Eumenes, Neoptolemus and

PSI XII 1284

A. B. Bosworth

In 1932 E. Breccia discovered a small scrap of papyrus at Kom Ali el Gamman near Oxyrhynchus. Once discovered it waited nearly twenty years for publication. The editio princeps of 1951 was the work of Vittorio Bartoletti, aided by suggestions from Maas and Jacoby. The papyrus itself consists of three columns, numbered consecutively 81–83, of which the central column is preserved almost complete. Those to right and left are defective except for a few letters at the extremities which defy reconstruction.

The script belongs to the late second century. I shall first give the text with rudimentary critical apparatus and then a translation of the consecutive narrative.

\[
\begin{align*}
\end{align*}
\]


8 Wirth 285–86 gives a conjectural reconstruction of the fragmentary third column, based on new readings; but the result does not inspire conviction.
Maas, Wirth. The fifth letter is confidently read as τ (Wirth 286), but Arrian does not use ἀντιτείνω in the sense ‘to hold out against’. I prefer Bartoletti’s first thought ἀντιτάξωντο, perhaps used with a tinge of irony: “they would not set their array against famine.”

“. . . intending] to make their appearance have the most fearful impact upon the cavalry, they advanced in close order; and the troops behind them, those who were cavalry, began to fire javelins where the opportunity offered in order to throw back the cavalry charge by means of the continuity of their barrage. When Eumenes saw the close-locked formation of the Macedonian phalanx at its minimum extension and the men themselves heartened to venture every hazard, he sent Xennias once more, a man whose speech was Macedonian, bidding him declare that he would not fight them frontally but would follow them with his cavalry and units of light troops and bar them from provisions. As for them, even if they considered themselves altogether invincible, they would none the less neither [hold out] for long against famine . . .”

It was immediately obvious that the fragment is part of a historical narrative of the years after Alexander the Great. Bartoletti had first ascribed it to Hieronymus of Cardia, the source of virtually all extant histories of the Successors; but even before the publication of the editio princeps Kurt Latte had disproved the attribution, and Bartoletti unhesitatingly accepted his conclusions. Latte showed indisputably that the style of the fragment bears no resemblance to the prose of the early Hellenistic period but belongs rather to the archaising literature of the second century. In fact it has most of the distinctive hallmarks of L. Flavius Arrianus, the historian of Nicomedia. The following list will make the correspondences clear:

Line 1, φοβερωτάτην . . . δῆμον: cf. Tact. 22.3 ἐπιφάνειαν ἀποκαταστήσαν . . . τὴν δῆμον. See also 5.10.2 καὶ τῇ ὅψει . . . φοβούντων.

Line 2, ἐν τάξει (‘in close order’): cf. 4.26.4, 2.10.3; 3.21.8, 30.1; 5.13.2, 6.21.4.

Line 2, δοῦι ἰπήκε: the elliptical relative clause used nominatively in apposition is reasonably frequent in Arrian; cf. 3.2.7 τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους δοῦι αἰχμάλωτοι; 5.25.2, 7.19.5.

Line 3, ἔνεχεαι τῶν βελῶν: cf. Tact. 15.4 ἔνεχεαι τοῦ ἀκροβολομεῖ; 40.8.

F. Jacoby was more cautious, terming the fragment merely “ein neuesstück einer Diadogenergeschichte” (Die Fragmenteder griechischen Historiker III.B p.743).


In what follows all references without book title are taken from Arrian’s Alexander history. For the minor works I use the standard abbreviations.
LINES 3–4, ἀναστελλόντε[ε] τὴν ἐμβόλην: cf. 1.7.9, 2.21.6; Tact. 15.4. For ἐμβόλη as a cavalry charge see 1.4.3–4, 5.17.2.

LINES 4–5, τὴν τε ἐγκλημα ... πυκνή: cf. 5.17.7 ἰσοναπίεσαντες ὡς ἐκ πυκνοτάτην ἐγκλημα. For other examples of the terminology see 1.4.3, 5.22.7; Ect. c. Alanos 26.

LINE 7, κατὰ ετόμα: cf. 5.15.6; Cyneget. 25.8.6

LINE 9, εἰ[ρ][ε]οι . . . ἐπὶ[τρεῖ]ον: for the active verb with accusative and genitive see 1.19.8, 3.18.2, 5.8.2.

LINES 9–10, εἰ καὶ πάντες . . . ἀλλ' οὖτ': the combination of adjectival phrase strengthened by πάντες in the protasis and the adversative ἀλλ' beginning the apodosis does not occur in Arrian's Alexander history, but there are two exact parallels in the Cynegeticus (15.1, 16.2). For ἀμαχος used to describe the men of the phalanx compare 2.10.6.

These examples supplement and correct the more extensive list of Latte, and the number of parallels and verbal echoes is quite remarkable, given the brevity of the papyrus fragment. One may add that there is a conscious variation of mood and construction which is wholly typical of Arrian's prose, as is the deliberate archaism. There can be no doubt that our papyrus preserves a fragment of Arrian's History of the Successors (τὰ μετὰ Αλέξανδρον), a ten-book survey, clearly in meticulous detail, of the three-year period between the death of Alexander and Antipater's return to Europe after the conference at Triparadeisus.

Now for the historical context of the fragment. It seemed obvious to Bartoletti that it dealt with the final stages of Eumenes' great battle with Craterus and Neoptolemus in the early summer of 321 b.c. In that battle the cavalry of both the right and left wings of Craterus' army were forced back to the phalanx, which remained undefeated (Diod. 18.30.6, 32.1); and the situation appeared to cohere well with the opening of our fragment, which describes

---

* Latte 598 found no instance of the phrase in Arrian. He was correct that Arrian never uses ἐπιχωρεῖν in the sense 'to advance' (line 2), but the word occurs prominently in Xenophon's description of the advance of a Hellenic phalanx, which was surely familiar to Arrian (Xen. Anab. 1.2.17; cf. Arr. 2.8.11).

* The use of ἔνων for εῶν both alone and in compounds is wholly characteristic of Arrian, as is the reflexive εἵκειν (line 10: for an exact parallel see Peripl. 22.2 τιμῆν καταβάλοντες τὴν ἄξιαν εἵκειν δοκοῦντας) and the archaic Attic plural ἵππης (line 2: cf. Tact. 17.1, 32.3, 36.1–2, 40.4).

* The best edition of the fragments is that of Roos, Arriani Scripta Minora 253–86 (see also Jacoby, FGrHist 156 ff 1–11, 54–56). Photius (Bibl. cod. 92 = fr.1, Roos) gives a digest of the contents of the 10 books.
cavalry in position behind a phalanx in close formation. Secondly, Eumenes is known to have parleyed with the enemy phalanx, allowing the soldiers to forage from neighbouring villages (Diod. 18.32.2-3; Nep. Eum. 4.3); and the threat of starvation which we find in the papyrus might have been issued at the beginning of that parley. Finally an unusual collocation of letters (γν..) in the fragmentary left column (line 19) of the papyrus was taken as an echo of the rare word ἵγνυ/ἱγνύαω which occurs in the battle narratives of Diodorus and Plutarch and certainly derives from their common source, Hieronymus. The placing of the fragment has been almost universally accepted, but none the less there are serious difficulties. Pierre Briant has already pointed out that in the context of the battle with Craterus it is peculiar to find stress laid upon Xenias' competence in Macedonian. The observation makes sense only if Macedonian speakers were relatively few in Eumenes' army, but in the encounter with Craterus he had a considerable number of Macedonians, so many in fact that he was forced to take elaborate precautions to conceal the identity of his opponent and so prevent mass desertions. There are other points which deserve consideration. In May 321 the threat of starvation was not entirely apposite. Craterus' army was leaderless, but it was largely unharmed and its baggage train was intact. In those circumstances there was little prospect of cutting off the army from its sources of provisions, which in late spring in western Asia Minor were abundant. But the most important consideration is that Diodorus' account of the parley with the defeated phalanx is quite different from that of the papyrus. In Diodorus there is an interval; the cavalry takes refuge behind the phalanx, while Eumenes, content with his victory hitherto, sounds the retreat, sets up a trophy and buries his dead. Only then does he approach the enemy with terms. In the papyrus the negotiations take place on the field of

---

9 Diod. 18.31.3; Plut. Eum. 7.10. For this interpretation, deriving from Maas, see Bartoletti 159f., 164; Wirth 283. Of course, the traces are consistent with many other supplements, for instance some simple or compound form of ἰγνύμι. Maas' attempt to deduce Diodorus' εὐαλείης τῆς βάσεως from εὐφα from the papyrus' col. i line 20 can only be described as wishful thinking.

10 P. Briant, Antigone le Borgne (Paris 1973) 223-24 n.13 (hereafter, BRIANT). Briant tentatively ascribes the fragment to the first cavalry battle between Eumenes and Neoptolemus but considers his ascription no more than a probability.

11 Plut. Eum. 6.5-7, 7.1-2; Nep. Eum. 3.3-6; Arr. Succ. fr.1.27.

12 Diod. 18.32.2: ὁ δ' Εὐμένης .... ἀνεκαλέσατο τῇ κάλπης τοὺς στρατηγάς. ετήσια δὲ τρόπαιον καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς θάφας διαπλάττατο πρὸς τῆν τῶν ἡττημένων φάλαγγα.
battle. The phalanx is in close order, ready for a fight to the last, but Eumenes sends an embassy to force them into submission. There is no hint of an intermission or of the burial of the fallen. Arrian might have omitted the incident, but in a narrative so detailed and extracted from a single source it is hard to see why such an omission should have occurred. The prima facie evidence suggests rather that the incident described in the papyrus does not belong to the great battle between Eumenes and Craterus. We must therefore examine Eumenes' career before 320 and find, if possible, a more suitable context for the fragment.

At the Babylon distribution (June/July 323) Eumenes was assigned a new and extensive satrapy, comprising Cappadocia, Paphlagonia and the Pontic coastline as far as Trapezus. Most of the satrapy was out of Macedonian hands and controlled by a native dynasty, Ariarathes, who had ruled northern Cappadocia under Darius and survived Alexander's reign with his territories unimpaired. Eumenes was given the task of acquiring the area as a Macedonian satrapy, and two incumbent satraps, Antigonus of Greater Phrygia and Leonnatus of Hellespontine Phrygia, were ordered to give assistance. Antigonus seems to have refused point-blank, but Leonnatus was more ambiguous. He welcomed Eumenes but received overtures from Antipater, conveyed by Eumenes' bitter enemy, Hecataeus the dynast of Cardia. Leonnatus finally decided to help Antipater through the crisis of the Lamian War, and Eumenes became progressively more alienated from him until he fled to the court of Perdiccas with a squadron of cavalry, 5,000 talents in gold bullion and news of Leonnatus' designs on the Macedonian throne. So far there was bad blood and intrigue aplenty but no actual warfare between Macedonian armies.

13 Arr. Succ. fr.1.5 (so Dexippus, FGrHist 100 f.8.2); Diod. 18.3.1; Plut. Eum. 3.3; Nepos 2.2; Curt. 10.10.3; Justin 13.4.16.
14 For Cappadocia in Alexander's reign see Strabo 12.1.4 (534); Diod. 31.19.4. Alexander's administrative arrangements in 333 (Arr. 2.4.2; Curt. 3.4.1) concerned only southern Cappadocia, a separate satrapy not then controlled by Ariarathes (Strabo i.c.; cf. H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage [Munich 1926] I 257; II 59f no.113 [hereafter, Berve]; Briant 56f).
15 Plut. Eum. 3.4–5. On the rôle of Antigonus see most fully Briant 145–51.
16 Plut. Eum. 3.5–12 (Nepos 2.4–5 adds that Leonnatus planned to kill Eumenes). See further Briant 162–68.
In summer 322 Perdiccas led a royal army into Cappadocia, intending not merely to instal Eumenes in his satrapy but also to suppress the numerous pockets of independence and brigandage in the Anatolian highlands. Ariarathes was the first victim. After two battles he was defeated, captured with his family and brutally executed.\textsuperscript{17} Eumenes was now formally installed as satrap; but for the moment he remained with the royal army as it moved south to Lycaonia, on the northern slopes of the Taurus range,\textsuperscript{18} and laid siege to Isaura and Laranda, whose inhabitants had defeated and killed Balacrus, Alexander's first satrap of Cilicia.\textsuperscript{19} The sieges ended in fire and slaughter, and Perdiccas continued south into Cilicia. During the following winter (322/1) he extended his programme of pacification to Pisidia, which was left independent and virtually untouched by Alexander.\textsuperscript{20} That was not all. There was a second front in Armenia, where the survivors from Ariarathes' débâcle had taken refuge (Diod. 31.19.5). Armenia itself was not under Macedonian control. Alexander had claimed it in 331 when he sent Mithrines to take possession; but even if Mithrines managed to establish himself, his rule was short lived.\textsuperscript{21} By Alexander's death Armenia had reverted to its Achaemenid satrap, Orontes, and it does not appear in the Babylon settlement.\textsuperscript{22} A Macedonian expeditionary force may even have been destroyed.\textsuperscript{23} Like Cappadocia the area required pacification,

\textsuperscript{18} Plut. \textit{Eum.} 3.14. For his administrative arrangements before leaving the satrapy see Briant, \textit{RE}A 74 (1972) 36-49.
\textsuperscript{20} Cf. Diod. 18.25.6. It is only revealed in passing that Perdiccas was in Pisidia early in 321. Justin 13.6.10 locates him in Cappadocia, but this is clearly an inaccuracy.
\textsuperscript{21} For Mithrines' appointment as satrap see Arr. 3.16.5; Diod. 17.64.6; Curt. 5.1.44. It is usually assumed that he failed to establish himself and that Armenia reverted to its former satrap, Orontes (cf. Arr. 3.8.5; Diod. 19.23.2; Polyaeus 4.8.3). But nothing excluded the possibility that Armenia was formally surrendered to Alexander in 331 (so B. Niese, \textit{Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea} I [Gotha 1893] 94). We hear of a friendship between Peucetas and Orontes (Diod. \textit{Ic.}), which is difficult to explain unless Orontes had spent some time at the Macedonian court during Alexander's reign. He may have surrendered after Gaugamela and been restored to Armenia towards the end of the reign.
\textsuperscript{22} Ausfeld's addition of Armenia to Dexippus' satrapy list (\textit{RhM} 56 [1901] 537) is quite untenable, even though it was accepted by Roos (\textit{Arriani Scripta Minora} 257).
\textsuperscript{23} Strabo 11.14.9 (529): a force sent under Menon (Berve no.516) to occupy the gold mines at Caballa ἀνήχθη ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγχωρίων (ἀνηρέθη Casaubon; ἀνῆχθη Meineke; ἀνῆχθη Groskurd).
and it is clear that the task was assigned to Neoptolemus, who operated with a substantial body of phalanx infantry detached from the royal army. But Perdicas did not wholly trust him. According to Plutarch Perdicas sent back Eumenes from Cilicia "ostensibly to his own satrapy but in fact to take control of neighbouring Armenia, which was in chaos under Neoptolemus." The intention was clearly that Eumenes should cooperate in the war in Armenia and at the same time frustrate any undesirable ambitions that Neoptolemus might have. It was a difficult assignment. Plutarch (our only source for these transactions) claims that Eumenes found Neoptolemus intransient and could not control the Macedonian phalanx, which treated him with contempt and insubordination. Naturally so. Eumenes was a Greek and his employment under Alexander had been mostly secretarial, whereas Neoptolemus was a scion of the Molossian royal house and had been hypaspist commander in Alexander’s later years. Eumenes therefore raised a counter-army (ἀντίταγμα) of 6,300 cavalry, levied from the Cappadocian hinterland and attracted by grants of fiscal exemption. This was a body which owed loyalty to himself alone, which balanced the Macedonian phalanx and could be used against them if necessary. When they took the field, the Macedonians were divided between consternation (at the threat to themselves) and confidence (because of the extra forces for the Armenian campaign).

Nothing is known of the progress of the war except that Eumenes was not continuously engaged in it. During the winter of 322/1 he paid a visit to Sardes, where he presented Perdicas' proposal of marriage to Cleopatra. That was the episode which confirmed Antipater and Craterus in their declaration of war, and in the early spring of 321 Perdicas faced an invasion from Europe. For the first time Macedonian forces were set against each other. Once more Eumenes found himself in titular command of the Perdiccan forces.

---

24 Plut. Eum. 4.1: λόγῳ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σατραπείαν, ἔργῳ δὲ τὴν δομοῦ Αρμενίαν τιταραγμένην ὑπὸ Νεοπτολέμου διὰ χειρὸς ἔξοντα. For Neoptolemus' position see J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte IV.1 (Berlin/Leipzig 1925) 313; Briant 152.

25 Note Neoptolemus' gibe reported at Plut. Eum. 1.6. For Neoptolemus' Aeacid lineage see Arr. 2.27.6 and for his career under Alexander see Berve no.548.

26 Plut. Eum. 4.3-4. See the detailed analysis by Briant, RÉA 74 (1972) 49–60. I disagree with his assumption that Eumenes intended the antitagma to be used against his own troops, there is no indication that he had a separate army of Macedonians (cf. Diod. 18.29.5), and Plutarch must be referring to his attempted cooperation with the army of Neoptolemus.

27 Arr. Succ. fr.1.26. For the chronology see Briant 174f.
in Asia Minor. He was sent to prevent the crossing of the Hellespont, and once again all commanders in the area were ordered to give assistance, notably Neoptolemus and Alcetas (Perdiccas' brother, left in command of the forces in Pisidia). Eumenes seems to have reached the Hellespont and strengthened the forces of the western satrapies with his newly-levied cavalry. Nothing suggests that he remained there. In fact he is next attested in Lydia, where he was faced by an invasion from Antigonus, aided and abetted by the satraps of Caria and Lydia. It seems most probable that he left a holding force at the Hellespont and fell back with his cavalry at least to counter the threat from Antigonus. In fact his forces were fatally dispersed. Craterus crossed the Hellespont, thanks to the treachery of the defenders, and Eumenes was forced out of Lydia into the interior of Phrygia. At this point he had to solve the problems posed by his supposed allies. Alcetas had refused absolutely to take the field against Antipater and Craterus, whereas Neoptolemus actually intrigued with the invaders and moved to join them. His plans were betrayed to Eumenes, who engaged his forces somewhere in the interior of Asia Minor and won a decisive victory with his cavalry. As a result Neoptolemus' army came over to him and helped him defeat Craterus ten days later. It is this first encounter which provides an adequate context for the Arrian fragment.

---

18 Diod. 18.29.1-2; Plut. Eum. 5.1-2; Nepos 3.2; Justin 13.6.14-15.

19 Diod. 18.29.3. I cannot accept the elaborate construction of Briant (189-203), according to which there were two councils of war, one in Pisidia and once in Cilicia, but both commissioning Eumenes to conduct the war against Craterus. This results in a very tight chronology (cf. Briant 227) and involves the supposition of a flight by Eumenes into Cappadocia which is attested in no source (and no source hints at two separate councils of war).

81 Briant disputes this and argues that Eumenes levied a brand-new cavalry force immediately before his encounter with Neoptolemus in spring 321 (cf. p.233). But when Nepos (Eum. 3.3) refers to Eumenes' forces as in exercitatae et non multo ante contractae, he is contrasting them explicitly with the Macedonian veterans of Craterus, and his description is entirely appropriate to the cavalry raised in 322. By comparison they were recently levied and untrained. And Plutarch (Eum. 5.5) implies clearly that the cavalry used against Neoptolemus were the cavalry raised the previous year in Cappadocia (cf. Eum. 4.3). Briant 209 n.1 argues that there were considerable losses to Craterus at the Hellespont, which may be true; but nothing indicates that Eumenes and his cavalry were present at the time of Craterus' crossing (Arr. Succ. fr.1.26 suggests the opposite). Eumenes had probably taken the bulk of his cavalry to Ionia to counter the naval threat from Antigonus (Arr. fr.25: cf. fol. 235v 7f—there is no indication that this cavalry was "une petite troupe" [Briant 190]).
As so often, the only source to describe the first battle with Neoptolemus is Plutarch, and his account, though extremely brief, is illuminating. "Then Eumenes enjoyed the first-fruits of his forethought and preparation; for, although defeated in the infantry fighting, he routed Neoptolemus with his cavalry and captured his baggage train. Leading his men en masse in a charge against the phalanx, which was now dispersed in pursuit, he forced them to ground arms and join his army after exchanging oaths." This final cavalry charge could well be what is described in the first lines of the papyrus fragment. There we have phalanx infantry closing ranks to repel a cavalry charge. The phalanx is not stated to be dispersed in pursuit, but the first continuous words of the fragment suggest that the men had only just adopted the close formation. The description is consistent with an emergency manoeuvre; Neoptolemus' phalan-gites, carried away by their apparent victory over the enemy foot, were unpleasantly surprised when Eumenes' cavalry reappeared on the battlefield in full triumph and were forced to reform in close order. The refugees from the cavalry battle regrouped in the rear of the phalanx, intending to use the firepower of their javelins to break up the enemy cavalry before they reached the solid fence of phalanx sarisae. This was a recognised stratagem against a cavalry charge, one which Arrian himself used in his defence against the heavy Alan cavalry in A.D 135.

It should also be emphasised that Eumenes had captured the enemy baggage train, leaving his antagonists without family, retainers, money or possessions. It is not surprising that they came to terms immediately, exactly as did Eumenes' own argyraspides in 317 B.C. when their ἀποκεκυνή fell into Antigonus' hands. In these circumstances Eumenes' threat to harass them and cut them off from provisions had a very sinister ring. The troops had only the arms they carried and were in no position to live indefinitely off a hostile country. Finally the fragment suggests, as we have seen, that Eumenes had no Macedonian troops in his army. He refers in his ultimatum

33 Plut. Eum. 5.5. The other sources only give the bare fact of the encounter (Diod. 18.29.5; Arr. Succ. fr.1.27; Justin 13.8.4–5).
35 Diod. 19.43.2–9; Plut. Eum. 16.9–18.4; Polyaenus 4.6.13; Justin 14.3.3f. Cf. M. Holleaux, Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques III (Paris 1942) 18–22.
soley to cavalry and light infantry, which were the forces he is attested using in Lydia immediately before the encounter with Neoptolemus. It was only when the phalanx surrendered that he had a nucleus of Macedonians, who even so were far fewer than those in Craterus' army.

The papyrus fragment, then, seems to relate to Eumenes' first battle with Neoptolemus. There are no other plausible candidates. The great battle with Craterus we have already excluded. Subsequently Eumenes fought a campaign in Asia Minor against Antigonus (320), and that campaign was recorded, in part at least, in Book 10 of Arrian's history. But Eumenes then retained a strong nucleus of Macedonians, and there is no report of any parley with the attacking forces. The only alternative which is remotely feasible is some occasion during the mysterious campaign in Lydia before the battle with Neoptolemus. But there is no indication that Antigonus' invading force included Macedonian phalangites or that Eumenes ever risked a pitched battle. The Vatican palimpsest of Arrian suggests rather that he escaped into Greater Phrygia without coming into contact with the enemy. We are left with the cavalry battle against Neoptolemus.

The papyrus fragment is an interesting supplement to Plutarch's skeletal outline. It gives a very full and vivid description, as one would expect in a work as detailed as Arrian's History of the Successors, but unfortunately it is not long enough to shed light on Eumenes' general strategy in 321. What it provides is more detailed and limited information. First, it affords strong corroborative evidence that, whatever its etymological roots, Macedonian was regarded in antiquity as a language separate from and alien to Greek. Secondly, the fragment is eloquent testimony that the phalanx infantry still

---

86 Arr. Succ. fr.25, fol. 235v 6-8: ξυναγαγών τοῦ δὲ ξυνακολουθηκότας αὐτῷ ψιλοῦς καὶ ιππέας. Briant 190 n.8 regards Roos' reading ψιλοῦς as an error, no doubt because Jacoby (FGrHist 156 Ρ 10B) reads ψιλοὺς. But Jacoby followed Reitzenstein's editio princeps of 1888, whereas Roos made his own collation of the Vatican palimpsest and was able to correct many of Reitzenstein's readings. He only recorded variants in Reitzenstein where the reading was uncertain; errors he corrected without notice (Arriani Scripta Minora xxxiii). ψιλοὺς is presumably one of those corrections.

87 Arr. Succ. fr.1.40-45; cf. Plut. Eum. 8.6-9.2; Justin 14.1–2. For Eumenes' Macedonians see Plut. Eum. 8.11, 9.1ff. The battle of Orcyna, fought in early 320 (Diod. 18.40.5–8; Plut. Eum. 9.2–5), fell outside the scope of Arrian's history.

maintained its fearsome reputation. Even when he had the upper hand and was attacking the enemy off their guard, Eumenes still refrained from a frontal charge and preferred to negotiate.

University of Western Australia

June, 1978