Aristotle on Helios’ ‘Omniscience’ in Iliad 3 and Odyssey 12: On Schol. B* Iliad 3.277

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In my recent book on Aristotle’s lost Homeric Problems, I briefly discussed schol. B* Il. 3.277a ([Marc.gr. Z. 453 [= 821] fol. 47r) in the context of whether Aristotle ever interprets Homer allegorically. I there remarked in passing that I hoped “to write further about this fascinating scholium (and related texts) in more detail at some other time.” That is what I am doing here: discussing this scholium at length, not confined to that narrow context and having now examined the textual evidence firsthand.

1. Schol. B* Iliad 3.277a

In Iliad 3, as part of his oath affirming that the Greeks will abide by the outcome of the duel between Menelaus and Paris, Agamemnon swears first to Zeus, and then to Helios (the Sun), “you who oversee all things and overhear all things,” Ἠέλιος θ’, ὃς πάντ’ ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ’ ἐπακούεις (277). In Odyssey 12,


2 Unless indicated otherwise, the numbering of the scholia is my own. See nn.12–13 below for the source of this scholium and for information on MS. B and the difference between the B- and B*-scholia.


4 The poet’s meaning may simply be “see all things and hear all things” (though “oversee” is one meaning of ἐφοράω and “overhear” one meaning of ἐπακούω). But I want to capture the ἐπ- prefix in ἐφοράξ and ἐπακούεις. Note M. Krieter-Spiro, Homer’s Iliad: The Basel Commentary. Book III (Berlin 2015)
however, in describing his adventures, and specifically the killing of the Cattle of Helios by his comrades on the island Thrinakia, Odysseus says (374–375): “Swift to Hyperion Helios came a messenger, Lampetia5 of the long robe, [proclaiming] that we/the companions killed his cattle,” ὡκέα δ’ Ἡελίῳ Ὑπερίονι ἄγγελος ἠλθε Λαµµετίθ τονύπελος, ὦ οἱ βόας ἠκταµεν ἲµεις/ἠκταν ἑταῖροι.6 One or more ancient Homeric scholars suspected a contradiction here,7 which gave rise to a Homeric problem: Why would a god who sees and hears all need a messenger?8

109: “ἐφορᾶν with the connotation ‘to monitor, and punish if the need arise’ also at Od. 13.214 (Zeus), 17.487 (gods).” In addition to “hear” and “overhear,” ἑπακούω can also mean “hear about” (which is arguably its meaning in this verse).

5 Lampetia and Phaethousa (meaning something like “Shining” and “Radiance”7) are divine daughters of Helios and the nymph Neaera (they are referred to as θεαί and νύμφαι). They were made herdswomen (ἐπιποιένεις) tasked with guarding (φυλασσένει) their father’s cattle and sheep: Od. 12.131–136. Earlier in Odyssey 12, Odysseus referred to Helios, who oversees everything and overhears everything (Ἡελίου, δς πάντων ἐφορᾷ καὶ πάντων ἑπακούει, 323). More on this below. He claims he later learned about Lampetia going to Helios from Calypso, who heard it from Hermes (389–390).

6 M. L. West, Homerus Odyssea (Berlin 2017) 269, prints ἠκταµεν ἲµεις, and in his apparatus writes: “ἠκταµεν ἲµεις Ἀρ Ἐ ὧς ἐκταν ἑταῖροι (nov. Did) 28 t Ω* fere.” The scholium that is the focus of this essay has ἐκταν ἑταῖροι. Note schol. H Od. 12.375 (Harl. 5674, fol. 77v): “οἱ οἱ βόας ἠκταµεν ἲµεις”: οὕτως οἰ Ἀριστάρχου. (More on the H-scholia in §4 below.) Heubeck comments (in A. Heubeck and A. Hoekstra, A Commentary on Homer’s Odyssey II [Oxford 1990] 139): “It is not easy to choose between ἠκταµεν ἲµεις … and ἐκταν ἑταῖροι … It is possible that the Vulgate attempted to ‘correct’ an expression which strangely implies an element of guilt in Odysseus.” On Odysseus’ claims of innocence, see n.41 below.

7 For a post-Aristotle example, consider the second part of schol. A II. 3.277 (Venetus A, fol. 47v) = schol. A II. 3.277a Ariston. (Erbse): καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀθετήσαν τῶν ἐν Ὀδυσσείας ἀκέα δ’ Ἠελίῳ ὑπερίοιν ἄγγελος ἠλθεν” περὶ τῆς ἀπωλείας τῶν βοῶν τῷ πάντα ἐφορῶντι, “And [the dipλέ] is regarding the athetesis of these [words] in the Odyssey, ‘Swift to Hyperion Helios came a messenger’, concerning the destruction of the cattle to the one who oversees all things.” On the first part of this scholium see the following note.

8 Another issue surrounding II. 3.277, which will not concern me, is why
According to schol. B* Il. 3.277a, Aristotle offered three solutions to this problem. My aim here is to take a fresh look at this scholium, which has properly been considered a fragment of the lost *Homerian Problems*. For this purpose, I have consulted an excellent digital copy of the relevant *Iliad*-manuscript: *Venetus B* ([Marc.gr. Z. 453 [= 821]], eleventh century, which contains two levels of scholia (eleventh century, and twelfth or thirteenth cen-

(or whether) Homer uses the nominative Ἡέλιος rather than the vocative Ἡλιε. Consider the first part of schol. A Il. 3.277: “Ἡέλιος θ’”. ὃτι ἄντι τοῦ Ἡλιε, ὦς κάκει “δός, φίλος” [Od. 17.415] καὶ “ἄλλα, φίλος, θάνε καὶ σύ” [Il. 21.106]. Schol. T Il. 3.277 (Burney 86, fol. 25r) (= 3.277a2 Erbse) and schol. Ge Il. 3.277 (Genav.gr. 44, p.130) claim that this form of the vocative is Attic (as does Eust. Il. 3.277 [I 652.16–17 van der Valk]). Modern scholars disagree about this. For instance, G. S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary* I (Cambridge 1985) 304, claims that “Ἡλιος is a vocative here, cf. 21.106,” whereas Krieter-Spiro, *Homer’s Iliad* 109, comments on Ἡέλιος θ’: “nom. instead of voc. in the second address, which is connected to the first, vocative address via θ’.” As for Od. 12.374–375, there are a couple of minor issues involving variant readings: for one of these, see n.6 above; for the other, note the first part of schol. H Od. 12.374c: ἐν πολλοῖς, ὀκῦς δ’ Ἡελίῳ, ἶν’ ἔ ῥι ὀκῦς ἀγγελος (the whole of which is quoted in n.59 below).

9 This is not the only case of Aristotle offering multiple solutions. See e.g. schol. B* Il. 2.649 (= fr.146 Rose3/370 Gigon), on an apparent contradiction: in the *Iliad* Crete is called “hundred-city Crete” (2.649), in the *Odyssey* it is said to have ninety cities (19.173). Aristotle offers two or three solutions (depending on how one interprets the scholium).

I follow Erbse and others in using B* to refer to the later scholia, which is the type that interests me here.\footnote{Image at http://www.homermultitext.org/iipsrv?IIIF=/project/homer/pyramidal/deepzoom/hmt/vbiffin/v1/vb_46v_47r.tif/full/2000,/0/default.jpg (last accessed 17 Dec. 2019). This image was derived from an original ©2007, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venezia, Italia; the derivative image is ©2010, Center for Hellenic Studies. Original and derivative are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. The CHS/ Marciana Imaging Project was directed by David Jacobs of the British Library.}

What follows is my transcription and translation of schol. B* Il. 3.277a (fol. 47r).\footnote{On Venet. B, and the difference between the B- and B*-scholia, see H. Erbse, Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem I (Berlin 1969) xvii–xviii. The scholiast responsible for the material labeled B* is credited with the addition of (inter alia) the excerpts from Porphyry, in the spaces of the page that were empty. Lips. gr. 32, fourteenth century, contains a version of schol. B* Il. 3.277a (see L. Bachmann, Scholia in Homeri Iliadem quae in codice bibl. Paull. Acad. Lips. legentur [Leipzig 1835] 173–174). It has been used by editors (e.g. Rose\textsuperscript{1} p.159) to correct what they see as errors or an inferior text in B*, but it will not concern me. On Lips. gr. 32 see Erbse xxiii–xxiv. Note that there are in fact two B* scholia on fol. 47r concerning Iliad 3.277 (which I distinguish by the designations ‘a’ and ‘b’), in two different locations: The ‘b’ scholium is written to the right of the text of the Iliad; the ‘a’ scholium runs along the bottom and is followed directly by another scholium on a different verse (Il. 3.457). (See H. Schrader, Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Iliadem pertinentium reliquiae [Leipzig 1880] 66–67.) This fact is important in assessing schol. B* Il. 3.277b, which I discuss in §4.}\footnote{That I could transcribe this scholium myself does not diminish my gratitude to earlier editors, whose own transcriptions I have relied upon. I have added capitalization and quotation marks and have added or altered much of the punctuation. For versions of this text in earlier editions of scholia or the fragments of Porphyry’s Homeric Questions see J. B. G. d’Ansse de Villoison, Homeri Ilias ad veteris codicis Veneti fidem recensita (Venice 1788) 99; W. Dindorf, Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem III (Berlin 1877) 178–179; Schrader Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum 113–114. This text was not included among Erbse’s presentation of the scholia on Il. 3.277, because his aim was to produce an edition of the Vierrämerscholia/A-scholia and the exegetic/bT-scholia, and these texts belong to a different tradition than the scholia taken from Porphyry, the D-scholia, etc. Schol. B* Il. 3.277a was, however, re-} Ἀριστοτέλης is found written in the parenthesis).\footnote{That I could transcribe this scholium myself does not diminish my gratitude to earlier editors, whose own transcriptions I have relied upon. I have added capitalization and quotation marks and have added or altered much of the punctuation. For versions of this text in earlier editions of scholia or the fragments of Porphyry’s Homeric Questions see J. B. G. d’Ansse de Villoison, Homeri Ilias ad veteris codicis Veneti fidem recensita (Venice 1788) 99; W. Dindorf, Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem III (Berlin 1877) 178–179; Schrader Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum 113–114. This text was not included among Erbse’s presentation of the scholia on Il. 3.277, because his aim was to produce an edition of the Vierrämerscholia/A-scholia and the exegetic/bT-scholia, and these texts belong to a different tradition than the scholia taken from Porphyry, the D-scholia, etc. Schol. B* Il. 3.277a was, however, re-}
margin,\(^14\) as is an ἀστερίσκος (※) indicating that this is a comment on Il. 3.277 (and specifically on πάντ’ ἐφορᾷς):

Διὰ τί τὸν ἥλιον πάντα ἐφορᾶν καὶ πάντα ἐπακούειν εἰπὼν, ἐπὶ τὸν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἄγγελον δεῖμον ἐποίησεν. “ὡκέα δ’ Ἡλίῳ Ὄπερον ἄγγελος ἦλθε Λαμπετή ταυνύπελος, ὦ οἱ βόας ἐκτενέταιροι.” λύων δὲ Ἀριστοτέλες φησιν ἤτοι ότι πάντα μὲν ὁρᾶ ἥλιος ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ ἄμα. ἦ ὁτι τοῦ ἥλιου ἦν τὸ ἔξαγγείλαν\(^15\) ἡ Λαμπετία, ὠςπερ τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ ἢ υψίς. ἦ ὁτι φησίν ἀρμόττον ἦν εἰπεῖν οὔτως τὸν τέλε Αγα-μένιν αὐτῶν ορκίζοντα ἐν τῇ μονομαχίᾳ, ὁτι “Ἡλίος,\(^16\) ὦς πάντ’ ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ’ ἐπακούεις.” καὶ τὸν Ὄσυσσά πρὸς τοὺς ἑταῖρους λέγοντα. (lacuna?)\(^17\) οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἄιδη\(^18\) ὁρᾷ.\(^19\) καὶ ὁλὸς ὁ ποιητὴς ὁποῦ πάρεστιν εκεῖνα φησιν ὅραν πάντως ἐν μὲν τῇ ἀνατολή ὅταν τὰ ἐν τῇ ἀνατολῇ, ἐν δὲ τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ δυσμῶν, τὰ κατ’ αὐτὰς ἐπιβλέπειν. εἰκὸς οὖν ἔστι κατ’ ἄλλο κλίμα τῆς κινή-


\(^{14}\) Villoison and Heitz print Πορφυρίου at the outset of their presentations of this scholium. Bachmann does not, however, so I assume Πορφυρίου is not present in Lipt.gr. 32 (but I have not studied this manuscript).

\(^{15}\) The MS. reads ἦ ὁτι τοῦ ἥλιου ἦν τὸ ἔξαγγείλαν, though it is possible that -αν is a correction of -α. Villoison printed ἦτοι ὁτι τῷ ἥλιῳ ἦν τὸ ἔξαγγείλα, and was followed by Rose\(^1\) and Heitz. Rose\(^2\) is the same, except in restoring ἔξαγγείλαν. Rose\(^3\) and Schrader follow the MS. in everything but τῷ ἥλιῳ. Gigon enigmatically prints ἦ ὁτι τῷ ἥλιῳ ἦν ἔξαγγείλα, and unfortunately (though typically) provides no information about his text.

\(^{16}\) Regarding ὁτι Ἡλίου of the MS., Villoison, Bachmann, and every compiler of fragments add θ᾽ after Ἡλίου (from Il. 3.277) and omit ὁτι—presumably to make the verse better fit syntactically into the passage. The addition of θ᾽ is unnecessary. The presence of ὁτι is harder to make sense of, but not impossible, so I have retained it.

\(^{17}\) Schrader marks a lacuna here, which may well be right, see below.

\(^{18}\) The MS. has ζῆν. I capitalize this and add the iota subscripts (which are absent, as usual). Villoison, Bachmann, and every compiler of fragments print ᾿ζῆν (some of them indicating that this is a correction of the MS. reading). Schrader follows the MS.

\(^{19}\) Fr.132.1 Rose\(^1\), 173.1 Heitz, 144 Rose\(^2\), and 149 Rose\(^3\) all end the fragment here. They are likely right that the Aristotle material ends here. Nevertheless, I think it is better for an editor to include the entire scholium, as Gigon has done.
σεως ὄντα, μὴ ἐωρακέναι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Θρινακίαν πραττόμενα· πάντα μὲν γὰρ ἑφορᾷ, οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ καμήτρον πάντα ἐποπτεύει·

Why, having said that Helios oversees all things and overhears all things, did [Homer] portray [him] needing a messenger in the case of his own cattle: “Swift to Hyperion Helios came a messenger, Lampetia of the long robe, [proclaiming] that the companions [sc. of Odysseus] killed his cattle”? Now Aristotle, solving [the problem], says: either it is (1) because Helios does see all things but not simultaneously; or (2) because Lampetia was the messenger20 for Helios just as sight is for a human. Or (3) because, he says, it was appropriate that Agamemnon spoke in this way when administering an oath in single combat—namely, “Ὄ Helios, you who oversee all things and overhear all things”—and that Odysseus [spoke in this way] when speaking to his companions. (lacuna?) For [Helios] surely does not see things in Hades as well. And in general, the poet says that [Helios] sees those things absolutely, where he is present—when in the East, the things in the East; in the South, the things there, and, again, in the case of its settings [i.e. in the West] to observe the things there. Therefore, it is reasonable that, being in a different region of his path, he did not see what was happening in Thrinakia; for he oversees all things, but he does not look upon all things at the same exact time:—

2. Aristotle’s solutions

I want to look closely at each of Aristotle’s solutions. But before doing so, it is important to make explicit two points about Helios. First, ‘Helios’ is not simply the name of the Sun, a celestial object; he is in Homer an anthropomorphic god. This is true of Helios in the Homeric epics, and (apart from the views of some philosophers and scientists) he continued to be envisioned this way in Aristotle’s own time (see fig. 1 for an image of Helios so conceived).21

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20 Or more literally, “what delivers the message” (τὸ ἐξαγγεῖλαν).
21 I should add, as Mor Segev has reminded me, that Aristotle too regarded celestial objects (and so the Sun) as living things that fit his definition of ‘god’, and—I am less sure about this part—that it is possible that he attributed visual perception to them. See M. Segev, Aristotle on Religion (Cambridge 2017) 91–101.

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Second, Helios shining his light is the equivalent of, or implies, his seeing (and knowing). A sequence in *Iliad* 14 makes this clear. Hera seduces Zeus (as part of a plan to help the Greeks), and when they are about to have sex on Mt. Ida, she expresses a concern for privacy (her actual reason being to distract Zeus). He responds (342–345):

> Ἡρη, μὴ τε θέων τό γε δείδιθι µήτε τιν’ ἀνδρῶν ὤψεσθαι· τοῖν τοι ἐγὼ νέφος ἀµφικαλύψω χρύσεον· οὐδ’ ἂν νοὶ διαδράκοι Ἡέλιος περ, οὐ τε καὶ δὲτατον πέλεται φάος εἰσοράασθαι.  

Hera, fear not this, that any god or man will see; such is the golden cloud I shall enfold us in: not even Helios would see the two of us through it, and his light is the sharpest for seeing.

As R. Janko comments: “φάος has a twin significance, ‘light’ and ‘sight’, derived from the ancient idea of vision; we see with rays of light coming from the eye, and darkness is a mist through which such rays cannot pass … The Sun, the greatest eye in the

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cosmos, sees all…”

2.1. To understand and evaluate Aristotle’s first solution, we need to consider the Homeric conception of Helios and his travels across the sky and over the Earth. In the epics, the Earth is a circular flat disk surrounded by the ‘river’ Okeanos. The sky or heavens (οὐρανός) is a hemispherical dome covering the Earth, supported in some way by pillars and Atlas. Helios travels along the sky from east to west during the day.24 At night—according to other early sources, though this is not mentioned in Homer—Helios returns east floating in a vessel on Okeanos.25 (In any case, during this time he is neither shining on Earth nor therefore seeing anything happening there.) Since the Earth is flat, one might well assume that Helios—once he has risen—would shine on and so see everything on Earth at the same time


> ὃς φαίνει θνητοῖς καὶ θεοῖσιν ἱπποῦς ἐμβεβέλως· σμερδύν δ’ ὁ γε δέρκεται ὀσσοῖς χρυσέης ἐκ κόρυθος, λαμπραὶ δ’ ἀκτίνες ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ αἰγλῆεν στίλβουσι

He [sc. Helios] shines for mortals and immortals, mounted on his chariot; his eyes gaze fearsomely out of his golden helm, the bright rays from him gleam brilliant

Note that in some texts (e.g. *Mete.* 3.2, 372a29–33), Aristotle speaks as if vision travels from the eye to the object seen, which would seem to contradict his conception of sight as presented in *De anima* (e.g. 2.7, 418a31–b2, 419a9–11) and *De sensu* (3, 440a18–20). See the long footnote in D. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler* (Chicago 1976) 217–218 n.39. I cannot here comment on why Aristotle presented these two different (extramission and intromission) conceptions of vision. Lindberg believes it can be explained chronologically, the *Meteorologica*-conception being earlier (and closer to Plato’s).


25 Mimnermus fr.12 West (perhaps the earliest extant version of this account of Helios) and other ancient sources quoted in Ath. 469C–470D.
during the day. I imagine that such an assumption in part gave rise to the present problem.

What then should we make of Aristotle’s first solution: that Helios does see all things, but not simultaneously? One possibility is that Aristotle is anachronistically reading into these verses his own scientific conception of the shape of the Earth and the movement of the Sun.26 On his view, the Sun orbits the Earth, and as the Earth is a sphere, the Sun shines on only part of the Earth at any given time.27 Interpreted in this way, Helios can be said to see all things, but not simultaneously.

Another possibility is that even accepting the Homeric conception of the shape of the Earth and the movements of Helios around it, Aristotle not unreasonably assumed that, as the day can be divided into parts,28 Helios most clearly or fully sees everything only in those parts of the Earth where he is shining directly at that time of day (morning, noon, and afternoon). Though not a perfect fit with this speculation, a passage from Odyssey 12 in any case might seem to imply that Helios sees his cattle only at certain times during the day; he complains to Zeus about what Odysseus’ companions have done (379–381):

οἵ μεν βοῦς ἔκτειναν ὑπέρβιον, Ἡσιν ἐγὼ γε χαίρεσκον μὲν ἧν εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα, ἡδ’ ὁπότ’ ἀψ ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἀπ’ οὐρανόθεν προτραποίμην.

26 Cf. Breitenberger, in Aristoteles 387: “In dieser Lösung legt Aristoteles als Naturwissenschaftler—entgegen der traditionellen Auffassung von Helios als einem mythischen Wesen—das Konzept des Gottes als Personifikation bzw. Allegorie der Sonne zugrunde.” If my speculations in what follows are correct, then I would agree with the “Aristoteles als Naturwissenschaftler” part of this comment, but not that this implies an allegorical interpretation.

27 See Arist. Cael. 2.12–14, especially 297a8–298a20, and L. Judson, “Aristotle’s Astrophysics,” OSAPh 49 (2015) 151–192, at 157–158. In Theophrastus of Eresus: On Winds (Leiden 2018) 106, I describe Aristotle’s view as follows: “The celestial sphere of the sun moves daily around the Earth (itself a sphere, which is fixed and at the center of the cosmos), while the sun itself moves along the ecliptic (across its sphere) during the course of the year, such that its daily motions about the Earth are at one extreme the summer tropical circle, and at another the winter tropical circle.”

28 See especially Il. 21.111, as well as Il. 16.777–779 and Od. 7.288–289.
they insolently killed my cattle, in which I
took delight going to the starry heavens,
and when I turned back again from heaven to earth.

It is most natural to take this to be saying that Helios delights in
seeing his cattle when he is rising and setting—the implication
being that he does not see them otherwise, because he cannot
see anything where he is not present or because he is not focused
on them at other times.

Whatever one thinks of the merits of this solution, if either of
the above two interpretations is correct, then it fits Aristotle’s
discussion of the various ways of solving Homeric problems
sketched in Poetics 25. There he writes that some problems
should be solved by looking at diction (τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν
ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν, 1461a9–10), and one way of doing this is to
point out that some word at the center of an objection to Homer
is ambiguous (τὰ δὲ ἁμφιβολία, 1461a25–26). In the present
case, there is an ambiguity in πάντ’ ἐφορᾶς. One could take this
to mean—and clearly those who detected a contradiction here
did take this to mean—that Helios “sees” (i.e. knows) everything
on earth completely and virtually instantaneously (perhaps like
the god of Plato’s Laws,29 if not anachronistically like the
omniscient God of the Abrahamic religions). But that is not the
only, nor even in Aristotle’s context the most obvious, way of
taking it. For one could also interpret the claim that Helios sees
all things to mean that (as Aristotle puts it in this scholium) he
“does see all things but not simultaneously.”30 That is, he over-
sees everything in that part of the world where he is present (i.e.
on which the Sun is shining, or shining directly). This is, so to


30 It is worth noting in this connection Aristotle’s principle of non-contra-
diction, discussed in Metaphysics Γ.3–6: “It is impossible for the same thing to
belong and not to belong to the same thing simultaneously and in the same
respect” (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ὄνομα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ὁδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ
κατὰ τὸ αὐτό, 1005b19–20). See also 1005b23–30, and note the formulation
at 1011b13–20: “that opposite assertions cannot be true simultaneously” (τὸ μὴ
εἶναι ἄληθεῖς ὄνομα τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις).
speak, a contextual omniscience, and it solves our Homeric problem: Lampetia had to get the message to Helios because he was not shining on this part of the world when his cattle were killed and eaten, nor when the crime was discovered (presumably by Lampetia).

2.2. Aristotle’s second solution is to claim that Lampetia is the messenger for Helios just as sight is for humans. This solution has received a fair amount of attention, as it is sometimes considered evidence that Aristotle was open to allegorical solutions to Homeric problems.\(^{31}\) I argue against this interpretation in *Aristotle’s Lost Homeric Problems* (192–193), but do not discuss it here.\(^{32}\)

Putting aside allegorical interpretations, this solution is usually (and plausibly) taken to be an instance of solving a problem via metaphor, which again fits what Aristotle says in *Poetics* 25: that some problems should be solved by looking at diction, and another way of doing this is to point out that some word at the center of an objection to Homer is in fact a metaphor (\(\mu\varepsilon\tau\alpha\varphi\omicron\rho\alpha\)) (1461a16–21). And of the four kinds of metaphor described by Aristotle, the one closest to our sense of the word and relevant in the present case is metaphor by analogy. \(^{33}\) If this is what Aristotle

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\(^{32}\) I shall merely add that I agree with R. Janko, *Philodemus On Poems, Books 3–4, with fragments of Aristotle On Poets* (Oxford 2011) 328 n.3, who writes (of the fragments concerning *inter alia* the Cattle of Helios): “Aristotle is explaining why Homer said what he did, not positing (as do true allegorists like the author of the Derveni papyrus) that Homer is giving an encoded account of reality.”

\(^{33}\) In *Poetics* 21 Aristotle says that “a metaphor [or transference] is an application of an alien name either (1) from genus to species, or (2) from species to genus, or (3) from species to species, or (4) by analogy” (\(\mu\varepsilon\tau\alpha\varphi\omicron\rho\alpha\ δέ \ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἴδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἴδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἁνάλογον, 1457b6–9). Cf. Bouchard, *Du Lycée au Musée* 64: “À strictement parler, il s’agit d’une métaphore obtenue
had in mind, however, it is quite different from the examples of Homeric metaphor by analogy that he provides in the Rhetoric. In Rhetoric 3.11 (1411b30–1412a10) he discusses Homer’s use of metaphor by analogy:34 “Homer has also employed the making of inanimate things animate through metaphor.” He gives five examples (the metaphorical words are in italics):

“Then once again the shameless stone rolled to the ground below” (Od. 11.598)
“the arrow flew” (Il. 5.99, 13.587, 13.592)
the arrow “longing to fly” (Il. 4.126)
the spears “were stuck in the earth, anxious to feed on flesh” (Il. 11.574)

“the spear-point, being eager, darted through his chest” (Il. 15.542)

Aristotle makes it clear that these are analogical metaphors:

“And [Homer] attached these [animate attributes to inanimate things] through analogous metaphor: for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the one being shameless to the one being shamed.”

Analogies have the form A is to B as C is to D (see Poet. 21, 1457b16–19). So if Aristotle’s second solution was meant to be a metaphor by analogy, I take him to be saying: Lampetia (A) is a messenger to Helios (B) just as sight or visual perception (C) is a ‘messenger’ to a human (D). I think it likely that what Aristotle is claiming is this: seeing in humans requires a (virtually instantaneous) interaction between the faculty of sight and what is seen, and this in no way undercuts or contradicts the fact that a human sees (and knows) what he sees. In the same way, Helios’ seeing all requires a (swift) interaction between Helios and what

par analogie telle que la définit Aristote.” Her conception of the analogy involved here (cf. 65) is more complex than mine.

34 ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ, οἶον ἐν τοῖσδε, “άντις ἐπὶ δάπε-
δόντε κυλίνδετο λάας ἀναίδης” καὶ “ἔπτατ’ ὀϊστός” καὶ “ἐπιπτέσθαι µενεαίνων”
καὶ “ἐν γαίῃ ἰσταντο λιλαιόµενα χροὸς ἄσαι” καὶ “αἰχµῆ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσυτο
µαµώωσα.” ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἐµφυχα ἐνὶα ἐνεργοῦντα φαινεται: τὸ
ἀναισχυντεῖν γάρ καὶ µαµών καὶ τάλλα ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσήψε διὰ τῆς κατ’
ἀναλογίαν µεταφορᾶς· ὡς γάρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀναισχυντοῖµον πρὸς τὸν
ἀναισχυντούµενον. ποιεὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖσ εὐδοκιµούσαις εἰκόσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ὕψων
ταῦτα: “κυρτά, φαληρίωσαν: πρὸ µὲν τ’ ἄλλα’, αὐτάρ ἐπ’ ἄλλα”· κινούµενα γάρ
καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα, ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια κίνησις.

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he sees (Lampetia swiftly delivering a message); and here too, this in no way undercuts or contradicts the fact that Helios sees (and knows) what he sees—which is all things. The second solution to this problem, then, is that far from contradicting each other, the Iliad passage and the Odyssey passage in effect say the same thing: the former says that Helios sees all things, the latter says that Lampetia delivering messages to Helios is the means by which he sees all things.

Now I think the point Aristotle is making is arguably more naturalistic or scientific than this metaphor might suggest. He does not treat Helios as a god whose perception of all is simple, automatic, and eternal, requiring no means or method or processing.\textsuperscript{35} That is, I think it is likely that Aristotle is saying that just as a human automatically sees what is in front of him (and only what is within the range of his vision), but that this requires a process—a specific kind of interaction between the faculty of sight and the object of sight, and of course some form of illumination\textsuperscript{36}—so it is with the all that Helios, an anthropomorphic god, sees.\textsuperscript{37}

It is worth noting that these first two solutions are, as far as I can tell, incompatible: the first implies that Helios sees all things where he is present, but otherwise he requires Lampetia to deliver him messages (which constitutes an indirect source of

\textsuperscript{35} Cf. e.g. the conception of divine omniscience in Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa contra Gentiles} 1.44–71 (esp. 55–58). The knowledge possessed by the god of Aristotle’s \textit{Metaphysics} \(\Lambda\) may be simple, automatic, and eternal as well; however, that god is far from omniscient: the prime mover arguably does not know anything but itself (being thought that is thinking of thought [\(\eta \ νόησις \ νόησεως \ νόησις\)], \(\Lambda.9, 1074b34–35\)), and it certainly does not know particulars (1074b15–30).

\textsuperscript{36} For details see \textit{De an.} 2.7 and \textit{Sens.} 2–3.

\textsuperscript{37} In \textit{Poetics} 25, discussing how to respond to the charge that what is portrayed in Homer is false, Aristotle says that one may respond that even so, it is not a legitimate aesthetic criticism if people believe that it is true. Aristotle gives as an example the traditional gods that populate Homeric epic: even if Xenophanes is right and no such gods exist, this is not grounds for criticizing the poets, as most people do believe in such gods (1460b35–1461a1).
knowledge): she tells him what he missed. The second seems to imply that Lampetia delivering a message to Helios is or represents his means of acquiring knowledge \textit{per se}. She is the shining or illumination that constitutes Helios’ vision.\textsuperscript{38} This is why I find the second solution problematic: for it is more natural to take our passage in the \textit{Odyssey} to be saying or implying that Helios sees all where he is present, but that if he misses something (significant) on account of not being present, he will in any case hear about it from Lampetia—and that, one assumes, is how he found out about the killing of his cattle. But to take Lampetia delivering a message as a metaphor for Helios’ vision would imply (or seem to) that she does not actually deliver messages to him concerning what he has missed.\textsuperscript{39}

2.3. The third solution seeks to eliminate the apparent contradiction by considering the different contexts in which \textit{Il}. 3.277 and \textit{Od}. 12.374–375 appear, focusing on the former context, which is a special one. This arguably falls under one of the standard Aristotelian strategies for solving Homeric problems: in \textit{Poetics} 25, he says that sometimes the problem is the result of a false assumption on the part of the critic of Homer (1461b1–9). That is, an apparent contradiction is generated by someone’s false preconception, and so the problem turns out to be the preconception and not anything in Homer. The actual contradiction is between what a critic (incorrectly) believes, and what, according to Homer, is in fact the case. Here the false assumption is that there is no difference between swearing an oath (what

\textsuperscript{38} Cf. Eust. \textit{Od}. 12.132 (II 18.27–28 Stallbaum): “Phaethousa and Lampetia, who are the powers relating to Helios” (Φαέθουσα δὲ καὶ Λαµµητία, αἱ κατὰ τὸν Ἢλιον δυνάµεις).

\textsuperscript{39} See Breitenberger, in \textit{Aristoteles} 387: “Als Nymphe und Tochter des Helios (\textit{Od}. XII 132 ff.) agiert Lampetie (λαµµητέω: „scheinen,” “strahlen”) nach mythischer Vorstellung als seine individualisierte und personifizierte Botin, die die Geschehnisse durch ihren Bericht gleichermaßen ‘sichtbar’ macht. Verhält sie sich aber zu Helios wie der Sehsinn zum Menschen (Lampetie : Helios; Sehsinn : Mensch), dann fungiert sie nicht als externe Vermittlerin, sondern bezeichnet die Sehfähigkeit des Sonnengottes selbst.”
Agamemnon is doing at *Il.* 3.277) and describing one’s adventures (what Odysseus is doing at *Od.* 12.374–375). But swearing an oath is a special, arguably ritualistic, context, and so the words of the oath need not be taken as an accurate or precise description of Helios’ cognitive powers.\(^{40}\) Swearing to Helios, who sees all (in some sense), was a traditional way of swearing an oath. G. S. Kirk (*The Iliad* 304) notes: “The Sun … is concerned with oaths … because he sees and hears all and so cannot be deceived.” Odysseus, however, in telling his tale later, has no need to stress the fact that Helios sees all (in any sense). On the contrary, it would do him no good to emphasize that his companions committed this crime after having been warned that Helios sees all—though such an oath did feature a little earlier in his tale (and I turn to that oath now).\(^{41}\)

Recall that Aristotle’s third solution refers to two oaths: “it was appropriate that Agamemnon spoke in this way when administering an oath in single combat . . . and that Odysseus [spoke in this way] when speaking to his companions.” The latter is a reference to Odysseus getting his companions to swear to leave these cattle alone (*Od.* 12.322–323):

\[
dεινοῦ γὰρ θεοῦ ἁίδε βόες καὶ ὕφια μῆλα,
'Ηελίου, ὃς πάντ᾽ ἑφορᾷ καὶ πάντ᾽ ἑπακούει.
\]

for these are the cattle and fat sheep of a dread god: Helios, who oversees all things and overhears all things.

Again, it was fitting in one context for Odysseus to describe

\(^{40}\) Again, note the principle of non-contradiction, this time focusing on κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ rather than ἂμα: “It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong to the same thing simultaneously and in the same respect” (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἃμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἅδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ, *Metaph.* Γ.3, 1005b19–20).

\(^{41}\) Cf. Bouchard, *Du Lycée au Musée* 63: “il est normal qu’Agamemnon, dans le cadre d’un serment, prenne solennellement Hélios à témoin et en appelle à la puissance de son regard, tandis que le récit d’Ulysse à propos du massacre du troupeau d’Hélios implique une certaine ignorance de ce dernier.” Note that Odysseus claims he was sleeping while the cattle were being killed (*Od.* 12.335–338, 366–373).
Lampetia delivering a message to Helios, and in another to refer (ritualistically) to Helios seeing and hearing all things.

That Aristotle has in mind the oath taken by Odysseus’ companions is made clear by the last line of the third solution, which (as indicated earlier) seems disconnected from the rest of the solution (which prompted Schrader to insert a lacuna): “For [Helios] surely does not see things in Hades as well.” Hintenlang agrees with Schrader that something is missing, and argues that it is some claim to the effect that Odysseus made his companions swear this oath in order to strike fear in them (for Helios does not see things in Hades as well—that is, he does not literally see all things).\(^{42}\) This approach may well be right. In any case, I think Aristotle is likely alluding to an upcoming passage in *Odyssey* 12, where Helios addresses Zeus, after the killing of his cattle, with the following threat (382–383):

\[
ei\ δέ\ μοι\ οὐ\ τίσουσι\ βοῶν\ ἑπτεικέ\'\ ἀμοβήν,
δόσωμι\ εἰς\ Αἴδαο\ καὶ\ ἐν\ νεκύεσσι\ φαεῖνω.
\]

If they do not pay me fitting recompense for my cattle,
I shall sink into the house of Hades and shine among the dead.\(^{43}\)

3. *Porphyry and the second part of the scholium*

I turn now to the remainder of our text (a little over a third of the scholium):

And in general (καὶ\ ὅλως), the poet says that [Helios] sees those things absolutely, where he is present—in the East, the things in the East; in the South, the things there; and, again, in the case of its settings to observe the things there. Therefore, it is likely that,

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\(^{42}\) Hintenlang, *Untersuchungen* 85: “Er wollte aber mit diesen Worten nur Furcht erwecken, denn Helios sieht ja nicht auch die Dinge in der Unterwelt.” See also Sodano, *AAP* 25 (1966) 217, and Breitenberger, in *Aristoteles* 387–388. M. Niehoff, *Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria* (Cambridge 2011) 44, takes this approach in translating the passage: “and also Odysseus spoke thus to his friends [Od. 12.323], [but he only wished to arouse fear] for surely he does not see things in Hades” (her brackets).

\(^{43}\) Heubeck, *Commentary on Odyssey* 139: “The threat is that Helios may descend (fut.) to Hades and shine (φαείνο subj.) on the dead rather than the living.”
being in a different region of his path, he did not see what was happening in Thrinakia; for he oversees all things, but he does not look upon all things at the same exact time (κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ καιρόν).

I believe this is likely someone else’s elaboration on the one solution of Aristotle that this scholar prefers, namely the first one. And the best candidate is Porphyry. I am not the first to think so; but it is worth repeating, not only because Rose merely asserts this, but especially given that there has been scholarly disagreement about whether Porphyry is the indirect source of schol. B* II. 3.277a.

I think the most likely source is Porphyry for three reasons. First, there are a great many B*-scholia, beginning διὰ τί, which scholars tend to agree come from Porphyry. But as διὰ τί is quite common in problêmata literature, this alone cannot count for much. Second, there is a similar καὶ ὀλως at the beginning of the concluding line of schol. B* II. 4.343 (fol. 60r), the source of which is Porphyry (see MacPhail 88). Third, Porphyry sometimes refers to and perhaps favored a category of solution (not found in Poetics 25, at least not in this form or under this name) according to kairos (ἡ λύσις ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ vel sim.).

See e.g. Rose¹ (p.159): “καὶ ὀλως ὁ ποιητής etc. quae sunt verba Porphyrii.”

Schrader included this text in his edition of Porphyry’s Homeric Questions on the Iliad, MacPhail did not.

Here are eight examples, just from Iliad 1–2 and included in MacPhail (who includes far fewer than Schrader): schol. B* on Il. 1.138–139 (fol. 6v) (MacPhail p.18); on 1.225 (9r) (p.20); on 1.524 (16r) (p.28); on 2.73 (20v) (p.34) = Arist. fr.142 Rose³/366 Gigon; on 2.257–277 (25v) (p.42); on 2.370–374 (28v) (p.50); on 2.478 (31r) (p.66); on 2.649 (35r) (p.68) = Arist fr.146 Rose³/370 Gigon.

Five examples: λύεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ (schol. B* on Il. 1.420 [fol. 14r], MacPhail p.275); λύεται δ’ ἂν τῷ καιρῷ (on 2.844 [40r], p.70); ἡ δὲ λύσις ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ (on 3.315 [48r], p.278); λύεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ (on 4.226 [49r], p.279); λύεται δ’ ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ (on 9.186 [118r], p.148). (There are many more instances among the texts included in Schrader but not in MacPhail.) Apart from Porphyry’s Homeric Questions (and a few scholia that may well go back to him) I know of no evidence of ancient scholars employing the solution.
Solving a Homeric problem from *kairos* requires some explanation. As far as I can tell, this solution comes in three different forms (based on different meanings of καιρός). One concerns the context or occasion or circumstances—as for example swearing an oath versus telling a story—though that is not what according to *kairos*—at least not under that name. It is possible (but I think unlikely) that this was Porphyry’s name for Aristotle’s sixth type of solution (*Poet.* 25, 1461a4–9), or for the part of it referring to *when* (ὅτε) something was done: "Concerning whether what is said or done by someone [is said or done] beautifully or not beautifully, one must not only consider whether it is excellent or low by looking into what was done or said in itself, but also into the one doing or saying it, or to whom, or when, or by what means, or for the sake of what—for instance, to bring about a greater good, or to avoid a greater evil" (περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς εἰ εἰρηται τινι ἢ πέρασκαι, ώμον σκεπτέον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πεπραχμένον ἢ εἰρημένον βλέποντα εἰ σπουδάζον ἢ φαύλον, ἄλλι καὶ εἰς τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα, ἢ πρὸς ὃν ἢ ὃτε ἢ ὃτῳ ἢ ὃ ἄνεκεν, ὦν εἰ μείζονος ἐγαθοῦ, ἢν γένηται, ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ, ἢν ἀπογένηται). I doubt this because Porphyry’s *kairos*—solution is broader in scope than solutions meant to solve problems concerning “whether what is said or done by someone is said or done beautifully (or ‘nobly’, καλῶς) or not.”

48 LSJ s.v. καιρός: “A. due measure, proportion, fitness” … “III. more freq. of Time, exact or critical time, season, opportunity.” The BDAG s.v. also lists “circumstances” and “what is opportune.” R. Nünlist, The Ancient Critic at Work: Terms and Concepts of Literary Criticism in Greek Scholia (Cambridge 2009) 376, in his Glossary of Greek Terms (s.v. καιρός), has “(critical, decisive) moment, time”; and in his one discussion of the term (323) he translates it “current circumstances.”

49 For instance: in *Iliad* 1, Thetis tells Achilles that she will go to Zeus on Mt. Olympus on his behalf, but that this will have to wait till Zeus and the other gods return from Aithiopia, where they are feasting (419–427). This gave rise to a problem: “Why did Thetis not go to Zeus when he was in Aithiopia? For Aithiopia was not further away than Olympus” (διὰ τί ἢ Θέτις ὡς ὅχετο πρὸς τὸν Δία ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ ὄντα; ἢ γὰρ δὴ πάρρῳ Αἰθιοπίᾳ ἦν τοῦ Ὀλύμπου), schol. B* II. 1.423 (fol. 14r), on Αἰθιοπίας. On the same folio there is a brief paraphrase or restatement of this problem, and a solution ἐκ τοῦ καρποῦ: “It is unreasonable not to go straightaway to Aithiopia; but it is solved [by reasoning] from the *kairos*; for it would be strange to trouble the gods while they are feasting” (ἀλογον τὸ μὴ πορεύοσθαι εὐθὺς εἰς τὴν Αἰθιοπίαν. λύεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ καρποῦ· τοῖς γὰρ θεοῖς εὐσχομένοις ὄτι πον ἐνεχλεῖν), 1.420 (14r), on εἰμι’ αὐτὴ πρὸς Ὁλυμπον. Schrader includes both scholia, MacPhail only the latter.
is meant by *kairos* at the end of schol. B* Il. 3.277a. James Porter refers to a “rare species” of this kind of solution: “ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ, meaning a solution based on considerations of the moment—the relevant factor here being Homer’s own sudden narrative urgency.”

Here is the key text, which begins with an abridged version of the problem (schol. B* Il. 12.25 [fol. 159v]):

> It is unreasonable that men [built] the wall in one day, but the gods demolished it in nine days … Some solve this [by reasoning] from the *kairos*, because then (τότε), wanting to abolish completely the wall invented by him [sc. Homer], he made the time [i.e. duration] of the demolition [last] this long (τοσοῦτον χρόνον).

The point is that Homer chose a long demolition period of nine days (even though *gods* were demolishing the wall) to emphasize its total obliteration. This type of *kairos*-solution is not relevant in the context of Helios seeing all things.

Finally, *ἡ λύσις ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ* can refer to a solution based on the exact time. Take for example schol. F* Il. 9.186 (fol. 77r), which concerns the activity that Achilles was engaged in when, in *Iliad* 9, he is visited by Odysseus and the rest of the ‘embassy’ from Agamemnon: “It seems inappropriate [for Achilles] to be found on arrival playing the *kithara*. But this is solved [by reasoning] from the *kairos*; for by night he was not found more appropriately otherwise. For it was not the time (τότε) to train the


51 ἄλογον τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους μυὶ ἡμέρα τὸ τεῖχος, τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς ἐννέα ἡμέραις καθελεῖν … οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ, ὅτι τότε βουλόμενος παντάπασιν ἔξαλείψαι τὸ τεῖχος πλασθὲν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐποίησε τῆς καθαιρέσεως. This scholium is found at the top of fol. 159v. Another longer and separate B* scholium, on the same verse, is found at the bottom of fol. 159v. It begins: “Why did the Achaeans make the wall in one day, whereas Apollo and Poseidon overthrew it in nine days?” (διὰ τί τὸ τεῖχος οἱ μὲν Αχαῖοι μυὶ ἡμέρα ἐποίησαν, ὁ δὲ Ἀπόλλων καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν ἐννέα ἡμέραις κατέβαλον). The *kairos*-solution is not included in what follows. Scharder presents both of these scholia together, whereas MacPhail (194 and 286) separates them (consigning the briefer one to his appendix of *epitomai*).
I think this is clearly the version of the *kairos*-solution intended in our text. (Of course, solving a problem by reference to the precise time is a narrow version of solving a problem by reference to the context or occasion or circumstances.) If I am right, it is how Porphyry characterized the *first* solution to the problem that is the focus of this essay: differences in where Helios is in the sky are specifically differences in time.

So I think Schrader was right to include schol. B* Il. 3.277a in his edition of the fragments of Porphyry’s *Homeric Questions on the Iliad*, and MacPhail was wrong to omit it from his. And it was good that Villoison and Dindorf included it in their editions of the *Iliad*-scholia, and unfortunate that Erbse did not. One would hope that any new edition of the *Iliad*-scholia would include this material.

4. Two other solutions

One may wonder why Aristotle and Porphyry did not provide a better version of the solution according to which Helios sees all things *where he is present*, and one that is more in line with the Homeric conception of Helios’ travels over and around the Earth: namely, that Helios sees all things where he is present, but that he is not present *at night*. As it turns out, there are three related scholia, each of which presents or includes two other solutions, this ‘at night’ solution being one of them. The first two seem to be more and less condensed versions of some common

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52 ἀπρεπὲς δοκεῖ καταλαμβάνεσθαι κιθαρίζοντα. λύεται δ’ ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ· ἐν γὰρ νυκτὶ οὐκ ἄπρεπετερον [F: εὐπρεπέστερον Schrader] ἄλλως κατελομβάνετο. γιμνώζεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῷ σώματι οὐκ ἤν τότε. Porphyry is referred to in the manuscript. See Schrader 134 and MacPhail 283. My thanks to the journal’s anonymous referee for help in understanding καταλαμβάνεσθαι and κατελομβάνετο here. See LSJ s.v. καταλαμβάνω II.2, “find on arrival, c. part.”

53 But see n.13 above.

source. Their relationship to the third scholium is more complex (and will not concern me).

Schol. B* Il. 3.277b (fol. 47r) is on the right side of the text of the *Iliad*, on the same folio as the one that has been the focus of this essay, though it does not immediately follow that scholium. It is preceded by a symbol (_example) indicating that it is a comment on Il. 3.277 (and specifically on πάντ’ ἐφοράς); it lacks, however, an indication of the problem to which it is clearly offering a couple of solutions. Given this lack, one might speculate that it had once been a continuation of schol. B* Il. 3.277a:

άφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐχρῆν ἐγνωκέναι τὸν πάντ’ ἐφοράντα, λύοιτο δ’ ἂν τῇ λέξῃ τὸ γάρ πάντα δηλοῖ τὰ πλείστα. λύοιτο δὲ καὶ τῷ καιρῷ, νυκτὸς γὰρ εἰκὸς ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς βουσί_57_ τοὺς Ἰθακησίους.

The one who sees everything should know [everything] _by himself_. Now [this objection] could be solved by [an appeal to] diction: for “all” could mean “the most.” And it could also be solved by [an appeal to] the exact time (kairos), for it is likely the Ithacans attacked the cattle at night.

Schol. H Od. 12.374a (fol. 77v), found in Harl. 5674, a thirteenth- or fourteenth-century manuscript of the *Odyssey*, is more expansive:

“ὡκέα δ’ Ἡλίῳ”: ἐναντίον τοῦτο τῷ “Ἡλίος θ’ , ὃς πάντ’ ἐφοράς καὶ πάντ’ ἐπακούεις”. άφ’ ἑαυτοῦ γὰρ ἐχρῆν ἐγνωκέναι τὸν πάντα ἐφοράντα. λύοιτο δ’ ἂν ἦ τῇ λέξῃ τὸ γάρ πάντα δηλοῖ τὰ πλείστα: ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἡγνόει τὸ πεπραγμένον ὁ Ὁ Ἡλίος, ἀλλ’ ἔδει ὡς ποιμαίνουσαν καὶ ταύτην ἀπαγγέλλαι. ἦ τῷ καιρῷ λύεται, ὡς νυκτὸς ἐπιθεμένοι ταῖς βουσί τῶν ἑταίρων_:—

55 See n.12 above.
56 For versions of this text in earlier editions see Villoison and Dindorf.
57 This should be ταῖς βουσί, as these are cows (see e.g. αἱδέ βόες, *Od*. 12.322,). Cf. schol. H Od. 12.374a (fol. 77v), which has ταῖς.
59 This scholium is followed directly by two others: on *Od*. 12.374b: “ὡκέα δ’ Ἡλίοιο (sic)”: πῶς οὖν ὁ πάντα ἐφορών οὐκ οἴδε πάντα; ὥρα ἄλλη’ οὐχ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτό:— (the text should have Ἡλίῳ); and on 12.375: “ο’ οἱ βοάς ἑκταμεν.
“Swift to Helios”: this is contrary to “and Helios, you who oversee all things and overhear all things”; for the one who sees everything should know [everything] by himself. But [this objection] could be solved either by [an appeal to] diction: for “all” could mean “the most”; and besides, Helios was not ignorant of what had been done, but it was fitting for her also to report this because she was tending the herds. Or it is solved by [an appeal to] the exact time, as the companions attacked the cattle at night.

Schol. X Od. 12.374 (fol. 57v), in Vindobon,phil.gr. 133 (thirteenth or fourteenth century), seems to consist of two parts: (1) the exact equivalent of schol. H Od. 12.374a, except that its lemma is longer: ὧκέα δ’ Ἡελίῳ Ὑπερίονι; (2) the near equivalent of the bulk of schol. B* Il. 3.277a—lacking the statement of the problem and the reference to Aristotle, and beginning with the solution involving Lampetia delivering a message to Helios just as sight does to a human. In other words, in this text, the scholiast (or his source) has, in place of Aristotle’s first solution, the one referring to the companions attacking Helios’ cattle at night. Clearly, there is no need to present a full transcription and translation of this text.

ἡµεῖς”. οὕτως αἰ Ἀριστάρχου. Further, there is another scholium on the other (i.e. right) side of the text of the Odyssey, on 12.374c: ἐν πολλοῖς, ὠκύς δ’ Ἡελίῳ, ἵν’ ᾗ ὠκύς ἐγγελος· καὶ πῶς “πάντ’ ἐφορᾷς” ὁ Ἡλιος; πάντα µὲν οὐκ ἀµά δέ.

60 On ms. X see Pontani, Sguardi su Ulisse 285–293. I am grateful to Filippomaria Pontani for providing me with a beautiful digital photograph of fol. 57v, for answering my questions about this scholium, and for preventing me from going astray in my understanding of it. (See the following note. If I nevertheless failed to hit the mark in some way, please blame me.) Schrader includes the entire text. Dindorf, relying on the inferior Ambrosianus Q. 88 sup. (fifteenth century), includes only the first part. (Dindorf claims to have relied on Ambrosianus B. 99 sup. as well, but Pontani informs me that this manuscript does not contain our text.) Note that Dindorf’s edition was the basis for Fr. 132.2 Rose1 and 173.2 Heitz.

61 The only other difference worth mentioning is that the scribe erroneously punctuates the text at one point (πλείστα: ~ ὁλλος τε), treating ἀλλος τε as if it were ὁλλος and thus the beginning of a new scholium. (I made the same mistake initially.)

62 There are some variations in the material overlapping schol. B* Iliad
I think it more likely that schol. X Od. 12.374 is a composite than that schol. B* Il. 3.277a is. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that both are composites and/or are otherwise incomplete. Moreover, that schol. X Od. 12.374 begins with the two solutions presented in schol. H Od. 12.374a, and follows them, without interruption, with the bulk of schol. B* Il. 3.277a, including two of Aristotle’s solutions, strongly suggests the possibility that all these texts have the same source (most likely Porphyry), but that they have become divided up and dispersed based on the needs and convictions of the various Homeric scholars responsible for the extant scholia.

Before turning to the ‘at night’ solution, a word is in order regarding the first solution in these scholia—that the problem is solved by taking “all” to mean “the most.” This is certainly Aristotelian, whether or not Aristotle or someone influenced by him is the ultimate source of these scholia. In the Poetics 25 account of metaphor as a solution by appealing to diction, discussing a “verse” of the Iliad that is likely a mistake on Aristotle’s part (πάντες … θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες), he writes: “For ‘all’ has been said metaphorically instead of ‘many’, since ‘all’ is a kind of ‘much’” (1461a16–20). This is a ‘species-to-species’ metaphor, though they are not significant.

63 Note the reference to the problem being solved by an appeal to the kairos.
64 Breitenberger, in Aristoteles 387, mentions this solution in connection with Aristotle’s first solution.
66 τὸ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, οἶον “πάντες μὲν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἱπποκορυσταὶ εὗδον παννύχιοι”: ἀμα δὲ φησὶν “ἡ τοίς ἐξ πεδίων τὸ Τροικὸν ἄθρησειν, αὐλὸν συρίγγων τε ὀμαδον”. τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοῦ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, τὸ γὰρ πάν πολλὸ τι (“Some things are said metaphorically, for instance, [Agamemnon says] ‘Now all the gods, and the men who were chariot-lords, slept the whole night’; but at the same time [he says] ‘but when he gazed at the Trojan plain, he wondered at the sound of their auloi and pipes’. For ‘all’ is said metaphorically, instead of ‘many’, for ‘all’ is a kind of ‘much’”). Tarán comments, in L. Tarán and D. Gutas, Aristotle: Poetics (Leiden 2012) 299: “There is no question that Aristotle meant to quote Iliad 10, 1–2 (ἄλλοι μὲν παρὰ νησίν ἄριστήρες Παισχαϊον / εὗδον παννύχιοι), since he
as “all” and “many” are both species of “much” (see Poet. 21, 1457b6–13). The present case is similar, as “all” and “the most” are both species of “many.” So, according to this solution Helios does not literally see every single thing and action as he travels above and shines down on the earth, but he does see most of them. And this does not in the end matter or undercut his vast knowledge, for anything of importance that he does not see he hears about from Lampetia—who delivers such messages whether or not Helios requires it.

The same could be said with respect to the other solution in these scholia. Why, having said that Helios sees all things and hears all things, did Homer portray him as needing a messenger in the case of his own cattle? This is “solved by [an appeal to] the exact time, for it is likely the Ithacans attacked the cattle at night.” Helios does see all things—where he is present, i.e. during the day. And again, this limitation does not in the end undercut his vast knowledge, for anything of importance that happens at night he hears about from Lampetia. This would seem to be a better (more precise, less ambiguous) solution to the problem than that Helios does see all things but not simultaneously—so much so, that one may wonder how Aristotle and Porphyry could have missed it.

Perhaps they didn’t. I have already mentioned the possibility that the three texts discussed in this section may have had the same source but were later divided up and dispersed. I think that source may well have been Aristotle (via Porphyry). What follows is speculation, but it is not groundless speculation. The first solution in schol. B* Il. 3.277a—Helios does see all things but

immediately relates this passage (ὠμα δὲ φησιν) to Iliad 10, 11 and part of 13 (ὥτοι ὤτ’ ἐξ πεδίων τὸ Τρωϊκὸν ὀφθήσεσθαι / ... / σώλων συρίγγων τ’ ἐνοπὴν ὤμαδον). But, as Bywater says, he seems to have mixed up 10, 1–2 with 2, 1–2: ἄλλοι μὲν ἔνας θεὸς τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἱπποκόρυσται / ἐδὼν παννύχιοι.”

Unless “all” is here supposed to be a species of “most,” in which case this is a ‘species-to-genus’ metaphor. For another example of Aristotle using species-to-species metaphor to solve a Homeric problem (coming from Porphyry, via the scholia), see Mayhew, Aristotle’s Lost Homeric Problems 97–98.

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not simultaneously—has been abridged and emended to the point of inaccuracy, as it was originally part of a lengthier solution based on what Helios sees when: during the day, he does not see everything simultaneously (but only the part of the earth where he is shining directly), and at night he does not see anything on earth at all. If this speculation is on the right track, then it is possible that there were four Aristotelian solutions to this Homeric problem: (1) involving the ambiguity of Helios seeing all things, according to the exact time; (2) according to analogical metaphor, Lampetia delivering messages to Helios as sight does to humans; (3) according to species-to-species metaphor, where ‘seeing all’ actually means ‘seeing most’; and (4) an apparent contradiction is generated by someone’s false preconception, namely that the contexts of the two statements are the same.

This study of schol. B* Il. 3.277a (fol. 47v) and related texts confirms something I argued for at greater length in Aristotle’s Lost Homeric Problems: that the fragmentary evidence for this work reveals that Aristotle there followed the methodology he outlined in Poetics 25. And it further suggests (if I am right that his first two solutions in the scholium are inconsistent) that, according to Aristotle, the solutions a scholar comes up with in response to a Homeric problem need not be integrated into one, consistent interpretation of the relevant verse(s).

I hope this study has also demonstrated (or illustrated) the need, in reassessing the fragments of the Homeric Problems, to go back to the manuscripts themselves. However valuable are the editions of the fragments of Aristotle, the fragments of Porphyry, and the Homeric scholia—and however much one depends on this excellent scholarship, as I have done—in the end, at least given their present state, one can never be quite certain that

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69 There may be other possibilities, involving combinations of these four, e.g. that (3) and (4) originally went together: “seeing all” is a metaphor for “seeing most,” but it is an especially useful one in the context of oaths, where what Helios sees is emphasized.
what is found therein (in the texts and, where they exist, in the critical apparatuses) reflects accurately what exists in the margins of the Homeric manuscripts. Some relevant information is lost in the editions: for instance, where precisely a scholium is found on the folio, and how that relates to the location of other relevant scholia. And as we have seen, scholia have been presented in these editions incomplete and/or divided up and recombined with similar texts from other manuscripts. This is often legitimate, but not always, and in the end, a scholar ought to try to decide for oneself. The same is true in coming to conclusions about whether a text should be considered Porphyrian. Fortunately, the relevant manuscripts are increasingly becoming more readily available to scholars in electronic form.\footnote{I would like to thank Andrei Lebedev, Lara Pagani, Mor Segev, and the journal’s anonymous referee for helpful comments and criticisms, and (as indicated in the relevant notes) Filippomaria Pontani for help with MSS. H and X. Any remaining errors are of course my own. I am also grateful to Gregory Nagy and his colleagues at the Center for Hellenic Studies for a recent one-day visit, during which I did a great deal of work on this essay.}

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