IN THIS ARTICLE I am concerned with the historical worth of some passages in Polyaenus concerning Alexander, and therefore with the sources from which these derive, whether directly or through an intermediary. It should be noted that Alexander’s stratagems were of greater importance to Polyaenus than any others, for the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, to whom Polyaenus dedicated his work, were about to campaign against the Parthians in the very parts of Asia where Alexander and his Macedonians had defeated the Persians; and they would be able to learn from the prowess of Polyaenus’ ancestors and from their ability to defeat

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the Persians (4 praef., τας ἀρετας των ἡμετέρων προγόνων; 1 praef., τὸ κρατεῖν Περσῶν πολεμοῦντων δύνασθαι). We may therefore be confident that Polyaeenus took special pains to understand and present Alexander’s stratagems to the emperors.2 For our part many ancient accounts of Alexander have survived, and we are therefore better able to study the methods of Polyaeenus in Strat. 4.3 than elsewhere in his work. In Part I an attempt is made to identify Polyaeenus’ sources for each stratagem, and in Part II my conclusions are summarised and then compared with the conclusions of other scholars.

I. The Sources of Some Stratagems

4.3.27. Alexander defeated Darius at Arbela. Phrasaortes, a relative of Darius, with a large Persian force was guarding the Susian Gates; and they are indeed narrow, high mountains. The Macedonian attack on them was easily repelled by the barbarians, who shot at them with slings, arrows, and rocks, so that Alexander recalled them and at a distance of thirty stades [ca 6 km.] was making the palisade [of his camp]. There was an oracle of Apollo that an alien wolf [lykos] would indeed become his guide on the road against the Persians. There came in fact to Alexander a herdsman wearing a wild beast’s skin, admitting that he was a Lycian [Lykios], and [saying] that there was a path round the mountains, a path concealed by the dense canopy of the forest, and known to him alone because he pastured his cattle. Recalling the prophecy, Alexander trusted the herdsman. Indeed he ordered the entire army to stay in camp and kindle many fires, attracting the eyes of the Persians.3 But he issued a secret order to Philotas and Hephaestion, to the effect that whenever they should see the Macedonians appear on the top of the mountains they should attack from below, and he himself leading the Hypaspists, one brigade [phalanx] of heavy infantry, and all the Scythian archery along the slight pathway advanced eighty stades [ca 16 km.] and camped where he was covered by a close-set forest. And going round during the midnight hour he came upon the enemy asleep; and at daybreak the trumpets were sounding the signal from the top of the mountains. Hephaestion and Philotas began to lead forward their Macedonians from the palisade. The Persians were caught between the

2 At 5 praef. Polyaeenus indicates that the emperors were reading his work.

3 The contrast between this order and the secret order that follows was part of Alexander’s deception, for the order to “the entire army” to stay in camp, if leaked to the enemy, would mislead him, even as the many fires were intended to do. One may compare similar deceptions: Arr. 5.10.1, 11.2 fin.
troops from above and the troops from below. Some were killed, some flung themselves over the cliffs, and some were taken alive. For Alexander’s attack on the Persians at the Susian Gates, Polyaeus could have read the accounts of Diodorus, Plutarch, Curtius, and Arrian. If he did so, he could have derived the oracle of Apollo about a Lycian from PA 37.1f and/or Curt. 5.4.4, but not from Diod. 17.68.5, who described the Lycian but did not mention an oracle, nor from Arrian, who did not include either the Lycian or the oracle in his narrative. Even as regards Plutarch and Curtius it is probable that the resemblances in the matter of the oracle between them and Polyaeus were due to a common source.

Polyaeus chose not to follow the account of Arrian, for he named different officers: the Persian Phrasaortes and Hephaestion and Philotas in charge of the base camp, whereas Arrian had named Ariobarzanes and Craterus (3.18.2, 4, with Philotas accompanying Alexander for part of the circuitous route). Plutarch had nothing to offer except the oracle (PA 37.1f), and Diodorus was much briefer than Curtius, with whom he had some points in common (THA 131). We turn therefore to a

4 Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Ἀρβήλωις Δαρείων ἐνίκησεν. Φρασαόρτης, Δαρείων συγγενεῖς, πολλὰν χείρα Περσικὴν ἑξέστησε τὰς Σουσίδας πύλας· αἱ δὲ ἄρα εἰσίν ὅρη στενὰ καὶ ψηφιᾶ, τοῦτοις προσβάλλοντες τοὺς Μακεδόνας εὐκόλως ἀπεκρύσθην ὁ βαβυλαῖος σφενδόνας, βῆλη, πέτρους ἀφιέντες· ὥσπερ ἀνακλάσεις αὐτοῦς Ἀλέξανδρος ἀπὸ τριμίκροντα σταδίων χάρακα ἐξάλλετο· ἦν δὲ λόγιον Ἀπόλλωνος, ὡς ἄρα ἔξωμος λύκος ἥγεμον αὐτῷ τῆς ὄδοι τῆς κατὰ Περσῶν γένους, ἐπράσει ἡ τῷ Ἀλέξανδρῳ βουκόλῳ ὑθεῖται ἑξάστηκε σταλῆ, ὁμολογὼν ὅτι Λύκιος ἦν, καὶ ὡς κύκλῳ τῶν ὀρῶν ἄτραπος εἰς τὸ συνεργεῖ τῆς ὕλης ἀποκεκυμένην, αὐτῷ δὲ μόνῳ γιγνώμορα διὰ τὴν νομήν τῶν βοῶν, ἀναμνησθεῖς Ἀλέξανδρος τοῦ μαντείου πιστεύει τῷ βουκόλῳ. τὴν μὲν δὲ πασῶν στρατιῶν ἐκέλευσεν ἐν στρατοπέδῳ ἑκένει καὶ πολλὰ πυρὰ ἀνακαίνει, ἐφελκομένου τὴν τῶν Περσῶν ὁνίν. Φιλάται δὲ καὶ Ἡρασίτων παράγγελμα δοὺς ἀπόρρητον, ὕποταν κατὰ κορυφῆς τῶν ὀρῶν ἱθαί τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐκφανέντας, αὐτοῦς κἀκεκένθην προσβάλλειν, αὐτοῦς τοὺς ὑπεισαπτές ἄγον καὶ μίαν ὁπιλικίαν φάλαγγα καὶ τὸ σκυθικὸν τοξικὸν ὅσον ἦν διὰ τῆς ἄτραποῦ τῆς λεπτῆς ὁγδούκοντα σταδίων προελθὼν ἡλιόστατο πυκαζόμενος ὦλη δασυτάτη. μέσης δὲ νυκτὸς περιέλθων ἐπέστη τοῖς πολεμίας καθευδούσιν· ἄρχομενὴς δὲ ἡμέρας αἱ σάλπηγγες ἐσήμαινον ἀπὸ τῆς κορυφῆς τῶν ὀρῶν· Ἡρασίτων δὲ καὶ Φιλάται τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος Μακεδόνας προσήγον. οἱ Πέρσαι μέσοι τῶν ἀναβεβεβεμένοις καὶ τῶν κάτωθι ἀποληθεῖτες ὁ μὲν ἐκείνων, οἱ δὲ κατεκτημένων, οἱ δὲ ἐξογγευόμενον.

5 The Ptolemy at Arr. 3.18.9 is probably Ptolemy, son of Lagus (so Bosworth, C I 328f, to which add that Ptolemy, son of Lagus, had just been mentioned at 3.17.6). If that is so, he will have known the names of the Persian commander and of the other officers in the operation.
comparison of Curtius and Polyaenus. The following points are in common: "Susian Gates" (C. 5.3.17), Persian slingers (5.3.19), a withdrawal of thirty stades (5.3.23), the oracle (5.4.11), many fires at night to deceive the enemy (5.4.14), dense foliage en route (5.4.24f), and the arrival of Alexander at a high peak at dawn (5.4.27). These points are sufficient to indicate that Polyaenus drew this part of his account from Curtius. 6 Who was Curtius’ source? The probable answer is Cleitarchus, who, writing for a Greek audience, may well have introduced the oracle of Apollo, which was clearly an invention post eventum. 7

In other matters, however, Polyaenus differed from Curtius. Thus Polyaenus gave different names for the officers. He described the turning movement by Alexander as lasting a day and a night, whereas Curtius extends it over a night, a day, and a night (5.4.17, 19, 22, 26). 8 He reported that Alexander came upon the enemy at midnight, whereas Curtius had Alexander reach the summit at dawn unopposed and then see the enemy’s position (5.4.26f). Polyaenus had the base camp alerted to Alexander’s arrival on the summit by trumpet blasts, whereas Curtius said that the shouting reached the camp (5.4.29). 9 We conclude, then, that Polyaenus followed Curtius, using Cleitarchus, for some parts only. Whom, then, did Polyaenus follow for the other parts?

The derivation of Arrian’s account now becomes relevant. He named Ptolemy as holding the minor command during the turning movement, and the inference is that Arrian was following Ptolemy, who had mentioned his own participation (see

6 See Sources 70, where I argue that Cleitarchus was the source for the oracle.


8 Bosworth, Conquest 91 ("probably over two nights"), follows Curtius. But the distances are such that a day and a night are likely to be correct, for the Persian position and the Macedonian base camp were only thirty stades (some 6 km.) apart. That distance suits the geographical identification of A. Stein, Old Routes of Western Iran (London 1940) 25. Diodorus (17.68.6), like Arrian, mentions only one night. For my account of the whole operation see AG 167f with Fig. 15 inset and n.105.

9 As the two positions were some 6 km. apart, it is impossible that the Macedonians could have seen their compatriots or heard their shouts. Arrian’s account is to be preferred with Alexander attacking during the darkness before dawn and giving the signal to those in the base camp by trumpet-call (3.18.7).
supra n.5). It was characteristic of Arrian to prefer the account of a participant. The features of Polyaeus' account not found in Curtius and Arrian are as follows. Polyaeus used φάλαγξ for a brigade of heavy infantry and χάραξ for an encampment. These words came from a source conversant with Macedonian terminology. Then the defeat of Alexander at the Susian Gates was minimised, and a smaller force was given to Alexander by Polyaeus than by Arrian (the hypaspists, one phalanx of infantry, and all the Scythian archers in Polyaeus, as compared with Arrian's force, which added the Agrianians, the Royal Squadron of Companion Cavalry, and a tetrarchy of cavalry). The probability is that Polyaeus was following Aristobulus for these features.

To summarise, Polyaeus probably took his account in part from Curtius (who had drawn on Cleitarchus) and in part from Aristobulus. The merit of Polyaeus' account is that it is clear, relatively concise, and at several points corrective of the sensational and sometimes clearly false narrative of Curt. 5.3.17–4.33.

4.3.22. In the battle against Porus, Alexander drew up the cavalry on his right wing so that half of it faced the enemy and the rest was at an angle, while he placed the phalanx and the light-armed [infantry] on the left wing and from them at an angle a force [of cavalry]. Porus formed a line of many elephants opposite [the Macedonians] and he himself was on the left, riding the leading elephant. He placed the other elephants at intervals of fifty feet as far as the right wing. The spaces between the elephants he filled up with infantry, so that the formation resembled a great wall, the elephants being like towers and the infantry like curtain walls between the towers. This was indeed the position when Alexander gave the order to lead the infantry against the enemy, and himself drove the cavalry more impetuously rightwards, his aim being to outflank those opposite. Guarding against this, Porus led [the infantry] against him, but because the beasts could not keep up he was breaking his formation at many points. With the Macedonians

10 The same usage appears in Arr. 1.14.2f; 5.20.3, 21.5. At 3.9.6 τάξις refers presumably to a hypaspist brigade, and φάλαγξ to a pikemen brigade. These passages in Arrian were derived from Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus (Arr. 1 praef.). Bosworth argues (HSCP 81 [1977]; C I 118) that Ptolemy wrote τάξις and Aristobulus φάλαγξ. But it is most unlikely that officers in Alexander's army used different terms; further, if the Macedonian term was φάλαγξ, then we should expect Ptolemy as a Macedonian to have used it and Aristobulus as a Greek to have used τάξις. I suggest that Arrian wrote τάξις as the normal term of his day, but that he occasionally reproduced φάλαγξ from his source (Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus).
charging into the gaps he was compelled to turn and fight face to face. Meanwhile the cavalrymen with Alexander were first in their encircling movement, and driving the Indians together from behind won a most complete victory, which made Alexander king of Indian territory.\textsuperscript{11}

It is necessary to add a note about my translation in response to A. M. Devine (1987). We agree well enough on the translation of the end of the first sentence, where Devine writes “and adjacent to these he posted [another] ‘angled formation’ (ἐπικάμπτοις).” Where we differ is that he assumed that this “angled formation” consisted not of cavalry but of infantry. If this were so, Alexander’s left wing would have been exposed to attack by Porus’ cavalry, whereas in other set battles Alexander had protected the left flank of the phalanx with cavalry as well as with light-armed infantry. Polyaeus will have read the accounts of the battle order in Curt. 8.14.15\textsuperscript{12} and Arr. 5.16.3, in which Alex-

\textsuperscript{11} Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Πῶρον μάχῃ τὸ μὲν ἵππιον ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρας ἔταξεν ἐν μετώπῳ τῷ ἡμισθίῳ, τὸ δὲ λεωπὸν ἐπὶ ἐπικαμπτῷ, τὴν δὲ φάλαγγα καὶ τοὺς ἐλαφρούς ἐπὶ τοῦ λαυτοῦ κέρας ἔτησε καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦτον ἐπικάμπτων ἐτάξα. Πῶρος δὲ πολλοὺς ἔλεφαντας ἀντιπαρατάξας αὐτὸς μὲν κατὰ τὸ λαυτὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου ἔλεφαντος ἢν· τοὺς δὲ λεωποὺς ἔλεφαντας ἐκ διαστήματος πεντήκοντα ποδῶν μέχρι τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρας ἔτησε· τὸ δὲ μέσα τῶν θηρίων ἀνδρασὶ πεζοῖς ἀνεπλήρωσεν, ὡστε ἢν τὸ σχῆμα τείχει μεγάλο παραπλήσιον, οἱ μὲν ἔλεφαντας ἐοικότες πύργοι, οἱ δὲ πεζοὶ μεσοπυργίοι, ἔνθα δὴ παραγείλας Ἀλέξανδρος τοὺς πεζοὺς ἀντιπαρατέψας τοῖς πολεμίοις, αὐτοῦ τὴν ἤπων ἐπὶ δόρῳ σφοδρότερον ἡλασεν βουλομένος ύπερεκράσαι τοὺς ἐναντίους, τοῦτο φυλασσόμενος Πῶρος ἀντιπαρήγη. τὸ δὲ μὴ φθάνειν τὰ θηρία διέσας κατὰ πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν, τῶν Μακεδόνων τοῖς διασπάσασιν ἐμπιπτόντων ἧναγκάζετο κατὰ πρόσποσιν ἐπιστρέφον αγγύιζονθαι. ἐν τούτῳ φθάνουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἵππεῖς ἐκπεριελθόντες καὶ κατὰ νότον συνελάσαντες τοὺς Ἰνδικῆς τελεστάτην νίκην ἀνέπιλον (μεθ’ ἢν βασιλεὺς Ἰνδικῆς Ἀλέξανδρος ἤν). My translation agrees with that of Krentz, except that ἀπὸ τοῦτον seems to me to depend on ἐπικάμπτων ἐταξα (cf. ἀπὸ τοῦ λαυτοῦ at 4.3.17), Porus to be the subject of διέσα (cf. διέσα at 4.3.17), and συνελάσαντες to mean “driving the Indians together.” Further, at 4.3.6 (discussed below) I take τὰ σκεύοφορα to mean “baggage” (see “Army Transport in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries,” GRBS 24 [1983] 31=Collected Studies [Amsterdam 1993] I 429), and at 4.3.17 (see below) I take τοῖς διασπάσασι to mean “gaps” as at 4.3.22.

\textsuperscript{12} The ἀπὸ τοῦτον ἐπικάμπτων on the left of the light-armed infantry in Alexander’s battle order was commanded by Coenus, who was ordered to move towards the enemy’s right wing (Arr. 5.16.3, where ὃς ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν is contrasted with ἐπὶ τὸ εὐθὺς κέρας τῶν πολεμίων). When the cavalry of the Indian left wing turned left to face Alexander’s cavalry, Coenus was to turn to his right (Curt. 8.14.15, dextrum move) and attack that cavalry from behind (Arr. 5.16.3, κατάςτιν). The supposition of Devine (Fig. 1) and of Bosworth (C II 296 Fig. 4; confused in Conquest 128f), that Coenus drove back

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ander moved "with the bulk of the cavalry" towards Porus' left wing and Coenus in command of two hipparchies was sent "as towards Porus' right wing." He will have assumed that his reader would understand the "angled formation" on the Macedonian left wing to consist of cavalry. Some sentences later Devine has Alexander "lead on the right-wing cavalry more vigorously"; but this is not a correct translation of τὴν ἵππον ἐπὶ δόρυ σφοδρότερον ἠλατεν. In the next sentence τοῦτο φυλασσόμενος Πόρος is mistranslated as "at this point, Porus, standing on guard, also advanced," for the middle form of φυλάσσω means "be on one's guard against" (see LSJ s.v. C.II.1), and "advanced" misses the force of the compound verb. Devine continues: "Lest the elephants should overrun it, the phalanx divided itself into many parts; and when the Macedonians counterattacked in sections, the enemy formation was compelled to keep wheeling about in order to fight face to face" (see supra n.11 for the Greek text). This is entirely mistaken. Polyaeus presents the victory over Porus as a victory by Alexander's cavalry, which encircled the Indians and drove them into a confined space from the rear. In this Polyaeus differed fundamentally from Diodorus and Curtius, for whom the phalanx's victory over the elephants was the turning point. Polyaeus agreed, however, with Arrian, who concluded his account in a similar manner (5.17.7): "Alexander threw his cavalry in a circle round their whole formation ... and thus the Indian cavalry were cut down in the action with few exceptions." Polyaeus gives a fuller account of Alexander's original battle order than any other surviving writer. It enables us to understand the opening actions of Alexander's forces in Arr. 5.16.2f and the instructions given by Alexander at Curt. 8.14.15, for the

the cavalry of the Indian right wing and then pursued it behind Porus' line to the Indian left wing, is without foundation in the ancient evidence. Bosworth's supposition that dextrum move can mean "assail the right" is not supported by Lewis and Short. They do, however include an elliptical meaning (s.v. moveo I.A.1): here "move yourself" or "move your troops." My account of the battle is in AG 211ff with Fig. 20 and nn.141-44.

13 The spear being held in the right hand, the expression ἐπὶ δόρυ means "toward his right." Here it goes not with τὴν ἵππον but with ἠλατεν.

14 From that position the Macedonian horses did not face the elephants, of which they were terrified (Arr. 5.10.2, 11.4, 15.5f; Curt. 8.14.23). Despite these passages Bosworth (Conquest 128) supposed that "the Macedonians had acquired experience of elephants over the previous months and could cope with them."
formations of cavalry drawn up at an angle to the line of the infantry (ἐν ἐπικαμπτω καὶ ἐπικαμπτον ἐτοξευ) were evidently at a forward angle in each case, with Alexander commanding “the main cavalry force” (τὴν πολλὴν τῆς ἵππου) on the right and Coenus the cavalry on the left (Arr. 5.16.3; Curt. 8.14.15 init.). With this disposition of his forces Alexander was ready to make the cavalry forces under his own command advance impetuously and to bring forward his infantry line en retard (Arr. 5.16.3 fin.). Polyaenus does not mention the action of Coenus, but we learn from Curt. 8.14.15 and Arr. 5.16.3 that Coenus was to advance “as towards the right,”15 and then on “seeing” Alexander already engaged against the enemy cavalry and that cavalry in confusion, he was to attack “from behind.”16

Polyaenus turns immediately to the position of the elephants in the battle order of Porus. Herein he differs radically from Arrian, who has the elephants in front of the phalanx of infantry (5.16.2), but he agrees with Diod. 17.87.4f and Curt. 8.14.13, who fill the spaces between the elephants with armed men (ἀνὰ μέσον, inter armatos) in order to protect the flanks of each elephant. Polyaenus’ comparison of the Indian battleline to a walled city with towers and curtain walls was the same as in the accounts of Diodorus and Curtius. Arrian was clearly correct, for the purpose of placing the elephants just ahead of his own infantry (but not out of contact with the infantry line, as in Devine’s plan [1987: 113]) was to break up the dreaded phalanx of pikemen.17

15 Devine (1987: 110) has an interesting note in which he regards ὡς ἔξι as interchangeable with ἔξι. But there is no sense in using the two expressions in consecutive sentences unless there was some difference in meaning.

16 It is important to note that Coenus had to be able to see what was happening around Porus’ left wing, implicitly in Arrian and explicitly in Curtius’ viderisque me in medio ardore, ipsa dextrum move et turbatis infer signa, and that the enemy Coenus was to attack was already thrown into confusion. These passages alone prove that the reconstructions of the battle by Devine (1987: 113 Fig. 1) and by Bosworth (C II 296 Fig. 4) are incorrect in making Coenus attack or just follow the cavalry on the right wing of Porus’ army. So too they both disregard Arr. 5.16.2, where Alexander decided not to advance against the centre of the Indian phalanx, for they show the Macedonian phalanx attacking the entire length of the Indian phalanx in their plans.

17 Porus’ disposition was made for defense only. Bosworth’s statement (C II 293) that “Arrian gave Porus an offensive strategy” seems to rest on a misunderstanding of Arr. 5.15.6, where Porus argues that the Macedonian infantry would not make a frontal attack on his own phalanx, “for they would be barred by the Indian infantry engaging them frontally and would be trampled on by the elephants turning upon them” (κατὰ στόμα τε γὰρ ἔν
When the action developed beyond his left wing, Porus led his infantry from line into column, moving to its left. But gaps now arose in the right flank of the column, because the elephants proceeded slowly and irregularly. Into the gaps the Macedonian infantry charged. Porus was compelled to halt his column and turn it back into line, facing the Macedonians. Thus the infantry battle started not in the centre, which Alexander had decided to avoid (Arr. 5.16.2, κατὰ μέσον), but in the left part of Porus’ line.

Polyaenus must have obtained his opening description of Alexander’s battle order from a source not used by Diodorus, Curtius, and Arrian. Polyaenus might have deduced the development of the battle from these three authors, but it is more likely that he continued with the initial source. He differs from Arrian in making the distance between the elephants fifty paces and in having the Macedonian infantry charge into the gaps that developed in the Indian infantry. Therein he is probably correct, for Arrian became so absorbed in describing the infantry’s attacks on the elephants that he mentions the Indian infantry only as being trampled by the retreating elephants and finally cut down from all sides (5.17.6f). Arrian’s source was certainly Ptolemy, a participant accompanying Alexander (Arr. 5.13.1). It is probable that Polyaenus based his version on Aristobulus’ account, which was well charged with military detail as we see from Arr. 5.14.3; and it was Aristobulus who reported Darius’ order of battle at Gaugamela.

4.3.20. Alexander besieged a strong place in Indian territory. Being terrified (the) Indians made an agreement to come out with their weapons. On coming out they occupied another [a second] hill and set up their guard-posts. Alexander was leading his forces against them while the Indians were shouting out “the agreement.” He admitted that he had made an agreement about their coming

πρὸς τῶν ὑπῆρτων προσβαλλόντων εἰργασθαι καὶ καταπατηθῆσθαι ἐπιστρεφόμενων ἐπὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐλεφάντων).

18 Polyaenus is probably to be preferred, for when we combine Arrian’s figure of 200 elephants with his interval between elephants of 100 paces, we would have a phalanx some 6 km. in length. See my arguments in AG 212.

19 See my analysis of the sources in AG 215f. Bosworth (C II 262) gives the overall view that much of Arrian’s account was based on Ptolemy, “but it remains uncertain how much material is added from Aristobulus.”
This account is very similar to Diod. 17.84.1f. The Indians, named there as mercenaries, are contrasted with the native people (the Assaceni of Massaga) by Plutarch (PA 59.6; see Sources 106). It was as mercenaries that the Indians were to come out “with their weapons,” for they depended on their weapons for further employment. Now, according to Diodorus, “they advanced for eighty stades [ca 16 km.] and encamped without interference, unaware of what was about to happen.” When Alexander attacked them, “the mercenaries at first kept shouting that the attack was contrary to the sworn agreement … but Alexander shouted out to them in a loud voice, that he agreed to their leaving the city but not to eternal friendship with the Macedonians” (17.84.2). It is apparent that Polyaenus and Diodorus both drew on a longer account in which both the destination—the second hill—and the distance had been stated. I have argued elsewhere that Diodorus’ source was an account by Cleitarchus (THA 53, 79, 149; Sources 106). It is therefore probable that Polyaenus too drew on that account.

Where was the first hill? In the long and largely different account by Arrian (4.26.1–27.4) a hill was mentioned at the start of the action. Then Alexander intended to make his camp close to the walls of Massaga, but when the defenders made a sortie he withdrew a distance of some seven stades “towards a hill” (4.26.2, πρὸς γῆλοφόν τινα). This hill was presumably the first hill to be mentioned in any full account. I suggest that Alexander made his camp there when he realised how aggressive the defenders of Massaga were. Later, when under the agreement the Indian mercenaries left the city, they were sent to encamp farther away from the city and did so according to Polyaenus on “a second hill” (λόφον ἔτερον). This hill cannot be the first hill, as Bosworth (C II 175) presumed in ignoring Polyaenus’ “second hill.” Rather, Alexander’s camp was between the city and the mercenaries’ camp on the second hill.

20 Ἀλέξανδρος χωρίῳ τῆς Ἰνδικῆς ἐχωρὶ προσεκάθητο, φοβηθέντες Ἰνδοὶ συνέθεντο μεθ’ ὀπλῶν ἐξελθεῖν. οἱ μὲν ἐξελθόντες λόφον ἔτερον κατέλαβοντο καὶ φυλακᾶς καθίσταντο. Ὅλεξανδρος επήγε τὴν δύναμιν τῶν Ἰνδῶν ἐπιθυμομένον τὰς συνθήκας, ὡς δὲ περὶ ἐξόδου μὲν ὀμολογεῖ συντεθείσαι, περὶ δὲ ᾠφέσεως μηδὲν ὑπεσχῆσθαι.
In case there was treachery by the Assaceni and the mercenaries, Alexander was anxious not to be at close quarters with either. If I am correct in supposing that the Macedonian camp was on the first hill, it was seven stades from the city. Diodorus (17.84.1) says that the mercenaries encamped "eighty stades from the city." This is not the impression given by Arrian (4.27.3), who places the mercenaries on a hill "opposite" (ἀντί­πορος) the Macedonian camp," and by the Metz Epitome 43, in which the mercenaries' camp was "at no great distance" from the city (ab oppido haud longe).21 The differences are much more radical in regard to the fate of the city, relations with the queen Cleophas and the allegations of treachery in the behaviour of Alexander and of the mercenaries. Polyaenius' merit is that he gave a clear summary from a detailed account in which Alexander behaved in a treacherous manner. Similar forms of deception were attributed to Philip by Polyaenius at 4.2.4f. Polyaenius' source was neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus (they underlay Arrian's account), but it was very probably Cleitarchus.

4.3.17. Alexander was drawing up his army at Arbela. Darius was planting with caltrops the space of the engagement between the armies. The Macedonian indeed realised this. Leading his right wing he gave the order to follow rightwards, in order that he should pass round the area planted with the caltrops. As the Persian endeavoured to oppose Alexander by leading his own army leftwards, he was continually disrupting his own cavalry's formation. Charging into the gaps, Alexander—and equally Parmenio too on the left—avoided the caltrops and compelled the enemy to flee.22

Polyaenius wrote as if the caltrops covered most of the space between the enemy lines, and the avoidance of them was the main consideration in Alexander's course of action. In these respects Polyaenius exaggerated, for Darius had to leave clear of

21 It is possible that the number "eighty stades" is an error of Diodorus or his copyists (so e.g. Bosworth, C II 175), but it may have been a figure added for verisimilitude by Cleitarchus to his very sensational account, as reflected in Diod. 17.84: THA 53.

22 Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Ἀρβῆλοις παρετάσσετο. Δαρείος τὸ μεταίχυμον τῆς συμβολῆς τριβόλοις κατέστειρε. Τούτο δὴ συνιδόν ὁ Μακεδόν τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρας ἡγούμενος ἐπὶ δόρῳ παρῆγετεν ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅπως περιέλθῃ τὸν τόπον τὸν καταστρομένον ταῖς τριβόλοις. ὁ δὲ Πέρσης ἄντιπαράγειν πειρώμενος ἐπὶ ὁπιτίδα διέστα συνεχῶς τὴν ὑπόν. τοῖς δὲ παλαιοῦς εξενέκατον, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους φεύγειν ἠνάγκασαν.
caltrops not only pathways for his three groups of scythed chariots, so that they could charge across "the space of engagement" (τὸ μεταίχμιον τῆς συμβολῆς), but also the ground in front of his own right wing for his cavalry to launch an attack. During the action the ground in front of Darius' left wing was crossed without difficulty by Alexander's troops and by Darius' cavalry. The only place where caltrops could have been was in front of the centre where Darius was, and then only in a small area somewhere between the runways for two groups of chariots.

Polyaenus was not alone in attaching great importance to caltrops. They figured prominently in Curtius' account, as follows. A deserter informed Alexander that "Darius had spread iron caltrops planted in the ground over which he believed his enemy would send forth his cavalry" (4.13.36; tr. Rolfe). Alexander summoned a meeting of commanders and warned them of the area with the caltrops. When he advanced, he did so in oblique formation, "in order both to pass round the place of the snares (insula rum locum) and to engage Darius, who was guarding his [left] wing" (4.15.1; cf. 4.14.8).

That caltrops could have been planted in advance was envisaged in Arrian's account (3.9.4). At a conference of commanders, which Alexander convened on first seeing the enemy, Parmenio advised him to undertake a full reconnaissance, in case there were impediments or "spikes hidden in the ground" (σκόλουσες κατασεπιγότες). As this passage was based on an account by Ptolemy, who in my opinion consulted the Journal of Alexander (see Sources 228f), the thought that there might be such spikes is to be regarded as historical. It was worth recording in Ptolemy's history presumably because such caltrops had been planted. Where then could they have been? When we consider a Persian battle order, preserved in Arrian, we see that Darius in the centre with his Royal Cavalry Squadron, 1,000 strong, was heavily protected against any frontal attack, for ahead of him were four groups of cavalry in line. Then in front of one of them—the Indian cavalry—some elephants were

23 I refer to my plan of the battle in AG 142 Fig. 14 and to that of Devine (1986: 114 Fig. 2), which is generally in agreement with mine. They are based on the captured order of battle of the Persian army (Arr. 3.11.3), which Aristobulus cites.

24 The Indian cavalry's horses were trained to act together with elephants, and it was in the company of the Indian cavalry that the elephants were mentioned in Arr. 3.8.6. In the course of the battle the Indian cavalry were
posted, let us say on the left of the line (Arr. 3.8.6, 11.6); then in front of the central group were fifty scythed chariots with a prepared runway; but there were no troops in front of the right of the line. It is here that a nest of caltrops would have protected Darius. If they were there, we can see what Darius had in mind. His expectation was that Alexander would deliver a frontal attack on the centre in the hope of capturing or killing him. If Alexander should do so, his forces would be disrupted by the charge of the chariots; and if they advanced again, they would hit the spike-field on their left and be up against the elephants on their right. Darius' policy in this central area was entirely defensive, for his fine cavalry had only one route for an advance, namely along the runway after the chariots had charged. On the wings he expected that his much more numerous cavalry would be able to take the offensive, outflank, and defeat the Macedonian army.

Scholars have generally rejected the planting of caltrops as "surely a fiction" and as "a legend."²⁵ How then did they first enter the tradition? For his description of the battle Curtius in my opinion used several sources but principally Cleitarchus, an unreliable writer.²⁶ Arrian followed the accounts of Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus, who knew Cleitarchus' work and at times corrected it. I have inferred from Arrian's account that Ptolemy mentioned the fear of caltrops because they had in fact been planted. Polyænus did not follow the account of Curtius, for Curtius (4.15.1) placed Darius on the Persian left wing and had Alexander move to his right in order to engage Darius, whereas according to Polyænus Darius moved his own troops to their left. It is more likely that Polyænus drew on the account of Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus either via Arrian or directly, and that he found there the mention of caltrops. This suggestion is supported by Polyænus' attribution of the victory to Alexander's exploitation of gaps in the enemy formation, precisely as Arrian did (3.14.1f, κατὰ τὸ διεξοῦν).

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²⁵ So Devine (1986) 89; Atkinson 437, who reports (428) the views of some other scholars.

²⁶ I have discussed Curtius' sources in AG 138f and THA 100, 122f, and 128; see also Atkinson 447f ("Cleitarchus may have been the common source of Diodorus and Curtius"); Devine (1986) 91f.
It is probable then that Darius planted caltrops, that Alexander knew where they were, and that he did in fact avoid them. Polyaenus was providing not an account of the battle but an example of a use of caltrops; and he therefore seized on the stratagem of Alexander’s incidental avoidance of the spike-field. Polyaenus made the same point and used the same terms in his account of the battle against Porus (4.3.22).

4.3.6. Alexander was engaged in his last battle against Darius at Arbela. No small force of Persians, going round [the Macedonians], were plundering the baggage of the Macedonians. Parmenio advised Alexander to go to the help of the baggage-bearers. Alexander said: “No need at all to break the formation of our phalanx. Our need is to fight our enemies themselves. If defeated, we have no longer any use for our baggage; and if victorious, we shall have both our own baggage and that of our enemies.”

In making the Persians “go round” the Macedonian wing Polyaenus agrees with Diod. 17.59.5 (περιπετευοσα), PA 32.5 (περιπέμυγμονσι), and Curt. 4.15.5 (circumvehi). On the other hand, he differs from Arrian, who had the Persian cavalry pass through a gap in the Macedonian phalanx (3.14.5, κατά τὸ διέχον). We infer then that Polyaenus shared a common source with the first three writers, who in my opinion were following the version of Cleitarchus. As Polyaenus differs from Arrian, he also therefore did not here use Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus, Arrian’s sources. As for Parmenio’s advice to Alexander, we find similar versions in PA 32.5ff and Curt. 4.15.5–9, for which I have argued that Cleitarchus was the main source.

Polyaenus’ choice was unwise, for the account of the attack on the baggage-camp, which Arrian derived from Ptolemy…
and/or Aristobulus, is factual and not sensational: “some of the Indians and of the Persian cavalry” (3.11.5) broke through a gap in the infantry, reached the baggage-camp and were then defeated by a detachment from the rear rank of the double phalanx. These cavalrymen came from the Persian centre, as I noted above (ad 4.3.17). The Persians whom Arrian next mentioned were from the Persian right wing; they outflanked and attacked Parmenio’s troops (3.14.6 fin.). There they were joined by the defeated members of the first group, so that Parmenio’s men were attacked from both sides (ἀμφιβόλων) and Parmenio sent for help. Alexander, now victorious in the enemy centre, brought his Companion Cavalry from there towards the Persian right wing, clashed with the retreating “Parthyaeeans, some of the Indians, and the largest and strongest force of Persians” (3.15.1), who were in formation, having broken off their action against Parmenio’s Thessalians (3.15.3). Polyaeuenus, or rather his source, conflated the two Persian attacks and made Parmenio ask for help to be sent to the baggage-camp.

4.3.11. The Thracians having prepared many heavy-laden wagons to let loose on the Macedonians, Alexander ordered them to avoid as many [wagons] as possible, and should they be caught to go down on the ground and hold their shields overhead, so that it would happen that the rushing wagons would leap over them. As this was done in the actual event, the Thracians’ preparation of the wagons proved useless.

The only other extant account of this campaign is in Arr. 1.1.4f and I have argued that Arrian derived it from Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus. Thus Polyaenuses could have obtained his version either from Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus or from Arrian. There are striking verbal echoes between Arrian and Polyaenuses, so much so that we should conclude that Polyaenuses made direct 31

31 For this interpretation see AG 147, where ἔτι is taken not with διώκειν but with ἀπετράπετο in Arr. 3.15.1; for the confusion see Bosworth, C I 309ff.

32 Ἀλέξανδρος Θρακών παρασκευασμένων καταγόμενως ἀμάξεως πολλάς ἐπαφέναι τοῖς Μακεδώνι παρήγγειλεν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνους μὲν ὡς δύναντο, εἰ δὲ καταλαμβάνοντο, καθιέναι αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὑπερτιθέναι τὰς ἀσπίδας, ὡς συμβαίνει φερομέναι ταῖς ἀμάξεις ὑπερηφανί. τούτῳ τοῖς καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πεῖρᾳ γενόμενον ἥλεξε τοῖς Ἐραξίν ἀχριστότων τὴν τῶν ἀμαξῶν παρασκευήν.

33 These include parakseusaménwv, ἐπαφέναι, καταλαμβάνοντο, πρὸς τὴν γῆν, φερομέναις ταῖς ἀμάξεις, and ὑπερηφανί. My account of the action is in AG 46.
use of Arrian. The only difference is that Polyaeus said that the wagons were “heavy-laden” (καταγόμενος). He probably invented this detail in order to make the stratagem more impressive, for Arrian merely said that the Thracians collected wagons initially to form a defensive laager.

4.3.12. Alexander took Thebes by concealing a sufficient part of his force and putting Antipater in command of it. He in person led the visible force against the strong part of the [Theban] positions (ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐχυροὺς τῶν τόπων). The Thebans came out against him, and they fought not ignobly against that visible force. At the crisis of the battle Antipater raised up his hidden force, went round in a circle to where the wall was rotten and unguarded, and at that point he occupied the city and raised the signal. Alexander saw it. He shouted out: “Thebes is already mine.” The Thebans were fighting stoutly, but when they turned and saw the city captured, they fled.34

There are three accounts elsewhere of the capture of Thebes: Diod. 17.12; PA 11.9f; Arr. 1.8.12–17. The first two have points in common, which are best explained if they drew on a common source, namely Cleitarchus.35 Arrian’s version is completely different: his source was Ptolemy with touches of Aristobulus (Sources 205f). Where does Polyaeus’ version stand? It is incompatible with Arrian’s account, which attributes the break into the city to Alexander. It resembles that of Diodorus in that it is a Macedonian officer who first led a detachment into the city (17.12.3); but while Polyaeus provides a concealed force under Antipater, Diodorus has Perdiccas lead a force through an unguarded postern gate. Nor does Polyaeus chime in with Plutarch, in whose short account the Macedonian garrison of the Cadmea made a sortie and overcame the Thebans from behind (PA 11.10).

Arrian’s version, based on Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus, is to be regarded as true to the facts. Diodorus and Plutarch have
points in common that seem due to a common source, namely Cleitarchus. Polyaeus followed a source that represented the Thebans as “fighting stoutly.” He had that in common with Cleitarchus, but he must have obtained his report of the hidden force from a source other than Cleitarchus—a source for which one cannot offer a name. In any case, Polyaeus unwisely chose an account that did not rest on historical fact.

4.3.16. While crossing the Granicus Alexander outflanked the wing of the Persians, as they were about to attack from a commanding position, by himself leading them, the Macedonians, upstream to the right [literally, “towards the spear”]. The phalanx charged and routed them.\(^{36}\)

Polyaeus did not derive this passage from the author followed by Diodorus (17.19.3; almost certainly Cleitarchus: \textit{THA} 16f, 23f, 26) in making Alexander cross the river unopposed. On the other hand, Arrian agreed with Polyaeus in describing a move in the riverbed by Alexander, “continually extending his formation at an angle where the stream was pulling,” \textit{i.e.}, against the current (1.14.7).\(^{37}\) A further point of agreement is the part played by the phalanx in the centre of Alexander’s formation, for Arrian also had the Macedonians of the centre break through first and then the Persian wings collapse (1.16.1). Moreover, Polyaeus’ statement that Alexander outflanked the Persians enables one to understand in Arrian’s account how his “light-armed infantry” inflicted heavy casualties on the Persian cavalry (1.16.1), for these infantry were the Archers and the Agrianians stationed on Alexander’s right wing (1.14.1), and they now overlapped the Persians’ left wing and attacked the flank of that wing.

\(^{36}\) Αλέξανδρος Γρανίκον διαβαίνων Πέρσας εξ υπέρδεξιόν ἐπίόντας (αὐ­τοῖς) αὐτῶς ἐπὶ δόρυ τοῖς Μακεδόνας ἀναγαγόν ὑπερεκέρασεν· ή δὲ φάλαγχ προσπεσοῦσα τοὺς πολεμίους ἔτρεψατο.

I have translated Koraïs’ emendation, ἐπὶ δόρυ as printed by Melber, instead of the reading of the archetype, ἐπὶ δῷορ, which I prefer. The sense is the same, as “waterwards” and “spearwards” both lead one upstream, which is the meaning also of the compound ἀναγαγὼν (cf. ἀνα τοῦ ποταμοῦ at 4.3.9 ).

The text was misinterpreted by E. Badian (\textit{Ancient Macedonia II} [Thessaloniki 1977] 288 n.51), for he makes Alexander move his men downstream, which would have led to confusion in the centre and not to an outflanking of the enemy.

Arrian’s sources were Ptolemy and Aristobulus, as he pro-
claimed in his Preface, and in this we know that he fol-
lowed Ptolemy, because Plutarch cited Aristobulus when re-
porting the number of Alexander’s losses, which were given
differently by Arrian (PA 16.15; Arr. 1.16.4).38 We conclude,
then, that Polyaeusus derived his account at 4.3.16 from a long
account by Ptolemy, whether directly or indirectly. It is of
crucial importance for understanding the battle.39

4.3.29. Alexander invaded the land of the Sogdians. It is all rough
and hard to traverse. In the centre of it a rock rises up which is
accessible only to birds that fly. Around the rock a thick forest of
close-packed trees made the unscalable cliffs even more unscalable.
The rock was occupied by Ariomazes with a large, powerful force
of Sogdians, and he had springs of water inside the rock and an
abundant supply of foodstuffs. After riding round the rock and
noting its natural features Alexander issued his orders. Three hun-
dred young men were to be selected who had experience and skill
in rock-climbing, and they were to make their way unarmed up
through the thick forest and to pull one another up with fine
ropes. Once they gained the summit, they were to take off the
white waistbands which they were wearing, tie them to very long
poles and raise them up above the foliage, so that the intensive
waving of the bright waistbands all together would be visible to
the enemy above and to the Macedonians below. Well, the rock-
climbers with great exertions reached the top, and as the sun rose
they waved their waistbands. The Macedonians below raised a
mighty, resounding shout. Ariomazes, astounded that all the
army was on the way up and that he was already caught from
above, surrendered himself and the rock to Alexander in the belief
that Alexander's power and fortune were more than human.40

38 Hamilton 38: “it is clear ... that Plutarch uses Aristobulus.”

39 My account of the battle (supra n.37: 73–88) differs from the accounts of,
44; R. Lane Fox, Alexander the Great (London 1973) 122; Badian (supra n.37);
and Bosworth, Conquest 40ff.

40 Ἀλέξανδρος ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Συγδιανῶν χώραν. η δὲ ἐστὶ πάσα τραχεία
καὶ δύσβατος· πέτρα δὲ κατὰ μέσην ἀνατείνει (ἄρνθιον) τοῖς πτηνοῖς [μόνοις]
βάσιμος· ἐν κύκλῳ δὲ ὑπὶ δασεῖα καὶ πυκνῆς τοὺς άβατοὺς κρημνοὺς ἀβατο-
τέρους εἰργάζετο. τὴν πέτραν Ἀρίωμάζης μετὰ πολλῆς χειρός καὶ κατεργάζει
Συγδιανῶν καταλάβετο πηγὰς θάτατος ἔξοι ἔνδον καὶ παρασκευὴν σίτιων
ἀρθουν. Ἀλέξανδρος περιπασάμενος καὶ καταμεθόν τὰς φύσεις τῆς πέτρ
ἐκέλευς τριακοσίους λογάδας τεναίας, ὡς ἡ ἄκασης καὶ τέχνη κρημνο-
βατεῖν, ἀόρας κατώπιν τῆς πέτρας διὰ τυχνῆς ὑπὸς ἀνέρετεν καὶ λεπτοῖς
κάλοις ἀνιμὰν ἀλλήλους· ἤπειδαν δὲ τῶν κορυφῶν κρατήσανεν, ᾠνάς
λευκάς, ὡς ἔχον, λυσαμένους κοντοὺς εὐμήκεσι περιάπαι καὶ τούτους ύπὲρ τὴν
Polyaenus did not follow Arrian’s account, for there is no mention in Arrian of the thick forest, the approach through the forest, the foliage on top of the rock, and the springs of water on the rock. Polyaenus does not mention the snow, which in Arrian’s account provides a supply of water and makes the ascent so difficult that, when some thirty men fell to their death, the bodies were lost in the snow, nor the exchange of jibes about “flying men.” On the other hand, Polyaenus and Curtius have some points in common: copious springs of water inside a cavern on the rock (Curt. 7.11.3); the king rode round the rock (a distance of some 30 km; 7.11.2); his orders were reported at some length (expanded into a speech at 7.11.7–12); 300 young men were to be selected (7.11.7); on gaining the summit they were to signal with white garments (7.11.11, evadite in cacumen; quod cum ceperitis, candidis velis signum mihi dabitis); these garments were raised aloft on their spears (7.11.19); and when that did happen, there was shouting by the entire army (7.11.25, totius exercitus clamor). Whereas Arrian limited the operation to a single night (Arr. 4.19.1, τῆς νυκτὸς), Polyaenus and Curtius made it cover at least a day and a night (Polyaenus having the men proceed through the dense forest to the back of the rock; Curt. 7.11.14, 16 [diem], 21 [postero die]).

It is evident that Polyaenus disregarded Arrian’s account, no doubt based on Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus (Arr. 1 praef.). He chose to follow Curtius, or alternatively to go back to Curtius’ source or rather sources, for I have argued elsewhere⁴¹ that Curtius followed Aristobulus for the actual ascent of the rock and Cleitarchus for the background and the finale, the scourging and crucifying of the Sogdian leaders (7.11.28). There are interesting parallels between what we have ascribed to the influence of Cleitarchus and the account of the operation at the Susian rocks in Polyaenus 4.3.27 and in Curt. 5.3.17–4.33, which derived from Cleitarchus (supra ad 4.3.27). In each case Cleitar-

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⁴¹ THA 144f. Bosworth (C II 125) has criticised me for believing in these two sources and called it “contamination,” but his own theories involve what he calls “two complicated contaminations” (126).
chus has expanded an operation to cover at least a day and a night instead of Arrian’s single night; he has had the troops take provision for two or three days; he has added a thick forest and dense foliage; he has invented conversations and a speech by Alexander; and he has exaggerated the exhaustion of the troops (e.g. Curt. 5.4.18; 7.11.17). For his part Polyaeus expanded the boldness of the stratagem by stating that the climbers went “unarmed” (ἀνεμπλουτος), whereas Curtius had them armati “with swords and spears only” (7.11.14) and Arrian implied that they were lightly armed and not, as the defenders supposed, “exactly fully-armed” (4.19.4, ἀκριβῶς ὑπλισμένους).

In his account of the two very strong rocks that Alexander captured, Strabo reports the one was “in Sogdiane the rock of the Oxus,” but some say “the rock of Ariamazes (517C=11.11.4). Polyaeus agrees with Strabo, for he places his rock in Sogdiane and has it defended by Ariomazes—thus in agreement with Curt. 7.11.1—whereas Arrian (4.17.4) called it just “the in-Sogdiane rock” and did not name a defender.42

4.3.30. The Cathaei, a division of the Indians, made a desperate opposition to Alexander. He killed them from the youth upwards and razed their strongest city, Sangala. India was pervaded by the bad report that Alexander was waging war in a murderous, barbarian manner. As he wished to change his reputation, when he captured another city in Indian territory, he took hostages and made a treaty; and then on coming to a third city, which was very large and well-populated, he placed the hostages—old men, women, and children—in front of the phalanx. The inhabitants, recognizing those of their own race and seeing the evidence of Alexander’s clemency, opened their gates and admitted him as suppliants (μετὰ ἱκτηριῶν). The report spreading at once persuaded the Indians to accept Alexander willingly.43

42 So also Strabo’s other rock, “the in-Bactriane rock of Sisimithres,” was also called “the rock of Sisimithres” (PA 58.3), “the in-Paraitacae stronghold, another rock, named after Chorienes” (Arr. 4.21.1), but just “a rock” in the list of contents of Diodorus 17 KE and at Curt. 8.2.20. See Hamilton 129, who is clearer than Bosworth, C II 124ff.

43 Ἀλέξανδρος Καθαίους, μοιράζεν Ἰνδῶν ἐξ ἀπονοιας ἀντιστάσαν ἤμβδων ἐκτείνει καὶ πόλιν αὐτῶν Σάγγαλα τὴν καρπεταστὴν κατέσκαψεν. διήκε τοὺς Ἰνδοὺς φήμη πονηρᾶ ἢ Ἀλέξανδρος φωνικὸς καὶ βαρβαρικός πολεμόσων, δὲ μεταβάλλειν τὴν δόξαν βολόμενος ἄλλην πόλιν (διὰ) τῆς Ἰνδικῆς ἔλως, ὁμήρους λαβὼν, σπειράμενος ἐπὶ τρίτην πόλιν ἠλθεν εὐμέγεθη καὶ πολυ-ανθρωπον, τάξεις πρὸ τῆς φάλαγγος τοὺς ὁμήρους, γέροντας, παιδιὰς, γυναῖκας, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ὁμοφόλους γνωρίσαντες καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς Ἀλέξανδρου φυλανθροπίας ὁρῶντες ἀνοίγουσιν τὰς πύλας καὶ μετὰ ἱκτηριῶν αὐτῶν ἔδεξαντο. αὐτίκα ἡ φήμη διαδραμοῦσα ἔπεισεν Ἰνδοὺς ἐκόντας Ἀλέξανδρον δέχεσθαι.
Diodorus mentions briefly (17.91.4) the costly siege of "the largest and strongest city" of the Cathaei and Alexander's burning of it. Curtius describes the city as "great by the standards of the region," the escape of only a few men, and the destruction of the city (9.1.18, excitium urbis). Arrian gives a long description of the siege of Sangala (5.22.4–24.5), the capture of 70,000 persons, and the razing of the city, of which the territory was given to Indians who came over to Alexander voluntarily (5.24.8). The ultimate source of all these accounts was the description by Ptolemy (holding a command during the siege) and/or Aristobulus.44 The opposition was, as Arrian makes clear and as Polyainos says, "desperate" (ἐξ ἀνοικῶν ἀντιστάσαν), and the casualties were very high for the Cathaei45 and higher than usual for the Macedonians (Arr. 5.24.5).46 It is probable that Polyainos exaggerated the "murderous" element in saying that Alexander killed the inhabitants "from youth upwards," for Arrian's full account (5.24.5) has Alexander take over 70,000 prisoners.

The taking and parading of hostages47 are described also at Curt. 9.1.23 (obsides ducebantur ante agmen). The surrender of Indians as "suppliants" also occurs at Diod. 17.91.4 (μεθ' ἵκεντρων). Arrian reports only incidentally that, at the time of the razing of Sangala, Indians of the region were coming over voluntarily (5.24.7).48 The further effect of Alexander's policy of clemency (τίς Ἀλεξάνδρου φιλανθρωπίας, as Polyainos puts it) was described not by Arrian but by Diodorus (17.91.7, 93.1) and by Curtius (9.1.30, 36). Polyainos may have drawn his final

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44 It is generally agreed that they were Arrian's sources, with Ptolemy predominating: Sources 256f; Bosworth, C II 327, citing the views of earlier authors.
45 As at Thebes and at Tyre, when there was opposition and fighting within the city, the casualties were respectively 6,000 (Diod. 17.14.1) and 8,000 (Arr. 2.24.4), as compared with 17,000 at Sangala (Arr. 5.24.5), where the Cathaeans and their neighbours had congregated (5.22.4f).
46 Bosworth (C II 334: "the military population [of Sangala] was clearly massacred en bloc") disregarded the statement that over 70,000 were captured (Arr. 5.24.5). Presumably he took Polyainos as his authority, although he did not mention him.
47 The taking of hostages indicates that a treaty had been concluded, for the hostages were intended as a guarantee that the treaty would be kept.
48 Arrian abbreviates a great deal, and this is a good example. See Bosworth, C II 336f.
remark from reading either Diodorus or Curtius or their source, Cleitarchus.49

4.3.31. Alexander observed that the land of the Cossaei was rough with high, inaccessible mountains and that there was a multitude of notable warriors in the mountains; there was therefore no expectation of taking it. Someone came reporting “Hephaestion has died in Babylon.” He [i.e., Alexander] proclaimed universal mourning and was hurrying away to the burial of Hephaestion. The scouts of the Cossaeans, as they saw men departing, scattered themselves. Alexander, sending cavalrymen by night, captured the unguarded approach-route to the mountains, and [himself] turning back from his march and appearing (in support of) the cavalrymen, together with them subjugated the land of the Cossaei. This action, they say, was a consolation to Alexander for his grief over Hephaestion.50

A similar description of the land and its warriors at Arr. 7.15.1f explains more fully than Polyaeus that a regular force could not capture the territory, because the Cossaei left their villages and took to the high mountains, from which they later returned and resumed their practice of brigandage.51 Arrian had earlier mentioned (7.14.9) that mourning was ordered throughout the whole barbarian country, and he placed “a considerable time” of mourning (7.15.1, χρόνος συχνὸς) before Alexander’s expedition towards the Cossaei. Diodorus too has an interval of time between the death of Hephaestion (17.110.8) and the invasion of Cossaea (17.111.4). He describes the country and the warriors in similar terms. Strabo (524C=11.13.6) cites Nearchus’ report that the Cossaei were a tribe of brigands, exacted tribute from Persia, and were checked from their audacious way of life by Alexander in a winter campaign. Such remarks recur at Arr. Ind. 40.6f, who gives Nearchus as his source (Ind. 20.1; 40.5, 9).

49 Alexander’s policy of harshness followed by clemency succeeded also in southern Pakistan; see AG 230.

50 Αλέξανδρος τὴν Κοσσαίων χώραν ἔφορα τραγείον τε καὶ δρῆ υψηλὰ καὶ ἀπλοῖα καὶ πλῆθος εν τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἀνθρώπων δοκίμων· οὐ τούτων ἔλειν ἔτης, ἤκε τις ἀγέλλων ἡ Ἡφαιστίων ἐν Βαβυλονίᾳ τεθνηκέν. ο δὲ κοινὸν πένθος ἐπαγ­γείλας ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡφαιστίωνος ταρην ἡπέγετο· οἱ σκοποὶ τῶν Κοσσαίων, ἀνα­ζηγοῖντας ὡς ἔδον [αὐτοὺς], αὐτοὶ διεσπάρθησαν. Ἀλέξανδρος νόκτωρ ἐπι­πέας πέμψας τὴν ἐς τὸ δρῆ πάροδον ἀφύλακτον κατελάβετο καὶ τῆς ὁδο­πορίας ἀποκλίνει, ἐπιμενέι τοῖς ἑπεύσει σὺν αὐτοῖς τὴν Κοσσαίων χώραν ἐχειρώσατο, τούτο τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἐπὶ Ἡφαιστίωνι λύπης παρηγόρημα φασίν Ἀλέξανδρω γενέσθαι.

51 These tactics were employed by resistance groups in the Balkans in World War II.
Plutarch places Alexander’s order for mourning some time before the campaign against the Cossaei (PA 72.3f). It is clear that Polyaeus drew on the same source or sources as these writers, namely Ptolemy, who took part in the campaign (Arr. 7.15.3), and Nearchus. Polyaeus dramatises the stratagem on his own initiative by moving the proclamation of mourning down to the start of the campaign.

The preliminary capture of the ‘approach-route’, which Polyaeus describes, occurs in the plural in Diodorus (17.111.5, προκαταλαμβόμενος τῶς παιρόδους). Polyaeus’ final comment, that the campaign was said to be a consolation to Alexander in his mourning, is echoed in Plutarch’s remark that “this was called a death-offering to Hephaestion” (PA 72.4). The παρηγόρημα in Polyaeus and the ἔναγισμός in Plutarch imply in each case a turn to a new source that they shared in common. If so, Polyaeus stopped short of Plutarch’s statement that Alexander “slaughtered all Cossaeans from the youth upwards,” even though Polyaeus (4.3.30) had used that phrase of the Cathaei. In the present case Polyaeus was wise, for the statements by Diodorus, that Alexander took very many prisoners and by liberating them obtained the submission of the Cossaeans, and by Arrian (Ind.), that Alexander founded cities so that the Cossaeans should adopt a settled life, are to be accepted as historical,52 as their sources were respectively Ptolemy or Diyllus and Nearchus.53

4.3.24. When Alexander was administering justice in the presence of Macedonians or Greeks, he thought fit to keep the court modest and democratic, but when he did so in the presence of the barbarians he thought fit to have it brilliant and fit for high command, thereby astounding the barbarians even with the form of the courtroom. At any rate, when he was administering justice in the presence of Bactrians, Hyrcanians, and Indians, he had his marquee set up as follows. The marquee was of a size for 100 couches; it was supported by fifty gold columns; the upper part was covered by extensive canopies overhead, which were interwoven with gold and decorated with embroideries. On the inner side round the marquee there stood first of all 500 Persian Apple-bearers, in full dress uniforms of purple and quince-yellow cloth.

53 For these writers see Sources 140, 298; THA 74 (Diyllus). I suggested (Sources 298) that the idea of a death-offering may have been taken over from an account by Cleitarchus.
After the Apple-bearers there were archers up to the same number; they differed in their uniforms, some being clad in flame-coloured garments, others in dark blue, and others in deep-dyed scarlet. In front of them stood Macedonians, silver-shielded, 500 of the tallest men. At the centre of the marquee the golden throne was placed, on which he presided and conducted his business; the Bodyguards stood by the king on either side as he was giving judgment. The marquee was encircled by the Guard of elephants, fully equipped, and by 1,000 Macedonians, wearing Macedonian uniforms. Next to them 500 Susians in purple dress, and after them, encircling the entire parade, 10,000 Persians, the most handsome and the tallest of their race, adorned with every Persian finery, all carrying their short swords. Such was Alexander's court of justice when he was judging in the presence of the barbarians.

Anecdotes about Philip as the final judge in Macedonia show that proceedings there were almost informal, and appellants were completely outspoken in addressing the king. As Polyaeus indicates, this continued to be so in Asia when Alexander judged the cases of Macedonians and Greeks, for he kept one ear ready to hear the words of the defendant (PA 42.2ff). We

54 'Αλεξάνδρος ἐν μὲν τοῖς Μακεδώνιοι ἢ ἐν τοῖς "Ελλησι δικάζον μέτριον καὶ δημοτικοῖς ἔχειν τὸ δικαστήριον ἐδοκιμάζειν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις λαμπρόν καὶ στρατηγικῶν, ἐκπλήσσον τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ τὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου σχῆμα. ἐν γοῦν Βάκχων καὶ Υρκανίως καὶ Ἰνδός δικάζων εἶχε τὴν σημείωσιν ὅτι περισσεῖν, ἡ σκηνὴ τὸ μέγεθος ἡ κλίνων ἐκάτον· χρύσοις κίονες ὑποτέθεντο αὐτὴ πεντήκοντα· ὑπερενιόντες σύναρσισι διάχρυσοι, ποικίλασιν ἐκπεπνημένοι, τὸν ἄνω τόπον ἔσκεψαν. Πέρσαι μὲν πρῶτοι πεντακόσιοι μηλοφοροὶ περὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ἐντὸς ίσαντο πορφυρὰς καὶ μηλίναις ἐθισθήν ἐξησυμνοῦν, μετὰ δὲ τοὺς μηλοφόρους τοῦτοι τὸν ἦσον ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντες ταῖς ἐις ἡθισὶ διήλ­λατον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἠλήγαν, οἱ δὲ κυνεῖ, οἱ δὲ ἴσων θριάμβου περιεβλήματο, τοῦτον προϊστάτου Μακεδόνες ἀργυρόστασες πεντακόσιοι τῶν μεγιστῶν ἐνδρίνον. κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέσον τῆς σκηνῆς ὁ χρυσός ἔχει τὸ θρόνον, ἐφ’ ὧν προ­καθήμενοι ἐχρημάτιζον· οἱ σωματοφύλακες ἐξέστησαν ἐκτεθεῖσθης δια­σέλεις δικάζοντος, ἐκ κύκλῳ τῆς σκηνῆς τῶν ἀπεφάντων ἕγεμνα διεσκευ­ασμένον ἐφεστικεὶ καὶ Μακεδόνες χίλιοι στόλας Μακεδονικὰς ἔχοντες· ἐπὶ τούτως πεντακόσιοι Σοῦσσιοι πορφυροσχήμονες, καὶ μετὰ τούτους ἐν κύκλῳ πάν­των Πέρσαι μύριοι (Περσῶν) οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ μέγιστοι, κεκαλλυσσιμοὶ, παντὶ κόσμῳ Περσικῳ, πάντες ἀκινάκας ἔχοντες, τούτῳ ἦν ’Αλεξάνδρου τὸ δικαστηρίον ἐν τοῖς Βερβάροις.

See Griffith in G. T. Griffith and N. G. L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia II (Oxford 1979) 393f. W. L. Adams (in Ancient Macedonia IV [Thessaloniki 1986] 48ff) discusses freedom of speech in Macedonia without mentioning this passage in Polyaeus. It seems that Alexander presided as Hegemon in some cases tried in the court of the Greek League, before he left for Asia. The trials of Cleander, Sitalces, and Heracon were instigated by accusatores ... e provincia (Curt. 10.1.2), who were exercising the right of appeal that Alexander as King of Asia had granted to all his subjects.
know little of trials when barbarians were defendants or appellants; the best example is probably the trial of Heracon, first acquitted and later "convicted by men of Susa" (Arr. 6.27.5).

A marquee was probably customary at Macedonian festivals. In 335 B.C. a marquee for 100 couches was set up for Alexander at Aegaeae, not for administering justice but for entertaining guests at a state banquet "with splendid equipment" (Diod. 17.16.4). On the other hand, the gold columns, the canopies decorated with gold, the embroideries, and golden throne were Asiatic features in the Persian manner. Alexander marked this combination of Macedonian and Persian royal customs by parading elite forces of both Macedonia and Persia.

The Bodyguards, standing by the king, were Macedonians of high rank, usually seven in number. The 500 "Macedones" constituted the Royal Infantry "Guard of the Macedonians" (Arr. 1.8.4), drawn from the tallest men, as already in Philip's time (Theopompus, FGrHist 115 f.348). The 1,000 Macedonians wearing Macedonian uniforms constituted the Royal Hypaspist Guard (Arr. 1.8.4). The Persian units, parallel to these, were the 500 Apple-bearers, and two groups of 500 each, namely the Archers and the Susians. The number of Apple-bearers was reduced from the 1,000 of the Persian King's Guard, in order to equal the size of the Macedonian Infantry Guard. The Susians were also armed with bows, as Phylarchus (Ath. 539E) placed after the Apple-bearers a force of 1,000 archers. These Susians wore purple uniforms because, according to Phylarchus, Alexander had granted them that colour of uniform. The 1,000 archers were equal in number to the Royal Hypaspist Guard. On the other hand, there was no Macedonian equivalent to the Guard of Elephants and the 10,000 Persians, for they indicate

55 Plutarch (PA 37.7) tells the story of Alexander sitting for the first time "on the throne of Darius under the golden canopy"; and the marriages of Alexander and his Companions to Asiatic women were celebrated "in the golden-canopied marquee" (Plut. Mor. 329D), appropriately because they were conducted in the Persian manner (Arr. 7.4.6).

56 These two guards are defined in my "The Various Guards of Philip II and Alexander III," Historia 40 (1991) 403ff (=Collected Studies II 186ff).

57 When the Apple-bearers formed the Guard of the Persian king, they had numbered 1,000 (Hdt. 7.41.1f; Heracleides of Cumae, FGrHist 689f.1=Ath. 514b). On the funerary car of Alexander a tablet showed as attendant on the king a Guard of Macedonians and a Guard of "Apple-bearers" (Diod. 18.27.1).

58 Phylarchus, FGrHist 81f.4. So too Eumenes granted the wearing of the purple: Plut. Eum. 8.7.
that the reception was for the Asiatics. We may note that a Guard of Macedonians, a Guard of Apple-bearers, and a group of Elephants were portrayed on the tablets that accompanied the funerary car of Alexander (Diod. 18.27.1).

Polyaenus’ account presents striking similarities (even in precise phrases) to the account of Phylarchus, writing in the latter third century B.C., but differences indicate that Polyaenus did not draw entirely from Phylarchus. The likelihood is that both were familiar with an account written near the time of Alexander, i.e., in the latter fourth century B.C., presumably by the court historian Chares.

The most prestigious place in the marquee, after the Bodyguards, was accorded to the Maκεδόνες ἀργυρόσπιδες by Polyaenus and to ἀργυρόσπιδες Μακεδόνες by Phylarchus. Polyaenus alone dates this form of ceremonial to within the time when Indians were present, i.e., in 326-325 B.C. It is then understandable that such features of the marquee as the golden columns were inspired by those of the palaces of the Indian kings where they administered justice (Curt. 8.9.23-27).

An explanation of the term ἀργυρόσπιδες appears just before the invasion of India: because the equipment of Indian soldiers was said to be enriched with gold and ivory (Curt. 8.5.4), Alexander adorned his cavalry with gold and silver, and “he added silver plates to the shields” (Curt. 8.4.3) and “called his army (exercitum) ‘Argyraspides’ after the silver shields” (Just. 12.7.5). As I have argued elsewhere (THA 104, 147f, 151), the common source of Curtius and Justin in these passages was very probably Cleitarchus. Although Cleitarchus may well

59 Phylarchus, FGrHist 81 F4. For instance in both accounts ὑπερτείνοντες οὐρανικοὶ διάχρυσοι ποικίλωσιν ἐκπεσομενόν, πορφύριοι καὶ μπλένιοις ἔθησιν ἐξηκομενοὶ and ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς σκηνῆς τοῦ τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἀγήμα διεσκευασμένον ἐφεστήκει.

60 Chares mentioned the marquee for 100 couches in his account of the mass wedding (Ath. 538c). Aelian (VH 9.3) gave a similar version, but it is not relevant here, as Aelian wrote after Polyaenus.

61 It is generally agreed that mention of Argyraspides in the battle order of the Macedonians at Gaugamela in 331 B.C. at Diod. 17.57.1 and Curt. 4.13.26 are anachronistic: see my view cited above (n.56: 416). Tarn (II 149-53) maintained that all references to Argyraspides as existing in the reign of Alexander were anachronistic, but he failed to mention the Argyraspides of Phylarchus, Polyaenus, and Aelian. His view has been supported by D. Kienast, Philip II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden (Munich 1973) 287; R. A. Lock, “The Origins of the Argyraspids,” Historia 26 (1977) 377.
have exaggerated, it is to be noted that Curtius and Justin were not restricting the addition of gold and silver ornamentation, and in Justin's case the name "Argyraspides," to any individual unit or units. We may, however, be confident that Alexander would have issued such shields first of all to his Infantry Guards. That may explain why Chares, if he was the ultimate source of the statement in Polyaenus, described one of the Infantry Guards in the court of Alexander as "argyraspides" within the years 326-325 B.C., and why Alexander created "a Persian unit of Argyraspides" at Opis in 324 B.C. (Arr. 7.11.3).

II. Conclusions and Comparisons

As argued above, the writers whose accounts Polyaenus used for his own versions were in all probability the following:

Cleitarchus: 4.3.27 in part (Susian Gates) 4.3.20 (mercenaries at Massaga) 4.3.6 (camp at Gaugamela) 4.3.30 final remark only (Sangala)

Ptolemy: 4.3.16 (Granicus) 4.3.31 in part (Cossaei)

Aristobulus: 4.3.27 in part (Susian Gates) 4.3.22 (Hydaspes)

Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus: 4.3.17 (caltrops at Gaugamela) 4.3.30 the main source (Sangala)

Nearchus: 4.3.31 in part (Cossaei)

Phylarchus: 4.3.34 the main source (court of justice)

Curtius: 4.3.29 (Sogdian rock)

Arrian: 4.3.11 (Thracian wagons)

X (unidentified) 4.3.27 in part (Susian Gates) 4.3.12 (Thebes).

Of these the original writers were Cleitarchus, Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Nearchus; the secondary writers Phylarchus, who had probably used Chares, an original writer; Curtius, who had

62 Bosworth's "this new term was reserved for the hypaspists" (Conquest 270) is his own ipse dixit. Tarn (II 151) had given some reasons for advancing a similar view.
probably relied on Cleitarchus and Aristobulus; and Arrian, who had used Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus. In each case Polyaenus presumably chose a writer, because he found in his work the most striking version of a stratagem (most clearly the choice of Curtius for 4.3.29, the Sogdian rock).

The secondary writers may be called intermediate or Zwischenquellen. The clearest example of Polyaenus using such a writer is at 8.35–42, where Polyaenus took his versions of the acts of eight courageous women from Plutarch's *Mulierum virutes* 16–27 (*Mor.* 253f–63c). Polyaenus abbreviated accurately and wrote in his own style. He even kept the same order, although it was haphazard. Plutarch had given his reason for doing so: "Cases of individual bravery I will put down as they come to me, not in any order, because I think that the record of the present subject does not at all require a chronological arrangement" (tr. F. C. Babbitt). Polyaenus evidently thought likewise, not only in this context but also in recording the stratagems of Alexander at 4.3, for the emperors were interested in the subject of each stratagem and not in its date. But when we try to assess the historical worth of each item, the Zwischenquelle does not usually help; Plutarch, for instance, rarely named his source.

For Alexander's stratagems Polyaenus added 'improving' touches to make a stratagem more striking still: 4.3.11, "heavy-laden" wagons," 4.3.29, "unarmed" warriors, 4.3.17, caltrops covering "the space between the armies," 4.3.30, the inhabitants of Sangala "slain from the youth upwards," and 4.3.31, the proclamation of mourning at the start of the campaign against the Cossaei. We owe to Polyaenus some points not in the surviving accounts of other authors: the use of slings at the Susian Gates (4.3.27), the 'outflanking' at the Granicus (4.3.16), the 'second' hill at Massaga (4.3.20), the position of Porus on

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64 On the other hand, the unknown author of the *Mulierum Virtutes* named as sources Herodotus, Ctesias, Timaeus, Hellanicus, Aeschines Socraticus, Xenophilus, and Menecles, no doubt truthfully. See A. Westermann, *Paradoxographoi, Scriptores rerum mirabilium Graeci* (Braunschweig 1839) 213ff.

65 A. Abramenko, "Alexander vor Mazagae und Aornus," *Klio* 76 (1994) 203 n.71, argues that Polyaenus was referring to Indian mercenaries leaving not Massaga but Aornus. He did not notice the 'second hill', which on my interpretation places the episode at Massaga.
the leftmost elephant and the space of fifty feet between the
elephants (4.3.22), and the Indians among those to whom Alex­
ander administered justice (4.3.24). Another contribution by
Polyaenus was his own clear, factual, and uniform style, which
overlaid and concealed the style of his sources.

On my interpretation of only some passages on Alexander, it
is apparent that in 4.3 Polyaenus had read the works of original
and secondary writers before he made his own choice, and that
he consulted quite a wide range of such writers. This interpreta­
tion indicates that Polyaenus was justified—at least in the pas­
sages here considered—in claiming that he had engaged in much
original and laborious enquiry (2 praef.: ἐφ’ ὅσης ἱστορίας καὶ
ὁσω πόνω τάδε συλλεξάμενος).67

My conclusions may be compared with those of nineteenth­
century scholars, whose views were epitomised by J. Melber
(“Über die Quellen und den Wert der Strategemensammlung
clusions for Alexander’s stratagems, with which alone we are
dealing, may be summarised as follows. Polyaenus did not
arrange the thirty-two stratagems of 4.3 in their chronological
sequence, i.e., from 336–323 B.C. Melber did observe such a
sequence, however, within three separable parts of 4.3, which
he called “Groups”: namely, items 1–10, 11–22, 23–31. In fact his
observation was less than accurate, for in his Group 1 items 1–2,
5 are undatable; in Group 2 items 7–10 are not in chronological
sequence, and items 13–14 are undatable; and in Group 3 items
24–25 are out of chronological sequence, and item 28 is undat­
able. The next step in Melber’s argument was that each Group,
its content being (he thought) in chronological order, must have
been drawn from a separate source (on the assumption that the
source had arranged its material in chronological order). He
proceeded next to identify those separate sources as follows:
for Group 1 an Anekdotenversammlung, an Apophthegmen­
sammlung, and for item 9 an excerpt from a Sammlung; for

66 This is probably correct, as in Devine (1987) 108, for from this position
Porus would have been able to order and to direct the left part of his phalanx
to turn left and move to the left and he would have been in the thick of the
fighting. Had he been in the centre, he could not have seen the course of the
action beyond his left wing, and he would have been on the periphery of the
fighting, for the centre was at least 1.5 km. from the left wing.

67 Buraselis (121) has shown that the Prefaces addressed to the two
emperors are to be treated as “basic evidence.” I am grateful to him for
sending me an offprint.
Group 2 the history of Cleitarchus, whether directly or indirectly (p.615); and for Group 3 a Sammelwerk (p.616). Melber’s derivation of his Groups 1 and 3 from already existing ‘Collections’, which Polyaeus would merely have copied, is not compatible with the emphasis that Polyaeus placed on his own research and his own labours. Nor when we consult the available ‘collections’ do we find any significant use of them by Polyaeus for the stratagems of Alexander. Thus the thirty-four items in Plutarch’s Apophthegmata of Alexander (Mor. 179D–81F) and the thirty-two items of Polyaeus 4.3 share only one in common, namely the order that the Macedonians should shave their beards, so as not to afford a handhold for their enemies (Plut. no. 10, Mor. 180B; Polyaeus 4.3.2)—an order ascribed to Alexander also at Plut. Thes. 5.4. The gap between Frontinus’ collection of stratagems and that of Polyaeus was some eighty years, and it would have been easy for Polyaeus to have simply copied items from Frontinus. The relation between them is very different. Only one item, namely Alexander’s refusal to drink water from a helmet when it was not available for his men, is shared (Front. 1.7.7; Polyaeus 4.3.25), but Polyaeus might have taken it from elsewhere, as Arrian remarks (6.26.1) that “some others” told the story (e.g. Curt. 7.5.10; PA 42.7). In three instances it seems that Polyaeus corrects Frontinus without naming him. At 1.11.14 Frontinus ascribes to Alexander the trick of transferring onto a liver the words “victory for the king” and then showing the liver to his men. Polyaeus gives a fuller account of the trick but ascribes it to Attalus (4.20). No doubt Polyaeus is right, for Alexander respected the omens of sacrifice that his seer Aristander interpreted (e.g. Arr. 4.4.3). Frontinus (3.7.4) attributes a stratagem during a siege of Babylon to Alexander, which Polyaeus attributes to Cyrus—correctly, for Alexander never besieged Babylon, whereas Cyrus did and used that stratagem

68 Wheeler (Krentz and Wheeler viii) make the point that “the practical aim of the military type of stratagem collection ... sets stratagem collections apart” from other collections.

69 Also in Synesius 16, p.79 C. E. Rohde, RHM 38 (1883) 303f, held the view that Polyaeus used Plutarch directly and that the ultimate source was Ptolemy.

70 One reason for the silence of Polyaeus may have been the relationship between Frontinus and Marcus Aurelius, as Wheeler (Krentz and Wheeler xiii) remarks, for “Marcus Aurelius’ great-great-grandfather had married Frontinus’ sister.”
(Hdt. 1.191.3; Xen. Cyr. 7.6.16). At 1.4.9-9a Frontinus gives two accounts of a stratagem in crossing a river, namely the Hydaspes (1.4.9) and the Indus (1.4.9a); of these the first is very brief, and the second, naming the Indus instead of the Hydaspes, is inaccurate (cf. Arr. 5.12.4–14.6). Polyaenus (4.3.9) puts matters right in a full account derived from Arr. 5.10.3 or Arrian’s sources. So much for Polyaenus’ use of such ‘collections’ as have survived for his stratagems of Alexander.

Modern scholarship lays less stress on ‘collections’. Thus, writing generally of Polyaenus’ work, Wheeler (Krentz and Wheeler xv) writes: “No doubt he did consult other stratagem collections ... it is improbable that he could have hoped to gain the well-read Marcus Aurelius’ attention merely by reworking another exempla collection.” Whereas some writers had had doubts, Wheeler states firmly that “as a pleader in Roman courts Polyaenus had to know Latin” (xiii), and in consequence could have read the works, for instance, of Frontinus and Curtius. That is clearly correct. There is also more readiness to believe that Polyaenus did sometimes consult the works of earlier authors. Thus in a dissertation of 1970, R. J. Phillips71 maintained that Polyaenus consulted Theopompus, Hieronymus, Phylarchus, Duris (“possibly”), and Plutarch. In 1987 D. M. Lewis72 argued that Polyaenus (4.3.32) used Ctesias, possibly through Cleitarchus, for the list of foods for the Persian kings. In 1994 Wheeler (Krentz and Wheeler xv) went further. He named seventeen authors of whom “traces have been found ... with much debate over their direct or indirect use.” I have tried to show here that for some passages concerning Alexander Polyaenus consulted six identifiable authors.73

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71 The Sources and Methods of Polyaenus (diss. Harvard University 1970), summarized in HSCP 76 (1972) 297f.


73 This paper has been extended and improved as a result of suggestions by the Editor’s reader to whom I am very grateful.