

On the Antecedents of Aristotle's Bipartite Psychology

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THIS ESSAY is concerned with the antecedents of Aristotle's bipartite or moral psychology.¹ It considers two common theses: (1) Aristotle's bipartite psychology is in origin a popular psychology already present (though not clearly formulated) in Euripides' *Medea* and *Hippolytus*; (2) Aristotle's bipartite psychology developed out of tripartition by collapsing together the two lower elements of tripartition. Roughly, I shall be qualifying the first and rejecting the second thesis. In both cases I hope to develop and make more precise the origins of Aristotle's bipartite psychology.

I

It is generally recognized that Euripides' depiction of Medea in the tragedy bearing her name and of Phaedra in the *Hippolytus* involves some sort of distinction between passion and reasoned deliberation, and that this distinction is important for understanding the development of Greek psychology and ethics.² In particular the famous monologues of Medea (*Med.* 1021–80) and Phaedra (*Hipp.* 373–430) are said to present a kind of psychic dichotomy that anticipates in some way

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² See, for example, F. Dirlmeier, "Vom Monolog der Dichtung zum 'inneren' Logos bei Platon und Aristoteles," *Gymnasium* 67 (1960) 31–32; M. Pohlenz, *Freedom in Greek Life and Thought* (New York 1966) 67; H. Görgemanns, *Beiträge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi* (*Zetemata* 25, München 1960) 159; J. J. Walsh, *Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness* (New York 1963) 16–22. See also my n.31 in "Aristotle: Emotion and Moral Virtue," *Arethusa* 2 (1969) 184.

the dichotomy of Aristotle's bipartite or moral psychology. In this section I want to clarify this thesis. First I shall try to make more precise the way in which Euripides' *Medea* may be said to anticipate and elucidate Aristotle's moral psychology. Then I shall point out that Euripides' characterization of Phaedra differs significantly from his characterization of Medea and that this characterization of Phaedra cannot be used without considerable qualification to illustrate Aristotle's bipartite psychology.

It is true, I think, that the *Medea* as a whole and the famous monologue in particular are especially useful for illustrating and understanding Aristotle's moral psychology, because they distinguish implicitly spirit or emotion from *both* deliberation about means *and* also reasoned reflection about emotional response. Medea's monologue implies two distinctions that have been present earlier in the play and that are essential for an understanding of Aristotle's bipartite psychology. Bipartition is not a simple dichotomy between emotional response and means-end deliberation alone. Rather it is a dichotomy between emotional response on the one hand and means-end deliberation *together with* reasoned reflection about emotional response on the other.³ Let me develop this point by considering relevant portions of the *Medea*.

At the beginning of the play we learn from the nurse that Medea is filled with hate and grief (16, 24-35), because she thinks herself dishonored by Jason (20, 26). Medea's emotional state is not in doubt. What is in doubt, and what especially troubles the nurse, is Medea's plans or deliberations (*βουλευέειν* 37). Here we have a partial expression of the dichotomy of bipartition. Medea's anger and grief, or more generally her emotions, are distinguished from the deliberations that follow upon and are given direction by her emotions. Considering herself outraged and so desiring revenge, Medea must deliberate about how to achieve revenge. Some way or means must

³ A proper understanding of the dichotomy of bipartition is an essential prerequisite for an adequate understanding of Aristotle's distinction between moral virtue (*ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*) and practical wisdom (*φρόνησις*). As the psychic dichotomy does not oppose emotional response to means-end deliberation alone, so the distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom is not a simple distinction between perfection in regard to emotional response and perfection in regard to means-end deliberation alone. Practical wisdom has as its province both deliberation about means and reflection about emotional response, because the dichotomy of bipartition groups together both these performances and distinguishes them from emotional response. See *infra* n.11.

be discovered (260) before her emotion and desire for revenge can be translated effectively into action.

The same distinction between emotional response and means-end deliberation is implied later when Creon confronts Medea and orders her to leave Corinth. Creon acknowledges being frightened of Medea, and explains his fear by pointing out that Medea is clever (*σοφή* 285) and pained at the loss of Jason's love (286). In other words, Medea is not only angered by Jason's behavior but is capable of following up her anger with successful deliberations about means to achieve revenge. This same distinction between emotion and cleverness occurs again when Creon says that he fears lest Medea be planning something (317) and then adds that a sharp-tempered (*ὀξύθυμος* 319) person is easier to guard against than a silent but clever (*σοφός* 320) person. A sharp-tempered person responds emotionally straightway and without deliberation. The silent and clever person does not act without deliberation. In his case anger is the occasion for deliberation about means.

Emotion is distinct from means-end deliberation, and this distinction is part of the dichotomy of bipartition. Emotion is also distinguished from reasoned reflection about emotional response, and this distinction, too, is part of the dichotomy of bipartition. We can gain a clearer understanding of this latter distinction if we consider Medea's first meeting with Jason. During this meeting Medea criticizes herself for having followed and aided Jason, describing herself as eager (*πρόθυμος* 485) rather than wise (*σοφοτέρα* 485). Medea does not, of course, mean that her actions on behalf of Jason were lacking in cleverness. On the contrary she makes clear that without her skills Jason would never have escaped danger. (She begins and ends her opening statement with the claim to have saved Jason [476, 515].) Her point is simply that reason was not controlling emotion when she aided Jason. Her actions were motivated by the particular emotion of love.⁴ With this piece of self-analysis Jason is in full agreement. He credits Medea with a subtle mind (529) but restricts her clever deliberations to means-end reasoning. Love was dominant and determined the course of her deliberations (527–31). Medea's cleverness at finding the means to effect a desired goal is never in doubt. All Greece knows that Medea is clever (*σοφὴν* 539). But if she is skilled in

⁴ At the opening of the play the chorus made clear that in regard to Medea's emotional side (*θυμὸν* 8), love (*ἔρωτι* 8) was dominant. Cf. 330 and 530.

means-end deliberations following upon emotional response, she is not similarly effective in reflecting upon and altering her emotional response in accordance with reasoned consideration (*cf.* 600). In contrast Jason's actions—or so Jason claims—are guided by reasoned reflection. He is not motivated by desire (556). He has considered (*βεβούλευμαι* 567) his actions and their consequences and so can claim to be wise (*σοφός* 548).⁵

A similar distinction between emotion and reasoned reflection appears during the second meeting of Medea and Jason (866–93). In the course of this meeting, the emotion of Medea is alleged to be under the control of reasoned reflection. Medea begins by asking Jason to pardon her anger (*ὀργάς* 870) and by saying that she has engaged in discussion (*λόγων* 872) with herself. Then she subjects her angry emotion to criticism (873–81) and indicates that she will give up her anger (*θυμοῦ* 879). Claiming to have considered (*ἐννοήσας* 882) her children and the impending exile without friends, Medea states that she has exhibited a lack of good sense (*ἀβουλίαν* 882, *ἄφρων* 885) and that her anger has been foolish (883). She admits that her previous conduct was unreasonable but claims now to have considered (*βεβούλευμαι* 893) the matter and come to a better understanding. Jason is fooled by Medea's speech and replies sympathetically. He allows that Medea's anger (*ὀργάς* 909) was after all quite natural and that now at last Medea has come to better reasoning (*βουλήν* 913). He credits Medea with having reflected reasonably and having altered her emotions in accordance with reason.

Emotion, then, may be distinguished from reasoned reflection as well as from means-end deliberation. It is now time to look at Medea's monologue which, as I have suggested, implies both distinctions and so may be said to illustrate fully the dichotomy of bipartition. Medea begins the monologue by reflecting upon the evil consequences of her actions, by considering the personal loss involved in killing her children (1021–39). This reflection, together with the pathetic sight of her children,⁶ causes her to alter briefly her intentions. She abandons

⁵ Jason would say, of course, that in some sense his actions, too, are guided by emotion. He would say that he is motivated by feelings of friendly affection, by a desire to aid and preserve Medea and her children (595, 620). But he would add that his emotional responses and subsequent plans can stand and have stood the test of reasoned reflection. While Medea's emotions motivate her to act in unreasonable ways, Jason's emotions do not. At least, Jason thinks he can defend and justify his own behavior.

⁶ It would be wrong to say that Medea's reasoned reflections alone effected a momentary

her plans (*βουλεύματα*) and states that she will take her children away with her (1040–48). But her desire for full revenge returns swiftly. She chides herself for having listened to soft arguments (*μαλθακοὺς λόγους*) and sends the children indoors to await death (1049–55). Then for a second time she falters, addressing her spirit (*θυμός*) and pointing out the joy that the children can bring in exile (1056–58). This time her hesitation is of even shorter duration. Once again she determines to kill the children. She is quite conscious of the terrible path that she has chosen for herself and the even more terrible path that she has chosen for the children (1067–68). But now she does not falter. She understands (*μανθάνω*) that her forthcoming deed is evil (1078), but she also realizes that her reasoned reflections are unable to alter her angry desire for full revenge. As she puts it, *θυμός* is stronger than *βουλεύματα* (1079).

By means of this monologue Euripides has depicted a mother torn between an angry desire for total revenge and the realization that total revenge is in the long run an evil for herself and her children. From a dramatic point of view, the monologue does not set forth explicitly the dichotomy of bipartition. For reasoned reflection and means-end deliberation are on different sides of Medea's dilemma. Her reflections enable her to see the horror of her planned revenge and so argue for abandoning the plans that bring total revenge. But if the dichotomy of bipartition is not dramatically set forth in this monologue, it is, I think, clearly implicit in the monologue. Medea's emotions are distinguished from her *βουλεύματα*. And these *βουλεύματα* include both the deliberate plans (1044, 1048) which follow upon and are given direction by emotion and also the reflections (1079) which consider the reasonableness of emotion and on occasion alter emotion. It would be, of course, overstatement to say that by using *βουλεύματα* in an inclusive sense, Euripides has captured (consciously) the dichotomy of bipartition: deliberation and reflection in contrast with emotional response. But it can be said that this double usage of *βουλεύματα* encourages the dichotomy of bipartition, that the dichotomy is implicit or latent in Medea's monologue, so that the monologue can be used with caution to illustrate the dichotomy of bipartition.⁷

change in her emotional response and planned revenge. Certainly the sight of her children contributed to her momentary change. But so did her reflections, and it is these reasoned reflections that are of especial interest.

⁷ H. D. Voigtländer, "Spätere Überarbeitungen im grossen Medeamonolog," *Philologus*

It is this dichotomy with which Aristotle works and which enables him at one time to treat reason as something that follows emotion and at another time to treat reason as something that controls emotion. When Aristotle says that the alogical soul is obedient to reason (*EN* 1098a4, 1002b31), he is thinking primarily of reasoned reflection and

101 (1957) 228; A. Lesky, in *Euripide, Sept exposés et discussions* (Genève 1960) 83; and E. Schlesinger, "Zu Euripides' Medea," *Hermes* 94 (1966) 29–30, point out correctly that *βουλευματα* is not restricted to a single, well defined (technical) usage. Certainly it is wrong to think that Euripides is operating with some clearly formulated psychology (like Plato's tripartite psychology, Schlesinger 29). But we can say that the opposition between *θυμός* and *βουλευματα* reflects an everyday distinction employed by ordinary men in describing human action and subsequently formulated in the dichotomy of bipartition. H. Strohm, *Euripides* (*Zetemata* 15, München 1957) 103 n.1, seems to go too far when he says that *βουλευματα* cannot be selected as a label to designate the opposite of *θυμός* because in 1079 *βουλευμάτων* refers only to the preceding *μανθάνω*, while in 1048 *βουλευματα* is used for the murder plans. Instead of ruling out *βουλευματα*, this double usage may be thought to qualify *βουλευματα* as a technical label for one-half of the dichotomy of bipartition. Taking *βουλευματα* inclusively so as to include both deliberations about means (murder plans) and reflections about emotional response (whether this kind of angry response is an over-response), we can see in the usage of *βουλευματα* and its opposition to *θυμός* a striking anticipation of Aristotle's logical soul and its opposition to *τὸ ἄλογον*.

H. Diller, "*Θυμός δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων*," *Hermes* 94 (1966) 273–75, followed by H. Rohdich, *Die Euripideische Tragödie* (Heidelberg 1968) 64, does not recognize in Euripides a wide usage of *βουλευματα* signifying deliberation and reflection in general. He interprets 1079 so that anger rules or guides (*κρείσσων*, cf. Walsh [*supra* n.2] 19, who seems to have anticipated Diller) Medea's plans (*βουλευμάτων* having the same reference as *βουλευματα* in 1044 and 1048). This thesis seems to me unacceptable. In the first place it seems more natural to construe *βουλευμάτων* (1079) closely with *μανθάνω* (1078). By reasoned reflection Medea has learned that she is about to do evil (1078). But her reflections are powerless to affect her emotion, so that she declares her angry emotion stronger than her reasoned reflections (1079). In the second place and more importantly, Diller's argument seems to focus too closely on the single word *βουλευματα* and on the monologue itself. We should, I think, take note of Medea's second meeting with Jason (866–93). For in the course of this meeting the emotion of Medea is said to be controlled by reasoned reflection, and this reflection is twice (893, 913) referred to by words cognate with *βουλευματα*. Perhaps similarities in vocabulary should not be pressed. Still, it may be observed that this exchange between Medea and Jason agrees with the monologue in opposing *θυμός* or a cognate form (879, 883, 1056, 1079) to *βουλεύειν* or a cognate form (reflections: 882, 893, 913, 1079; plans or deliberations: 874, 1044, 1048) and in using the word *λόγος* in reference to reasoned reflection about emotional response (872, 1052). More important, however, is an agreement in content. Both passages oppose emotional response to reasoned reflection. Both passages indicate one important respect in which emotion is commonly opposed to reason. Emotional responses are subject to rational criticism and in many cases can be altered by reasoned reflection. Indeed, Medea's words to Jason are able to deceive just because Jason assumes that reasonable consideration will guide emotional response. Of course Jason is deceived in this matter. But as a working hypothesis his assumption is not foolish. Much of the time reflection is able to guide emotional response. But not always. For in Medea's monologue it becomes clear that reason can fail, that emotion may be stronger than reasoned reflection (1079, cf. 447, 590).

its ability to control and alter emotion. A virtuous man subjects his emotional responses to reasoned reflection.⁸ He contrasts with Medea in that he heeds reason, altering or abandoning his emotional responses according to the dictates of reasoned reflection.⁹ Still, the virtuous man is like Medea in regard to means-end deliberation. In this respect his reason may be said to follow his emotion. When Aristotle says that moral virtue makes correct the goal and practical wisdom the means (*EN* 1144a7–9, 1145a5–6), he is thinking primarily of means-end deliberation in relation to emotional response. Means-end deliberation follows upon and is given direction by emotional response.¹⁰ Since the latter is the province of moral virtue, and the former of practical wisdom, Aristotle can say that moral virtue makes correct the goal and practical wisdom the means without implying that practical wisdom is altogether restricted to means-end deliberations.¹¹ The distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom is

⁸ A qualification is necessary. A virtuous man subjects his emotional responses to reasoned reflection when time permits. The virtuous man confronted with sudden danger does not have time to reflect. He must respond out of character and without reasoning (*EN* 1117a17–22). To illustrate further emotional response in sudden situations we may take a hint from Plutarch (*Moralia* 475A) and refer to Odysseus' meeting with the dog Argos. When Odysseus and Eumaios reach the palace, they come upon the ancient and all but dead Argos. The dog recognizes his former master and struggles in vain to move off the dung heap where he lies. Odysseus is moved by the pathetic sight of Argos and turns aside to wipe away a tear, unnoticed by Eumaios (*Od.* 17.291–305). As Plutarch comments, Odysseus fell into this situation quite suddenly and unexpectedly (475A). His behavior is not the result of reasoning (whether reflection about how one should respond to the situation or deliberation about how to prepare for the situation). Rather it is an expression of emotion quite in keeping with Odysseus' character. He sheds a tear but also turns away and so escapes the notice of Eumaios. We can contrast this response with Odysseus' behavior a little earlier when reviled by the goatherd Melanthios. The words of Melanthios stir the heart of Odysseus (17.215–16). But after reflection Odysseus restrains himself (17.235–38). On this occasion Odysseus has time to reflect and to permit reason to control his emotional response.

⁹ We may add that the virtuous man heeds not only his own reasoned reflections but also those of other men. Unlike the sullen man who hides anger within himself, so that no one can persuade him to give up his anger (*EN* 1126a23–24), the virtuous man pays attention to the reasoned arguments of others.

¹⁰ Cf. *Rhet.* 1383a6–7, where Aristotle says that fear makes men deliberate. In other words, emotional response is often the occasion for means-end deliberation.

¹¹ I agree with D. J. Allen, *The Philosophy of Aristotle* (London 1952) 181–82, that Aristotle never wanted to restrict practical wisdom to means-end deliberations. But I cannot agree with Allen insofar as he (following R. Loening, *Die Zurechnungslehre des Aristoteles* [Jena 1903]) assumes an identity between the alogical soul of bipartition and the sensitive and motive faculties of the scientific psychology. Comparisons with the scientific psychology will not help and may impede an adequate understanding of why the logical soul of bipartition is not restricted to means-end deliberation. To understand Aristotle's dichotomy

founded upon the dichotomy of bipartition, and this dichotomy is in a way complex. Reason is related to emotion not only as deliberation that follows emotion but also as reflection that can control emotion.

The *Medea* can also help us to understand Aristotle's assertion in the *Politics* (1260a13) that women possess the deliberative faculty (*τὸ βουλευτικόν*), but lacking in authority (*ἄκυρον*). Aristotle does not mean that women cannot think straight. He is well aware that many women are like Medea in being able to deliberate and reflect. Aristotle's point is that their reasoning does not control their emotion. Just as Medea engaged in reflections concerning her response to Jason's betrayal but was not able to control her response, so for Aristotle women are able to reflect and in general to deliberate (they possess *τὸ βουλευτικόν*) but are unable to guide their emotions by reasoned reflection. In the case of women, reasoning is effective or authoritative only in the sphere of means-end deliberation. Within this area the deliberations of women can be most effective, and indeed disastrous. Women can be most clever contrivers of every kind of evil (409). But in the area of reasoned reflection about emotional response, a woman's reasoning is not authoritative. It cannot effectively guide or alter emotional response.

We may be tempted to go on and illustrate further Aristotle's view of women by reference to Euripides' *Hippolytus*. For in this play Phaedra is presented as a woman who knows that she is behaving improperly but is unable to control her behavior. Like Medea, Phaedra reflects upon her dilemma in an impressive monologue and describes her weakness as a common failing: "We know and apprehend the good but do not bring it to fulfillment" (380–81). Phaedra recognizes that women are generally despised (406, cf. *Med.* 407–09, 889–90), and may be thought to illustrate together with Medea Aristotle's view of women. Here caution is necessary, for the characterization of Phaedra differs considerably from the characterization of Medea. Phaedra's behavior is not a clear case of uncontrolled emotional response. Unlike Medea, who perceives herself outraged,¹² and so responds angrily, Phaedra is said to be afflicted by a disease (*νόσος* and cognates, 40, 131, 176, 186, 205, 269, 279, 283, 293, 294, 393, 405, we should keep in mind that emotional response (which includes cognition as well as sensation and drive) is related to reasoning in two different ways. As the *Medea* illustrates, an enraged person may engage in reasoning either to realize a goal or to reflect upon his emotional state.

¹² See *infra* n.18.

463, 477). Diseases are not open to reasoned reflection in the way that anger and other emotions are. Anger invites reasoned criticism and is frequently abandoned, if shown to be unreasonable. A disease, however, is not an emotion and is not given up, if shown to be unreasonable. Indeed, diseases are neither reasonable nor unreasonable. They are afflictions that must be cured. While an emotion like anger is grounded upon evaluation or assessment (e.g. "Jason has treated me unjustly," *Med.* 26), a disease is not. It is caused by bodily disorder. So long as Phaedra is viewed as a victim of disease, her behavior is significantly different from that of Medea and cannot be used without considerable qualification to illustrate Aristotle's view of women and bipartite psychology in general. A disease may be the occasion for means-end deliberation (how to restore health), but it does not invite reasoned reflection in the way that an emotion like anger does. Anger or fear or any similar emotion is not only the occasion for means-end deliberation; it also admits reflection concerning the reasonableness of the emotion itself.

Reasoning, then, is related to emotion in two distinguishable ways. This twofold relationship between reason and emotion is fundamental to Aristotle's moral psychology. It determines his account of moral virtue and practical wisdom and also his view of women. Still, this twofold relationship is not an Aristotelian discovery. It was ready at hand in popular thought and more or less clearly implied in a tragedy like Euripides' *Medea*. Aristotle along with other members of the Academy gave the dichotomy formal recognition, but they did not invent it.

II

If Aristotle's bipartite psychology developed out of a popular distinction between reason and emotion as explained in the preceding section, can it also be said to have developed out of Plato's tripartite psychology? More precisely, did Aristotle's own moral psychology develop through bringing together the *θυμοειδές* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν* of tripartition? Here I think we must say not only that Aristotle's bipartite psychology is significantly different from such a bipartite version of tripartition¹³ but also that Aristotle himself was aware of the

¹³ Elsewhere ("Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 [1970] 40–70) I have argued that Aristotle's moral psychology is significantly different from tripartition, because tripartition did not draw a clear distinction between emotional responses and bodily drives. Aristotle's moral psychology is a dichotomy between reasoning

difference and prepared to criticize bipartition whenever it took the form of a simplified tripartition. Perhaps I can support this claim, and at the same time clear up a persistent misunderstanding, by focusing upon the criticism of bipartition advanced in the *De Anima*.

Here (432a22–b7) at the beginning of his account of locomotion, Aristotle makes some prefatory remarks about psychic divisions and criticizes cursorily both those persons who offer a tripartite psychology and those who offer a bipartite psychology (432a24–26). It has been widely assumed and sometimes stated that this criticism of persons advancing bipartition is in part at least a self-criticism. Aristotle's remarks, we are told, are directed not only against members of the Academy who may have developed or advanced a bipartite psychology, but also against Aristotle himself, insofar as he employed bipartition both in earlier writings like the *Protrepticus* and *De Justitia* and in more mature treatises like the *Ethics* and *Politics*.¹⁴ This view seems to me unacceptable. I want to suggest that Aristotle's criticism of bipartition is not a self-criticism. His remarks are directed against members of the Academy who had simply altered tripartition by collapsing the spirited and appetitive elements into a single psychic part and thereby created a particular kind of bipartite psychology. Aristotle's own bipartite or moral psychology differs in important ways from this Academic version and so should not be confused with it.

We may begin by considering two passages that create difficulties for anyone who tries to identify the bipartition criticized in the *De Anima* with Aristotle's own moral psychology. One of these passages occurs in Book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1097b33–1098a5). Here

and emotional response—those *πάθη* that necessarily involve some assessment and so are amenable to reason. In contrast, bodily drives are caused by physiological disturbance and are in general not remedied by reasoned reflection.

¹⁴ That Aristotle's criticism of bipartition applies in some way to his own bipartite psychology either is stated explicitly or seems to be implied in the comments of the following scholars: Simpl. 289.7–19; Philop. 547.1; E. Wallace, *Aristotle's Psychology* (Cambridge 1882) 284; R. Heinze, *Xenokrates* (Leipzig 1892) 142; R. D. Hicks, *Aristotle, De Anima* (Cambridge 1907) 550, cf. 300; D. A. Rees, "Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy," *JHS* 77 (1957) 118; R. Gauthier and J. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Louvain 1959) 2.93; W. Theiler, *Aristoteles, Über die Seele* (Berlin 1959) 149–50; Sir David Ross, *Aristotle, De Anima* (Oxford 1961) 312; A. Jannone and E. Barbotin, *Aristote, De L'Ame* (Paris 1966) 109; D. W. Hamlyn, *Aristotle's De Anima* (Oxford 1968) 150. Cf. H. v. Arnim, "Das Ethische in Aristoteles Topik," *SB Wien* 205.4 (1927) 7, 66; P. Moraux, *Le Dialogue "Sur la Justice"* (Louvain 1957) 43–44; F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik*⁸ (Berlin 1964) 278; *Aristoteles, Magna Moralia* (Berlin 1958) 164.

The comments of F. Trendelenburg, *Aristoteles, De Anima Libri Tres* (Berlin 1877) 441,

Aristotle is trying to pin down the function of man. Toward this end he introduces first the nutritive life of plants, then the sensitive life of animals, and finally the practical life of the rational element. At this point he adds a note to the effect that the rational element is twofold: one part being obedient to reason and the other part possessing it and being deliberative (1098a4–5).¹⁵ This note is important, for it clearly relates Aristotle's bipartite or moral psychology to his scientific psychology. The division between the alogical and logical halves of the moral psychology occurs within the scientific faculty of intellect. The division does not coincide with the scientific division between sensation and intellect. The reason for this is clear enough.¹⁶ Bipartition is a human psychology that is useful for explaining intelligent (human) actions.¹⁷ It is based upon a distinction between emotional response (which is intelligent in that it necessarily involves certain kinds of cognitions¹⁸) and reasoned deliberation. The alogical

and of G. Rodier, *Aristote, Traité de L'Ame* (Paris 1900) 2.529–530, suggest that the *De Anima*'s criticism does not apply to Aristotle's bipartite psychology because Aristotle does not commit himself to separate soul parts. Trendelenburg and Rodier are correct in ruling out Aristotle's own bipartite psychology as an object of criticism, but their reason does not get to the heart of the matter. The *De Anima* passage is concerned not only with whether or not there are spatially separate psychic parts (432a20), but also and primarily with how many parts or faculties are to be recognized (432a23). The advocates of bipartition are being criticized especially for having failed to distinguish adequately between the several psychic parts or faculties (432a24–26). And in this regard the criticisms developed in the *De Anima* do not seem to attack Aristotle's own brand of bipartition. Even if Aristotle's bipartite psychology did involve a commitment to separable psychic parts (and it did not, *EN* 1102a28–32), this particular bipartite psychology would not seem to be under attack. As we shall see, the attack of the *De Anima* is directed against an Academic version of bipartition that differs in fundamental ways from Aristotle's own bipartite or moral psychology.

¹⁵ On the genuineness of this note see my article (*supra* n.2) 181–82 n.22.

¹⁶ See my article (*supra* n.2) 173–77, in which I have tried to explain why the divisions of the moral and scientific psychologies do not coincide neatly.

¹⁷ Cf. Moraux (*supra* n.14) 44, 47 and Simplicius *In de An.* 289.15–16.

¹⁸ On the necessary involvement of cognition in emotional response, see my article referred to *supra* n.13. Here again it may be useful to refer to Euripides' *Medea*. At the outset of the play the nurse tells us that Medea perceives herself dishonored (26, cf. 20) and so is filled with hate and grief (16, 24–35). Her emotional condition is not in doubt. It is Medea's deliberations that are unknown and of especial concern to the nurse (37). We should note that the nurse's remarks do not suggest a dichotomy that locates all cognition on the side of deliberation. Part of being angry is perceiving or thinking oneself outraged (26). This evaluation, together with the desire for revenge, may be distinguished both from the means-end deliberations that follow upon emotional response and also from the reasoned reflections that consider the emotional response—that is, the reasoning that asks

soul is primarily the capacity for emotional response, while the logical soul is primarily the capacity for reasoned deliberation. Both acts are intelligent, so that both capacities are cognitive. In contrast, the scientific faculty of sensation is not cognitive and so can be possessed by animals that cannot act intelligently.

It is, of course, possible to extend the alogical soul to include non-cognitive functions like nutrition and sensation. Aristotle does this in respect to nutrition at *EN* 1102a32–b12 (cf. *EE* 1219b31–32). But neither nutrition nor sensation are essential components of the alogical soul.¹⁹ Bipartition is fundamentally a distinction between two kinds of intelligent action. Moreover, there can be no serious question about including either nutrition or sensation in the logical soul of Aristotle's moral psychology. Aristotle cannot seriously suggest that someone might try to house the scientific faculty of sensation within the logical soul of his own moral psychology. Such an attempt would be foolish. In regard to Aristotle's own bipartite psychology the assignment of sensation is clear. It is properly located outside (or "below") the dichotomy, though the alogical soul can be extended ("downward") to include it. And if this is true, difficulties arise for anyone who will refer the criticisms of bipartition advanced in the *De Anima* to Aristotle's own moral psychology. For in terms of Aristotle's own bipartite psychology, there can be no question concerning the assignation of the *αἰσθητικόν*. If the *De Anima* passage (432a30–31) presents a serious puzzle, it must be directed against a different version of bipartition that suggests the possibility of locating sensation in the logical as well as in the alogical part. As we shall see, the *Timaeus* suggests such a version of bipartition.²⁰

whether the evaluation is correct and the desired goal appropriate, so that the emotional response may be deemed reasonable and justifiable.

¹⁹ See Plutarch (*Moralia* 442b), who is correct insofar as he distinguishes the scientific faculties of nutrition and sensation from the alogical soul of bipartition on the grounds that nutrition and sensation are bodily off-shoots without any share in *λόγος*.

²⁰ It might be suggested that Aristotle is not presenting a "serious" puzzle or difficulty for bipartition. Aristotle says that the *αἰσθητικόν* cannot be classified easily as either alogical or logical (432a30–31), because he knows full well that his own scientific faculty of sensation is essentially outside the dichotomy of his own moral psychology. This suggestion seems to me unacceptable, not only because it reduces the stated difficulty to a mere quibble, but also because it fails to consider the entire criticism of bipartition advanced in this portion of the *De Anima*. In particular, it ignores the fact that Aristotle goes on to say that bipartition splits up the *ὀρεκτικόν* (432b3–6). This is not true of Aristotle's own bipartite psychology. When both criticisms of bipartition (432a30–31, 432b3–6) are considered together, it becomes most unlikely that Aristotle is criticizing his own moral psychology.

The second passage that causes difficulties occurs in the *Politics* (1334b6–28). Here Aristotle is concerned to point out that habituation is employed in education before *λόγος* is employed. In the course of his argument, Aristotle introduces his own moral psychology and locates *θυμός*, *βούλησις*, and *ἐπιθυμία* on the alogical side of the dichotomy (1334b22–23). This creates difficulties, if it is assumed that Aristotle’s criticism of bipartition in the *De Anima* is directed in part against his own moral psychology. For in the *De Anima* Aristotle locates *βούλησις* on the logical side (432b5). This location may be necessary, if Aristotle is going to charge bipartition with splitting up *ὄρεξις*. But the location needs considerable explanation if it is assumed that the bipartition in question is Aristotle’s own moral psychology. For as the *Politics* makes clear, Aristotle’s own bipartite psychology locates *βούλησις* on the alogical side.²¹

These difficulties can be removed if we understand that bipartition takes more than one form. The fact that in the *De Anima* Aristotle does not seem to include himself among the proponents of bipartition and then brings forth arguments largely ineffective against his own moral psychology becomes intelligible when we realize that Aristotle is not criticizing his own bipartite psychology. Rather he is criticizing a particular kind of bipartition that was developed in the Academy out of tripartition by bringing together the spirited and the appetitive faculties. A closer look at 432b5–6 will help to make this point clearer. Here Aristotle is criticizing bipartition, but instead of employing the label *τὸ λόγον ἔχον* to refer to the logical half, he uses the label *λογιστικόν*, which belongs to the vocabulary of tripartition (432a25). Is this a confusion? Perhaps, but only a very minor one. For Aristotle is

²¹ We cannot construe *De Anima* 432b5 to mean that *βούλησις* is a logical *ὄρεξις* only in that it responds to the injunctions of *λόγος* (see Alexander 74.6–13). The *De Anima* passage is quite clear in its wording. *βούλησις* is said “to occur in the *λογιστικόν*.” As at *Topics* 126a13, *βούλησις* is located in the *λογιστικόν*. W. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford 1902) 3.456, following Eaton, suggests that Aristotle’s usage of *βούλησις* is not uniform, for in the *Politics* *βούλησις* is connected with the alogical and not with the logical soul as in the *De Anima*. Certainly the word *βούλησις* is used in different ways. (See the remarks of H. G. Ingenkamp, *Untersuchungen zu den pseudoplatonischen Definitionen* [Wiesbaden 1967] 64–65.) For at least a partial understanding of the different usages of *βούλησις* and especially for a fuller understanding of why the *De Anima* and *Politics* differ in locating *βούλησις*, we should, I think, consider the possibility of two different kinds of bipartition: an Aristotelian version (*Pol.* 1334b6–28), and an Academic version that developed out of tripartition by bringing together the two lower faculties into a single *ἄλογον* (cf. *De An.* 432b5–6 with *Top.* 126a3–16, and see below).

criticizing a variety of bipartition which identifies the logical half of the dichotomy with the λογιστικόν of tripartition. Aristotle has in mind that kind of bipartition which is already suggested in the *Republic*²² and clearly indicated in the *Timaeus*—a dialogue which groups together the spirited and appetitive elements as the mortal soul and opposes this combination to the λογιστικόν as the immortal soul. Apparently tripartition and this related form of bipartition enjoyed a contemporaneous life within the Academy. At least the *Topics*, which seems frequently to reflect discussion within the Academy, introduces for illustrative purposes not only tripartition but also that version of bipartition which is a variation on tripartition (129a10–16).²³ We may suspect that, just as in the *Topics* Aristotle takes note of two closely related Academic psychologies, so in the *De Anima* he is concerned with members of the Academy, when he criticizes those who advance tripartition and those who advance bipartition (432a24–26).

The *Timaeus* can help us to understand Aristotle's charge that the αἰσθητικόν cannot be comfortably located in either the logical or alogical soul (432a30–31). While the *Timaeus* introduces tripartition and even assigns each of the three psychic parts its own bodily location, the *Timaeus*, as we have already said, presents a bipartite version of tripartition. The λογιστικόν is divine and elevated spatially to a seat in the head. The other two psychic parts are mortal and are located in the trunk of the body. For our purposes the important point is that the *Timaeus* not only employs this bipartite version of tripartition

²² At 439E5 Glaucon suggests that spirit is not some third psychic element but rather identical in nature to the appetitive element. At 571c3–572b1 Socrates describes two different kinds of sleep by opposing the λογιστικόν to the two lower elements. See Dirlmeier, *Nikomachische Ethik* (*supra* n.14) 278–79.

²³ To illustrate that a relative property may be a difference that holds usually and in most cases, the *Topics* distinguishes the λογιστικόν from the ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμικόν and states that the one commands and the other serves usually but not always (129a10–16). This passage from the *Topics* names the three psychic parts of tripartition. In this respect it agrees with *De Anima* 432a25, which also names the λογιστικόν, θυμικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν. However, it seems to differ from *De Anima* 432a25 in an important respect. While *De Anima* 432a25 is introducing tripartition in contrast with bipartition, the *Topics* passage appears to be dealing with a bipartite version of tripartition. By grouping together the θυμικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν in opposition to the λογιστικόν, the *Topics* passage creates a particular kind of bipartition—namely, that kind that is under consideration at *De Anima* 432b5–6 and that groups together spirit and appetite to form a single alogical faculty. On 129a10–16 and bipartition, see Dirlmeier, *Magna Moralia* (*supra* n.14) 164; on tripartition in the *Topics*, see v. Arnim, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.14).

but also attempts to handle sense perception. And this attempt seems to result in just the kind of difficulty which Aristotle asserts does occur when the sensitive faculty is referred to bipartition. For at one time the *Timaeus* seems to treat the λογιστικόν or immortal soul as the center of consciousness to which sensory motions are transmitted (43–44, 64B), and at another time it seems to associate the mortal soul with αἰσθησις (61C, 69D). In this regard certain passages are especially difficult, if not confusing. In explaining pleasure and pain, the *Timaeus* first connects sensation with the φρόνιμον (64B5, apparently the brain, which is the locus of the immortal soul or λογιστικόν)²⁴ and subsequently refers pleasurable sensations caused by sudden replenishments to the mortal soul (65A5). The sensation of taste is explained by reference to veins that are said to extend to the heart (which is in the region of the θυμοειδές) and that apparently do not continue on to the brain or seat of the λογιστικόν.²⁵ By contrast, the effect of bad odors is said to extend from the head to the navel (67A4–5) and so would seem to affect the entire soul, both its mortal and immortal portions.²⁶ Similarly, hearing is described as a process extending not only to the brain and head (67B3–4) but also to the liver (67B5).²⁷ And finally, discussing the maintenance of mortal creatures, the *Timaeus* first introduces plants, which are said to possess the ἐπιθυμητικόν and αἰσθησις (77B3–6),²⁸ and then considers veins, which not only water the

²⁴ See the note of A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford 1928) 447.

²⁵ The account of tastes is particularly perplexing. It is not explicitly said that the veins terminate at the heart, and so the possibility is left open that the veins continue on to the brain. Taylor, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.24) 465, assumes some kind of connection between the heart and the brain. F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London 1937) 270, suggests that the sense messages do not have to pass through the heart to reach the brain. Further, pungent tastes are associated with particles that rise toward the senses (or sense organs) in the head (65E7) and so seem to have little connection with the veins extending to the heart. F. Solmsen, "Antecedents of Aristotle's Psychology and Scale of Beings," *AJP* 76 (1955) 156 n.26, cautions that the heart is not strictly speaking the seat of the θυμοειδές (the heart is in the region of and closely associated with the θυμοειδές [70A7–D6] but is not its seat), and suggests that had Plato wished to indicate a connection between tongue and soul, he would have made the connection explicit. In whatever way we interpret this passage, we can, I think, say that it helps point up the difficulty of handling a scientific or biological faculty of sensation within the framework of a bipartite version of tripartition.

²⁶ For the navel as a boundary of the ἐπιθυμητικόν see 70E1, 77B4. See also Taylor, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.24) 476: "Since at 70E1 the navel is mentioned as the boundary of the tenement devised for the ἐπιθυμητικόν, the result is that smells affect the whole 'seat of the soul' from one end to the other."

²⁷ The liver is located in the region of the ἐπιθυμητικόν (71A7–B1).

²⁸ At 77A4–5 Timaios says that plants are endowed with αἰσθήσεις different from those

body but also divide in the region of the head and so seem to serve the brain and λογιστικόν in regard to sense perception (77D6–E6).²⁹ Whether or not we think that each of these passages presents a difficulty for the location of sensation within a bipartite version of tripartition, we can, I think, agree that collectively these passages do indicate a problem. We can agree³⁰ that in the *Timaeus* Plato has not altered sufficiently his psychic framework to house the scientific (i.e. biological) faculty of sensation. And we may suspect that when Aristotle criticizes bipartition for its inability to handle sensation, he is thinking of bipartition much as it appears in the *Timaeus*.³¹ He is thinking of certain members of the Academy who collapsed the spirited and appetitive faculties into one and so formed a bipartite version of tripartition.

This suspicion seems to be confirmed when we reflect again on Aristotle's charge that bipartition splits up ὄρεξις (432b4–6). Ad-

possessed by men. Hence when Timaios subsequently says that plants possess the third kind of soul, which concerns pleasant and painful αἰσθησις in conjunction with ἐπιθυμίαι (77B5–6), he would seem to be connecting the ἐπιθυμητικόν with αἰσθήσεις different from those possessed by man. This portion of the *Timaeus* would seem to have been partly responsible for Aristotle's insistence that there is no sixth sense (*De An.* 424b22–425b11). See Solmsen, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.25) 153.

²⁹ See Taylor, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.24) 546–47.

³⁰ With Solmsen, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.25) 154–55.

³¹ It is not surprising that the *De Anima*'s criticism of bipartition can be referred for elucidation to a literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*. We may compare how in Book I of the *De Anima* (406b26–407b11) Aristotle construes (too) literally the myth of the *Timaeus* and so can fault Timaios' account of the world soul. (See Ross, *op.cit.* [*supra* n.11] 189: "He (Ar.) may well be criticized as having taken the myth as if it were sober prose.") Certainly the objection to spatially separated parts (432a20) is directed most naturally against a version of bipartition (or tripartition) like that advanced in the *Timaeus*. For taken literally, the *Timaeus* has a different bodily seat for each psychic part. Still, it would be a mistake to think that Aristotle's criticism is directed only (or perhaps even primarily) against the *Timaeus*. (We might expect Aristotle to name Timaios as at 406b26.) Most probably Aristotle is criticizing a group (οἱ δέ 432a26) within the Academy who followed the lead of Plato's *Timaeus* and endeavored to handle biological soul functions within a particular bipartite framework. We may compare the ἀπορίαι considered by Aristotle toward the beginning of his discussion of moral weakness in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. First Aristotle introduces some men (τινες EN 1145b22) who deny the possibility of doing wrong knowingly. Here Aristotle mentions Socrates and is quite certainly referring to Plato's *Protagoras* (352B). After remarking that this view goes against the phenomena and needs further clarification, Aristotle turns to another group (τινες EN 1145b31) that tries to explain moral weakness by making a psychological distinction between knowledge, which is strong, and opinion, which is weak. Here Aristotle seems to have in mind certain members of the Academy who may have been influenced by a passage like *Timaeus* 51DE. See Dirlmeier, *Nikomachische Ethik* (*supra* n.14) 478.

dressed to his own version of bipartition, the charge is very odd. For Aristotle frequently refers to *ᾠρεξίς* as a mark of the alogical soul.³² He never refers it to the logical soul. Further (and this is the important point), *βούλησις* cannot be located in Aristotle's logical soul.³³ This is not just a matter of textual evidence, though the evidence of the *Politics* (1334b22–23) is important. It is also and primarily a matter of how Aristotle conceives of the dichotomy of bipartition. For Aristotle the dichotomy of bipartition is primarily a dichotomy between reasoned deliberation and emotional response. Practical wisdom, which is the virtue of the logical soul, is a perfection of deliberation. Moral virtue, which is the virtue of the alogical soul, is a perfected disposition in regard to emotion (*EN* 1105b19–1106a13). All emotion is located in the alogical soul. This is not true of tripartition and (we may add) the bipartite version of tripartition. For these Academic psychologies assign *βούλησις*, *αἰσχύνη*, and possibly other emotions to the *λογιστικόν*.³⁴ Each psychic part including the *λογιστικόν* has its own peculiar drives and desires.³⁵ In contrast Aristotle's own moral psychology groups together all desires and emotions in the alogical soul. The logical soul is no longer the seat of desires and emotions like *βούλησις* and *αἰσχύνη*. It is the seat of means-end deliberation and

³² See, for example, *EN* 1102b30, 1139a17–b5; *Pol.* 1334b20. I say “a mark of the alogical soul” because I want to avoid the suggestion that the alogical soul is to be identified with the *ὀρεκτικόν* (together with the *αἰσθητικόν* and *φανταστικόν*). I have argued already (*supra* with n.16) that the alogical soul is the capacity for emotional response and so includes not only motive force (*ὀρεξίς*) but also cognition. This is clearly implied at *EN* 1098a3–5. Still, for the purposes of refuting the suggestion that Aristotle's criticism of bipartition is a self-criticism, it does not matter whether the alogical soul is restricted to non-cognitive functions like *ὀρεξίς* or includes certain cognitive functions. In either case all *ὀρεξίς* belongs on the alogical side, so that Aristotle's charge of splitting up the faculty of locomotion cannot be leveled against his own brand of bipartition.

³³ Cf. Gauthier and Jolif, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.14) 2.193.

³⁴ For *βούλησις* and *αἰσχύνη* in the *λογιστικόν* see *Topics* 126a8, 13. Von Arnim, *op.cit.* (*supra* n.14) 74–76, suggests that *φιλία* and *μῖσος* should be assigned to the *λογιστικόν* and that *φιλία* is a kind of *βούλησις*. Whether or not we follow v. Arnim in his interpretation of 126a12–13 (I do not think he adequately explains 113b2), we must agree that *φιλία* is closely related to *βούλησις* and that in his account of emotions Aristotle defines *φιλεῖν* as a particular kind of *βούλεσθαι* (*Rhet.* 1380b36–37).

³⁵ The *Republic* states that each of the three psychic parts has its own *ἐπιθυμία* (580d). The *λογιστικόν* is said not to care about wealth and reputation but to be directed wholly toward knowledge (581a5–7). See, for example, Raphael Demos, *The Philosophy of Plato* (New York 1939) 317–18, who points out that each of Plato's three psychic parts “is really a complete soul, in the sense that it includes all the characteristic psychical functions” (318). Each enjoys not only a cognitive aspect but also a desiderative and emotional aspect. This is not true for Aristotle's bipartite psychology.

reasoned reflection concerning emotional response. Of course, reasoning can direct or alter desires and emotions, but it is distinct. In terms of Aristotle's own bipartite psychology, there can be no question of splitting up *ὄρεξις* and locating *βούλησις* in the logical part. That question arises only when bipartition is conceived of as a simple variant of tripartition.

My conclusion, then, is that there are different kinds of bipartition and that a failure to note the difference has misled some commentators into supposing that Aristotle's criticism of bipartition is in part a self-criticism. Aristotle is not criticizing his own moral psychology but rather an Academic version of bipartition that arose from tripartition by collapsing together the *θυμοειδές* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. Aristotle did not identify his own moral psychology with this variant on tripartition and would have objected to the (unqualified) suggestion that his own bipartite psychology developed out of tripartition.

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