

Reading the Arrivals of Harpalus

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THE IMPORTANCE of the Harpalus Affair in the history of late classical Athens has long been recognized. The difficulty has been to grasp its significance, both in terms of Athenian politics and in terms of the politics of Alexander's court during the final years of his life. Many have tackled the Harpalus Affair from these perspectives, without providing a completely satisfactory account of it.¹ Here I focus on an aspect whose significance, to my knowledge, has gone unnoticed: the way in which Harpalus arrived at Athens. I will argue that the peculiar way in which he did so may give us some insight not only into what he was hoping to achieve in Athens, but also into the fluid state of public opinion before the outbreak of the Lamian War. This is important because it re-

¹ E. Badian, "Harpalus," *JHS* 81 (1961) 16–43, is still fundamental. Extensive treatments include S. Jaschinski, *Alexander und Griechenland unter dem Eindruck der Flucht des Harpalos* (Bonn 1981); M. Marzi, "Il processo arpalico e i suoi protagonisti," *Orpheus* n.s. 2 (1981) 87–104; W. Will, *Athen und Alexander: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Stadt von 338 bis 322 v. Chr.* (Munich 1983) 113–127; J. Engels, *Studien zur politischen Biographie des Hypereides: Athen in der Epoche der lykurgischen Reformen und des makedonischen Universalreiches* (Munich 1989) 298 ff.; I. Worthington, *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth-century Athens* (Ann Arbor 1992) 41–77, and "The Harpalus Affair and the Greek Response to Macedonian Hegemony," in I. Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History* (Oxford 1994) 307–330; F. Landucci Gattinoni, "Demostene e il processo arpalico," in M. Sordi (ed.), *Processi e politica nel mondo antico* (Milan 1996) 93–106; C. W. Blackwell, *In the Absence of Alexander: Harpalus and the Failure of Macedonian Authority* (New York 1999); G. Wirth, *Hypereides, Lykurg und die ἀύτονομία der Athener: Ein Versuch zum Verständnis einiger Reden der Alexanderzeit* (Vienna 1999) 105 ff.

flects on the ambiguity of Athenian attitudes towards Macedon and on the nature of Macedonian hegemony in Athens.²

In outline, the story of Harpalus is relatively uncontroversial. It begins when Harpalus, Alexander's boyhood friend and treasurer in Babylon, defected from the king while he was campaigning in India. Diodorus claims that Harpalus was afraid of Alexander's return because he was rumored to have indulged in excess and debauchery (17.108.5–6).³ Badian made sense of this flight as part of a broader shake-up in Alexander's administration of the empire.⁴ Whatever the true reason, Diodorus tells us that Harpalus took 5000 talents of the king's money and assembled an army of 6000 mercenaries and sailed to Attica. His arrival in Athens was peculiar, perhaps unique. There, Diodorus says, οὐδενὸς δὲ αὐτῷ προσέχοντος, "because no one accepted him," he departed with his mercenaries to Taenarum. But he came back again soon after, with a portion of the money, and only one or two of his ships.⁵ This time, Diodorus claims, he came as a suppliant, ἰκέτης ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου, and that is how he entered the city. Plutarch agrees with this scenario, in part, suggesting that Harpalus "sought refuge with

² This is a topic that is increasingly attracting scholarly interest: see e.g. J. Frösén (ed.), *Early Hellenistic Athens: Symptoms of a Change* (Helsinki 1997); O. Palagia and S. V. Tracy (eds.), *The Macedonians in Athens, 322–229 BC* (Oxford/Oakville 2003); G. J. Oliver, *War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens* (Oxford/New York 2007); P. P. Liddel, *Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens* (Oxford/New York 2007); A. Bayliss, *After Demosthenes: The Politics of Early Hellenistic Athens* (London/New York 2011).

³ On these allegations see most recently S. Müller, "Alexander, Harpalos und die Ehren für Pythonike und Glykera: Überlegungen zu den Repräsentationsformen des Schatzmeisters in Babylon und Tarsos," *Philia: Festschrift für Gerhard Wirth* (Galati 2006) 71–106, who argues that Harpalus instituted the performance of *proskynesis* for his 'girlfriend' Glycera and the cult for his other girlfriend Pythonice, famously ridiculed by Theopompus (*FrGrHist* 115 F 254), in order to undermine Alexander's legitimacy.

⁴ Badian, *JHS* 81 (1961) 16–43.

⁵ See I. Worthington, "I.G. II² 1631, 1632 and Harpalus' Ships," *ZPE* 65 (1986) 222–224.

the *demos*, and handed himself over with his money and his ships.”⁶ Notably, he does not corroborate Diodorus’ point that Harpalus initially arrived at the head of a small armada and only later as a suppliant. The Plutarchan *Lives of the Ten Orators*, on the other hand, does suggest a double arrival, implying that Demosthenes “initially” spoke against taking him in (846A, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον). More importantly, we find contemporary corroboration of Diodorus’ account by Dinarchus, who charges that Philocles, the general in charge of the port, vowed to not let Harpalus enter the city but went back on his pledge, presumably after he returned as a suppliant.⁷ This further suggests that his arrival caused some consternation, and Dinarchus says as much elsewhere.⁸

We do not have to look far for the cause of the consternation. The Athenians thought that the fleet was an invasion.⁹ Hyperides gives us another glimpse of this event, stating that Harpalus turned up without warning and unexpectedly.¹⁰ Putting all this together, we have a sudden arrival at the Piraeus of a large fleet that causes the city to panic, followed by a debate and a refusal

⁶ *Dem.* 25.2–3, καταφυγόντος δὲ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον αὐτοῦ, καὶ μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτὸν παραδιδόντος.

⁷ *Din.* 3.1, ἐψευσμένος ἀπάντων Ἀθηναίων ἐναντίον καὶ τῶν περιεστηκότων, φάσκων κωλύσειν Ἄρπαλον εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ καταπλεῦσαι. It is usually assumed that Philocles was responsible for admitting Harpalus the second time, as a suppliant, and that is why he is now accused of taking his bribes (e.g. Worthington, *Dinarchus* 315; A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* [Cambridge 1988] 216). It is hard to imagine a context where it would make sense for Philocles to say “before all the Athenians and the bystanders” that he would prevent Harpalus from entering—as a suppliant. My guess is that Philocles’ “promise” or “vow” should be read as a statement of opposition to Harpalus’ *initial* approach.

⁸ *Din.* 2.5, τῆς Ἀρπάλου ἀφίξεως δυσχεροῦς οὔσης.

⁹ *Din.* 2.4, ὃν ἴσθεθ’ ἦκειν καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν. Technically, he says that *Aristogiton* thought the fleet was an invasion but took Harpalus’ bribes regardless. This implies that others would have had the same thought.

¹⁰ *Hyper.* 5.18, Ἄρπαλος οὕτως ἐξαίφνης πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλάδα προσέπεσεν ὥστε μηδένα προαισθῆσθαι.

to allow Harpalus entry, and then a return in the guise of a suppliant, and admission into the city in such guise. None of this is very controversial, but it raises some interesting questions that have not been sufficiently explored. First, why did he initially arrive suddenly and in force? And second, why did he return as a suppliant after leaving his troops behind at Taenarum? These questions are important for understanding Harpalus' intentions in the context of public opinion towards Macedon and the prospect of war. Let us take each question in order.

The usual interpretation of Harpalus' first arrival is that he was trying to rally Athens to war against Alexander. This motive is nowhere stated explicitly.¹¹ But it is a reasonable assumption, and one that almost all historians have made. Ashton in an important paper questions this consensus, arguing that Harpalus could not have sought to rally the Athenians to war because they were *already* preparing to fight to defend their claim to Samos, which they knew they were in danger of losing as a result of Alexander's decision to proclaim the Exiles Decree.¹² This is why when they saw the fleet they thought it was an invasion. In fact, Harpalus' arrival was a distraction from

¹¹ The one exception is the anonymous *Anecd.Bekk.* I 145, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐς Ἀθήνας ἐλθὼν ὡς ἐκπολεμώσων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον. Although the referent of αὐτὸς is unstated, the sentence is usually thought to derive from Arrian's lost pages that dealt with Harpalus. A fragment of Ephippus is also regularly adduced to support the view that a war between Athens and Alexander was imminent shortly after the arrival of Harpalus. It refers to a celebration in Ecbatana, most likely in 324, in which his *hoplophylax* Gorgus offered Alexander an extravagant crown and in addition promised, ὅταν Ἀθήνας πολιορκῆ, μυρίαίς πανοπλίαις καὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καταπέλταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις βέλεσιν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανοῖς (*FrGrHist* 126 F 5). Gorgus' involvement in particular with the Samian question is also attested by the Samian decree thanking him for his intercession with Alexander in the matter of the return of the Samian exiles (*IG XII.6* 17 = *Syll.*³ 312). On Gorgus see A. J. Heisserer, *Alexander the Great and the Greeks: The Epigraphic Evidence* (Norman 1980) 169–203.

¹² N. G. Ashton, "The Lamian War: A False Start?" *Antichthon* 17 (1983) 47–63.

the war effort, postponing the war until after Alexander's death.

Worthington has argued against this thesis, because in his view it overestimates the Athenian will to fight.¹³ But there is something to be said for it. For one, it makes sense of this otherwise puzzling statement by Hyperides (5.19):

ταῦτα σὺ πα[ρεσκευ]ακας τῶι ψηφ[ίσματι], συλλαβῶν τὸ[ν Ἄρπα]λον, καὶ τοὺς μὲ[ν Ἑλ]λη[ν]ας ἅπαντας [πρεσ]βεύεσθαι πεπ[οίη]κας ὡς Ἀλέξανδ[ρον], οὐκ ἔχοντας ἄλλ[η]ν οὐδεμίαν ἀποσ[τρο]φήν, τοὺς δὲ σ[ατράπας], οἱ αὐτοὶ ἂν ἤκο[ν]τες πρὸς ταύτη[ν τὴν] δύναμιν, ἔχοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοῦ[ς] στρατιώτας ὅσους ἐκ[α]στος αὐτῶν εἶχεν, τούτους σύμπαντας οὐ μόνον κεκόλυκας ἀποστῆναι ἐκε[ί]νου τῆ συλλήψει τῆ Ἄρπαλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ...

this situation you have brought about by your decree for Harpalos' arrest. Also, you have made all the Greeks send envoys to Alexander—because they have no other option. And then there are the satraps, who for their part would willingly have come to (join) this force, each with money and all the soldiers at his disposal: these as a body you have not only prevented from revolting (from Alexander), by your detention of Harpalos, but also ... (transl. Whitehead)

There is an unfortunate gap here (as in many other crucial places in the text of Hyperides), where we do not know what “this situation” is which Demosthenes supposedly brought about by proposing to arrest Harpalos. In Ashton's view it refers to a delay in the preparations for war. Worthington argues that it should instead refer to Demosthenes' failure in his negotiations with Nicanor over the Exiles Decree, not to Harpalos' arrival, when the Athenians still held hope of pressing an exemption for Samos under the Exiles Decree. As for the satraps who had been looking to revolt, Worthington suggests that this might be rhetorical exaggeration; it is impossible to be

¹³ Worthington, in *Ventures into Greek History* 307–330, and “Athens and Alexander in 324/3 BC,” *MeditArch* 7 (1994) 45–51.

sure.¹⁴ But Ashton also adduces other evidence, such as a dictum of Demosthenes' preserved in Plutarch, who relates its context to the arrival of Philoxenos. He says that Philoxenos appeared suddenly (not unlike Harpalus) during a time when "the Athenians were hastening to help Harpalus and getting ready against Alexander." To the dumbstruck Athenians Demosthenes is said to have quipped, "What will they do if they see the sun [i.e. Alexander] if they cannot look at the lamp?"¹⁵ Worthington seeks to discount the passage as well by pointing out that Hyperides says that envoys arrived from Philocles (5.8), not Philocles himself, as the passage plainly states. And furthermore, Philocles should not have been in Greece at this point.¹⁶ For Worthington, the Athenians rejected Harpalus initially because they were *not* ready to go to war over the Exiles Decree. They were hoping to influence Alexander diplomatically by offering to recognize his divinity. When Harpalus returned as a suppliant, they felt compelled to let him in, and that is when the trouble started.

Worthington's reconstruction of the events surrounding Harpalus' arrival is carefully designed to take account of some knotty chronological problems and serves ultimately to justify the cautious approach of Demosthenes. But there is another, simpler explanation for why the Athenians refused to accept Harpalus, which does not require us to accept Ashton's view wholeheartedly. In the first place, as many have pointed out, it is unthinkable that the Athenians would simply open their gates

¹⁴ It is possible they are the ones to whom Diodorus refers at 17.111.1–2, as noted with caution by D. Whitehead, *Hyperides: The Forensic Speeches* (Oxford 2000) 417–418.

¹⁵ *Mor.* 531A, τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ὠρμημένων Ἀρπάλω βοηθεῖν καὶ κορυσομένων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη Φιλόξενος ὁ τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ πραγμάτων Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγός. ἐκπλαγέντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου καὶ σιωπῶντος διὰ τὸν φόβον ὁ Δημοσθένης "τί ποιήσουσιν" ἔφη "τὸν ἥλιον ἰδόντες οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὸν λύχον ἀντιβλέπειν;"

¹⁶ But see Paus. 2.33.4–5, putting Philocles at Rhodes; this passage Worthington also seeks to discount.

and let in “thirty warships crammed with battle-hardened mercenaries.”¹⁷ While this must be right, I suggest that there might be more to it. I propose that Harpalus’ first approach to Athens was calculated *not* to gain access to the city, but to terrify the Athenians. And that is why he appeared without warning and in full force.

Commentators frequently point out the superficial resemblance of Harpalus’ arrival to the sudden arrival of Demetrius Poliorcetes in Athens in 307. According to Plutarch, it required “great care and luck,” εὐτυχία δ’ ἅμα καὶ προνοία, for Demetrius to sail into the Piraeus, προαίσθηθαι μὲν οὐδενός, “with no one realizing” (*Demetr.* 8.5). Granted, he does claim that Demetrius had 250 ships, compared to Harpalus’ 30, making it a more impressive feat of seamanship.¹⁸ But the point stands that for a fleet to appear suddenly at the harbor of a city was a common stratagem.¹⁹ Furthermore, Harpalus might have had reason to take precaution against this possibility, for the sudden arrival of a single Macedonian ship had caused a minor scandal only a few years before. Some even tried to portray the event as a *casus belli*. In the pseudo-Demosthenic speech *On the Treaty with Alexander* the speaker lists the many reasons why Athens should go to war against Alexander. Among them “the most arrogant and insulting,” τὸ δὲ ὑβριστικώτατον καὶ ὑπεροπτικώτατον (17.26), is that a single

¹⁷ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 216. Cf. Diod. 18.9.3: ἐστρατευμένοι γὰρ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν πολὺν χρόνον καὶ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ἀγόνων μετεσχικότες ἀθληταὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔργων ἐγεγένητο. According to Aeneas Tacticus (12.2), it behooves a city to make sure not to give entry to a too-large or powerful force of mercenaries, otherwise ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις γίνονται αὐτοὶ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις. See G. A. Lehmann, “Krise und innere Bedrohung der hellenischen Polis bei Aeneas Tacticus,” in W. Eck et al. (eds.), *Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte: Festschrift Friedrich Vittinghoff* (Cologne/Vienna 1980) 71–86.

¹⁸ According to another version, Demetrius sailed in with only 20 ships (Polyaen. 4.7.6).

¹⁹ Cf. Isoc. 15.123: Timotheus always took precautions to avoid any possibility of terrifying a city by appearing unannounced.

Macedonian ship sailed into the Piraeus without permission. This was a particular insult, the speaker argues (27):

ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε τοῦτο παράδυσις ἦν κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ ἐθισμὸς τοῦ ἀνέχεσθαι ἡμᾶς τοὺς τοιούτους εἴσπλους ... πῶς οὐ καταφανὲς ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰσπλεῖν τὸ εὐθύς ἔνδον εἶναι ἐμηχανῶντο; καὶ εἰ λεπτὰ πλοῖα ὑπομενοῦμεν, ὀλίγον ὕστερον καὶ τριήρεις· καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον ὀλίγας, μικρῶ ὕστερον πολλάς.

because it was an encroachment by degrees, to make us accustomed to putting up with such entries ... Is it not obvious that they are contriving instead of sailing in, to *be* completely in? And if we put up with small ships, in a little while we will have triremes; if few at first, soon there will be many.

It is certainly possible that Harpalus simply made a mistake in sailing unannounced to Athens in full force. But the fact remains that a fleet appearing unannounced was liable to provoke terror. And the prospect of *Macedonian* ships appearing unannounced was especially worrisome to Athenians. These considerations raise the possibility that Harpalus acted intentionally.²⁰

It is impossible to say for sure how the Athenians viewed the possibility of hostilities with Alexander when Harpalus sailed into the Piraeus. In Worthington's view, war was the furthest thing from the Athenians' minds. In Ashton's view, the decision to go to war had already been made. The difference between them depends on whether the Athenians knew about Alexander's intention to issue his Exiles Decree before it was officially proclaimed at the Olympic games in early August, and thus becomes involved in uncertain and much-debated chronology.²¹

²⁰ Wirth, *Hyperides* 110, suggests that Harpalus was perhaps psychologically disturbed. He also suggests (114) that the plan to return as a suppliant was suggested to him by his allies in Athens. I would argue that both approaches were according to a plan.

²¹ Harpalus' arrival in Athens is usually dated to July/August 324: see Jaschinski, *Alexander und Griechenland* 34–44; Will, *Athen und Alexander* 115–27; I. Worthington, "The Chronology of the Harpalus Affair," *SymbOslo* 61

But it is possible to sidestep that thicket entirely by pointing to the long-standing debate in Athens about how to deal with Macedon, quite apart from the Samian question (the prospect of losing their holdings on Samos after Alexander restored all the exiles in his empire), which notoriously fails to register in any of the preserved speeches surrounding the Harpalus Affair.²² The Athenians did not have opinion polls, and there is no way for us to answer the question of the state of public opinion towards war at one particular moment. The answer is probably that, as usual, it was divided. That some had been beating the war-drums for some time while others were op-

(1986) 63–76; Engels, *Studien* 298–303. There are two reasons for this. First, we are told that Harpalus' arrival coincided, roughly, with the Olympic festival of that year, at which Nicanor announced the Exiles Decree (Hyp. 5.18, Din. 1.81, Diod. 18.8.3–5). Second, Philocles, who was accused of allowing Harpalus to enter Athens in return for a bribe, was the general in charge of the Piraeus in 325/4 (on the basis of *IG II²* 1631b.214–215, naming a different general in that post for the following year), so Harpalus had to reach the city by the last day of the archon year, in this case July 21. One problem with this is that it leaves a five-month gap between the time he fled Babylon and arrived in Athens. This is a very leisurely flight indeed, but not impossible. The reconstruction is also complicated by the fact that the sources are contradictory. Thus Demosthenes tells us that Philocles was convicted of taking money from Harpalus and exiled (*Ep.* 3.31), but in the following year a Philocles appears honored as *kosmetes* for a group of epehebes (*I.Oropus* 353), although Dinarchus tells us that he was rejected from that office (3.15, not “suspended,” as Worthington reads it: cf. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3). So either Philocles was rejected for the office and then approved in quick succession, or the Philocles who let Harpalus in and the Philocles honored in *I.Oropus* 353 are different men, as is argued by Worthington, “Thoughts on the Identity of Deinarchus' Philocles,” *ZPE* 79 (1989) 80–82, and S. C. Humphreys, “Ephêboi at Oropos,” *Horos* 17–21 (2004–2009) 83–90. Granted that Philocles is not an uncommon name, this is too drastic a solution when there is so much overlap in the evidence in terms of name, office, and date. Also possible is that one (or more) of the sources is being less than truthful. For instance, Dem. *Ep.* 2.15–17, 26, also says that no one besides Demosthenes was punished, which flatly contradicts what is stated in *Ep.* 3.31.

²² See O. Schmitt, “Deinarch, Hypereides und Samos: Über die Berechtigung des *argumentum e silentio*,” *Klio* 78 (1996) 61–67.

posed we can see quite clearly in the Demosthenic speech just quoted, which probably dates to shortly before Agis' rebellion, ca. 333–331.²³ It issues a call to war in response to Macedonian infringements of the Common Peace. The Athenians debated going to war when Thebes rose against Alexander, they debated it when Sparta did, and they would also debate it when Alexander died and his seemingly divinely touched person was no longer on earth.²⁴ Of course, Hyperides speaks from the perspective of a 'war hawk', trying to portray Demosthenes as the only 'dove' in Athens, and thus as the only impediment to success.²⁵

I suggest that Harpalus orchestrated his arrival in order to provoke another debate and to frame it in such a way that the war hawks would win. If public opinion was divided about a new war with Macedon at the time of Harpalus' arrival, it makes sense to consider Harpalus' first arrival as a 'publicity stunt'.²⁶ Assuming that Harpalus wanted to start a war against Alexander, the best way to get Athenians not otherwise inclined to go to war to change their minds would be to shake them from their sense of complacency. The sudden and un-

²³ On its date (arguing for 333) see W. Will, "Zur Datierung der Rede Ps.-Demosthenes XVII," *RhM* 125 (1982) 202–213.

²⁴ Debate at the time of the Theban rebellion: Plut. *Dem.* 23.1–2; [Demades] *On the Twelve Years* 17. At the time of Agis' rebellion: Aeschin. 3.165–167; Din. 1.34–36; *IG* II³ 352.13–14 (*GHI* 94). After Alexander's death: Plut. *Phoc.* 23, Diod. 18.10.1 (with men of property arguing for peace and demagogues arguing for war). If Demosthenes' *First Epistle* is authentic, as J. Goldstein, *The Letters of Demosthenes* (New York 1968), has argued persuasively, its call for *homonoiā* in pursuing the war suggests that the Athenian divisions were quite deeply felt. See further O. Schmitt, *Der Lamische Krieg* (Bonn 1992) 53–66.

²⁵ Wirth, *Hyperides* 136–137, raises the possibility that Hyp. 5.19 was subject to *ex post facto* editorial revision in order to characterize Demosthenes as undermining a war effort already under way at the time of the trial but not necessarily at the time of Harpalus' arrival.

²⁶ For the political utility of such theatrical acts in Athens see A. Gottesman, *Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens* (Cambridge 2014) ch. 5.

announced appearance of a Macedonian fleet in the Piraeus would have had such an effect by reminding them how precarious and susceptible to the whims of others their peace and prosperity really were.

Either Harpalus knew what he was doing by sailing in unannounced, or he did not—that is possible too. So either he was ignorant or he miscalculated. Diodorus says “the people did not accept him.” Dinarchus suggests that the general in charge of the port, Philocles, promised not to let him land. This seems to imply that the Athenians did get riled up, but against Harpalus, not against Alexander. Macedonian ships were Macedonian ships, and they had sailed into the Piraeus without permission. Such an act violated Athenian sovereignty. So, finding the Athenians not inclined to support him, Harpalus sailed away. But then he came back, and this second arrival also supports the point that he sought to incite the Athenians to go to war. For he did not simply return: he returned in the guise of a suppliant.

Worthington suggests that the supplication was simply a matter of gaining access, for “to deny a suppliant access to a city of which he was a citizen was unthinkable.”²⁷ He refers to the fact that Harpalus had apparently received the honor of citizenship previously in return of a large gift of grain to the city.²⁸ The prior benefaction, combined with the religious

²⁷ Worthington, *Ventures into Greek History* 318. Wirth, *Hypereides* 105 n.338, rightly dismisses this line of argument.

²⁸ Python *TrGF* I 91 F 1.14–16, ἀκούω μυριάδας τὸν Ἄρπαλον αὐτοῖσι τῶν Ἀγῆνος οὐκ ἐλάττονας σίτου διαπέμψαι καὶ πολίτην γεγονέναι. It seems that the eastern Mediterranean experienced a severe grain shortage in the early 320s, perhaps due to climatic conditions or perhaps to Alexander’s activities. Demosthenes (56.7, 34.37–39) alludes to the price increases that accompanied it. This coincides with the honorific decrees for the grain merchant Heraclides of Salamis (*IG* II³ 367 = *GHI* 95). It also coincides with the massive grain shipments from Cyrene donated to various Greek cities (*SEG* IX 2 = *GHI* 96). Some intriguing connections between this decree and Harpalus’ ‘first flight’ to Megara are drawn by B. M. Kingsley, “Harpalos in the Megarid (333–331 B.C.) and the Grain Shipments from Cyrene,” *ZPE*

obligation under which the ritual of supplication put the Athenians, compelled them to change their minds and let Harpalus into the city to hear him out. Worthington's view misses a big part of the picture. For one, the honor of citizenship did not translate into full, active citizenship automatically.²⁹ Clearly Harpalus wanted something more from Athens than just refuge from Alexander. Otherwise he very well could have come incognito, disembarking in the Piraeus and making his way to the city where his allies and friends, such as Phocion, could have brought his case before the Council and Assembly.³⁰ Furthermore, if he had activated his citizenship he likely would not have needed to supplicate. For, to judge from inscriptions recording supplications to the Assembly, suppliants were normally non-citizens, for citizens could access the Athenian institutions of government by following other procedures of approach.³¹ Finally, supplication

66 (1986) 165–177. More generally see P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge 1988) 144–149, 54–62; A. Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC* (Oxford 2007); Oliver, *War, Food, and Politics*. That the grain crisis was ongoing in Athens at the time of Harpalus' arrival is clear from the mission in spring 324, just before his arrival that summer, to establish a colony in the Adriatic ὅπως δ' ἂν ὑπάρχηι [τῶ]ι δήμῳ εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα [χρ]όνον ἐμπορία οἰκεία καὶ [σιτ]οπομπία, “in order that the *demos* might have its own grain supply and transportation” (*IG* II² 1629.217–220). Cf. also the lines of Python immediately before the ones just cited: “While they [the Athenians] claimed they lived a life of slavery, they dined well. *Now* they eat only lentils and fennel, no longer grain”: ὅτε μὲν ἔφασκον δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι βίον, ἰκάνον ἐδείπνουν· νῦν δὲ τὸν χέδροπα μόνον καὶ τὸν μάραθρον ἔσθουσι, πυροῦς δ' οὐ μάλα (11–13).

²⁹ See M. J. Osborne, *Naturalization in Athens* IV (Brussels 1983) 171–183.

³⁰ On his friendship with Phocion see Plut. *Phoc.* 21.2–3. Along with his son-in-law Charicles, Phocion became the guardian of Harpalus' daughter after her father fled (*Phoc.* 22.4).

³¹ The Athenian Assembly by this time had an established procedure specifically for hearing petitions brought by suppliants: *Ath. Pol.* 43.6, with P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*² (Oxford 1993) 527–529. In inscriptions only foreigners recorded as suppliants: P. Gauthier,

was not a procedure wherein ritual propriety excluded pragmatic considerations and arguments.³²

The sources that explicitly describe Harpalus as a suppliant are much later than the event.³³ It is possible that they imagine him a “suppliant of the *demos*” only in a metaphorical sense. But there is reason to believe that he did perform the ritual. First, we know that Philocles was accused of allowing Harpalus to enter the city (Din. 3.1). This made him the cause of the whole trouble, according to his accuser (3.7). This charge makes sense only if Philocles somehow acted in an official capacity and if Harpalus made some appeal to him to enter in that capacity. We know that Philocles was general in charge of Munychia and the docks. It seems that the shrine of Artemis on Munychia was an important focus for suppliants in the port.³⁴ In Athens it was normal procedure for a magistrate to hear a suppliant’s plea and if he found it meritorious to bring it before the Assembly.³⁵ Most likely, this is the role that Philocles played and is why he was later accused of accepting Harpalus’ bribes to allow him to enter, even though on the occasion (most likely) of Harpalus’ initial arrival he declared that he would not allow him to enter the city (Din. 3.1). So, assuming that we believe Diodorus and Plutarch’s claim that Harpalus acted the part of the suppliant, why would he do so?

According to Worthington, Harpalus returned to Athens because he wanted to collaborate further with war hawks like Hyperides in order to further his aim of involving Athens in war.³⁶ The fact that he came as a suppliant supports this in-

Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs (Paris 1985) 182–185; R. Zelnick-Abramovitz, “Supplication and Request: Application by Foreigners to the Athenian Polis,” *Mnemosyne* 51 (1998) 554–573.

³² See F. S. Naiden, *Ancient Supplication* (New York 2006).

³³ Diod. 17.108.7 and Plut. *Dem.* 25.2.

³⁴ Lys. 13.23–30 (supplication by a man preparing to sail out); Dem. 18.107 (supplication by trierarchs).

³⁵ Naiden, *Ancient Supplication* 173–191.

³⁶ Worthington, *Dinarchus* 49.

terpretation, but suggests in addition that Harpalus had to convince the public at large as well as the opinion-leaders like Demosthenes and Hyperides. Here it is important to underscore that the role of suppliant had specific connotations for the Athenians. It was a common topos that Athens was “the common refuge of the Greeks” (Aeschin. 3.134). In the city’s self-representation, Athens was always willing to take in the refugees that no one else would, and to defend them against those who pursued them. Harpalus’ choice to appear as a suppliant, accordingly, should be read against the backdrop of Athenian myth and tradition about the city’s role as a protector of suppliants.

According to Demetrius of Phaleron, a fair pretext for war was crucial for managing public opinion.³⁷ In Athenian myth, supplication always constituted an argument for such a pretext. Thus, in several nationalistic myths, Athens takes in suppliants who bring it into direct conflict with a tyrannical enemy, and who give it the opportunity to display its power in a just war.³⁸ The stories of the children of Heracles and of the fallen Seven against Thebes support Athens’ hegemonic role in its mythic imagination. By giving the city the excuse it needed to confront other dominant powers, their supplications also allowed Athens to forge an empire on a morally justified basis. “You can tell a lot about our city by looking at our suppliants,” says Isocrates. “For who would supplicate those who are weaker or those who are under the power of someone else and ignore the mightier—and supplicate not just concerning private matters, but about matters which were common, and which no one else could possibly deal with than the people who claim to be the leaders of

³⁷ Fr.91 SOD (Polyb. 26.2.3): ἔνστασις γὰρ πολέμου κατὰ τὸν Δημήτριον δικαία μὲν δοκοῦσα εἶναι καὶ τὰ νικήματα ποιεῖ μείζω καὶ τὰς ἀποτεύξεις ἀσφαλεστέρας, ἀσχήμων δὲ καὶ φαύλη τάναντία ἀπεργάζεται.

³⁸ See A. Tzanetou, *City of Suppliants: Tragedy and the Athenian Empire* (Austin 2012); R. Brock, “Mythical *polypragmosyne* in Athenian Drama and Rhetoric,” in M. M. Austin et al. (eds.), *Modus operandi: Essays in Honour of Geoffrey Rickman* (London 1998) 227–238.

Greece?”³⁹

This passage is from the *Panegyricus*, of ca. 385. But the notion of Athens as the refuge of suppliants, and the protection of its suppliants as a *casus belli* on behalf of all of Greece, was long-lived indeed.⁴⁰ Aeschines alludes to it in his speech against Demosthenes in 330. The aim now is to contrast the old glory days, when suppliants came to Athens because they knew it had the power to help, with the present state of affairs:⁴¹

ἡ δ' ἡμετέρα πόλις, ἡ κοινὴ καταφυγὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πρὸς ἣν ἀφικνοῦντο πρότερον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος αἱ πρεσβεῖαι, κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι παρ' ἡμῶν τὴν σωτηρίαν εὐρησόμενοι, νῦν οὐκέτι περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας ἀγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους.

Our city, the common refuge of the Greeks, to which formerly embassies came from Greece, each seeking to find salvation from us, is now no longer fighting for hegemony of the Greeks but for the soil of the fatherland.

Dinarchus also exploits this topos in his speech against Demos-

³⁹ Isoc. 4.54–57: γνοίη δ' ἄν τις καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν ῥώμην τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐκ τῶν ἰκετειῶν ... τίς γὰρ ἄν ἰκετεύειν τολμήσειεν ἢ τοὺς ἥττους αὐτοῦ ἢ τοὺς ὑφ' ἑτέροις ὄντας, παραλιπὼν τοὺς μείζω δύναμιν ἔχοντας, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ πραγμάτων οὐκ ἰδίων ἀλλὰ κοινῶν καὶ περὶ ὧν οὐδένας ἄλλους εἰκὸς ἦν ἐπιμεληθῆναι πλὴν τοὺς προεστάναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀξιοῦντας;

⁴⁰ Engels, *Studien* 121–122, suggests that a particular kind of *Asylpolitik* was behind the Athenians' decisions to take in refugees from Philip after Chaeroneia, and that it expressed a posture of resistance (otherwise Will, *Athen und Alexander* 26). This has to do with the Athenians' reception of Troezenians (Hyp. 4.31, with Dem. 18.295), Acarnanians (*IG* II³ 316), and Thebans (Diod. 17.15.4, Plut. *Alex.* 13.1). This is possible, but there is no indication that any of these actually supplicated: granting citizenship was quite different from accepting a suppliant. The Acarnanians did not supplicate, in contrast to someone like Dioscurides of Abdera, possibly another refugee from Philip (*IG* II³ 302; see L. J. Bliquez, “Philip II and Abdera,” *Eranos* 79 [1981] 65–79, at 69). On how these acts served to frame ‘social memory’ in political debates see now B. Steinbock, *Social Memory in Athenian Public Discourse: Uses and Meanings of the Past* (Ann Arbor 2012) 272–274.

⁴¹ Aeschin. 3.134; cf. Lyc. 1.42.

thenes in 324: “In those days, Athenians, in those days, the Lacedaemonians who were renowned on account of their leaders and their leaders’ upbringing, humbly came to our city, begging our ancestors for salvation,” τότε, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι, τότε οἱ μὲν πρότερον ὄντες λαμπροὶ διὰ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῖς ἐκείνων ἤθεσι τραφέντες ταπεινοὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ἦκον, δεόμενοι τῆς παρὰ τῶν προγόνων ἡμῶν σωτηρίας (1.76). The difference is that he places the glory days of suppliants not in myth but in the early fourth century under the leadership of men like Conon and Timotheus. The distance between Demosthenes and those leaders explains why Athenian fortunes had fallen in the meantime. Aeschines sums up the same idea: “These things have happened to us since Demosthenes came into politics,” καὶ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ὅτου Δημοσθένης πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν προσελήλυθεν (3.134).

Oratory of the 330s and 320s repeatedly hammers home the point that Athens had fallen, in terms of prosperity and military might, from its past and needed to return to it.⁴² Orators presented this as imminently within the grasp of the *demos*: one decision, or one small change of policy would be sufficient to do it. By presenting himself as a suppliant, Harpalus may have been trying similarly to appeal to battered Athenian egos, suggesting that they could step into the role of their ancestors who defended suppliants against tyrants in righteous wars that illustrated Athenian moral superiority and in addition gave them the opportunity to expand their empire to all of Greece, as was argued in Euripides’ *Suppliants* (301–325). Appeals to similar “feelings of frustrated patriotism”⁴³ helped Demosthenes defeat Aeschines in 330. In that same year they almost led to the conviction of Leocrates. Here they might have led Athens to war.

⁴² In Badian’s apt phrase, Athens was haunted by “the ghost of empire”: E. Badian, “The Ghost of Empire: Reflections on Athenian Foreign Policy in the Fourth Century BC,” in W. Eder (ed.), *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jh. v. Chr. Vollendung oder Verfall einer Verfassungsform?* (Stuttgart 1995) 79–106.

⁴³ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 214; see also E. M. Burke, “*Contra Leocratem* and *de Corona*: Political Collaboration?” *Phoenix* 31 (1977) 330–340.

If in this drama Harpalus played the part of the suppliant and Athens the part of the defender, then the part of the tyrant would feature none other than Alexander.⁴⁴ The notion of Athens as a defender of suppliants against Alexander-as-tyrant finds an echo in the Alexander historians, as we can see in the apocryphal conversation between the court historian Callisthenes and Philotas, who will subsequently be implicated in a conspiracy against Alexander.⁴⁵ In the story Callisthenes none-too-subtly praises to Philotas the Athenian tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogiton and the unparalleled honors they received in Athens for murdering a tyrant. Philotas complains that no one nowadays would give refuge to someone who killed a tyrant, and Callisthenes replies (Arr. 4.10.4):

εἰ καὶ μὴ παρ' ἄλλους, παρά γε Ἀθηναίους ὅτι φυγόντι ὑπάρχοι σῶζεσθαι. τούτους γὰρ καὶ πρὸς Εὐρυσθέα πολεμήσαι ὑπὲρ τῶν παίδων τῶν Ἡρακλέους, τυραννοῦντα ἐν τῷ τότε τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

If no one else, the Athenians would save the fugitive. For for the sake of the children of Heracles they fought against Eurystheus, who was then a tyrant in Greece.

While there are clearly differences between the scenario envisioned here and the case of Harpalus (Harpalus had not killed anyone), this *logos* makes explicit what Harpalus was stating implicitly, or rather performatively. If anyone was a tyrant, it was Alexander. If anyone would stand against a tyrant, it would be Athens.⁴⁶ This was the city's traditional role and the index of its power and righteousness.

⁴⁴ On Alexander as a tyrant-figure in his early reception see further H.-U. Wiemer, "Held, Gott oder Tyrann? Alexander der Große im frühen Hellenismus," *Hermes* 139 (2011) 179–204.

⁴⁵ As Bosworth suggests, the story is colored by an attempt to slander Callisthenes, who was seen as an inspiration for the subsequent 'Conspiracy of the Pages': *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander II* (Oxford 1995) 76.

⁴⁶ For the spread of anti-tyrannical ideology in the early Hellenistic period see now D. Teegarden, *Death to Tyrants! Ancient Greek Democracy and the Struggle against Tyranny* (Princeton 2014).

In short, Harpalus was trying to enact a tragic pattern.⁴⁷ I suggest that Harpalus' arrival in 324 was designed to enact for the Athenians the very same well-worn tragic pattern to which Isocrates, Aeschines, Dinarchus, and Arrian all refer. The pattern is simple: a suppliant is running for his life, pursued by nasty heralds from a tyrant figure who demands him back.⁴⁸ The Athenians unanimously decide to defy the tyrant. They go to war, and triumph.

Of course, not every Athenian would actually have seen Harpalus playing the part of the suppliant, but they would not have had to. Such 'stunts' worked in Athens by relying on word-of-mouth transmission to reach their audience.⁴⁹ For Harpalus' purposes (as I reconstruct them) it was enough if people were talking about him as a suppliant. Perhaps he thought that the familiar pattern would resonate with the Athenians at a time when not only the means but the very meaning of resistance to Macedon was a topic of debate. In that connection we should remember that what modern historians call the Lamian War the Athenians thought of as the Hellenic War, "which the Athenian *demos* undertook for the freedom of the Greeks," already by 318 and most likely by 323.⁵⁰ And if that is the case,

⁴⁷ For supplication as a kind of 'script' see V. Farenga, *Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece: Individuals Performing Justice and the Law* (Cambridge 2006). Historical instances of acts of supplication that precipitate military action include the supplications by the Plataeans (Hdt. 6.108.4) and by the Spartan Periclidias (Ar. *Lys.* 1138–1144, Plut. *Cimon* 16. 9–10).

⁴⁸ See J. Kopperschmidt, *Die Hikesie als dramatische Form: Zur motivischen Interpretation des griechischen Dramas* (Tübingen 1967); R. Bernek, *Dramaturgie und Ideologie: Der politische Mythos in den Hikesiedramen des Aischylos, Sophokles und Euripides* (Munich 2004).

⁴⁹ See Gottesman, *Politics and the Street* 117–118.

⁵⁰ Compare *IG* II² 448.44–45 (of 318/7), [καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πολέμου] τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ, ὃν ἐ[ν]ε[στ]ήσατο ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, with Dem. *Ep.* 2.5 (of 323/2), ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ἀγῶνα, ὃν ὑμεῖς ἠγωνίσασθε. See further N. G. Ashton, "The Lamian War: *stat magni nominis umbra*," *JHS* 104 (1984) 152–157; E. Poddighe, "La questione samia tra Alessandro e Atene: 'libertà dei Greci,'" *QS* 66 (2007) 29–45. On the

it is possible that Harpalus' initial arrival was designed to exacerbate those feelings of impotence that the second arrival was designed to assuage and channel towards a specific aim: a war of Greek liberation against a tyrant. In his speech of 322, Hyperides acknowledges this idea when he compares favorably the fallen of the Lamian War to the famous tyrannicides, and finds the recent dead more impressive because while Harmodius and Aristogiton opposed the tyrants of their own city, the Lamian War's dead opposed the tyrants of all of Greece.⁵¹

Unfortunately for Harpalus, life rarely follows a script. The decree that Demosthenes passed in the Assembly did not call for mobilization against the 'tyrant' Alexander but for the arrest of Harpalus and the confiscation of his money (Din. 1.89, Hyp. 5.9). It may very well be that most Athenians did not want to risk a war against Alexander because they were preparing to deal with him diplomatically, especially with an eye on their holdings on Samos.⁵² Demosthenes' meeting with Nicanor (Din. 1.81, 103), Alexander's envoy sent to announce the Exiles Decree at Olympia, is clear indication that Demosthenes at least was leaning in that direction, and the fact that the Assembly endorsed Demosthenes' decree to arrest Harpalus suggests that the Athenians were willing to go along with him. Another, related, possibility is that most Athenians were too thoroughly in awe of the personality and propaganda of the king for Harpalus' own propaganda to have its intended

origins of 'Lamian War' see most recently J. Walsh, "The *Lamiaka* of Choerilus of Iasos and the Genesis of the Term 'Lamian War,'" *CQ* 61 (2011) 538–544. The Samians apparently called it "the war against the cleruchs": *IG* XII.6 43.9–11, with the reconstruction of E. Badian, "A Comma in the History of Samos," *ZPE* 23 (1976) 289–294.

⁵¹ Hyp. 6.40, οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοὺς τῆς πατρίδος τυράννους κατέλυσαν, οὗτοι δὲ τοὺς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσης.

⁵² The list of councilors of the cleruchy in Samos (*IG* XII.6 262), published by C. Habicht, "Buleuten und Beamte der athenischen Kleruchie in Samos," *AthMitt* 110 (1995) 273–304, suggests that there was a sizable Athenian presence on the island.

effect.⁵³ Harpalus soon fled Athens (Diod. 17.108.7), or was ordered out (Plut. *Dem.* 25.6). He met his death on Crete at the hands of an associate, Thibron, who took command of his mercenaries and apparently used them to try to carve out a small kingdom for himself around Cyrene.⁵⁴ Whatever other advantage Thibron had over Harpalus, he also had the virtue of being more direct.⁵⁵

October, 2014

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⁵³ Cf. Aeschin. 3.132, Dem. *Ep.* 1.13, Plut. *Phoc.* 22.6. “Die makedonische Macht hatte sich in Alexander personifiziert”: Will, *Athen und Alexander* 130.

⁵⁴ Diod. 18.19–21, esp. 19.5: ὡς μέλλοντος αὐτοῦ [sc. Thibron] τὴν πλησιόχωρον Λιβύην καταστρέφεισθαι. For a coin apparently struck by Thibron see E. T. Newell, *Miscellanea numismatica: Cyrene to India* (New York 1938) 3–11. For a chronology of Thibron’s war see Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 291–292.

⁵⁵ I am grateful to the readers and the editor of *GRBS* for helpful criticism and suggestions.