A specific problem of fifth-century Macedonian history in the period after the Persian Wars is posed by two notices in the Demosthenic corpus on the grant of Athenian politeia (23.200), or ateleia (13.24), to Perdikkas for military action against the retreating Persians.¹

The obvious difficulties are (a) the inconsistency between politeia and ateleia, (b) the lack of decisive literary evidence for Macedonian military action after Plataea, (c) the fact that Perdikkas and not Alexander Philhellene is the recipient of the award, whatever it was. In view of the free treatment which fourth-century orators gave to earlier history, either because they wished to score a point or were simply ill-informed, (a) is the least of the difficulties, particularly as one of the notices appears in a speech of problematic authorship (13).²

As to (b), hints of Macedonian actions against the retreating Persians are strongly suggested in Demosthenes (?) 12.21, where Alexander is said to have dedicated a gold statue at Delphi from the spoils of victory over the Persians at Amphipolis. Confirmation of the dedication, although without mention of the background, is provided by

¹ The two passages are almost identical in their wording. As early as the edition of G. Dindorf (Oxford 1849) the communis opinio of scholars was set against the authenticity of 13 (vol. V p.221 and references). Dindorf added little to the argument himself. Only stylometric analysis can, perhaps, offer a fresh approach to the debate. Dion.Hal. ad Ammaeum 1.6 p.725 dates 23 to the archon-year 352/1 and there is no internal evidence which makes it necessary to reject this date (Dindorf VI 877–88). The date of 13 is uncertain. M. Croiset in his Budé edition (1959) has tentatively suggested 349, putting it before the Olynthiacs, but such precision is hardly possible on internal indications alone. We can be reasonably certain that it postdates 23, but by how much it is almost impossible to say. Whether or not there is any conscious parody of Demosthenes in the relevant passage of 13 is anybody’s guess.

² Most historians have been content to make the “correction” in the two texts without discussion. Apart from the two views to be discussed (infra n.4), comment has been minimal: e.g., G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte II (Gotha 1893–1904) 626 n.3; 738; and F. Geyer, Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II (Munich and Berlin 1930) 45 n.2 See infra p.28 for a possible resolution of this difficulty.
Herodotus 8.121.2. Thracians are said to have attacked and killed retreating Persians in Herodotus 9.89.4. Aeschylus, *Persae* 491–97 might be taken to indicate that the Persians had problems at the Strymon river crossing, though doubtfully of the kind that Aeschylus says. The omission of direct mention of such an action by Herodotus tends to dampen enthusiasm for an optimistic reconstruction, particularly if it is correct to suppose that Herodotus did his best to redeem the reputation of the Philhellene after his ambiguous actions in the earlier fighting.

Problem (c) presents the greatest difficulty. The easiest solution is to suppose that Demosthenes and the author of 13, if other than Demosthenes, made an honest (or dishonest) error: honest, if he or they believed that Perdikkas was in fact the recipient of the honour for such action; dishonest, if, as A. Daskalakis has suggested, the name was changed from Alexander to Perdikkas to avoid the mention of one which was anathema to Demosthenes. J. Papastavrou argues against an error, reading into the words βασιλεύοντι Μακεδονίας as opposed to βασιλεύ Μακεδονίας the fact that Perdikkas, Alexander’s eldest (?) son and ultimate successor, was either regent during his father’s absence or held some other position of independent authority, and in fact initiated action against the retreating Persians on his own responsibility, to be subsequently rewarded by the Athenians in his own name rather than that of his father.

Both the speeches, regardless of the problem of authorship of the one, seem too early for the kind of animosity that would lead to such a calculated change of name, although it is always possible that the change was made between the spoken and published versions. Elsewhere Demosthenes does not hesitate to use the name Alexander,

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8 H. W. Parke, *Delphic Oracle* I (Oxford 1950) 65–66, has suggested that the dedication “repaid” the god for producing a convincing document on Argead pedigree. I hope to prove elsewhere that the Olympic “examination” should be dated to the end of the sixth century, and so I think this explanation unlikely. I regard the dedication rather as an act of self advertisement for services rendered to the Greek cause during the Persian attack. This is strongly suggested in Hdt. 8.121.2, where we are told that the “first fruits” dedication of the Greeks after Salamis was near Alexander’s statue. Only the unreliable Aristodemus (FGrHist 104 F 1.2, 3) directly attests Macedonian action against the retreating Persians, and his account may have been prejudiced by fourth century events.


and Daskalakis' special pleading for change here, but not in two other passages of the same speech (23), is unconvincing.\textsuperscript{6}

Daskalakis himself has sought to refute Papastavrou's thesis.\textsuperscript{7} In general one might observe that such verbal hair-splitting, of more than questionable validity in other contexts, would be particularly inappropriate to an historical reference in a fourth-century orator. Apart from that, Perdikkas' age is a stumbling-block. He was on the throne until ca 414, and a birth-date before the nineties is unlikely. While it is true that Thucydides' references to Perdikkas before and during the Peloponnesian War are less than satisfactory, we might have expected some mention of his privileged status—if, in fact the award had been made to him as a young prince—during the narrative (especially at 1.57) of his anti-Athenian intrigues in the two or three years before the war broke out.

There is another way of looking at the notices, which to my knowledge has not previously been canvassed. It is to assume that the error lies not in the name of the Macedonian honoured but in the reason why he was honoured. Perdikkas was in fact given privileged status by the Athenians not for anything he had done during the Persian retirement but for services which he had rendered, or was expected to render, in the Peloponnesian War. The history of Athens' involvement with him through two decades or more (437–414) is complicated. His neutrality, if not active alliance, came to be highly valued by the Athenians; and on occasions they showed themselves remarkably indulgent to his devious activities. It is not improbable that at some time during the repeated and protracted negotiations with him the Athenians did grant him a privileged status, if for no other reason, to consolidate his support.\textsuperscript{8} If the award took place during the war, Thucydides' silence would be far less surprising.

This solution commends itself in other ways. It brings down the date of the award to a time when we know that Athens was most conciliatory towards northern and northeastern dynasts.\textsuperscript{9} The problem of double honours to Alexander Philhellene with a possibility of redundancy within them is eliminated. Alexander is honoured as

\textsuperscript{6} e.g., Alexander I in 6.11; and, actually in one of the speeches under discussion, Alexander of Pherae in 23.120, 162.

\textsuperscript{7} op.cit. (supra n.4).


\textsuperscript{9} e.g., Demosthenes 12.9, where Sitalkes is said to have been given Athenian citizenship, although Thuc. 2.29.5 says that it was his son, Sadokos, who was honoured.
proxenos and euergetes in the eighties, or certainly before his mission to Athens in the winter of 480/479, as Herodotus indicates (8.136), and that is all.\textsuperscript{10} I believe the award to be ateleia rather than politeia. A grant of ateleia, particularly if made after the Peloponnesian War had begun and when it may well have been enjoyed by both his predecessor and successor on the throne in connection with their proxenies, would not have seemed sufficiently significant for Thucydides to note.\textsuperscript{11} This choice means, of course, preference for the statement in the work of doubtful authorship (13) to that in a work which is certainly Demosthenic (23). The context of the argument in 23, however, makes it necessary for the award to be identified as politeia. Charidemus, who is the central figure of the speech, had been made an Athenian citizen sometime before 352/1 (23.65). The target of the indictment is the “illegality” of the extraordinary privilegium which Aristocrates has now proposed for Charidemus over and above the citizenship which he already has. Demosthènes’ point is that men in the past who had performed much greater service for Athens than Charidemus were simply given citizenship as their reward. The example of Perdikkas is linked with that of Menon of Pharsalus. The starting-point of the argument is citizenship as the ultimate reward for beneficence to Athens, because that in fact was the status which Charidemus had. It is very doubtful that anyone in the audience knew that either Alexander I or Perdikkas II had received any reward from Athens, leave alone what it was. In these circumstances Demosthènes could manipulate the facts (even if he knew them!) according to the requirements of his point. No one was going to be in a position to correct them.

The argument of 13 imposes different requirements. There the speaker is contrasting the moderation of the past with the extravagance of the present. The award to Perdikkas occurs in a list of examples of past moderation. Here, obviously, the point can be best made by quoting the lowest level of honour which the Athenian state granted to foreigners, and that presumably was ateleia.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} I do not accept the view most recently expressed by N. G. L. Hammond, \textit{OCD} (Oxford 1969) 39 s.v. Alexander (1) I, that Herodotus has misplaced these honours and that they properly belong to the decade after the Persian Wars.

\textsuperscript{11} Hdt. 8.138; \textit{IG} \textit{I*} 105 (Tod 91).

\textsuperscript{12} As in 23, Menon of Pharsalus is again coupled with Perdikkas. The award to both is said to have been ateleia.
The final question to be resolved is why Perdikkas is said by both writers to have been honoured for action in the Persian Wars and not in the Peloponnesian War, if, in fact, it was Perdikkas who was honoured as we have argued. Once more we may have an honest error, or it may be that the Persian War evoked associations which were emotionally more acceptable than those of the Peloponnesian War, or, to use an argument similar to that employed by Daskalakis, that Demosthenes did not want to admit in the context of 23 that a Macedonian king had performed services uniquely for Athens, so changed them to services performed for the Greeks as a whole.\textsuperscript{13}

To summarize, then, there is no reliable evidence that Alexander ever performed the services which Perdikkas is said in both speeches to have performed. The silence of Herodotus is particularly significant. It is most unlikely that Alexander was ever awarded \textit{politeia}; he may well have had \textit{ateleia} as part of his proxeny, and there would have been no need for a separate award later. It is equally unlikely that Perdikkas was ever given \textit{politeia}, but he may well have had \textit{ateleia}, awarded to him specifically and separately at some time during the Archidamian War. I would associate it tentatively with \textit{IG I\textsuperscript{a}} 71, which, despite Hoffman’s recent article, I would still date to the late twenties.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{On the Date of \textit{IG I\textsuperscript{a}} 71}

R. J. Hoffman has recently argued (\textit{op.cit. [supra n.8]}) that 431 is the most appropriate year for the alliance which is partially incorporated in this inscription. I have some reservations about the arguments which he has used both against 423/2 and for 431.

1. He surely exaggerates the superiority ("upper hand") which Perdikkas held in 423 (p.368). The second combined expedition of Perdikkas and Brasidas against Arrabaios had failed because Illyrian mercenaries whom Perdikkas had expected to join him had in fact joined Arrabaios (Thuc. 4.125). Arrabaios was going to be a much more formidable enemy with Illyrian support (whether official or unofficial) than alone. Perdikkas’ relationship with Brasidas had

\textsuperscript{13} The argument which I have used against Daskalakis, that 352/1 was too early for this kind of animosity and that, in any case, Demosthenes uses the name Alexander elsewhere, would not apply in its first part, at least with the same force, to this explanation.

\textsuperscript{14} Hoffman, \textit{art.cit. (supra n.8)} 359–77.
deteriorated to the point of no return (Thuc. 4.128.4–5). He, therefore, had much more reason to be conciliatory towards the Athenians than Hoffman allows. In fact, his awareness of his own weakness is a ready explanation of why he made the initial move towards reconciliation.15

2. Even if I were to agree that Athens was occasionally in such a favourable position for timber supplies that “she hardly needed, or could use, the wood of Macedonia” (p.367), I think it likely that she needed Macedonian timber more in 423/2 than at any other time during the Archidamian War. Amphipolis had been lost, the relationship with Thrace had possibly deteriorated, and supplies from Chalkidike must have been much reduced, if not cut off.16 Athens had far more reason to demand exclusive status as a purchaser and importer of Macedonian timber in 423/2 than in 431 when, admittedly, Chalkidike was in ferment but Amphipolis was still intact and the relationship with the ruling dynast of Thrace, Seuthes, apparently amicable.17

3. I question Hoffman’s point about “great financial loss to Macedonia” if she were compelled by the treaty to sell all her timber to Athens (p.367). While I grant that he raises this as an objection to dating the treaty to 435 (i.e., peace time), I am concerned both about the validity of the argument in general, and, if it is valid, about the correctness of applying it simply to 435 and not to other suggested dates as well. If the exclusiveness-clause was in fact going to mean loss of revenue for the Macedonian king, he would have had to feel under some compulsion to allow it. To me the compulsion of 423/2 (see § 1), despite Hoffman’s arguments, seems stronger than that of 431. How valid, however, is the argument? From the sheer size of her fleet and the nature of her military commitments, Perdikkas would

15 Cole, art.cit. (supra n.8) 68–69.

16 For Amphipolis’ importance for the timber trade, see Thuc. 4.108.1. The succession of Seuthes rather than the “Athenian citizen” Sadokos to the Thracian kingship (Thuc. 4.101.5) may be symptomatic of an anti-Athenian reaction. The situation in Chalkidike had been fluid since the outbreak of war; it had, of course, deteriorated considerably since Brasidas’ arrival in the north. We do not know the battle-worthy life of a trireme, but the need for new ships to replace those operational at the beginning of the war may have been pressing in the late twenties, and this, regardless of whether there was or was not a regular procedure for building replacements in the fifth century as apparently there was in the fourth (Arist. Ath.Pol. 46.1).

17 Cole, art.cit. (supra n.8) 59–63.
surely have inferred that Athens was always going to be the most reliable customer for timber of all the states involved in the fighting. Her known or suspected wealth may also have made her seem the most reliable payer for goods received. In any case Perdikkas’ word or oath was notoriously not his bond, and it is unlikely that he would have been deterred by a mere treaty clause from doing what the clause forbade him to do if he thought it in his own or his country’s interests. If he did not break the clause, it could mean only that it was in his interest to keep it inviolate or he feared the consequences of violation. If the treaty is to be dated to 431, his notion of his interests must have quickly changed, or his fears must have been allayed.

4. The fact that the only significant military service which Perdikkas performed for Athens in the Archidamian War occurred in the period 423/1 strongly suggests that the tie between the king and Athens is stronger than at any other time since the war’s outbreak. (One can draw the contrast of Macedonian inaction in 430/29.) This might have stemmed simply from an identity of interests, but it could also have been the result of the conclusion of a more formal treaty rather than of the characteristically loose compact which had previously been used to resolve differences between the two states.

5. Arguments from silence in Thucydides (p.368) are never strong but are particularly weak when he is dealing with peripheral warfronts.

6. We do not need to date the alliance to 431 in order to explain the Methone decrees (pp.375-76). They can be regarded as much a prelude to as a sequel of the formal alliance. As such they would be early expressions of an increasingly conciliatory attitude on both sides, which culminated in the alliance. I would agree completely with Hoffman when he says (p.371) that the key to Athens’ north Aegean policy was Macedonia, and that assumption must always be a basic control in our interpretation of the Athens–Macedonia relationship in the war.

If the treaty is to be moved from 423/2, I would incline more to the view of C. F. Edson that it should go down rather than up. In

18 Hermippus, Phormophoroi fr. 63.8 (Edmonds 1.304).
19 Thuc. 4.132.2; 5.6.2.
20 C. F. Edson “Early Macedonia,” Ancient Macedonia I, ed. B. Laourdas (Thessaloniki 1970) 29–35. Papastavrou’s argument against dating to 423/2 from Thucydides’ use of ὠμολογία in 4.132.1 is undermined by the wording of 5.6.2 κατὰ τὸ ἐξειλλήκτων. This does not seem to have been noticed by Hoffman. See Papastavrou, Hellenika 15 (1957) 259.
summary, I do not think that Hoffman has made out a convincing case for 431, and, pending the publication of the third edition of *Inscriptiones Graecae* I, I continue to believe that 423/2 is the better date. I would associate the grant of *ateleia* with this alliance, perhaps as some *quid pro quo* for the exclusiveness-clause.

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