Perdikkas and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War

Richard J. Hoffman

Much of the recent work on fifth-century Greece has centered on reevaluating the evidence relating to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.1 One important piece of evidence, however, has been consistently relegated to footnotes and appendices, viz., the inscription which records a treaty between Athens and Perdikkas of Macedon (IG I² 71). While the importance of the inscription has been recognized since its discovery, there has been a continuing controversy over its dating. It has been customary to place this particular alliance of Perdikkas and Athens either in the decade prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War or at the end of the Archidamian phase of that war. Neither of these periods is totally satisfactory. The present study proposes to show that the proper historical context for the treaty lies in the diplomatic moves of Perdikkas and Athens in the summer of 431 B.C., and as such, it illuminates Athenian and Macedonian activities in the years immediately preceding and following the outbreak of hostilities in the spring of 431.

I

Any discussion of the date of the Perdikkas treaty must begin with an examination of the text of the treaty itself. Such an examination must be undertaken cautiously, however, because great portions of the stone are missing, and only eight fragments remain. While the placement of these extant fragments vis-à-vis one another is no longer a problem,² there remains the question of how the missing portions

---


2 P. A. Davis, "Two Attic Decrees of the Fifth Century, II: The Alliance of Athens and Perdikkas II of Macedon in 422 B.C.," AJA 30 (1926) 179-88. Like Davis, I consider the now missing ninth fragment (IG I² 71 b) to belong to another decree.
of the inscription are to be restored. While many restorations have been proposed, these are difficult to accept for several reasons. In the first place, so much of the stone is missing, and so much variation exists in even the most elementary of fifth-century treaty formulae, that practically any clause or signatory can be inserted. As a result, proposed texts have lines ranging from 68 to 100 letter-spaces. Furthermore, the stonemason made so many mistakes in his execution of the text that the scholar, in his restoration, is faced with the impossible task of anticipating other such possible errors. Because of these difficulties, then, discussions of the inscription and its text are best drawn from the actual remains rather than from possible restorations, no matter how attractive they may be.

The text of the inscription consists of two decrees (lines 1-46 and 47-51) and a lengthy list of Macedonian signatories (lines 52-70). Despite the damaged condition of the first decree, it is possible to distinguish certain clauses. The beginning lines concern the dispatch of a five-man embassy to Perdikkas to receive his oath. There then follow (lines 13f) provisions for negotiating mutually acceptable changes in the treaty. Because of the fragmentary nature of the inscription it is not clear whether these changes could be made prior to, or after, the oath-taking. This ability to alter the terms of the alliance

---

8 This is not the place for a complete discussion of the epigraphic problems concerning the stone; these are dealt with in detail in my forthcoming article, "Epigraphic Notes on IG 11 71," CSCA 8 (1975). For various restorations and estimates of line length, see the following works: Davis, art.cit. (supra n.2); A. Wilhelm, "Fünf Beschlüsse der Athener," JOAI 21-22 (1922-24) 132; J. J. E. Hondius, Novae Inscriptiones Atticae (Leyden 1925) no.3; H. B. Mattingly, "Athenian Finance in the Peloponnesian War," BCH 92 (1968) 467-75; B. D. Meritt et al., The Athenian Tribute Lists III (Princeton 1953) 313 and n.61. D. Lewis, in IG 11 89 (the new number for the Perdikkas treaty), restores the line to 99 letters. A comparative examination of the above restored texts reveals the wide variety of clauses and signatories that are possible; note especially the work by Mattingly and Meritt: though only three letter-spaces apart in their restorations, they supply different signatories in the missing areas and, therefore, arrive at different dates for the inscription.

4 See, for example, lines 36 (an error in a formulaic expression); 12 and 28 (missing aspirates); 48 and 64 (three letters occupying two letter-spaces); and 36, 51, 68 and 70 (various uninscribed letter-spaces).

5 I am using my own text of the inscription which is drawn from my 1971 autopsy of the stone. A reliable text can be found in H. Bengtson, Die Staatsverträge des Altertums II (Munich and Berlin 1962) no.186. I would like to thank David Lewis for showing me a copy of the text as it will appear in the third edition of Inscriptiones Graecae and Charles Edson for lending me his unpublished notes on the stone. For other general discussions of the terms of the treaty, see Davis, art.cit. (supra n.2); Meiggs, op.cit. (supra n.1) 428-30; and A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides III (Oxford 1956) 621.
was by no means a universal provision in all treaties, and is a partial indication of the importance of this particular treaty. Athens seemed anxious to secure a treaty that was satisfactory to both the Macedonians and the Athenians.

The reason behind the Athenian desire for the satisfaction and cooperation of Perdikkas is revealed in the next several clauses. First, Athens’ interest in the success of the alliance can be seen in the scope of the treaty. There is a partial list of those who are to be a party to the treaty, a list which includes not only Perdikkas but also his children and various other vassal kings (lines 18 and 27). This was not to be a treaty with only one or two minor Macedonian monarchs but one with all who might hold power in that area of the world. This alliance appears to be part of an effort to solidify the northwest Aegean behind Athens. Second, Athens’ interests can also be identified in the remains of the oath itself. The Macedonian kings promise to have the same friends and enemies as the Athenians (line 20), to support the treaty “in good faith,” and to aid the Athenian demes “with all possible strength” (lines 21–22). More importantly, however, the Macedonians swear to sell timber only to Athens (line 23). This exclusive right to Macedonian wood is undoubtedly the single most important clause of the treaty. Not only was Athens hoping to receive military support from the north Aegean but also to secure sources for crucial raw materials at the same time.

The oath of the Athenians to Perdikkas, his children and “the kings with Perdikkas” is equally revealing. Of this oath, only two clauses are clear: the Athenians promise not to attack any city which is under the control of Perdikkas (line 31): and they swear to continue the treaty with Perdikkas’ children (lines 32f). As Davis notes, “neither of these [clauses] is an extraordinary concession on the part of the Athenians; they are swearing like men who have the upper hand.”

The apparent benefits of the treaty to both Athens and Perdikkas should be noted. For Athens the restrictions were few and the rewards many. She received the exclusive right to Macedonian wood and created an alliance system in the northwest Aegean with a double potential: these allies could act as a cordon sanitaire between Athenian

6 While the oath is fragmentary, this appears to be the substance of it. For similar phraseology, see Tod no.101 (line 6), no.102 (lines 6 and 9), and no.158 (line 5).
7 Note Tod no.136, lines 10 and 11.
8 Davis, art.cit. (supra n.2) 184.
possessions on the Thracian coast and the rest of Greece, as well as suppliers of troops and material for Athenian ventures. Perdikkas also gained from the treaty. Two major problems faced any Macedonian who ruled over all of the petty kings and princes of Macedon: internal turmoil and external interference. Both problems were ameliorated somewhat by the Athenian promise to maintain the alliance with Perdikkas' children and with the Athenian recognition of the Macedonian status quo around the Thermaic Gulf.

The second decree begins after provisions have been made for sending ambassadors and for the erection of a stele to record the treaty. The new decree was made on the motion of the strategoi. While the precise terms of the addendum are lost to us, its general purpose appears to be to ally Arrabaios and Perdikkas, and then to include Arrabaios in the trade agreement with Perdikkas and Athens. The importance of the addendum should not be minimized. On the one hand, the raw materials of upper Macedonia were to be made available to Athens via the trade route through Perdikkas' realm. Lyncestis was not yet under the aegis of the kings of Pella; thus, a separate decree was necessary from the Athenian point of view in order to gain unhindered access to Lyncestian wood. On the other hand, the decree was important for Perdikkas as well, in that it made his northwest frontier secure, an action which is analogous to his moves in securing the eastern frontier with Thrace in 431 and 429 (Thuc. 2.29 and 101).

The last portion of the inscription indicates the seriousness and importance of the document. At this point, there is appended a long list of signatories. This list, beginning in line 52, runs for a minimum of ten lines. Most of it comprises the names of nobles; but also present are the names of members of the immediate royal family—Perdikkas, his children, his brothers and their children—as well as those of hostile petty kings (line 61). The list of signatories, therefore, indicates not only that all of Macedonia formed a solid north which was allied to Athens but also that Perdikkas was at peace with his brothers and the local dynasts.

The treaty recorded on these stones marked a high point in Athenian-Macedonian relations. The problem has always been,
II

The search for such a context is aided by the fact that two dominating factors play a continuous rôle in Athenian and Macedonian diplomacy from Alexander I to Alexander III. One factor is the inner stability of Macedon itself. The position of Macedonian kings, like that of Perdikkas, was a tenuous one. Power in Macedonia was shared by the king with relatives who had dominion over large tracts of land and with the many vassal kings scattered throughout the realm.\(^{10}\) As a result, the king of all the Macedonians had to contend with assassination attempts and with revolts from lesser kings.\(^{11}\) From the point of view of the monarch, this situation meant that it was to his advantage to be on good terms with neighboring powers, like Athens, since they could tilt the balance of power against him. From the point of view of Athens, the potential inner chaos in Macedonia was a weapon which could be used to weaken the king or to convince him of the error of his ways.\(^ {12}\) The other factor is geographical. Both Athens and Macedon had interests in the same areas: the Thermaic Gulf and the Strymon Valley.\(^{13}\) Activity by either power in these areas often brought a change in the foreign policy of the other. These two factors, one political, the other geographical, help to explain the motivations behind the diplomatic moves of both the Athenians and Perdikkas in the period prior to the Archidamian War as well as after the War had begun.

The authors of ATL have suggested that the treaty recorded in the inscription was concluded around 435.\(^ {14}\) Thucydides states (1.57) that

\(^{10}\) For the 'feudal' nature of the Macedonian realm, see Edson, op.cit. (supra n.9) 29–32; and J. W. Cole, "Perdiccas and Athens," Phoenix 28 (1974) 56–57. See too, Thuc. 2.99.1–2 and IG I* 71, lines 27 and 52ff.

\(^{11}\) See Curt. 6.11.26; Arist. Pol. 1311b; Diod. 12.50.4–6, 14.89, 14.92.3 and 16.94.3–4; Thuc. 1.57 and 2.100.3; and Tod no.111.

\(^{12}\) Edson, op.cit. (supra n.9) 32–36 and 42–43. Note Thuc. 1.57; Diod. 16.2.4–6; and Tod no.157.

\(^{13}\) The rival interests of Macedon and Athens in these areas need hardly be noted. See, for example, Hdt. 8.137–139; Just. Epit. 7.1; Thuc. 1.137.2 and 2.99; Diod. 16.3 and 8; Tod no.150 (plus commentary); D. Raymond, Macedonian Royal Coinage to 413 B.C. (ANSPNNM 126, New York 1953) 118–21; A. Momigliano, Filippo il Macedone (Florence 1934) 11–12; P. Cloché, Histoire de la Macédoine (Paris 1960) 54–55; Edson, op.cit. (supra n.9) passim; Meiggs–Lewis no.65.

\(^{14}\) Meritt, loc.cit. (supra n.3). Their restorations can also be found in G. F. Hill, Sources for Greek History (Oxford 1966) B 66; and SEG 12.16.
Perdikkas and Athens had formerly (προτερον) been allies and friends when they went to war in 432. A likely date for this alliance was the middle of the same decade, a time when the authors of ATL think that the tribute lists indicated a period of rapprochement between Macedon and Athens. The reason for reassigning IG 12 71 to that date and to that treaty is that they restored the missing name of Perdikkas' brother, Philip, to the inscription. Since Philip was dead by 423/2, the date normally assigned to the treaty, an earlier date had to be found. That date was suggested by Thucydides and the tribute lists. Epigraphic considerations aside, however, 435 has little to recommend itself: the period after 445 is one of ever-increasing tensions between Athens and Macedonia, not one of rapprochement. A closer look at the evidence is in order.

The earliest treaty between Perdikkas and Athens should probably be placed around 454, at the beginning of Perdikkas' reign. The new monarch inherited his kingdom as a result of the assassination of his father, Alexander I, and spent much of his early years attempting to consolidate his regal position. As a result of the political instability with Macedonia, Perdikkas needed the neutrality, if not friendship, of neighboring powers if he was to survive on the throne. Furthermore, it seems likely that Perdikkas was favorably predisposed towards Athens at his accession. Not only had both he and his father been honored by Athens before the latter's death, but at the time of the assassination itself, the royal house was on good terms with the Athenians.

Evidence for the years following Perdikkas' accession is meagre. What does remain, however, seems to indicate a continuation of good relations. First, the coinage of the Macedonian king in these years is of Attic weight. This is usually a sign of favorable relations between the two powers. Second, in 446/5 Perdikkas came to a mutually profit-

15 See p.360 and n.3 supra. For critiques of the ATL dating see Mattingly, BCH 92 (1968) 467–75, and "The Athenian Coinage Decree," Historia 10 (1961) 168; Gomme, loc.cit. (supra n.5); Cole, art.cit. (supra n.10) 60–61; Meiggs, op.cit. (supra n.1) 429; and I. Papastavrou, "The Foreign Policy of Perdikkas II during the Archidamian War," Hellenika 15 (1957) 259.

16 Mar.Par. 58; Raymond, op.cit. (supra n.13) 136–66, provides numismatic evidence to support the immediate succession of Perdikkas. F. Geyer argues against this view (RE 19 [1937] 591), but is successfully refuted by Cole, art.cit. (supra n.10) 55–57. Also see Papastavrou, art.cit. (supra n.15) 257, and Gomme, op.cit. (supra n.5) I 200–19. For Perdikkas' efforts at consolidation, see Curt. 6.11.26 and Pl. Gorg. 471.

17 Hdt. 8.136.1; Plut. Kim. 14; Ps.-Dem. 13.23–24; Raymond, op.cit. (supra n.13) 109–21.

18 See Raymond, op.cit. (supra n.13) passim.
able agreement with Perikles over the fate of the Hestiaians. Good relations between the two powers did not last much past 445, however.

For reasons which are not entirely clear, the relations between Perdikkas and Athens began to deteriorate after 445. The first hint of the change comes from Perdikkas. Shortly after the middle of the decade, in addition to striking coins of Attic weight he began to strike so-called ‘tribal’ coins. It has been suggested that this partial reversion to ‘tribal’ coinage is a part of a program to disrupt the Athenian empire in the north Aegean. Any disruption, however, was minimal at this time. Methone is absent from the tribute lists of 443/2 and may very well have been under the control of Perdikkas. Two other cities, Gale and Chedrolos, which had paid in the past, are missing from the list as well. Whether their absence is due to Perdikkas cannot be said, though it is not unlikely: they will be among the other cities which leave the Athenian league under Macedonian encouragement in 432/1. At the most, the evidence indicates that the king of the Macedonians is attempting to extend his power in a modest way while Athens was occupied elsewhere. It would, however, be a mistake to go too far. Suffice it to say that the evidence shows some change in Macedonian policy towards Athens, and, as a result, it is a harbinger of things to come.

At the same time that Perdikkas changed his attitude towards Athens, Athens began to change her attitude towards the Delian League. The series of crises after the Peace of Kallias resulted in policies to tighten Athenian control over the League. Some of these policies proved to be inimical to Macedonian interests. The various rubrics on the tribute lists after 439 indicate Athenian efforts to improve both membership and tribute collection. Here, however, there is some indication that Athens was open to compromise with Macedon. In spite of any compromise over the payment of tribute,
other rubrics show an increasing tension in the area: some cities were now paying tribute in order to receive Athenian protection from a hostile Perdikkas. 24 The source of this hostility is traceable to other Athenian policies, policies in which there could be no compromise. In order to maintain her interests in the north Aegean more effectively, Athens established two new colonies, Brea and Amphipolis. 25 The more important of the two was Amphipolis, whose value to any power need hardly be stressed. For Athens it meant access to natural resources like silver and timber; it meant control of trade routes north to the Bulgarian plain, west to Macedonia and east to Byzantium; and it meant a powerful military base for protecting allies and for enforcing the payment of tribute.

The reaction of Perdikkas to the foundation of Amphipolis in 437 was one of anger. Though he was not willing to break with Athens completely, he did show his hostility numismatically. 26 From 437/6 to 432/1 most of the coins produced in Perdikkas' mint were of a non-Attic weight. Perdikkas then seems to have used this coinage to counteract Athenian influence west of the Strymon by the cultivation of good relations with Olynthos. Not only do 32 per cent of the extant coins of this series come from Olynthos, but no Macedonian coins of Attic weight were found at Olynthos at all. It is no wonder, then, that many cities in the north Aegean were anxious about their safety.

The trend of the years after 439 is clear. The activities surrounding the extension of Athenian authority over the north Aegean could only serve to antagonize Perdikkas. The situation became irreversible with the founding of Amphipolis in 437. The 430's, then, do not mark a period of détente between Athens and Perdikkas; rather, they were one of increasing hostility, culminating in war in 432.


24 Meiggs, op.cit. (supra n.1) 250.
25 For Brea, see IG I* 45 (Meiggs-Lewis no.49, plus commentary); A. G. Woodhead, “The Site of Brea,” CQ 2 (1952) 60-61; H. B. Mattingly, “The Foundation of Brea,” CQ 16 (1966) 172-92; Edson, CP 42 (1947) 100-04; and Meritt, op.cit. (supra n.3) III 286ff. For Amphipolis, see Thuc. 4.102 and 108; Dio. 12.32.3; and Meiggs, op.cit. (supra n.1) 195.
26 For the reaction of Alexander I to Athens' attempts at Ennea Hodoi, see Raymond, op.cit. (supra n.13) 118-21; Momigliano, op.cit. (supra n.13) 11-12; and Cloché, op.cit. (supra n.13) 54-55. For the adverse reaction of Perdikkas, see Raymond, 157-61; Papastavrou, art.cit. (supra n.15) 259; and Edson, CP 42 (1947) 94-95.
While it is unlikely that any treaty was concluded after the founding of Amphipolis, it is even more unlikely that a treaty such as IG I² 71 could have been concluded at that time. The terms of the inscribed treaty are out of place in the context of 435. The main difficulty concerns the Macedonian promise to sell timber to no one else but Athens. This would probably have meant great financial loss to Macedonia. Since Athens had unlimited access to wood from the Chalkidike and Amphipolis, she hardly needed, or could use, the wood of Macedonia as well. For Perdikkas to bind himself so rigidly to a power which he feared and disliked is incredible. The Macedonian king could conceivably use that very wood to annoy the Athenians. There are only two conditions under which Athens could have successfully put in such a clause: either the strength of Athens was so great, and the desire by Perdikkas for a treaty equally great, that Athens could dictate whatever terms she wanted; or the urgency of a wartime situation allowed Athens to so restrict the trade in wood of her actual and potential allies. Neither of these conditions prevailed in 435.

III

It is the Peloponnesian War itself which provides the basic precondition for such terms as are found in the Perdikkas–Athenian alliance. The date most often proposed by scholars is 423/2—the year of Perdikkas’ disenchantment with Brasidas. This date does answer many of the objections put forward concerning 435. In 423/2 Perdikkas was anxious for a treaty; Athens was at war, and since she had lost Amphipolis, she was doubly in need of timber (Thuc. 4.106); and

87 See Legon, op.cit. (supra n.1) 165.

88 The importance of a wartime situation for this clause is argued by Bengtson, op.cit. (supra n.5) no.186, and others; see Meiggs, op.cit. (supra n.1) 429; and Cole, op.cit. (supra n.10) 60–61. Macedonia, in one of her strong periods, heavily restricted Chalkidic exports of wood during peacetime; it should be noted, however, that Macedonia was not only stronger than the Chalkidic League at this time, but also that exports to places other than Macedonia were not totally forbidden (Tod no.111).

89 Meiggs, op.cit. (supra n.1) 428–30; Gomme, op.cit. (supra n.5) III 621; Ste. Croix, op.cit. (supra n.1) 317; Davis, op.cit. (supra n.2) 179–80; Cole, op.cit. (supra n.10) 61; Mattingly, op.cit. (supra n.3) 467–75. Papastavrou, art.cit. (supra n.15) 259 and 262, argues that Thucydides speaks of the arrangement in 423/2 as a ὁμολογία rather than as a συμμαχία, thus negating the possibility of that date for the inscription; he prefers to date it to the second year of the war (262). Edson, op.cit. (supra n.9) 35, prefers a date closer to 413; he argues this on the basis of Amyntas’ friendship with and aid towards Athens. He thinks that Thuc. 7.9 bespeaks the treaty recorded in the inscription (see the forthcoming IG I² 89).
Athens desired to seal off the north Aegean by placing Macedonia and Macedonia's Thessalian allies in the way of any further expeditions to the Thraceward area. As further evidence, some have argued that the stonemason who inscribed the stele is clearly of this date.  

There are, however, certain difficulties with this date as well. The arguments in favor of this date vary, but one factor links them all: the presence of the name of Arrabaios in Thucydides (4.124–32) and in the inscription (lines 47–49 and 59). Arrabaios is, of course, the subject of the second decree, as well as a signatory of the entire treaty. One should not, however, exaggerate the presence of Arrabaios' name in the inscription, for there is no indication in Thucydides that Perdikkas was reconciled with Arrabaios in 423/2, or that he even had any intention of doing so.  

The mere presence of the name on the stone, therefore, does little to help us in ascertaining the date of the inscription.

There are other problems as well. In spite of the fact that it was Perdikkas who had approached the Athenians for an alliance, he clearly had the upper hand in 423. He did not need the treaty, whereas Athens did. Perdikkas was motivated to make an alliance with Athens, it would appear, out of revenge towards Brasidas (Thuc. 4.132), though the Macedonian monarch may also have harbored some hope for Athenian assistance against Arrabaios. Athens, however, was in desperate need of such a treaty: a major source of timber had vanished with the loss of Amphipolis and other cities in the Thraceward area, and the Spartans were in the process of sending up reinforcements under Ischagoras. Yet the only concession wrung from the Athenians was that they would not attack any Macedonian city. This was a rather hollow concession, in that Athens had not attacked any Macedonian city since 432. Considering the needs of the Athenians and the position of Perdikkas, one would have expected more concessions in favor of Macedonia. If the treaty is to be assigned to this date, then it must be observed that the only benefit which

---

80 Mattingly argues for a similarity of hands between IG 11* 71 and other inscriptions which he dates to 423/2; see, for example, "The Growth of Athenian Imperialism," Historia 12 (1963) 267; "Epigraphically the Twenties are too Late...", BSA 65 (1970) 142; BCH 92 (1968) 467; and Historia 10 (1961) 168. Because of the unscientific nature of Mattingly's evidence, I have not commented on it. For critiques of the methods occasionally employed by Mattingly and others, see W. K. Pritchett, "Kallias: Fact or Fancy," CSCA 4 (1971) 225; and Pritchett and Higgen, "Engraving Techniques in Attic Epigraphy," AJA 69 (1965) 367–71; and Meiggs, op.cit. (supra n.1) 520–22.

81 Thuc. 4.124–28. This was also observed by Papastavrou, art.cit. (supra n.15) 262.
Perdikkas received was the pleasure of harassing Sparta; and to enjoy that pleasure he did not need a restrictive treaty with Athens. Thus, while 423/2 is a better date than 435, IG I² 71 does not seem to fit there either. We must return to where we left Athens and Macedonia in the 430's to find the best historical context for the inscription.

IV

As will be recalled, Perdikkas had been less than pleased with the Athenian foundation of Amphipolis. In order to neutralize this Macedonian hostility, Athens broke her old treaty with Perdikkas and allied herself with two rebel kings, Derdas and Philip. Athens could hope to keep Macedonia weak for many years to come by such a tactic. Not being satisfied with a provocative policy in the north Aegean, Athens played a most dangerous game of diplomatic brinkmanship with Corinth in the conclusion of an alliance with Corcyra. Whatever Athens' intention had been in striking this alliance, the result was significant: the battle of Sybota and extreme Corinthian hostility. Perdikkas took advantage of this situation and sent ambassadors to Corinth and Sparta. He had already been in contact with the tribes on his borders and with Athenian allies in the Chalkidike. Perdikkas wanted as much as possible a united kingdom and close ties with his neighbors, for only in this way could he hope to thwart the efforts of Philip, Derdas and Athens in Macedonia. To aid him in his efforts he wanted Sparta to distract Athens by attacking Attica, and he wanted Corinth actively to support a possible revolt of Potidaia (Thuc. 1.57). These critical events took place in late August or early September 433.

The situation in the Greek world continued to deteriorate into the winter of 433/2. Athens, rightly fearing an active Macedonian–Corinthian intrigue in the Chalkidike, demanded that Potidaia pull down her walls, send hostages to Athens, banish her Corinthian magistrates


33 See Sealey, art.cit. (supra n.1) 100; Ste. Croix, op.cit. (supra n.1) 64–85; and Meiggs, op.cit. (supra n.1) 199–200.

34 Thuc. 1.31–57. See Ste. Croix, op.cit. (supra n.1) 318–19; and Meiggs, loc.cit. (supra n.1).
and refuse to receive new magistrates from Corinth. With the stage set in this manner, Athens and Perdikkas went to war in 432. The Athenians prepared to send Archestratos with thirty ships and 1,000 hoplites on a twofold mission to the north Aegean: (1) to prevent revolt in the area by implementing the Athenian demands on Potidaia, then utilizing Potidaia as a base for watching the other cities (Thuc. 1.57.6); and (2) to attack Perdikkas, thus removing another source for revolt among the Chalkidic cities (Thuc. 1.59.2).

In an attempt to stop the expeditionary force of Archestratos, Potidaia sent an embassy to Athens. As a safeguard, embassies were sent to Corinth and Sparta as well. Potidaia's diplomatic mission, however, was a failure. This failure encouraged Perdikkas to persuade the Chalkidians to revolt from Athens and to form a league centered around Olynthos. Those who left their cities would be offered land belonging to Perdikkas. The results of this policy can be seen in the large number of absentees from the tribute lists for 432/1. This immediate revolt of the cities in the north complicated Archestratos' mission: he had only enough troops to make war on one set of enemies at a time. It had been hoped that he would reach the north Aegean before any revolt could take place, and thus he could concentrate his martial energies on Macedonia (Thuc. 1.59).

The Athenians invaded the western portion of the Thermaic Gulf, and simultaneously Philip and the brothers of Derdas invaded from upper Macedonia. The results were fairly successful for the Athenians: they managed to seize Therme and began to lay siege to Pydna. While reinforcements came from Athens under the command of Kallias, a force of volunteers had also been sent by Corinth to Potidaia. This new situation in the Chalkidike forced the Athenians to reconside their priorities: should they continue to lay siege to Pydna, or should they immediately attack Potidaia? It was decided that it would be best to end their support for the rival princes and to use

---

35 Thuc. 1.56 and Diod. 12.34; also see Sealey, _art.cit._ (supra n.1) 98–99.
36 See Meritt, _op.cit._ (supra n.3) III 320–22; and _Athenian Financial Documents of the Fifth Century_ (Ann Arbor 1932) no.80 (expenses for 432/1) and 58 and 68–69.
37 On the founding of the Chalkidic League, see P. A. Clement, "The Beginning of Coinage by the Olynthian Chalkidians," _James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science_ 46 (1964) 28–33. The Macedonian policy of strengthening Olynthos and fostering the Chalkidic League did not always work out to the advantage of Macedonia; see Tod nos. 111, 119 and 158.
38 See Hill, _op.cit._ (supra n.14) 411–15; Ste. Croix, _op.cit._ (supra n.1) 80; Meiggs, _op.cit._ (supra n.1) 527.
these princes—including Perdikkas—in the battle against Potidaia (Thuc. 1.61). This second treaty between the Athenians and the Macedonians having been made, the troops were moved to the Chalkidike. While Philip remained true to Athens, Perdikkas broke the alliance almost immediately and struck an alliance with Potidaia. He himself remained in Macedonia, stationing his cavalry at Olynthos under the command of Iolos (Thuc. 1.61–62).

Several points are to be noted here. First, from the Athenian point of view, when Athens' territories were threatened by members of the Peloponnesian League, Athens was perfectly willing to patch up differences with Perdikkas in order to have him on her side. This occasionally might mean that Athens would help to end any inner Macedonian conflict, thus strengthening the hand of Perdikkas politically and militarily. Second, from Perdikkas' point of view, he too was not beyond reconciliation, especially if he were threatened by rebellious princes. By what means Athens managed to reconcile the feuding Macedonian princes in that year remains a mystery, though this ability to do so would be used again the following year.

The armed hostilities during the summers of 433 and 432 were localized, but in the spring of 431 general war broke out. Whatever had been the intent of Athens in allying with Corcyra, events had spiraled into the outbreak of war. As a result, Athens made a series of strategic decisions: retirement behind the Long Walls, the periplous of the Peloponnes, the resettlement of Aegina, and naval manoeuvres off of Lokris and Euboia (Thuc. 2.22, 23, 26–27). A policy also had to be made in order to protect Athenian interests in the north Aegean against possible attack.

The key to Athens' north Aegean policy was Macedonia. Either this kingdom was to be an ally or it had to be effectively neutralized so as to render it useless to Sparta and her allies. Because Perdikkas had broken the alliance of 432 with such haste, the Athenians at first looked to the second alternative. The plan adopted was similar to that which Athens had previously used against Perdikkas, viz., support for dissident and neighboring kings so as to distract and weaken the basileus of the Macedonians. This was not lost on Philip, the chief contender against Perdikkas. He not only engaged Athenian help but he also engaged the help of Sitalkes, the king of Thrace (Thuc. 2.95.2).

39 Athens used this same diplomatic policy in the fourth century as well: see Tod nos. 157 and 159.
Athens also desired the aid of Sitalkes to weaken Perdikkas and to watch over Athenian towns on the Thracian coast (Thuc. 2.29).

The new instrument of Athenian diplomacy with Thrace at the beginning of the new year (431/0) was a former enemy, Nymphodoros. Nymphodoros, an inhabitant of Abdera, a city faithful to Athens, was made a proxenos because his sister was the wife of Sitalkes and because he himself possessed great influence with the Thracian king (Thuc. 2.28-29). The Athenian proxenos arranged a treaty whereby Sitalkes would aid Athens by supplying cavalry and peltasts. To help solidify the pact, Sitalkes’ son, Sadokos, was made an Athenian citizen (Thuc. 2.29.4-5). Undoubtedly Sitalkes was to continue to support Philip as well. Since Perdikkas would not be able to support the Chalkidic states while being occupied with Philip and the Thracian king, Perdikkas would be where Athens wanted him: weak and busy. Athens could then employ her men and ships in other areas.

Perdikkas, however, must have been horrified at the prospect of the Thracian-Athenian alliance. His subsequent actions allowed Athens to return to her first policy: a strong, allied Macedonia was safer and more advantageous than a weak but hostile Macedonia. Immediately Perdikkas tried to make a reconciliation with Athens and Sitalkes. Sitalkes for his part promised to bring about the reconciliation of Athens and Perdikkas, and he vowed that he would not continue his support of Philip. Thucydides does not record what Perdikkas promised to do or to give Sitalkes in return (2.95). The agent of the reconciliation between Perdikkas and Athens was the brother-in-law of Sitalkes, Nymphodoros. Significantly, for Macedonian support in Athenian efforts, Athens promised to return Therme to Perdikkas. With the conclusion of this triple entente, Perdikkas and Sitalkes joined Phormio against the Chalkidic states (Thuc. 2.29.6-7).

It is in this context that IG I2 71 should occur. Athens very much needed a treaty such as the one recorded on that stone, as did Perdikkas. If the treaty recorded on this particular inscription did not occur in 431, then one very similar to it must have. With the outbreak of the war, Athens would be very interested in securing some sort of lasting peace with Macedonia. This fits the spirit of the first portion of the stone: in order to make sure that Perdikkas was satisfied with the treaty, there were provisions for altering the terms of the alliance (lines 13-16). The restriction on the sale of timber also fits the context of the summer of 431. Not only would Athens want as much timber
as possible but she would want to keep it out of the hands of the Peloponnesians as well.\textsuperscript{40} Athens, for her part, promised not to attack any Macedonian city, a promise extended to the heirs of Perdikkas. This clause brings to mind the capture of Therme and the siege of Pydna in 432. The subsequent return of Therme was a product of the general negotiations of Nymphodoros. Thus the two oaths fit the conditions of 431 very well.

The addendum to the treaty also fits the conditions of 431. Perdikkas had brought about peaceful relations with the petty kings in his own realm and with his immediate neighbors, Athens and Thrace (lines 52ff and Thuc. 2.95.1–2). His southern frontier was protected because of his friendship with Larissa and with Athens, the latter having many friends among the Thessalians (Thuc. 4.78). To complete his security, it is not unreasonable to assume that it was he who suggested to the strategoi that Arrabaios be included in the treaty. Since Athens, too, would gain by such an inclusion, the king of the Lyncestian Macedonians was made the subject of the second decree.\textsuperscript{41}

Finally, there is the long list of signatories. The peace and unity of the Macedonian realm was important for Athens: northern allies could help in the struggle against the Chalkidic states, and a solid Macedonia could prevent movements of Spartan troops into the Thraceward region. In both instances this meant that Athens could deploy her troops elsewhere. Acting accordingly, the Athenians removed their troops from the Chalkidike by 429 (Thuc. 2.79), only to leave their allies defenseless when Perdikkas broke the treaty in 424 (Thuc. 4.79 and 108.6).

\section{V}

The treaty of 431 did not, of course, solve all of the problems between Athens and Macedonia. Events of the recent past were not easily forgotten by either side. Yet in spite of the suspicion and

\textsuperscript{40} For the importance of wood from the north Aegean, see Andoc. 2.11; Hermippos, \textit{Phormophori} fr.63.8. Also see Legon, \textit{art.cit.} (supra n.1) 161–71; and Meiggs, \textit{op.cit.} (supra n.1) 308.

\textsuperscript{41} There is nothing in the remains of \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{a} 71 that suggests that Perdikkas and Arrabaios were in a state of war. Macedonian relations with Lyncestis, like those with Thrace, would never be entirely successful, though Philip II did incorporate that part of Macedonia into his realm. See Diod. 16.4; \textit{CAH} VI 205; E. Badian, “The Death of Philip II,” \textit{Phoenix} 17 (1963) 248–49; J. R. Hamilton, “Alexander’s Early Life,” \textit{G&R} 12 (1965) 122.
mistrust present in the years immediately following 431, neither party was willing to set aside this important treaty.

Indications of the mutual mistrust between the Athenians and Perdikkas can be found in 430 and 429/8. Perdikkas appears to have been absent from the Chalkidike in these years, for he is not mentioned in connection with Hagnon's expedition in the summer of 430 (Thuc. 2.58), the Athenian victory at Potidaia in the winter of 430/29 (Thuc. 2.70), or the Athenian defeat north of Olynthos in the summer of 429 (Thuc. 2.79). This absence of the Macedonian king was linked to probable hostile designs on his part. At the time same that Xenophon and his colleagues were engaged in the Chalkidike in 429, Perdikkas, so Thucydides reports (2.80), was in collusion with the Spartans. They were conducting military operations in Acarnania near Stratos. Joining with the Spartans were various tribes north of Stratos, including the Orestian Macedonians (Thuc. 2.80.6). While the Spartan efforts were a failure, Perdikkas was accused of secretly having sent 1,000 Macedonians to aid in the operations (Thuc. 2.80.7). The troops, however, arrived too late to take part in any battle. One should, I think, question the factual nature of Perdikkas' rôle in this episode. The Athenians were undoubtedly angry over their defeat in the Chalkidike, a defeat which in part could be blamed on the lack of support by her Macedonian ally. While in the previous year the outbreak of the plague could explain the lack of Macedonian aid (Thuc. 2.58), there was no plague in 429. The presence of the Orestian Macedonians, however, supplied the basis of an explanation for the failure of any Macedonian aid in the Chalkidike, viz., Perdikkas too must have been involved at Stratos, though nothing could be proved. Thus there arose rumors of secret troop movements, but movements which were conveniently tardy. I suggest that these movements did not take place at all but were put forward as an explanation for what had happened in the Chalkidike. The entire incident is an indication of the state of mistrust between the two powers, rather than of a possible collapse of the treaty of 431.42

Athens repayed Perdikkas for his lack of support by playing a passive rôle in the dispute between Sitalkes and the Macedonian king.

42 This suspicion is reflected in Hermippos' play, Pharmamphoroi (fr.63.8). Hermippos claims that instead of wood, Athens receives lies from Perdikkas. The precise date of the play is not known; see Gomme, op.cit. (supra n.5) II 215, and A. Körte, RE 8 (1912) 845 s.v. Hermippos 5.
In the winter of 429/8 Sitalkes planned two separate, though related, campaigns. First, he planned to attack Perdikkas and replace him with Amyntas, the Macedonian king’s nephew. The avowed reason behind this move was that Sitalkes felt that Perdikkas had not lived up to their mutual agreement of 431 (Thuc. 2.95.1–2). Second, the Thracian king also decided to give aid to the Athenians in the Chalkidike, as he had promised in 431. It is important to note that the attack on Perdikkas had nothing to do with how the Athenians felt about the Macedonians: his attack was made out of personal motives, as a type of vendetta. The two campaigns are linked, however, by another motive of the Thracian king. Sitalkes desired to replace the suzerainty of Perdikkas over the entire area with his own (Thuc. 2.101). Sitalkes was unsuccessful in both expeditions (Thuc. 2.101.5).

The rôle of Athens in the invasion of Sitalkes is not entirely clear. Present at the court of the king were Amyntas, an Athenian embassy and Hagnon. The nephew of Perdikkas seems to have been there as a political exile from Macedon and was probably encouraging Sitalkes to dethrone Perdikkas. Hagnon, apparently an adviser of Sitalkes, also must have encouraged the Thracian king to attack Perdikkas. The purpose of the embassy, however, was to attempt to get Thracian aid for the war in the Chalkidike, though the problem of Perdikkas was undoubtedly discussed as well (Thuc. 2.95.3). To show Athenian support for Sitalkes the ambassadors brought gifts and promises of military aid (Thuc. 2.95.3 and 101.1). From the events that followed, however, it appears that the embassy—perhaps because of the influence of Hagnon—exceeded its authority. Sitalkes received no support, militarily or otherwise, from Athens or any of her northern allies. The king was justifiably baffled by this lack of response and was forced to retire because of a lack of supplies. Thucydides maintains that Athens did not think that Sitalkes would attack (Thuc. 2.101.1). This excuse for the lack of Athenian aid rings hollow when it is recalled that Athens had thirty days in which to respond in some form. Instead, Athens sat on the side lines, precisely as Macedonia had done in the campaigns of 430 and 429. While the Athenians must have enjoyed Perdikkas’ discomfiture, they had no desire to scrap the treaty of 431 if they could help it.

This willingness to maintain the alliance of 431 can be seen in a more positive area as well. Methone, like Amphipolis, was a constant

---

43 Gomme op cit. (supra n.5) II 241.
source of contention between Athens and Perdikkas. While the rights of Athens and her allies had to be protected, Athens had no desire to go to war with Perdikkas over Methone. Hence a series of diplomatic missions concerning Methone were inaugurated by Athens in order to settle differences with Perdikkas. Several of these missions are recorded in a group of decrees which were published by Athens in 423. The first decree, probably passed in the late summer of 430, attempted to resolve a dispute over Methone's freedom of movement and Perdikkas' troop activity in Methone's territory. The two parties in the dispute were asked to send ambassadors to Athens if no accommodations could be made. Lines 27-29 of the inscription indicate, as has been noted elsewhere, the atmosphere of suspicion in that year: Perdikkas was reminded of the Athenian troops at Potidaia. The second decree, passed in 426/5, also concerns further diplomatic discussions among Athens, Methone and Macedon. The third decree, and possibly a fourth, may also have been passed before the publication of the entire series. The decrees show a continuous policy on the part of Athens to work out problems with Perdikkas through diplomatic rather than military means. The success of this policy can be seen in the security which Athens felt in the north Aegean: there appear to have been no garrisons west of the Strymon.

VI

An examination of the evidence preceding and following the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War suggests that the most plausible historical context for IG I² 71 is the first year of the Archidamian phase of the war. Of the other dates put forward, 435 appears to be the least likely. Not only is there no solid evidence for a treaty's being concluded at that time but there is every indication of increasing hostility, hostility which ended in open war in 432. It is more difficult to eliminate 423: Thucydides does record a treaty for that year, though, he

44 For a text of the Methone decrees, see Meiggs-Lewis no.65 (plus commentary). I have followed their interpretation of the text and their solution to the chronological difficulties. For these and other inscriptions concerning Methone in this period, see Meiggs, op.cit. (supra n.1) 534–35. Ste. Croix, op.cit. (supra n.1) 42, sees the Methone decrees in a negative light. It should be noted, however, that any settlements were to come through negotiation (see Meiggs-Lewis no.65, lines 16ff).

maintains, Perdikkas had no intention of keeping it (Thuc. 5.80). Certain factors do, however, make 423 less likely than 431. The Athenian desire to have a treaty which was acceptable to Perdikkas, the restrictions on the wood trade, the concession to leave Macedonian cities alone, the decree concerning Arrabaios, and the impressive list of signatories strike a note closer to the events and diplomatic moves of 431 rather than to those of 423. In 423 Athens simply was not in a position to bargain as she had been earlier. Furthermore, Athens' and Macedon's actions between 431 and 424 show a willingness and a desire to maintain the treaty. When Perdikkas broke the treaty, it was out of a desire to use Spartan armies to extend his kingdom. When this failed, he renegotiated the treaty. That Athens wished this alliance in 423/2 is no mystery: she needed to restore that unity which Nymphodoros had created in the summer of 431. Absolute proof is, of course, impossible. Given a choice of the various dates which are possible, however, the best historical context is provided by 431.

SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY

June, 1975