Notes on Dio Chrysostom

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In GRBS 17 (1976) 154-56 Professor Highet suggests a number of changes in the text of Dio Chrysostom. My view of most of the places affected differs from his. In this paper I shall try to defend the transmitted text of a number of those passages, except for 3.86, where I would modify Professor Highet's solution. For convenience I shall follow him in basing my comments on von Arnim's edition (2 vols., Berlin 1916, 1919).

3.86. φιλίαν γε μην ἀπάντων νεώμικε τῶν αὐτοῦ κτημάτων κάλλιστον καὶ λερώτατον. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως αἰσχρόν εἶναι [τὸ βασιλεύειν] οὐδὲ ἐπικύδιων χρημάτων ἀπορεῖν ὡς φίλων, οὕτως οὐ γὰρ τῇ χαρηγίᾳ καὶ τοῖς στρατοπέδοις καὶ τῇ ἀληθῇ δυνάμει διαφυλάττειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὡς τῇ πίστει τῶν φίλων.

τὸ βασιλεύειν del. Wilamowitz: τοῖς βασιλεῦσι Weil.

Highet would read οὕτως <ἀσφαλές> τῇ χαρηγίᾳ ... Since it does not seem that οὕτως ... ὡς ... can mean 'as well (securely) ... as ...', he is very probably right in thinking that something has fallen out after οὕτως. I see no objection, either, to the suggestion that the missing word was a form of ἀσφαλής, which is supported not only by 3.96 (quoted by Highet) but also by the much nearer 3.89 τοῖς μὲν τυχόνων οὐκ ἀσφαλές εἰκῇ μεταδιδόναι δυνάμεως; it is worth noting that in this whole passage Dio does not seem to be striving for any great variety of vocabulary. I am not, however, happy with <ἀσφαλές>; with it one would have to understand εἶναι, and this would divert to itself the ἃν that surely belongs to διαφυλάττειν (why ἃν with this understood εἶναι, though not with αἰσχρὸν εἶναι just above?).

There is a way of providing οὕτως with a form of ἀσφαλῆς, leaving ἃν to διαφυλάττειν, and getting a common construction with that verb: read οὕτως <ἀσφαλῆ>, the adjective being predicative, agreeing with εὐδαιμονίαν. Cf. Plut. Rom. 21f οὕτως ἄρττητοι ἑαυτῶν διεφύλαξεν οὕτε ...; Comp. Ages. et Pomp. 663D ἀεὶ διεφύλαξεν ἑαυτῶν ἀνίκητον; Mor. 14b, 85b, 87d.
8.8. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔφη παύσεως τούς πεισομένους αὐτῷ ἀγνοίας καὶ πονηρίας καὶ ἀκόλογας, οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ προσέχειν οὐδὲ ἐκέλευεν ἵσθαι αὐτόν, οὔτε ἄν εἴ πολὺ προσلحقεθαι ἀργύριον ἔμελλεν, . . .

οὖθ’ ᾧ ‘ἄν’ εἰ von Arnim: οὖθε εἰ codd.

Highet proposes the deletion of ἀργύριον: "Diogenes never suggested that his spiritual cures would make his patients rich: he would have scorned the idea. Delete ἀργύριον as an addition by a reader who did not know that προςλήψεθαι can be used without an object, as in Dem. 2.7." He does not say what he would do with πολὺ: with ἀργύριον deleted, what would πολὺ be if not object of προςلحقεθαι? In any case suspicion of the text comes from misunderstanding it, as the Loeb translator also did: 'no matter how much richer he might become thereby'. The Greek means 'not even if he was (had been) going to get a lot of money besides' (the προς­means 'in addition to the cure'): those in need of intellectual and spiritual improvement would not seek that improvement, 'not even if you paid them'. There is nothing in the Greek about long-term wealth.

11.96. καταφανῆς οὖν ἔγεγονει αὐτῷ διὰ τούτων ἀπάντων εὐάλωτος ὄν, ἂτε δεινῷ τὴν πολεμικὴν τέχνην· ὡστε θαρρῶν ἀπήμητεν αὐτῷ κατὰ μέσον τὸ πεδίον. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐνέκλινεν ὡς φεύγων, ἀποτειρώμενος αὐτοῦ, ἀμα δὲ κοπτᾶ κηβολόμενος, ὡτε μὲν περιμένων, ὡτε δὲ ἀποφεύγων· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐώρα βραδύνοντα καὶ ἀπολειπόμενον, οὕτως ὑποστρέφας αὐτὸς ἧκεν ἐπ’ αὐτὸν οὖθε τὰ ὀπλα φέρειν ἔτι δυνάμενον, καὶ συμβαλὼν ἀπέκτεινε καὶ τῶν ὁπλῶν ἐκράτησεν, ὡς καὶ τούτο "Ομηρός εἰρνῆκε. τοὺς δὲ ἅπαντες διώξει μὲν φης τὸν "Εκτόρα, οὐ λαβεῖν δὲ, κακείνων ἀλόντων.

Highet sees ὅ λαβεῖν δὲ, κάκεινων ἀλόντων as self-contradictory and goes on, "The horses, like Hector himself, were tired: Dio remembers Iliad 17.75–78 and rationalizes it. Read κακοντων." I have found no basis for κακοντων in the Iliad; and I see nothing wrong with ἀλόντων: οὖ negatives not just λαβεῖν but also the dependent participle: 'it was not the case that they too having fallen prey to him he got them into his hands'. Cf. Plut. Mor. 614d (Quaest. conv. 1.4) οὐδ’ ὑποκονίεται, τὴν λαβήν ὥσπερ εἴωθεν εὔτονοι ποιῶν καὶ ἄφυκτον, where ποιῶν would contradict οὐδ’ ὑποκονίεται unless it too were negatived by οὖδ’: here, and in Dio, the participle and the verb on which it depends express aspects of a single complex activity, and it is this
activity as a whole that is negatived. In Dio the καὶ of κακεῖνων means 'as well as Achilles' and ἀλόντων echoes εὐάλωτος used of Achilles in the first sentence of the paragraph.

The Loeb translation is also wrong here: 'but he did not bring them in though they too were caught'.

18.8. μέλη δὲ καὶ ἐλεγεῖαι καὶ ἡμῖνοι καὶ διδύραμβοι τῷ μὲν σχολὴν ἐγὼντι πολλοῦ ἔξισι· τῷ δὲ πρᾶττειν τε καὶ ἡμι [τὰς πράξεις] καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐξεῖν διανοοομένοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρὸς αὐτὰ σχολή.

τὰς πράξεις scil. von Arnim.

Hight would read ἡμὶς τὰς πράξεις. There is no pressing need for emendation: ἡμὶς is adverbial, expressing the simultaneity of progress in πράξεις and in λόγοι, and τὰς πράξεις as well as τοὺς λόγους is governed by αὐξεῖν: 'to engage in public affairs and to promote his political career and at the same time develop his rhetorical powers', i.e. 'to engage in politics and to develop his powers as an orator while at the same time making progress in his career'.

30.4. καὶ ἡμὰς ἐκέλευε λέγειν, ὅταν κοί ἐντύχωμεν, ὅτι κοί μεμημένοι ἐτελεύτα. καὶ γὰρ τὸ συνεῖναι αὐτῷ καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ἐσσι ὑπότου παρέμειναι.

Hight objects to συνεῖναι: "the infinitive of συνέημι (= 'understand') is shown, for instance by Herodotus 3.46.1, 3.63.4, and 5.80.1, to be συνεῖναι." ἐναι is, to be sure, the present infinitive of ἐημι, but the second aorist infinitive is ἐναι (Ar. Ran. 133). The simple form is rare, but -εναι is common: in Plato e.g. ἐψείναι Grg. 492d; La. 179A; Ly. 209b; Resp. 368c, 538b; Symp. 179c; Soph. 235a; ἀφείναι Philb. 50d, 62e; Resp. 327c, 599a; ἐφείπαι Pkt. 338a; μεθείναι Philb. 50d; συνεῖναι (ἐν-) Cta. 414d; Epin. 979b; Leg. 683b.

30.18. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς τόχαις τε καὶ δοξαις καὶ τιμαις ἀλλήλων ὑπερέχειν, ὅπερ ποῖς εὐμαιεῖν. ἐναι γὰρ τοὺς μὲν βασιλεῖς, τοὺς δὲ ιδιωταῖς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλουεῖους, τοὺς δὲ ἀπόρους.

Hight regards ἀλλήλων as corrupt, saying "All men cannot be superior to one another: read ἄλλους ἀλλῶν ὑπερέχειν." He believes, it seems, that this would mean '...some are superior to others', whereas it would in fact be Greek for '...some are superior to one group, others to another' and that would be nonsense here.

The idea of reciprocity in ἀλλήλων does seem inappropriate at first
reading, but the word can, I believe, be defended and need be regarded neither as corrupt nor as an instance of loose usage. Men cannot, it is true, be superior to one another in one and the same respect, but here we have what are probably intended to be understood as three distinct features of life: τούχας . . . δόξας . . . τιμαῖς. Just as in the preceding paragraph one can think of the prisoners as ringing the changes on the physical characteristics mentioned, some being small and good-looking, others large and ugly, and so on, so one is probably meant here to envisage one man as being, say, honoured above others but otherwise dogged by misfortunes that those others escape, and so on: A is above B in one respect, B above A in another; they can in fact be said to be superior to one another.

If ἀλλήλων is, after all, used loosely, without any notion of reciprocity, then it may be compared with the use of ἐπάλληλοι = ‘one close after another’ rather than the impossible ‘close after one another’: see LSJ s.v. ἐπάλληλοι 1, and R. C. Jebb on Sophocles, Antigone 57 (Jebb’s generalisation stumbles at Achilles Tatius 2.11.3).

30.26. . . ἐν τῇ γῇ ἑρήμῃ οὐσὶ κατοικίας τοὺς ἄνθρωπους ἐφ᾽ ἕπτοις τιμαῖς καὶ ὀλβίῳ, δικαίως δὲ καὶ νόμους τοῖς αὐτοῖς:

dikaios, which Professor Highet would change to dikaios, should be kept. It is to be taken as a substantive, on the same footing as νόμοις, with the postponed τοῖς, and for the sense see LSJ s.v. dikaios 1.2.

31.27. καὶ μὴν ἀτόπου γε ὄντος τοῦ τινα παρεῖναι τῶν ἀξίων τιμῆς καὶ μηδεμίων παρασχεῖν ἀμοιβὴν τῆς εὐεργεσίας, . . .

“The infinitive of πάρειμι = ‘pass over’ is παριέναι” (Highet). But παρεῖναι is the second aorist infinitive of παρήμι (see on 30.4 above) and gives faultless sense: ‘pass over’ (LSJ π.2).

33.1. Ἐγὼ θαναμάζω τί ποτ᾽ ἐκεῖ τὸ ὑμέτερον καὶ τί προσδοκῶντες ἢ βουλόμενοι τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἄνθρωπους διαλέγεσθαι ύμίν ζητεῖτε, πότερον εὐφώνους οἰκεῖει εἶναι καὶ φθέγγεσθαι ἥδιον τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπείτα ὠστερ ὀρνέων ποθεῖτε ἀκούειν μελοδοῦντων ύμίν ἢ δύναμιν ἄλλην ἔχειν . . .

“The adverb of sequence, ἐπείτα, makes no sense. A subordinate clause of explanation is needed, introduced by ἐπειδῆ γε” (Highet). But ἐπείτα also expresses consequence. This use is specially common in questions, with a connotation of surprise, contemptuous disbelief vel sim. (LSJ s.v. ἐπείτα π.3; cf. εἶτα 11), and here, of course, we have an
indirect question. Dio is saying ‘... whether you think ... , and really
then (if that is the only merit you see in orators) long to hear ...’. In
view of my bracketed conditional elaboration, it is also worth com­
paring LSJ s.v. ἐπιθέτα 1.4.b (which, by the way, hardly belongs under
‘of mere Sequence’).

48.14. ἐμοί <δὲ> μέλει μὲν καὶ τοῦ καθ’ ύμᾶς, μέλει δὲ καὶ τοῦ κατ’
ἐμαυτόν. εἰ γὰρ φιλόσοφος πολιτείας ἀφάμενος οὐκ ἐδυνήθη παρέχειν
ὁμοιόμορον πόλιν, τοῦτο δεινὸν ἦδη καὶ ἀφυκτον, ἀπερ εἰ ναυπηγός ἐν
νην πλέων μὴ παρέχοι τὴν ναὸν πλέονοιν, καὶ εἰ κυβερνήτης φάκων
ἐναι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κύμα ἀποκλίνοι, ἢ λαβών οἰκίαν οἰκοδόμος, ὅρων
πνεύμοναν, ὁ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἀμελεῖ, κοινῶν δὲ καὶ χρῶν οἰστό τι ποιεῖν.

‘Such a failure,’ writes Professor Highet, ‘is distressing but not
literally inescapable, ἀφυκτον. Read ἀφόρητον.’ But is not Dio saying
that if someone who claims to be a philosopher undertakes to bring
about political harmony in his city and fails, the resulting stigma will
be ‘terrible and inescapable’? That is why in his rôle as political
admonisher Dio is concerned for himself. Highet seems to see τοῦτο
as referring to failure viewed as a prospect which could, of course,
be avoided, by avoidance of the whole effort or by a better approach.
It refers in fact (in what could be seen as exaggerated terms) to the
situation obtaining after the hypothetical failure (ἀφάμενος ... ἐδυνήθη),
to the stigma that the philosopher will never escape from
or live down. ἀφυκτος of what one is already caught up in (this dis­
tinction between ‘avoiding’ altogether and ‘escaping out of’ is not
made in LSJ) occurs also in Plut. Mor. 614D (Quaest. conv. 1.4); Mar.
422c τῷ Μετέλλῳ ἀπάτην περιτιθείει άφυκτον; cf. 433D ὡς ἢ ἀφυκτα ...,
αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀπέκτεινεν; Ant. 927Ε ἀφήν δ’ ἐξεγερής και ἐν συνδιάτηςις ἀφικτον
(as one would not discover until already captivated).\(^1\)

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April, 1977

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\(^1\) While investigating instances of ἀφυκτος and related words, I found that LSJ cite
ἀνεκβιβαστος, ἀναποδράστος and ἀναποτατός (s.vv.) from Plut. Mor. 1666 (De superst. 4),
taking them as passive (wrongly, in my view) and giving no proper indication that the
text and interpretation (precisely whether the words in question are active or passive in
force, i.e. refer to slaves or masters) are in serious doubt.