

Negative Comparison: Agamemnon and Alexander in Plutarch's *Agesilaus-Pompey*

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PERHAPS THE GREATEST DEVELOPMENT of twentieth-century Plutarchan studies was the demonstration that the pairings and comparisons within *Parallel Lives* are extremely meaningful.¹ In various ways, Plutarch uses comparison, or *synkrisis* (implied in the pairs and explicit in the formal *synkriseis* which follow most pairs) to express key themes, bringing the *Lives* richer meaning than they achieve in isolation. In the *Agesilaus-Pompey*, we see that the protagonists shared many character traits and that, partly as a result of these traits, their careers followed similar arcs. In recognising that Agesilaus and Pompey are alike, we see both of them more clearly. The differences between them work in a similar way, casting each into relief. This picture has been enriched by G. W. M. Harrison's demonstration that Alexander the Great provides a further model for comparison in this pair, with each man's achievements contrasted with those of Alexander.² This article

¹ Including but not limited to: H. Erbse, "Die Bedeutung der Synkrisis in den Parallelbiographien Plutarchs," *Hermes* 84 (1956) 378–424; P. A. Stadter, "Plutarch's Comparison of Pericles and Fabius Maximus," *GRBS* 16 (1975) 77–85; J. Geiger, "Plutarch's Parallel Lives: The Choice of Heroes," *Hermes* 109 (1981) 85–104; C. B. R. Pelling, "Synkrisis in Plutarch's Lives," in F. E. Brenk and I. Gallo (eds.), *Miscellanea Plutarchea* (Ferrara 1986) 83–96, revised ed. in *Plutarch and History. Eighteen Studies* (London 2002) 349–364; S. Swain, "Plutarchan Synkrisis," *Eranos* 90 (1992) 101–111; T. Duff, *Plutarch's Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice* (Oxford 1999), esp. 243–252.

² G. W. M. Harrison, "The Semiotics of Plutarch's Συγκρίσεις: The Hellenistic Lives of Demetrius-Antony and Agesilaus-Pompey," *RBPhil* 73 (1995) 91–104.

will take this further, demonstrating that a fourth figure provides balance in this connecting set of relationships. As well as being compared and contrasted with each other, Pompey the Great and Agesilaus II of Sparta are both likened to Agamemnon and Alexander. Plutarch undermines these comparisons, so that Pompey's failure is expressed through the demonstration that he was not so great as Alexander, while Agesilaus is shown to have been less great than Agamemnon. Part of what pairs Agesilaus and Pompey together is their failure to live up to these more successful counterparts. How and why they were less successful is the key moral of the pair.

Love of victory: key themes in the *Agesilaus-Pompey*

In an explicit authorial intervention early in the *Agesilaus*, Plutarch writes that while some philosophers consider conflicts essential, it is his opinion that “if they are pushed to extremes, [conflicts] are most harmful to states and carry great dangers with them” (*Ages.* 5.3–4). As Thomas Hillman demonstrates, this authorial statement establishes a key theme of this pair. The *Lives* themselves (with further authorial interventions) go on to demonstrate Plutarch's theory, showing how Agesilaus' and Pompey's excessive φιλονικία, love of victory, led to conflicts that were ruinous for them and their peoples.³ So

³ T. P. Hillman, “Authorial Statements, Narrative, and Character in Plutarch's *Agesilaus-Pompeius*,” *GRBS* 35 (1994) 255–280. I follow P. A. Stadter, “Competition and its Costs: φιλονικία in Plutarch's Society and Heroes,” in G. Roskam and L. Van der Stockt (eds.), *Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics* (Leuven 2011) 237–255, in interpreting the text as φιλονικία (“love of victory”) rather than φιλονεικία (“love of strife”). As Stadter demonstrates, the concept of φιλονεικία is never far from the meaning of φιλονικία. For convenience, the Greek quotations and translations in this article are adapted from the Loeb, although the Loeb favours φιλονεικία, while it is the Teubner edition which prefers φιλονικία. Other key themes in this pair are the ability to manage friendships appropriately, on which see Hillman 255–280, and control of *eros*, on which see J. Beneker, “Plutarch on the Rise and Fall of Pompey,” in A. Perez Jimenez and F. Titchener (eds.), *The Historical and Biographical Values of Plutarch's Works: Studies Devoted to Professor Philip Stadter by the International Plutarch Society* (Málaga 2005) 33–46.

Agesilaus fought other Greeks and Pompey other Romans, to the detriment of Sparta, Greece, and Rome. The exploration of this theme culminates in a lengthy authorial statement about the battle of Pharsalus, the gist of which is that Caesar and Pompey together might have had the whole world had they not thrown away their strength through excessive desire for pre-eminence (*Pomp.* 70.1–4). In making this intervention, Plutarch echoes the words he attributed to Agesilaus, who bemoaned the loss of Greek life at the battle of Nemea (*Ages.* 16.4–5).⁴ As we shall see, Agesilaus' and Pompey's excess of φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία is shown to be a major factor in their failure to match the achievements of their other parallels, Agamemnon and Alexander.

Agamemnon and Alexander both led spectacular expeditions into Asia, toppling empires and proving the Greeks' prowess in battle. The mythical Agamemnon's success was made possible by his ability to combine the disparate Greeks into one army, and Alexander's success was similarly dependent upon the creation of combined forces and the suppression of revolt at home. Both remained controversial figures. Agamemnon had notoriously tense relations with his subordinate leaders, and the classical Greeks often associated him with overbearing hegemony.⁵ The early authorial statement in which Plutarch discusses conflict acknowledges the ambivalence of Agamemnon's position. Plutarch explains that “some think that Homer [con-

⁴ Hillman, *GRBS* 35 (1994) 277. Plutarch suggests a correlation of place for these statements by referring to “the Pharsalians.” This implied (though unstated) correlation emphasises the shared meaning of the statements, an interpretive factor achieved through a deviation from Xenophon's tradition (*Hell.* 4.3.1–8), which explicitly names Amphipolis as the place where Agesilaus receives the news, and which refers to “Thessalians” led by “Polycharmus the Pharsalian” rather than Plutarch's “Pharsalians.”

⁵ See esp. Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, with Thuc. 1.9–12, on which R. J. Rabel, “Agamemnon's Empire in Thucydides,” *CJ* 80 (1984) 8–10. On Agamemnon in Homer see esp. O. Taplin, “Agamemnon's Role in the *Iliad*,” in C. B. R. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature* (Oxford 1990) 60–82.

sidered conflict good for society] for he would not have represented Agamemnon as pleased when Achilles and Odysseus were carried away into abuse of each other ‘with frightful words’ if he had not thought the general interests likely to profit from the mutual rivalry and disagreement of the best men (*ariston*)” (*Ages.* 5.4, quoting *Od.* 8.75). Plutarch had a firm command of the context of the Homeric episodes that he invoked, and he used that context to enrich the meaning implicit in his citation of those passages.⁶ This episode is the subject of the Phaeacian bard Demodocus’ first song, and it makes Odysseus weep to hear it. It is noticeable that Plutarch holds that, while “some” may offer this example, it does little to support their case. Agamemnon takes pleasure in the quarrel because it has been prophesied that Troy will fall only when the “best of the Achaeans” argue. He is right that this argument anticipates the fall, but his satisfaction is premature. His own quarrel with Achilles, Achilles’ withdrawal from battle, and Achilles’ death, will all delay the fall and bring, as the narrator of the *Odyssey* reminds us, great “pain” (8.81) rolling over Greeks and Trojans alike.⁷ “Some” take Agamemnon’s pleasure as evidence of the benefits of conflict, but Plutarch certainly does not, and he follows up immediately with the observation that “this principle must not be accepted without some reservations” (*Ages.* 5.4). This first reference to Agamemnon establishes him as an am-

⁶ B. X. de Wet, “Plutarch’s Use of the Poets,” *AClass* 31 (1988) 13–25. Also see Duff, *Plutarch’s Lives* 236–237, on Plutarch’s use of Homer and Euripides in *Alc.* 23.5.

⁷ This Odyssean episode has been a source of controversy. In this interpretation, I largely follow G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore 1979) 15–65, who regards the quarrel as a product of an alternative epic tradition which made Odysseus rather than Agamemnon Achilles’ main antagonist, with the contrast of *metis* (cunning) and *bie* (might) as its central subject. J. S. Clay, *The Wrath of Athena* (Princeton 1983) 96–112, 241–246, also regards this episode as a contrast of *metis* and *bie*, but believes the Achilles-Odysseus quarrel to be an invention of the poet of the *Odyssey* and set *after* the action of the *Iliad*, with the start of the great “pain” being the fall of Troy, not the struggle to bring it down.

bivalent figure, and anticipates the risk involved in emulating him. Nevertheless, none could deny his military success. Despite the “pain” he oversaw and the bitter end he came to, he was still the leader of the successful campaign against Asia that was a defining aspect of Greek identity.

While Alexander received a mixed representation for his moral standards, as a measure of military success he was an outstanding paradigm. Agamemnon was no longer the only model for significant success in Asia, and writers in the Hellenistic age and beyond made Alexander a point of comparison for measuring the worth of other military figures.⁸ Plutarch himself had a pronounced recourse to this device throughout the *Parallel Lives*, despite his scepticism about Alexander’s moral worth. Harrison has suggested that comparison with Alexander is fundamental to the *Parallel Lives*. He claims that Plutarch “seems to have wanted to investigate a series of lives which moved towards the incredible career of Alexander or was later to be lived in thrall to it.”⁹ Agesilaus and Pompey achieved huge military success, with victories in Europe, Asia, and Africa. This made them ripe for comparison with Alexander, and indeed, Pompey was likened to Alexander in his own lifetime, as Agesilaus was to Agamemnon. But their successes were not unmitigated, and while allowing that they achieved some greatness, Plutarch deconstructs the apparent likeness between Agesilaus-Agamemnon and Pompey-Alexander. In doing so he demonstrates how excessive φιλονικία destroyed the full potential of their lives.

⁸ See A. E. Wardman, “Plutarch and Alexander,” *CQ* 5 (1955) 96–107, and T. Whitmarsh, “Alexander’s Hellenism and Plutarch’s Textualism,” *CQ* 52 (2002) 174–192, esp. 175–179, on Alexander’s mixed reception.

⁹ Harrison, *RBP* 73 (1995) 94–95. Also see J. M. Mossman, “Plutarch, Pyrrhus and Alexander,” in P. A. Stadter (ed.), *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition* (London/New York 1992) 90–108, on Alexander in the *Pyrrhus*.

Agesilaus

It is easy to see how Agesilaus could be likened to Agamemnon. After his accession to the throne in the wake of the Peloponnesian War, Agesilaus dominated the Greek political landscape as Sparta established its empire. In 396, as a warrior king, he led an allied Greek force against Persia. The extent of his authority over other Greeks was unusual enough in itself, and the fact that this force was on the *offensive*, heading into Persian territory, gave the campaign a notionally panhellenic, Trojan War-like quality.

The literary association between Agesilaus and Agamemnon is at least as old as Xenophon's *Hellenica*. The *Hellenica* (but not the *Agesilaus* encomium) suggests that Agesilaus himself cultivated the association when he was poised to invade Asia Minor. Xenophon (3.4.3) tells us that while the allies gathered, Agesilaus went north to Boeotia for an extraordinary sacrifice: "He wished to go and sacrifice in Aulis, the place where Agamemnon had sacrificed before he sailed to Troy" (αὐτὸς δ' ἐβουλήθη ἐλθὼν θῦσαι ἐν Αὐλίδι, ἔνθα περ ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων ὄτ' εἰς Τροίαν ἔπλει ἐθύετο). By explaining Agesilaus' desire to sacrifice at Aulis with reference to Agamemnon and Troy, Xenophon indicates that the Agamemnon-Troy connection motivated the sacrifice, with Agesilaus explicitly casting himself in the role of a new Agamemnon. Events did not go smoothly:

When he got there, however, the Boeotarchs, on learning that he was sacrificing, sent horsemen to tell him to stop sacrificing, and the sacrificial victims that they happened to find already sacrificed they swept from the altar. Calling the gods to witness, and feeling furious, he embarked on his trireme and sailed away.

Agesilaus' grand gesture had resulted in a shambles. He had assumed the right to sacrifice in a Boeotian sanctuary without prior consultation of the Boeotian authorities. This expressed a claim to a level of dominance over Boeotia that would not have been welcome amongst the increasingly anti-Spartan element of Boeotian society nor even amongst more ambivalent Boeotians. Even non-Boeotians had every right to find the imitation of Agamemnon disconcerting. While it signalled the

Spartans' high hopes about the campaign, it could also be interpreted as a claim that Agesilaus (and Sparta) held an Agamemnon-like hegemony over all the Greeks, a thing unheard of in historical times. As it was, the apparently panhellenic mission lacked the backing of Argos and Athens as well as the Boeotian League.¹⁰ The imitation of Agamemnon was therefore extremely undiplomatic. It created an opening for a hostile response which, when delivered, served to highlight the limit of Agesilaus' control.

Xenophon's suppression of Aulis in the encomium and his representation of it in the *Hellenica* indicate a disapproval of the king's behaviour as "improperly ambitious."¹¹ John Dillery suggests moreover that "we are meant to see that in addition to being an outrage committed by the Thebans, the sacrifice is also a failed sacrifice, one that suggests that Agesilaus' expedition will fall short of success."¹² The expedition *was* a failure. Agesilaus failed in his emulation of Agamemnon at Aulis, and then failed to emulate Agamemnon's conquest of Asia. The negative tone of Xenophon's account is repeated in Plutarch's. There are enough discrepancies between them to show that Plutarch had access to other traditions, but if, as seems likely,

¹⁰ Even Isocrates, who termed Agesilaus φρονιμώτατος, "most sensible," and advocated conquest of Asia, condemned the king's attempt to invade Asia while simultaneously trying to dominate Greece in the face of opposition (Isoc. *Or.* 5.86–87; *Ep.* 9.4–14). Isocrates argued that this recklessness was caused by excessive φιλοτιμία. When endorsing Evagoras' decision to oppose Agesilaus' expedition, he describes the Spartan invasion as motivated by insatiable greed and the naval defeat of the Spartans at Cnidus as a victory for all Greeks (*Evag.* 54–56). See P. Cartledge, *Agesilaus and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore 1987) 208–218, and C. D. Hamilton, *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* (Ithaca 1991) 87–103, for discussion of the military aspect of the Spartans' campaign strategy.

¹¹ C. J. Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire. A Reading of Xenophon's Hellenica* 2.3.11–7.5.27 (Stuttgart 1993) 57; cf. G. Proietti, *Xenophon's Sparta. An Introduction* (Leiden 1987) 97.

¹² J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (London/New York 1995) 116.

these were Boeotian, they may be expected to have had a similarly critical tone.¹³ Plutarch makes Agamemnon more prominent than Xenophon did, a choice that was most likely influenced by the role Agamemnon plays throughout the *Life*. References to Agamemnon book-end the Asian expedition, reinforcing and focusing the comparison between the kings and their campaigns.

The Aulis episode follows Plutarch's authorial statement about the dangers of excessive pursuit of preeminence, and the observation that the campaign was motivated by Lysander's desire to help his unjust and violent friends in the Asian cities. He begins the episode with Agesilaus travelling with companions to Aulis for an unspecified reason, while his troops gather at Geraestus. Once there, a voice in a dream addresses Agesilaus (*Ages.* 6.4):

¹³ A suggestion put forward by C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War* (Ithaca 1979) 156–158; *Agesilaus* 31 n.106; and “Plutarch's *Life of Agesilaus*,” *ANRW* II 33.6 (1992) 4201–4221, at 4214–4215. D. R. Shipley, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Life Of Agesilaos* (Oxford 1997) 127, suggests that Plutarch's account of the Boeotian response may be Boeotian in origin. Regarding aspects of Plutarch's *Lysander*, H. D. Westlake, “The Sources for the Spartan Debacle at Haliartus,” *Phoenix* 39 (1985) 119–133, argues that “there is a strong case for ascribing its ultimate origin to a Boeotian source,” and cites Theopompus' use of Daimachus, Anaxis, or Dionysodorus as the most likely route (122–123 and n.11). As Lysander and Agesilaus' lives overlapped, this has implications for the Boeotia-based aspects of the *Agesilaus*. While Theopompus is a possible source for Plutarch's Aulis account, the likelihood of this is reduced by the distinctly different version of Aulis in Paus. 3.9.3–4, which is far more likely to be drawn from Theopompus. A Boeotian perspective accessed via Callisthenes, or Callisthenes through Ephorus, seems more likely, on which see G. S. Shrimpton, “The Theban Supremacy in Fourth-Century Literature,” *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 310–318. Wherever Plutarch derived his source material, it shows a pronounced sympathy for the Boeotian perspective. Plutarch also knew of a tradition (probably created by confusion with a story about Agesipolis—on *Mor.* 191B see F. Babbitt in the Loeb) that Agesilaus went to Delphi and either Olympia or Dodona before sailing to Asia, but for the *Life* he prefers the Aulis tradition.

O King of the Lacedaemonians, surely you have considered that no one else has ever been appointed *strategos* of all the Greeks together except Agamemnon, before, and now you after him. And since you are commander of the same people as he, against the same enemies, setting out for the war from the same place, it is natural for you also to sacrifice to the goddess the sacrifice which he sacrificed there before he set sail.

ὦ βασιλεῦ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅτι μὲν οὐδεὶς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὁμοῦ συμπάσης ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγὸς ἢ πρότερον Ἀγαμέμνων καὶ σὺ νῦν μετ' ἐκείνον, ἐννοεῖς δὴπουθεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἄρχεις ἐκείνῳ, τοῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς πολεμεῖς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων ὁρμῶς ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον, εἰκόσ ἐστι καὶ θῦσαι σε τῇ θεῷ θυσίαν ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἐνταῦθα θύσας ἐξέπλευσεν.

Although we cannot rule out the possibility that Agesilaus had or reported having such a dream, it is hard to see why he travelled to Aulis, if not to emulate Agamemnon.¹⁴ In Plutarch's *Lives*, dreams and responses to dreams often illuminate the subject's inner state or prospects. As such, although Agesilaus' likeness to Agamemnon is asserted by the dream voice rather than by the king himself, the dream narrative communicates Agesilaus' overly assertive claim to preeminence and serves to bring the Agamemnon comparison to the forefront.¹⁵

¹⁴ For W. V. Harris, *Dreams and Experience in Classical Antiquity* (London 2009) 152 n.170, the absence of the dream from Xenophon proves that it is a later tradition. This seems likely, although, as Shipley notes, "no one can prove a dream fabricated" (*Commentary* 125). E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951) 107, suggests that dreams of this kind were more common in the ancient world than they are in the modern. For dreams as the result of incubation see Dodds 108–111. Are we to suppose that Agesilaus was staying at the sanctuary when he had the dream? If so, his refusal to use sanctuary personnel for the sacrifice was all the more provocative.

¹⁵ For Plutarch's account as expressing Agesilaus' "sense of self-importance with its egotistic self-pride," see Hamilton, *Agesilaus* 32, with *ANRW* II 33.6 (1992) 4215. For dreams in Plutarch revealing the dreamer's character, see F. E. Brenk, "The Dreams of Plutarch's *Lives*," *Latomus* 34 (1975) 336–349, at 338, 344, and *In Mist Apparelled: Religious Themes in Plutarch's Moralia and Lives* (Leiden 1977) 214–235, with Harris, *Dreams* 160–162; 250–252, for

Agesilaus' response to the dream is even more revealing (6.4–5):

Almost at once Agesilaus remembered the sacrifice of his own daughter which Agamemnon had made there in obedience to the soothsayers. He was not disturbed, however, but after rising up and imparting his vision to his friends, declared that he would honour the goddess with a sacrifice in which she could fitly take pleasure, being a goddess, and would not imitate the callousness of the former *strategos* (οὐ μιμήσεσθαι δὲ τὴν ἀπάθειαν¹⁶ τοῦ τότε στρατηγοῦ). So he ordered a hind to be wreathed and ordered his own *mantis* to begin the sacrifice, instead of the one normally appointed by the Boeotians to do this.

Agamemnon's sacrifice had involved the infamous killing of Iphigenia or, in most traditions, a replacement animal.¹⁷ Plutarch abhorred the idea of human sacrifice and would not have expected Agesilaus to sacrifice one of his daughters.¹⁸ Nonetheless, Agesilaus' response to the dream is problematic. The dream never explicitly asks that he sacrifice a daughter; that is only *his* interpretation of its meaning.¹⁹ The dream could be interpreted as having indirectly requested the hind that many traditions featured as the victim that Artemis interposed. Instead, Agesilaus' automatic refusal indicates disobedience towards what he himself interprets as a divine command.²⁰

a discussion of Plato's theories about dreams as expressions of internal self or wish-fulfilment.

¹⁶ Or possibly ἀμαθίαν.

¹⁷ For Iphigenia replaced see e.g. *Cypria* arg. (p.41 Bernabé) and fr.23; Eur. *IA*, esp. 1580 ff.; Eur. *IT*; Hdt. 4.103 (by implication); Apollod. *Epit.* 3.21–22; and Paus. 1.43.1 citing Hesiod's *Catalogue of Women* (fr.23b). For Iphigenia sacrificed, Aesch. *Ag.* 1520–1559, Soph. *El.* 516–609, Eur. *El.* 1018–1030.

¹⁸ See esp. *On superstition* 171B–E, with Brenk, *In Mist* 49–64.

¹⁹ A distinction that is unheeded in the discussion in Brenk, *Latomus* 34 (1975) 336–339, 341; *In Mist* 20 n.9, 228.

²⁰ J.-F. Bommelaer, “Le songe d’Agesilas: un mythe ou le rêve d’un mythe?” *Klèma* 8 (1983) 19–26, perceives the refusal as disobedience (21), as does Brenk, who suggests that “the impression of divine wrath for ignoring

Divine dreams were notoriously difficult to interpret. Agesilaus might have put forward his interpretation and invited confirmation, yet despite the presence of his *mantis* and colleagues, in addition to the Boeotian sanctuary personnel, he interprets the dream alone.²¹ His companions might readily have offered support for his planned action by observing that the voice did not specifically ask for a human and could therefore be requesting an animal. Instead, he is depicted as asserting his superiority to Agamemnon while acting without counsel. This is particularly ironic given that Agamemnon was punished and ordered to sacrifice because he had boasted of his superiority (in his case, to Artemis).²² By contrast, two Plutarchan leaders who are successful following dreams, Arimnestus the Plataean (Plut. *Arist.* 11.5–6) and Pelopidas (*Pel.* 21.1–2), consult with experienced advisors or friends about their dreams before acting on them. By acting without counsel, Agesilaus demonstrates his characteristic desire for preeminence. Although his choice of victim is

the dream commanding the hero to sacrifice his daughter is probably due to the source of *Agesilaus*” (*In Mist* 55 n.7). In adding this qualifier, Brenk underestimates the extent to which Plutarch links these events and subsequent developments, viz. the role of Agesilaus’ excessive self-assertion in his state’s downfall. P. Bonnechère, *Le sacrifice humain en Grèce ancienne* (*Kernos Suppl.* 3 [1994]) 260, argues only that the substitution is appropriate and does not address the manner in which it is decided upon. Agesilaus’ automatic and absolute protection of his own daughters should be read as an example of what Plutarch represents as his characteristic tendency to address his friends’ needs before considering the needs of the state (see esp. *Ages.* 5.1–2). Again, while no fourth-century figure was likely to give serious thought to human sacrifice, the possible reference to Agesilaus’ daughters (Eupolia and Proauga: *Ages.* 19.6) should have been discussed rather than interpreted and acted upon unilaterally.

²¹ Shipley, *Commentary* 127, notes that “A king’s priestly office gives him authority to make decisions about sacrifices” and that he “directs” his seer rather than “consult” him. See Harris, *Dreams* 123–228, on the difficulties and divided opinions about dream interpretation in antiquity.

²² *Cypria* arg. and fr.23; Apollod. *Epit.* 3.21–22.

pious, his choice is made poorly. Moreover, the claim to be a superior Agamemnon will make his subsequent failure all the more apparent.

As in Xenophon, the Boeotarchs respond urgently to news of the irregular sacrifice (*Ages.* 6.5–6):

Hearing of this, the Boeotarchs were moved to anger and sent their assistants, forbidding Agesilaus to sacrifice contrary to the laws and ancestral customs of the Boeotians. Having delivered their message, they also swept the thigh-pieces from the altar. And so Agesilaus sailed away with great anger; he was enraged at the Thebans, and full of ill-boding on account of the omen. He was convinced that his undertakings would be incomplete and that his expedition would have no fitting outcome.

ἀκούσαντες οὖν οἱ Βοιωτάρχαι πρὸς ὀργὴν κινηθέντες ἔπεμψαν ὑπηρέτας, ἀπαγορεύοντες τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ μὴ θύειν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ πάτρια Βοιωτῶν. οἱ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀπήγγειλαν καὶ τὰ μηρία διέρριψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ. χαλεπῶς οὖν ἔχων ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἀπέπλει, τοῖς τε Θηβαίοις διωρισμένος καὶ γεγινώς δύσελπις διὰ τὸν οἰωνόν, ὡς ἀτελῶν αὐτῷ τῶν πράξεων γενησομένων καὶ τῆς στρατείας ἐπὶ τὸ προσήκον οὐκ ἀφιζομένης.

While the gist of the account is the same, the differences are telling. Plutarch has the sacrifice left incomplete and is explicit, where Xenophon only implied, that its desecration was thought to pose an ill omen. Although Agesilaus likens himself to Agamemnon, the likeness proves false. His excessive self-assertion provoked the Boeotians and so prevented him from really matching Agamemnon even before the campaign started. We are bound, like Plutarch's Agesilaus, to see the failed sacrifice as an omen of further failure. The episode need not be thought to *cause* the failure of the Asia campaign but, unlike Agamemnon, Agesilaus will be driven by excessive and misdirected φιλονικία to spend the rest of his career fighting Greeks.²³ The

²³ Hillman, *GRBS* 35 (1994) 275, discusses the significance of Aulis for the rest of Agesilaus' career and notes how Plutarch draws on his readers' knowledge of subsequent Spartan history, expecting them to recognise the significance.

evocation of Agamemnon fits the pattern that can be seen throughout the *Agesilaus-Pompey*, in which negative comparison—reference to whom someone is ultimately *not* like—reinforces the main theme.

Plutarch provides a fairly positive account of Agesilaus' time in Asia Minor, and even allows him success when acting on Agamemnon's example in recruitment, which Agesilaus does because he "thought Agamemnon had done well in accepting a good mare and freeing a cowardly man from military service" (*Ages.* 9.4).²⁴ But just when real impact is to be attempted, the campaign is cut disastrously short. As Agesilaus prepares to fight for the throne in the East (a prospect which seems unlikely in Xenophon's more muted account), news arrives that Greece is at war, and the army is recalled. At this turning point, Plutarch pauses for an authorial intervention that evokes the Trojan War, Alexander the Great (twice) and, as the narrative resumes, the Trojan War again.

Plutarch opens his intervention with a quotation from Euripides' *Trojan Women* (764): "O barbarous ills devised by Greeks!" (*Ages.* 15.2). As well as expressing Plutarch's disgust at the Greeks' self-destructive infighting, as a reminder of Troy the quotation highlights the potential conquest of Asia that has been thwarted. Plutarch goes on to say (15.3):

I do not agree with Demaratus of Corinth, who said that those Greeks who did not see Alexander sitting on the throne of Darius missed a great pleasure—but rather they would probably weep when they reflected that this was left for Alexander and his Macedonians while they had thrown away the lives of Greek generals at Leuctra and Coronea and Corinth and in Arcadia.

Odysseus wept to be reminded of his quarrel with Achilles, and Plutarch's hypothetical Greeks weep to think of the rivalry that destroyed so much potential. Agesilaus (with 'real' Greeks)

²⁴ The anecdote is repeated in *Apoph.Lac.* 209C, where the more explicit ζηλώω stresses Agesilaus' emulation of, and perhaps competition with, Agamemnon.

might have conquered Asia, but the opportunity was lost. The comparison with Alexander is hardly flattering to the Macedonian, yet it damns Agesilaus more by reemphasising his failure in Asia and the wastefulness of the inter-Greek conflicts he stoked.

The next allusion to Alexander is more favourable to Agesilaus. It relates to a triumph of character, but while commendable, it again highlights Alexander's greater military accomplishment. Agesilaus is praised generously for returning to Greece when ordered. He is more willing than Hannibal and more gracious than Alexander, who "actually went so far as to joke when he heard of Antipater's battle with Agis, saying: 'we were conquering Darius here, whilst in Arcadia there has been a battle of mice'" (*Ages.* 15.4). Agesilaus exceeds Alexander in his characteristic virtues of obedience and support of his friends, but the comparison with Alexander takes a familiar form—while Alexander went "conquering Darius," Agesilaus cannot. In both cases Agesilaus *might* have been like Alexander, but is not so because of conflict with other Greeks.

After establishing Agesilaus' failure to be an Alexander, Plutarch returns to the Agamemnon model. The self-disciplined Agesilaus "abandoned the great good fortune and power in his grasp and the great hopes which beckoned him on, and at once sailed away 'with his task unfulfilled'" (*ἀπέπλευσεν ἄτελευτήτῳ ἐπὶ ἔργῳ*, *Ages.* 15.5). The quotation is from the *Iliad* (4.175): Agamemnon is speaking to an injured Menelaus; he is horrified by the thought that if Menelaus were to die, then the Greeks would sail home, he would be ridiculed, and Menelaus would rot in Trojan soil without achieving what he came for. The very thought of such failure horrifies Agamemnon, but it is Agesilaus who experiences it, leaving Asia without significant success. With this quotation at the close of the campaign, Plutarch neatly reminds us of Agesilaus' optimistic emulation of Agamemnon and underscores the difference in their achievements.

The rest of Agesilaus' career was dominated by interstate war, and he lived through the collapse of Spartan military supremacy at Leuctra. In an attempt to raise funds, he cam-

paigned with his troops as mercenaries in Egypt. When he began his journey home, “he kept close to shore with his ships, and was borne along the coast of Libya to an uninhabited spot called the Harbour of Menelaus. Here he died, at the age of eighty-four years” (*Ages.* 40.2). This final reference to the Atreidae is more than geographical trivia. Plutarch marks Agesilaus’ death with a mention of Menelaus that recalls the Greeks’ *nostoi* after Troy. While Agamemnon’s homecoming was bitter, he did return victorious, and Menelaus did not rot “with his task unfulfilled,” but made it home, via Egypt and Libya, with victory and his wife. This final allusion to the Trojan War prompts a last reflection on what might have been for Agesilaus and on his failure to live up to his aspiration. As it is, he did not die as a new Agamemnon, or even as the new Menelaus, but rather as a mercenary, *en route* from somebody else’s war.

Having seen how Agamemnon is used throughout the *Agesilaus*, we can reflect on the poignancy of his first appearance there. Plutarch showed us Demodocus’ Agamemnon taking pleasure in in-fighting, unaware that the Greeks would have a great deal of pain to endure before achieving their goal, and that that pain would be worsened by further quarrelling and jostling for preeminence (*Ages.* 5.4). By the end of the *Agesilaus*, it is clear that Agesilaus was premature in playing Agamemnon and that the Greeks’ painful in-fighting prevented them from taking their Troy. The figure of Agamemnon had surfaced throughout the *Life*, highlighting Agesilaus’ shortcomings and helping to demonstrate that while “some” may argue that φιλονικία breeds positive conflict, for the Greeks of this period it was disastrous.

Pompey

Alexander and Agamemnon play the same roles in the *Pompey* that we saw in the *Agesilaus*. By providing models of military success and hegemonic authority, the two provide a point of contrast which highlights the extent to which φιλονικία damaged Pompey’s career and his society. Much as Agesilaus is shown to encourage the association between himself and Agamemnon, Pompey enjoys the association between himself and

Alexander. Plutarch undermines the likeness and eventually shows its assertion as provoking bad feeling and amplifying the sense of anti-climax that characterises Pompey's career.

Early in the *Life*, Plutarch describes the young Pompey, telling us that his hair and graceful looks “produced a resemblance, more talked about than actually apparent, to the portrait statues of King Alexander” (*Pomp.* 2.1). Plutarch entertains the likeness, only to undermine it.²⁵ Comparison with a similar incident in the *Life of Pyrrhus* throws light on Plutarch's method here. Although Pyrrhus is formally compared to Gaius Marius, comparisons with Alexander are important too, as in this passage relating to a battle between the armies of Pyrrhus and Demetrius (*Pyrrh.* 8, cf. *Demetr.* 41.3–4):

This battle, so far from filling the Macedonians with anger or hatred against Pyrrhus for having defeated them, caused all those who had fought in it and witnessed his exploits to talk about him endlessly and marvel at his courage. They compared his appearance and the speed and vigour of his movements to those of Alexander, and felt that they saw in him an image and reflection of that hero's fire and impetuosity on the field. The other kings, they said, could only imitate Alexander in superficial details, with their scarlet cloaks, their bodyguards, the angle at which they held their heads, or the lofty tone of their speech: it was Pyrrhus alone who could remind them of him in arms and in action.²⁶

It is the *Macedonians* who establish Pyrrhus' similarity (though

²⁵ J. M. Mossman, “Plutarch's Use of Statues,” in M. A. Flower and M. Toher (eds.), *Georgica: Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell* (London 1991) 98–119, observes the “tension” Plutarch produces through this comparison, likening it to Plutarch's reference to Delphic visitors' tendency to mistake a statue of Brasidas for Lysander (*Lys.* 1.1) which “sets up a tension that will continue throughout the *Life*, between the ideal of Spartan virtue, which Brasidas may be taken to represent, and Lysander's more equivocal approach” (111).

²⁶ Plutarch says that Pyrrhus himself wished to be seen as “a true son of Achilles” (*Pyrrh.* 7), itself another Alexander-like trait.

inferiority—as a mere “image,” εἶδωλον)²⁷ to Alexander, just as it is the Romans who are said to note the likeness between Pompey and Alexander. With Pyrrhus, however, Plutarch leaves the Macedonians’ assertion unchallenged, while with Pompey he uses his authorial authority to contradict them. He concedes that there was enough similarity for people to comment on it, but will not support their claims. He reinforces the sceptical tone by noting immediately that “Since many also applied the name to [Pompey] in his early years, and Pompey did not decline it (οὐκ ἔφηνεν), some came to call him Alexander in derision” (*Pomp.* 2.2). Once again, where the likeness is asserted, it is undermined. While Plutarch challenged the first instance through his authorial voice, in this case he has Romans themselves drawing similar conclusions. He gives Pompey agency here, and it is a warning about the dangers of excessive φιλονικία, for Pompey’s acceptance of the ambitious sobriquet offers an opening for his rivals’ sarcasm, much as Agesilaus’ imitation of Agamemnon offered an opening for Boeotian resistance. Plutarch’s contrast between Pompey’s youth and his later years also carries ominous intimations of the future. While Pompey seemed (mistakenly) to have an air of Alexander in his early days, the likeness will prove disastrously false.

Once Pompey’s military career developed further, comparisons between him and heroes are based less on superficial similarity and more on military action. Nonetheless, the next comparison is distinctly ambiguous. Plutarch tells us that even Pompey’s friends were displeased with how Pompey treated Metellus, who was clearing pirates from Crete. Pompey intervened on the pirates’ behalf in order to assert preeminent authority in the area, even sending an officer to fight for the besieged pirates. In criticising this, Plutarch adds (*Pomp.* 29.4, with *Il.* 11.207):

²⁷ Mossman, in *Georgica* 109, notes the subtle distinction.

Not even Achilles played the part of a man, men said, but that of a youth wholly crazed and frantic in his quest of glory, when he made a sign to the rest which prevented them from smiting Hector ... whereas Pompey actually fought in behalf of the common enemy ... that he might rob of his triumph a general who had worked hard to win it.

This passage explores the ambiguity of thirst for glory. It is not that seeking glory, victory, or preeminence is an inherently bad quality, far from it, but in excess, if applied wrongly, it can override good judgement to the detriment of a warrior's reputation or his group's success. Here, reference to the "common enemy" echoes Late Republican demonization of the pirates and expresses just how anti-social Pompey's support for them was.²⁸ Reference to Achilles softens the criticism of Pompey, however, as comparison with Achilles is always somewhat positive for a military figure. While still conveying criticism of Pompey's actions, the comparison with Achilles makes it clear that his actions stemmed from a positive instinct. But even Homeric figures can get things wrong, as Achilles did in Plutarch's example.²⁹ Reference to Achilles is also a reminder of Alexander. While Alexander emulated Achilles in positive ways, Pompey acted like him in the wrong way.

Pompey went on to campaign in Asia and, like Agesilaus during his campaign, he held an unusually high degree of

²⁸ P. de Souza, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge 1999) 149–178, esp. 171–172, and "Rome's Contribution to the Development of Piracy," in R. Hohlfelder (ed.), *The Maritime World of Ancient Rome* (Ann Arbor 2008) 71–96.

²⁹ Mossman, in *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition* 97–98, remarks upon a similar episode (*Pyrrh.* 12.8–13.1): Plutarch implies criticism of Pyrrhus for invading Italy out of intolerance of inactivity, but he mitigates the criticism and bestows glamour upon Pyrrhus by expressing this disposition through reference to Achilles. Dominant characteristics in the *Lives* are often shown to be potentially positive as well as negative, depending on the context, see esp. C. B. R. Pelling, "Plutarch's Adaptation of his Source Material," *JHS* 100 (1980) 127–140, revised ed. in *Plutarch and History* 91–116, and Duff, *Plutarch's Lives* 83–89, on the ambiguity surrounding ambition.

authority.³⁰ Here he is at his most Alexander-like, yet even so there are deflating qualifiers. In Hyrcania, south of the Caspian Sea, Pompey routed a local Iberian army. Plutarch presents Pompey as exceeding Alexander in this respect, as Alexander left the area hurriedly (*Pomp.* 34.5). As the *Alexander* would present this period of Alexander's campaign more positively, with Alexander receiving the surrender of cities and an apologetic return of the kidnapped Bucephalus (*Alex.* 44), we can only conclude that Plutarch intended Pompey to shine by comparison in this section. At a follow-up battle, it is even suggested that his army was fighting against Amazons. Mention of the warrior women links Pompey to the Alexander tradition³¹ and indicates how close he was getting to the Alexander ideal. Yet something is curiously amiss in Pompey's version, for no Amazon bodies are found, only shields and boots. While Alexander was credited with having a child with the Amazon queen (or at least promising her that he would), Pompey's Romans find Amazonian arms, although "no body of a woman was seen" (*Pomp.* 35.3–4). While Alexander has physical possession, Pompey grasps at shadows. The Amazons' bodies serve as a metaphor for Alexander's mythic level of success. Pompey approaches Alexander's greatness, but his claim lacks substance.

Soon Pompey is faced with another mocking reenactment of an Alexander-like situation. Like Alexander, Pompey shows admirable self-control when faced with the capture of his enemy's household (*Pomp.* 36.2–6; *Alex.* 21, 30).³² Pompey takes none of

³⁰ At *Pomp.* 30, Pompey takes on new land powers in addition to his existing naval authority. At *Ages.* 10.5, Agesilaus receives command of the navy as well as of the army—an unprecedented honour. The exact nature and novelty of Pompey's position are notoriously unclear: see Tac. *Ann.* 15.25, Vell. Pat. 2.31, Cass. Dio 36.30–34, App. *Mith.* 97, with R. Seager, *Pompey. A Political Biography* (Oxford 1979) 35–43.

³¹ E.g. Arr. *Anab.* 7.13; Plut. *Alex.* 46, where Plutarch lists writers who believe or disbelieve the stories.

³² Beneker, in *The Historical and Biographical Values* 73, notes the parallel between this episode and that involving Alexander, but in contrast to the

Mithridates' concubines, returning them to their families, much as Alexander respected Darius' family. But while the likeness is there, once again it does not hold firm. While Alexander's Stateira was Darius' royal daughter, Pompey's story is dominated by Stratonice the concubine, the daughter of an impoverished harpist. Plutarch tells the story of how the harpist made a fool of himself when his daughter's concubinage made him rich. Pompey's self-controlled disinterest in the wealth he is offered forms a positive contrast with the harpist, but that is small praise. Making alternative use of negative comparison, Plutarch pokes fun at the mean background to Pompey's encounter by contrasting the concubine's heritage with that of a Homeric hero; he echoes the speech of Glaucus, proclaiming "such was the family and lineage of Stratonice."³³ The whole episode is clearly intended to recall that of Alexander and Stateira, but while Alexander's anecdote was full of grace, Pompey's is absurd and rather petty.

Plutarch refutes one final comparison between Pompey and Alexander in striking terms. Plutarch states that it is wrong of people to claim that Alexander and Pompey were of the same age at the height of their power, and then adds (*Pomp.* 46.1):

It would have been good for him if he had ended his life at this point, up to which he had the fortune of Alexander. For succeeding time brought him only good fortune that made him hated, and ill fortune that was irreparable.³⁴

present work, he interprets the episode as being entirely to Pompey's credit.

³³ τούτης τοι γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵματος εὐχομαι εἶναι (*Il.* 6.211) becomes τούτης μὲν ἦν καὶ γενεᾶς καὶ αἵματος ἡ Στρατονίκη (*Pomp.* 36.6).

³⁴ De Wet, *AClass* 24 (1981) 128–132, discusses the theme of intra-Roman hostility but does not sufficiently address the significance for the pair of *Lives* or the warning signs earlier in *Pompey* (125–128). Hillman, *GRBS* 35 (1994) 258–259, stresses the level of personal criticism in this passage. J. Beneker, "Thematic Correspondences in Plutarch's *Lives* of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus," in L. de Blois et al. (eds.), *The Statesman in Plutarch's Works* II (Leiden 2005) 315–325, discusses the Alexander-Pompey comparison, but gives no weight to Plutarch's undermining of the comparisons that occur before *Pomp.* 46.1 or to the thematic link between *Pompey* and *Agesilaus* (315–318).

Plutarch continues in this vein, decrying Pompey's weakening of Rome. This authorial intervention is Plutarch's most explicit assertion of Pompey's likeness to Alexander. It is also his strongest refutation. This intervention is the culmination of all the occasions on which Plutarch had undermined attempts to liken Pompey to Alexander. No more comparisons with Alexander will occur in the *Pompey*. Homeric figures will take his place, not the Alexander-like Achilles, but Agamemnon, Andromache, and Ajax.

While Agamemnon provided the main informal figure of comparison with Agesilaus, we saw that Alexander also made a brief appearance as a point of comparison. The same is true of Agamemnon in the *Pompey*, for while Alexander provides the main informal figure of comparison there, Agamemnon also makes a brief appearance. These cross-threads strengthen the comparison across the *Agesilaus-Pompey* pair. The allusion to Agamemnon occurs when Pompey resolves to continue fighting Caesar. Plutarch reports that Pompey "was denounced, and it was complained that he was not campaigning against Caesar, but against his fatherland and the senate" (*Pomp.* 67.2). This charge of intra-community hostility is made worse by Domitius Ahenobarbus, who "by calling [Pompey] Agamemnon, and King of Kings, made him hated" (67.3). The Boeotians did not want Agesilaus as a new Agamemnon, and the Romans do not want Pompey in that role either. Ahenobarbus' comparison was as false as it was ill-judged, for while it decreased Pompey's popularity, it also denied the reality that Pompey was not leading a united nation to war against foreign enemies, but facing an on-going civil conflict. Pompey *might* have been as successful as Agamemnon but, like Agesilaus, he was prevented by having to pursue intra-community hostilities, fighting Romans instead of barbarians.³⁵

³⁵ Suetonius asserts that Pompey compared himself to Agamemnon in a very different manner, namely by referring to Caesar as "Aegisthus" when he believed Caesar was having an affair with his wife, Mucia (*Iul.* 50).

The battle of Pharsalus in 48 BCE resulted in the destruction of Pompey's forces. Plutarch uses a combination of Homeric allusions to express Pompey's disaster (*Pomp.* 72.1–2):

What thoughts passed through his mind it were difficult to say; but he was most like a madman, one whose wits were destroyed, who had utterly forgotten that he was Pompey the Great, and without a word to anyone, he walked slowly off to his camp, exemplifying those verses of Homer: "But Zeus the father, throned on high, in Ajax stirred up fear; he stood confounded, and behind him cast his shield of seven ox-hides, and trembled as he peered around upon the throng."

When Pompey is "most like a madman," he is, as Christopher Pelling notes, "an Andromache (*Il.* 6.389, 22.460) more than a Hector or an Achilles."³⁶ The association with Andromache's desperation emasculates Pompey and offers criticism of his loss of rationality through despairing of victory. Plutarch's chosen passage of the *Iliad* describes the moment when Ajax is forced by Zeus to retire before a mass of Trojans (11.544–546). Whilst generally appropriate as a scene of retreat, the real impact of the image comes from its connection to the existing chain of heroic associations. The fall from Achilles to Ajax marks the final collapse of Pompey's aspirations. While he had been flattered as an Achillean Alexander and vaunted as Agamemnon, he now appears as Ajax—mighty, but never the greatest, and doomed to a miserable end. Alexander retains his Achillean supremacy, and Caesar, the other hovering figure of comparison in this *Life*, gains the victory. It was Caesar, not Pompey, whom Plutarch saw fit to pair formally with Alexander; it is Caesar, not Pompey, who vied with Alexander for supremacy.

Conclusion

The evocations of Agamemnon and Alexander work to the detriment of Agesilaus and Pompey across the two *Lives*. Both subjects were great military figures who might have defeated foreign foes, but both missed this goal because their desire for

³⁶ Pelling, *Plutarch and History* 102.

preeminence led them into conflict with their own peoples. The allusions to Agamemnon and Alexander show the failed potential of their careers. Negative comparison thus clarifies the theme that permeates the pair, namely the personal and civic damage that is caused by excessive desire for victory.

Part of what defines the Plutarchan Agesilaus and the Plutarchan Pompey, and matches the two of them as a pair, is that neither measures up to the person that they thought they were most like. This mutual mismatch is part of what holds the pair together, clarifying their characters and prompting readers to reflect on how and why they fell short of the greater heroes. Although it falls out of the scope of the present study, there is potential benefit in revisiting Plutarch's other *Parallel Lives* to explore further instances of subjects who are characterised by a failure to live up to aspirational counterparts.

While it is beneficial to analyse Plutarch's use of emulation and comparison as a literary device, his representation of his subjects' own acts of emulation is also of interest. Agesilaus and Pompey are shown to invite damage to their reputations through their over-ambitious posturing as an Agamemnon or an Alexander. This could seem somewhat harsh when we consider that it was not unusual in antiquity to compare things and persons to those of the Trojan War.³⁷ Pericles apparently did something similar, claiming to have exceeded Agamemnon through his conquest of Samos. While Pericles seems to have been ridiculed for it, Plutarch defends him and even states that the comparison "was not unreasonable."³⁸ The difference here lies in how the comparisons were achieved. Pericles boasted

³⁷ As P. A. Stadter, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles* (Chapel Hill 1989) 262, notes of *Pericles* 28, citing Hdt. 1.3–4, Plut. *Cimon* 7.6, *De gloria Ath.* 350E.

³⁸ Plut. *Per.* 28.7 = Ion *FGrHist* 392 F 16. Cratinus' comedy *Dionysalexandros* seems to play with this comparison, but it is subverted with Pericles playing the Paris role: see M. Wright, "Comedy and the Trojan War," *CQ* 57 (2007) 412–431, who suggests, at 421–422, that this was brought on by Pericles' own Agamemnon boast.

only of surpassing Agamemnon in the time he took to complete his campaign. More crucially, he waited until *after* he had succeeded to make the boast. The excessive φιλονικία of Agesilaus and Pompey prompts them into incautious rivalry with the dead and the mythical. Most incautiously of all, they engage in this rivalry publicly before achieving their goals. This is where the crucial difference lies, and the criticism Plutarch directs towards them for their lack of judgement surely stems from the Greek idea that no one can really be said to be fortunate until they die fortunate. If only Pompey had died young; if only Agesilaus had never quarrelled with the Boeotians; if only either of them had controlled their φιλονικία, they might truly have been as great as the kings they wished to excel.³⁹

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