The Last Years of Philip V

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The last years of Philip V were clouded with bitterness, anguish and tragedy. Frustrations in foreign wars plagued him, as did troubled relations with Rome, hostility from Thessalians and from Eumenes of Pergamum. There was warfare in Thrace, wholesale deportation of peoples, disaffection that induced Philip to execute Macedonian nobles and their families. And there was a ruinous quarrel within the royal house. The two sons of Philip, Perseus and Demetrius, turned against each other—a conflict that ended in the assassination of Demetrius. Philip died a year later, amidst personal torment and confused doubts. The events are well known. Or are they? In fact, the ancient tradition tells one story, the consensus of modern scholarship offers a very different one. That divergence needs to be set forth and confronted. And the implications, not only for Macedonian affairs but for an understanding of Rome’s eastern policy, take on considerable importance.

I

Our information derives almost exclusively from Polybius—much of it, unfortunately, sifted through the workshop of Livy. In broad terms, the following picture emerges. After the Syrian war of 191–188 B.C. Philip was embittered and vengeful, dissatisfied with his treatment and bent on preparations for a future conflict with Rome. In this venture Perseus was his principal helpmate, chosen successor, and the eventual executor of his plans. But Demetrius stood in the way, a favorite of Rome and the Roman statesman Flamininus, and immensely popular among the Macedonians. Perseus became consumed with jealousy and anxious about the succession. The older son hatched plots to disgrace and remove Demetrius, even forged a letter of Flamininus to suggest Roman intrigue behind Demetrius’ ambition. The mounting quarrel afflicted Philip with uncertainties. Though reluctant and disbelieving, he was obsessed with plans for war and eventually persuaded to authorize Demetrius’ elimination. But
repentance came soon thereafter. Philip was apprised of Perseus’ perfidy, sought to block his son’s accession, but was overtaken by death.\(^1\) As is evident, Perseus is the chief villain in this tale. Demetrius was immature, perhaps too pretentious as a consequence of his treatment by Rome, but largely an innocent victim. Philip was unduly suspicious and misled by his elder son, but at least reluctant to do away with Demetrius and remorseful afterward. It was Perseus who yielded to envy, schemed for his brother’s murder, and turned Macedon decisively against Rome.

Modern analysis dissents on almost every point. Polybius is taken to task for his schematic reconstruction. Philip did not prepare war on Rome after 188; the ascription of motive is premature and erroneous. Rather it was Roman insolence, the Senate’s desire to clip his wings, and its willingness to listen to the enemies of Macedon which drove Philip to measures of self-defense. Worse still, Rome—and Flamininus in particular—deliberately fostered Demetrius’ hopes, encouraged him to seek the throne, and rendered inevitable a dissension within the royal house. Perseus’ concern for the succession is justifiable, his reaction intelligible—not an unscrupulous schemer but a man who took necessary steps to protect his position against the stratagems of Rome. The letter of Flamininus, therefore, even if its reported contents are inaccurate, is an authentic reflection of Roman meddling. Demetrius’ aspirations, promoted by Rome and welcomed by many Macedonians, proved intolerable. Philip was induced to eliminate his son for reasons of state. And his alleged repentance and last-minute discovery of Perseus’ fraud is sheer fabrication concocted by an anti-Perseus tradition. Polybius failed to see the truth for he reckoned Philip as absorbed in aggressive war plans and driven by Tyche to a tragic dénouement. The real responsibility lies with Rome.\(^2\) So, a serious gulf between ancient and modern views. The matter can stand reexamination.

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1 Polybius’ extant text takes this story only to 182 B.C.; Polyb. 22.6, 11, 13–14, 18, 23.1–3, 7–11; cf. Livy 39.23–29, 33–35, 46–48, 53, 40.2–16; Diod. 29.16; App. Mac. 9.6; Plut. Aem. 8.4–5. Thereafter we must rely on Livy 40.20–24, 54–56; cf. Diod. 29.25; Plut. Arat. 54.3; Aem. 8.6.

The fallibility of the tradition is clear—and undeniable. Polybius is committed to the notion that Rome’s war with Perseus had roots a decade and a half earlier, in the reign of Philip. The Macedonian king, stung by Roman rebuff and mistreatment, planned the retaliation which his son later pursued. Demetrius might have offered a better hope. But he became an unwitting instrument of larger forces. Impressed with his own self-importance, he aggravated friction and hastened his demise. Relations between Rome and Macedon are viewed through Polybius’ peculiar prism: they emerge as a series of episodes which progressively increased tensions and built to an inescapable conflict. Hindsight and schematism can be charged against him. Further, Polybius molded his account of Philip’s last years in tragic form: the king was pursued by furies and in the iron grip of Tyche which brought retribution for the misdeeds of his past. His conception does not engender trust.

Livy adopted Polybius’ premises—but went further. The Roman historian felt obliged to absolve his countrymen of all blame. That object is readily discernible. Flamininus’ conversation with Demetrius, which inspired lofty dynastic hopes in the prince, is reported by Polybius but pointedly omitted by Livy, who had the text in front of him. Flamininus’ later missive to Philip, explaining his contacts with Demetrius, proved fatal to the latter. Its authenticity was subsequently challenged and stirred much controversy. But Livy (40.23.7–24.1, 54.9–56.1) has no doubts: the letter was a forgery, part of Perseus’...
The diabolical plot against his brother; Rome's hands were clean. Demetrius was gullible and naïve, Perseus cunning and villainous. The Polybian portrait is delivered with heightened colors—and diminished credibility—by Livy.

Skepticism is warranted. And one may go further. What were the sources of Polybius' information? The motive and means of Demetrius' assassination formed a topic of debate in Achaea during the 170s, when Polybius was present. Hence, it has been suggested, a pro-Demetrian version, stemming from Achaea, is transmitted by Polybius. But that will not do. Reports were confused and contradictory, subject to varied interpretations. In the Achaean debate of 174, recreated by Livy, Archon, a close political ally of Polybius, is made to assert that one cannot know how Demetrius died nor what Philip's plans were. The confident affirmation of Philip's guilt and his aggressive anti-Romanism comes in a speech of Callicrates. Though Polybius echoes that version, it is hardly plausible that he accepted it on the authority of Callicrates, a man for whom he has the utmost contempt. In any case, the disputed rumors in Achaea provided no reliable basis for recording Macedonian affairs.

Polybius' principal source was unquestionably Macedonian. The intimate details of events in the court can only have come from men well placed to observe. Polybius had access to at least one Macedonian noble who deserted Perseus during the Third Macedonian War and several others who were transported to Rome after the war. On another matter, Perseus' negotiations with Eumenes, the

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8 Walbank, *JHS* 58 (1938) 65–66 n.51; rightly doubted by Meloni 41–42.
7 Livy, 41.24.4–5: nec ob quam causam nec quem ad modum perierit Demetrius scimus, nec quid Philippus si vixisset facturus fuerit. On Polybius' association with Archon, see Polyb. 22.10.8, 28.3.7–8, 6.7–9, 29.23.1–3.
8 Callicrates' statement in Livy 41.23.9–11. Polybius' hostility to Callicrates is well known; see Polyb. 24.8–10, 29.23–25, 30.13, 29, 36.13. The speeches are, in any case, rhetorical compositions by Livy. Nor is it clear that he follows Polybius closely here. Notice his rather favorable assessment of Callicrates, and his negative remarks on Archon's brother Xenarchus (Livy 41.23.4–5). For G. Lehmann, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Glaubwürdigkeit des Polybios* (Münster 1967) 298 n.321, this is evidence for Polybius' objectivity—a rather optimistic conclusion.
9 Cf. Livy 40.6–7, 23–24, 54–56. This has long been recognized; see R. von Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios* I (Stuttgart 1890) 269; Walbank, *JHS* 58 (1938) 65; *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* I (Oxford 1957) 33–34; Pedech 132–33.
10 On Onesimus, who disapproved of Perseus' policies and fled to Rome in 169, where he was handsomely treated, see Livy 44.16.4–7. And there were other intimates of Perseus who surrendered after Pydna and were sent off to Italy to march in the triumph of Aemilius Paullus; Livy 44.45.2, 45.35.1; Plut. *Aem.* 34.1; cf. Pedech 133, 361–62.
historian (29.8.10) explicitly cites information from the friends of Perseus. They could supply firsthand data both on the intrigues of the court and on Macedonian public opinion, but from their own vantage point. It is well to remember that Polybius’ contact with these men came more than a decade (at the very least) after the death of Philip. And it was in the interests of expatriate Macedonians to dissociate themselves as far as possible from the actions and policies of the fallen Perseus. Best to praise Perseus’ victims, men like Demetrius and Antigonus, who stood for cooperation with Rome and a peaceful coexistence. The expatriates could claim that they tried but failed to deter the king from his warlike posture. Perseus would not receive favorable treatment at their hands. The analysis fits suitably with Polybius’ conviction that Perseus did away with all obstacles standing in the path of his resolve for war on Rome. But that hardly confirms its validity.

The tradition then is suspect, demonstrably so. Are we to abandon it for the modern reconstruction? Does it follow that Rome is to blame, that Roman actions set events in motion, that the Senate’s criminal meddling produced tragedy in the Macedonian court, drove Philip to self-defense and Perseus to war? That may be extreme, if not altogether erroneous. The situation must be examined in the larger context of Roman policy in the East.

II

Philip had collaborated with Rome, as socius et amicus, during the Aetolian and Syrian wars. Among benefits received were the restoration of his son Demetrius, previously a hostage in Rome, and remission of the indemnity imposed after the Second Macedonian War. There were some territorial gains too, notably Magnesia, with its stronghold Demetrias, and towns along the Pagasean and Malian gulfs; and Philip retained some influence in Athamania. But he had

11 So Onesimus in 169; Livy 44.16.5–6.
12 The reports of Perseus’ ‘friends’ on his dealings with Eumenes reflect no credit on the Macedonian king; Polyb. 29.7–8.
13 Polyb. 21.3.1–3, 11.9; Livy 36.35.12–13, 37.25.11–12; App. Mac. 9.5, Syr. 20, 23; Diod. 28.15.1; Zon. 9.19; Plut. Flam. 14.2. On cooperation in 191 and 190, see Livy 36.8.2–6, 10.10; 36.13–14, 25, 33; 37.7.8–16, 39.12; 39.28.7–9; App. Syr. 16, 23; Mac. 9.5; Zon. 9.20.
14 On gains in Magnesia and the Thessalian coast, see Livy 36.33; 39.23.12, 24.6, 24.11–12, 25.9; 42.42.1, 56.7, 67.9–10; cf. De Sanctis, op. cit. (supra n.2) IV.1.161; Walbank, Philip V 204–05 n.6. On Athamania, Polyb. 22.6.3; Livy 36.34.9, 38.1.11; 39.23.11, 24.8, 24.11–12, 25.17, 28.4.
reason to be less than fully satisfied with his treatment. In 191 the Romans had prevented him from taking Lamia and had concluded an *ad hoc* truce with Aetolia, in order to cut short some of Philip’s advances.\textsuperscript{15} And the peace settlement was not to his liking. Eumenes of Pergamum proved to be the chief beneficiary, obtaining the Thracian Chersonese, Lysimacheia, and other European territories which Philip had expected to be his (Polyb. 21.45.9, Livy 38.39.14). The king’s unhappiness was well known. Some suspected even that Philip was behind a Thracian attack on returning Roman forces in 188 (Livy 38.40.7–8).

Postwar resentments are intelligible, but no prospect of calamitous consequences. Once Roman troops were withdrawn from Greece, Philip could anticipate a freer hand. In 187 and 186 he set about a systematic policy of consolidating his territory and strengthening his resources. Old mines were reopened and new ones exploited. Augmentation of tax revenues, expanded coinage and a greater interest in trade followed. Official state policy encouraged population increase by native Macedonians. And to shore up manpower in the meanwhile, Thracian dependants were transported to Macedonian areas.\textsuperscript{16} Philip proceeded to advance along the Thracian coast. By 186 he had absorbed the towns of Aenus and Maronea with their surrounding territories.\textsuperscript{17} Those cities had been ‘liberated’ from Syrian garrisons by Rome’s fleet in 189 and a praetor had fixed the new boundary which separated them from Philip’s domains. But that was an *ad hoc* arrangement, not, so far as we know, formally ratified. Aenus and Maronea receive no explicit mention in the recorded terms of the peace of Apamea. After the war Philip calmly redrew the boundaries and occupied the towns.\textsuperscript{18} In Polybius’ construct, all of this represents deliberate expansionism designed to prepare war on Rome.\textsuperscript{19} The annalistic tradition adds even that Philip had been forbidden by the treaty of 196 to wage any wars without Roman permission, which is certainly false.\textsuperscript{20} Dire forecasts would be premature. Philip felt secure and justified in rebuilding his resources and making a logical

\textsuperscript{15} Livy 36.25.3–8, 34.1–35.6; 39.23.8–9, 28.3; Plut. *Flam.* 15.4–5; Zon. 9.19.


\textsuperscript{17} Polyb. 22.6.1–2; Livy 39.23.13, 24.7–9, 27.10.

\textsuperscript{18} Livy 37.60.7, 39.27.10. That no provision was made for Aenus and Maronea in the peace settlement seems clear from Livy 39.27.5, 28.11–12.

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. Livy 39.23.5–6, 24.1.

\textsuperscript{20} Livy 33.30.6. No such clause appears in Polybius’ account of the peace terms, 18.44.
extension to his eastern holdings. There was little reason to expect Roman retaliation.

Nor did Rome initiate a reaction. Envoys streamed into the Senate in the winter of 186/5—from Eumenes, Thessaly, Perrhaebia, Athamania, and from an exiled party of Maroneans—to complain of Philip's territorial aggrandizement. Representatives of the Macedonian court were there as well: Philip's advances, so they claimed, were well within wartime agreements made with Roman generals (Polyb. 22.6.1-4, Livy 39.24.6-12). The Senate was in no hurry to arbitrate the disputes. And they paid Philip the courtesy of declining any decision in his absence. Instead, a senatorial legation was sent to Greece to hear the charges and to offer Philip an opportunity to refute them in person—a reasonable proceeding, and far from bellicose.21

A gathering was summoned at Tempe before the Roman legates who were to serve in the rôle of arbitrators. Numerous allegations issued forth, especially from the Thessalians, about towns unjustly seized and held by Philip, plus a host of vaguer and unrelated complaints. The argument rested on a solitary principle: that Rome's commander in the Aetolian war had agreed to let Philip keep the cities which he acquired only if they had previously belonged to Aetolia or had joined her voluntarily; he had no right to places forcibly attached to Aetolia, places which the Thessalians and others claimed as their own.22 That is clearly a case of special pleading. Philip responded that no such restrictions applied in his agreement with Rome: he had been given authority to take cities which fought on the side of the enemy (Livy 39.26.11). And there can be little doubt that he is right. The Polybian account, followed by Livy, outside the context of the speeches, states that Philip was permitted to annex even those towns which the Aetolians had seized from Thessaly.23 Among the Roman ambassadors present at Tempe was M. Baebius Tamphilus, the man who had conducted the initial arrangements with Philip in 191 (Livy 36.8.6, 10.10, 13). The king would hardly distort those arrangements in his presence. Philip rounded on his accusers, charged the Thessalians with a list of transgressions, and delivered

21 Polyb. 22.6.5–6; Livy 39.24.13: senatus, ne quid absente rege statueret, legatos ad eas controversias discendentas misit. Walbank's formulation, Philip V, 226–27, that Rome felt "a drastic remedy was required," is unwarranted.
23 Livy 39.23.10. An understanding of this sort seems assumed also in Livy 36.34–35.
himself of a pointed utterance: "the sun of all his days had not yet set." 24

What was the Roman attitude? The commissioners, after listening to arguments on both sides, announced that Philip should withdraw his garrisons from the disputed cities and limit his kingdom to the ancient boundaries of Macedon. 25 A harsh verdict, it is often stated, and one predetermined by Roman policy, regardless of the justice of Philip's claims: Rome had decided to contract Macedonian holdings, and the king's blustering attitude at the conference made matters even worse for him. 26 But that may be too simple. The Polybian tradition, of course, reckons this episode as a step on the road to war between Macedon and Rome, another source of friction confirming Philip's hostility and Roman suspicions. 27 Philip was angry, to be sure. But his anger here was directed against the Thessalians, as was the menacing pronouncement about his sun not yet set. To Rome he was conciliatory. The legates had a ticklish problem. Conflicting claims regarding towns which had shifted so often from one power to another were almost impossible to adjudicate. On detailed charges and countercharges the legates professed themselves incompetent to decide until proper procedures had been determined (Livy 39.26.14, cf. 36.25.6). Philip's appeal to his agreement of 191 did not have legal standing, a battlefield arrangement never ratified in Rome. The commissioners' sweeping pronouncement will have brought satisfaction to the Thessalians and others. But couched in vague and ambiguous terms (who could fix the 'ancient borders' of Macedon?), it left room for extensive dispute and interpretation. The point was not so much what the commissioners said but how strictly Rome would be willing to enforce it. In fact, Philip held on to much of the controversial territory, as was no doubt to be expected. 28 The Senate did not evince great concern for the claims of the Thessalians. 29

Eumenes counted for more; he was the principal guarantor of the

24 Livy 39.26.1-13; Diod. 29.16.
26 Cf. Walbank, Philip V, 226–32; Badian, Clientelae, 92–93.
27 Cf. Diod. 29.16, who has the legates deliver their opinion with much irritation—stronger stuff than Livy records at 39.26.14.
28 Walbank, Philip V, 232, admits that he retained Demetrias, a large part of Magnesia and Dolopia, as well as towns in Phthiotic Achaea. And these should hardly be dismissed as "minor exceptions."
29 Livy 39.24.7: minus Thessalos curabant.
peace in the Hellespont and in Asia Minor. His complaints produced a reconvening of the commissioners at Thessalonica in the early summer of 185. Eumenes’ representatives were there, as was a delegation from the exiled Maroneans. The status of Aenus and Maronea were at issue. Eumenes asserted a proprietary right, implied, so his envoys maintained, in the granting to him of Lysimacheia and the Chersonese; Rome could leave the cities free if she wished, but if overlordship were preferable, better that it be Eumenes’ than Philip’s (Livy 39.27.1-6). The Maroneans chimed in with details of Philip’s harsh and despotic rule in their city, a rule which he had usurped despite arrangements made in the last war (Livy 39.27.7-10). Philip’s reply was forceful: he angrily dismissed Eumenes’ arguments, stressed his services for Rome, and expressed offense at efforts to despoil him of holdings legitimately acquired. And a final plea: he ought not to be abused like an enemy but be granted justice as a loyal friend and ally (Livy 39.28).

The Roman commissioners again fumbled for a formula. Philip’s speech had hit home; but it would not do to aggravate the fears of Eumenes. The commissioners hedged once more, declining to pass on the merits of the case. They left open the possibility that Philip’s contention might be just. And they claimed ignorance of the peace settlement, insofar as it applied to Aenus and Maronea. The matter would be referred to the Senate, and Philip should withdraw his garrisons, pending a decision. That was clearly a dodge. It is unthinkable that senatorial envoys, well aware that Aenus and Maronea would be the principal items of dispute, had neglected to check their status in the peace of Apamea. The envoys’ purpose, it seems, was to keep Eumenes happy, without explicitly denying Philip’s claims. In Livy’s conceptual analysis, adapted from Polybius, the Macedonian’s alienation from Rome was thereby aggravated, a further move toward the inevitable war. But Polybian hindsight is not a definitive guide. The commissioners preferred ambiguity to dictation.

A clearer pronouncement came from the Senate. Spokesmen from all contending parties were in Rome early in 184, together with the

30 Livy 39.29.1-2: Movit aliquantum oratio regis legatos. Itaque medio responso rem suspendere...placere senatui reservari et, ut omnia in integro manerent, praedia quae in iis urbis sint deduci.

31 Livy 39.27.1, 29.3; cf. 39.28.1-4. Of course, Rome, for Livy, is in no way to blame: Romae nulla Macedonici belli suspicio erat.
commissioners, who had returned to deliver their report. The Senate confirmed the preliminary and tentative arrangements: Philip should evacuate Aenus, Maronea and all his coastal possessions in Thrace, as well as the disputed cities in Thessaly and Perrhaebia. A new embassy was appointed, headed by Ap. Claudius, the consul of 185, to see that these requirements were implemented (Polyb. 22.11.1-4, 12.4; Livy 39.33.1-3). Whether this decree was just is a question best left aside. In matters so complex and ambiguous, equity can hardly be determined. The Senate acted to gratify her allies, not to render strict justice nor to prepare for a coming war. But the question remains as to how rigidly she would enforce her decisions.

Philip was understandably peeved. From his vantage point Rome’s policy could hardly seem evenhanded. Concessions to Eumenes and Thessaly at his expense were more than a loyal amicus deserved. Philip declared no express defiance of the new arrangements. But at least Maronea, some of whose citizens had complained of him, would pay. A band of Thracians, allegedly on Philip’s orders—as conveyed by Onomastus, his governor of Thrace, and through him to an agent Cassander—entered the town and conducted a brutal massacre. When Ap. Claudius and the Roman delegation arrived in the spring of 184, they delivered a rebuke and would not hear Philip’s denials of responsibility. An explanation would have to be offered at Rome, and by the supposed culprits, Onomastus and Cassander (Polyb. 22.13.1-14.1; Livy 39.34.1-6)—a proper show of indignation. But how much did it cost Philip in fact? In private conferences with Ap. Claudius he got Onomastus excused altogether. Only Cassander would have to go. And Cassander conveniently perished on the way. The Roman legates conveyed their displeasure, but left it at that and returned home (Polyb. 22.14.2-6; Livy 39.34.7-35.2). There was no further investigation of the Maronea massacre nor (despite rumors and suspicions) any inquiry into the death of Cassander.

The events do not imply a systematic Roman effort to cripple Macedon. The legates did their duty: a report of the Senate’s message and a rap on Philip’s knuckles—hence, an advertisement of Rome’s

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32 Cf. Walbank, *Philip V*, 234: “On the basis of the settlement, the senate’s decision was a just one”; Errington, *op. cit.* (supra n.2) 197: “This decision was neither fair nor reasonable.”

33 Polybius flatly asserts (22.14.5) that Philip had Cassander poisoned in order to prevent him from talking. That was bound to be said at the time, and, no doubt, endorsed by Polybius’ Macedonian informants later. Livy simply reports Polybius’ opinion without committing himself (39.34.10: *veneno creditur sublatus*).
fides. But they were not eager to press the issue. The slaughter at Maronea went unpunished, the mysterious death of Cassander was passed over in silence. Compliance with Rome's decrees was far from unequivocal. Philip, as we have seen, did not abandon his Thessalian holdings altogether. He continued to exercise decisive influence in judicial disputes over territory not only in Thessaly but in Perrhaebia, Athamania, Epirus and Illyria (Polyb. 23.1.2-3, 10-12). And, more strikingly, he had not even removed his garrisons from Aenus and Maronea, despite requests from two different sets of Roman envoys (Polyb. 23.3.1, Livy 39.46.9). Rome's implementation of expressed wishes was decidedly negligent.

Philip pursued, without hindrance, his projects in Thrace and further east. Employing an appeal from Byzantium as justification or pretext, he made inroads into Thrace and even captured the Thracian chieftain Amadocus (Polyb. 22.14.12, Livy 39.35.4). He further engaged in negotiations with the Bastarnae and the Scordisci, probably with an eye to protecting his northern frontiers, and married off a daughter to another Thracian princeling. And he harassed Eumenes by sending forces to assist Prusias of Bithynia in his war against Pergamum (Polyb. 23.1.4, 3.1; Livy 39.46.9). The king did not feel himself hamstrung by Roman pronouncements.

But he could expect additional complaints. The enemies of Macedon had reason to feel cheated by Roman dilatoriness and threatened by Philip's aggressiveness. A new round of protests could easily be anticipated. How best to deal with it? Philip, in consultation with his advisers, hit upon an appropriate plan: he would send his son Demetrius, who had been raised in Rome and left a favorable impression there, to answer charges and to provide a means for improving public relations. In view of modern preoccupation with Rome's alleged manipulating of Demetrius, it is worth stressing that the idea was Philip's; it did not come on Roman initiative. The king expected that through Demetrius he would obtain senatorial approval of his activities and would short-circuit Greek demands. Polybius, of course, reckons it as a mere delaying tactic: the war was inevitable, but

34 On the Bastarnae, Livy 39.35.4; the Scordisci, Justin 32.3.5; the marriage alliance, Diod. 32.15.5. Livy's inference that Philip encouraged barbarian tribes to invade Italy may be safely discounted. It was the Dardanians who worried him; cf. Livy 40.57.4-9; Walbank, Philip V, 236-38.

Philip was not yet prepared and hoped to buy some time by using Demetrius to smooth over differences. That kind of retrospection can be ignored. In fact, Polybius may provide a clue as to Philip's real motivation here. The king was worried not so much about what Rome was doing but what she was saying. Senatorial declarations, designed to appease envoys from the socii and amici, promoted the idea that relations between Rome and Macedon were irreparable and encouraged Philip's enemies to persist in their accusations. The despatching of Demetrius would be an act of good faith. At the same time it would provide Rome with a convenient vehicle whereby to quiet malcontents in central Greece and Asia Minor and to permit Philip to operate within limits, but with less annoyance.

And the Romans were cooperative. Subsequent negotiations, if seen in that light, begin to make more sense. In the winter of 184/3, a bewildering collection of envoys besieged the Senate with charges against Philip: from Eumenes, Thessaly, Perrhaebia, Epirus, Athamania and Illyria (Polyb. 23.1, Livy 39.46.6–9). And, no doubt, they were dissatisfied with Roman action, or lack thereof. It is well to remember that two full years had elapsed since the initial protestations against Philip. And he had complied very sparingly with announced decisions. Countless accusations were presented by the Greeks regarding Philip’s territorial aggrandizements, various deprivations, and his control of judicial decisions and arbitration. Eumenes pointed to his armed assistance for Prusias and to the fact that he still, after all this time, kept his garrisons in Aenus and Maronea (Polyb. 23.1.4, 1.10–13, 3.1; Livy 39.46.7–9). In anticipation Philip had sent Demetrius with two principal counsellors to present his side of the story (Polyb. 23.1.5, Livy 39.47.1).

The Senate's treatment of Demetrius is illuminating. The young

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23 Polyb. 22.14.7–8; Livy 39.35.2. There is no need to see this as the product of a source different from the general pro-Demetrian tradition followed by Polybius; as Walbank, JHS 58 (1938) 65–66. Philip is made to see the necessity of resisting, as well as attacking, the Romans: ἀμέσως καὶ μετερθέντων αὐτῶν. But he is in no way exculpated here. Polybius’ analysis is straightforward: relations between the two states were strained, war was inescapable, and Philip was eager (προθυμός) for it, only he needed time to prepare. It is not Polybius’ purpose, let alone that of his Macedonian informants, to blame Rome for pushing Philip into a corner.

prince was graciously received, excused from replying in detail to the complex charges, and asked only if he had brought any memoranda from Philip. Of course he had. The Senate bade him simply to summarize the contents. The exchange has all the earmarks of a pre-arrangement. Philip's message was self-serving but conciliatory: he grumbled about the inequities of previous decisions but asserted that he had acted in accordance with them as far as possible and, if he had failed to do so in any instance, the fault lay with his accusers, not himself. Not an altogether satisfactory response. But the Romans proved to be most accommodating. Demetrius' statements were accepted at face value, and the prince was warmly entertained. With regard to all the complaints registered by the Greeks, the Senate professed itself satisfied by Philip's message and Demetrius' assurances that justice had been or would be done. Aenus and Maronea were more sticky. Eumenes' displeasure could not be so easily brushed aside; he was too valuable an ally. Hence the Senate insisted on evacuation by Macedon and appointed still another commission to see to it that this was accomplished. Eumenes was appeased. But more striking is the gentle and generous treatment of Macedon.

How best to interpret these proceedings? According to Polybius (23.2.10), the Senate's message expressed confidence in Philip and a reassertion of friendly relations, but added that he owed this congeniality to Demetrius. In consequence thereof Philip and Perseus became the more nettled, for it appeared that Roman favor was secured not through themselves but only through the agency of

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38 Polyb. 23.2.1-5; Livy 39.47.1-4; App. Mac. 9.6.

39 Polyb. 23.2.6-9: ἀπόκρισιν ἔδωκε διότι περὶ πάντων καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀνεγνωσμένων Δημητρίῳ πιστεύει διότι τὰ μὲν γέγονε, τὰ δ’ ἔσται, καθάπερ δίκαιον ἕστι γένεσθαι; Livy 39.47.5-11; App. Mac. 9.6.

40 Polyb. 23.3.1-3. Polybius maintains here that the cities are to be turned over to Eumenes—which goes beyond earlier senatorial pronouncements; cf. Polyb. 22.11.3; Livy 39.29.2, 33.4. Nor, so far as we know, did Eumenes ever receive them. Certainly they were not in his possession as late as 168/7 (Polyb. 30.3.3). Hence, it has been suggested, Polybius or his excerptor is in error; Walbank, Philip V, 240 n.4. Not necessarily so. The excerptor in any case is not to be blamed. Appian (Mac. 9.6) seems to have found that passage in Polybius. This may be another instance of a Roman promise which they did not trouble to implement. The very same promise, given and then broken by the Romans, is explicitly recorded by Polybius (30.3.1-7) under the year 167. One may note that in both instances the relevant passages are altogether omitted by Livy; they would not have placed Rome in an especially favorable light; cf. Livy 39.47.8-11, 45.20.1-3.

41 Cf. Livy 39.47.8-11; App. Mac. 9.6.
Demetrius. Modern historians wax eloquent about Roman insolle nce and cynicism, a deliberate effort to humiliate Philip and elevate Demetrius. But that goes well beyond Polybius’ own analysis. The Greek historian is concerned here not with motivation but with consequences. Demetrius’ mission and the benefactions he received in Rome turned the young man’s head, stirring jealousy in the Macedonian court and leading inevitably to disaster. Polybius imputes no cynical plan to the Roman Senate.

It will be prudent to avoid confusing intentions with results. Philip, in fact, got what he wanted. He had, after all, sent Demetrius precisely because of the prince’s influence in Rome. The Senate accepted Philip’s justification regarding all affairs in Greece, asking only, with an eye to Eumenes, that he withdraw from Aenus and Maronea, a repetition of the request made two years before. The presence of Demetrius provided a convenient face-saving device for all sides. Rome was, it should be noted, drawing back from insistence on her previous pronouncements; she would not endorse all the claims of Thessalians, Perrhaebians and others, let alone confine Philip to Macedon’s ‘ancient borders’. By parading favor to Demetrius, a man advertised as a promoter of peaceful relations and a sign of Philip’s good will, the Senate could appease Roman allies while discouraging future complaints. Assurances to Eumenes and indulgences to Demetrius hang together. Roman diplomacy aimed at compromise, not humiliation.

A more sinister plot, however, is ascribed to Flamininus. Here careful and scrupulous attention to the evidence is required. A brief passage in Polybius has stimulated mountainous speculation on Roman motives and policy. Flamininus, it is said, took Demetrius aside while he was in Rome. He won the young man’s confidence, engaged him

42 Polyb. 23.3.4–6, 7.4; Livy 39.48.1; App. Mac. 9.6.

43 Cf. De Sanctis, op.cit. (supra n.2) IV.1.244–45; Colin, op.cit. (supra n.2) 209–11; Edson 192–93; Wallbank, Philip V, 239, 241; Badian, Clientelae, 94; Errington, op.cit. (supra n.2) 198–99. An exception is P. V. M. Benecke, CAH VIII.252–53, who suggests that Rome sought only to show kindness to Demetrius and that she erred in her “excessive courtliness.”

44 Notice Polybius’ statements that the distress of Philip and Perseus stemmed from the appearance of Rome’s indulgence for Demetrius: 23.3.6, ἄντρειας δὲ καὶ τὸν Περσέα καὶ τὸν Φιλίππον ἴσημαι τῷ δοκεῖν μὴ διὰ αὐτοὺς, ἀλλὰ διὰ Δημήτριον τυγχάνει τὸς παρὰ ‘Ρωμαίων φιλανθρωπίας: 23.7.4, ὅπερ αὖτοις τῷ δοκεῖν τοὺς ‘Ρωμαίους αὐτῶν μὲν μηθενά λόγον ποιεῖται, τῷ δὲ Δημήτριῳ πάσαι ἀνατίθεναι τὴν καὶ αὐτῶν χάριν. There is, of course, no suggestion of Roman double-dealing in Livy. Only Appian implies a deliberate effort to weaken Philip: Mac. 9.6, ἀδεμονοαύτες οὖν τὸν Φιλίππον. But his account is generally unfavorable to Rome (cf. App. Mac. 11.1, 3)—an attitude not derived from Polybius.
in secret conversations, and led him to expect that the Romans were ready to install him immediately on the Macedonian throne. Flaminius further provoked Philip by a written request that Demetrius be sent back to Rome with an entourage of his most serviceable friends (Polyb. 23.3.7–8). It is now common consent that this story damns Rome beyond recovery: a calculated interference in Macedonian dynastic politics, an effort to secure a malleable pro-Roman monarch in Macedon, an intentional tactic to bend the royal house to Rome’s will. But how much confidence can be placed in this tale?

No other source reports the episode. Livy’s silence is, of course, deliberate and counts for little. He found the story in Polybius’ text and chose to omit it. Philip and Perseus are the sole villains; it would not do to transmit a report that implies Roman intrigue. More interesting is the silence of Appian (Mac. 9.6). He mentions Flaminius as introducing and strongly recommending Demetrius to the Senate. But no word about any secret meetings. And Appian was not grinding an axe for Rome, as the tenor of his account makes clear. Hence some skepticism is legitimate.

Not that Polybius’ text can be tossed out on the silence of later authorities. A basis for the tale did exist. There is no reason to doubt that Flaminius held conversations with Demetrius. The latter implicitly admits as much in a speech accorded him by Livy (40.12.17, cf. 20.3). Flaminius’ request to Philip for a return visit by Demetrius is surely factual as well, mentioned also in Livy’s pages (40.11.1–3), and its authenticity is not questioned. A later missive from Flaminius was indeed challenged as a forgery. But even if it were fabricated, the forgers would hardly have undertaken the job unless a relationship between Demetrius and the Roman were well known in Macedon. So much is acceptable: Flaminius entertained and conversed with Demetrius in Rome and later asked Philip to send him back for another visit. But the further conclusion that Flaminius wilfully stirred trouble in Macedon’s royal house is not indisputable.

Where would Polybius have got such a story? Not, of course, from the participants, both of whom were dead before Polybius began work on his Histories. Hence the data are, by any reckoning, second hand. Nor are they likely to have come from Roman informants. The tale is, in fact, framed in a Macedonian context—not part of the

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45 See the works cited supra n.2. Dissent from this communis opinio in Benecke, CAH VIII 252–53, who does not, however, argue the case in detail.
straight narrative but an excursus and a commentary upon the repercussions of Demetrius' Roman mission. It is introduced by the statement (23.3.5) that this embassy was the source of eventual tragedy in the Macedonian royal house. And, after describing the conversation and the letter to Philip, Polybius adds that these were the pretexts subsequently employed by Perseus to encompass Demetrius' ruin. The vantage point is Macedon and the source, no doubt, Macedonian. Whatever the motives of Flamininus (which Polybius' informants could not have known), it was the effects which were relevant: the vanity of Demetrius, the discomfiture of Philip and the stratagems of Perseus. Events in Macedon conspired to develop and embellish the tale. Court gossip and Perseus' machinations lay between the conversation itself and the report received by Polybius. The information conveyed to him was information on what brought matters to a head in the royal family. And that is what interested the historian. Unlike Livy, he is not concerned to exculpate Flamininus—nor, for that matter, to condemn him. The episode assumed importance in view of the reaction, whether justified or not, in Macedon. Hence, a link in the ever-lengthening chain of events which brought on war between the two major powers. Such is the framework in which Polybius presents the incident. Not a sound basis whence to infer sinister schemes by Flamininus, let alone by senatorial policy.

46 Polyb. 23.3.9: ταύτας γὰρ ταῖς ἀφορμαῖς χρησάμενος ὁ Περσεὺς μετ’ ὀλγὸν ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα εὐκαταλέθη τῷ Δημητρίῳ θανάτῳ. Polybius then halts the digression with a promise to get back to it at the appropriate time: 23.3.10, περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ὡς ἐχειρίσθη τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἐν τοῖς ἔξις δηλώσομεν.

47 Cf. Livy 40.11.1–3, 23.7–9.

48 The question of Polybius' alleged bias against Flamininus has been much debated, but always with regard to the events of the Second Macedonian War; cf. e.g., F. M. Wood, TAPA 70 (1939) 93–103; AJP 62 (1941) 277–88; Lehmann, op.cit. (supra n.8) 165–79; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Phoenix 21 (1967) 177–90; E. Badian, Titus Quinctius Flamininus (Cincinnati 1970) 22–27, 40–48; Briscoe, op.cit. (supra n.2) 22–32. He is certainly prepared to record sharp practice on Flamininus' part; e.g. Polyb. 18.10–12, 43. But condemnation is not his aim here.

49 Edson's confident assertions (pp. 192–94, 200–01) about the Senate's backing for Flamininus are unfounded. Nor will it do to aduce Roman policy toward Pergamum in the 160s as an analogy: as Meloni 30; Badian, Clientelae, 94. Matters were very different in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War. There are no analogies in the generation before Pydna. The real parallel so far as Pergamum is concerned comes in 181/0. Eumenes sent Attalus and other brothers to Rome to reassert amicable relations and obtain support for his war on Pharnaces of Pontus. The Senate lavished praises and gifts upon Attalus, as they had done for Demetrius, but obviously with no intention of supplanting Eumenes. And the Roman legates who went to Asia Minor offered no backing in the war but endeavored to arrange a reconciliation: Polyb. 24.5, 14–15.
The return of Demetrius, armed with Rome's accommodating reply, brought relief and joy to the Macedonians. Friction between the two states had now been alleviated, and the prospect of a conflict receded into the background. For Polybius (23.7.1–4; cf. Livy 39.53.1–2, 9), only Philip and Perseus were unhappy with the results, displeased with excessive attentions paid to Demetrius. That is obvious exaggeration. But there is no reason to doubt that the Macedonians in general welcomed news of a detente and the reaffirming of cordial relations. And the petulance of Philip may well be predated. Polybius resorts to a familiar device: the king concealed his pique. It will be profitable to separate two items which are entangled in the ancient tradition: suspicions and dissension within the court on the one hand and Macedonian relations with Rome on the other. The former arose from rivalry between the sons of Philip and uncertainties about Demetrius' intentions. Discussion may be postponed for the moment. It is the latter with which we are presently concerned. And here, it seems plain, discord had subsided.

The settlement as adumbrated in the Senate was carried out peaceably. When a Roman embassy, headed by Q. Marcius Philippus, arrived in the spring of 183, Philip at last removed his garrisons from the Thracian coastal towns (two and a half years after the initial Roman request) and consented to arrangements on several other disputed matters. In Polybius' account this was done with grumbling and reluctance: Philip complied only to gain time for his war preparations. And Marcius' later report to the Senate announced that the concessions came grudgingly; he warned the patres that Philip was awaiting the opportunity to conduct full-scale war. That there was grumbling need not be doubted. Philip had perhaps hoped that lesser concessions would be required. But the psychologizing about his long-range motives is unverifiable and dubious. In fact, the interview between Marcius and the king was cordial. An important piece of evidence, usually neglected in this context, affirms it. More than a decade later, when Marcius was in the East again, on the eve of the Third Macedonian War, Perseus requested a personal interview. And he appealed to the amicitia and hospitium that existed between his father and Marcius, a relationship duly acknowledged by the latter.

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50 Polyb. 23.7.5: ὁ μὲν Φιλιππος ἐπεκρύπτετο τῇ̓ ἐπὶ τούτως διαφεύγειν.
51 So even Polybius, 23.3.4.
52 Polyb. 23.8.1–2, 9.6; Livy 39.53.10–11, 40.3.1–2.
That is surely a reference to Marcius' embassy of 183, and is testimony to its harmonious character.\textsuperscript{53}

The report to Rome may well have expressed concern about Philip's cheerless acquiescence. But the Senate's attitude is clear. They were not interested in pushing Philip around further. In the winter of 183/2 they transmitted an amiable message through the king's envoys: it commended Philip for his cooperation and asked only that he refrain from actions which might give the appearance of opposition to Rome.\textsuperscript{54} Appearances counted in the ancient world. Outward cordiality would calm fears and would spare Rome the annoyance of perpetual Greek embassies with their lists of grievances against Macedon.

It was not Rome's purpose to cripple the Macedonian kingdom. Philip had had to yield up Aenus and Maronea. But the blow was softened, it may be assumed, by an assurance that those towns would not fall into the hands of Eumenes. Certainly the Pergamene never acquired them. Elsewhere in Thrace Philip could pursue his projects with impunity. During the summer of 183 he conducted campaigns against the Odrysae, the Bessi and the Denteleti, establishing strongholds at Philippopolis and in the Axius basin.\textsuperscript{55} He was now in a position to dominate most of the Thracian interior. And he went further. Philip transported Macedonians in large numbers from the coastal cities of his kingdom to the frontier districts of Paeonia. In their place he settled Thracian mercenaries and other barbarian forces directly responsible to him, men whose loyalty was more secure than that of restive Macedonian nobles (Polyb. 23.10.4–5, Livy 40.3.3–4).
resultant outcry was widespread and disaffection threatened. Philip took firm but brutal steps: suspected leaders were executed and their children imprisoned. Negotiations with the Bastarnae, begun two years earlier, came to fruition in 182. An alliance followed and a marriage between Perseus and a noble lady of the Bastarnae. That people could prove to be a bulwark against the Dardanians (Livy 39.35.4, 40.5.10; cf. 40.57.4-9). Philip intended to maintain a solid grip on his realm, to overawe Thrace, and to brace his northern frontiers. In all this there is no sign of Roman displeasure or concern. And after the king’s settlement with Marcius, it might be noted, Greek complaints stopped coming. Diplomacy had taken effect.

III

Strife in the court is a separable matter. It was Tyche, not Roman will, which brought it into play in the same years in which Philip labored to consolidate his dominions internally and externally. Demetrius had returned from Rome much impressed with himself. His treatment by the Senate had given the youth an exaggerated sense of his own station (Polyb. 23.3.6, Livy 39.53.8). What had been a diplomatic move by Rome turned into a source of discord in the family of Philip. There is no need to rationalize Tyche by imputing wicked

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56 Polyb. 23.10.6-11, 15; Livy 40.3.5-4.15. See Walbank’s discussion, Philip V, 243-45. His conjecture that the insurrection was designed to put Demetrius on the throne, however, finds no support in Polybius. It was a reaction to Philip’s policy of mass deportation: Polyb. 23.10.6-9.

57 Polybius, of course, repeats the worn refrain that Philip’s actions were conceived as preparation for a Roman war: Polyb. 23.8.2-3, 10.4; Livy 39.53.11–12, 40.3.2-4. That idea pervades his entire narrative, leaving no room for alternatives.

58 An interesting decree from Larisa records steps taken for the rebuilding of a gymnasium. Among the donors who contributed for this purpose were both Philip and Perseus: hence, evidence for a detente between Macedon and Thessaly. The original editors wrongly dated the decree to the late third century B.C.: T. D. Axenides, Πλήρωμα 2 (1950) 44-68; SEG XIII, nn.390, 393. Perseus was too young at that time to have been listed as an independent contributor; cf. H. Kramolisch, ZPE 9 (1972) 31–33. The absence of Demetrius’ name is suggestive. One is tempted to opt for a date of 180/179, between the deaths of Demetrius and Philip. But the later 190s are also possible, while Demetrius was in Rome. Note the collaboration of Philip and Thessaly in the war on Nabis of 195 (Livy 34.26.10). And Philip combined with Roman forces against Antiochus to raise the siege of Larisa in 191 (Livy 36.10, 13.1-2). It can hardly come in the 180s when Philip and Thessaly were at odds.

59 Polyb. 23.10.16: τὸς τύχης ἄσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἀναβιβαζόοις ἐπὶ κακὺ παρά τὰς τύχων εὐμφοράς.
plots to Rome. Rumors started to fly in Macedon: popular talk had it that Demetrius was Philip's legitimate heir, Perseus a mere bastard, that Demetrius was the best hope for continued peace, that the Romans were eager for his accession. Demetrius' consorting with Roman commissioners seemed to lend truth to the gossip; and numerous opportunistic nobles began to flock about him as a potential ruler. It is not surprising that Perseus should feel discomfort and alarm. The anti-Perseus character of the tradition is especially clear here: the elder brother realized his inferiority to Demetrius in character and training and schemed for his removal by playing on Philip's fears, entrapping Demetrius in compromising statements, and cajoling court figures onto his own side (Polyb. 23.7.5-7; Livy 39.53.5-10, 40.5). The bias may stem from Polybius' Macedonian informants. But the growing division is clear. A struggle for the throne seemed to be taking shape.

Matters threatened to reach a crisis in 182. The annual festival in honor of the hero Xanthus involved a mock battle with contending teams headed by Demetrius and Perseus. The performance became rather more violent than expected, and the subsequent revelries inflamed spirits further. Perseus professed to fear for his life. On the next day he openly charged Demetrius with plotting his murder and secured an audience before Philip and a few counsellors. The two brothers delivered impassioned harangues, but Philip declined to take sides, only lamenting the existence of strife in his house and promising to watch the activities of both with care.

How much truth lies in all this? Delicate surgery to extract the vitals which suit one's own hypothesis is a tempting operation. It is best avoided. The setting derives from Macedonian witnesses who could attest to friction in the court and—from the distance of more than a decade—saw it as an element not only in the royal tragedy but in the crumbling Roman-Macedonian relations. The speeches are rhetorical compositions by Polybius and Livy, cast in that light. Perseus becomes the prime mover, denouncing his brother as a figurehead in the

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60 Livy 39.53.2-8; see 39.53.5: *haec vulgo loquebantur*; cf. 40.9.2.
61 Polybius, in fact, asserts that the two brothers were plotting against one another: 23.10.13, τῶν μὲν νεανίσκων ἄλλοις ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.
62 The tale is set out at length by Livy, who includes drawn-out speeches by the king and his sons (40.6.1-16.3). The speech of Philip is an elaboration of one found in Polybius, as a Polybian fragment (23.11) happens to reveal. And the entire story is clearly derived from the Greek historian.
Roman design to dominate Macedon and urging his father on an anti-Roman path to which he was already inclined. Demetrius is the guileless victim, caught in Perseus’ snares, reduced to tears, and defending his Roman associations as genuine efforts to promote peace. The tendentiousness is plain. But to argue from it that Rome was indeed contriving Demetrius’ accession and a de facto subject status for Macedon is to introduce an even greater modern tendentiousness on the other side. Demetrius’ statement that his behavior in Rome furthered Philip’s own hopes for peace has been labelled as frail and puerile. But it coincides, in fact, with Polybius’ explanation (22.14.9–10) of the king’s purpose. And one may note that Philip is most reluctant to accept Perseus’ charges and much saddened by the dispute between his sons (Polyb. 23.11, Livy 40.8, 16.1–3). The best that Livy can do, following the Polybian construct, is to claim that Philip concealed his true feelings and continued to meditate his war plans in secret. As direct evidence for Roman motivation the whole story is valueless.

Philip’s attention was still focused on the north, on control of the Dardanians and on domination of Thrace, ventures which would involve no conflict with Rome. Negotiations proceeded with the Bastarnae (cf. Livy 40.57.3). And in 181 Philip conducted an expedition through Paeonia and the territory of the Maedi, ravaged the land of the Dentheleti, and aimed at an ascent to heights which would permit a view from the Adriatic to the Black Sea (Livy 40.21–22). Demetrius went as far as Stobi in Paeonia and was then sent back to Macedon; Perseus accompanied the king for the rest of his expedition. Sinister suspicions are hypothesized by Livy: Philip dismissed Demetrius lest he be present when strategic routes for an invasion of Italy were discussed—obviously a worthless conjecture dictated by the slant of the tradition (Livy 40.21.7, cf. 40.21.2). The reasons given by Philip are plausible enough: he did not want both his sons with him on a risky adventure which might bring disaster upon all of them. And Perseus was the proper choice, the man whom Philip expected to carry out

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63 Livy 40.5.2, 5.6, 5.7, 5.12–14, 10.5–11.4, 11.8.
65 Livy 40.15.5–8; see Walbank, Philip V, 247; Meloni 46.
66 Livy 40.5.9, totus in Persea versus cum eo cognitiones eius rei dies ac noctes agitabat; 40.5.14, animo magis quam vultu ea crimina accipiebat; 40.16.3; cf. Polyb. 23.7.5.
his projects against the barbarians. Livy’s discomfiture is manifest and leads him into a tangle. On the one hand, Philip’s northern enterprise is explained as an effort to mask any designs on Rome; on the other, it is a preliminary foray for the invasion of Italy, from which Demetrius has to be excluded. The historian seeks to have it both ways (40.21.1–2, 21.7). In fact, the expedition simply furthered Philip’s efforts of the past two years, for which he had received implicit clearance from Rome.

The fate of Demetrius, however, was soon sealed. It was all part of an evil conspiracy by Perseus, according to our tradition. Philip, unconvinced by the charges levelled in the previous year, had sent two principal advisers, Philocles and Apelles, to Rome to discover the truth or dispel the rumors about Demetrius’ associations. The young prince meanwhile was on his best behavior, shunning contacts with Rome and discouraging written communications lest they feed Perseus’ propaganda mill (Livy 40.20.3–6). But Perseus swiftly ripened his schemes. He instructed Philocles and Apelles to bring back damaging reports from Rome. And when Demetrius returned to Macedon from Paeonia, Perseus induced Didas, the governor of Paeonia, to win his confidence and betray his secrets (Livy 40.20.4, 21.9–11, 22.15–23.1). The intrigue worked to perfection: Didas reported that Demetrius contemplated a flight to the Romans; Apelles and Philocles returned with an incriminating document, a letter from Flamininus attesting to discussions in which Demetrius expressed desire for the throne. Philip put Demetrius’ friend Herodorus on the rack to obtain confirming evidence, to no avail; but he already had enough. In the winter of 181/180 Demetrius was assassinated on private orders of his father.

Such is the sorry tale of Demetrius’ demise. To what extent it is accurate will never be known. Our sources stress the criminal guilt of Perseus, as naturally they would. It expresses the sentiments of Macedonian hostages after Pydna, eager to fix blame on their fallen king; it suited the design of Polybius, who envisioned a developing tragedy to culminate in the Third Macedonian War; and it furthered the purposes of Livy to exonerate Rome and dramatize the iniquities of the

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68 The story told most fully by Livy 40.23–24. How much comes from Polybius is unclear. But the Greek historian certainly believed that Philip ordered his son’s death (23.10.13); Diod. 29.25; Plut. Aem. 8.6; Arat. 54.3; Zon. 9.22.1; cf. Livy 40.54.2, 56.9.
enemy. That having been said, however, it does not follow that the analysis should be turned on its head, that Demetrius harbored treasonable aims, egged on by the policy of Rome. All that may be affirmed with confidence is rivalry between the brothers, the appearance (if not the reality) of inordinate ambition by Demetrius, and efforts by Perseus (whether justifiable or not) to establish his brother's guilt. Philip was reluctant throughout to embrace the charges but ultimately saw the necessity of taking drastic steps to assure the succession he wanted. It will be prudent to evade the problem of who was the deceiver and who the deceived. The Roman rôle in this drama is the more interesting question.

A chief exhibit in the indictment is Flamininus’ letter. The item was produced by Philocles and Apelles after their fact-finding mission in Rome. We have only Livy’s summary of the contents: Flamininus asks Philip’s indulgence for Demetrius if the young man, misled by desire for the throne, had discussed the matter with him and assures Philip that he would never have advised Demetrius to act against his own family. Is the letter authentic? Scholarly debate rages on the subject, with inconclusive results. It would avail nothing to add another voice on one side or the other of the controversy. In fact, we shall never know. Livy unequivocally pronounces the letter a forgery. His judgement, it can be argued, is deliberate whitewashing and without value. Philip later came to believe that the letter was fabricated by Perseus. But this supposed volte-face is imbedded in the confused and dubious tale of Philip’s last days, from which no confident conclusions may be drawn. That Polybius regarded the letter as counterfeit is by no means clear. His text is lost on these events. And, as we have seen, he reported Flamininus’ earlier colloquy with Demetrius which had stimulated the prince’s aspirations. The letter

69 Edson (196–98) accepts without question the reports that Demetrius planned a flight to Rome and that he was guilty of concealing Flamininus’ treacherous suggestions from his father. Cf. also Meloni 50–53, who sees Perseus’ actions as self-protective. Somewhat more cautious but in the same vein, Walbank, Philip V, 250–52: “[Demetrius] had lent himself to clumsy maneuvering by Flamininus and his circle, and had himself to thank for his untimely end.”

70 On Philip’s reluctance and caution, see Livy 40.16.1–3, 23.4–5, 24.1–2.

71 Livy 40.23.8: *Deprecatio in litteris erat si quid juvenis cupiditate regni prolapsum secum egisset; nihil eum adversus suorum quemquam facturum neque eum se esse qui ullius impii consilii auctor futurus videri possit.*

72 Livy 40.23.7, falsas litteras; 40.24.1.

73 Livy 40.54–56; cf. Plut. Aem. 8.6 Zon. 9.22.1; see Edson 199–200.
is consonant with that discussion. But Polybius’ belief that the letter was genuine (if such was his belief) would not make it so. Later testimony can be read either way, depending on one’s predilections. In 179 a certain Xychus confessed openly his part in forging the document, but faced with the prospect of torture perhaps he might have confessed to anything (Livy 40.55.5). Apelles, when the plot was uncovered or alleged to have been uncovered, fled to Italy. His destination is usually taken as proof of authenticity: how could he find refuge in Italy if he fabricated a Roman letter? Yet rumor had it that Apelles was later recalled by Perseus and secretly executed, a curious ending on that interpretation. And Apelles’ partner Philocles is said in one report to have denied his guilt to the end, in another to have admitted it (Livy 40.55.7). A morass of uncertainties. The verdict must be non liquet.

What needs to be pointed out is that the letter, even if factual, convicts Rome of no wrongdoing. Nothing was reported therein that was not already known or rumored. A conversation between Demetrius and Flamininus in Rome two years before was a matter of public knowledge and was not denied by the prince (cf. Livy 40.12.17, 20.3). Flamininus had written a letter in the meantime asking Philip to send Demetrius back for another visit (Polyb. 23.3.8, Livy 40.11.1–3). The request was given portentous overtones by Perseus, but, prima facie, it was no more than a friendly gesture announcing the continuation of cordial diplomatic relations. Talk concerning Demetrius’ ambitions and his contacts with Romans had been making the rounds for two years in Macedon. Flamininus’ missive, if genuine, endeavored to soften those rumors, ascribe any indiscretions to Demetrius’ youth, and deny plans for a usurpation. Once again it was not the facts themselves but what was made of them which carried importance for Polybius and for the subsequent tradition. Perseus, whether motivated by legitimate fears or by cunning calculation, utilized (if he did not fabricate) the document for his own purposes. Philip was persuaded, and Demetrius perished. But the letter itself, of questionable authenticity and known only through Livy’s (at best) thirdhand résumé, can hardly be used to establish a case against Rome.

74 Polyb. 23.3.7–8. Livy’s denial of authenticity is generally assumed to be Polybian; e.g. Walbank, Philip V, 251; Meloni 52; Pedech 130; Errington, op.cit. (supra n.2) 288 n.28. Rightly cautious is Briscoe, op.cit. (supra n.2) 25.
75 Livy 40.55.6, 42.5.4; cf. Pedech 130 n.154.
Polybius, writing from the perspective of nearly two decades, assessed this affair as a component in the breakdown of Roman-Macedonian relations. But no such breakdown was apparent at the time. Rome registered no protest and displayed no concern about the death of Demetrius. And harmony prevailed even after Philip's death and the accession of Perseus in 179. The new king's envoys were courteously received in Rome, amicitia between the two powers was reaffirmed, and Perseus' right to the throne explicitly acknowledged. Perseus pursued the projects of his father in Thrace and in the north. An invasion by the Thracian prince Abrupolis was immediately repulsed and Abrupolis himself expelled from his kingdom. Not long thereafter, the king furthered Philip's policy of stirring up the Bastarnae to rid Macedon of the Dardanian menace. In this he found no hindrance from Rome, any more than Philip had. It was only six years later that Perseus' enemies would portray those actions as anti-Roman, only after Pydna that Macedonian detainees would antedate Perseus' hostility to a period before Philip's death, and only then that Polybius would begin to shape the pattern that dominates our tradition.

IV

Roman policy toward Macedon in this period is remarkable not for its aggressiveness but for its passivity. Philip's advances in the years immediately following Apamea stirred hardly a ripple in the Senate. It took the ardent appeals of various Greek states and especially of Eumenes to generate any response. Roman arbitrators announced decisions which pleased the protesters but were vague enough to leave Philip room to maneuver. The Senate found it more convenient to deliver pronouncements than to trouble about their implementation. Philip retained footholds in Greece and held on to the Thracian cities coveted by Eumenes. There were pro forma expressions of annoyance by Roman envoys; but the Senate pressed no inquiry, even after the massacre at Maronea and the mysterious death of the man held to be responsible. Philip's ventures in Thrace were ignored and his violations discounted. Two years after the first protests repre-
sentatives from Greece and Pergamum had to present them all over again. And this time the presence of Demetrius as intermediary defused the situation satisfactorily. Concessions by Philip undercut Eumenes' complaints, and Roman favor to Demetrius publicized good relations while deterring further Greek remonstrances. The king's subsequent projects went on without Roman obstruction, and the Senate relapsed into inertia.

The tragic fate of Demetrius could not have been foreseen. Tyche had her way—not the vengeful goddess imagined by Polybius but the capricious acts of Chance. Demetrius overplayed his rôle, and Perseus' anxieties magnified his brother's ambition. Rivalries in the Macedonian court were unwelcome to Philip but unimportant to Rome. Though Demetrius perished under a cloud, the Senate accorded to Perseus the same complaisance that had marked the last years of Philip. Rome's responsibility for the drama at Pella is neither attested by the sources nor consonant with the drift of Roman policy.79

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79 Professor T. J. Luce deserves credit for some illuminating suggestions on this paper, and no blame for remaining blunders.