

# Thucydides, Homer and the 'Achaean Wall'

*J. A. Davison*

IN THE second appendix to his Sather lectures<sup>1</sup> Professor D. L. Page argued in detail the case for believing that "the Iliad current in Thucydides' own day did not include the extensive passage in the seventh book of which the building of the wall in the tenth year is the principal theme" [HHI 316], but that "this large addition to the Iliad must have been the work of an Athenian poet" [HHI 323], and hence that "such passages were composed, and did enter the vulgate, in the fourth century B.C." [HHI 324]. If it could be demonstrated that these propositions are correct, no one could deny him the right to assert that "Here is one of the most important articles of external evidence in the whole Homeric Question" [HHI 316]; indeed, even the most obstinate defender of the integrity of our *Iliad* would be bound to surrender at once. The difficulty, as Page reminds us in a bibliographical note [HHI 335], was first put on the agenda of the Homeric Question by Hermann in 1846, but in English-speaking lands it is best known through the works of G. M. Bolling<sup>2</sup>; that the difficulty has never been felt to be insuperable is implicitly admitted by Page (HHI 335: "There have been few discussions since [Hermann], and

<sup>1</sup> *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Berkeley 1959) 315–24, 335–40. I refer to this work henceforward as HHI. Other works for which I use abbreviated titles are: G. M. Bolling, *The External Evidence for Interpolation in Homer* (Oxford 1925)=EE; G. S. Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge 1962)=SH; and *idem*, "The Homeric Poems as History" (CAH 2<sup>2</sup>, fasc.23, Cambridge 1964)=HPH. In the first part of the paper (to note 14) and in the appendix merely numerical references are to the text of Thucydides; in the second part of the paper (from note 14) such references are to the text of the *Iliad*. For Thucydides I have used chiefly the edition by H. Stuart-Jones with *apparatus criticus* revised by J. E. Powell (Oxford 1942), together with that of Book 1 by J. de Romilly (Paris 1953), A. W. Gomme's *Historical Commentary* 1 (Oxford 1945), and the *Lexicon Thucydideum* of É.-A. Bétant (Geneva 1843–7). Miss D. H. F. Gray read an early draft of this paper and made helpful suggestions; she is in no way to blame for the use to which I have put them.

<sup>2</sup> Page rightly mentions EE 92–9, but omits Bolling's *The Athetized Lines of the Iliad* (Baltimore 1944) and *Ilias Atheniensium* (Lancaster [Pa.] 1950), which, though they did not reargue the case, at least resuscitated it for a while.

very few of any value”), and is perhaps most clearly shown by the fact that Mr G. S. Kirk does not attach anything like the importance to it which Bolling and Page have done [*SH* 218–20, *HPH* 31–2]. On the face of it, then, the suggestion might well be allowed to relapse into suspended animation; to me, however, it seems to raise some points of importance which are perhaps worth a little further examination.

## I

Both Bolling [*EE* 98] and Page [*HHI* 319, quoting *Iliad* 16.30–2] make it clear that (in Page’s words) “in the *Iliad* of Thucydides . . . the wall was built when the ships were hauled up; that is to say at the very beginning of the war.” It will therefore be as well to begin by examining what Thucydides says, and to consider whether his words support this particular inference. Page [*HHI* 315] translates the relevant passage [1.10.5–11.2] as follows:

If we strike the average of the smallest and largest ships, the numbers of those who sailed will appear inconsiderable, representing as they did the whole force of Hellas. And this was due not so much to scarcity of men as of provisions. Difficulty of subsistence made the invaders reduce the numbers of the army to a point at which it might live on the country during the prosecution of the war. Even after the victory which they obtained on arrival—and a victory there must have been, or the fortifications of the naval camp could never have been built,—there is no indication that their whole force was employed; on the contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese and to piracy from want of supplies. This was what really enabled the Trojans to keep the field for ten years against them, the dispersion of the enemy making them always a match for the detachment left behind. If they had brought plenty of supplies with them, and had persevered in the war without scattering for piracy and agriculture, they would easily have defeated the Trojans in the field, since they could hold their own against them with the division on service. In short, if they had stuck to the siege, the capture of Troy would have cost them less time and less trouble.<sup>3</sup>

He then proceeds: “Let us focus our attention on the sentence in the middle: ‘After they had won a victory on arrival—and this is proved

<sup>3</sup> Except for this crucial sentence it is unnecessary to quote the Greek text: Page gives it in full in his note 26 [*HHI* 335]; his wording follows that of the standard texts (above, n.1), except that where OCT and Budé in 1.11.2 have ἀθρόοι . . . ἀθρόοι, Page has ἀθρόοι . . . ἀθρόοις.

by the fact that they could not otherwise have built the fortifications for their camp,—they did not apparently employ all available forces even in the field of operations’ (understand: ‘any more than they had done when mobilizing in Hellas’).”

If we follow Page’s injunction and “focus our attention on the sentence in the middle,” we are, I think, bound to feel that, whichever of Page’s distinctly different versions we may prefer to follow, there is something strange about the logic which this interpretation ascribes to Thucydides. Can it really be compelling evidence that a landing-force was “victorious in a battle” [*HHI* 335] on landing that they should at once set to work to surround their ships and themselves with a wall of heavy masonry and timbering [*Iliad* 12.79, 178], provided with towers [*Iliad* 7.338], κρόσσαι [*Iliad* 12.258], battlements [*Iliad* 12.308], and other appurtenances of what, had they first taken the trouble to propitiate the gods, might well have been called ‘permanent fortifications’? I doubt if anyone who had a practical understanding of military affairs would suppose it for a moment: it is clear that in such circumstances our idea of a force’s success on landing must vary inversely with the strength of the fortifications with which they at once surround themselves. Complete confidence corresponds to ‘no fortifications’; defences rise as morale sinks. We may ask, therefore, if the Achaeans could have begun at the highest point on the fortification scale, supposing that they had won such a victory as Thucydides implies. It is no defence to say that this is the traditional interpretation, to be found in all the standard commentaries on and translations of Thucydides; the correctness of the text has been doubted more than once, most recently by Professor (then Mr) R. M. Cook,<sup>4</sup> and I for another have felt for some time that the question needed more discussion than it has received, in defence not only of Homer’s integrity but also of Thucydides’ reputation for good sense.

Let us begin by looking at the Greek text of the crucial sentence, as it appears in the Oxford text: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν (δῆλον δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα τῷ στρατοπέδῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐτειχίσαντο), φαίνονται δ’ οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει χρησάμενοι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γεωργίαν τῆς Χερσονήσου τρεπόμενοι καὶ ληστείαν τῆς τροφῆς ἀπορία. Apart from the parenthesis, this is as plain as anything in Thucydides; only the δ’ after φαίνονται need cause a moment’s hesitation, and it is clearly

<sup>4</sup> *ProcCamPhilolSoc* NS 3 (1954–5) 3. Unfortunately Cook’s note does not argue the case in detail; it has therefore gone mainly by default.

resumptive after the parenthesis: "When on arrival they won the mastery in battle (so much is clear, since . . .), it is evident that they did not employ all their force here [*i.e.* to carry on active operations against Ilios], but that they had recourse to cultivation of the Chersonese and to piratical raids, owing to the shortage of supplies." But the parenthesis is quite another matter; apart from its doubtful logic, it has several stylistic oddities: (1) except in 3.105.1 Thucydides does not use the middle voice of *τειχίζειν*; (2) nowhere else in Thucydides is *ἔρυμα* the direct object of *τειχίζειν*, even in those cases where *ἔρυμα* perhaps means 'fort'; (3) if *στρατοπέδω* means 'camp',<sup>5</sup> why need it be in the dative? None of these points is of great importance by itself, but together they may legitimately inspire doubts.

I am inclined to begin with *ἔρυμα*. Bétant (*s.v.*) reasonably distinguishes two senses: 'munimentum, propugnaculum' (six examples, including our passage) and 'castellum, locus munitus' (five examples, three of which refer to the "old wall made of stones picked up by hand" by which the Lacedaemonians made their last stand on Sphacteria [4.31.2, 35.1,2]. The first sense is the one which concerns us: in 4.69.2 'houses given battlements' form an *ἔρυμα* and are combined with *τείχη τε καὶ ταφρόν* and palisades into what the next section calls a *τείχος*; in 4.90.2 Hippokrates begins to fortify Delion, with a trench and a mound formed from its spoil *ἀντὶ τείχους*—the mound is then revetted with stakes and vine tendrils and strengthened with bricks and stones from demolished buildings, "and by every means they went on raising the *ἔρυμα*"; in 6.66.2 the Athenians "planted a palisade beside the ships, and quickly raised an *ἔρυμα* of sorts (*τι*) on Daskon, with stones picked up and timbers"; in 8.40.3 the Athenians on Chios are building a wall round the Delphinion, and adding besides an *ἔρυμα μείζον* about the camp (or army?) and ships (*καὶ στρατοπέδω καὶ ναυσὶν ἐρύματος μείζονος προσπεριβαλλομένου*); and finally in 8.55.3 we find Pedaritos with the Chians attacking *τῷ περὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐρύματι* and getting possession of some of the ships (*νεῶν τινῶν . . . ἐκράτησαν*), whereupon the Athenians "charge out upon them to the rescue" (*ἐπεκβοηθησάντων*) and chase them off, inflicting considerable loss. This last case is particularly interesting, since the Athenians have both a *τείχος* (*cf.* 8.40.2: *ἡ στρατιὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βεβαίως ἔδοξε μετὰ τείχους ἰδρῦσθαι*), though it is not yet finished (8.40.3; *ἀτέλους ὄντος*), and are

<sup>5</sup> It need not; Thucydides uses the word quite as often in the sense "army" as in the sense "camp" (Bétant *s.v.*).

adding an ἔρυμα to surround camp and ships. Later [8.55.3] the ships evidently have an ἔρυμα to themselves, with the Athenian troops in an inner fortification (cf. the restored Viking camp at Trelleborg, where a separate mound, much lower than that surrounding the crews' living quarters, marks off the area in which ships were beached). An ἔρυμα, then, seems to be what we should call a 'field fortification', which may vary in strength from zero (cf. 1.117.1 ἀφάρκτω τῷ στρατοπέδῳ)<sup>6</sup> to a quite solid, though always more or less improvised, structure.

A more generally illuminating example is that to which Gomme, in his long note on 1.11.1, draws attention: the first operations against Mytilene early in Book 3. The Athenians having, owing to Mytilenaeans haverings, acquired a beachhead ἐν Μαλέα to the north of Mytilene [3.4.5], are later attacked by the Mytilenaeans, who did not "have the worse" of it, but had no self-confidence and retreated [3.5.2]. The Athenians, feeling rather stronger, called in allies and "walled two camps" (ἐτείχισαν στρατόπεδα δύο) on either side of Mytilene; they cut the Mytilenaeans off from using the sea, but the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians who had now come to their help controlled (ἐκράτουν) all the land, except for small areas round the camps [3.6.1–2]. The Athenians, Thucydides tells us, were doubtful from the beginning about the feasibility of operations against Lesbos [3.4.3], so that even when the arrival of allies gave them some confidence their tactics were still Periclean: they shut themselves up behind their walls, leaving the control of the land to their opponents. "Look here, upon this picture and on this": the enterprise of the Samians after their temporary success in 1.117 (above, note 6), and the defensive-mindedness of the Athenians in 3.4.6 and (more excusably) in 8.40 and 55. It must be admitted that Thucydides' later words (in 1.11.2) ascribe rather more enterprise to the Trojans, and show a good deal less understanding of the strategic dilemma facing the Achaeans, than Homer does. Indeed Thucydides goes out of his way to blacken the picture of Achaean inactivity by talking about "cultivation of the Chersonese": there is no evidence for this, either in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* or in what little we know of the cyclic epics. For anything we know to the contrary the Achaeans could have grown crops on their

<sup>6</sup> Athenian camp attacked by Samians, who won such a victory that "they ruled (ἐκράτησαν) in their own neighbourhood for fourteen days, importing and exporting what they pleased."

own side of the Hellespont unmolested for nine years; all that military security would have required would have been adequate covering parties. Thucydides also minimizes the force which Agamemnon brought with him: even on his own calculation (an average of 85 men per ship) it must have amounted to nearly 100,000 men in nearly 1,200 ships, a respectable force for the whole of Greece to raise, one would think, even in Thucydides' own time.

The answer to the question about the walling of the camp must now, I think, be clear: if Thucydides was acquainted with a poem which described the camp as walled from the beginning, he muddled himself (and his readers) very badly by suggesting that this was a proof that the Achaeans "won the mastery in battle" on arrival: what it would prove, if anything, would be that the Achaeans, in spite of their initial victory, were too few in numbers (and perhaps too short of confidence as well) to undertake immediate operations against Ilios. It is not impossible that this is what Thucydides meant, since it would fit reasonably well into the context, but one may ask why, if Thucydides meant that, he did not say it. Perhaps after all the text is corrupt, as Professor D. S. Robertson and Mr Cook suggested; and what Thucydides really said was something which we might paraphrase as follows: "in spite of the confidence induced in them by the military superiority which they gained on landing, which is shown by the fact that they did not at once equip their camp with perimeter defences of any sort, they still muddled away their advantage by not taking the shortest possible route to victory."

Thucydides' idea of how the campaign ought to have developed shows that, allowing for his tendency to think in fifth-century terms (e.g., circumvallation), his picture of the actual state of affairs prevailing in the Achaean camp before Ilios is not so very different from the one which we gather from our texts of the *Iliad*: a first battle on landing, and after that no direct operations against Ilios—reconnaissances, perhaps, and negotiations (as in *Iliad* 3.305ff), but otherwise only piratical raids of the type organized by Achilles [*Iliad* 9.328–9] and perhaps also by Odysseus (else how had he come by the title *πολίπορθος*, which he already has in *Iliad* 2.278, and which he alone of the Achaean heroes shares with Achilles?).<sup>7</sup> For the military explanation of this

<sup>7</sup> Odysseus' title may be anticipatory; by his share in the taking of Troy Odysseus will become the champion *πολίπορθος* of the age. Or it may be the working of formulae: *πολίπορθος* 'Αχιλλεύς ~ π. 'Οδυσσεύς. But formulae with *πολίπορθος* (sometimes in oblique cases) could be made up to suit most of the major heroes.

development we can only fall back on the *Iliad*: it is evident from the beginning of the poem that the Achaeans have long since decided that Ilios is not to be taken by regular siege operations, whether by circumvallation and starving or by the use of such primitive means as the Trojans and their allies employ against the Achaean wall in *Iliad* 12; the only hope is to capture the city as a result of a pitched battle in the plain, as a result of which pursuing Achaeans and fleeing Trojans “mingl’d in a mass” rush through the still open gates into the city—and those of the Trojans who cannot escape or die fighting surrender. All therefore that the Trojans have to do is to remain behind their walls, and not let themselves be lured or goaded (by Achilles’ *ληστέλαι*, for example) out to battle before the walls of the city. The Achaeans, faced with a stalemate, cannot cut their losses and go home, since by so doing they will recognize that Paris-Alexandros is now *de jure* as well as *de facto* ‘*Ελένης πόσις ἠυκόμοιο*, and hence, now that the Dioskuroi are dead [*Iliad* 3.243–4],<sup>8</sup> king of Lakedaimon in right of his wife. The Achaeans can only hang on until the tenth year, in the hope that Kalchas’ prophecy will then prove true [*Iliad* 2.324–30]; and it is one of the many ‘ironies’ of the early books of the *Iliad* that they do not see that Achilles’ withdrawal is the essential first step towards breaking the deadlock—now at last there is a chance that the Trojans will “come out” to battle, and the end of that can only be the coming of that day “when holy Ilios shall be destroyed.” But before that the Achaeans have vicissitudes to undergo, and the course of those vicissitudes as described in the *Iliad* up to the building of the wall in *Iliad* 7 makes no allusion of any kind to any fortification round the camp (or to any security measures whatever—the picquets of *Iliad* 9 and 10 appear to be a new idea when they are first mentioned): when the Achaeans muster in *Iliad* 2 [455–78] they simply pour out of the camp on to the assembly ground, whereas the fall-in in *Iliad* 11 has to take account of the ditch [*Iliad* 11.48, 51] and hence of the wall,<sup>9</sup> even if the fighting later in the book does not seem to. This of course is due to the fact that in *Iliad* 11 the fighting is still well out on the plain: the wall makes itself felt again at *Iliad* 11.599ff where Achilles, standing

<sup>8</sup> The significance of this fact, and the added significance of the fact that Helen is ignorant of it, have been regularly missed by modern commentators; but this is why the Achaeans *must* recover Helen.

<sup>9</sup> The picquets in 9.87 post themselves between the wall and the ditch (would they not be better *on* the wall, or further out towards the enemy? But the voice of military reason awakens no answer from Homer—or from Agamemnon’s bright young men.)

on the poop-deck of his ship at the west end of the Achaean encampment, cannot see the face of Nestor's passenger (the chariot, it seems, came in through a gate some way east of where Achilles is standing and at once turned east—Achilles of course knows Nestor well enough, but does not recognize Machaon from behind).<sup>10</sup>

There is simply no trace at all of any fortification, however insubstantial, round the Achaean camp in the first six and a half books of our *Iliad*; and therefore an 'Iliad' in which a solid stone wall was built round the camp at the very beginning of the war would be a poem so different in content from ours that it could not be usefully invoked in any discussion of the internal evidence for the textual history of our *Iliad*. As I have shown there is evidence that Thucydides had other things in his mind as he wrote 1.11.1–2 than could have come from our *Iliad*, which (for example) is silent about the cultivation of the Chersonese, and even (as Miss Gray pointed out to me) implies that the Chersonese was held by Trojan allies [*cf. Iliad* 2.835, 844–5]. Thucydides has not any explicit reference to military agriculture in his own time, but such agriculture is a commonplace in the histories of forces on detached service for long periods—if you cannot get the civil population to grow enough food to feed the troops, why then the troops must set to and plough and sow and reap and mow for themselves (this must have been the experience of anyone who took part in the siege of Poteidaia, for example). Thucydides may therefore be talking in fifth-century terms when he speaks of farming the Chersonese, and in Peloponnesian War terms when he assumes that the Achaean camp must have had an *ἔρυμα*. In any case it is clear that, whatever poem it may have been that Thucydides had in mind, it was not one which described the initial landing, or the events which followed immediately upon that, in any detail, if at all: for the initial landing he has to use inference as we do, and it is clear that his version of the catalogue of ships must have tallied very closely with ours.

If then he had an *Iliad* like ours in other respects, what about the wall? Let us look again at what our texts make Thucydides say: τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα τῷ στρατοπέδῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐτειχίσαντο. Whether this potential sentence means "they would not" or "they could not have walled the fortification for their camp (or 'army')," it is offered us as proof of the military superiority of the Achaeans on landing in the Troad. I have

<sup>10</sup> This is the answer to Kirk's difficulty about what becomes of the wall between the end of 8 and the beginning of 12.



already argued that, militarily speaking, this is nonsense: if the Achaeans on landing built the wall which has to be stormed in *Iliad* 12 and 13, they evidently had no confidence in the completeness of their initial victory nor in the duration of their superiority, and the Trojans would hardly have left them free to build it (is it to push the point too far to ask whence they would have obtained their materials, when they were still unacquainted with the terrain? Or was Kalchas' seer-ship [cf. *Iliad* 1.72] equal to that problem too?) Thucydides had more knowledge of military affairs than to imagine such things, much less write them: he may not have had as much experience as we have had in the last fifty years in the conduct of opposed landings on enemy territory, or about the customary reactions of landing forces when once they are established ashore, but he knew the late fifth-century formula for operations against a hostile city, and this influences his own account of what must have happened before Ilios. He cannot have gathered from our *Iliad* anything about the cultivation of the Chersonese or about an ἔρρυμα round the camp before the wall was built or about the possibility of circumvallation; even if the heroic age recognized the last as a feasible operation of war, the *Iliad* makes it clear that the Trojans had too many allies for such a thing to be possible in the particular case. No: what Thucydides is trying to tell us is that "the Achaeans won a crushing victory on landing (as is proved by the fact that they did not < then > provide the perimeter of their camp with a wall)"<sup>11</sup>—and the text must be read accordingly.

The simplest correction is that proposed by Cook (above, note 4): ἀνετειχίσαντο for ἂν ἐτειχίσαντο. This is not really any change at all, since in Thucydides' own orthography the two phrases must have been indistinguishable; the only question is whether ἀνετειχίσαντο could be the right word for the meaning required, and Page has argued that it cannot be, since it is first attested for Xenophon in the sense 'build up again', of Konon restoring the walls of Athens after Knidos (*HII* 338, note 31, where the word is described as "very nearly non-existent" on the evidence of Liddell and Scott and Dindorf's *Thesaurus*). This argument is not in fact as strong as Page's emphatic language makes it appear. I have been through all the prepositional compounds of τειχιζέω recorded in *LSJ*, and checked them for Thucy-

<sup>11</sup> It is not necessary to require Thucydides to have written the bracketed word or to adopt D. S. Robertson's ingenious <ἐτει λ' > ἐτειχίσαντο; Thucydides is writing allusively, for readers whom he expects to recognize the allusion.

dean usage in Bétant, and have set out the detailed results in an appendix to this paper. It will there be seen that of the twelve compounds listed only ἐπιτειχίζω and its derivatives give a consistent picture, both semantically and historically, and secondly that there is no word in the list as it stands which could exactly describe the action proposed by Nestor, which is "to face the outside of a previously created earth rampart with a solid stone wall." The nearest to this which Thucydides comes, as I have already suggested, is in the fortification of Delion [4.90.2-4], where the Athenians first throw up an earth mound (χοῦν) and then revet it, by planting stakes alongside it (σταυροὺς παρακαταπηγνύντες) and interlacing them with vine tendrils. Had the Athenians had more time (or more labour, or better materials) at their disposal, they might have faced the ἔρυμα which they left behind them with a τεῖχος; and though the most accurate Greek for this might be παρακατατειχίζειν, this compound is not quoted from anybody—even if it were, Thucydides shows no fondness for compounds in παρακατα-.<sup>12</sup> ἀνετειχίσαντο may not therefore be entirely objectionable as a means of saying "they ran a facing wall along the mound," but if this is felt to be too hazardous a conjecture, ἐνετειχίσαντο might be suggested, in the sense 'they fortified, i.e. walled in defensively'. Even in Thucydides ἀποτειχίζω and περιτειχίζω already show precisely the ambivalence which this conjecture would attribute to ἐντειχίζω; and it may be noted that ἐντειχίζω is the only compound of τειχίζω which Thucydides uses only in the middle voice. If however it is still to be maintained that Thucydides in fact wrote ἄν ἐτειχίσαντο, then the conclusions are inescapable: (1) Thucydides, of all people, wrote nonsense on a matter within his own professional experience; and (2) Thucydides was not talking about our *Iliad*.

Page writes as if there could have been only one text of the *Iliad* "current in Thucydides' day," and this text he later calls "the vulgate." Even in 1959 he might have been aware that some people at least had their doubts about this single pre-Alexandrian "vulgate,"<sup>13</sup> and Kirk shows that he has profited by more recently published work on the production and circulation of books in the ancient world when he writes [SH 219-20]: "it seems reasonable to conjecture that there had been at least two poetical versions of the Trojan fighting, in one of

<sup>12</sup> He has only παρακατα-θήκη, -λείπειν, -έχειν for certain; Powell's apparatus shows that the Mss have their doubts about παρακαταπηγνύντες in 4.90.2.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. my "The Study of Homer in Graeco-Roman Egypt" (*Akten d. 8. Internat. Kongr. f. Papyrologie, Wien 1955* [= *MPER* ns 5 (1956)] 51-8, especially 55).

which the wall was an important factor and in the other of which it was not." In so far as it recognizes the relative fluidity of the 'Homeric' canon in the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C., Kirk's formulation is acceptable; but I hope that I have shown that, so far as Thucydides is concerned, the supposed version of "the matter of Troy" in which the wall "was there all the while" may well be a chimera, and that, if it ever existed, it has no relevance to the question of the content of the poem which we call the *Iliad* at that or any other period. Thucydides cannot, in my judgement, have meant what his editors and commentators want to make him mean; and if he *did* mean that after all, the poem which he was talking about was not our *Iliad*, nor a direct ancestor of it.

## APPENDIX

### Compounds of TEIXIZΩ

NOTE: the information in this appendix has been extracted from the ninth edition of Liddell and Scott (revised by H. Stuart-Jones and R. McKenzie, Oxford 1925–40) and from the *Lexicon Thucydideum* of É.-A. Bétant (Geneva 1843–7). If a translation contains italic letters it has been taken verbatim from *LSJ*, otherwise it is new.

(1) ἀντιτειχίζω, "erect counter-fortifications", "fortify instead" (both Josephus; Philo has the word once in a metaphor); Thucydides [2.77.1] has only ἀντιτείχισμα "counter-fortification" (once in Athenaeus).

(2) ἀποτειχίζω, "wall off" ("1. by way of fortifying" quoted only from Herodotus, but Thucydides has it once at 3.51.3); Thucydides uses the verb (frequently) and its derivatives in -σις and -μα in sense "2. by way of blockade". Other meanings quoted from later writers are "keep off by fortification" (Plutarch), "wall off, separate" (Julian), "build a party-wall" (middle, Lucian), "raze, dismantle" (Polyaenus, who also has ἀποτείχισις, "slighting"). ἀποτειχισμός "blockading" is used by Plutarch.

(3) διατειχίζω, "cut off and fortify by a wall" (Aristophanes, Lysias, Polybius in concrete senses; Xenophon, Philo and Lucian in metaphors). Thucydides has only διατείχισμα, in two senses: "internal cross-wall" [3.34.2, 3] and "switch-wall" [7.60.2].

(4) ἐκτειχίζω, "fortify completely": Thucydides has it four times [4.4.1, 45.2; 7.4.5, 26.3], but none of these justifies "completely"; "fortify as far as possible (or 'necessary')" seems to come nearest.

(5) ἐντειχίζω, “build or fortify in a place” (Isocrates, Xenophon, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Josephus); the middle, “wall in, i.e. blockade” is in Thucydides [6.90.3], and in the sense “fortify” in Nicolaus of Damascus, Plutarch and Dio Cassius.

(6) ἐπιτειχίζω, “build a fort . . . on the frontier of the enemy’s country, to serve as the basis of operations against him” and its derivatives are very common in Thucydides and in later writers; there is no recorded change in the meaning of the words in this group.

(7) ξυντειχίζω, “help build a wall”: Thucydides [4.57.2, 7.7.1], once in Xenophon; “enclose within the same wall” (fourth century B.C. inscription, Colophon).

(8) παρατειχίζω, “fortify besides” (Philostratus only). Thucydides has παρατείχισμα “cross-wall” [7.11.3, 42.4, 43.5] of Syracusan counter-walling (he uses the verb παροικοδομεῖν).

(9) περιτειχίζω, “wall all round” for defence: Aristophanes, Thucydides [5.75.5]; “surround with a wall, so as to beleague”—this is Thucydides’ preferred sense, both for the verb and for its derivatives in -σις, -μα, -μός. The defensive sense however reappears in Xenophon, and lives on to Vettius and Themistius (who also has περιτείχισις defensive).

(10) προστειχίζω, “include in the city-wall”: Thucydides [6.3.2], Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The obviously legitimate “build a wall against” is not attested.

(11) προτειχίζω, “protect by a wall” (Strabo and Gloss.). Thucydides has προτείχισμα, “advance fortification, outwork” [4.90.4; 6.100.2, 102.2; 7.43.6], as do Polybius, Lxx and later writers.

(12) ὑποτειχίζω, “build a cross-wall”: Thucydides [6.99.2], Appian; Thucydides has also ὑποτείχισις and ὑποτείχισμα [both 6.100].

I have not thought it necessary to repeat the information about ἀνατειχίζω given by Page [HHI 338, note 31].

## II

What then about the internal evidence of the Homeric text as it has been transmitted to us?<sup>14</sup> “Consider first,” Page adjures us, “the speech of Nestor (*H* 327–43); and notice above all the enormous fault in the structure of the poem. ‘We have suffered heavily,’ says Nestor; ‘it is high time to stop fighting, to collect and cremate our dead, and to build high towers and a trench to protect our army from being crushed by the attack of these proud Trojans.’ Suppose that you did not know what has

<sup>14</sup> Henceforward all merely numerical references are to the text of the *Iliad*.

happened in the Iliad up to this point: you would of course infer that the Achaeans must have been hard pressed, that they are on the defensive, the Trojans attacking. For the first time in ten years the Achaeans must build a defensive wall. At the very least, then, you would laugh to scorn the notion that what has happened up to this point is an unbroken run of success for the Achaeans.

“But that is what really has happened. The wonderful successes of Diomedes are the principal theme of the Fifth Book and the earlier part of the Sixth” (*HHI* 321; Page’s italics). It is difficult to know where to stop quoting Page’s as always eminently quotable prose; but by this point the raptest reader should have recovered his wits and be anxious to ask some questions. Page’s report of Nestor’s words is accurate enough, except that he should perhaps have put ‘to protect our ships and ourselves’ for ‘to protect our army’ (Nestor says: *ἐλαρ νηῶν τε καὶ αὐτῶν*, 7.338); but no one who has read the *Iliad* attentively up to this point ought to accept for a moment Page’s picture of the background to this council. Night has just fallen on the day which began at 2.48, and the events of that day have been narrated in 3,599 hexameters, requiring not less than 5½ hours for recitation,<sup>15</sup> that is to say in almost minute-for-minute detail, starting with the clear account of the disastrously low morale of the Achaean army in general, faced at last after nine years of almost complete military inactivity<sup>16</sup> with the appalling idea that *now*, at the very moment when Achilles and the Myrmidons (who *are* in fighting trim, thanks to what Thucydides calls *ληστεία*) have suddenly withdrawn from the alliance, they should go out and fight the Trojans—who will, *ex hypothesi*, be going all out for victory, in the hope of disposing of the other Achaeans while the only serious obstacle to their success is temporarily off the field. From the still deeper abyss of despair into which Agamemnon at once plunges them [2.110–41] the Achaeans are rescued by the exertions of Odysseus, who not only re-assembles the troops (and their officers) but with what must be the finest speech ever composed for such an occasion [2.284–332] works them up to fighting pitch. The familiar ritual of the assembly parade may bring

<sup>15</sup> For the argument on which this estimate depends, see below, pp. 23–25.

<sup>16</sup> Those who, in default of actual experience, have read much of the literature produced between 1919 and 1939 by participants in the trench warfare of 1914–18 will not have forgotten the emotions of the *λαοί* or *canaille* (“which in this war,” a Major-General is said to have observed, “includes everyone from divisional commanders downwards”) when faced with a move from a quiet sector of the front to an active one, or *vice versa*.

its comfort to the troops (unless they think of why they have just sharpened their spears); in any case Book 3 brings the Achaeans the vicarious excitement of the duel, and the momentary relief of its apparently unambiguous verdict in favour of Menelaos; but this is followed almost immediately (alas, for the partisan log-rollings of Olympos!) by the deep disappointment of the wounding of Menelaos in breach of the truce [4.86ff] and the realization that the war must go on. Agamemnon, who seems to lose no opportunity of inspiring alarm and despondency in those around him, makes such a fuss over Menelaos that even the victim rebukes him [4.184–7]; but, though the treachery has not succeeded,<sup>17</sup> it has by its commission sealed the fate of Ilios, provided that the Achaeans do their duty. This however means that they must now go out and fight battles; and by way of giving us (and them) an idea of what that fighting may be like, the poet provides another frightening example of Agamemnon's disastrous incompetence as a leader, in the *'Επιπώλησις'*.<sup>18</sup> The battle then begins, at 4.446. In the next eighty lines thereafter, two of the contingent leaders named in the Catalogue, Elephenor and Diores, are killed [470; 526]. Up to this point only one such commander has been killed; Protesilaos died at the landing, "much the first of the Achaeans," as the Catalogue rightly says [2.702]. With Elephenor and Diores many troops also died [4.543–4].

Though Book 5 is not unfairly called *Διομήδους ἀριστεία*, his success is far from unbroken; he has a sharp brush with Aineias, which leads to Diomedes' reluctant recoil before Apollo [443], after which Apollo rescues Aineias. Then comes a great Trojan counter-attack, headed by Ares and Hektor, in which another commander, Tlepolemos, is killed with full heroic honours by Sarpedon [5.628–69], and which becomes so dangerous that Here and Athene have to intervene [711], Athene personally. Then the gods leave the battlefield, and Book 6 begins with an Achaean break-back [6.5–72], which develops so seriously that Hektor has to return to Ilios and try to win Athene's

<sup>17</sup> It is to be noted that, if Menelaos had been killed, the whole Achaean enterprise would have lost its purpose, since there would not have been anyone left to dispute Paris' possession of Helen.

<sup>18</sup> Agamemnon, it should be observed, is portrayed in the *Iliad* as a general worthy of such connoisseurs of the contrast between outward appearance and inner reality as Archilochus and Mr Siegfried Sassoon. He may *look* like a combination of King Arthur and Richard Coeur-de-Lion (e.g. 11.16–46), but in fact he is a brute, a bully, a military incompetent, and a snivelling coward (witness his unmanly shrieks when he is scratched in 11.269–79, and compare his demeanour with that of the seriously wounded Diomedes or Odysseus or Eurypylos later in the book).

intervention against Diomedes, although in fact Diomedes seems to have lost a lot of his fighting spirit, to judge by his dealings with Glaukos [119–236]. At this point fighting, for anything that we are told, seems to stop for a time, but the situation still looks dangerous to amateur tacticians like Andromache and most commentators. Homer thinks that the most the Achaeans could have done was to drive their opponents back within the walls, but Andromache sees the Achaeans rushing and climbing the wall itself, by the wild fig-tree [433–4]. The beginning of Book 7 brings us, with Hektor and Alexandros, back to the battlefield; and now the tide turns again and begins to run strongly against the Achaeans; but both sides are by now practically exhausted, and they naturally welcome Hektor's challenge: watching a single combat between champions will be a nice change from fighting, giving the spectators all the thrills of war, *sua sine parte periculi*. But this requires an Achaean to be found to face Hektor [7.93]: the shilly-shallying of the Achaean heroes, until Telamonian Aias is finally chosen by lot to be their representative [94–182], is the clearest possible evidence that Achaean morale is again at a low ebb; and though Aias has just enough of the advantage over Hektor to justify Aias' friends in hailing him as the victor, the heralds declare the duel a draw [7.279–81].

So ends the first full day's fighting which the Achaean host as a whole has experienced in over nine years. In these few hours eighteen Achaeans "of name" (even if we know no more of them than that) have died at the enemy's hands, and the troops have perished in uncounted heaps (*cf.* 5.758 for the execution wrought by Ares). There is therefore plenty of reason for Nestor to put the burial of the dead at the top of the agenda; and since the Achaeans have evidently left the Trojans in possession of the battlefield, the Achaeans must now ask for the necessary truce. This would be common form, win or lose: the bodies of the dead must be collected and buried. So far, all seems to be straightforward: but what about the wall? As I have shown, Page's picture of "an unbroken run of success" for the Achaeans will not do: as long as Achilles is off the field, some pro-Trojan deity (and it is evident to some of the Achaeans, and not least to Nestor [*cf.* 2.80–3], that Zeus himself may at any moment be found on the Trojan side)<sup>19</sup> may sweep the Achaeans into the kind of rout which Ares has

<sup>19</sup> Poseidon is in fact another doubtful supporter: as a general rule he is staunchly pro-Achaean, but in 20.318–49 he suddenly rescues Aineias without explaining why he should take a personal interest in Aineias' survival. When one thinks of the arguments which the

already caused them in 5.454–710, or there may be an unlucky run of casualties among the leading champions (as there soon will be, in Book 11), and before the Achaeans know what has happened to them they may find themselves being “tamed beside the seafaring ships,” as Hektor has just reminded them (7.70; it is more likely to this than to Hektor’s words to the Trojans in 8.181 or 530–41 that Agamemnon refers in his whine to Nestor in 14.44–7). There is no fault in all this: if we pay attention to the text of Homer, we can understand both why there has not been a wall up to now and also why one must now be made, since a day’s fighting has shown the previously unapprehended danger.

And so we come to the burial, which Nestor ingeniously (once again “the very model of a modern Major-General,” as in 4.293–310)<sup>20</sup> contrives to combine with the wall building. The procedure, as he describes it, is simple and natural, with one exception (which I italicize): “Let us gather the dead ourselves and wheel them here with oxen and mules, and then let us burn them to ashes a little way out in front of the ships, *so that each may take the bones home to his children* whenever we return to our native land. Then let us create one mound over the burning-place, raising it without distinction from the plain, and against it let us quickly build high walls as a defence for ships and men” [7.332–8]. Omitting for a moment the italicized words, which can only be excised from the text by a sacrifice of two lines (334–5, including the valuable *τυτθὸν ἀποπρὸ νεῶν* of 334<sup>a</sup>), we have a clear picture of normal Greek procedure: the bodies are burned and the ashes buried in a *polyandrion* on, or as near as possible to, the battlefield. It comes naturally from Nestor, who knows better than any of the others (except the usually silent Diomedes, who fought at Thebes, cf. 4.105–6, and the absent Achilles, cf. 6.418–20) the drill in these matters; but to most of his hearers, though not of course to Homer’s own audience, this sort of thing is as new as it must have been to most of the men in the British ‘New Armies’ in 1915. However repugnant the task, the dead must be disposed of after a battle; and

---

disintegrators have used against the text of the *Iliad*, it is really surprising that no one should have suggested that this passage in particular (and indeed the whole of Aineias’ appearances in the *Iliad*) might be a post-Virgilian interpolation.

<sup>20</sup> Both Nestor’s address to his men (a good example of how businesslike Nestor can be, when there is urgent business on hand) and the formation which he has adopted are further evidence that his contingent contains a considerable number of men not hardened for battle.



however shocking it may have been to the prejudices of the ordinary Bronze Age Achaean, for whom inhumation was normal, cremation in the Anatolian manner<sup>21</sup> would be the only possible thing—there would not be any hope of providing each of them with a “stone tunic” in proper form. Besides, argues Nestor, if we cremate them, we can take the remains home with us when we go. But who will take the ashes and see that they reach the right destination? Nestor does not suggest that this should be done as a formal military operation ending with parades and speeches and burial in a state mausoleum; indeed his logic goes so far astray as almost to suggest that “each (of the dead) may take his bones back to his children.” So comrades and relations are left with the painful duty,<sup>22</sup> which will in any case be practically impossible to fulfil, since the mound is to be one and indistinguishable, and the individual’s ashes will be unidentifiable, since even if there is a separate urn for each man it cannot be legibly marked [cf. 7.185]. The oddest thing however about this whole business is that this is not the first time, even in the *Iliad*, that the Achaeans have been faced with the problem of mass mortality, and have solved it in a similar way, without any logic (good or bad) from Nestor or anyone else: look at 1.52, when the plague victims are quietly cremated in one hexameter. It is true that Homer often holds up what to us seem necessary explanations: so the *Μενοιτιάδη* of 1.307 is not explicitly identified as Patroklos until 9.201–2, and we have to wait until 20.215–41 to learn the intricacies of the Trojan royal pedigree. Funeral arrangements may be another case of this, or it may be that battle casualties are on a different footing from deaths by plague; but I suspect that Nestor’s argument in 7.334–5 was already in Homer’s mind before he began to describe the quarrel in Book 1, or the plague which preceded it.

Page points out that there is a certain resemblance between the procedure suggested by Nestor and that described by Thucydides in connection with Perikles’ funeral speech [Th. 2.34]. So too Miss Lorimer, in her *Homer and the Monuments* (London 1950) 442–9, pointed out resemblances between the Trojan *Supplicatio* in 6.286–312 and the

<sup>21</sup> So the ritual for Patroklos’ funeral in 23 seems to follow the pattern of that for a Hittite prince: M. Riemschneider, *Die Welt der Hethiter* (Stuttgart 1954) 78–9.

<sup>22</sup> Nestor does not seem to have brought home the ashes of Antilochos, nor Neoptolemos the mingled ashes of Achilles and Patroklos, nor Teukros the ashes of Telamonian Aias; it is therefore unlikely that anyone else had much thought or opportunity for such things when the time came to gather up the booty and sail for home.

ritual of the great Panathenaia. These resemblances do indeed exist, but they should not be exaggerated, nor should it be forgotten that in a purely linear argument with two terms A and B the possibilities of logical connection may be diagrammatically expressed: A > B or B > A. It is thus legitimate for the student of the part played by Athens in the preservation and dissemination to suggest that apparent resemblances between Homeric and Attic usages are as likely to be due to Attic imitation of Homer as to 'Homeric' imitation of Athens: 'Peisistratos' may have devised the peplos ritual and commissioned a seated statue of Athena after reading or hearing *Iliad* 6,<sup>23</sup> and 'Kimon' may have been given the idea of bringing his men's ashes home from the North Aegean by *Iliad* 7.

Page makes a good deal of play with what he calls "symptoms of relatively late and untraditional composition in this part of the *Iliad*" (*HHI* 339; see the whole of his note 35); but it does not seem that the points which he emphasizes contain any evidence which would compel us to believe that this part of the poem is the work of Attic or other interpolators. It must be remembered that, if our *Iliad* was indeed composed in the latter years of the eighth century (as I am not alone in believing), it is likely to have contained a good many "relatively late" elements from the moment of its composition: from the end of Mycenaean IIIB<sup>24</sup> to what Kirk calls "the date of monumental composition" [*SH* 287, *cf.* 316-7] and I should call "the date of Homer" at the end of the eighth century considerably more than five hundred years must have elapsed, giving plenty of time for the poetic language to develop and to evolve 'earlier' and 'later' forms. Kirk puts the point well (*SH* 203): "there is a strong case for assuming that a very large proportion of the forms identified as 'late' by Chantraine and others . . . are not post-Homeric, but are simply 'late' in relation to the whole history of the oral tradition, near the end of which came the great monumental poems." It may be added

<sup>23</sup> I argued the point briefly but sufficiently in my review of Miss Lorimer's book (*CR* ns 2 [1952] 15). The linguistic arguments based on Wackernagel, purporting to show the irreversibility of the supposed Attic influence on Homer, have been mainly demolished by the decipherment of Linear B; of the remainder, that based on the -γο->-εω- metathesis ought not to have survived the first publication of the inscription on Nikandre's dedication at Delos, with ΔΕΙΝΟΔΙΚΗΘ for the choriambic Δεινοδίκηω and ΑΛΗΘΝ for the spondaic ἀλλέων—for this inscription, see now L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961) 291, 411 (transcription), Pl. 55.2 (photograph and tracing).

<sup>24</sup> For this, see now P. Ålin, *Das Ende der mykenischen Fundstätten auf dem griechischen Festland* (Lund 1962) and V. R. D'A. Desborough, *The Last Mycenaeans and their Successors* (Oxford 1964).

that it is at least possible that the remaining forms would look less strange than they do if we had more evidence about the language actually used by pre-Homeric (pre-monumental) narrative poets.

But, though I almost hesitate to mention it because of its apparently unrelieved mechanicism, there is one piece of evidence which suggests that our *Iliad* was, as the literary critics have always held, deliberately designed, and that the poem as composed to that design has not in fact suffered any *large-scale* interference whether by interpolation or by excision.<sup>25</sup> The Oxford text of the *Iliad* contains 15,683 lines, distributed into twenty-four 'books' of very different lengths, from the 909 lines of Book 5 to the 424 of Book 19. If however these twenty-four books are divided into six groups of four, the groups are found to be surprisingly similar in length, and to compare even better with the average (one-sixth of 15,683 = almost exactly 2,614).

<i>Group</i>	<i>Books</i>	<i>Lines</i>	<i>Relation to Average</i>
			<i>Longer:Shorter</i>
1	1-4	2493	121
2	5-8	2481	133
3	9-12	2606	8
4	13-16	2972	358
5	17-20	2304	310
6	21-24	2827	213

If it is further assumed (as I think there is some evidence that we might not be far wrong in assuming) that a reasonable speed for the

<sup>25</sup> It is necessary to emphasize the limitation of the argument to "large-scale interpolation" and to define this term. Most of the interpolations pointed out by Bolling, and rejected from his *Ilias Atheniensium* (above, n.2) as not having formed part of the "panathenaic" *Iliad*, are too short and too widely distributed to affect the relationship between books significantly: but 7, which would lose 73 lines (not to mention the consequential losses to other books, notably 12, which would be entailed by the loss of the "Building of the Wall"), and 18, which would lose 159 lines, would be seriously shortened. What the argument in the text does exclude without any question is any suggestion that whole books (such as 9 or 10) could be post-Homeric interpolations. On the general question of length, readers may perhaps be reminded that the *Odyssey* is about one-fifth shorter than the *Iliad* (12,110 lines) and that Odysseus breaks off his narrative in *Od.* 11.330 after the equivalent of 1,470 hexameters; being adjured to go on, he then continues for a further 714 lines (or, at about eleven lines to the minute, approximately 3h.20m. actual narration, with a short break for general conversation just after two-thirds of the whole story). This was an exceptional effort, no doubt, to an exceptionally receptive audience (cf. *Od.* 11.335, 13.2); but it gives some idea of what, in the author's opinion, an after-dinner audience might be prepared to stand—and that too on top of Demodokos' song summarized in *Od.* 8.500-20.

public recitation of Greek hexameters to a continuing audience is about eleven lines a minute,<sup>26</sup> these figures become even more significant:

<i>Group</i>	<i>Lines</i>	<i>Time required</i> <sup>27</sup>
1	2493	3h.47m.
2	2481	3h.46m.
3	2606	3h.57m.
4	2972	4h.31m.
5	2304	3h.30m.
6	2827	4h.18m.

I therefore suggest that the man who designed the *Iliad* (and by that I mean Homer) did so deliberately, with the intention that it should be recited to a festival audience over a period of three days, with two sessions each day, by a team of four reciters, each of whom was to recite one 'book' in each session. If the four reciters appeared at each session in the same order, their tasks would differ in weight, but this difference might well be significant.

<i>Reciter</i>	<i>Books and lines</i>						<i>Total Lines</i>
	<i>Day 1</i>		<i>Day 2</i>		<i>Day 3</i>		
A	1+ 5		9+ 13		17+ 21		4438
	611	909	709	837	761	611	
B	2+ 6		10+ 14		18+ 22		3638
	877	529	579	522	616	515	
C	3+ 7		11+ 15		19+ 23		3857
	461	482	847	746	424	897	
D	4+ 8		12+ 16		20+ 24		3750
	544	561	471	867	503	804	

<sup>26</sup> See my "Bebenaia 1: Experiment at Tübingen" (CR ns 14 [1964] 14). In arriving at the figure here suggested, I have made two allowances: (1) the Tübingen audience being small and quietly attentive, I have accepted the suggestion of Dr T. J. Kakridis (who was also present at the readings) that the original rate of reciting should be supposed to be considerably slower, since the audience would not only have been larger but have been composed of Greeks, whose reactions might be expected to be less inhibited; (2) on the other side I have allowed for two factors which would contribute to increase the speed somewhat: (a) that the Homeric team would be reciting from memory, not reading from text; (b) that the Homeric team would have experience of the conditions prevailing at a narrative recitation.

<sup>27</sup> These times, which are taken to the nearest minute, do not allow for intermissions, but it will be seen that, allowing for intervals of ten minutes each between books, even the longest session would require just over five hours (less than a Covent Garden performance of *The Mastersingers*), and that in the afternoon, when the timetable would be more flexible.

The longest single day is thus C's (Day 2: 1593 lines), but to make up for this he also has the shortest (Day 1: 943), and his 1321 lines on Day 3 keeps him well below A. I should guess that C was the least experienced member of the team: his part is well calculated to let him gain confidence and experience, and his material is mostly straightforward, ending with the *bravura* of the games. Next in ascending order of experience I should put B: numerically Day 1 is his biggest day, but on Day 2 he has Hektor and Andromache (6) and on Day 3 Achilles and Hektor (22), both dramatically important episodes; he needs a good memory, too, with the catalogue in 2 and the shield in 18. A is clearly the strong man of the team: fully experienced, he can open the sessions; in good health, he can carry far the heaviest load of lines; and his material includes such important episodes as the quarrel (1), Diomedes' *aristeia* (5), the embassy (9), the fight at the ships (13), the fighting over Patroklos (17) and the battle by the river (21). D, I suspect, was the author himself: though he has not kept all the 'fat' for himself, and does not altogether shirk the exertion of a long recitation (16 and 24 are both above the average length), it is noticeable that his main efforts come at the end of the day, and that with the breach of the truce in 4, the fight at the wall in 12, the killing of Patroklos in 16, the theomachy in 20 and the ransoming of Hektor in 24 he has opportunities for displaying his skill and experience.<sup>28</sup> It should not be forgotten, either, that if D was the author the whole direction of the performance would have to be done by him, including probably the prompting.

This is a part of the case for design which the believers in large-scale interpolation have never yet, to my knowledge, had to meet. Kirk himself [*cf.* *SH* 263–5] is not more sceptical about 'geometrical' correspondences in the *Iliad* than I am;<sup>29</sup> but arithmetical relationships of the sort described above seem to me to be on a different footing, because an inborn sense of scale is, after all, one of the necessary qualifications for an artist, and the arithmetical relationships which the *Iliad* suggests are neither so close nor so rigid as to inhibit the play of the artist's emotions. Indeed, though I would not be understood as implying that considerations of numerical, and above all temporal, relations such as I have attempted to demonstrate above

<sup>28</sup> The importance of Book 8 is shown by the attention which Karl Reinhardt paid to it in his *Die Ilias und ihr Dichter* (ed. U. Hölscher [Göttingen 1961] 138–211).

<sup>29</sup> *Cf.* my review of T. B. L. Webster, *From Mycenae to Homer* and C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (*CR* ns 9 [1959] 231).

could have been consciously present to Homer's mind when he was composing his *Wrath of Achilles*, Reinhardt in his posthumous *Die Ilias und ihr Dichter* (above, note 28) was able to give many examples of passages in which, as it seemed to him, the poet was revising himself—and it is at least possible that one of the motives for such revision might be the wish to improve the relative scale of different episodes. In the song school of which the man whom they called Homeros was *ex hypothesi* the head, even the master's works must have run the gauntlet of criticism by his senior pupils and potential successors; and that criticism may have turned as much on problems of public relations as on those of narrative consistency or verbal felicity. The *Iliad* was, for anything we know to the contrary, the first (and also very nearly the last)<sup>30</sup> Greek narrative poem on a truly 'monumental' scale to be constructed according to what mediaeval critics called the *ordo artificialis*; its first public performance might fairly be expected by those who were to be concerned in the occasion, whether as performers or simply as members of the school, to be an event of great professional importance, and it is reasonable to suppose that there was long and anxious discussion between the author and his intended reciters about problems of organization and distribution. It does not therefore seem to me entirely fanciful to suppose that Homer produced several oral versions, whether full-length or in the form of more or less extended synopses, before he and his amanuenses (were they the three other members of the team?) set to work on the production of a 'stabilized' text in writing. This stabilized text was not, of course, intended for publication in anything like the modern sense of the word; it was not intended that there should be more than one copy, and that copy would be the author's property, to be kept in the school, or perhaps to be given as a valuable asset to some individual upon a special occasion.<sup>31</sup> Whether this copy was written on prepared skins (*διφθέραι*) or on papyrus rolls imported from Egypt via Byblos, the text need not have been much more bulky than the book-texts of Roman Imperial times; the writing may have been larger and less tidy than the best bookhands of later times, but there was probably more economy in the use of the material (smaller margins and the

<sup>30</sup> Its only serious competitor is the *Odyssey*; and I do not think that anyone who has worked through both poems with really close attention to questions of structure would argue that the *Odyssey* shows a poetical technique nearly so complex as that of the *Iliad*.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. the story, already it seems known to Pindar (fr. 265 Snell<sup>3</sup>), that Homer gave his daughter the *Cypria* as her dowry (the authority is Ael. *VH* 9.15).

like), and the supposed difficulties of transport, at which Page has poked a little fun (*Antiquity* 36 [1962] 310: “carried about in carts”), would not be likely to arise often, if at all. There is no evidence that the author of the *Iliad* ever surrendered his copy of the poem to anyone else in his lifetime, and he may well have gone on tinkering at it himself for years. The reflection that “a work of art is never finished” is sometimes ascribed to Paul Valéry, but he was not the first to act on it; and Homeric critics have obviously felt the same about the *Iliad*—they have been trying for millennia (since the time of Zoilos, at least) and are still trying, poor fellows, to rewrite it—but without success.

It may thus fairly be claimed that there is no evidence in Thucydides for the proposition that Homer’s text of the *Iliad* underwent large-scale interpolation after its author’s death, and that there is even less evidence in other authors for this proposition than can be marshalled against it. If, as Kirk thinks [*HPH* 9, 32] the *Doloneia* (Book 10) is an interpolation of the period between the “first monumental composition” in the late eighth century and the reorganization of the Panathenaic competitions by ‘Hipparchus’ about 530 B.C., the *Doloneia* as we have it must, in my judgement, have superseded something of about the same length and of not altogether dissimilar content.<sup>32</sup> Our Book 10 may be an “afterthought,” but it has not yet been proved that the afterthought was anyone but Homer’s; the onus of proof is on those who seek to athetize it, and that onus they have not yet successfully discharged. It is understandable that, after all that the *Analytiker* have written in the last three hundred years, professional students of Homer are chary of proclaiming belief in the unity and substantial integrity of our *Iliad*; but what the *Iliad* needs now is not so much disintegrating analysis as understanding.<sup>33</sup>

### ADDENDUM

I had already completed the foregoing and submitted it to a journal for publication before I saw Professor J. A. Notopoulos’ “Studies in

<sup>32</sup> This is not the place to argue the point; but the despondency of the Achaean leaders at the end of Book 9, though slightly less than at the beginning of the book (*i.e.* at the end of Book 8) seems to need some kind of success, on however small a scale, to put them (and the troops) in good heart for the next day’s fighting. This the *Doloneia* supplies, and at the same time foreshadows the less active role to be played by Nestor from the middle of 11 onwards.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. U. Friedländer, *de Zoilo aliisque Homeri obtrectatoribus* (Diss. Königsberg 1895) 48: *nemo velim obliviscatur, scholiorum non esse, Homerum vituperare, sed explicare.*

Early Greek Oral Poetry" (*HSCP* 68 [1964] 1–77). Most of the points on which he and I agree and disagree will be plain to anyone who reads both papers, but two things seem to me to need emphasizing:

(1) I have never been able to accept the view, which is fundamental to Notopoulos' argument, that the evident analogies between Yugoslav heroic song and the κλέα ἀνδρῶν of *Iliad* 9 and *Odyssey* 8 can be so extrapolated as to cover the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Above all, I do not believe that Homer composed either poem to be sung to a musical accompaniment; everything that we are told about the activities of rhapsodes is based on the belief that these men recited other men's poems without musical accompaniment, and it is my belief that Homer's school invented both monumental epic poetry and the specialized activity of the rhapsode as a response to the introduction of the alphabet and the coming of literacy. Notopoulos' calculations (3–12) thus seem to me entirely irrelevant to the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*.

(2) In his discussion of the relative dating of Arktinos *et al.*, Hesiod and Homer (37–40), Notopoulos is guilty of a chronological fallacy: he accepts the traditional dates for Arktinos and the rest, while dating Homer and Hesiod on the lower chronology preferred by modern scholars ( $\pm 700$ ); he should either give traditional dates all round, with Homer and Hesiod  $\pm 830$  (*Hdt.* 2.53.3) or stick to the modern dating—which knows nothing of Arktinos and co. at all!

UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

May, 1965