

αἰδῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή:
Works and Days 317–319

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AT *WORKS AND DAYS* 311–326, in the midst of an exhortation to seek prosperity through work and not through theft, Hesiod pauses for three lines over the topic of αἰδῶς (317–319):

αἰδῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένον ἄνδρα κομίζει,
αἰδῶς, ἣ τ' ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεταί ἣδ' ὀνίνησιν·
αἰδῶς τοι πρὸς ἀνολβίῃ, θάρσος δὲ πρὸς ὄλβῳ.

A not-good αἰδῶς tends to the indigent man;
αἰδῶς, which greatly harms and benefits men;
αἰδῶς before poverty, confidence before wealth.

Since αἰδῶς is a cardinal virtue for Homer and, to judge from other references in the poem, would appear to be so for *Works and Days* as well, the question of what αἰδῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή might be has puzzled commentators since antiquity.

1. Inappropriate αἰδῶς

Textual solutions have been offered for the puzzle of line 317's not-good αἰδῶς. Some editors have proposed rearranging the order of the lines, without, however, producing a consensus.¹ West prints the infinitive κομίζειν rather than the vulgate κομίζει, arguing that the infinitive is “guaranteed by *Od.* 17.347” and that “Hesiod is not saying that there is a bad Aidos separate from the good (like the two Erides).”² That is,

¹ E.g. A. Rzach, *Hesiodi Carmina* (Leipzig 1902), and T. A. Sinclair, *Hesiod. Works and Days* (London 1932), transpose 318 and 319. P. Mazon, *Hésiode. Les travaux et les jours* (Paris 1914), transposes 317 and 319.

² M. L. West, *Hesiod. Works and Days* (Oxford 1978) 236. At line 500

the indicative, *κομίζει*, entails that the modifier *οὐκ ἀγαθή* is attributive—a not-good *αἰδώς* does or is thus and so—but if the infinitive is substituted, *ἀγαθή* must be construed as a predicate with an infinitive complement—*αἰδώς* is not-good for a certain purpose. The predicative option diminishes, as West points out, the contradiction of labeling a virtue such as *αἰδώς* not-good and therefore makes better sense than the alternative. Although West argues from the preferred meaning, three of the four papyri preserving 317–319 do offer the infinitive *κομίζειν* as does one manuscript of Stobaeus, in which the reading appeared before being corrected. Plutarch, for his part, condemned 317–318 as interpolated from Homer on the strength of their resemblance to *Od.* 17.347 and *Il.* 24.45 respectively.³ In light of Plutarch's judgment it is, of course, easy enough to infer how an infinitive might have replaced an indicative in 317: the infinitive provides a morally more satisfying sense and follows the Homeric line from which 317 is allegedly copied. Is it a more likely scenario, then, that in the course of transmission the line as composed by Hesiod was altered from an original infinitive to an indicative, or the reverse, that Hesiod's indicative was altered to a Homeric infinitive? Solmsen, in spite of the papyri, prefers the received reading *κομίζει*, which he believes Stobaeus supports. Verdenius argues, correctly I believe, that the reading *κομίζειν* for 317 is the result of Homeric influence on the textual tradition of *Works and Days* and that the attributive usage gives a sense in keeping with Hesiod's dialectical outlook in the poem, which I will discuss below.⁴

(*ἐλπίς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένον ἄνδρα κομίζει*) West (80–82) again prints the infinitive, a reading found in the **D** manuscript as well as in the related ψ 2, though to justify his choice he refers the reader to his note on 317. West remains uncertain whether this reading was subsequently corrected, though F. Solmsen, *Hesiodi Theogonia Opera et Dies Scutum* (Oxford 1970), expresses no doubt: see their ap. crit. ad loc.

³ See A. Pertusi, *Scholia vetera in Hesiodi Opera et Dies* (Milan 1955) 107 = Plut. fr.45 Sandbach.

⁴ W. J. Verdenius, *A Commentary on Hesiod Works and Days, vv. 1–382* (*Mnemosyne* Suppl. 86 [Leiden 1985]) 159; cf. Mazon, *Hésiode* 89–90.

In addition to the attestations at 317–319, the word *αἰδώς* occurs on three occasions in *Works and Days*. In the collapse of morality and justice that characterizes the Age of Iron, the phrase *καὶ αἰδώς / οὐκ ἔσται*, “and *αἰδώς* will not exist” (192–193), is inserted between the failure of *δίκη* and the triumph of false swearing and the wicked *ζῆλος*, certainly a stand-in for the wicked *ἔρις*.⁵ This apocalyptic description then culminates in the departure of the goddesses *Αἰδώς* and *Νέμεσις* (200) for Olympus.⁶ The only other occurrence in *Works and Days* is at the end of the passage in question, in line 324, where, once again, the perversion of justice through false testimony is summarized *αἰδῶ δέ τ’ ἀναιδείη κατοπάζῃ*, “and shamelessness overthrows *αἰδώς*.” The association of *αἰδώς* with *νέμεσις* at 200 suggests, moreover, that not only does *αἰδώς* preempt misdeeds before they occur, but it can also be aroused in the minds of offenders after the fact, through public censure (*νέμεσις*) of such behavior after it has taken place. *αἰδώς*, then, appears to be both the anticipation of shame and humiliation that forestalls anti-social acts as well as the shame and humiliation experienced when such actions are publicly criticized.⁷

⁵ Verdenius, *Commentary* 25–26, 115, and West, *Commentary* 203, both personify *Ζῆλος* in line 195. Regarding the close parallel between *ζῆλος* and *ἔρις* in *Works and Days*, especially in terms of double natures, see Verdenius, West, and U. von Wilamowitz, *Hesiodos Erga* (Berlin 1928) 44–45, 62. In its only occurrence in *Theog.* (92) *αἰδώς* is likewise linked to *δίκη* in the form of the good king’s “straight judgments” (86).

⁶ *αἰδώς* and *νέμεσις* are paired in Hesiod fr.204.82 again as opponents of violent theft, in this instance of a bride. Regarding the intimate link between *αἰδώς* and *νέμεσις* see G. Ricciardelli Apicella, “*Αἰδώς* e *νέμεσις* in Omero e in Esiodo,” *SMEA* 33 (1994) 131–143, and D. L. Cairns, *Aidōs. The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* (Oxford 1993) 48–146, esp. 51–54, 83–86.

⁷ See e.g. Hector’s anticipation of *αἰδώς* before his fellow Trojans at *Il.* 22.105 (Cairns, *Aidōs* 79–83) and Agamemnon’s cry of *αἰδώς* to rebuke his faltering troops at 8.228 (Cairns 68–71). See additionally Cairns’ discussions of the prospective and contemporaneous temporalities of *αἰδώς*: *Aidōs* 84–85, 99, 141, 145–156.

Works and Days localizes αἰδώς to its own primary concern of judicial extortion much as the *Iliad* ties it to the battlefield and the *Odyssey* to hospitality, but αἰδώς as an ethical concept remains essentially the same for Hesiod as in Homer.

Explanations of what Hesiod could possibly have in mind for αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή approach αἰδώς from two directions. The one proceeds from *Od.* 17.347, αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρέλναι, “αἰδώς is not good for helping an indigent man,” and *Od.* 3.14, in which Athena-Mentor cautions Telemachus that he should feel no inhibition due to αἰδώς when he prepares to address Nestor: Τηλέμαχ', οὐ μὲν σε χρὴ ἔτ' αἰδοῦς οὐδ' ἡβαιόν, “Telemachus, you mustn't feel any αἰδώς, not a bit.” Athena explains that they have traveled so far solely to get word of Odysseus, implying that it would now be foolish to permit an exaggerated sense of αἰδώς to interfere with that goal. On this basis it has been suggested that the αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή of both *Od.* 17.347 and *Works and Days* 317 is a “misplaced” or “false” αἰδώς, such as that against which Athena warns Telemachus.⁸ The analogy of these Homeric lines suggests, then, that Perses is a starving peasant paralyzed by other-directed feelings of deference, awe, and humility as he contemplates approaching one of the local great men to beg for aid. Such an overpowering feeling of αἰδώς towards the wealthy

⁸ Cf. *Od.* 3.24. This reasoning does not entail that 317 was borrowed from *Od.* 17. Many do, however, regard *Il.* 24.44–45 (οὐδέ οἱ αἰδώς / γίγνεται, ἢ τ' ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεται ἢδ' οὐνίησι) as adapted from 318: West, *Commentary* 236; A. Hoekstra, “Hésiode, Les Travaux et les Jours, 405–407, 317–319, 21–24. L'élément proverbial et son adaptation,” *Mnemosyne* SER. IV 3 (1950) 89–114, at 99–100; E. Livrea, “Applicazioni della ‘Begriffsspaltung’ negli *Erga* (αἰδώς-θάρσος-νέμεσις-ζήλος),” *Helikon* 7 (1967) 81–100, at 84–85; N. J. Richardson, *The Iliad: A Commentary* VI (Oxford 1993) 281. For the view, which seems to me correct, that some or all of the lines in both the Homeric and Hesiodic contexts were adapted from preexisting proverbs, see T. A. Sinclair, “On αἰδώς in Hesiod,” *CR* 39 (1925) 147–148, and *Works* 35; Hoekstra 99–100; K. J. McKay, “Ambivalent αἰδώς in Hesiod,” *AJP* 84 (1963) 17–27 and 303; Livrea 83–85; West, *Commentary* 236–237; Cairns, *Aidōs* 149–150.

would of course prove counterproductive for a beggar and is therefore misplaced or false.⁹

A fundamental problem for this interpretation of Hesiod's *αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή*, however, is the simple improbability that Hesiod would offer, in the midst of a harangue insisting that work is the only secure means of avoiding hunger (299–316), advice about how to become a more effective beggar or that he would suggest that the impoverished should dispense with *αἰδώς*, the very sentiment likely to spur them to shed the humiliation of poverty in exchange for *ἀρετή* and *κῶδος* (312–313), preferably through hard work. The passage, moreover, goes on to warn against turning to criminal behavior as an escape from poverty (320–326), although that is hardly a course likely to be adopted by a man so paralyzed by what his neighbors think of him—that is, by an inappropriate sense of *αἰδώς*—that he cannot bring himself to ask for a handout. Indeed, Hesiod regards begging, living like the idle drones (303–306, cf. 394–404) off of the efforts of others, as not far removed from robbery. So this argument from “misplaced” or “false” *αἰδώς* runs up against the objection that Hesiod does not at all want Perses to turn to or succeed at begging.

A second explanation of *αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή* presupposes that Perses is a man of aristocratic birth but now down on his luck. Since Perses consequently disdains manual labor, such as would now be required to feed himself, as a shameful and humiliating affront to his birth, he prefers poverty, or even theft, to the labor that he scorns. Thus, a self-directed but completely inappropriate sense of *αἰδώς* prevents Perses from engaging in farm labor.¹⁰ Cairns, a proponent of this position,

⁹ For this interpretation see Sinclair, *CR* 39 (1925) 148, and *Works* 35; I. Sellschopp, *Stilistische Untersuchung zu Hesiod* (Hamburg 1934) 97–98; Hoekstra, *Mnemosyne* 3 (1950) 102–106; McKay, *AJP* 84 (1963) 19–24; Livrea, *Helikon* 7 (1967) 89–92; E. Valgiglio, “Interpretazioni esiodee,” *Maia* 21 (1969) 161–176, at 172–173; P. Walcot, *Greek Peasants, Ancient and Modern* (Manchester 1970) 60–65; Ricciardelli Apicella, *SMEA* 33 (1994) 140–144.

¹⁰ Both this and the preceding interpretation of 317 appear in the scholia

documents the feeling of *αἰδώς* experienced by those encountering a challenge to their status and *τιμῆ* generally, but he concedes that Homer and Hesiod provide no evidence that work was in itself regarded as degrading.¹¹ Certainly this interpretation gains no support from *Odyssey* 17.347. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, the village of Ascra is not characterized by such permanent or such deep status divisions that an aristocratic scorn of labor—or, for that matter, demotic deference toward a social elite—would suit it.¹² The use of the phrases *δῖον γένος* (299) and *δαίμονι δ' οἶος ἔησθα* (314) to support this position seems to me a case of explaining *obscurum per obscurius*. It appears, then, that there is adequate reason to doubt that an overstated, inappropriate sense of *αἰδώς*, whether directed outward so as to inhibit the confidence needed to beg for support, or self-directed, resulting in arrogant condescension toward labor, adequately explains Hesiod's *αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή*.

The phrase is problematic because *αἰδώς* is a virtue not only in *Works and Days* but continuously throughout the history of ancient Greek thought. Line 317 is, to be sure, very much at odds with the other attestations of *αἰδώς* in the poem. To posit

(schol. 317a and 317–318; Pertusi 107). For Perses as a déclassé aristocrat or at least as adopting an aristocratic hauteur see C. E. von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ und verwandte Begriffe in ihrer Entwicklung von Homer bis Demokrit* (*Philologus* Suppl. 30.2 [Leipzig 1937]) 48–49; Livrea, *Helikon* 7 (1967) 89–92 (*αἰδώς* due to poverty resulting from *αἰδώς* to engage in labor); Valgiglio, *Maia* 21 (1969) 169–171, 173; D. B. Claus, “Defining Moral Terms in *Works and Days*,” *TAPA* 107 (1977) 73–84, at 80–84; West, *Commentary* 236; Verdenius, *Commentary* 159; Cairns, *Aidōs* 150–151.

¹¹ This condescending view of labor arises in Greek culture at a later date: Cairns, *Aidōs* 150 n.9, citing F. Nussbaum, “Labour and Status in the *Works and Days*,” *CQ* 10 (1960) 213–220; see also C. B. Welles, “Hesiod’s Attitude towards Labor,” *GRBS* 8 (1967) 5–23, at 19–23. Euripides fr. 285.11–14 is the best evidence that can be mustered for this well-bred *αἰδώς* towards labor; see e.g. West, *Commentary* 236, and Verdenius, *Commentary* 159. Cairns 95–103 discusses *αἰδώς* as a reaction to an affront to one’s honor.

¹² A. T. Edwards, *Hesiod’s Ascra* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 2004) 99–101.

an excessive or misplaced *αἰδώς* alongside its familiar, positive form amounts, in effect, to splitting this moral concept much as *ἔρις* is famously divided between a good and a bad form at the outset of *Works and Days* (11–26).¹³ That *ἐλπίς*, for example, is an ambivalent concept is evident from the uncertainty dogging what to make of the fact that *ἐλπίς* alone remains behind in Pandora’s *πίθος* (96–101; see West, *Commentary* 169–170). Thus, when Hesiod claims *ἐλπίς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένον ἄνδρα κομίζει*, “a not-good hope tends to the indigent man” (500), one is prepared to accept that there is a bad or damaging form of “hope” to which the indigent are particularly susceptible—presumably the *κενεῖν ... ἐλπίδα* of 498. Of course, *ἐλπίς* is not a moral term or a virtue for Hesiod, and consequently to label it *οὐκ ἀγαθὴ* does not entail such a harsh contradiction as results when *αἰδώς* takes the place of *ἐλπίς* in the same line. *ἐλπίς*, moreover, like *ἔρις*, is not paired with an opposing concept as are so many of the poem’s other key terms: *δίκη* vs. *ὑβρις*, *ἔργον* vs. *ἀεργίη*, or *λιμός* vs. *Δημήτηρ (βίοςτος)*, for example.¹⁴ I wish to propose an understanding of *αἰδώς* in

¹³ It is broadly accepted in the scholarly literature that *αἰδώς* in *Works and Days* is to a greater or lesser degree a split or divided concept: Sinclair, *CR* 39 (1925) 148, and *Works* 35; Sellschopp, *Stilistische Untersuchung* 97–100; Livrea, *Helikon* 7 (1967) 93–98; Valgiglio, *Maia* 21 (1969) 171–177; Claus, *TAPA* 107 (1977) 80–84; Verdenius, *Commentary* 159 with n.593; Cairns, *Aidōs* 149–50 with n.6; Ricciardelli Apicella, *SMEA* 33 (1994) 140. Von Erffa, *AIAΩΣ* 48–49, and Hoekstra, *Mnemosyne* 3 (1950) 105–106, seem to me to beg the question through too free paraphrases of the lines. G. Broccia, *Tradizione ed esegesi. Studi su Esiodo e sulla lirica greca arcaica* (Brescia 1969) 41–61, and G. Arrighetti, “Ancora sullo sdoppiamento dei concetti etici in Esiodo,” *SCO* 19–20 (1970–1971) 297–301, both argue to qualify the degree to which *αἰδώς* and other moral terms experience such splitting in *Works and Days* and to distinguish them from *ἔρις*, for which this dialectical quality is emphatic and explicit.

¹⁴ Cf. e.g. 3–7. See A. T. Edwards, “The Ethical Geography of Hesiod’s *Works and Days*,” in M. Skempis and I. Ziogas (eds.), *Geography, Topography, Landscape: Aspects of Space and its Representation in Greek and Roman Epic* (Berlin forthcoming), on the role of opposites in *Works and Days*. Livrea, *Helikon* 7 (1967) 98, clarifies the distinction between opposites like *δίκη* and *ὑβρις* and

Works and Days 317–319 that is in line with the word's other attestations in the poem by locating it within such an explicit opposition.

2. *Works and Days* 317–319 in Context

Relying on Homer's testimony for our understanding of these lines from *Works and Days* has led us to split the concept of *αἰδώς* into positive and negative aspects. A different outcome is reached, however, if lines 317–319 are rigorously situated both within their immediate context in *Works and Days* as well as within the broader thematic oppositions of the poem as a whole. My examination of the passage will show that it is organized by a series of overlapping oppositions that locate lines 317–319 as a transitional passage within an overarching contrast between wealth won from labor and wealth gained from theft.

Lines 317–319 occur in a segment of *Works and Days* that runs from 293 to 335. The passage as a whole can be broken down into five sections—I 293–310, II 311–316, III 317–319, IV 320–326, and V 327–335—but I will focus on sections II–IV:¹⁵

II

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος.
εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ, τάχα σε ζηλώσει ἀεργὸς
πλουτεῦντα· πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ.
δαίμονι δ' οἶος ἔησθα, τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι ἄμεινον,
εἴ κεν ἀπ' ἀλλοτρίων κτεάνων ἀεσίφρονα θυμὸν
ἐς ἔργον τρέψας μελετᾶς βίου, ὡς σε κελεύω.

III

αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένον ἄνδρα κομίζει,
αἰδὼς, ἣ τ' ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεται ἧδ' ὀνίνησιν·

a split concept ('Begriffsspaltung', 'dialettizzazione') such as *αἰδώς* is claimed to exemplify.

¹⁵ See W. Nicolai, *Hesiods Erga. Beobachtungen zum Aufbau* (Heidelberg 1964) 69–71, with notes 120 and 124, regarding the boundaries between sections and sub-sections in the passage.

αἰδώς τοι πρὸς ἀνολβίῃ, θάρσος δὲ πρὸς ὄλβῳ.

IV

χρήματα δ' οὐχ ἀρπακτά, θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω·
 εἰ γάρ τις καὶ χερσὶ βίῃ μέγαν ὄλβον ἔληται,
 ἢ ὅ γ' ἀπὸ γλώσσης λήισσεται, οἷά τε πολλὰ
 γίνεται, εὖτ' ἂν δὴ κέρδος νόον ἐξαπατήσῃ
 ἀνθρώπων, αἰδῶ δέ τ' ἀναιδείῃ κατοπάξῃ,
 ῥεῖα δέ μιν μαυροῦσι θεοί, μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκον
 ἀνέρι τῷ, παῦρον δέ τ' ἐπὶ χρόνον ὄλβος ὀπηδεῖ.

II

Work is no reproach; no work is a reproach.
 If you get to work, soon your workless neighbor will envy you
 as you grow rich: excellence and prestige attend wealth.
 Regardless of your luck, working is better,
 if, turning your wayward mind from the possessions of others
 to your own work, you attend to your livelihood, as I advise you.

III

A not-good *αἰδώς* tends to the indigent man;
αἰδώς, which greatly harms and benefits men;
αἰδώς before poverty, confidence before wealth.

IV

Property must not be stolen; what is god-given is better by far.
 For if someone seizes great wealth by force of hand
 or steals it with his tongue, such as often
 occurs whenever greed deceives the prudence
 of men and shamelessness overthrows *αἰδώς*,
 the gods easily cause such a man to dwindle, they diminish
 his house,
 and his wealth abides for but a brief time.

Section I, introducing the passage, announces that work will bring Perses the hatred of *Λιμός* and the love of Demeter in the form of a full grainery (299–301). *Λιμός* is developed in terms of the *νέμεσις* directed at the *ἀεργός* (cf. *στυγέουσιν ἀεργούς*, 310) and through the simile of the slothful drones who eat the livelihood of the industrious bees (302–306), introducing the theme of indolence and prosperity through theft. The Demeter branch of the opening contrast at 299–301 is then filled out by the promise of wealth and the favor of gods and men for those

who work (306–310). This opening section presents a series of opposed terms: indolence and theft vs. work, blame vs. admiration, and hunger vs. prosperity.

Section II asserts that work is the source of prosperity (πλουτεῦντα· πλούτῳ) and a good reputation (οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ζηλώσει, ἀρετῇ καὶ κῦδος) but that shiftlessness is a source of blame (ὄνειδος, cf. νεμεσῶσι at 303 and στυγέουσιν at 310). The conditional clause of 315–316 restates and amplifies the opposition of ἔργον and ἀεργίη from 311 by opposing work, ἔργον and βίου, to the possessions of others (ἀλλοτρίων κτεάνων), which of course implies theft, reverting to the simile of the idle drones feasting on the toil of others (304–306). Moreover, the comparative ἄμεινον in τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι ἄμεινον presupposes shiftlessness as the missing term of comparison—working is better than not working. The elements of toil, reputation, and wealth line up against shiftlessness, disrepute, and the possessions of others. The possessions of others are condemned as an alternative to wealth from one's own labor. This system of oppositions repeats that of the preceding lines and echoes lines 11–41 presenting the twin ἔριδες, for which the “possessions of others” (κτῆμσ' ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις, 34) invoke false-swearing and judicial theft.

As my goal at this point is to clarify the context of lines 317–319, I will postpone discussion of those lines themselves and turn to the lines immediately following, 320–326. From section IV's opening contrast of ἀρπακτά and θεόσδοτα it is the first term, ἀρπακτά, that Hesiod selects for detailed development. If θεόσδοτα names the wealth that comes from toil (reverting to 299–301, 306–310 in section I and 311–313, 316 in section II), then ἀρπακτά resumes the theme of the idle drones (304–305) and of ἀλλοτρίων κτεάνων (315) that tempt the ἀεργός (311–312) in spite of Hesiod's advice.¹⁶ ἀρπακτά is in turn subdivided between the contrasting modes of theft through force and theft through false swearing (321–322), the thematically salient form

¹⁶ The identity in Hesiod's mind of what is gotten through labor with what is granted by god (θεόσδοτα) is evident in lines 299–310.

of theft for *Works and Days*.¹⁷ When κέρδος overrules νόον and ἀναιδείη overrules αἰδῶ, then wealth is sought through theft (ἄρπακτά) rather than labor (θεόσδοτα). Even though αἰδώς, restraint and fear of public rebuke (cf. νεμεσῶσι, 303, and ὄνειδος, 311), ought to forestall such behavior, the attraction of prosperity through theft can nevertheless often overwhelm it along with a livelihood won through labor.¹⁸ In the final section (327–335) the theme of ἄρπακτά loses focus as Hesiod continues to catalogue various crimes, closing with another warning against Zeus' retribution and another direct appeal to Perses. Each of sections I through IV repeats the contrast of work with theft. Within, however, the larger frame of the entire passage, sections II and IV contrast respectively as an exhortation to work and a warning against theft.

It is certainly noteworthy that the account of the good ἔρις (17–26) and the following appeal to Perses to flee the wicked ἔρις (27–41) exhibit clear thematic links with sections II (311–316) and IV (320–326) respectively of our passage. Lines 20–26 in particular contrast the idle man with his diligent neighbor who keeps to his plowing and planting in his quest for wealth, the one envying and striving to rival the other. Lines 312–313 compress this same drama of work bringing wealth that the shiftless man then wishes to match.¹⁹ Similarly in lines 27–41

¹⁷ Perses' threatened litigation (27–41) establishes the theme of false swearing and judicial theft, which I discuss in Edwards, "The Ethical Geography."

¹⁸ αἰδώς is closely linked to νέμεσις, for which ὄνειδος is arguably a synonym (see n.6 above).

¹⁹ The two passages exhibit significant verbal echoes: cf. ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων / εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ' (23–24) to τάχα σε ζηλώσει ἀεργὸς / πλουτεῦντα (312–313); ἔργοιο χατίζων (21) to ἀεργὸς (312); πλούσιον (22) to πλουτεῦντα· πλούτῳ (313). Additionally, the phrase ἀπ' ἔργου θυμὸν ἐρύκοι (28) inverts θυμὸν / ἐς ἔργον τρέψας in section I (315–316); κτήμασ' ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις (34) inverts in context the sense of ἀπ' ἀλλοτρίων κτεάνων (315); cf. ἄλλα τε πολλὰ / ἄρπάζων (37–38) to χρήματα δ' οὐχ ἄρπακτά (320); ἐκ Διὸς εἰσιν ἄρισταί (36) to θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω (320); and βίος (31) to βίου (316).

toil and livelihood contrast with the possessions of others that are sought through courtroom swindling in opposition to Zeus much as they do in lines 315–316 of section II and 320–326 of section IV. Hesiod's divided ἔρις, moreover, would seem to stand in the same relation to this contrast in lines 11–41 as does αἰδώς in 293–335

Lines 317–319 are firmly set within this fundamental conflict of the poem, that between prosperity through work and prosperity through theft. This contrast, in fact, finds its most concentrated expression, at least within the passages under examination, in lines 315–316 in section II: εἴ κεν ἀπ' ἀλλοτριῶν κτεάνων ἀεσίφρονα θυμὸν / ἐς ἔργον τρέψας μελετᾶς βίου, ὡς σε κελεύω, “if, turning your wayward mind from the possessions of others / to your own work, you attend to your livelihood, as I advise you.” The contrast of ἀλλοτριῶν κτεάνων with ἔργον and βίου in these lines seems to offer an excellent transition from the preceding focus upon prosperity through work of section II to that of prosperity through theft taken up in section IV. From this perspective section III, lines 317–319, appears actually to interrupt the movement from section II into IV, suggesting that the passage as a whole would do well enough without them. But, setting this problem aside, αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή, at least understood as inappropriate or misplaced αἰδώς, cannot in any case suffice as the patron deity of theft and false oaths, the topic developed in lines 320–326 immediately following, the domain of the wicked ἔρις. The notion of a split or divided concept seems an inadequate explanation of the relationship between αἰδώς and the oppositions within which it is so prominently placed.

3. Paths out of Poverty

The rhetorical goal that *Works and Days* announces for itself in its introductory section is to persuade Perses to abandon the life of the wicked ἔρις for that governed by the good ἔρις. Wickedness must, however, possess some attraction since there would otherwise be no need for *Works and Days*. Hesiod acknowledges the appeal of the wrong choice in his description of the paths of κακότης and of ἀρετή (287–292):

τὴν μὲν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
 ῥηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει·
 τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάρουθεν ἔθηκαν
 ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν
 καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,
 ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ εὐῶσα.

For there is wickedness in abundance to pick
 easily: its approach is smooth and it certainly lies nearby.
 But the immortal gods have placed sweat in front of virtue:
 long and steep is the path to it
 and rough at first; but when one reaches the top,
 thereafter it becomes easy even though it is tough.

Much as *κακότης* sums up the values covered by the wicked
ἔρις, *ἀρετή* comprehends the positive terms associated with the
 good *ἔρις*.²⁰ The path of wickedness lies near at hand, makes
 for light traveling, and consequently is an easy choice. The
 road towards *ἀρετή*, not surprisingly, is the opposite: it takes
 effort to reach and it is long, steep, and rough, though once you
 reach the peak it becomes easy to follow.

This allegory illuminates Hesiod's later description of the
 counsel the idler takes with himself as he suffers the hardships
 of poverty (498–501):

πολλὰ δ' ἀεργὸς ἀνὴρ, κενεὴν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδα μίμνων,
 χρηίζων βιότοιο, κακὰ προσελέξατο θυμῷ.
 ἐλπίς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένον ἄνδρα κομίζει,
 ἥμενον ἐν λέσχῃ, τῷ μὴ βίος ἄρκιος εἶη.

The workless man, marking time in empty hope,
 needing a livelihood, deliberates many evils in his heart.
 A not-good hope tends to the indigent man,
 idling in conversation, who lacks enough to live on.

In this passage, with its echo of line 317, Hesiod pictures the
 slacker (496–497) whom idle hopes have steered into starva-

²⁰ I discuss *Works and Days* as a persuasive appeal in Edwards, *Ascrea* 176–184; see 91–92, 111–112, for discussion of lines 287–292. Cf. lines 213–218, where the choice between *ὑβρις* and *δίκη* is similarly envisioned as a road.

tion. In his state of want he commences deliberating evils in his heart (*κακὰ προσελέξατο θυμῶ*), contemplating, it seems likely, the path of *κακότης* as an exit from his troubles. For *Works and Days* the salient form that wickedness takes is the courtroom swindling that brings retribution and ruin hot on its heels.²¹ Hesiod would not repeatedly caution against such behavior if he considered it an easy task to turn Perses from its temptations. The alluring path of *κακότης* and the wicked scheming of the indigent place us back in the territory of the idle drones who feast on the toil of others since shiftlessness has made hunger their companion (302–306).

As I have noted, *νέμεσις* can be characterized as blame justifiably directed against those whose behavior exhibits a lack of *αἰδώς*. Since *αἰδώς* as a moral term designates not only the restraint exercised over behavior in order to avoid such censure but also the feeling of embarrassment or humiliation experienced in the face of explicit *νέμεσις*, implicit in the use of *νέμεσις* is the conviction that if its object felt no restraining *αἰδώς* in advance of some transgression, he should be made to experience it after the fact through public condemnation. The assertions, therefore, that *τῶ δὲ θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἄνδρες ὅς κεν ἀεργὸς / ζῶη*, “Gods and men feel *νέμεσις* for that man who lives workless” (303–304), likening the idler to the “workless drones” who eat the toil of the bees (304–306), and that *ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος*, “no work is a reproach” (311), presuppose that the shiftless violate *αἰδώς* through their indolence and consequent dependence on others. This offense leaves such individuals liable to *νέμεσις* and *ὄνειδος* intended to correct their behavior by provoking a reaction of *αἰδώς*, much as Hesiod hopes to correct that of Perses through the appeal of *Works and Days* itself. Conversely, wealth in *Works and Days* attracts prestige and envy: *εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ, τάχα σε ζηλώσει ἀεργὸς / πλουτεῦντα· πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ*, “If you get to

²¹ I discuss line 499 and the topos that the profits of crime are temporary (89, 213–218, 265–266, 320–326, 333–334, 352, 356–362, 760–764) in Edwards, “The Ethical Geography.”

work, soon your workless neighbor will envy you / as you grow rich; excellence and prestige attend wealth” (312–313).²² As if the physical pain of hunger were not in itself enough of a motive to evade poverty, Hesiod acknowledges equally the social hardship of disgrace, the experience of *αἰδώς* in public, as an incentive to repair one’s fortunes and to seek the approval that prosperity attracts.

If *νέμεσις* and *αἰδώς* can serve to spur the shiftless to escape poverty, there is nevertheless, as the passages just discussed indicate, a right way and a wrong way to achieve prosperity. Hesiod so consistently opposes *αἰδώς* to the crime of false swearing in *Works and Days* because that is one of the two paths he specifically identifies for escaping poverty. The options of prosperity through work and prosperity through judicial theft that appear in 11–41 and in the contrast of section II (311–316) with section IV (320–326) acknowledge the risk that the shiftless, experiencing both *λιμός* and *νέμεσις*, might prefer the easier path of *κακότης* to that of *ἀρετή*, that is, not the path ruled by *αἰδώς* but that commended by *ἀναιδείη* as a way out of poverty and disgrace. If *αἰδώς* is indeed a motive for escaping the shame of poverty, then *Works and Days* confronts the paradox that *αἰδώς* can stir the indigent either to work or to theft, that is, to the path of *αἰδώς* itself and to the opposite path of *ἀναιδείη*.²³ In a discussion of the destructive quarrel that erupts between Agamemnon and Achilles in *Iliad* 1, Cairns comments on the courses of action open to both: “Two kinds of response are thus envisaged: one of self-control and one of self-assertion—one of regard for the *timē* of others, one of regard for one’s own. *Aidōs* moreover, may be part of both responses, *aidōs* for one’s *philoī* and superiors on the one hand, and *aidōs* at the prospect of humiliation resulting from the failure to avenge

²² Cf. 21–24, 477–482; see Edwards, *Asora* 91–92.

²³ In actual usage *νέμεσις* and *αἰδώς* exhibit a certain amount of overlap in regard to the blame offered and the humiliation experienced in a given setting. See Cairns, *Aidōs* 83–87, and Ricciardelli Apicella, *SMEA* 33 (1994) 131–135.

the affront on the other ... Obviously, the two responses conflict.”²⁴

4. αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή

If αἰδώς parallels ἔρις in embarking individuals upon either the course of justice or that of ὕβρις, is it, like ἔρις, a divided concept or does it function as one half of an explicit pair of opposites? The expression οὐκ ἀγαθή is an example of litotes, a figure that appears not uncommonly in Hesiod and in Homer. Speaking, for example, of the goddess Δίκη, Hesiod complains that ἄνδρες ... / δωροφάγοι have dispensed her οὐκ ἰθεῖαν (220–224), that is, they have dispensed crooked justice, the σκολιῆς δὲ δίκης of 221 (cf. 219). Again, a woman who is οὐ γαμετήν is κτητήν (406), a matter that is οὐ δῆμιος is ἰδίη (*Od.* 3.82), and Charybdis is οὐ θνητή, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατον κακόν (*Od.* 12.118). Likewise the assertion that ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος (311) amounts within the logic of the passage to identifying ἔργον as the opposite of ὄνειδος, namely, the source of ἀρετή καὶ κῦδος (313). In these examples the specific adjective or noun negated must be interpreted as meaning its opposite. To cite a final illustration, as Odysseus tests Laertes in the last book of the *Odyssey*, he says to the old man: αὐτόν σ' οὐκ ἀγαθή κομιδὴ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἅμα γῆρας / λυγρὸν ἔχεις αὐχμείς τε κακῶς καὶ ἀεικέα ἔσσαι, “not-good provisioning sustains you; rather you’ve reached a miserable old age, you’re ill-washed, and you’re disgracefully clothed” (24.249–250). In this passage, however, it is not ἀγαθή itself that is negated but rather the noun, κομιδὴ, modified by οὐκ ἀγαθή, that is glossed by oppos-

²⁴ Cairns, *Aidōs* 100. In connection with *Works and Days* it appears significant that Achilles reacts to Agamemnon’s appropriation of Briseis not only with an accusation of shiftlessness (ἀεργός: *Il.* 1.226–228, 9.320), while stressing his own toil on behalf of the army (1.161–168, 9.321–329), but also of ἀναιδείη (1.149, 158, 9.372) and in effect theft (1.229–231, 9.334–336). Agamemnon may therefore parallel Perses as an example of an individual faced with disgrace who is driven by αἰδώς onto the path of ἀναιδείη as the easiest remedy to his loss of face. I am indebted to Leslie L. Collins for this example.

ing terms—*γήρας λυγρόν, ἀχμεις ... κακῶς*, and *ἄεικέα ἔσσαι. οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κομιδὴ* goes beyond “bad (not good) treatment” to be restated as “miserable old age,” “ill washed,” and “disgracefully clothed.”²⁵

These examples clearly suggest that *αἰδῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ* at 317 should be understood to mean the opposite of *αἰδῶς*, that is, *ἀναιδείη*. The appearance of the litotes *αἰδῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ* in 317 thus anticipates and prepares for the explicit opposition of *αἰδῶς* and *ἀναιδείη* in line 324 in section IV's elaboration of theft with the tongue. Similarly, the only other attestation of *ἀναιδείη* in *Works and Days* occurs precisely in a contrast between giving willingly and stealing, describing the latter *ὅς δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλθται ἀναιδείηφι πιθήσας*, “whoever takes on his own, trusting in shamelessness” (359).²⁶ The transition from prosperity through work to prosperity through theft is introduced in the closing lines of section II (315–316), where Hesiod invites Perses to turn his attention from the possessions of others to his own farm and livelihood. This warning against theft in these lines that introduce the phrase *αἰδῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ* suggests again that it should be understood to mean *ἀναιδείη*.

To return briefly to section II, lines 311–313 oppose work and prosperity to shiftlessness and blame (*ὄνειδος*) while 314–316 oppose work and prosperity to shiftlessness and the possessions of others (*ἀπ' ἀλλοτρίων κτεάνων*). Blame ought to provoke the feelings of *αἰδῶς* that inspire the indolent to turn to

²⁵ Cf. Theognis 408, where *γνώμης οὐκ ἀγαθῆς* lends itself to interpretation as *ἀγνωμοσύνη* (as at 895–896), especially in the context of 405–406. Hesiod's fondness for such periphrases is also evident in the use of *χειροδίκαι* (189) and *δίκη δ' ἐν χερσὶ* (192) to express the opposite of *δίκη*, that is, *ὑβρις* (191).

²⁶ This passage exhibits lexical and thematic links to section IV (320–326): *ἄρπαξ* (356) and *ἄρπακτά* (320), *δότειρα* (356) and *θεόσδοτα* (320), *ἀγαθὴ* (356) and *ἀμείνω* (320). The phrases *θανάτοιο δότειρα* (356) and *τό γ' ἐπάχνωσεν φίλον ἦτορ* (360) arguably parallel the warning at 325–326 that the gods cause the house of the thief to waste away and ill-gotten gains soon vanish.

labor and rise into prosperity. But the shift between blame in 311 and the possessions of others in 315 acknowledges that blame and humiliation might place a Perses not onto the path of ἀρετή but onto the path of κακότης. As a buttress, then, to his advice not to go down this road (ὥς σε κελεύω), Hesiod addresses in 317–319 precisely this risk that αἰδώς, the very sentiment that ought to forestall criminal behavior, could misfire in this way, that criticism of the ἀεργός and the shame he consequently feels could push him in the direction of theft rather than towards the socially sanctioned pursuit of labor.

The subsequent three-line meditation on αἰδώς (317–319) exhibits a modulated trajectory from the socially destructive vice of ἀναιδείη to the virtue of αἰδώς, which, as 192–201 attest in their treatment of αἰδώς, is essential to life in a community. αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή, that is, shamelessness, ἀναιδείη, tends to the needy man. Line 317 states as a general law the risk that Hesiod has just alluded to in 315–316, that the indigent may out of shameful desperation attempt to improve their fortunes by stealing (cf. 498–501, quoted 13 above), the activity with which ἀναιδείη is consistently associated in *Works and Days* (324, 359). The next line, αἰδώς, ἣ τ' ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεταί ἡδ' ὀνίνησιν, “αἰδώς, which greatly harms and benefits men,” though it depends for its meaning entirely upon the interpretation of the phrase αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή in 317, is perhaps the most difficult of the three lines since it requires that αἰδώς itself, the desire to flee opprobrium, can cause harm. According to the proposed interpretation, the line provides an explanation of 317 by acknowledging that αἰδώς can indeed, perverse as it may seem, damage men by leading them onto the path of ἀναιδείη, stealing what belongs to others, as much as it can benefit them by pointing them on the way to ἀρετή and κῦδος as the rewards of their own labor. In 319, αἰδώς τοι πρὸς ἀνολβίη, θάρσος δὲ πρὸς ὄλβω, “αἰδώς before poverty, confidence before wealth,” Hesiod works his way out of the paradox that αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή comprises by placing αἰδώς in an explicit opposition, in fact in a double antithesis, that both attests to the concept's own coherence and integrity and re-

integrates it with section II's themes of prosperity, reputation, and toil. *αἰδώς* is opposed to *θάρσος*, disentangling it both from the litotes of 317 and from its opposite, *ἀναιδείη*.²⁷ That is, *αἰδώς* in 319 names that same sentiment that it does elsewhere in *Works and Days*, the feeling of humiliation before failure provoked by *νέμεσις*, or *ὄνειδος*, that functions as a goad to bring one's behavior and aspirations in line with accepted norms. Line 319 invites the *ἀεργός* to exchange the humiliation (*αἰδώς*) and blame of impoverished indolence for the confident prosperity that labor provides.

After 319 Hesiod proceeds to reinforce his point about the proper role of *αἰδώς* by returning in section IV to the dangers of *ἀλλοτρίων κτεάνων* (315), which triggered his three-line excursus on *αἰδώς* to begin with. The theme of *αἰδώς* reaches its conclusion in line 324 with the explicit opposition between *αἰδώς* and *ἀναιδείη*. *αἰδώς*, supplanted in 324 by *ἀναιδείη*, gets the worst of this confrontation here just as it does in lines 192–201, when the goddesses *Αἰδώς* and *Νέμεσις* flee mankind's unjust behavior, but its autonomy as a virtue in opposition to its vicious opposite has been reestablished along with the moral ascendancy of labor over theft.

This interpretation of *αἰδώς* δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή as *ἀναιδείη* draws *αἰδώς* into the system of oppositions announced in the introductory passage at 11–41 as well as in the immediated context

²⁷ I.e., *θάρσος* is the feeling of confidence resulting from his prosperity for the man of *ἀρετή* and *κῦδος*; cf. *γηθήσειν* at 476 as parallel to *θάρσος* here: *καί σε ἔολπα / γηθήσειν βιότου αἰρέυμενον ἔνδον ἑόντος*. For Homer *θάρσος* is a good quality almost without exception. *θάρσος* in 319 has, however, been regarded as a vice, for the most part the arrogance typical of a wealthy aristocrat, by Sellschopp, *Stilistische Untersuchung* 97–98; von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ* 48–49; Hoekstra, *Mnemosyne* 3 (1950) 102–105; and West, *Commentary* 237. Contra, see Wilamowitz, *Hesiodos Erga* 79; McKay, *AJP* 84 (1963) 20–22, 26–27; Walcot, *Greek Peasants* 60–61; and Claus, *TAPA* 107 (1977) 83–84. Livrea, *Helikon* 7 (1967) 89–92, sees *θάρσος* as either vice or virtue depending on class perspective, and Valgiglio, *Maia* 21 (1969) 169–173, and Cairns *Aidōs*, 150–151, view it as a virtue in 319 but with negative potential that is elaborated in 320 ff.

at 293–335. Dispensing with the explanation from “misplaced” or “false” *αἰδώς* relieves Hesiod of the improbable burden of instructing Perses to forget about *αἰδώς* in order to succeed as a beggar. Nor must we resort to the anachronisms of an aristocratic aversion to work or a steeply stratified Ascra to account for Perses’ work-shy behavior. By this account, moreover, *αἰδώς* does resemble *ἔρις* both in mediating between the options of prosperity through work and prosperity through theft and in playing its paradoxical role as an impulse towards both work and, perversely, theft. Notwithstanding this functional equivalence between *αἰδώς* and *ἔρις* in *Works and Days*, the two are not at all similar in their meanings, nor can *ἔρις* approach the importance of *αἰδώς* in the history of Greek ethical thought. *αἰδώς* stands between the two forms of *ἔρις*, one that of the courtroom and its crooked judgments, the other that of the farm with its store of Demeter’s grain, to guide loafers onto the better path to prosperity. But those who choose the other course, preferring to scheme against the prosperity of others, even though they perhaps flee poverty out of a sense of shame, nevertheless embark on a course of shamelessness, *ἀναιδείη*. If the phrase is understood in this way, finally, lines 317–319 no longer interrupt the movement from the topic of prosperity through work to that of prosperity through theft but facilitate it by providing a clarification of the mechanism common to the two opposed paths out of poverty, the good and the not-good.²⁸

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