A Pragmatic and Sociolinguistic Account of δαιμόνιε in Early Greek Epic

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THE ADDRESS FORM δαιμόνιε is not particularly common in early Greek epic (hereafter *epic*),[1] with thirteen occurrences in the *Iliad*, nine in the *Odyssey*, and two in Hesiod and in the *Hymns*.[2] The range of contexts in which δαιμόνιε is found, along with the range of speakers and addressees, has resulted in a bewildering range of interpretive stances.[3] Attempts at defining the term have resulted in either chaotic polysemy or vagueness. Wendel states "within the same work it can express now blame, now admiration, now gravity, now astonishment, now contempt, now friendship."[4] Brunius-Nilsson found similar "complete contrasts" but nevertheless defended a unified semantics wherein it has an essential, neutral meaning which:

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[1] G. Hutchinson, "Deflected Addresses: Apostrophe and Space (Sophocles, Aeschines, Plautus, Cicero, Virgil and Others)," *CQ* 60 (2010) 96–109, at 98, prefers the term *ancient hexameter narrative* to distinguish Homeric texts (and the *Aspis*) from didaxis and lyric.

[2] E. Dickey, *Greek Forms of Address from Herodotus to Lucian* (Oxford 1996) 141–142, notes that the vocative of δαιμόνιος predates its referential use, first found in Pindar. See also E. Brunius-Nilsson, *Δαιμόνιε, An Inquiry into a Mode of Apostrophe in Old Greek Literature* (Uppsala 1955) 5 and 139.

[3] Brunius-Nilsson, *Δαιμόνιε* 6, herself notes "the confusion which exists as far as this word is concerned is apparent from the fact that the interpretations of one and the same passage by different scholars, even in quite recent years, can vary between such extremes."

[4] T. Wendel, *Die Gesprächsanrede im griechischen Epos und Drama der Blütezeit* (Stuttgart 1929) 108. B. Mader, *LfgE* 10 (1982) 197–198, if differing in specifics, assigns a similarly wide range of meanings to δαιμόνιε.

expresses intensity, force—a force of the kind realized by a
speaker using the name of the person addressed … (by) creating
this intimate atmosphere and obliging the person addressed to
co-operate.[5]

This description suggests that, in epic, the use of δαιμόνιε does
not reflect a lexical meaning (*possessed by a daimon*, vel sim.), [6] but
social constraints (*intimacy*, *force*) and discourse strategies (*oblig-
ing*, *naming*). Mader similarly observes social constraints on the
use of the term, specifically that δαιμόνιε regularly opens a
speech that reacts to, rather than initiates, discourse.[7] Brunius-
Nilsson's insight was that δαιμόνιε did not correspond to any
consistent evaluation of an addressee, but reflected the context
in which it appeared, which she took to be *intimate*. The ques-
tion is how to determine whether δαιμόνιε actually functions in
this way. Brunius-Nilsson's study omits a systematic examina-
tion of the social relationships involved—surprising given the
social nature of her definition. Instead, she proceeds more or
less ad hoc, which, Dickey notes, results in great difficulties.[8]
Wendel's, Mader's, and Brunius-Nilsson's attempts to explain
δαιμόνιε in epic met with mixed results for two related reasons:
they failed to account for a distinction between lexical meaning
and pragmatic or functional meaning, and they conflated
grammatical function with discourse function.

In this paper I attempt to define a prototypical usage for
δαιμόνιε across the 26 instances of the term in Homer, Hesiod,
and the Hymns, by correlating the social and interpersonal
relationships of the various interactants with features of the

[5] Brunius-Nilsson, *Δαιμόνιε* 146.

[6] A. Sihler, *Language History: An Introduction* (Philidelphia 2000) 131, sums
up the problem with previous, etymologically based interpretations: "it can-
not be overemphasized that a word's etymology is not its meaning. And
emphasis is called for, here: the *etymological fallacy* is immemorial and shows
no signs of exhaustion."

[7] Mader, *LfgE* 10 (1982) 198; his exceptions: *Il.* 9.40, 13.448, 24.194, on
which see below ad loc.

[8] Dickey, *Greek Forms of Address* 141.

particular contexts in which the term is used. In this way it will be possible to note any patterns of usage (or their absence) and isolate any instances that deviate from that pattern. The ascription of qualities such as *familiarity* or *intimacy* to occurrences of δαιμόνιε, as commentators have suggested,[9] should correspond, by and large, to a pattern of social relations within self-identified social units such as the immediate family, οἶκος, φῦλον, φρήτηρ, etc. In general, the results of this study do reveal a correlation between the use of δαιμόνε and *familiarity* so defined, but also a pattern of use by speakers in positions of authority. Neither of these tendencies is absolute, and the exceptions suggest that the speakers' emotional states were an important factor as well.

1. The Vocative, Formal versus Functional Categories

One of the problems in Wendel's and Brunius-Nilsson's studies arises from their assumption that vocative noun phrases (NPs) refer or denote in the way that other case forms do. Certain facts about the vocative argue, however, that this is not the case. (1) Vocative NPs are asyntactic; they cannot function as verbal arguments and so do not enter into syntactic relations to form larger propositions, nor can they affect the truth-conditionality of such propositions (cf. [*John,*] *there's a spider on your back*). Brown and Yule distinguish between *transactional* (content expressing) and the *interactional* (context expressing) functions, according to which vocatives serve primarily interactional functions.[10] (2) Like *interjections*, vocative NPs typically appear non-elliptically as a single, complete utterance, distinguished as a separate intonational unit.[11] Interjections serve primarily to in-

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[9] Brunius-Nilsson, *Δαιμόνιε* 13–14; J. T. Hooker, *Homer Iliad III* (Bristol 1980) 263–264; N. Richardson, *The Iliad: A Commentary* VI (Cambridge 1985) 294.

[10] G. Brown and G. Yule, *Discourse Analysis* (Cambridge 1983) 1.

[11] On the position of vocatives in Greek see E. Fraenkel, *Noch Einmal, Kolon und Satz* (Munich 1965), esp. 70–71. Fraenkel omits epic from his study.

dicate changes in the "speaker's current mental state" (e.g., *wow!*, *damn!*, *mehercule!*),[12] and often develop from other word classes, including, vocative NPs (e.g., *oh my God!*, *man!*, *Great-Caesar's-ghost!*). (3) Like *discourse particles*,[13] vocatives play a role in the on-going organization of discourse, by regulating relations between interactants, including conversational turn-taking and topic management.[14] In general, there is considerable overlap between these categories. (4) A wider range of NPs can be used in the vocative than are used to refer to an individual, suggesting that the vocative does not function solely, or even primarily, to identify the addressee.

1.a: Social relations and speech

Humans employ a wide range of social categories to organize their experience: *sameness* and *difference*; distinctions in *age*, *gender*, *relatedness*, *class*; ascriptions of *friendliness*, etc. Within a specific relationship (a *dyad*), one individual is usually viewed as more important, influential, etc.[15] These categories are generally

[12] A. Wierzbicka, "The Semantics of Interjection," *Journal of Pragmatics* 18 (1992) 159–192, at 164.

[13] F. Ameka, "Interjections, the Universal yet Neglected Part of Speech," *Journal of Pragmatics* 18 (1992) 101–118, at 102, distinguishes between the formal word class *interjection* and the utterance type *exclamation*, assigning to the latter expressions of the speaker's *mental state*. On the distinction between *particles* and *interjections* see M. Mosegaard Hansen, *The Function of Discourse Particles* (Philadelphia 1998) 38–41, and Ameka 105–111. The term *particle* is most commonly used as a formal category referring to (usually) small, invariant terms that do not belong to one of the canonical word classes; also referred to as *function words*. These include conjunctions, negations, modal particles (such as ἄν), topic-focus particles (δέ, μέν), and illocutionary particles (ἄρ, γε, μέν, δή).

[14] M. McCarthy and A. O'Keefe, " 'What's in a Name?': Vocatives in Casual Conversation and Radio Phone-in Calls," in P. Leistyna and C. Meyer (eds.), *Corpus Analysis: Language Structure and Language Use* (Amsterdam 2003) 154–185, at 160–165.

[15] R. J. Watts, *Politeness* (Cambridge 2003) 155, defines power as the ability to change "the value and/or structure of (social) network links" within an ongoing interaction.

scalar, and so the social relationships that they define are hierarchical on multiple levels.[16] Social structures may be conventionalized, as in a *caste* system or involving conventional roles such as *policeman*, or they may be situational, as in asking for directions, or they may involve some combinationof these. Although individuals continuously construct or reconstruct the social structures within which they operate, they often perceive them to be preexisting and static.[17]

Language is crucial for organizing these social structures, and the communication of information is often secondary to managing behavior and social relationships. Saville-Troike defines three basic social functions for language: *separating*, *unifying*, and *stratifying*, all of which are organizational.[18] Since language use reflects and organizes the social world, the hierarchical nature of that world should be reflected in language.[19] Speakers' language, in fact, varies, often quite dramatically, according to the specific social relations,[20] and the facility with which speakers switch between registers emphasizes the importance they place on the social role of language perception and suitability.

[16] P. Eckert, *Linguistic Variation as Social Practice* (Malden 2000) 41–45, argues that identity construction involves the manipulation of a cluster of parameters that contribute to the display of a social identity.

[17] The relationship between individual praxis and social norms assumed here reflects Bourdieu's term *habitus* in which social structures are internalized through socialization and then reenacted, often unconsciously: P. Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford 1990) 52.

[18] M. Saville-Troike, *The Ethnography of Communication*[3] (Malden 2003) 15.

[19] Cf. M. Locher, "Polite Behavior within Relational Work: The Discursive Approach to Politeness," *Multilingua* 25 (2006) 249–267: "people are social beings who use language not only to communicate facts but also to shape their identities vis-à-vis their interactional partners" (250).

[20] See M. A. K. Haliday and R. Hasen, *Cohesion in English* (Longman 1976). Such variation is usually referred to as *register*, and involves shifts not only in lexicon but in grammar and pronunciation as well. On the distinction between *dialect* and *register* see R. Hudson, *Sociolinguistics*[2] (Cambridge 1996) 45–54.

1.b: Sociolinguistics, *status*, and *familiarity*

Two basic metrics define the social relationships of individuals:[21] (1) *Status* refers to notions of *importance*, *position*, *rank*, etc., and reflects the fact that some individual claims more ability, control, or agency, in some given relevant context. In defining *status*, Saville-Troike distinguishes two aspects: *power* and *prestige*.[22] Ervin-Tripp, O'Connor, and Rosenberg represent the first as the "ability to get compliance" and the second as the ability to receive deference but not have to show it.[23] *Power* reflects the control of resources such as physical ability, wealth, charisma, etc.; *prestige* reflects the acceptability of images associated with age, gender, class, etc.[24] (2) *Familiarity* refers to the degree to which individuals perceive themselves to share a common social identity, and common experiences and knowledge.

Homeric social relations are informed by differences in *status* and *familiarity* which, while not arbitrary, are also not fixed. Nestor, in fact, expresses the importance of *status* at *Il.* 1.280–281, distinguishing the two aspects discussed by Saville-Troike

[21] On the concepts of *familiarity*, *solidarity*, *status*, and *power* see for example Hudson, *Sociolinguistics* 122–127. R. Brown and A. Gilman, "The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity," in T. A. Sebeok (ed.), *Style in Language* (London 1960) 253–276, are responsible for the specific terms *power* and *solidarity*. Watts's criticism of Brown and Levinson's use of scalar parameters such as *social distance* (i.e., *solidarity*) reflects his concerns about assumptions of a rational, deliberate individual, not with the parameter itself: Watts, *Politeness* 68–69, on P. Brown and S. Levinson, *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage* (Cambridge 1987). Bourdieu's notion of the *habitus* can account for the effects of this parameter, and eliminates the need for a constantly aware, rational, and deliberative individual calculating values for these parameters *ad hoc*: Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* 57–61.

[22] Saville-Troike, *Ethnography* 72.

[23] S. M. Ervin-Tripp, M. C. O'Connor, J. Rosenberg, "Language and Power in the Family," in M. Schulz and C. Kramerae (eds.), *Language and Power* (Belmont 1984) 116–135, at 117–118.

[24] Watts, *Politeness* 150, following Bourdieu, suggests that *power* (i.e., *status*) reflects the possession of material, cultural, and social capital.

and Ervin-Tripp et al., which he terms *κράτος* and **φέρος* respectively,[25] the latter of which he privileges:

εἰ δὲ σὺ καρτερός ἐσσι θεὰ δέ σε γείνατο μήτηρ,
ἀλλ' ὅ γε φέρτερός ἐστιν ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει.

you [Akhilleus] have more *power* because your mother is a goddess, but [Agamemnon] has more *prestige* because he commands a greater armada.

Nestor similarly acknowledges the importance of *familiarity*. His advice that Agamemnon reorganize the army *κατὰ φῦλα κατὰ φρήτρας* (*Il.* 2.362), reflects the importance he ascribes to shared identity for the army's performance.

1.c: Pragmatics and *disposition*

The infrequent, anomalous use of δαιμόνιε in epic suggests that social relations, which tend to be stable, were not the only determining factor, but that some pragmatic factors were involved, including the speaker's emotional state.[26] A speaker's emotional relationship toward the addressee, what I am calling *disposition*, is also reflected in the form and content of their speech.[27] Maynard argues that even propositional expressions, such as *there's a spider on your back*, "always express, in varying degrees, emotive meanings as well."[28] Her point is that we

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[25] See P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue greque* (Paris 1980) 1189. The Sanskrit cognate *bharas* refers to *presentation*, *bearing*, etc., and also reflects the passive nature of this aspect of *status*.

[26] It is important not to ascribe ongoing mental states to the poets' characters beyond those that the narrator describes. In this regard, the job of the interpreter is much like that of the hearer in the case of spoken discourse.

[27] While N. Besnier, "Language and Affect," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 19 (1990) 419–451, obscures the distinction between *feelings*, the person's inner "psychological sensations," *emotion*, the outward display of *feelings*, and *affect*, the "subjective states that observers ascribe to a person on the basis of the person's conduct," features of the narrative frame, especially speech introductions, allow the poet to present all three. The distinction can be seen in the contrast between the introductory phrases *τὴν δ' ἄρ' ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν προσέφη* (*emotion*) and *τὴν δὲ μέγ' ὀχθήσας προσέφη* (*feelings*).

[28] S. Maynard, *Linguistic Emotivity: Centrality of Place, the Topic-Comment Dy-*

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often need to consider a speaker's emotional state when analyzing any particular utterance. The importance of *disposition* can be seen in the first verse of the *Iliad*: μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά, Πηληιάδεω Ἀχιλῆος defines Akhilleus first by his emotional state (μῆνις) and only then by other, traditional attributes (Πηληιάδης). His *disposition* and its changes are reflected in his language. The language he uses to address Agamemnon changes considerably over the course of the poem.[29] Dickey argues that *disposition*, however, is not formally encoded in the Greek address system the way that *status* and *familiarity* are.[30] This fact reflects how *disposition* is situational rather than social, and how, as Schnall states, "the manner in which experiential states map onto lexical terms is constrained by the communicative context."[31] Thus *disposition* relates to specific features of a specific encounter, and so operates on the pragmatic level.[32]

The social positions of characters in epic can be read with respect to these three parameters, which, for convenience sake, may be imagined as a three-dimensional space (see *fig.* 1). In determining what language to use, the speaker locates the ad-

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namic, and an Ideology of Pathos in Japanese Discourse (Philadelphia 2002) 4.

[29] See R. Friedrich, "'Flaubertian Homer': The *Phrase Juste* in Homeric Diction," *Arion* 10.2 (2002) 1–13, at 2.

[30] Her point is not that *disposition*, "the feelings of the speaker towards the addressee and the general emotional level of the interaction," does not influence the choice of address form, but that it is not subject to sociolinguistic rules or rule formation and so not encoded in the grammar: *Greek Forms of Address* 8. On the Greek (Attic) address system and the grammatical encoding of the social parameters of *power* and *solidarity* see E. Dickey, "The Ancient Greek Address System and Some Proposed Sociolinguistic Universals," *Language in Society* 26 (1997) 1–13. However, terms such as σχέτλιος, or even φίλος, as address forms, refer to dispositional categories more than they do specific social ones, as terms like πατήρ or στρατηγός do.

[31] S. Schnall, "The Pragmatics of Emotion Language," *Psychological Inquiry* 16 (2005) 28–31, at 28.

[32] Besnier suggests that emotions *can* be expressed formally on the grammatical and lexical level, which is usually referred to as *connotation*: *Annual Review of Anthropology* 19 (1990) 422.

dressee at a point on all three axes simultaneously.[33] The simultaneous independence and interconnectedness of these parameters is important for understanding interactional dynamics. Location on, or movement along, any one axis does not relate in any deterministic way to position on the other axes, although it is often informed by it.[34]


Figure 1. Schematization of speaker-to-addressee social dynamics

[33] The degree of *familiarity* is marked along the *X* axis, *status* along the *Y* axis, and *disposition* along the *Z* axis. On the notion that social relations involve individuals locating themselves and their addressee in relative positions along variable scales, especially of *status* and *familiarity*, see Brown and Levinson, *Politeness* 107–111, and Hudson, *Sociolinguistics* 120–134. Watts, *Politeness* 154–155, notes how these positions are variable and are constructed by interactants at the moment of their interaction, on the basis of their previous experience and the exigencies of the immediate context.

[34] The importance of this can be seen in the common *T/V* (*tu/vous*) address system, in which *status* and *familiarity* are both important conditions for the suitability of address forms. Terms associated with elevated addressee *status* also mark social distance; terms associated with equal or lower addressee *status* also mark *familiarity*. In *T/V* address systems, addressees marked as +S(*tatus*) and those marked as –F(*amiliarity*) both receive *V* forms of address. *T* forms are reserved for addressees marked as =/–S and/or +F: see F. Braun, *Terms of Address: Problems of Patterns and Usage in Various Languages and Cultures* (Boston 1988) 7–9. Examples are French *tu* and *vous* and German *du* and *Sie*.

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How speakers behave, the language they use, will be influenced by where they position their addressee socially in respect to themselves.[35] The degree of difference in *status* and the degree of *familiarity* of interactants represent important social pressures that influence what language is and is not felt to be felicitous.[36] For example, in the world of the *Iliad*, Agamemnon is addressed by in-group speakers (the $\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\hat{\iota}\varsigma$) with the title $\check{\alpha}\nu\alpha\xi$ $\dot{\alpha}\nu\delta\rho\hat{\omega}\nu$ and/or a patronymic, which I have suggested then functions as a title.[37] Conversely, Akhilleus is addressed regularly with his given name by in-group speakers but with his patronymic only by out-group speakers. This pattern suggests how distinctions in *familiarity* and *status* can correlate to the choice of address within the world of the poem.

Since there are only a few exceptions to the general sociolinguistic tendencies governing the use of $\delta\alpha\iota\mu\acute{o}\nu\iota\epsilon$, the primary focus here will be on pragmatic factors relating to the term's use, especially the relation of speaker *disposition* to the parameters of *status* and *familiarity*.

1.d: Evaluating social dynamics in epic speech

Our task is to examine how the appearance of $\delta\alpha\iota\mu\acute{o}\nu\iota\epsilon$ relates to the identities of speakers and addressees. There are,

[35] On the effect of the audience on speaker intentions in Homer see B. Sammons, "Agamemnon and His Audience," *GRBS* 49 (2009) 159–185, who argues that Agamemnon's speech to Menelaos at *Il.* 4.155–182 should be read as intended, on some level, for others who are also present.

[36] Speaker *disposition* is more complex. Because it is situation-specific, it is more dynamic than the other parameters. In addition, the speaker's feelings both towards the addressee and about the addressee's own feelings are potentially important, especially when the speaker is of lower status.

[37] H. P. Brown, "Addressing Agamemnon: A Pilot Study of Politeness and Pragmatics in the *Iliad*," *TAPA* 136 (2006) 1–46, at 40–43. Agamemnon is addressed as $\dot{A}\gamma\acute{a}\mu\epsilon\mu\nu\text{o}\nu$ alone only once, at *Il.* 2.362, by Nestor in his capacity as vizier. The narrator is not so constrained. See also A. Kahane, "The Semantics of Performance: A Case Study of Proper-Name Vocatives in Homer," in F. Létoublon (ed.), *Homage à Milman Parry* (Amsterdam 1997) 251–262.

however, two issues that need to be addressed up front. First, given the culturally specific nature of *status* and *familiarity* on the one hand, and the pragmatic nature of *disposition* on the other, I will start by making clear how they were assigned. The *status* of the speaker in respect to the addressee was determined in the following way. Gods were assigned +*S*(*tatus*) over mortals because of their power (κράτος). Similarly for reasons of esteem (φέρος), leaders were assigned +*S*, as were masters, husbands, hosts, and older siblings.[38] Finally, mutual strangers and battle-field opponents were taken to have approximately equal *status*, unless otherwise indicated. Speakers were thus assigned values of greater (+), equal (=), or lesser *status* (−), or intermediate values between those (+/= and =/−). For *familiarity*, the values of *close* (+), *moderate* (*m*), and *distant* (−), as well as intermediate points were assigned by the following criteria. Immediate family members—spouses, parents, children, siblings—were ranked the closest (+). Other members of a household or similar social unit, such as a ship's crew, were ranked next close (+/*m*). Followers and leaders were ranked as moderate (*m*) in terms of *familiarity*, since differences in *status* tend to be reflected in a certain degree of social distance.[39] Guests and hosts were ranked as moderately distant (*m*/−) because, while closing their mutual social distance, the stranger's identity is not secure and so he still represents a potential danger.[40] Complete strangers

[38] The status of guests and hosts is complicated by the potential that the guest is a god. However, there are reasons to assign +*S* to the host. First, the host has the choice to admit the stranger or not. The host's choice represents a type of authority, since it is not reciprocal, and the threat posed by the stranger only makes sense as such if that choice is a real one. Second, since the host is at home, he has the resources of his community behind him, which the stranger does not.

[39] This is reflected in *T*/*V* address systems: see n.34 above, and Braun, *Terms of Address* 7–9. There are a number of instances where subordinates willingly challenge or threaten to abandon their leaders, most notably Akhilleus in *Iliad* 1, the λαοί and Thersites in *Iliad* 2, and Odysseus' crew on several occasions.

[40] For example, Odysseus' encounter with the Cyclops, Metaneira's with

and battlefield opponents were ranked most distant (–). There are of course exceptions. When Telemakhos addresses the suitors as host, after his return to Ithaka, they are ranked as –F because of their ongoing abuse of *xenia*.

The second point of caution involves instances of disguise. In this case, it seemed best to adopt the speaker's perspective, and to assume that Odysseus speaks *as Odysseus* when he addresses Iros and Melantho, and that Eumaios speaks as if to a stranger.[41] However, when Helen addresses Aphrodite as δαιμονίη at *Il.* 3.399, her language suggests that she recognizes her addressee, and so speaks to her as Aphrodite, with whom she has a particular history.[42]

2. Findings: Epic δαιμόνιε and Speaker *Disposition*

Whereas the values assigned to *status* and *familiarity* were based on relatively stable social roles, speaker *disposition* is not stable, but subject to immediate pragmatic influences (which may include higher-level social factors). Furthermore, judging the dispositions of textual speakers is problematic because they do not have the internal mental states that physical individuals are assumed to, and cannot be queried for clarification. Nevertheless, phrases such as ὑπόδρα ἰδών, θάμβησεν, and δάκρυ χέουσα in the surrounding narrative allow us to ascribe a

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Demeter, and Menalaos' understood encounter with Paris highlight the possibility for the realization of the threat represented by the ξεῖνος.

[41] In the case of the first two examples, however, we should consider whether Odysseus πολύτροπος is able to adopt the persona of his disguise, which complicates the situation somewhat: see S. Murnaghan, *Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey* (Princeton 1987) 5–8.

[42] Brunius-Nilsson, *Δαιμόνιε* 31, takes the opposite position: "it seems obvious to me that, in spite of her recognition of Aphrodite, Helen addresses her remarks to a mortal woman." However, the content of Helen's speech specifically addresses her relationship to Aphrodite and its immediate history. G. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary* I (Cambridge 1985) 323–324, takes δαιμονίη here to be ironic, while Hooker, *Homer Iliad III* 14, suggests that it reflects Helen's confusion about Aphrodite's motivations, which Kirk rejects.

corresponding mental state to the character. This process is analogous to what we do ordinarily when interacting with another person, to whose mental states we also do not have access. But in a literary context, (1) there is less evidence of the speaker's mental state, and (2) that evidence is presented by a narrator who actively manipulates it.

The difficulty in establishing a character's disposition can be judged by comparing different readers' responses to the same passage. In respect to the poet's use of δαιμόνιε, Brunius-Nilsson and Wendel agree in only five instances (*Il.* 2.200, 3.399, 4.31, 6.326, *Od.* 4.774). Since emotions are immediate, idiosyncratic, and variable, there is no algorithm to use in ascribing them, and such determinations must remain provisional. In the majority of instances of δαιμόνιε, however, there are contextual cues that relate to the speaker's emotional state. In what follows I discuss evidence in Homer, Hesiod, and the Homeric Hymns for the *disposition* of speakers, including speech introductions, the content of the speech itself, and any description of the addressee's response. The values for all three parameters are then summed up in Table 1.

2.a. Negative speaker *disposition*

A negative value (–) was assigned to the disposition of the speaker in 15 instances:

Il. 1.561. Zeus to Hera (+*S*, +*F*): Zeus reacts when he learns that Hera has seen him talking to Thetis in secret. Hera is subsequently (1.568) described as becoming afraid (ἔδδεισεν) in response to Zeus' speech.

Il. 2.200. Odysseus to an ἀνὴρ δήμου (+*S*, m*F*): Athena tells him to calm the army in the aftermath of Agamemnon's call to return home. Odysseus feigns shock at their behavior. At 2.199 before speaking, he beats a man (σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν). The verb that introduces his speech, ὁμοκλήσασκε, usually has a negative implication of reproach.

Il. 3.399. Helen to Aphrodite in disguise (–*S*, +/m*F*):[43] Helen is sud-

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[43] Helen's relationship to Aphrodite, who is disguised as an old servant, in terms of the values assigned to *status* and *familiarity* is represented as the one

denly confronted by Aphrodite disguised as an old woman. Her re-action to Aphrodite's news that Paris has survived and is at home shows that Helen recognizes the goddess. Her reaction itself is qualified by θάμβησεν, common for the recognition of a divinity in disguise (cf. *Il.* 1.199 etc.). Helen strongly criticizes Aphrodite for her actions in respect to her and Paris. Aphrodite's response to Helen is also defined as anger (χολωσαμένη … μή μ᾽ ἔρεθε).[44]

Il. 4.31. Zeus to Hera (+*S*, +*F*): he acts surprised when Hera rebukes him for proposing to save Troy. Zeus' disposition is defined by the phrase τὴν δὲ μέγ᾽ ὀχθήσας.

Il. 6.326. Hektor to Paris (+/=*S*, +*F*): Hektor finds Paris at home ad-miring his armor instead of out on the battlefield. Hektor's speech is a reproach (νείκεσεν). He represents Paris as the cause of the war and criticizes him as a hypocrite for remaining behind when he used to chastise others for the same thing: σὺ δ᾽ ἂν μαχέσαιο καὶ ἄλλῳ / εἴ τινά που μεθιέντα ἴδοις στυγεροῦ πολέμοιο (6.329–330). Paris recognizes Hektor's discourse as reproach (ἐνείκεσας, 6.333).

Il. 9.40. Diomedes to Agamemnon (–*S*, *mF*): This is one of only two instances where δαιμόνιε does not open a speech.[45] Diomedes grows exasperated with Agamemnon for calling a second retreat (9.17–28). He speaks after a long silence (ὀψέ)[46] and characterizes this speech as a fight (σοὶ … μαχήσομαι, 9.32). δαιμόνιε comes at a transition in Diomedes' speech to his specific and pointed com-plaint: Agamemnon's previous characterization of the men as cowards. The contrastive rhetorical question that follows, οὕτω που μάλα ἔλπεαι υἷας Ἀχαιῶν / ἀπτολέμους τ᾽ ἔμεναι καὶ ἀνάλκιδας ὡς ἀγορεύεις; suggests incredulity.

Il. 13.448. Idomeneus to Deiphobos (=*S*, –*F*): One of two uses in the *Iliad* of δαιμόνιε that is not in-group, and the second that does not open a speech. Idomeneus' speech is a boast (ἐπεύξατο 13.445). The adverb ἔκπαγλον (which perhaps contains the root **plag* 'strike' with intensive ἐκ) suggests that Deiphobos will be *bowled over*

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she has with the goddess, on which see above.

[44] Cf. Achilles' use of μή μ᾽ ἔρεθε to Priam at 24.560. On Aphrodite see n.42 above.

[45] *Il.* 13.448 (see below) is the second.

[46] ὀψέ here seems to signal something approximating frustration on Dio-medes' part.

by it.[47] Idomeneus' speech begins with the given name *Δηΐφοβ(ε)*. As at *Il.* 9.40, *δαιμόνιε* is transitional. It concludes Idomeneus' criticism of Deiphobos' boast, and introduces his own challenge. Deiphobos' reaction (13.458–459) is to seek support from Aeneas. Janko refers to this instance and that at 13.810 (below) as *ironic* and *sarcastic* respectively.[48]

Il. 13.810. Aias to Hektor (=*S*, –*F*): As Hektor repeatedly approaches the front looking for a weakness, Aias calls him out to fight. Aias' rhetoric in *σχεδὸν ἐλθέ· τίη δειδίσσεαι αὔτως / Ἀργείους;* suggests Hektor's brothers Deiphobos (13.55 ff.) and Paris (3.30 ff.).[49] Hektor's response, *Αἶαν ἁμαρτοεπές, βουγάϊε, ποῖον ἔειπες*, "Aias Footinmouth, you *bougaie*, what are you saying?" (13.824), suggests how we are to read his reaction to Aias' speech.[50] His affectation of surprise implied in *ἁμαρτοεπές* and *ποῖον ἔειπες* suggests that Hektor matches Aias' rhetoric of incredulity.

Od. 4.774. Antinoös to the other suitors (+*S*, *mF*): Antinoös responds to the suitors who openly discuss their plans to kill Telemakhos without regard to news of their plot getting out (4.770–771). Their speech is *ὑπερφίαλος*, *indiscreet*.[51] The gist of Antinoös' rhetoric is

[47] See Chantraine, *Dictionnaire* 330.

[48] R. Janko, *The Iliad: A Commentary* IV (Cambridge 1985) 104 and 145.

[49] *δειδίσσεαι* is a causative/denominative in *yé* formed from the iterative stem **dey-dwik-*, as Attic *δειδίττομαι* suggests (cf. the Sanskrit iterative *de-dviṣ-te*). The iterative force implies an unfulfilled action, here reinforced by *αὔτως*. Hektor tries, and fails, to frighten the Greeks. The synchronic functions of many PIE secondary derivatives, largely unproductive, display a fair degree of divergence among the daughter languages. For a synopsis of PIE secondary derivational formations see M. Meier-Brügger, *Indo-European Linguistics* (Boston 2003) 173–174.

[50] But it also likely responds to the Akhaian reading of the bird omen at 13.821–822. *βουγάϊε* is also used by Antinoös of Iros at *Od.*18.79. The term is opaque, even in Homer, appearing in only these two passages, where the context involves a challenge and the notion of fear and retreat, and the term is addressed to a challenger. See Chantraine, *Dictionnaire* 187–188.

[51] This term is applied repeatedly to the suitors, but also to Antinoös himself (3.310) and to the Cyclopes (9.106). It seems to be a secondary derivative adjective compound of *ὑπέρ* and *φιάλη*, a type of vessel—perhaps originally defining something as like liquid overflowing its vessel. See Chantraine, *Dictionnaire* 1185. Here it seems to refer to having a "big mouth."

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that the other suitors' talk threatens everyone.

Od. 18.15. Odysseus in disguise to Iros (+*S*, −*F*): Odysseus has a sudden altercation with another beggar, Iros, before the suitors. His use of δαιμόνιε responds to Iros' threats (18.12–13). Odysseus' speech is characterized by ὑπόδρα ἰδών (18.14). Iros' reaction is anger, χολωσάμενος (18.25).

Od. 18.406. Telemakhos to the suitors (+/=*S*, *m*/−*F*): Telemakhos speaks in exasperation at the suitors' complaints about the disguised Odysseus. δαιμόνιοι is followed with a verbal description of them (μαίνεσθε). Whether as an assertion or a rhetorical question, their behavior seems crazy, as if they are drunk, οὐκέτι κεύθετε θυμῷ / βρωτὺν οὐδὲ ποτῆτα (18.406–407). Their response is strongly negative, πάντες ὀδὰξ ἐν χείλεσι φύντες (18.410).

Od. 19.71. Odysseus to the servant Melantho (+*S*, +/*mF*): Her demand for him to leave (19.66–69) threatens his plans. Odysseus, although in disguise, still addresses a subaltern. Again he speaks ὑπόδρα ἰδών (19.70).

Op. 207. Hawk to the nightingale (+*S*, −*F*): She is struggling for no good reason, as he is carrying her off to eat her. The hawk speaks ἐπικρατέως, used by Akhilleus at *Il.* 16.67 of the Trojans surrounding the Greek ships and at 16.81 of how Patroklos should drive them away.

h. Bacch. 17. Pirate helmsman to the crew (+/=*S*, *mF*): The helmsman, suddenly realizing their captive is a god, attempts to get the sailors to stop binding him. The helmsman likely has some social status (prestige) as his title, κυβερνήτης, and its specialized role suggest. While some degree of speaker/addressee inclusiveness is signaled by ἀλλ' ἄγετε and the first-person plural command ἀφῶμεν at 7.22,[52] his fear is certainly for himself: μή τι χολωθεὶς / ὄρσῃ ἀργαλέους τ' ἀνέμους καὶ λαίλαπα πολλήν (7.23–24).

h. Bacch. 26. The captain to the helmsman (+*S*, *mF*): The captain reacts to the helmsman's apparently unexpected reproach of the sailors: τὸν δ' ἀρχὸς στυγερῷ ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ (7.25), which characterizes his use of δαιμόνιε in the following line.

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[52] For examples of ἀλλ' ἄγετ(ε) plus first-person subjunctive cf. *Il.* 2.72, 83, 139, etc., discussed below.

2.b: Speaker *disposition* between negative and neutral

A value $n/-$ was assigned to the disposition of the speaker based on the presence of a combination of negative and neutral or positive polarizing features:

Il. 2.190. Odysseus to ὅστις βασιλεὺς (+/=S, mF): Odysseus again feigns surprise at his addressee's attempt to flee. Odysseus has situational authority via Athena (2.173–181) and because he acts in Agamemnon's stead. Although criticizing, he addresses the leaders with ἀγνοῖς ἐπέεσσιν (cf. the threats used with the ἄνδρες δήμου at *Il.* 2.200, above). Odysseus' speech is corrective, οὐ γάρ πω σάφα οἶσθα) (2.192), and contains an indirect threat, μή τι χολωσάμενος ῥέξῃ κακὸν υἶας Ἀχαιῶν (2.195), in which υἶας Ἀχαιῶν means 'you'.

Il. 6.407. Andromakhe to Hektor (–S, +F): Not knowing his intentions (to find her), she thinks he is leaving the city without seeing her. Her actions and discourse contain a mixture of emotions: anger and sorrow, but also affection. She is described at 6.405–406 as δάκρυ χέουσα and ἔν τ᾽ ἄρα οἱ φῦ χειρὶ, which signal both her emotional state and their degree of intimacy.[53] Her tone responds both to Hektor's smiling (μείδησεν) and to the possibility that he was already leaving. Her criticism (οὐδ᾽ ἐλεαίρεις "you don't pity us") implies a tragic future for her and their child.

Od. 10.472. The crew to Odysseus (–S, mF): After a year on Kirke's island, his exasperated companions have to remind Odysseus that they are supposed to be headed home. He introduces their collective speech with μ᾽ ἐκκαλέσαντες ἔφαν (10.471) and characterizes them as ἐρίηρες, while he characterizes himself with the phrase θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ (10.466). ἀγήνωρ here is probably negatively polarized, "too proud,"[54] and reflects a degree of self-criticism. Thus

[53] See n.21 above and also Besnier, *Annual Review of Anthropology* 19 (1990) 421, on the distinction between *emotion*, *feelings*, and *affect*. While the use of the introductory verb phrase ἔπος τ᾽ ἔφατ᾽ ἔκ τ᾽ ὀνόμαζε often implies close, even familial relationships (e.g. mother-son, wife-husband, brother-brother), it does not rule out a negatively polarized discourse (cf. Helen to Aphrodite at *Il.* 3.399, above).

[54] So applied to Akhilleus at *Il.* 9.699 after rejecting Agamemnon's bribe; to Laomedon at *Il.* 21.443 (also called ἔκπαγλος at 21.452) for refusing to pay Poseidon and Apollo; to the suitors at *Od.* 1.105.

Odysseus represents his crew's speech as a criticism.

Od. 14.443. Eumaios to Odysseus in disguise as a stranger and a beggar (+*S*, –*F*): Odysseus has been lying to Eumaios, who remains unconvinced, especially about Odysseus' return (14.321–323). Nevertheless Eumaios continues to entertain the stranger because he fears Zeus Xenios and pities his guest (14.389). The two argue around the same point repeatedly, with Eumaios growing increasingly irritated. He accuses the stranger twice of attempting to buy food with news (14.122–132, 14.166–167) implying that he is untrustworthy. When Odysseus implies at 14.440–441 that Eumaios, not the gods, has given him what he has received, the swineherd corrects him. The subsequent speech, addressed to the stranger as a δαιμόνιε ξείνων, reflects Eumaios' frustration and offers a correction. It is not Eumaios who is giving the stranger food: the gods have all the power (δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα, 14.445), whereas he acts thus only under their compulsion, Δία ξένιον δείσας, "because I fear Zeus Xenios" (14.389).

Od. 23.264. Odysseus to Penelope (+*S*, +*F*): After their reconciliation Odysseus wants them finally to go to bed, but Penelope asks him to elaborate on Teiresias' prophecy instead, even though she admits she will hear about it later (23.256–262). Her use of οὔ τι χέρειον, "not any worse," here functions as a hedge to temper the potential negative force of her request. Her use of such a hedge suggests how we might expect Odysseus to interpret that request. By beginning his response with δαιμονίη, Odysseus' language serves to reflect his frustration (cf. Eumaios at 14.443, above). His frustration is best suggested by his next words, τί τ᾽ ἄρ᾽ αὖ με μάλ᾽ ὀτρύνουσα κελεύεις / εἰπέμεν; implying that she has been repeatedly asking for something he does not want to do. That their conversation continues is suggested by ὣς οἱ μὲν τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγόρευον (23.288). Odysseus' speech did not silence Penelope or end their encounter. We may compare this with the negative disposition in Antinoös' speech at 4.774–777 (above), which appears to subsequently silence the indiscreet suitors.

2.c: Neutral speaker *disposition*

A neutral value (*n*) was assigned in four passages:

Il. 6.486. Hektor to Andromakhe (+*S*, +*F*): Hektor's speech here is characterized by the verb phrase ἐλέησε νοήσας. He and Andromakhe have just enjoyed a pleasant moment with their infant

son (ἐκ δ᾽ ἐγέλασσε, 6.471) but now she seems upset again (δα-κρυόεν γελάσασα, 6.484). His speech seems designed then to offer comfort. The choice of whether he will live or die is out of his hands; only fate can decide. She should take comfort from this and go back to her work (6.490). Hektor's use of negatively polarized language need not be read negatively, since (feigned) surprise at a suggested need can offer comfort by suggesting the absence of any actual need.

Il. 6.521. Hektor to Paris as they prepare to return to battle (+/=S, +F): Hektor corrects Paris' preceding apology as unnecessary. Hektor's tone shifts through the course of his speech, which begins with praise attenuated by litotes, οὐκ ἄν τίς τοι … ἔργον ἀτιμήσειε μάχης (6.521–522), but then returns to his previous accusation of cowardice, ἀλλὰ ἑκὼν μεθιεῖς τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλεις (6.523). At the same time he omits the earlier charge of hypocrisy (6.330–331).[55] His speech concludes with inclusive first-person plural jussives (ἴομεν, ἀρεσσόμεθα).

Od. 23.166. Odysseus to Penelope (+S, +F): After some silence, Odysseus addresses his wife as himself for the first time since his return. After bathing, he returns transformed, αὐτὰρ κὰκ κεφαλῆς χεῦεν πολὺ κάλλος Ἀθήνη / μείζονά τ᾽ εἰσιδέειν καὶ πάσσονα (23.156–157).[56] When she fails to speak to him, he accuses her hyperbolically of stubbornness.[57] His speech concludes with a clearly empty threat to sleep alone: στόρεσον λέχος, ὄφρα καὶ αὐτὸς / λέξομαι (23.171–172).

Od. 23.174. Penelope to Odysseus (–S, +F): Penelope responds to Odysseus' charge of stubbornness with the same address, followed

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[55] See on *Il.* 6.326, above.

[56] There are some problems with the grammar here, and some take these lines to be an interpolation: see J. Russo, M. Fernández-Galiano, and A. Heubeck, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey* III (Oxford 2002) 329. Thus again at 23.162–163.

[57] περί σοί γε γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων / κῆρ ἀτέραμνον ἔθηκαν Ὀλύμπια δώματ᾽ ἔχοντες (23.166–167). ἀτέραμνον is a hapax and its etymology is uncertain, but the sense seems clear in the context of τετληότι θυμῷ and σιδήρεον ἐν φρεσὶν ἦτορ at 23.172. See Chantraine, *Dictionnaire* 133. The phrase γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων appears also at 11.386 where it refers to the female dead, and at *Theog.* 590 where it describes those women descended from the woman whom Hesiod calls a πῆμα μέγα θνητοῖσι.

by a denial of his charge: *οὐ γάρ τι μεγαλίζομαι οὐδ' ἀθερίζω / οὐδὲ λίην ἄγαμαι* (23.174–175). Her reason is that he appears different from how she remembers him (23.175–176).

2.d: Speaker *disposition* between neutral and positive

A value between neutral and positive (*n/+*) was ascribed in two passages:

Il. 24.194. Priam to Hekabe (*+S*, *+F*): Priam asks for advice after being told to go to Akhilleus' tent to ransom Hektor's body. Priam's request for advice, or his desire for support in following Zeus' directive to go the Greek camp, contains nothing that relates specifically to Hekabe or what she might be doing (24.218–227). His agitation is not directed towards his addressee, as it will be subsequently,[58] but must concern his task. Since the topic of Priam's discourse is the gods' request and what he should do, and not his addressee, it is difficult to see how any evaluation of that addressee could be intended here. As Hooker states, "if anyone is behaving oddly here, it is Priam himself."[59] As in the case of *Od.* 23.174 (above), Hekabe's subsequent speech, characterized by the introductory verb *κώκυσεν*[60] at 24.200 and the introductory particle *ὤμοι* at 24.201, responds not to Priam's characterization of her— there has been none—but to his expressed desire to follow the gods' directive (24.199). If anything, his request suggests that initially he has a positive disposition towards her.

Theog. 655. Kottos to Zeus (*–/=S*, *+F*): Zeus has freed Kottos and the other Hundred-handers from Tartaros. The relationship between Kottos and Zeus is obscure in both *status* and *familiarity*. On the one hand, he is the recent recipient of Zeus' help (624–626, 639–640), and so subsequently helps Zeus (669–674). On the other hand, as a child of Gaia and Ouranos (147–149) he is Zeus' uncle. Thus it is possible to read Kottos' speech in the context of age-defined social

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[58] At *Il.* 24.239–246 he addresses and then attacks his surviving sons.

[59] Hooker, *Homer Iliad III* 263.

[60] *κώκυσεν* is also used of Thetis' response when she sees Akhilleus continuing to grieve for Patroklos (18.37 and 71). Here, Thetis' speech is also not a response to an evaluation or criticism of her, either expressed or implied, but to the actions of her addressee.

status (prestige) within the family.[61] Zeus' prior speech (644–653) requesting their help reminds them of their debt to him. Kottos' response οὐκ ἀδάητα πιφαύσκεαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ / ἴδμεν (655–656) feels mildly reproachful. However, this is followed with a promise to fulfill Zeus' request.[62] In light of the positive reaction to Kottos' speech (664–665), his initial statement should not be read as seriously reproachful or corrective.

3. Preliminary Findings

These findings, summarized in Table 1, suggest first that the use of δαιμόνιε correlates with higher status speakers (19/26) or with contexts of greater *familiarity* (19/26). There was a significant secondary cluster of instances involving lower status speakers, but always either within the family proper (11/26) or within a well-defined social unit such as the οἶκος or φῦλον (10/26).[63] These patterns are summarized in Graph 1. The significance of the high frequency of in-group uses is emphasized, despite the small sample size, by Beck's findings for the *Iliad* that "one-on-one conversation off the battlefield occurs very rarely."[64] Thus there is a contrastive disparity in the *Iliad*

[61] For example, Hektor exhibits social dominance over his younger brother, Paris. Note also that Zeus' own speech begins at 644 with the phrase κέκλυτέ μευ, which suggests the conventionalized language of ceremony (e.g. when addressing the assembly, *Il.* 2.67, 7.348, or in connection with the formal duel, *Il.* 3.86, 456, 7.67), but not exclusively (cf. *Il.* 3.304).

[62] On the relationship between Zeus' and Kottos' speeches see Kirk, *Iliad* 344–345, who characterizes δαιμόνιε here as "oddly used in addressing Zeus," clearly a reference to the use of δαιμόνιε to characterize another god; cf. Brunius-Nilsson, *Δαιμόνιε* 29, who voices a similar concern in respect to Helen's use of δαιμονίη to address Aphrodite at *Il.* 3.399 (see above ad loc.), but then at 31–32 she reads the term as if addressed to a mortal (see n.42). Kirk (323–324) calls its use for a god "more familiar and ironical."

[63] Depending on whether we read Kottos in the *Theogony* as a member of Zeus' family or as a member of the λαός in Zeus' army, there were 18 or 17 instances of +*S(tatus)*, 1 of +/=, 2 of =, and 5 or 6 of –. There were 14 or 13 instances of +*F(amiliarity)*, 2 of +/*m*, 3 or 4 of *m*, and 2 of *m*/–. This gives a total of 22 or 21 instances of in-group use, for a ratio of approximately 11/13.

[64] D. Beck, *Homeric Conversation* (Washington 2005) 272.

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poet's preference for battlefield conversation and his preference for using δαιμόνιε in speeches set within the οἶκος. When we turn to the parameter of *disposition*, we see that speaker *disposition* is largely limited to the negative range, as is summarized in Graph 2.[65] Lastly, by drawing correlations between parameters, other patterns begin to emerge which help to clarify the constraints at work in poets' use of δαιμόνιε.

First, cases showing the greatest social distance correlate with negative *disposition*. Conversely, the statistically fewer cases of disposition in the *n* to *+/n* range are restricted to use within the family. The majority of token instances across the full range of *solidarity* values showed values for *disposition* towards the negative end of the scale: 14 (–), 6 (*n/*–), a ratio of 10/13. These correlations suggest that in general δαιμόνιε in epic corresponds to negative disposition on the part of the speaker, although not always towards the addressee. And while this seems in keeping with the term's obvious etymology, we are wise to keep in mind that the referential use of the adjective, post-dating Homer,[66] emphasizes that some aspect of its reference is unexpected rather than specifically negative. Vocative noun phrases in general exhibit a strong tendency, noted by both Braun and Dickey, to show considerable divergence from the semantics associated with that noun's referential uses.[67] Dickey suggests that δαιμόνιε appears in later authors to function as a *friendship term*, similar to terms such as μακάριε. However, I note the unusual distribution of δαιμόνιε in her sample. Of the 31 occurrences, 23 come from Plato—a fairly idiosyncratic author—and of these, 20 are spoken by Socrates, who is highly

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[65] There were 14 instances of –*D*(*isposition*), 7 of *n/*–, 3 of *n*, and 2 of *+/n*.

[66] Dickey, *Greek Forms of Address* 139.

[67] Braun, *Terms of Address* 24–29; Dickey, *Greek Forms of Address* 19; also Brunius-Nilsson, *Δαιμόνιε* 5. Dickey, after Braun, distinguishes *bound* referential uses from *unbound* vocative uses. This distinction seems justified by the frequency with which vocative NPs develop meanings distinct from those of their referential uses.

idiosyncratic in Plato.[68] One reason the preponderance of occurrences come from Plato is not only the size, but more importantly, the role that dialogue plays in his surviving corpus. Despite these statistical issues, it does appear that the epic poets' use of δαιμόνιε differs in significant ways from that of later writers. The term tends to correspond in epic to contexts where the speaker is marked by authority over and familiarity with the addressee, and by a disposition that tends towards the negative end of the scale and which specifically excludes readings from the positive end. This distribution turns out to argue in favor of Brunius-Nilsson's ascription of *familiarity* to the basic semantics of the term.

As the use of δαιμόνιε in epic correlates largely to in-group settings, when we distinguish the immediate family from the larger context of the *oikos* or *phulon* we find the greatest range of speaker *disposition*, and the only instances of δαιμόνιε which are not characterized as negative to some degree (either – or *n/*–), namely Priam's address to Hekabe at *Il.* 24.194 and Kottos' to Zeus at *Theog.* 655.

3.a: Problematic cases involving disguise

While Eumaios is a servant of Odysseus, when he speaks to him at *Od.* 14.443 the latter is in disguise, and there is no evidence to suggest that Eumaios views him as other than a ξεῖνος.[69] However, Eumaios clearly is offering Odysseus ξεί-

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[68] See Dickey, *Greek Forms of Address* 139–140. Noteworthy, in fact, is the uneven distribution of non-specific vocatives (such as φίλε and ἀγαθέ) between Socrates (523 instances) and his interlocutors (56). David Johnson (personal correspondence) points out that many such positively polarized terms are regularly ironic in the mouth of Plato's Socrates. Wendel, *Gesprächsanrede* 23–24, takes the term to have a largely negative function in Aristophanes—*Verachtung, Unwillen, Stauen*—similar to how he sees it used in Homer, but with a significant subset of positive readings—*Freundschaft, Schmeichelei*.

[69] Murnaghan, *Disguise* 108, argues that Eumaios' loan of his cloak to the disguised Odysseus (14.510–511) constitutes a "covert expression of recognition." However, even if this is so, the story Odysseus tells (14.462–503), which elicits this gesture, follows Eumaios' use of the address δαιμόνιε

νιον in the form of food and lodging, even as he questions him for news of the lost Odysseus. Like the Phaiakians, Eumaios appears to be acting in accordance with *xenia*, which involves treating the stranger as if he were a potential member of the *oikos*. Thus we should consider how Eumaios' speech functions as part of his ongoing attempt to redefine the setting as in-group. For this reason Eumaios in his use of δαιμόνιε at *Od.* 14.443 was assigned *m/−* for *solidarity*.

At *Il.* 3.399 Aphrodite appears to Helen in disguise as an old servant and is addressed as δαιμονίη. But as Helen's general reaction indicates, the disguise clearly has failed. Helen's discourse with Aphrodite is presented as if to the goddess and concerns the goddess' treatment of her. At no point does it appear that Helen speaks as if she believes her addressee is an old servant.[70]

Odysseus appears in disguise as the speaker in two of the examples (*Od.*18.15, 19.71). In both cases, there is a legitimate question about whether to read his speech as that of Odysseus *ipse* or of his persona, the old beggar. At 18.15, Odysseus responds to the beggar Iros' threats (18.10–13). Iros has been described as attempting to Ὀδυσῆα διώκετο οἷο δόμοιο (18.8). The focus placed on the identity of Odysseus as the possessor of the house by the adjective οἷο suggests that we are to keep that identity in mind. At 19.71, the servant Melantho attempts to shame the disguised Odysseus into leaving the house. In this case, her desire threatens Odysseus' immediate plans (to remain in the house to provoke the servants and Penelope in preparation for killing the suitors, 19.44–45). Odysseus reacts to a situation which, though this is not expressed, threatens Odysseus as Odysseus. In both cases his discourse varies be-

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ξείνων (14.443). See also H. Roisman, "Eumaeus and Odysseus—Covert Recognition and Self Revelation?" *ICS* 15 (1990) 215–238.

[70] Kirk's ascription of familiarity and irony, as with Hooker's, is predicated on the notion that Helen is addressing a god, with whom she has a particular and personal relationship, not a mortal servant (Kirk, *Iliad* 323–324; Hooker, *Homer Iliad III* 98).

tween one that sticks close to the text of his disguise and one that invokes the specter of Odysseus. His response to Iros mixes an Odysseus-like threat with the possibility that both ξεῖνοι should be able to share the doorway, but then concludes with the boast that invokes his heroic guise as hereditary king (μέγα-ρον Λαερτιάδεω Ὀδυσῆος, 18.24). In his response to Melantho, Odysseus again stays close to the script as the beggar. How-ever, he concludes by making a claim to status, which he equates to that of Odysseus (19.75–80), followed by a threat that also invokes his persona as Odysseus, viz., that she will suffer at the hands of Penelope *or Odysseus* (19.83–84). In both these instances of disguise, while the poet has the angered Odysseus remain in character, at the same time his identity as Odysseus occasionally emerges from below the surface to shape his discourse and inform his rhetoric. For our purposes, how-ever, this complicates the task of reading Odysseus here in respect to the parameters of *status* and *familiarity*. In the statistics presented above, I have assumed that individuals in disguise speak as themselves, but are addressed according to their sur-face persona—the exception being *Il.* 3.399, where the context makes it clear that the disguise has failed.

3.b: Problematic social relations

The social position of Kottos in the world of the *Theogony* is ambiguous in a different way. He appears to occupy simultan-eously two different social roles in respect to Zeus. As Hesiod suggests (*Theog.*147–149) he is of the same generation as the Titans, and so is one of Zeus' uncles. In many older Indo-European traditions the uncle served as an important ally.[71] On the other hand, Kottos has been freed by Zeus specifically

[71] The prominence Hesiod gives to the role of Gaia in freeing the *Heka-tonkheires* suggests a focus on the matrilineal half of their descent (*Theog.* 626). Cf. the role of allies that the sons of Autolykos—Odysseus' maternal grand-father—adopt in the boar hunt, especially in taking care of Odysseus after he has been wounded (*Od.* 19.455–461). On the role of the maternal uncle in Indo-European Omaha-type kinship terminology see P. Friedrich, "Proto-Indo-European Kinship," *Ethnology* 5 (1966) 1–36.

to fight on his behalf and in his army, and as such functions as a member of the λαός. However, the pattern of usage for epic δαιμόνιε in which +*solidarity* corresponds to non-negative *disposition* (*Il.* 6.486, 521, 24.195; *Od.* 23.166, 174) suggests that Kottos' speech emphasizes his in-group, avuncular relationship to Zeus over that of a subordinate soldier. That is, all other evidence being equal, the sociolinguistic and pragmatic patterns that hold for epic δαιμόνιε in general can serve as evidence for how to read Kottos' relationship to Zeus in this one instance.

3.c: Out-group use

While most instances of δαιμόνιε in epic are found in contexts defined by moderate-to-high levels of *familiarity*, the majority of which are found in in-group settings, there are three that involve clearly out-group social relations. *Iliad* 13 offers two examples, Idomeneus' speech to Deiphobos (446 ff.) and Aias' to Hektor (810 ff.). In both speeches the rhetoric is similar. The speaker claims that the addressee has made some error. Deiphobos has boasted over Aïdos (13.414–416) when it is Idomeneus who has the greater body count (13.447). At 13.446, ἦ ἄρα and the first-plural ἐΐσκομεν suggest the language of inclusiveness (cf. *Od.* 24.193). The subsequent phrase ἐπεὶ σύ περ εὔχεαι οὔτως, / δαιμόνι᾿[72] suggests that Idomeneus' previous language of solidarity was mock solidarity. Aias adopts a similar tone in his speech to Hektor: τίη δειδίσσεαι αὔτως / Ἀργείους; οὔ τοί τι μάχης ἀδαήμονές εἰμεν (13.810–811), where his language is reminiscent of Odysseus' to the βασιλεύς at *Il.* 2.190. In both cases, the adoption of language that is associated with in-group (+*F*) discourse may actually function to suggest not social distance, but a lower degree of addressee *power*. This is analogous to what one finds in *T/V* languages, where the use of *familiar* forms of address

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[72] The compound conjunction ἀλλὰ καὶ that follows δαιμόνι᾿ at 13.447 is regularly clause initial, which suggests that δαιμόνιε is enjambed from the previous line.

functions as a way of defining a *–F* addressee as also *–S*.[73] In Idomeneus' speech, when Deiphobos is first addressed, it is with his given name rather than his patronymic, which is similarly the language of *familiarity*.[74]

The ascription of *–S* to the addressee by the use of *+F* language is also found in the hawk's speech to the nightingale (*Op.* 207 ff.), where the *familiarity* and *status* dynamics have already been established by the context. The hawk's use of δαιμονίη here functions as a test of the reading suggested above for the two out-group uses of δαιμόνιε found in the *Iliad* (13.448, 810). Here, the use of language ordinarily marked as *+F*, in a *–F* setting, what we might call *mock familiarity*, can have the secondary function of defining the addressee as *–S*. The assumption is that individuals with greater power feel correspondingly greater freedom in their use of language, and so the display of such freedom constitutes a claim to power.

A related question now arises as to why in settings marked by high degree of *familiarity* δαιμόνιε is found used by speakers with a wide range of dispositions, while its use in contexts of low *familiarity* is limited to speakers reflecting negative dispositions. A possible answer is provided by Culpeper's notion of *mock impoliteness*, in which language typically perceived as overtly negative does not carry the same negative implication if the relationship is one marked as a familiar one.[75] Social cohesiveness allows a wider range of behaviors to be accepted. Therefore, the use of negatively polarized language, in turn, can serve to signal a context as marked for a high degree of *familiarity*.[76] This is the basis of teasing and banter between

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[73] Dickey, *Language in Society* 26 (1997) 11–12, argues against the universality of the specific *T/V* distinction. See n.30 above, also Brown and Gillman, in *Style in Language* 253–276, and Braun, *Terms of Address* 7–24.

[74] See n.37 above.

[75] J. Culpeper, "Towards an Anatomy of Impoliteness," *Journal of Pragmatics* 25 (1996) 349–367, at 350–353.

[76] D. Bousfield, *Impoliteness in Interaction* (Philadelphia 2008) 136, defines *mock impoliteness* as language "which, ostensibly, appears to offend the face of

individuals who are otherwise socially close, and which then helps to reaffirm that closeness. A higher degree of *familiarity* allows for a corresponding greater freedom of language use that is analogous to that arising from greater *status*, and so the display of such freedom constitutes an analogous claim.

4. Conclusion

Thus, epic δαιμόνιε seems originally to have been restricted to contexts that were negatively polarized, as the data in this study suggest. In this way, it appears to function as an *attitudinal epithet*, reflecting the "speaker's subjective attitude."[77] The restriction of its non-negatively polarized uses to instances of high speaker-addressee *familiarity* fits with the general tendencies defined under the notion of *mock impoliteness*. This would further suggest that in epic, δαιμόνιε does not yet function as a *friendship term* in the way that Dickey suggests for later Attic authors. Instead, in these earlier works it appears to have a discourse-marking function that corresponds initially to expressions of surprise on the speaker's part at the addressee. This discourse function largely holds across the entire set of instances from Homer, Hesiod, and the Hymns. Occasionally this surprise may be overtly rhetorical, as in instances of *mock impoliteness* (*Il.* 6.486, *Od.* 23.166 and 174, perhaps *Theog.* 655) or *mock solidarity* (*Il.* 13.448 and 810) or even feigned (*Il.* 2.190 and 200). Despite the need to distance our reading from any *a priori* reference to the term's etymology, the restriction of δαιμόνιε to negatively polarized contexts of surprise corresponds in general to a wider, cross-linguistic tendency in which address forms for divinities can develop into interjections with contrastive discourse-marking functions. Examples can be seen, for example, in Latin *edopol!* and *mehercule!*, French *mon Dieu!,* or MnE *my God!* etc. In addition, the distribution of instances of δαιμόνιε across

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the intended recipient but, which, in practice, serves to strengthen social bonds."

[77] M. A. K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*[2] (London 1994) 184.

epic suggests that the felicity conditions on δαιμόνιε restricted its use primarily to contexts marked by (1) high degree of speaker-addressee *familiarity*, (2) speakers of higher *status*, and (3) negatively polarized discourse, where it serves to signal the introduction of, or a shift to, such a discourse.[78]

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TABLE 1: Epic δαιμόνιε and Speakers'
*Status*, *Familiarity*, and *Disposition*

An asterisk * indicates alternative possible readings of social relations.
(D) indicates instances of disguise.

Ref.	Speaker→Addressee	Social Relation	S	F	D
Iliad					
1.561	Zeus→Hera	husband	+	+	−
2.190	Odysseus→*Basileus*	leader	+	+/m	n/−
2.200	Odysseus→ *aner demou*	leader	+	m/−	−
3.399	Helen→Aphrodite	devotee	−	+/m	−
	Helen→Aphridite (D)	*master	+	+	
4.31	Zeus→Hera	wife	+	+	−
6.326	Hekor→Paris	older brother	+/=	+	−
6.407	Andromache→Hektor	wife	−	+	n/−
6.486	Hektor→Andromache	husband	+	+	n
6.521	Hektor→Paris	older brother	+/=	+	n/−
9.40	Diomedes→Agamemnon	follower	−	m	−
13.448	Idomeneus→Deiphobos	opponent	=	−	−
13.810	Aias→Hektor	opponent	=	−	−
24.194	Priam→Hekabe	husband	+	+	+/n
Odyssey					
4.774	Antinoös→Suitors	leader	+	m	−
10.472	Crew→Odysseus	followers	−	+	n/−
14.443	Eumaios→Odysseus	servant	−	+/m	n/−
	Eumaios→Odysseus (D)	*host	+	m/−	

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18.15	Odysseus→Iros	leader	+	–	–
	Odysseus (D)→Iros	*fellow	=		
18.406	Telemakhos→Suitors	host	+/=	*m/–*	–
19.71	Odysseus→Melantho	master	+	*+/m*	–
	Odysseus (D)→Melantho	*stranger	–	–	
23.166	Odysseus→Penelope	husband	+	+	*n*
23.174	Penelope→Odysseus	wife	–	+	*n*
23.264	Odysseus→Penelope	wife	+	+	*n/–*
Hesiod					
Th. 655	Kottos→Zeus	follower	–	*m*	*+/n*
	Kottos (as elder)→Zeus	*uncle	+	+	
Op. 207	Hawk→Nightingail	opponent	+	–	–
Hymns					
Bacch. 17	Helmsman→Sailors	leader	+/=	*+/m*	*n/–*
Bacch. 26	Captain →Helmsman	leader	+	*+/m*	–

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Graph 1: Distribution of Parameter Values
for Speaker *Power* and *Solidarity*

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
Graph 2: Distribution of Parameter Values
for Speaker *Disposition*

Instances of δαιμόνιε by Disposition

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