

John Italos' *Methodos Rhetorikê*: Text and Commentary

Thomas M. Conley

THE *Méthodos* ῥητορικὴ ἐκδοθεῖσα κατὰ σύνοψιν by John Italos (XI cent.) has not received much attention from students of Byzantine rhetoric. The text is not easy to obtain, and the available editions are neither very good nor very informative.¹ As a result, what attention it has received is largely misconceived—it is not, for instance, a synopsis of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, as some well-known authorities have maintained.²

The text and commentary presented here are intended to make Italos' short treatise more widely accessible than it has been and to fill out an argument I have made elsewhere that Italos probably did not have the text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* at hand when he composed his synopsis for the young

¹The text of the *Methodos* can be found in the edition by G. Cérétéli, *Opuscula selecta* II (Tbilisi 1926) 33–46 (= C.), collated from three manuscripts: *Marc.gr.* 265 (XIV cent.), *Vat.gr.* 316 (XIV cent., both of which he was able to inspect shortly before the outbreak of World War I; and *Vat.gr.* 1457 (XVI cent.), which he examined in 1924. In 1966 N. Ketchakmadze, who lists additional MSS. (pp.ix–xiii) but clearly did not collate them, republished Cérétéli's text in *Ioannis Itali Opera* (Tbilisi 1966) 35–42 (= K.).

²I made this argument briefly in "Notes on the Byzantine Reception of the Peripatetic Tradition in Rhetoric," in W. Fortenbaugh and D. Mirhady, edd., *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle* (New Brunswick 1994) 217–242, esp. 230–233. The alleged quotations from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* seem to have been gleaned from available commentaries and prolegomena, not from the *Rhetoric* itself. For the characterization of the *Methodos* as an epitome of the *Rhetoric*, see, among others, G. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (Princeton 1983) 318, who evidently follows P. Stephanou, *Jean Italos, philosophe et humaniste* (*Orient.Christ.Anal.* 134 [Rome 1949]) 82 and 86; this opusculum as a set of "excerpts" from the *Rhetoric*: O. Jurewicz, *Historia literatury bizantynskiej* (Warsaw 1984) 208.

Konstantinos Doukas.³ Indeed, it is far from clear that he had even read it. As we shall see, he seems to have drawn instead on commentaries on Aristotle's *Topics* and *Nicomachean Ethics* and, it appears, on the last chapters of the *Tέχνη* wrongly attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus.⁴ What cannot be traced to such sources is for the most part commonplace doctrine that is found in various prolegomena and commentaries on Hermogenes and Aphthonios, or which would in any event have been included in a rhetoric school course.

The organization of Italos' *Methodos* makes it quite clear that he was not following Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. The treatise has two large parts. §§1–10 take up some preliminary matters and a number of "accessus" questions set out in §3, which, as we shall see, are not the same as those found in the various prolegomena to rhetoric that were in circulation before Italos' time. The following sections, §§11–19, concern the importance of *êthos*, style, and the political/ethical dimensions of the art. In this, it differs also from, e.g., the verse epitome of Hermogenes composed by Italos' master, Michael Psellos (σύνοψις τῆς ῥητορικῆς διὰ στίχων, *Poemata* pp.103–122 Westerink), organized along the lines of the traditional order of Hermogenes' works as they appear in most manuscripts. Perhaps most strikingly, Italos never mentions *enthymemata* and has scarcely anything to say about invention by way of *topoi*, which of course is of para-

³On the general question of the Byzantine reception of the *Rhetoric*, see Conley, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Byzantium," *Rhetorica* 8 (1990) 29–44, and Conley (*supra* n.2). On John Italos' career and place in the Byzantine reception of Aristotle, Conley, "The Alleged 'Synopsis' of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* by John Italos and Its Place in the Byzantine Reception of Aristotle," in G. Dahan and I. Rosier-Catach, edd., *La Rhétorique d'Aristote: Traditions et commentaires de l'Antiquité au XVII^e siècle* (Paris 1998) 49–64. Italos (1025?–1089?), so called because of his origins in South Italy, came to Constantinople in 1049, became a student of Michael Psellos, and eventually rose to the rank of "leading philosopher" (ὑπατός τῶν φιλοσόφων, Anna Comn. 5.8.5). His unorthodox beliefs led to accusations of heresy in 1076/7 (he was acquitted) and in 1082/3, when he was (unjustly, most scholars believe) convicted and forced into a monastery.

⁴Text: H. Usener and L. Radermacher, edd., *Dionysius Halicarnassus Opuscula* II (Leipzig 1929) 359–387.

mount importance in Aristotle.⁵

The style of the *Methodos* is throughout almost painfully clear, with short thought units set out directly, involving at the most complex some parallel composition or elementary antithesis, usually organized around μέν and δέ. Italos makes his transitions quite mechanically (e.g. §7 init., ἐπεὶ δὲ εἴρηται περὶ τούτων ἱκανῶς, λεκτέον ἂν εἴη ... ["Since enough has been said about these things, it ought to be said that ..."]; cf. §12 init.; §8 init., ὅτι ... ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ... νῦν ἂν εἴη λεκτέον ... ["Since this is clear from what has been said, now it ought to be said ..."]; §13 init., περὶ ... εἰρήσθω τὰ τοιαῦτα ... ἔπεται δὲ ἀκολούθως ["Having said these things, it follows accordingly ..."]; etc.); and sometimes actively engages his reader (as at §10 init., τί τὸ ... κάλλιστον, ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν μετὰ ταῦτα ... ["As for what is the best, it is necessary to say after this ..."]). Italos repeatedly frames his lessons in the "impersonal imperative," using -τέον constructions, e.g. §4.1, πολιτικὰ μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖνα ῥητέον; §7.3–4, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον τῇ μεθόδῳ. In all, the style of this *Methodos* is not quite as sophisticated as that of some of his *Problems and Solutions* (Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις),⁶ and is more like that of the short pieces on dialectic by him that appear in the MSS. just before this work. But these stylistic features are com-

⁵This inattention to topical invention is particularly surprising since Italos became most famous as a champion of the dialectic taught by "the ancients," chiefly Aristotle—as is obvious from his extant works, which include an as-yet unedited commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*. "The ancients," he wrote in a defense of the art, "fittingly called dialectic a power in itself since it is the medium (μέση) of demonstrative and sophistic art alike" (K. p.1 §2). "[Dialectic] is useful (χρήσιμος) both for conversation between individuals and for the discussion of beliefs (δοκοῦντων διαλέγεσθαι)" (p.2 §5). If Anna Komnena is to be believed, he was enormously successful in his role as ὑπατός: "When he took up the chair," she writes (*Alexiad* 5.9.1), "all the young flocked to him, for he opened up to them the teachings (δόγματα) of Plato and Porphyry ... and especially the arts of Aristotle." Anna's portrait of Italos is not wholly favorable, however; see Conley (*supra* n.3: 1998) 54–55.

⁶The most accessible edition of Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις is that of P. Joannou (in *Studia Patristica et Byzantina* 4 [1956]).

mon in the commentary tradition;⁷ and they are, moreover, completely appropriate, given Italos' intended reader, his student Konstantinos Doukas.

In short, Italos' *Methodos* is more original than a set of crib notes to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and more sophisticated than it might appear at first glance.

τοῦ αὐτοῦ φιλόσοφου μέθοδος ῥητορικὴ ἐκδοθεῖσα
κατὰ σύνοψιν

§1 (33.1–34.2 C. = 35.1–16 K.)

Ἡ ῥητορικὴ μέθοδος ἐστὶν ἐξ ἐνδόξων τοῦ περὶ ἕκαστον θεωρῆσαι τὸ πιθανόν, διὸ καὶ ἀντίστροφός ἐστι τῇ διαλεκτικῇ, ὡς φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης. διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τὴν μὲν οὐ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον ἴσως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς δικαστάς τε καὶ δῆμον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον διαλέγεσθαι, τὴν δὲ πρὸς μόνον τὸν προδιαλεγόμενον, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ζητήμασιν ἔχει τὴν ἰσχύον, τὴν δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς θεωρητικοῖς, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐξ ὅλων ἀποφαντικῶν ἢ μερικῶν συλλογίζεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσιν ἔχει τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν καὶ τῇ διαθέσει τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου. οὐδεμιᾶ δὲ τούτων ἀφώρισται τῶν ὄντων <τὸ> ὑποκείμενον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν διακρίεται. ἀριθμητικῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοὶ

⁷Such constructions are not uncommon in Hermogenes or in the scholia: see in H. Rabe, *Prolegomenôn syllogê* (Leipzig 1931) (= *PS*), Sardonios at pp.354.15, 358.6, 359.12 (ἰστέον), 355.1 (ῥητέον); Doxapatres at pp.143.10, 421.22 (ἰστέον); Athanaïos at p.179.3 (ἰστέον); Anonymous, pp.169.6 (on Aphthonios) and 239.2 (on Hermogenes' *Peri staseôs*) (ζητητέον), etc. The most striking stylistic comparisons can be found in the pseudo-Dionysian *Téchnē*, which one observer (G. Theile, reviewing Usener's 1895 edition), asserts, rather indignantly, was composed in a manner befitting "ein unreifer unklarer Knabe ohne Talent" (*GGA* 1897, 247). Theile's observation is as unperceptive as it is indignant. If Italos drew on the *Téchnē*, it might be asked, and if the only manuscript version of this work that we know existed in Italos' time is the famous *Par.gr.* 1741, which also contains the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, how can we be so sure that Italos never read the *Rhetoric*? We should not be quick to assume that 1741 was seen by Italos, much less to infer that, if he did, he must also have seen the Aristotle text there. Clearly, some other MSS. of the *Téchnē* may have been available to him. All the passages reminiscent of Dionysius are, moreover, from the tenth and eleventh chapters of his work, the section that appears in isolation in *Marc.gr.* 508—which is, to be sure, a fifteenth-century manuscript, but which likely was modelled on an earlier collection.

καὶ μεγέθη γεωμετρίας καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰατρικῆς σώματα
 διαλεκτικὴ δὲ καὶ ῥητορικὴ ἀπάντων οὐσαι δυνάμεις τῶν
 βουλομένων ἐπιχειρεῖν πάντα κατελήφασιν· ταύταις γὰρ οὐ
 μόνον σοφός τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τέκτων χρῆται καὶ
 σκυτοτόμος. ἕκαστος γὰρ κατηγορεῖν πειράται καθ' ἕκαστον
 πρᾶγμα καὶ λόγους ὑπέχειν καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ὅθεν
 ὀρθῶς εἴρηται δυνάμεις καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῶν γυμνάζειν πρὸς
 ἀλήθειαν.

In the title, *κατὰ σύνοψιν* means only that this *μέθοδος* will not be organized by lemmata, as is, for instance, Italos' commentary on *Topics* 2–4, which draws heavily on the commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias. See the preface to *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* [CAG] II.2 pp. xlvii–l, where Wallies gives a list of borrowings; and, for excerpts from Italos, M. Wallies, *Die griechischen Ausleger der Aristotelischen Topik* (Berlin 1891) 24–27.

Line 1 *Ἡ ῥητορικὴ μέθοδος ἐστὶν ...*: C. K. cite as Italos' source *Rhet.* 1.2 (1355b25,) but the quotation is clearly not verbatim.

2 *ἀντίστροφός ἐστι τῆ διαλεκτικῆ*: C. K. cite *Rhet.* 1.1 (1354a1) as Italos' source.

11 *ἀριθμητικῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοὶ ...*: C. K. cite *Rhet.* 1.2 (1355b27ff).

13 *διαλεκτικὴ δὲ καὶ ῥητορικὴ ἀπάντων οὐσαι δυνάμεις ...*: C. K. cite *Rhet.* 1.1 (1354a4).

R. Kassel, *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica* (Berlin/New York 1976), includes these citations in his *testimonia ad locc.*

Italos begins by quoting Aristotle to the effect that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. The two arts differ in that rhetoric addresses judges and the people, whereas dialectic is addressed to one interlocutor; the one is designed to deal with political questions, the other with theoretical questions. Whereas dialectic reasons from universal and particular premisses, rhetoric can argue from flawed premisses and must take into consideration the condition of the audience. Both, however, are not limited as regards subject matter; and both are faculties that can train the mind to get to the truth.

Like others in the tradition who provide the versions of Aristotle's definition in, e.g., the prolegomena published by Walz (e.g. *Sopatros In Herm. stat.* V p.15.18 Walz, where rhetoric is called a *δύναμις θεωρητικῆ*) and Rabe (*PS* pp.29.6, 54.19, 103.11, etc.), Italos gets it almost right. His is the only version that includes *θεωρηῆσαι*, but he calls it a *μέθοδος*

instead of a δύναμις. While Aristotle does refer to μέθοδος in the *Rhetoric*, and explains that rhetoric's job is τὸ πιθανὸν θεωρεῖν at *Topics* 6.12 (149b25–26), a more likely source for Italos' information is perhaps to be found in Alexander *In Top.* (CAG II.2) p.1.4ff and *ad* 6.12 (149b25ff), p.484.17ff. This, as previously noted, Italos knew intimately.

That rhetoric is the ἀντίστροφος of dialectic and that both can argue both sides of a question is noted in Alexander *In Top.* pp.3.25–26, 5.4ff, 519.23ff, etc.; and the comparisons with arithmetic and geometry are taken up by Alexander at p.4.4ff. In general, compare also *In Top.* pp.9.5–18 and 25.29–30.2. Noticeably absent in Italos is any reference to enthymemes and examples, the two chief modes of argument in Aristotle. On rhetoric as useful to leather-cutters and carpenters, see *e.g.* Alexander *In Top.* p.86.18ff and 227.2ff See also [Heliodoros] *Paraph. in Eth.Nic.* 1.3 (1094b13ff), CAG XIX.2 p.4.3ff (of painters and modellers). Italos' last observation that “these wonderful powers” are valuable because “to be able to argue about everything τὸν νοῦν ἡμῶν γυμνάζειν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν” may have been prompted by Alexander *In Top.* p.27.21ff. This claim is made for dialectic by Aristotle at *Top.* 1.2 (101a25ff) (as Italos noted in his Ἐρωτήσαντα περὶ διαλεκτικῆς, dedicated to Konstantinos' brother Andronikos [C. 1.4, K. 3]), but not for rhetoric. It does not seem necessary, in short, to look much beyond Alexander of Aphrodisias for Italos' information about Aristotle on these aspects of rhetoric.

§2 (34.3–15 C. = 35.17–27 K.)

ἐπεὶ δὲ λόγου δυνάμεις εἶναι τὰς τοιαύτας ἔφαμεν καὶ λόγου τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν, διαιρετέον τὸν λόγον διχῶς εἰς τε τὸν προφορικὸν ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἐνδιάθετον καὶ τούτων ἐκάτερον εἰς ἔντεχνόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον. καὶ τῆς μὲν διανοίας τῶν μερῶν ἐατέον ἡμῖν τὴν ἐξέτασιν, τοῦ δὲ προφορικοῦ τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον σύμβολον ἔστω διανοίας ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ ἔντεχνον σύμβολον ἔντεχνον διανοίας <διὰ> φωνῆς, καὶ τούτου το μὲν πρακτικὸν εἶναι ὑπολεπτέον, τὸ

δὲ θεωρητικόν. συμβουλευτικὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ δικανικὸν πρακτικὰ ἄμφω· τῷ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τῆς συμβουλῆς αἰρετόν, οἷον πόλιν τειχίσαι ἢ πόλεμον ἄρασθαι, ἀκολουθεῖ, τῷ δὲ ἡ τιμωρία τῶν κακῶς διακειμένων. θέσις δὲ καὶ ἐγκώμιον θεωρητικά· ἡ μὲν γὰρ θεωρίαν ἔχει μόνον εἴτε ἠθικὴν εἴτε φυσικὴν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ παρὰ ταύτας, τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν προσόντων αὔξησιν καλῶν τε καὶ μὴ τοιούτων.

Discourse must be divided into the inner (ἐνδιάθετος) and the expressed (προφορικός); and both of them into artistic and inartistic. Putting aside an examination of the kinds of thinking, the two species of artistic discourse can be subdivided into the practical and the theoretical. The practical embraces deliberative and forensic discourse; the theoretical includes philosophical and panegyric, which consists in the amplification of the virtues of the subject or their opposite.

The distinction between ἔντεχνος and ἄτεχνος may bring Aristotle to mind, but the same is found in the Anonymous *In Herm. Stas.* at *PS* p.209.9–10 and Sopatros at IV p.95.10–11 Walz. The division into *logos endiathetos* and *logos prophorikos*, which C. finds in Doxapatres at II p.116.6–7 Walz (scholia on Aphthonios), is brought in also at 89.26 and by Sopatros at V p.1.11–12 Walz; and can be found also in *e.g.* Anon. *In Stas.* at *PS* p.184.1ff (= VII.1 p.1.20ff Walz), from *Par.gr.* 1983 and 2977—both tenth century; and the “excerpta” from *Par.gr.* 3032 (X cent.) (*PS* pp.228.24–229.16). It is attributed to Theophrastus by Athanasios (*PS* p.188.7–8) and was widely discussed in antiquity (see for instance Nemesius *De natura hominis* 14 [pp.71–72 Morani], a work known well to Italos’ master, Psellos); but this distinction is not found in Aristotle (see Conley [*supra* n.2] 225–226). It is interesting to note as well that the division seems to be accepted as commonplace by Psellos, as in *e.g.* *Epist.* 176.⁸ By contrast, however, even the

⁸In E. Kurtz and F. Drexl, *Michaelis Pselli Scripta minora* II (Milan 1941) 451.27–452.4 (the letters published here are not the same as those published by C. Sathas, *Mesaionike Bibliothek* V [Venice/Paris 1876] 219–523).

earlier commentators seem to have been aware of the division of the “kinds” of rhetoric Aristotle made on the basis of the kinds of hearers: e.g. Anon. *In Aphth. Prog.* II p.630.20ff Walz; the observations by Sopatros *In stas.* IV pp.51.26–52.25 Walz; the “excerpta” from *Par.gr.* 3032 at *PS* p.235.3ff; and cf. VII.2 p.1269.14ff Walz, from the commentary on *Peri methodou deinotêtos* attributed to Gregory of Corinth (XII cent.); but Italos seems here to follow a “neoplatonic” notion of “intrinsic” differentia. For this whole section, compare Psellos’ σύνοψις τῆς ῥητορικῆς (*Poemata* pp.103–122 Westerink) vv. 4–12.

§3 (34.16–35.6 C. = 35.28–36.6 K.)

τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ ῥητορικὴ καὶ τί διαφέρει διαλεκτικῆς, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον. ἀκόλουθον δ’ ἂν εἴη λέγειν, πῶς μὲν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἔχει τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ ποῖα ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τίνι τὸ χαλεπὸν ἔχει καὶ τίνος πέφυκεν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ὄργανον καὶ μέχρι τίνος σῶζει τὴν οἰκείαν δύναμιν καὶ τίνα πρὸ ταύτης εἰδέναι ὀφείλομεν καὶ τίς ἡ τάξις, ἣν ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς ἔχει ἐπιστήμας, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τί τὸ κάλλιστον τῆς προκειμένης δυνάμεως, ὡς ἂν ἐκ τούτων θεωρηθεῖ τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας ὁ σκοπὸς καὶ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ ὁδὸν ἔξομεν καὶ μηδὲν ἀγνοήσωμεν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν γινώσκεισθαι μέθοδον.

This section lays out the order of discussion down to §11. The eight questions to be addressed (πῶς ..., ποῖα ..., ἐν τίνι ..., τίνος ..., μέχρι τίνος ..., τίνα πρὸ ταύτης εἰδέναι ..., τίς ἡ τάξις ..., ἐπὶ τί ...) are clearly influenced by the approach used in the “accessus” sections of the old prolegomena as well as by e.g. Doxapatres; but Italos’ questions are not the same. Doxapatres (*PS* pp.127.24–128.3) lists the traditional headings in his *Commentary on Aphthonios’ Progymnasmata*: ὁ σκοπός, τὸ χρήσιμον, τὸ γνήσιον, ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀναγνώσεως, ἡ αἰτία τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς, ἡ εἰς τὰ μέρη διαίρεσις, ὁ διδασκαλικὸς τρόπος, and διὰ τί προτετίμηται τῶν ἄλλων κτλ. Compare also *PS* ##8, 11, 20, 32, and 33, where the same questions are treated. It should of course be remembered that these accessus questions were gen-

erated primarily to assist the student in understanding the work at hand, τὸ παρὸν βιβλίον, not the nature of the art of rhetoric itself.⁹

§4 (35.7–15 C. = 36.7–14 K.)

πολιτικά μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖνα ῥητέον. ὅσα περὶ ἀρετῆς ἔχει τὴν ἐξέτασιν οὐ πάσης, ἀλλὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς, καθ' ἣν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι εἰώθαμεν, ἥτοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους συναναστρέφεσθαι καὶ σφύζειν ἕκαστα τῶν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ διατεταγμένων, ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα, τό τε καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσα ἐν τούτοις ὑπάρχει παραπλήσια,* ὧν δὴ τὴν ἀκριβῆ κατανόησιν ἔχειν ἔργον μὲν οὐ ῥητορικῆς πλὴν τῶν ὧν ἀπορρητικῶς ἔχομεν καὶ ὧν ἐκατέρωθεν τοὺς λόγους ἰσχυροὺς εἶναι φαμεν καὶ πιθανούς, τῆς δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμης καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καταγινομένης πράγματα.

*C. and K. place a full stop here and give as a source *Rhet.* 1.4, 1359b6, which appears to be a phantom reference.

Italos reminds his reader that rhetoric deals with what is noble and just and accords with the law, explaining what he means by πολιτικά. Such explanations are standard in the commentary tradition: see e.g. the anonymous prolegomenon (from *Par.gr.* 3032) at *PS* pp.39.16–40.10; Athanasios at pp.181.24–182.9; and Markellinos at p.273.24ff. On λόγους ἰσχυρούς see e.g. Alexander *In Top.* pp.458.31–459.3, ad 145b11.

§5 (35.16–23 C. = 36.15–21 K.)

ἐπεὶ δὲ διχῶς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐγγίνεσθαί φασιν ἢ γὰρ προαιρέσει πεφύκαμεν ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἢ τρόπον ἕτερον, τουτέστι βία, ὧν θάτερον ἄχαρι καὶ πρὸς κακίαν ἀποκλίνον, οὐκ ἀργὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ λογισμῶν λόγῳ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν ταῖς δεχομέναις ψυχαῖς ἐμποιεῖν καὶ ἄγειν πρὸς τὸ καλόν. ἐν δὴ τούτοις καὶ τὴν

⁹On the traditional questions addressed in accessus literature see E. Quain, "The Medieval Accessus ad auctores," *Traditio* 3 (1945) 215–264, esp. 259; and for a fuller account, J. Mansfeld, *Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text* (Leiden/New York 1994).

ἰσχὺν ἢ ῥητορικὴν κέκτηται, κατηγοροῦσα μὲν ὧν δεῖ κατηγορεῖν, συμβουλευομένη δὲ τὰ εἰκότα (καὶ) ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων ἐκάστοις τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένη ὡς εἴρηται.

Rhetoric works its effects not through coercion, but reasoning; and so it is able to establish the noble, τὸ καλόν, in the souls of the listeners or lead them to it. Rhetoric's power enables one to accuse those who ought to be accused and to deliberate on the basis of what seems to be the case, τὰ εἰκότα.

This "psychagogic" function of rhetoric is, of course, not Aristotelian. See, however, Sardianus at *PS* p.214.13–14. On virtue, compare the discussions at *CAG* XX pp.235.6ff and 237.5ff, *ad Eth.Nic.* 5.10. This would be at odds in any event with Aristotle as understood by [Heliodorus] *ad Eth.Nic.* 2.4 (*CAG* XIX.2 p.32.3–11). Closer to Italos here is the opusculum by Psellos, "On the Voluntary and Involuntary."¹⁰

§6 (35.24–36.5 C. = 36.22–6 K.)

τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον ἄλλων τὸ περὶ πρακτέων διαλαβεῖν, μέγιστον μὲν ὡς φρονήσεως ἔργον καὶ λόγου ἐνέργεια, χαλεπὸν δὲ ὡς περὶ μελλόντων μαντευόμενον, ἃ οὐ ῥάδιον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν μὴ πεπαιδευόμενον τὸν λογισμὸν. εἰ δέ τις ἀπορήσειε τάς τε δίκας ὁμοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους εἶναι λογισμοῦ φάσκων, οὐκ ἄτοπος ἔσται θυμὸν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν προσάπτων.

Explanations of why φρόνησις and dealing with future events are so difficult can be seen in *e.g.* [Heliodoros] on *Eth.Nic.* 6.6 (pp.119–120) and 6.9 (pp.123–124); but the idea goes back at least to Isocrates, *e.g. Against the Sophists* 2.

§7 (36.6–37.5 C. = 36.23–37.6 K.)

ἐπεὶ δὲ εἴρηται περὶ τούτων ἰκανῶς, λεκτέον ἂν εἴη μετὰ ταῦτα τίνος πέφυκεν ἢ παροῦσα ὄργανον, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον τῇ μεθόδῳ καὶ εἰ πάντα τὰ τῆς ὑποθέσεως

¹⁰Ed. D. O'Meara, *Michaelis Pselli Philosophica minora* II (Leipzig 1989) 108–109 #31.

περιληπτέα ταύτη καὶ ποῖα πραγματικά ἢ παθητικά τῶν μερῶν καὶ τίνα τούτων ἀναγκαῖα καὶ τίνα ἐνδεχόμενα. πέφυκε τοῖνον τῇ μεθόδῳ χρῆσθαι καλῶς ὁ πάντων τῶν καλῶν ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ. γενόμενος καὶ τί μὲν τὸ δίκαιον εἰδὼς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν μεσότητος, τί δὲ τὸ μεγαλόψυχον ὁμοῦ καὶ χαῦνον, τί τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀκούσιον καὶ οὐκ ἐκούσιον, τί τε προαίρεσις διαφέρει βουλήσεως καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα ἐπιθυμίας ὁμοῦ καὶ δόξης. γελοῖον γὰρ τὰ τῆς τέχνης ἔχειν ὄργανα μὴ τῇ τέχνῃ. χρώμενον μηδέ τι τῶν ἐκείνης ἐπιστάμενον καλῶν. τί γὰρ ὄφελος ἀνδρὸς μήθ' ἑαυτῷ μήθ' ἑτέροις ὑποθέσθαι δυναμένου, τίς μὲν ἀριστὸς ἐστὶ βίος καὶ τί διαφέρει εὐδαιμονίας ἀρετῇ καὶ πότερον βουλητὰ ἄμφω ἢ καὶ προαιρετὰ ταῦτα; ἔοικε δὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τε τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη συγκεῖσθαι πολιτικῆς.* διὸ καλῶς ἦχθαι ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς τε λόγοις ὁμοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἥθεσι τὸν περὶ τούτων διαληψόμενον· ὅς γὰρ ἔτυχε δυνατὸς ἀνὴρ πείθειν, ὡς Εὐριπίδης φησὶν, ὄντως κακὸς γίνεται πολίτης νοῦν οὐκ ἔχων. πολιτικὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ ῥητορικῆς χάρις, ὡς δέδεικται, ἀναγκαῖον, ῥητορικὴ δὲ χωρὶς ἐκείνης ἄχρηστον ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀνόνητον.

*C. cites as Italos' source *Rhet.* 1.2 (1356a25–26) and 1.4 (1359b8–9).

Italos now turns to the foundations of the ὄργανον being discussed, how it should be used, and what pragmatic and emotional factors it should take into consideration. It is from this method that our understanding of the noble and just grows, and of the means between extremes that are all the other virtues, of the nature of high-mindedness and foolishness alike, of the voluntary and the involuntary, of choice and purpose, desire and sentiment, and the like. Rhetoric, after all, is comprised of elements of dialectic and politics; and if detached from the ethical, it is of no use.

It is not immediately clear what Italos means by ὑπόθεσις (line 3). He does not seem to be using it in the technical sense in either rhetoric (see e.g. the anonymous prolegomenon to Hermogenes *Peri staseôs*, PS p.254.20ff; Doxapatres on Aphthonios, PS p.130.16ff) or dialectic (Alexander *In Top.* p.82.15ff); but in

the broader sense of "argument," as in the pseudo-Dionysian *Τέχνη*, e.g. 10.12 (p.367.18–19, 25), 10.19 (p.374.2). By ὑποθέσθαι, by contrast, he refers to a rhetorical exercise, as [Dionysius] does similarly.

Concerns with the overlaps between rhetoric and ethics and dialectic are hardly peculiar to Aristotle. In any event, many comparable observations can be found in the commentary traditions on both *Topics* and *Eth.Nic.*: cf. e.g. Alexander *In Top.* pp.4.14ff, 183.5ff, 484.4ff (with regard to virtue as μεσότης), also 6.20ff and 95.21ff The differences between μεγαλόψυχος and χαῖνος, προαίρεσις and βούλησις, and the rest are drawn in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and commented on by Aspasius: e.g. CAG XIX.1 pp.58.4ff (*ad* 1109b30ff), 66.35ff (*ad* 1111b6–7), 108.2–14 (*ad* 1123a34). But closer to Italos may be the opusculum by Psellos referred to above (§5), in which Psellos draws extensively from Nemesios' *De natura hominis*.

Cérétéli erroneously gives *Orestes* 897 as the source of Italos' "quotation" from Euripides (κακὸς ... οὐκ ἔχων), which is in fact from *Bacchae* 271. The existence of copies of that play in circulation in the eleventh century is uncertain (there is no commentary tradition); hence it is more likely that Italos quotes it from some source such as Stobaeus *Anth.* 4.4.2 (II p.185 Hense).

§8 (37.6–38.7 C. = 37.7–27 K.)

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐν τούτοις ἔχει τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ ὅτι ὄργανον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν. μέχρι δὲ τίνος σφῆζει τὴν οἰκείαν δύναμιν, νῦν ἂν εἴη λεκτέον καὶ πρότερον περὶ προβλημάτων αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἢ ῥητορικὸν ἔσται ἢ διαλεκτικὸν πρόβλημα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ σοφιστικὸν ἢ ἐπιστημονικόν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἄμφω ἔχει τό τε φάναι ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀποφάναι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως θάτερον μόνιον. ὅσα μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτά ἐστι, οὐ ῥητορικὰ ταῦτα νομιστέον, ἀλλ' ἐτέρας ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπερκειμένης, ὅσα δὲ μή, ῥητορικῆς ἢ διαλεκτικῆς. ἐν τούτοις ἄρα τὴν οἰκείαν δύναμιν ὡς κατέρωθεν δυναμένη ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὡς εἴρηται, οὐδ' ἂν οὐδὲ μέχρι

παντὸς πείσειεν οὐδ' ἐκ πάντος ἰσχύσει τρόπου εἰς τέλος ἀγαγεῖν τὸ βουλευθέν, ἀλλ' εἴαν μηδὲν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων παραλίπη, ἱκανῶς αὐτὴν ἔχειν φήσομεν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς. πρὸ δὲ ταύτης καὶ ὁ περὶ ἀποφάνσεως λόγος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ὅσα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς περὶ τούτων εἴρηται ἀντὶ ἀναγκαιότητα. διὸ μετὰ τὰς εἰρημένας πραγματείας ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέτακται ὡς ἐκείνων πρὸς ῥητορείαν χρησίμων ὑπαρχουσῶν· καὶ γὰρ συλλογισμῶν χρηταὶ τῷ ἐνθυμήματι καὶ ἐπαγωγῇ τῷ παραδείγματι,* ἃ οὐκ ἔξεστι ῥητορεύειν ἀγνοοῦντα. τριχῶς τοίνυν ὄντος τοῦ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γένους καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἠθικοῦ, τοῦ δὲ παθητικοῦ, τοῦ δὲ λογικοῦ, ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τὸ λογικὸν ἔχομεν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἠθικῶν τὰ λοιπά. περὶ γὰρ πράξεις καὶ πάθη ἡ ἠθικὴ, καὶ εἴπερ ἄλλο τι ἀναγκαῖα τῷ ῥήτορι. καὶ γὰρ θυμὸν ἐγεῖραι καὶ καταπαῦσαι ὀργὴν καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα τούτοις παραπλήσια πάθη ἀδύνατον ἂν δόξειε τοῖς μὴ τὴν ἠθικὴν μετιοῦσιν.

*Cereteli sees here a reference to *Rhet.* 1.2 (1356a2–3).

On rhetoric dealing with “particulars,” cf. e.g. the Anonymous at VI pp.16–17 Walz (found in *Par.gr.* 3032, among other mss.); and on the use of enthymemes, etc.—which is in the *Rhetoric*, to be sure—see e.g. Alexander *In Top.* pp.62.6–63.19 and 86.4ff, Italos’ most likely source. The point is, however, commonplace. See e.g. *PS* p.240.22ff. The division τριχῶς into ἠθικός, παθητικός, and λογικός appears at e.g. *In Top.* p.190.9ff and at the beginning of Minoukianos *Περὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων* IX pp.601.10–602.13 Walz. See also Syrianos I 57pp..19–58.4 Rabe (and compare Planudes at V pp.506.13–507.3 Walz).

§9 (38.8–39.12 C. = 37.28–38.16 K.)

εἶδη δὲ ῥητορικῆς οἱ μὲν θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικὸν ἔφασαν, οἱ δὲ προστιθέασιν καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐξεταστικόν, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐν τοῖς δικάζομένοις, τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς δικάζουσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι. διὸ καὶ ἀντικειμένως ἔχειν δοκεῖ ἐξεταστικὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ προοίμιον καὶ ἀλλήλων ἀναιρετικά. ὡς γὰρ ἐπίπαν διαστρέφειν δοκεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν ἐξεταστικὸν μὴ ὄντα καὶ τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως

ἀλλότριον, κἀντεῦθεν ἂν εἶη δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀεὶ παραληπτέον τῷ ῥήτορι οὐδ' ἐπιλέγειν ἀεὶ ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ πάθους ἐστὶ κινητικὸν καὶ ἀνάμνησις ἔχον καὶ τὴν σύστασιν ἀφ' ὧν τὰ προοίμια. διὸ παθητικὰ μὲν ἄμφω καὶ οὐ μέρη ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ περιττὸν τι δοκεῖ καὶ κακοῦργον προοιμιαζεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπιλέγειν. χρήσιμα δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐν Ἀρειωπάγῳ οὐδ' ὅπου δικασταὶ βασιλεῖς ἢ ἀρχιερεῖς ἢ καὶ τινες ἄλλοι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντιποιοῦμενοι, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ἔναυλος ὁ λόγος* διὰ σμικρότητα χρήσιμον τὸ ἐπιλέγειν. Διήγησις δὲ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ πίστις· ὃ γὰρ ἂν τις ἀποδείξαι πειρῶτο, τοῦτο καὶ διηγήσαιτο (ἂν) πρότερον, εἰ μηδὲν τι τῶν δυσπίστων ἀπαντῶη. διὸ καὶ ἀναγκασθήσεται τοῖς μέρεσι χρῆσασθαι ἀνάπαλιν (καὶ γὰρ πιθανώτερον) καὶ τὴν διήγησιν πιστοτέρου ἀπεργάσεται. ἐνίοτε δὲ διήγησις ὁμοῦ καὶ πίστις συμβῆσεται κατὰ μέρος· τοῖς γὰρ καιροῖς συμμεταβάλλεσθαι εἰώθασιν οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους νίστασθαι παραδόξως οὐ πρὸς τάληθές, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἕκαστος ἀποβλέπων καὶ ὡς ἂν τὸν δικαστὴν ἐκ παντὸς πείσειε τρόπον. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων ἔοικε διαβάλλειν οὐ ῥητορικὴν, ἀλλὰ κακοθήειαν, ὅθεν οἱ μὲν διὰ πλοῦτον, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀλαζόνειαν,** οἱ δὲ δι' ἄλλας οὐκ ἐπαινετὰς διαθέσεις ῥητορικὴν μετιέναι δοκοῦσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν πάλαι ῥητόρων γεγενημένων. ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν ἄλλις, καὶ τῆς παρουσίας πραγματείας οὐκ ἀλλότριον.

*C. K. (followed by Kassel) see here a reference to *Rhet.* 3.13 (1414b4–6).

** Kassel sees here a reference to *Rhet.* 1.2 (1356a29–30).

To the species (εἶδη) θεωρητικόν/πρακτικόν should be added a third, ἐξεταστικόν. It is not always necessary to include both a *prooimion* and an epilogue, which works on the emotions and is redundant when it simply repeats what was said in the opening. Such *prooimia* are not useful before the Areopagus, however, nor when the judges are rulers (βασιλεῖς) or church authorities (ἀρχιερεῖς). The narration (διήγησις) and argument (πίστις), by contrast, are always required; although sometimes the narration itself amounts to an argument.

It may seem tempting here to see Italos follow “Aristotle” in the *Ad Alexandrum* by bringing in *exetastikos*, but the term is

found all over in Alexander's commentary on the *Topics* (e.g. at pp.28.17, 69.24, 147.18, 157.14, etc.); and see for instance Doxapatres' lectures on Aphthonios at II p.118.6ff Walz. The same lore (understanding political and dicanic rhetoric as "practical" and panegyric as "theoretic," i.e., regarded as a spectacle) can be found in Syrianos as well, e.g. at II p.11.21ff Rabe, IV p.60.9–14 Walz. It is not necessary to cite *Eth.Nic.* 1414b4–6 as Italos' source. These matters are standard in the treatments of τὰ ἔργα τῆς ῥητορικῆς, as e.g. Doxapatres *In Aphthonii progymnasmata*, PS pp.125.21–126.21.

Italos seems to follow Aristotle *Eth.Nic.* 1.1 (1354a21ff) on the practices permitted before the Areopagus, and 3.14 and 19 in pointing out that *prooimia* and *epilogoι* are not always necessary. On the Areopagus lore, however, see the anonymous prolegomenon to Hermogenes' *Inv.*, at VII.1 pp.64.8–65.6 Walz, from the tenth-century *Par.gr.* 2977. Aristotle, moreover, certainly did not believe that a narration was virtually a *pistis* in itself (cf., to the contrary, *Rhet.* 3.13 [1414a30ff]). Italos is perhaps making an inference from the traditional lore that holds *πιθανότης* to be one of the virtues of a good narration: see e.g. Doxapatres on Aphthonios, II pp.234.1–240.5 Walz, where Doxapatres also reports the opinions of John Geometres. Nor of course did Aristotle have anything to say about βασιλεῖς or ἀρχιερεῖς; but we do find the same idea—indeed, almost the same wording—as that here in Italos in the prolegomena to Planudes' commentary on Hermogenes *Inv.* (at V p.365.25ff Walz), most of which was compiled from much earlier scholia, mainly, it seems, *Par.gr.* 2977.

§10 (39.13–18 C. = 38.16–20 K.)

τί δὲ τὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς κάλλιστον, ἀναγκαῖον εἶπεν μετὰ ταῦτα, τῶν γὰρ ἀρχαιοτέρων οἱ μὲν συνθήκην ὀνομάτων ᾤθησαν, οἱ δὲ τὸ πιθανόν, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἕτερόν τι δοκοῦν αὐτοῖς. φαίνεται δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν εἰρημένων τοιοῦτον· τὴν γὰρ ὑπόκρισιν οἱ χαριέστεροι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν· ἦθος γὰρ ὑπεμφαίνουσα

τῶν προσώπων θέλγει ὡς ἐπίπαν τὸν ἀκροατήν.

Some of the older authorities say the best (κάλλιστον) part of the art resides in composition (συνθήκη), others in persuasiveness (πιθανόν), and so on. But it appears to be none of the aforementioned. Those with better judgment (οἱ χαριέστεροι)—who are indeed many—say it is delivery (ὑπόκρισις), for that is what enchants (θέλγει) the average hearer (ὡς ἐπίπαν τὸν ἀκροατήν).

For this peculiar power of delivery, see the similar observation by Athanasios, *PS* p.177.5ff (citing Theophrastus: fr.712 Fortenbaugh/Huby/Sharples). One of the “older [*i.e.* more traditional] authorities” Italos refers to may be his teacher, Psellos; *cf.* V p.598.4–7 Walz, from Psellos' *Peri synthekês*. Psellos says elsewhere, however, just what Italos does: see the *Peri rhetorikês* attributed to him.¹¹ Aristotle, of course, recognizes the power of ὑπόκρισις, but rejects it as belonging more properly to “the actor's art” (*Rhet.* 3.1 [1403b35–1404a8]).

§11 (39.19–40.14 C. = 38.21–25 K.)

ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἦθους ἐμνήσθημεν, φέρε περὶ αὐτοῦ εἶπωμεν, ὅσα τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις προσήκει, διελόντες εἰς πολιτικόν τε καὶ ῥητορικόν, ὧν τὸ μὲν φιλοσοφίας εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῆς παρουσίας πραγματείας. τὸ γὰρ ὄντως ζητεῖν καλόν τε καὶ δίκαιον ὡς πραγματείας ἐτέρας πάλαι πρὸς Ἑρμογένους ὀρθῶς εἴρηται, ἐν δὲ τοῖς παροῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διορίσαι χαλεπόν.

Ἔπεται δὲ τῷ ἦθει γνώμη καὶ λέξις καὶ τέχνη. καὶ δὴ καὶ διαιρετέον τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἀριθμῷ διοριστέον πρότερον. διαιρεῖται τοίνυν κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ γένη καὶ ἡλικίας καὶ προαιρέσεις καὶ τύχας ἔτι τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα. μιμῆσθαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος προσήκει φωνὴν εἰδότα ἀκριβῶς, πότερον Ἑλλήν ἢ βάρβαρος ὁ τοιοῦτος, Ἀθηναῖος ἢ Σπαρτιάτης. φαίνεται δὲ μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὰ αὐτὰ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἄγριον εἶναι καὶ

¹¹In M. Papillon and L. Brisson, *Longin Fragmenta. Rufus Ars rhetorique* (Paris 2001) 211.73–76. Psellos's source was identified as Longinus by P. Gautier, “Michel Psellos et la Rhétorique de Longin,” *Prometheus* 3 (1977) 193–203.

φονικὸν τὸ ἦθος καὶ πρὸς ἀμύνασθαι ἐτοιμότατον, τοῖς δὲ πολὺ διαφέρειν νωθρεΐα τε καὶ συντομίᾳ καὶ ἀγρία καὶ δειλία, καθὰ δὴ καὶ Σκύθαι διαφέρουσι Κελτῶν καὶ Φρύγες Μυσῶν καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλων, σοφία τε καὶ συνέσει, ὡσπερ Χαλδαῖοί τε καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι τούτοις παραπλήσιοι.

Discussion of the speaker's γνώμη, λέξις, and τέχνη comes after some observations on ἦθος. ἦθος may be divided along the lines of race (ἔθνος), lineage (γένος), age (ἡλικίας), moral choices (προαιρέσεις), fortunes (τύχας), and accomplishments (ἐπιτηδεύματα). One's diction is a sure sign of what sort of person one is (e.g. cruel [ἄγριος] or craven [δειλός]) or of one's native culture.

Italos wants to distinguish between rhetorical/political considerations about *êthos* and philosophical analyses of it, recalling no doubt the distinction drawn by [Dionysius] at *Technê* p.375.9ff or the observations Hermogenes makes at *Staseis* 1.1 (pp.28.3–29.6 Rabe) (or the remarks by the commentator *ad loc.* at e.g. VII pp.114.3–115.24 Walz and the scholia printed by Walz at p.114).

On γνώμη, λέξις, and τέχνη and the components of ἦθος here, the most striking parallel is again [Dionysios] *Technê* 11, p.375.4–5, and the discussions at 377.5ff: the διαίρεσις—ἔθνος, γένος, ἡλικία, προαιρέσεις, τύχαι, ἐπιτηδεύματα—is the same as that at 377.15–16.

The cruelty of the Skythians and Kelts, the cowardice of the Phrygians and Mysians, and the wisdom of the Chaldaeans and Egyptians were commonplace even in antiquity. For a general survey see A. Dihle, *Die Griechen und die Fremden* (Munich 1994).

In the sections that follow, *gnomê* is taken up in §13, *technê* in §14, *lexis* in §15, a distribution also based on [Dionysius] at *Technê* 11.7–9 (pp.381.11–386.11).

§12 (40.15–41.19 C. = 39.1–21 K.)

ἐπεὶ οὖν εἴρηται περὶ τούτων ἰκανῶς, λεκτέον ἂν εἴη περὶ τῶν ἐξῆς καὶ πρῶτον περὶ γένους, εἰ πατήρ ἐστιν ὁ λέγων καὶ πατήρ

βάρβαρος ἢ νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν. δεῖ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις τὰς τε προαιρέσεις ὁμοῦ καὶ τὰς τύχας, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἀκολούθως τοῖς εἰρημένοις στρατηγῶν ἢ ῥητόρων ἢ κολάκων ἢ φιλαργύρων ἢ ἄλλως γεωργῶν ἢ λίχνων· ἐκ δὴ τούτων οὐ μόνον ὑπόκρισιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότασιν ὁμοῦ καὶ πίστιν σχοίημεν ἂν ἱκανῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς τῶν τρόπων διαφορᾶς διατριβαὶ γίνονται καὶ δίκαιται κακ τούτων ἦθη, καὶ τούτοις πάλιν ἀναλόγως αἱ πράξεις, ἀφ' ὧν οἱ λόγοι καὶ περὶ ὧν ἡ κρίσις. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὡς οὐ μόνον τοῦ λέγοντος ὑποκρίνεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος καὶ περὶ ὧν. ὡς γὰρ τὸ πράττειν οὐ μόνον ἂν δεῖ καλὸν καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον καὶ πρὸς οὓς προσήκον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ λέγειν χρησιμώτατον, εἰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεμφαίνει τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τὴν ζωὴν ἀνεπίληπτον καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀνεξαπάτητον. χρήσιμον δὲ τοῦτο οὐ ῥήτορσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλεῦσι καὶ νομοθέταις καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπασιν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ὀρθῶς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι διατρίβειν. οὐ γὰρ ἡδονῆς χάριν τὸ λέγειν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐξαπατᾶν τὸ προσδιαλεγόμενον ἢ κατεπαίρεσθαι τῶν ἀγνώτων (τοῦτο γὰρ εὐήθες), ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὴν ἀρετὴν κατορθοῦν καὶ ἀμύνησθαι περὶ πάτρης, ὡς φησὶν Ὅμηρος [*Il.* 13.243]. δεῖ δὲ καθάπερ μητρὶ καὶ πατρίδι βοηθεῖν ἀρετὴν καθάπερ τροφεία ταύτ. παρεχόμενον. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ Δημοσθένους ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήνων κινδυνεύσας, εἰ καὶ Περδίκκας Ἀθήνησι μισθὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ λέγειν ἀπῆται.

Lineage, age, and the rest determine one's style and delivery, hence one's believability, if they are all consistent with one another. One must keep in mind the mode of delivery of the speaker, to whom, and about what he is speaking. The appearance of good moral character depends on these. This is important not only for public speakers, but also for kings and lawmakers; for they speak not just for the sake of pleasure or of fooling the hearer, but also to set them on the road to virtue.

Céréféli notes the parallels in this section with Hermogenes *Stas.* 3 (29.4–5 Rabe) and *Id.* 2.3 (304.5ff Walz = 321.5ff Rabe);

and there are also similar discussions in Doxapatres on Aphthonios (II p.500.3ff) Walz and in [Dionysius] *Technê* 6 (p. 380.5ff). For the list of “characters,” compare Theon *Progymn.* I p.116.1ff Walz. Once again, we seem to be dealing with material shared by many writers on rhetoric.

At the end, both C. and K. print Πρόδικος, giving in the apparatus *πρδικος* as the ms. reading. This cannot be right. The reference here may be to the example of Perdikkas in Dem. 13.24 (taken out of context).

§13 (41.20–42.18 C. = 39.22–40.7 K.)

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἥθους καὶ πῶς διαρετέον, εἰρήσθω τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἔπεται δὲ ἀκολούθως καὶ περὶ γνώμης εἰπεῖν καὶ πρότερον τί ἐστίν. Ἀριστοτέλης τοίνυν τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἔφησεν ἀκριβῆ κρίσιν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιεικῆ ἐλαττωτικὸν εἶναι τῶν δικαίων. εἰ οὖν ἀκριβεῖς ὅ τ' ἐπιεικῆς ὁμοῦ καὶ ἡ κρίσις, ἀκριβείας ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ γνώμη. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μήτ' ἐλλιπές μήτε περιττὸν μήτε τι ἐναντίον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενείας ὑπόδειγμα, τὸ δὲ τερθρείας, τὸ δὲ ἀπίθανον ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀκόζηλον καὶ οὐ μικρὸν ἐπιφέρον ἐνίστε τοῖς λέγουσι κίνδυνον. δεῖ δὲ μετρεῖν τοῖς τε καιροῖς ὁμοῦ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἔτι δὲ ταῖς τῶν δικαστῶν ἢ ἐκκλησιαστῶν διαθέσεσι τὸ ῥητορεύειν ὁμοῦ καὶ λέγειν. τοῦτο δὲ χαλεπὸν διορίσαι τῷ λόγῳ (ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου καὶ αἰσθήσεως), ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ λόγου βοηθεῖσθαι πάνυ ἀναγκαιότατον· μέτρον γὰρ τοῦ λέγειν ἄριστον τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν φεύγειν τὰς εἰρημένους κακίας καὶ μηδέν τι τῶν ἐξαγωνίων ἐνθυμεῖσθαι. ἀλλ' ἐάν τι τοιοῦτον συμβαίη, ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀντιδίκους αὐτοὺς καὶ πρόφασιν ἔχειν εὐλογον, ὡς ἐκείνους ὄντας αἰτίους τοῦ οὕτω διαλέγεσθαι.

As for γνώμη, we may ask what it is: it is the good judgement (ἀκριβῆ κρίσις) of a reasonable man (ἐπιεικῆς) that neither falls short of or exceeds what is appropriate. Compare [Dionysius] at *Technê* pp.382.15–17, 384.17–21. The main consideration here is the ability to size up the situation and stick to the point.

The definition of *gnomê* comes from *Eth.Nic.* 6.11 (1143a20–21). The discussion here should be read against the background, perhaps, of the materials collated by Eustratios on *Eth.Nic.* 6.11 (CAG XX pp.371.15ff, 373.21–22); and on *epieikeia*, see Alexander *In Top.* p.225.8ff. The “mean” appealed to here is cast in commonplace terms, but compare [Dionysius] 382.15. There is an echo of Italos’ analysis also at *In Top.* pp.183.5ff (citing *Eth.Nic.* 2.8 [1108b5ff] and 432.2ff.

§14 (42.18–43.4 C. = 40.8–16 K.)

μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα τρεπτέον τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὴν τέχνην καὶ δεικτέον, ὡς εἴη παρὰ τὴν γνώμην, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτὸν ἔδοξέ τισι· τὸ γὰρ μέτρον κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐν τῷ λέγειν τέχνης ἂν εἴη καὶ τέχνης ἀρίστης. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρὸν τῷ τὴν μὲν γνώμην κρίνειν ἴσως καὶ ἐπιτάττειν τὰ εἰρημένα, τὴν δὲ τέχνην ποιεῖν. τάχα <δ’> ἂν τις ὀρθῶς κρίνειν ἐρεῖ τὴν γνώμην, εἰ κατὰ τέχνην κρίνειν. ὡς γὰρ τὸ κρίνειν τοῦ ποιεῖν ἕτερον, οὕτω καὶ γνώμη τέχνης. ἀλλὰ προοιμιάσασθαι μὲν ὀρθῶς καὶ διηγῆσασθαι ἀκριβῶς καὶ ἐπιχειρῆσαι πιθανῶς τέχνης ἂν εἴη ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ μήτε περιττὰ μήτε ἐλλιπῆ φθέγξασθαι γνώμης.

It is important to keep in mind the difference between *gnomê* and *technê*. The former provides the basis for judgment (κρίνειν) and the latter for production (ποιεῖν). The soundness of a speaker’s γνώμη lies mainly in his respect for the mean: μήτε περιττὰ μήτε ἐλλιπῆ.

At p.382.15ff of the *Technê*, [Dionysius] lays down the same criteria, adding μὴ ἐναντία. Mastery of the *technê*, Italos says here, enables one to begin rightly (ὀρθῶς), lay out the narrative precisely, and argue (ἐπιχειρῆσαι) persuasively.

§15 (43.5–15 C. = 40.17–25 K.)

τὴν δὲ λέξιν διευκρινητέον τῷ τὴν μὲν ποιητικὴν εἶναι ἢ τραγικὴν, τὴν δὲ δεικτικὴν ἢ ἱστορικὴν, καὶ εἰ Ξενοφῶντος ἢ Θεοπόμπου ἢ Ἀριστοτέλους ἢ Ἀρχιλόχου. πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς παλαιοὺς σφᾶς ἑαυτοὺς ἀναπέμποντες καὶ τούτους ὅσον δυνατὸν ἐκμιμούμενοι θαρρεῖν ἔχομεν περιγενέσθαι τοῦ πράγματος καὶ

ζηλωτοὶ πᾶσι καθεστηκέναι. ἐν γὰρ ἐκείνοις οὐ τῇ λέξει δουλεύει τὰ νοήματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων καθέστηκε σύμβολα. τὸ δ' ἀνάπαλιν εὐήθες ὁμοῦ καὶ ἄτεχνον πρὸς τῷ δουλοπρεπὲς εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἀγοραίων· δουλοπρεπὲς γὰρ τὸ <τοῦ> κρεῖττον ὑποτάττειν τῷ χείρονι καὶ φθέγγεσθαι μὴ νοοῦντα καὶ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι ἀσχημονοῦντα.

Varieties of λέξις may be distinguished by genre (poetic or tragic and dicanic or historical), or by reference to individual authors (Xenophon or Theopompus, Aristotle or Archilochus). The ancients did not let their choice of words determine their thoughts (νοήματα), but what is set out orally (ἐν τῇ φωνῇ) are *symbola* of what they felt in their souls. One must be careful not to seem lowly.

I know of no comparable analysis of λέξις except for that in [Dionysius] *Technê* p.386.12ff, where we get δικανικόν, ιστορικόν, διαλεκτικόν (!), and κωμικόν. Italos' remark about οἱ παλαιοί as models for imitation is reminiscent of observations made by [Dionysius] at pp.373–374; and see also the scholia minora from *Marc.gr.* 433 (XI cent.) printed by Walz at VII p.868 n.28.

§16 (43.16–44.21 C. = 40.26–41.8 K.)

ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ οὕτω* διωρίσθω, λεγέσθω δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ προβλημάτων καὶ πόσα γένη αὐτῶν καὶ τίνα ταῦτα καὶ ποῖα μὲν τούτων ῥητορικά, ποῖα δὲ σοφιστικά ἢ διαλεκτικά. ἔστι τοίνυν πρόβλημα ζήτησις ἐξ ἐνδόξων πρὸς πρᾶξιν ἢ θεωρίαν συντείνουσα. περὶ ἧς ἀντιφατικῶς δοξάζουσιν οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι. διὸ καὶ στάσις παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς κέκληται. τὸ γὰρ “ἀντιφατικῶς” ταῦτὸν ἂν εἴη τῷ “στασιαστικῶς,” κἀντεῦθεν δῆλον, ὡς οὐ πᾶν πρόβλημα στάσις, ἀλλ' ὅσα κατὰ ῥητορικὴν τυγχάνει μέθοδον ἢ διαλεκτικὴν ἀμφοτέρων ἀντιστρόφων ὑπαρχουσῶν· τὰ γὰρ ἀριθμητικὰ ἢ γεωμετρικὰ ζητήματα τυγχάνει οὐ στάσις.** ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποφαντικός, πᾶν δὲ τοιοῦτον ὑποκείμενον ἔχει καὶ κατηγορούμενον, ἀνάγκη τὸ κατηγορούμενον ἢ ὡς εἰδῶν ἢ ὡς ὄρον ἢ ὡς ἴδιον ἢ (ὡς) συμβεβηκὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥητορικὰ ἐκ συμβε-

βηκότων ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν, τὰ δὲ σοφιστικὰ ἢ διαλεκτικὰ ἐξ ἀπάντων· περὶ γὰρ πάντος τοῦ προτεθέντος εἰσὶ προβλήματα. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ σοφιστικὴ τῆς μὲν ῥητορικῆς τῷ καθόλου εἶναι, τῆς δὲ διαλεκτικῆς τῷ εἶναι ῥητορικῆ· ῥητορικὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ φιλοσοφοῦσα. εἶδη δὲ προβλημάτων ὡς μὲν ἀπὸ γένους, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὡς δὲ χαρακτήρες ἐξ ἰδεῶν συγκείμενοι ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις, ὡς δὲ ποιά ὄντα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ῥηθήσεται. ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἢ πανηγυρικὴν ἔχοντα ποιότητα ἢ δικανικὴν, ἢ παθητικὴν ἢ ἠθικὴν ἢ μικτήν. ὅσα μὲν οὖν μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ λαμπρότητα καὶ κατορθωμάτων ἀφήγησις, ταῦτα πανηγυρικὰ ἂν εἴη τῷ σχήματι. ὅσα δὲ περὶ ψιλῆς δίκης ἔχει τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν, δικανικά. εἰ δὲ πάθους εἰσὶ κινητικὰ ἢ ἠθῶν ἔμφασιν ἔχοντα, τὰ τοιαῦτα παθητικὰ ἢ ἠθικὰ καλεῖται, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀπάντων ἔχοντα τὴν ἰσχὺν, μικτά. ἕκαστον δὲ τοιούτων πρόσωπον ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πράγματα ἔνδοξα ἔνδοξον εἶναι λέγεται κατὰ τὸ πρόσωπον, εἰ δ' ἄμφω ἔνδοξα. καὶ ὁ τρόπος ὡσαύτως, εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλως, ἀμφίδοξα. εἰ δὲ παρὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ὑπάρχοντα, εἰκότως ἂν κληθεῖη παράδοξα.

* So both C. and K., but ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ... seems preferable.

** C. K.: τυγχάνοντα οὐ στάσεις.

Now we should say something about the kinds of *προβλήματα* that are proper to rhetoric (as opposed to sophistic and dialectical). A *πρόβλημα* is an inquiry bearing on theory or practice based on accepted opinions (ἐξ ἐνδόξων) on an issue about which—as is not the case in arithmetic or geometry—there seem to be contrary propositions that give rise to a *stasis*. A rhetorical *problêma* is like a dialectical one in that, since every *problêma* is a *logos apophantikos* (i.e., an assertion, not a question), we need to proceed by defining and dividing the issues to be addressed (compare Alexander *In Top.* pp.36.28–37.23). Rhetorical *problêmata* involve particulars (compare Alexander p.37.20ff), and all the different kinds of discourse are marked by different qualities. Sophistic differs from rhetoric in being universal, and from dialectic in being rhetorical, for sophistic is rhetoric “philosophizing.”

Compare also the lore about rhetorical *problêmata* with e.g. *PS* pp.208.4ff, 256.3ff. This subject is, in any event, of considerable

concern to commentators on the *Topics*: see e.g. Alexander at pp.82.12–83.2, etc. Italos' explanation of *στάσις* is commonplace (cf. Syrianos at II pp.48–49 Rabe, Sopatros at IV p.199.5–6 Walz, and e.g. *PS* pp.211.9–10, 292.22–23, 330.3ff). Interestingly, this is the only place in the *Μέθοδος* where Italos mentions *στάσις*, a topic he discusses in one of his “quodlibetical” questions, #61 in *Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις* (pp.83–84 Joannou). Perhaps even more interesting is the fact that Italos says nothing about *τόποι* in his synopsis, which would be surprising if he was in fact trying to epitomize Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. As an expert dialectician, he would certainly have recognized the importance of, and functions of, *τόποι* in rhetorical argumentation.

The notion of a *ῥητορικὴ φιλοσοφοῦσα* goes back at least to Philostratos (*VS* 480), but see also Psellos *Epist.* 174 (*V* p.442.15–16 Sathas) and his *Chronographia* 6.197, where he says that rhetoric can *ταῖς ... ἐννοίαις φιλοσοφεῖ*.

§17 (44.22–45.17 C. = 41.9–25 K.)

ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσαν μέθοδον ἀποδεικτικὴν ἔκ τινων εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς εἴρηται, δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ὁμοίως ἔχειν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν εἴρηται αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὃν τρόπον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ καθ' ἕκαστην ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀφ' ὧν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς λελέξεται νῦν. ἔστι γὰρ λαβεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων τοῖς λέγουσιν ἢ καθ' ὧν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν δισχυρίζονται ἑκάτεροι· ἕκαστος γὰρ τῶν εἴτε λεγόντων ἢ πραττόντων ποιός τις ἐστὶ κατὰ τε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἠθος καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς ἐνέργειαν. ἃ ἐπισκοπεῖν δεῖ ὡς τῶν ἄλλων αἴτια καὶ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν λεγόντων μᾶλλον ἠθικῶς ἢ παθητικῶς, ἦττον δὲ λογικῶς ἐπιχειρητέον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πραττόντων ἢ πραξάντων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον μελλόντων ποιεῖν ἀνάπαλιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λογικῶς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἰσχυρότερον πῶς ὡς βίαιον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγῳ ὑπερέχοντα προτείνεσθαι ἀναγκαιότατον, τὸ δὲ παθητικῶς ἢ ἠθικῶς ἦττον μὲν τι ἰσχύει τῇ

τέχνη, ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ μεγίστην ἐνδείκνυται τὴν δύναμιν ὡς ᾧν ἀπλοῦν τι καὶ ἀπερίεργον καὶ δοκοῦν μᾶλλον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ στοιχεῖν κατὰ <τοὺς> πολλοὺς.* τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ φθόνῳ τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ῥητορείᾳ τυγχάνοντας ἢ ὑπολήψει τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ὡς διαλογομένων πιθανῶς καὶ κακουργούντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

*κατὰ πόλλους C. K.

As it is necessary to look into the argumentative method in any branch of knowledge, so too in the case of rhetoric. One must take into consideration who is speaking, about what, and what each side is declaring about it, for speakers and actors have their own particular qualities, either because of inner character or outside influences. In speaking (rhetorically), it is more necessary to argue with character and emotion than with logic, whereas in acting it is the opposite. Character and emotion are less weighty technically, but sometimes arguing forcefully and seeming closer to the truth arouses the ill will of the many toward those who have the floor or the impression that they may be acting badly in civil affairs.

Italos here betrays a dialectical bias, but conveys some common sense about rhetorical argumentation. Unlike dialectical arguments, his point seems to be, rhetorical arguments are determined by particular circumstances and intentions; and rigorous, unemotional arguments are likely to put audiences off.

§18 (45.18–26 C. = 41.26–32 K.)

λαμβάνεται δὲ τὰ ἐξ ὧν οἱ λόγοι ἔκ τε τῆς τῶν λεγόντων ὑποψίας ἢ πραττόντων, ὡς εἴρηται, ἢ ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν φανερῶν ὄντων οὐχ ὡς κακῶς πεπραγμένων ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἢ καλῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς κακῶς ἢ καλῶς ἢ κρειττόνως ἢ χειρόνως ἐκατέρωθεν δυναμένων δείκνυσθαι. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἔσται ἀπόδειξις ῥητορική, εἴ τις εἰς τὰ προειρημένα ἀποβλέψας ἐπιχειρήσειεν εὖ καὶ ὡς ἂν δέχοιτο, κἂν μὴ πολλάκις πείσειε πιθανῶς διαλεγόμενος οὐδὲν διοίσει, φρόνιμος ὢν καὶ ἀκριβῆς κατὰ τὴν τέχνην.

The materials for speeches are drawn from the assumptions of speakers or actors, or from the actions themselves when their evaluation is not self-evident, but can be argued ("with difficulty or

elegantly” or “done well or poorly”) on both sides (ἐκατέρωθεν). Anyone who has paid attention to what has just been said will be able to argue persuasively, being of good sense and technically accurate.

Italos’ point is similar to that which Hermogenes makes at the beginning of *On Invention*—that one must tailor the *prooimion* to the particular inclinations and judgments of the audience addressed. If that is right, however, one might expect to see here a reference to ὑπόληψις, as in Hermogenes and Italos at §17 end, not ὑποψία as in line 1. It might make sense to read here something like “the materials for speeches are drawn from [the audience’s] ‘supposition of wrongdoing’”—i.e., “suspicion”—which is how Ammonios, e.g., defines ὑποψία (*De adfinium vocabulorum differetia*, p.126 #486 Nikau); but that does not seem to be supported by the examples Italos gives at lines 2–5. Instead of hazarding an emendation (for which there is no manuscript evidence), we might take ὑποψία in the general sense of “mental uneasiness”—uncertainty about whether a deed was performed “well or poorly,” for instance. But I think Italos is thinking here of something very close to ὑπόληψις, which refers in Hermogenes to the audience’s “presumptions” or “impressions” about what is good or true or not, which the rhetorician must take into consideration. The other term in this passage that should be remarked upon is ἐκατέρωθεν—there must be arguments on *both* sides of a question.

§19 (46.1–21 C. = 41.33–42.11 K.)

ἐπεὶ δὲ τριττὸν εἶναι τὸ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἔφαμεν γένος καὶ τὸ μὲν ἠθικόν, τὸ δὲ παθητικόν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν, περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἠθικὸν ἱκανὸν ἔστω τὸ τοῦ ῥήτορος ἀγαθὸν ὃν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φανερόν ἐν πᾶσιν, ὡς οὐδέποτε ἦλω κακουργῶν ἐν τῷ λέγειν. διὸ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιοπιστότερος ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἀποδοχῆς ἄξιος, κἂν μὴ λογικῶς ἐπιχειρήσειεν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἀνάπαλιν ἐπιχειρῶν δικαίας ἐπιτιμήσεως. μάλιστα δε τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἐν ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις τῶν πόλεων,* οἷα περὶ

Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Λακόνων. ἐν γὰρ Αἰγύπτῳ οὐ παρόντες προέτεινον, ἀλλὰ ἐκατέρωθεν γραφῇ τοὺς λόγους παρείδουν. ὁ <μὲν ἠθικὸν>** ὡς μοχθηρὸν ἐκκλίνοντε, καὶ τὴν τοῦ δικαστοῦ πολλάκις ταραττον διάνοιαν, τὸ δὲ παθητικὸν <ὡς ὅτι>** ἐλέους ἐστὶ κινητικὸν καὶ μὴ ἐὼν ἀδέκαστον εἶναι τὸ δικαστὴν μὴδ' ἀκροᾶσθαι ἐπίσης ἀμφοτέρων, ὡς αἰχμάλωτον τῷ πάθει καὶ ὅλον θατέρου μέρους, ἀφ' οὗ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάθος κεκίνητο, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν <ὡς>** βίαιον ἅμα καὶ ἔντεχνον καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων, ὡς εἴρηται, θαυμαζόμενον. διὸ καὶ ὑποψίαν ἴσως παρέχον ὡς μὴ πάντῃ ἀληθές, ἀλλὰ ἀπατῶν τῇ τέχνῃ. ὡς γοητεία χρώμενον καὶ φενακίζον τοὺς πολλούς. διὸ ἦθος ἐπιμελητέον καὶ λόγου ὡς ὄντος ἀχρήστου θατέρου χωρίς. ὁ γὰρ ἐκ μοχθηρᾶς διανοίας προενηνεγμένος λόγος ἀπίθανος ἂν δόξειε κἂν πιθανῶς διείλεκται.

*μάλιστα ... τῶν πόλεων: C. K. find an echo here of *Eth.Nic.* 1.1 (1354a20).

** Supplevit C.

On the three rhetorical “proofs” (*apodeixeis*)—the ethical, the pathetic, and the logical—let it be observed that if the speaker has a good ethos, he will be more worthy of belief (ἀξιοπιστότερος) than one who does not, even if he does not argue logically (κἂν μὴ λογικῶς ἐπιχειρήσειεν), especially if he seems to have the interests of the city at heart.

While it might be argued that this echoes *Rhet.* 2.1, Aristotle does not go quite this far. And see Alexander *In Top.* p. 224.2–23, concerning οἱ ἀξιοπιστότεροι.

I have not found the source of the information Italos relates about Egyptian legal procedure.

Conclusion

The chief impression one takes away from reading this work is that it is extremely cerebral and schematic. Italos' main interests are largely limited to the relations between rhetoric and dialectic, which makes sense once we recognize Alexander of Aphrodisias lurking in the background—especially at the beginning, on the ἀντίστροφος question, and in his relatively

long disquisition on προβλήματα in the middle of the work. All of this is, of course, consistent with Italos' broader concerns with dialectic. As a result, even in those parts where he seems to depend on pseudo-Dionysius' Τέχνη, the ordinary concerns of writers on rhetoric are overshadowed. One of the shortest sections (15), for instance, is on style—and "style" restricted to considerations of diction, it would seem. And while it is true that this μέθοδος is presented κατὰ σύνοψιν, the almost total absence of examples and of models for imitation is surprising—especially if we are right in seeing pseudo-Dionysius as one of his chief sources.

In short, young Konstantinos would not have learned much about how to be a persuasive speaker from reading this short work. But then again, perhaps Italos himself did not know much about that, either. As Anna Komnena remarks, Italos τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ νέκταρος οὐκ ἐγέυσατο (*Alexiad* 5.8.6).¹²

June, 2004

244 Lincoln Hall
University of Illinois
702 S. Wright St.
Urbana, IL 60801
t-conley@uiuc.edu

¹²I wish to express my gratitude here to the anonymous reader for *GRBS* and to Prof. D. M. Schenkeveld, both of whom have been enormously helpful.