence of this simile is in the *Crown* speech (18.198) (see below).

³⁵ All translations from Demosthenes’ political speeches are freely adapted from J. Trevett, *Demosthenes: Speeches 1–17* (Austin 2011).

texts themselves, then at least of the theories in question.³⁶

Demosthenes' simile serves two purposes. It draws attention to the weak foundation of Philip's power, and it underscores the danger of the Athenians' hesitation, because the body in question could refer to either a monarchy or democracy. With the former, the message is optimistic. If the Athenians bring war to Philip, they can take advantage of the inherent flaws of monarchy, namely that tyrants are prone to hubristic behavior and are therefore hated by both subjects and allies (Dem. 1.4–5, 14). In this way, Demosthenes makes victory seem easy for the Athenians.³⁷ However, if they delay and are forced to fight a domestic war, their own political system, prone to corruption (Arist. *Pol.* 1286a28–37), may not be able to cope with the trauma that might resurface.³⁸ The urgency that underpins this simile reflects a key theme of the *Olynthiacs: kairos*.³⁹ Demosthenes is communicating his belief that if the Athenians do not act now, they will cause their city pain and suffering. Decades later, in defense of his civic crown, Demosthenes will cite these very warnings as examples of his political prescience.

In the *Third Olynthiac* (Dem. 3), Demosthenes explicitly confronts the issue of the Theoric Fund. He argues that this dole, given to destitute citizens to attend festivals and dramatic productions, would be better allocated for a military campaign against Philip. To underscore its current uselessness, he compares the effect of the Fund to a diet prescribed by physicians (33):

ἐὰν οὖν ἀλλὰ νῦν γ' ἔτι ἀπαλλαγέντες τούτων τῶν ἐθῶν ἐθελή-
σητε στρατεύεσθαι τε καὶ πράττειν ἀξίως ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῖς
περιουσίαις ταῖς οἴκοι ταύταις ἀφορμαῖς ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν ἀγαθῶν

³⁶ Cf. S. Gotteland, "La cité malade chez les orateurs grecs," in S. Franchet d'Espèrey et al. (eds.), *Fondements et crises du pouvoir* (Paris 2003) 239.

³⁷ MacDowell, *Demosthenes* 232.

³⁸ Gotteland, in *Fondements* 240.

³⁹ Tuplin, *Historia* 47 (1998) 272–282. For a detailed study of *kairos* from Homer to the end of the fourth century see P. Sipiōra et al. (eds.), *Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis* (Albany 2002) 97–113, and J. R. Wilson, "KAIROS as 'Due Measure'," *Glotta* 58 (1980) 177–204.

χρησθαι, ἴσως ἄν, ἴσως, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τέλειόν τι καὶ μέγα κτήσαισθ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λημμάτων ἀπαλλαγείητε, ἃ τοῖς [ἀσθενοῦσι] παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν σιτίοις [διδομένοις] ἔοικε. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖν' οὔτ' ἰσχὺν ἐντίθησιν οὔτ' ἀποθνήσκειν ἔα· καὶ ταῦθ' ἃ νέμεσθε νῦν ὑμεῖς, οὔτε τοσαῦτ' ἐστὶν ὥστ' ὠφέλειαν ἔχειν τινὰ διαρκῆ, οὔτ' ἀπογνόνας ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἔα, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὴν ἐκάστου ῥαθυμίαν ὑμῶν ἐπαυξάνοντα.

If then, even now, you abandon these habits and are willing to go on campaign and to act in a way that is worthy of yourselves, and to use these domestic surpluses as a starting point for external success, perhaps, men of Athens, perhaps you may acquire some great and lasting benefit and rid yourself of such payments, which are like the foods that doctors prescribe: they neither build strength nor allow the patient to die. In the same way, these sums that you now distribute among yourselves are not large enough to have any lasting benefit, nor would renouncing them allow you to do anything else, but they serve to make each of you more idle.

Here Demosthenes connects the Theoric Fund with ῥαθυμία, “civic uselessness”: it distracts the Athenians from taking an active role in the political and financial decisions of their city. The comparandum that Demosthenes uses is a medical diet, or regimen (δίαιτα), which was the cornerstone of Hippocratic therapeutics because it was safer and less painful than surgery or cauterization.⁴⁰ Given the painlessness of this therapy, it may seem surprising that Demosthenes’ opinion of regimen is decidedly negative.⁴¹ An explanation for his stance may be found in Plato’s *Republic*, where Socrates argues that regimen should only be used to heal citizens so that they can return to their

⁴⁰ The Hippocratic tracts on regimen are *On Regimen in Acute Diseases*, *Regimen in Health*, *On Regimen*, and *On Nutriment*.

⁴¹ There are many expressions of regimen in the Hippocratic writings, but Demosthenes seems to focus on diets for invalids. In *On Acute Diseases* (3, 10), the author recommends barley gruel (*ptisanê*) for the sick on the grounds that it is gentler on a weakened constitution. For more on *diata* and its limitations see J. Jouanna, “Regimen in the Hippocratic Corpus: *Diata* and its Problems,” in L. Dean-Jones et al. (eds.), *Ancient Concepts of the Hippocratics* (Leiden/Boston 2008) 209–241.

appropriate duties;⁴² it should never be allowed to prolong a “useless” life, that is, the life of the chronically ill (407D).

Thus what is behind Demosthenes’ (and Plato’s) condemnation of regimen is the Greek idea of usefulness, famously expressed as “to benefit one’s friends and to harm one’s enemies.”⁴³ For a Greek male to be sick was to be useless, and if he was useless, then he was not a man at all because the culture demanded that its males constantly reify their masculinity (*andreia*) through “acts of courage, athleticism, and military prowess.”⁴⁴ By using a medical model, Demosthenes applies this same notion of *andreia* to politics. He thus transforms rejection of the Theoric Fund into a question of reclaiming manhood, among other things.⁴⁵ Demosthenes’ message is harsh, but he softens the blow by directing some of the blame onto pro-peace politicians, whom he accuses of acting like bad physicians because they encourage a harmful therapy.⁴⁶ In *On the Crown*, he will take up again this same theme. However, his definition of what constitutes good medicine will be narrower, and importantly it will hinge on foresight.⁴⁷

In the *Third Philippic* (Dem. 9), Demosthenes once again urges

⁴² See above for Plato’s influence on Demosthenes’ medical language.

⁴³ K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974) 180–184. For examples of this paradigm see Ar. *Av.* 420–421; Soph. *Ant.* 643–644.; Xen. *An.* 1.3.6, *Cyr.* 1.4.25, *Hier.* 2.2.

⁴⁴ Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* 165–167. For the cultural importance of *andreia* see E. L. Wheeler, “The General as Hoplite,” in V. D. Hanson (ed.), *Hoplites* (London 1991) 138, and J. C. Kosak, “The Male Interior: Strength, Illness, and Masculinity in Sophocles’ *Philoctetes*” *BICS* 49 (2006) 61.

⁴⁵ Cf. G. Mader, “Foresight, Hindsight, and the Rhetoric of Self-Fashioning in Demosthenes’ Philippic Cycle,” *Rhetorica* 25 (2007) 339–360, esp. 356.

⁴⁶ Gotteland, in *Fondements* 242.

⁴⁷ Brock, *Greek Political Imagery* 72–73, notes that the Attic orators’ medical imagery often reflects a competition between “self-professed experts,” where-in they compete for access to the patient (i.e. the Athenians). On the role of foresight in Demosthenes’ speeches see G. Mader, “Fighting Philip with Decrees: Demosthenes and the Syndrome of Symbolic Action,” *AJP* (2006) 367–386.

the Athenians onto the warpath against Macedon. The major difference between this speech, delivered in the summer of 341, and the *Olynthiacs*, delivered eight years earlier, is that his countrymen listened. They listened because circumstances had changed. The Athenians had sent the general Diopieithes to the Thracian Chersonese to support Athenian colonists, who had settled the region to establish control over critical grain routes. Soon afterward, these colonists had come into conflict with the city of Cardia, a satellite of Philip's kingdom. On his arrival, Diopieithes raided parts of Thrace that were under Macedonian control, which prompted Philip to send a letter of protest to the Athenians. Demosthenes answered the letter with the *Third Philippic*, a speech that would both divorce Athens from a pacifist stance and secure Demosthenes' place as leading politician in Athens.

In this speech Demosthenes uses medical language to underscore Philip's dangerousness. He compares the Macedonian to a periodic attack of fever (29):

ὅτι γ' ὡσπερ περίοδος ἢ καταβολὴ πυρετοῦ ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς κακοῦ καὶ τῷ πάνυ πόρρω δοκοῦντι νῦν ἀφεστάναι προσέρχεται, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ.

Yet we all know that, like the periodic return or the sudden onset of a fever or some other evil, he visits even those who seem to have kept far away from him.

Here Demosthenes draws on the medical concept of febrile periodicity, the classification of fevers by their tempo of recurrence.⁴⁸ By using the terms “recurrence”/περίοδος (Hippoc. *Prog.* 19; *Epid.* 1.1.3, 6.3.18, 6.4.1; *Hum.* 20; *De diaet.* 66; *Affect.* 47) and “fever attack”/καταβολὴ πυρετοῦ (Hippoc. *Off.* 9; cf. Pl. *Gorg.* 519A), Demosthenes may be adding a technical veneer to his simile. In doing so, he evokes a physician's authority and thus attributes predicability to Philip's seemingly spontaneous behavior.⁴⁹ He also highlights the need for the Athenians' co-

⁴⁸ On febrile periodicity in the Hippocratic writings see Jouanna, *Hippocrates* 150.

⁴⁹ MacDowell, *Demosthenes* 351.

operation because a successful healing depends on cooperation between patient and physician. In the Hippocratic writings, this ideal is often expressed through military metaphors: physician and patient unite to form a defensive front against the invading disease.⁵⁰ In Demosthenes' simile the metaphor is reversed: Philip's invasion is real but just as insidious as the disease to which he is compared. Like the regimen analogy in the *Olynthiacs*, this simile may have been intended to address the Athenians' notion of *andreia*. Are they going to allow the disease of Philip to render them passive like invalids?⁵¹

Demosthenes delivered the *Fourth Philippic* (Dem. 10) the same year as *Third Philippic* in 341.⁵² He urges the Athenians to stop

⁵⁰ R. Rosen and I. Sluiter, *Andreia: Studies in Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity* (Leiden/Boston 2003), esp. 95–97. In the Demosthenic corpus, the marriage of military and disease imagery is best exemplified by Demosthenes' *prognōsis* of the fearsome disease (νόσημα δεινόν) of "Philippizing" in *On the False Embassy* (19.259–262), as mentioned above. He personifies the disease as a soldier: it "has invaded Greece," ἐμπέτωκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα (259), "has advanced into the Peloponnese," εἰς Πελοπόννησον δ' εἰσελθόν (260), "has brought about massacre in Elis," τὰς ἐν Ἥλιδι σφαγὰς πεποίηκε (260), "has marched into Arcadia," εἰς Ἀρκαδίαν εἰσελθόν (261), and "has now hemmed in Athens," ὡς βαδίζον γε κύκλω καὶ δεῦρ' ἐλήλυθεν (262).

⁵¹ Cf. Kosak, *BICS* 49 (2006) 59.

⁵² In antiquity the *Fourth Philippic's* authenticity was generally accepted, but it has become a subject of debate in modern scholarship: F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit* III.1 (Leipzig 1893) 54; A. Körte, "Zu Didymos' Demosthenes-Commentar" *RhM* 60 (1905) 388–416; Vince, *Demosthenes* I 268–269; J. Trevett, "Did Demosthenes Publish his Deliberative Speeches?" *Hermes* 124 (1996) 425–441. The primary grounds for rejection of the *Fourth Philippic* are that it shares two long and almost verbatim passages (10.11–27, 55–70) with *On the Chersonese* (8.38–67), both allegedly delivered in 341. Furthermore, it contains a defense of the Theoric Fund, which contradicts Demosthenes' vehement and consistent opposition to it in the *Olynthiacs*. MacDowell, *Demosthenes* 354–359, in defense, asserts that both the discovery of the Didymus papyrus and fragments of Philochorus and Androtion (Harpocration s.v. διαψήφισις), who describe a revision of the citizen lists in 346/5, likely affirm the speech's authenticity. With fewer citizens to take advantage of the dole, money would have been freed up for military expenditures; cf. S. G. Daitz,

listening to pro-peace politicians, who have been bribed by Philip to advance Macedonian interests. If they do not, they will have no one but themselves to blame for the city's downfall.⁵³ Once again, he uses a medical analogy to draw attention to the Athenians' civic passivity.⁵⁴ He compares their political apathy to the effects of the drug mandrake (6):⁵⁵

ἡμεῖς δ' οὐ μόνον τούτοις ὑπολειπόμεθ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ'
οὐδ' ἀνεγερθῆναι δυνάμεθα, ἀλλὰ μανδραγόραν πεπωκόσιν ἢ τι
φάρμακον ἄλλο τοιοῦτον εἰκόκαμεν ἀνθρώποις.

Nor is it only in these ways that we are being left behind, men of Athens: we cannot even wake ourselves up, but we are like people who have drunk mandrake juice or some other drug.

Demosthenes' stance toward the sedative mandrake and other such soporifics is negative on the same grounds as for regimen: they render the user useless.⁵⁶ His view of *pharmaka* is not unique.

“The Relationship of the *de Chersoneso* and the *Philippica Quarta* of Demosthenes,” *CP* 52 (1957) 145–162, esp. 146. As to its similarities to *On the Chersonese*, MacDowell, *Demosthenes* 355, offers the following hypotheses: (1) when Demosthenes was revising *Chersonese*, he added sections of the *Fourth Philippic*, which he never intended to publish, but it was published after his death; (2) he may have delivered the speech twice; (3) he never delivered the entirety of *Chersonese*. For more arguments supporting authenticity see C. D. Adams, “Speeches XIII and X of the Demosthenic Corpus,” *CP* 33 (1938) 129–144, and I. Worthington, “The Authenticity of Demosthenes' *Fourth Philippic*, *Mnemosyne* 44 (1991) 425–428.

⁵³ MacDowell, *Demosthenes* 359.

⁵⁴ Gotteland, in *Fondements* 241–2.

⁵⁵ Körte, *RhM* 60 (1905) 389, notes that Anastasius of Ephesus rejected the *Fourth Philippic* on the grounds that mandrake (μανδραγόρα) was too unusual a word for Demosthenes. However, this passage is not the only reference to a specific drug in the Demosthenic corpus, for in his *Crown* speech he tells his opponent Aeschines to go “take a dose of hellebore,” ἐλλεβορίζεις, for his habitual lying (Dem. 18.121), a drug to treat insanity (cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 1489, Pl. *Euthphr.* 299B8).

⁵⁶ For the sedative properties of mandrake see Pl. *Resp.* 488C and Arist. *Somn.* 456b. In the Hippocratic corpus mandrake appears as a treatment for depression (*Nat.Loc.* 39) and as a fever reducer (*Morb.* 2.43).

As early as Homer, drugs were viewed with both awe and fear because of their ability to produce a change contrary to nature.⁵⁷ In the *Odyssey*, Circe famously uses a combination of drugs and incantations to change Odysseus' men into pigs (10.212 ff.). The unnatural effect of her drugs is that they literally domesticate men, rendering them useless and completely at the mercy of a woman. In Plato's *Republic*, Socrates connects drug use with idleness: hypochondriacs seek out drugs for fictitious conditions because they have too much leisure on their hands (405C–406B). Given the stereotypes surrounding drugs, Demosthenes' analogy highlights the unnaturalness of the Athenians' civic passivity. As with Circe's *pharmaka*, the Athenians have lost the ability to act for themselves.⁵⁸ Like Plato's drug users, the Athenians are complicit in their own condition because they have allowed corrupt politicians to coopt their decisions. Once again Demosthenes makes adopting his political policies the path to civic health, restored *andreia*.

3. *On the Crown*

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines a forensic speech as accusatory or defensive in nature, and as being concerned with past events (1.3.4). This definition may shed light on Demosthenes' use of medical language in *On the Crown* (Dem. 18), arguably his most famous forensic speech. Put on the defensive,⁵⁹ Demosthenes must now defend himself with his medical language, and his strategy is the Hippocratic language of *prognôsis*. By casting himself as the good physician, the prognosticating physician, and his political opponent, Aeschines, as a charlatan physician, who will not or cannot prognosticate, I argue that Demosthenes re-

⁵⁷ D. Collins, "The Trial of Theoris of Lemnos: A 4th Century Witch or Folk Healer?" *Western Folklore* 59 (2000) 255–257. The ambivalence with which the Greeks viewed drugs is reflected in the word itself: *pharmakon* can be both a "drug" and a "poison" (LSJ s.v. I.1–2).

⁵⁸ Cf. Kosak, *BICS* 49 (2006) 54.

⁵⁹ See M. Gagarin, "Law, Politics, and the Question of Relevance in the Case on the Crown," *CLAnt* 31 (2012) 293–314.

negotiates the traditional meaning of political excellence. By redefining success in terms of foresight rather than victory in battle,⁶⁰ he evades blame for one of Athens' most shameful losses, the battle of Chaeronea, which resulted in the Athenians' complete defeat at the hands of Macedon and their subsequent loss of political autonomy. Lastly, as in his deliberative speeches, I argue that the medical language of his forensic speeches should be seen as engaging in a broader dialogue on civic excellence and duty.

4. *Defining prognôsis*

To shed light on Demosthenes' defense strategy in *On the Crown*, I will first briefly discuss why the Hippocratic physician made use of *prognôsis*. In antiquity both the orator and the physician faced a unique challenge: proof of expertise. No official certification or training program existed to distinguish the expert from the greenhorn or charlatan.⁶¹ If an individual wanted to be a physician or a politician, he simply needed to proclaim himself as one. Naturally, the absence of oversight led to the proliferation of charlatan physicians.⁶² For politics, one need only read the plays of Aristophanes or the speeches of the Attic orators to get a sense of the pervasiveness of political corruption and dissatisfaction in fifth- and fourth-century Athens. For medicine, the mid-fifth century Hippocratic text *Sacred Disease* is a most salient testament to this problem. The author bitterly lambastes “*magoi, kathurtai, agurtai, and alazones*,” all terms for magico-religious healers, for perpetuating erroneous beliefs about epilepsy, namely that the condition is god-given and thus can be cured through religious purifications. As mentioned

⁶⁰ Cf. H. Yunis, “Politics as Literature: Demosthenes and the Burden of the Athenian Past,” *Arion* 8 (2000) 97–118, esp. 104.

⁶¹ V. Nutton, “Healers in the Medical Marketplace: Towards a Social History of Graeco-Roman Medicine,” in A. Wear (ed.), *Medicine in Society: Historical Essays* (Cambridge 1992) 26.

⁶² For the spread of medical charlatanism in the fourth century see Dean-Jones, *Written Texts* 97–121.

above, the Hippocratic writings collectively reject divine causation in favor of an empirical approach to disease.⁶³

For the Hippocratic physician, the solution to the problem of charlatan physicians lies in *prognōsis*. This first appears in the mid-to-late fifth-century texts *Prognōsticon* and *Prorrhēticōn* 1 and 2. These texts are some of the oldest in Hippocratic Corpus, which attests to the importance placed on this skill even in early Hippocratic methodology.⁶⁴ Of the two, *Prognōsticon* offers the most complete definition of *prognōsis* (1.1):

τὸν ἰητρὸν δοκέει μοι ἄριστον εἶναι πρόνοιαν ἐπιτηδεύειν· προγιγνώσκων γὰρ καὶ προλέγων παρὰ τοῖσι νοσέουσι τὰ τε παρεόντα καὶ τὰ προγεγονότα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσσεσθαι, ὁκόσα τε παραλείουσιν οἱ ἀσθενέοντες ἐκδιηγούμενος, πιστεῦοιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον γινώσκειν τὰ τῶν νοσούντων πρήγματα, ὥστε τολμῶν ἐπιτρέπειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους σφέας ἑωυτοῦς τῷ ἰητρῷ.

It seems to me that it is the best thing for a physician to practice *prognōsis*. For discovering and declaring beforehand by the side of his patients the present, the past, and the future and filling in the gaps in the account given by the sick, he will be most believed to understand the matters of the sick so that men will confidently entrust themselves to him as a physician. (transl. W. H. S. Jones)

This differs considerably from more modern definitions of prognosis in that it requires the physician to be accountable for more than just the future course of a disease. The Hippocratic physician, according to *Prognōsticon*, had to be able to divine the past, present, and future condition of his patient and also any omitted information. To do this, the physician was expected to read the signs (*sēmata*) of his patient's body. Almost the entirety of *Prognōsticon* is devoted to laying out what these signs are. To name a few: changes in pallor, sleep patterns, appetite, bowel movements, etc. (*Prog.* 2). The vastness of the variables involved suggests that only the seasoned physician would have been capable of delivering a *prognōsis*. The author of *Decorum*, a late-

⁶³ Jouanna, *Hippocrates* 181.

⁶⁴ For dating the Hippocratic medical writings see Jouanna, *Hippocrates* 373–416.

Hellenistic text written for the novice on the proper behavior of a physician, confirms this in his recommendation that the young physician deliver a forecast *only* when he has acquired experience (9).⁶⁵ *Prognōsis*, therefore, should be viewed not only as a display of medical skill but also as a demonstration of experience that gains the patient's trust.⁶⁶

A physician's reputation is also at the heart of *prognōsis*. Unlike modern conventions, the physician of Greco-Roman antiquity was never alone with his patient. It was the norm for the entire household (and even curious passers-by) to crowd around the bedside of the sick.⁶⁷ When a physician delivered a *prognōsis*, he was proving himself not only to his patient but also to a potentially hostile (or enthusiastic and lucrative) crowd. A *prognōsis*, therefore, could make or destroy a physician's reputation. The Hippocratic text *Prorrhethicon* 2 explains these stakes (2.2):

συμβουλευώ δὲ ὡς σωφρονεστάτους εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ καὶ ἐν τοῖσι τοιούτοισι προρρήμασι, γνόντας ὅτι ἐπιτυχῶν μὲν ἂν τις τοῦ προρρήματος θαυμασθεῖη ὑπὸ τοῦ ξυνιόντος ἀλγέοντος, ἁμαρτῶν δ' ἂν τις πρὸς τῷ μισεῖσθαι τάχ' ἂν καὶ μεμνημένοι δόξειεν.

I advise you to be as cautious as possible not only in other areas of the art [of medicine] but also in making *prognōses* of this kind, realizing that when someone happens to be successful in making a *prognōsis* he will be admired by the patient that he is attending, but when he makes a mistake, not only will he be subject to hatred, but he might even be thought mad. (transl. P. Potter)

The good physician, therefore, wins renown with a successful *prognōsis*, but if he errs, he faces the animus of the crowd and possibly even accusations of insanity. As a result, silence becomes

⁶⁵ Although *Decorum* postdates both Demosthenes and Hippocrates, I include this text in my discussion because, in the words of Jouanna, *Hippocrates* 70, it “advocate[s] a medical ethic that descends directly from the Hippocratic ideal.”

⁶⁶ C. R. Eskin, “Hippocrates, *Kairos*, and Writing in the Sciences,” in P. Sipiōra et al. (eds.), *Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis* (Albany 2002) 97–113, at 102.

⁶⁷ Jouanna, *Hippocrates* 75.

an attractive option for the young or unskilled physician because it is self-preserving. Conversely, because of the personal risk involved, it becomes a mark of courage (*andreia*) to deliver a *prognōsis*.

5. *Prognōsis in Dem. 18*

Demosthenes delivered *On the Crown* in 330 as a defense against Aeschines' allegation that he was illegally awarded a civic crown, one of the highest honors an Athenian politician could receive. Fueled by more than a decade-long desire for revenge—Demosthenes had prosecuted Aeschines for misconduct during the Second Embassy to Philip in 346—Aeschines argues that Demosthenes' crown is illegal on the grounds that (1) he failed to submit to a final audit for his tenure as *teichopoios*, (2) he was crowned at the City Dionysia, (3) he failed to meet the conditions of his crown, for he did not speak and act in the best interests of the people (Aeschin. 3.49). Aeschines devotes the majority of his prosecution to the third point, transforming *Against Ctesiphon* into a trial of Demosthenes' political career.⁶⁸ In *On the Crown*, Demosthenes is tasked with proving that his speech and actions were always in the best interest of the people. This was no easy task. As mentioned before, his dogged pro-war policies led Athens to Chaeronea.

Demosthenes' use of *prognōsis* is shaped by Aeschines' focus on the third allegation,⁶⁹ that he does not deserve his civic crown because he did not speak and act in the best interest of the people. From the very beginning of the speech, he points to past examples of his foresight to underscore his political excellence. He reminds the Athenians that he warned them early on about the dangers of Philip and Philipizers (45):

ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ προὔλεγον καὶ διεμαρτυρόμην καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν αἰεὶ καὶ ὅποι πεμφθεῖην· αἱ δὲ πόλεις ἐνόσουν, τῶν μὲν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ πράττειν δωροδοκούντων καὶ διαφθειρομένων ἐπὶ χρήμασι, τῶν δ' ἰδιωτῶν καὶ πολλῶν τὰ μὲν οὐ προορωμένων, τὰ δὲ τῇ καθ' ἡμέραν ῥαστώνῃ καὶ σχολῇ δελεαζομένων.

⁶⁸ Cf. C. Carey, *Aeschines* (Austin 2000) 160–162.

⁶⁹ Cf. Yunis, *Arion* 8 (2000) 103–104, and Gagarin, *CLAnt* 31 (2012) 300.

I repeatedly warned and protested, both here in Athens and wherever I was dispatched. But the other Greek cities were diseased: the politicians and influential citizens were taking bribes and seeking money for their services; among the mass of private citizens, some did not see the problem coming, others were seduced by the calm and easy pace of daily life. (trans. H. Yunis)

The verb προὔλεγον, lit. “to tell in advance,” suggests *prognōsis* (e.g. Hippoc. *Prog.* 1.1, 3, 15, 23, etc.), even more so when it is combined with Demosthenes’ pronouncement of civic illness. Here Demosthenes transfers blame for the current state of affairs onto both “corrupt politicians,” a jibe at Aeschines, and the Athenian people, whom he accuses of being “improvident.” By choosing to characterize them as οὐ προορωμένων, he sets them in direct contrast with himself. He implies that he fulfilled his duty by forewarning the Athenians of the consequences of corruption, but they did not listen because they were too ensnared by the “ease” of daily life, a common theme in his political speeches.

Demosthenes draws further contrast between his foresight and the Athenians’ blindness when he describes the events surrounding Philip’s capture of the Phocian city of Elateia (170–173):

ὁ κήρυξ “τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται;” παρήει δ’ οὐδείς ... καλούσης δὲ [τῆς κοινῆς] τῆς πατρίδος [φωνῆς] τὸν ἐροῦνθ’ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ... ἐκεῖνος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα ἴκεινη οὐ μόνον εὖνον καὶ πλούσιον ἄνδρ’ ἐκάλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρηκολουθηκότα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ συλλελογισμένον ὀρθῶς τίνος εἴνεκα ταῦτ’ ἔπραττεν ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ τί βουλόμενος ... ἐφάνην τοίνυν οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγὼ καὶ παρελθὼν εἶπον εἰς ὑμᾶς ... μόνος τῶν λεγόντων καὶ πολιτευομένων ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς εὐνοίας τάξιν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς οὐκ ἔλιπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγων καὶ γράφων ἐξηταζόμεν τὰ δέονθ’ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς φοβεροῖς.

Then the herald asked, “Who wishes to speak?” but no one came forward ... the country was calling for a speaker to save it ... But it seems that moment and that day called for a man who not only was devoted and wealthy but had also followed events from the beginning and figured out correctly what Philip was aiming at and what his intentions were in taking the action he did ... The one who emerged as the right man on that day was I. I stepped

forward and addressed you ... you should know that I alone of the speakers and politicians did not abandon my patriot's post at the moment of danger but rather proved to be the one who in the very midsts of horror both advised and proposed the necessary measures for your sake.

Demosthenes illustrates his political expertise by drawing attention to his correct *prognōsis*. He reminds the Athenians of how his “inferences” about Philip’s designs on Greece came “true,” ὀρθῶς. His claim to have followed the course of events from the beginning and to have rightly predicted Philip’s intentions invoke the Hippocratic definition of *prognōsis* as a speech event that considers the past, present, and future (*Prog.* 1.1). Demosthenes underscores his unique excellence with the forceful μόνος τῶν λεγόντων καὶ πολιτευομένων ἐγὼ. With this, he dramatically shows his countrymen that even though he was completely alone, he did not “desert his patriot’s post”—a military metaphor intended to underscore his *andreia* despite the ultimate failure of his Macedonian policies. As indicated in the prologue of *Prorrheticon*, the good physician risks his reputation when he speaks his *prognōsis* before the public (1.1). Likewise, Demosthenes uses the example of Elateia to prove that he deserves his crown because he never let fear of losing his reputation prevent him from speaking in behalf of the city.

Demosthenes once more draws on the language of *prognōsis* to defend his proposal of a Theban alliance. On the eve of Elateia’s capture he had proposed that the Athenians should forgive their inveterate enemies and unite with them to stop Philip’s advance into Boeotia. This specific proposal led Athens to Chaeronea. In order to deflect blame from himself, he reframes accountability in more abstract terms (189):

ὁ γὰρ σύμβουλος καὶ ὁ συκοφάντης, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἑοικότες, ἐν τούτῳ πλείστον ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσιν· ὁ μὲν γε πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων γνώμην ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ δίδωσιν ἑαυτὸν ὑπεύθυνον τοῖς πεισθεῖσι, τῇ τύχῃ, τῷ καιρῷ, τῷ βουλομένῳ· ὁ δὲ σιγήσας ἡνίκ’ ἔδει λέγειν, ἅν τι δύσκολον συμβῆ, τοῦτο βασκαίνει.

Though an adviser and a *sykophantes* are in no respect similar, they differ most of all in this: the one discloses his view before things

develop and makes himself answerable to those who are persuaded, to fortune, to the occasion, to anyone who wishes; the other is silent when there is need for speech and then maligns if anything unpleasant happens.

By contrasting the *sumboulos*, political adviser, with the *sykophantes*, political charlatan, Demosthenes once more moves the definition of political excellence away from its traditional meaning as success in battle. He defines the *sumboulos* as one who “reveals his opinion before events” and “makes himself accountable,” a definition reminiscent of Hippocratic *prognōsis*.⁷⁰ In contrast, Aeschines has proven himself to be a charlatan, a *sycophantes*, with his silence.

The theme of speech and silence is at the heart of one of *On the Crown*'s most interesting similes, the simile of the physician. After listing numerous examples of his foresight,⁷¹ Demosthenes once again draws the Athenians' attention to his opponent's lack of prognostication. After a lengthy and colorful diatribe that includes aspersions on Aeschines' masculinity and status,⁷² Demosthenes compares him to a physician who refuses to deliver a *prognōsis* (242–243):

τί γὰρ ἢ σὴ δεινότης εἰς ὄνησιν ἤκει τῆ πατρίδι; νῦν ἡμῖν λέγεις περὶ τῶν παρεληλυθότων; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ἀσθενούσιν μὲν τοῖς κάμνουσιν εἰσιῶν μὴ λέγοι μηδὲ δεικνύοι δι' ὧν ἀποφεύζονται τὴν νόσον, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τελευτήσῃε τις αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ νομιζόμεν' αὐτῷ φέροίτο, ἀκολουθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ μνήμα διεξίσι “εἰ τὸ καὶ τὸ ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπος οὕτοσί, οὐκ ἂν ἀπέθανεν.” ἐμβρόντητε, εἶτα νῦν λέγεις;

⁷⁰ His focus on accountability may be an attempt to diffuse one of the more technical grounds of Aeschines' prosecution: Demosthenes was crowned before he submitted himself to a final audit (*euthumē*) for his duties as wall-builder for his deme (cf. Carey, *Aeschines* 160).

⁷¹ Also see 18.149, 191–192, 196.

⁷² The full list includes: a “*kinados* by nature” (φύσει κίναδος), “little man” (τὸνθρώπιόν), “unhealthy” (οὐδὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑγιές), “unfree” (οὐδ' ἐλεύθερον), “tragic-ape” (αὐτοτραγικὸς πίθηκος), “rustic Oenomaus” (ἀρουραῖος Οἰνόμαος), and “counterfeit orator” (παράσημος ῥήτωρ) (18.242).

What good, Aeschines, has your cleverness done the country? Now you talk to us about past events? Just like a physician who, though he attends the sick, gives them no information at all about how they might recover, but when one of them dies and receives the customary rites, he joins the funeral procession and declares, "If the man had only done such and such, he would still be alive." Imbecile, now you tell us?

Demosthenes' simile derives its force from a comparison of political and medical incompetence. Here the bad physician is defined as one who "neither speaks nor shows how [his patient] might escape the disease." The implication is that this physician fears that his speech will expose his inexperience and ignorance, so he withholds his advice until it is completely useless: his patient is dead. Aeschines, like a bad physician, lacks the ability to deliver a political *prognôsis*, a necessary qualification for the orator, who Demosthenes explicitly says must be able: to see things at their beginnings, to foresee them, and foretell them to others (246)—a definition that once more echoes *Prognôsticon's* "good physician." Instead, Aeschines *qua* bad physician protects himself from accusations of incompetence by only tendering advice about "past events." He waited years after Chaeronea to bring forward his accusations about Demosthenes' Macedonian policies. Like the bad physician, Aeschines could speak freely now, since there was no longer any fear that his own political advice (or lack thereof) would be judged. In the spirit of the *Prorrheticon*, Demosthenes also links madness with *ex post facto* predictions. He calls Aeschines ἐμβρόντητε, a comedic epithet for a "mad" or "gaping fool."⁷³ Demosthenes thus calls into question Aeschines' credibility: should the jury believe the advice of a madman? Even more insidiously, Demosthenes brings up the issue of the city's health. If an adviser is supposed to function like a physician to his city (Thuc. 1.138), then to what extent has Aeschines damaged Athens with his failure to act as a competent physician of the state?

Demosthenes deepens this by hinting at or directly calling

⁷³ See Antiph. fr.230 K.-A.; Oph. fr.3; Philem. fr.45; Men. *Dys.* 441, *Peri.* 523.

Aeschines diseased throughout the course of *On the Crown*. The most salient example, like the physician simile, centers on the topic of proper and improper use of speech. Aeschines' unwillingness to speak except in adverse situations is compared to an old injury whose pain the body re-experiences in times of sickness (198):

δηλοῖς δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὧν ζῆς καὶ ποιεῖς καὶ πολιτεύει καὶ πάλιν οὐ πολιτεύει. πράττεται τι τῶν ὑμῖν δοκούντων συμφέρειν· ἄφρωνος Αἰσχίνης. ἀντέκρουσέ τι καὶ γέγον' οἷον οὐκ ἔδει· πάρεστιν Αἰσχίνης. ὡσπερ τὰ ρήγματα καὶ τὰ σπάσματα, ὅταν τι κακὸν τὸ σῶμα λάβῃ, τότε κινεῖται.

You make that clear, Aeschines, by how you live, act, engage in politics and likewise do not engage in politics. Something is about to happen that apparently benefits you: Aeschines is speechless. Something has thwarted you and what ought not to have happened has: there is Aeschines, just as ruptures and sprains break out when the body suffers an injury.

This simile is strikingly similar to the “fracture simile” of the *Second Olynthiac* (2.21) with some quite minor variations in word choice. The function, however, is the same: it makes the threat, whether a war or a corrupt politician, more concrete. By portraying Aeschines as an internal injury, Demosthenes communicates his belief that his opponent's silence and even his speech can bring the city nothing but pain. Elsewhere Demosthenes complements the image of “the danger within” by qualifying Aeschines' periodic silence as “festering” (ὑπουλον, 307), an adjective frequently used in medical contexts to describe malignant sores in the body (Hippoc. *Medic.* 11; [Arist.] *Pr.* 863a12). Demosthenes also draws attention to his opponent's problematic speech, when he snidely recommends that Aeschines take a dose of hellebore (ἐλλεβορίζεις) for his habitual lying (121), the drug commonly prescribed for insanity. Like the epithet ἐμβρόντητε, this remark evokes *Prorrhethicon* 2's warning that false *prognôses* can lead to accusations of insanity. Once more, by drawing attention to Aeschines' misuse of speech, Demosthenes both lionizes his own speech and intimates the danger that his opponent's politics poses to the integrity of the civic body.

The physician simile was so effective that Aeschines felt the need to respond to it in his prosecution speech.⁷⁴ He warns the jury that Demosthenes intends to compare him to a physician, who refuses to deliver a *prognōsis* on his patients' behalf (3.225):

ἔπειτα ἐπερωτᾶν με, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, μέλλει τίς ἂν εἴη τοι-
οὔτος ἰατρός, ὅστις τῷ νοσοῦντι μεταξὺ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι μηδὲν
συμβουλευοί, τελευτήσαντος δὲ ἐλθὼν εἰς τὰ ἔνατα διεξίει πρὸς
τοῦς οἰκειοῦς, ἃ ἐπιτηδεύσας ὑγίης ἂν ἐγένετο.

And then he intends, so I am told, to ask what kind of a doctor it would be who gave no advice to a sick man during the course of his illness but on his death went to the funeral and explained to the relatives the treatment that would have restored him to health.
(transl. Carey)

Aeschines' mention of this simile is a testament to its effectiveness. By directly confronting it, he may have hoped to take away some of its force or undermine it altogether. He was unsuccessful. Demosthenes' language resounded with the jury, leaving Aeschines with fewer than a fifth of the votes. He was fined one thousand drachmas and prohibited from bringing similar litigations to trial (Plut. *Dem.* 24.2). The shame of his defeat drove Aeschines out of Athens and into exile.

Demosthenes' successful appropriation of medical language underscores the extent to which medicine had become embedded in the cultural milieu of Athens. Perhaps even more significantly, it indicates that the city was beginning to be popularly conceived as a corporate entity with unified interests.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ This passage raises the question of how Aeschines anticipated his opponent's simile. S. Usher, *Demosthenes: On the Crown* (Warminster 1993) 253, offers a few theories: Aeschines may have had access to a version of *On the Crown* pre-trial, because Demosthenes is known to have written down his speeches before delivery; or the extant version of *Against Ctesiphon* represents a post-trial revision, as it was common practice to publish one's speeches sometimes many years after their delivery.

⁷⁵ Brock, *Political Imagery* 70, notes that the first occurrence of the phrase "body of the city" appears in Hyperides' speech *Against Demosthenes* col. 25, delivered in 324: men who accept bribes (i.e. Demosthenes) are characterized as a threat "to the body of the city." Cf. Din. 1.110 in 323.

Trusting in Demosthenes' brand of politics, the Athenians voted to follow his advice. However, in an ironic twist of fate this strategy would be turned against him six years later. Hyperides, who had proposed the much-disputed crown, prosecuted him for bribery in the Harpalus affair (Ps.-Plut. *X Orat.* 11.4). Like Aeschines, Demosthenes would be labeled a harm to the civic body and driven into exile.

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