Alexander the Lyncestian: the Disloyal Opposition

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Since the life of Alexander the Lyncestian has never received individual treatment,¹ his character has been taken for granted and the curious nature of his career largely ignored. Why did the Lyncestian Alexander, one of the sons of Aeropus, survive nearly six years of his royal Macedonian namesake’s reign, instead of dying with his brothers when Alexander son of Philip took the throne? Any answer to this question must come from an examination of the Lyncestian’s background and career.

No source states that the son of Aeropus was a member of the Lyncestian royal house, but this is generally assumed.² We do know that he was Lyncestian (Diod. 17.32.1, 80.2; Curt. 7.1.5, 8.8.6) and that his father was called Aeropus (Arr. 1.7.6, 17.8).³ He had two

¹ Modern works mentioned in this and the following note will be cited thereafter by author’s name alone. See N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia II (Oxford 1979) 14-17 and passim, and F. Geyer, Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philips II (Historische Zeitschrift Beiheft 19, Oldenbour 1930) 79–82 and passim for Lyncestian history. There is no extensive study of Lyncestian Alexander (see however H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich II [Munich 1926] 17–19), but A. B. Bosworth, “Philip II and Upper Macedonia,” CQ 21 (1971) 93ff, deals with Alexander and his brothers as part of his discussion of the murder of Philip; cf. Z. Rubinsohn in Ancient Macedonia II (Thessalonica 1977) 409–20.

² Bosworth 96 is the only serious doubter. P. A. Brunt, Arrian I (LCL, London/Cambridge 1976) lx, and P. Green, Alexander of Macedon (Hammondsworth 1974) 111, are less than certain. E. Badian, “The Death of Parmenio,” TAPA 91 (1960) 336, and “The Death of Philip,” Phoenix 17 (1963) 248; K. J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte III.2 (Berlin and Leipzig 1923) 77; Berve II 17, 80, 169; Geyer 82; Hammond/Griffith 15; C. B. Welles, Diodorus VIII (LCL, London/Cambridge 1963) 207 n.2; U. Wilcken, Alexander the Great (New York 1967) 61f, all assume that the sons of Aeropus were members of the royal house of Lyncestis. See also Chr. Habicht in Ancient Macedonia II (Thessalonica 1977) 511–16.

³ This was not the Macedonian king of that name, who had a son capable of ruling in 393 b.c. (Beloch 77; Berve II 17; Geyer 82). Whether the Aeropus exiled by Philip (Polyaen. 4.2.3) is identical with the father of the three brothers is difficult to say. R. Lane Fox, Alexander the Great (London 1973) 37, believes this identification and suggests that his exile may have been a motive for revenge by the three brothers. See further Kirchner, RE 1 (1893) 679 s.v. “Aeropus 6,” and J. G. Droysen, Geschichte des Hellenismus I² (Gotha 1877) 83.
brothers, Heromenes and Arrhabaeus, who were executed soon after Philip's death because of alleged complicity in the assassination (Arr. 1.25.1; Just. 11.2.2). Alexander the Lyncestian was married to one of Antipater's daughters (Curt. 7.1.7; Just 11.7.1, 12.14.1). These are the meager certainties about the Lyncestian's background.

There are good reasons for thinking that he was a member of the Lyncestian house. The tendency of the 'vulgate' sources to call him 'the Lyncestian' and the fact that his brother's name Arrhabaeus had dynastic significance are both persuasive. More impressive still are the relations of the sons of Aeropus with Alexander of Macedon. At least one, if not all three, was killed because he was believed to have sought the throne for himself; all three seem to have been executed on charges of plotting against the life of the reigning king. They acted and were treated the way members of the Lyncestian house had historically acted and been treated.

If then they were of Lyncestian royalty, what did membership in that family signify? Philip II had accomplished the long-desired annexation of Lyncestis into the Argead realm. Any Lyncestian who wished to continue traditional opposition to Argead rule had to do so within the much closer confines of direct Macedonian control of

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4 If the sons of Aeropus were members of the royal family of Lyncestis, they may have been related to Eurydice, mother of Philip, and to Leonnatus. The ancestry of Eurydice is controversial. See most recently Habicht 512; Hammond/Griffith 14–16, contra Geyer 138.

5 δυνατή: Diod. 17.32.1, 80.2; Curt. 7.1.5, 8.8.6; Just. 11.7.1. Arrian refers to him by the patronymic. Bosworth 96 n.5 argues against the 'vulgate' usage as evidence, citing as parallel Ptolemy 'Alorites'. But in the case of Ptolemy, who was the son of an Amyntas but not the Amyntas who had been king, the possibility of confusion of patronymics would necessitate some other form of reference. Not so in the case of the Lyncestian, whose patronymic was sufficient to distinguish him from the king.

6 Bosworth 96 and Hammond/Griffith 20 maintain that by the middle of the fourth century the name Arrhabaeus was common outside the royal house of Lyncestis (there was a Lyncestian king of that name in 424/3), but their examples, particularly Bosworth's, are unconvincing. Berve II 80, Geyer 82, and Habicht 513 consider the name persuasive evidence.

7 The sources say that Arrhabaeus and Heromenes were culpable in Philip's death (Arr. 1.25.1; Just. 11.2.1), and that is almost certainly the official reason why they were killed (Diod. 17.2.1; Plut. Alex. 10.4). Lyncestian Alexander was at least suspect in the murder of Philip (Arr. 1.25.2) and probably regarded as guilty (Curt. 7.1.5ff; Just. 11.2.1). Arrian (1.25.3) implies that he wanted to be king himself. Arrian's story about the Thebans mistaking the son of Philip for the son of Aeropus (1.7.6) gives some suggestion of the Lyncestian's status. So does the elaborate care surrounding his arrest (Arr. 1.25.1–10) and Diodorus' stress on his importance (17.32.1).
Lyncestis and the other upland kingdoms. Yet the two factors which had so long protected previous Lyncestians might, even in the era of centralized Macedonian power, help the current Lynce stian scion: aid from foreign powers interested in creating disunity in Macedonia and the chronic contractions of Macedonian royal power.

Whether the sons of Aeropus considered a claim on the Macedonian throne part of their heritage and could realistically have expected support for such a claim (especially one based on a plot against the incumbent’s life)\(^8\) is unclear. Since the beginning of the fifth century the Argead dynasty, with the exception of Ptolemy Alorites usually granted,\(^9\) had had an apparent monopoly on the throne of Macedonia. Nevertheless, several facts suggest that the three brothers were considered contenders for the throne. We know that the Lynce stian dynasty had always been hostile to the Argeads, despite considerable intermarriage among all the upcountry dynasties and the Argeads.\(^10\) I would add that there may well have been a Lynce stian usurper on the Macedonian throne, a certain Aeropus, who reigned \(ca 398/7-ca 395/4\). Aeropus seized the throne by murdering his ward Orestes son of Archelaus (Diod. 14.37.6). Many would deny that Aeropus was Lyncestian, but their arguments are unconvincing and often circular.\(^11\) It is possible therefore that the Lyncestian princes of the later fourth century had a recent model for the seizure of the Macedonian throne by a Lyncestian prince.

\(^8\) Badian, “Parmenio” 325 and “Philip” 248; Berve II 80; J. R. Fears, “Pausanias, the Assassin of Philip II,” Athenaeum 53 (1975) 130 n.63; Welles 121 n.3, 350 n.1, 207 n.2; Wilcken 62, all conclude that the sons of Aeropus must have been possible pretenders to the throne. Bosworth disagrees (96f), citing Harpalus and Perdiccas as examples of scions of other princely houses who were not rivals. This would be more convincing if we knew more about the history of each princely house. Griffith (Hammond/Griffith 686) explicitly denies that the sons of Aeropus could have been pretend ers, but this would seem to contradict Hammond (Hammond/Griffith 16), who says that the royal house of Lyncestis and Macedonia were so closely bound together that Leonnatus’ presumed membership in the Lyncestian house accounts for his being styled ‘royal’ after the death of Alexander (Curt. 10.7.8). This last remark is particularly relevant to the later period, in which there was a dearth of Argeads.

\(^9\) The usurper Ptolemy Alorites, \(ca 368-ca 365\) B.C.: Hammond/Griffith 182 hold him an Argead, but this is contrary to the usual view: see Geyer 128–29.

\(^10\) See Bosworth 99–102; Hammond/Griffith 14–16.

\(^11\) I hope to develop this argument in greater detail elsewhere. The most recent discussion is Hammond/Griffith 134–36, 170. Hammond denies that the usurper Aeropus was Lyncestian, as do Beloch 65, Geyer 107; contra O. Abel, Makedonien vor König Philipp (Leipzig 1847) 5; Droysen 77; Green 11; Kaerst, RE 1 (1893) 679 s.v. “Aeropus 5.”
However this may be, in Macedonian politics, traditional yet fluid, an ambitious man at an opportune moment might dare the unprecedented. According to tradition, the Argeads initially had seized their own realm (Thuc. 2.99). When there were no more Argeads, the Macedonians accepted other dynasties. It is quite another matter whether a Lyncestian, possibly acting without precedent, could expect support and success in an attempt to seize the Macedonian throne. And because our extant narratives are of Roman date, it is possible that the reported designs of the Lyncestians on the throne are nothing more than anachronistic interpretations of writers long conditioned to imperial contenders of distinctly non-royal backgrounds. Yet we know that contemporaries found the ambitions of the brothers plausible. All three were eventually executed, almost certainly for plotting to take the life of the king; and in the case of Alexander, we are told that he was involved in such a plot as a pretender.

Although the Lyncestians apparently were plausible pretenders in the eyes of their contemporaries, they would not ordinarily have been viable ones. So long as there were adequate Argead heirs and relative stability in Macedonia, Lyncestian pretensions would have seemed uninteresting. But after the death of Amyntas son of Perdiccas, the only remaining Argead heirs were the king himself and his mentally deficient half-brother Arrhidaeus. There seems to have been Persian support for plotters and pretenders, especially Lyncestian ones, and there was growing resentment, particularly within the Macedonian aristocracy, of Alexander’s increasingly innovative, anti-traditional kingship. We should expect that the remaining senior Lyncestian, Alexander, became a more important man, or perhaps a more important tool, after the death of Amyntas.

But let us turn to the actual rôle of the Lyncestian house in the years 336 to 330, and first to the assassination of Philip and the

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12 See Berve II 80.
13 Berve II 385–86 for Arrhidaeus. Arrian (1.25.3) reports Darius’ offer of the throne for regicide. Arrian also (2.14.5) has Alexander son of Philip claim in a letter to Darius that Darius had publicly taken reponsibility for Philip’s death (for discussion of the authenticity of the letter see infra n.24). See Badian, “Parmenio” passim, for growing aristocratic resentment of Alexander’s kingship.
14 Green 112 n.4 makes the point that Darius’ standards in Macedonian pretenders might be different from those of Macedonians; plausibility of a pretender varied with time and self-interest.
alleged involvement of the sons of Aeropus. Both Arrian (1.25.1–2) and Curtius (7.1.6–7) allude to Philip’s death and to the Lyncestian brothers while narrating the arrest of Lyncestian Alexander, which occurred considerably later. Arrian says that Heromenes and Arrhabaeus had a part in the murder of Philip, but that the third brother Alexander managed to escape the aitia (either accusation or guilt) of murder because he was the first of the prince’s friends to go to his side, put on his breast plate, and accompany him to the palace. Curtius says it was certain that Lyncestian Alexander had plotted the death of Philip with Pausanias, but because he was the first to salute Alexander as king and because of the influence of his father-in-law Antipater, he escaped punishment if not guilt. Justin (11.2.2) says that the king had those guilty of his father’s death killed at the tomb (that is, those other than the assassin Pausanias), but that he spared one brother because he greeted him first as king. The remaining literary sources are more vague: Plutarch (10.4) says that Alexander punished the guilty; Diodorus says much the same (17.2.1), despite the fact that his previous narrative (16.94.4) implied that Pausanias alone was guilty.15

Currently three different candidates or sets of candidates are cast for the part of chief murderer: Pausanias alone, in search of personal revenge;16 the Lyncestian brothers, infuriated by Philip’s apparent desire to remove his son Alexander, supposedly the Upper Macedonian candidate, from the line of succession;17 and Alexander himself, to salvage his now endangered chance at the throne.18

15 P. Oxy. XV 1798 (FGHist 148), a fragment of an epitome of an Alexander historian of unknown date and identity, gives another kind of testimony. Beginning inside the theater where Philip has apparently just been killed, it mentions the execution of someone for murder. Bosworth 94 n.1 believes it refers to Pausanias; Green 524 n.65 and J. R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London 1976) 223 n.59, think that it refers to the Lyncestian brothers; N. G. L. Hammond, “‘Philip’s Tomb’ in Historical Context,” GRBS 19 (1978) 348, identifies the person executed as a ‘diviner’.
16 Fears (supra n.8) passim; Ellis (supra n.15) 226; K. Kraft, Der “rationale” Alexander (Frankfurter althistorische Studien 5, Kallmünz 1971) 32ff. The personal motivation of Pausanias is strengthened, but the possibility that he was a tool is not thereby weakened.
17 Bosworth 93–105. His arguments have not been accepted. See Green 525 n.73; Ellis (supra n.15) 223 n.59; Fears (supra n.8) 132 n.69; Hammond/Griffith 688; Lane Fox (supra n.3) 504. Exchanging an heir with some Epirote blood for one with merely Lyncestian and Illyrian would not seem sufficient motive for an Upper Macedonian conspiracy.
18 Badian, “Philip” passim. See Ellis (supra n.15) 226 and Hammond/Griffith 677–90 for recent arguments against Badian’s thesis. But the evidence (esp. Arr. 3.6.5) for continued tension between father and son is substantial.
While Alexander and Olympias, and probably Antipater, still appear the most likely group to lie behind Pausanias, it cannot be certain; there is, however, considerable agreement that the Lyncestians are unlikely to have been involved.

What is most curious in the aftermath of the murder of Philip is the pardon of one son of Aeropus, Alexander, and the execution of the other two. Whether the king killed them because they had really threatened the throne, because they were troublemakers and possible supporters of rival claimants, because he needed scapegoats, or some combination of these, the son of Philip obviously found it convenient to be rid of them. Why did he not find it convenient to be rid of the third brother as well? The influence of his father-in-law Antipater is not a sufficient answer. In-laws were rather expendable among Macedonian aristocrats, as the careers of Parmenio, Coenus, Cleander, and later Antipater himself amply demonstrate. We must have it the wrong way round: Lyncestian Alexander was not saved by Antipater's influence, but he must have married Antipater's daughter because he had influence.

The answer must lie with the other reason given for the young king's pardon of the one son of Aeropus: his support of the prince at a crucial moment, a support which seems to have been both political and (according to Arrian) military. Sparing the life of a man widely believed to be guilty of Philip's murder—let alone promoting him as Alexander later did—must have been very embarrassing and therefore very necessary. So Alexander of Macedon compromised: he eliminated two of the troublesome Lyncestians but allowed the third to buy his survival. Apparently the continued support of Lyncestian Alexander was also valuable: he was first governor of Thrace and later commander of the important Thessalian cavalry (Arr. 1.25.2).

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19 Bosworth 105 and J. R. Ellis, "Amyntas Perdikka, Philip II, and Alexander the Great," JHS 91 (1971) 24, think Alexander was foolish to risk Upper Macedonian unrest by the executions; but whether or not Alexander was responsible for his father's death, he needed plausible scapegoats, and plausible candidates were likely to be important. It was a calculated risk which paid off.

20 Badian, "Philip" 248, suggests that Lyncestian Alexander's quick act of homage to the king was the result of Antipater's prior warning; Green 112 attributes it to shrewd character evaluation. Fears (supra n.8) 130 n.62 prefers to think they really were friends.

21 Bosworth 103 remarks that whatever Lyncestian troubles there were when Philip
The détente between the two Alexanders may have begun to fail almost as soon as it was made. Considerable evidence exists to tie the Lyncestian house to an apparent attempt by Amyntas son of Perdiccas to replace his cousin as king. Amyntas was executed not long after the death of Philip (Curt. 6.9.17; Just. 12.6.14). A series of inscriptions, now dated to this period, suggest that Amyntas son of Perdiccas, Amyntas son of Antiochus, and Aristomedes of Pherae were soliciting support for the Argead Amyntas in Thebes and apparently demanding that Amyntas be given the title of king.\textsuperscript{22} Both the son of Antiochus and Aristomedes later deserted to Darius, most probably because of their involvement in this conspiracy (Arr. 1.17.9; Curt. 3.9.3).

Two pieces of evidence link the Lyncestians to Amyntas' attempt: a statement of Plutarch (\textit{de Alex. fort.} 327c) that after the death of Philip "all Macedonia was festering with revolt and looking toward Amyntas and the children of Aeropus,"\textsuperscript{23} and a passage in Arrian (1.25.3) which reveals that when Amyntas son of Antiochus deserted to Darius he carried with him a letter from Lyncestian Alexander, in response to which Darius offered the son of Aeropus the throne of Macedonia in return for the death of the incumbent.\textsuperscript{24} Thus the separatist Lyncestians appear to have supported a rival Argead claimant to the throne. Lyncestian Alexander's own chances for was murdered would have involved only the nobility, not the rank and file; yet Arrian (1.25.5) implies that Lyncestian Alexander had considerable appeal to the common soldiers, not Lyncestian in this case. The sparing of Lyncestian Alexander may also have been an attempt to retain the appearance of fairness, paralleling the king's later treatment of the sons of Andromenes (who also had an influential in-law) after the elimination of Philotas. See Berve II 26f, 92f, 322, 353f for references.

\textsuperscript{22} Ellis (\textit{supra} n.19) 16–19 and \textit{passim}, first dated these inscriptions to the period after the death of Philip. This view has been challenged by Hammond/Griffith 651 n.1, 703–04, but Ellis' view seems more persuasive.

\textsuperscript{23} Badian, "Philip" 249 n.26, Hammond/Griffith 686 attribute this information to rhetorical invention, based on inference about the executions of the three men. But see J. R. Hamilton, \textit{Plutarch, Alexander} (Oxford 1969) xxxiii, for the view that the facts in this speech, as opposed to interpretation, are likely to be correct.

\textsuperscript{24} Arrian (2.14.5) and Curtius (4.1.12) also mention a letter of Alexander to Darius in which he claims that Philip was murdered by men suborned by Darius, as Darius himself claimed. See Fears (\textit{supra} n.8) 112 n.4 for references to the debate on the authenticity of this and other letters. Even if the letter is genuine, it shows only that the Persian king took advantage of an obvious propaganda opportunity, and so did Alexander. See n.27 for the possibility that a nephew of Lyncestian Alexander was involved in the candidacy of Amyntas.
the throne were much improved by the death of the son of Perdiccas. But the son of Aeropus managed to escape immediate implication in the conspiracy, despite the great likelihood of his involvement or at least complicity.

Lyncestian Alexander’s remarkable success and early prominence in Alexander’s reign proved transitory: he was deposed, arrested, and ultimately executed. Our sources disagree not only about the date of the Lyncestian’s arrest but also about the reasons for it. Arrian (1.25.1–10, apparently followed by Just. 11.7.1–2) says that Lyncestian Alexander was arrested around Phaselis in the winter of 334/3 because of information received from Parmenio. Parmenio had intercepted a Persian messenger Sisines and sent him on to the king. Sisines revealed that Darius was soliciting the son of Aeropus to kill the king, offering in return the throne of Macedonia and a thousand talents. Darius’ intercepted message would appear to be a response to a letter from the Lyncestian sent via Amyntas son of Antiochus. Arrian never directly states that the original letter was treasonous, but the implication is strong. Diodorus (17.32.1–2) places the arrest in fall 333, not long before the battle of Issus, and blames it on a warning from Olympias. Curtius knew both versions: he says (7.1.6) that Lyncestian Alexander was killed in 330 in the third year of his captivity (i.e., Diodorus’ date), but he seems to have recounted the arrest prior to 333, in one of his lost books.25

The idea that both stories, with minor adjustments, are true—that Lyncestian Alexander was merely relieved of office in 334 and arrested in 333—remains the best solution to this puzzle,26 despite serious objections.27 There is no inherent reason to value the

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25 Curtius may have conflated the two versions: see Brunt 520f.
26 Berve II 18 and 29 separates the demotion and arrest in order to resolve the seeming contradiction. Both Diodorus (17.32.1) and Curtius (10.1.40) imply that more than one factor caused the Lyncestian’s arrest.
27 Brunt 521 argues against rejection of Arrian’s arrest date of 334 (1.25.10). He sees no reason for Ptolemy or Aristobulus to conceal or distort, and he doubts Berve’s attribution (II 29f) of Amyntas son of Arrhabaeus to the Lyncestian family, and therefore doubts that this man’s continuation in high command for some time after winter 334/3 proves that Lyncestian Alexander was not yet under arrest. Granted that the identification of Amyntas and Neoptolemus (a man who fled to Darius possibly because of the conspiracy of Amyntas son of Perdiccas: Arr. 1.20.10, Berve II 273) as the sons of Arrhabaeus brother of Alexander is not certain (so Bosworth 96 n.4 as well), it is reasonable and usually accepted (Droysen [supra n.3] 102; Ellis [supra n.19] 22; Lane Fox [supra n.3] 147). Arrian or his sources may have simplified a complex situation: Arr. 1.25.10 is less than clear—why was a return messenger to Parmenio necessary before the arrest?
testimony of one source over the other, and indeed Diodorus himself implies that the Lyncestian’s position worsened only gradually: “There were many other plausible circumstances joining to support the charge, and so the Lyncestian was arrested” (17.32.2). It is not surprising that Diodorus considered Olympias’ vague warning unlikely to have been the only precipitant of such dramatic action. Thus in the nine to ten months from winter 334 to fall 333, the position of the son of Aeropus worsened, because of both Parmenio’s and Olympias’ actions. By the fall of 333 the son of Aeropus was without honor and in chains.

Arrian’s version is full of mysterious melodrama. The messenger himself is forwarded under guard; a meeting of the king’s close associates reveals that they had long considered the son of Aeropus dangerously untrustworthy as a man of high rank; Craterus’ brother Amphoterus is sent in disguise to Parmenio bearing a message from the king too explosive to entrust to writing. Only after all this is the Lyncestian arrested. It is unlikely that this story is fiction. The probable plot of Amyntas son of Perdiccas and its connection, via Amyntas son of Antiochus, to Lyncestian Alexander hold out the possibility of independent corroboration, corroboration which Diodorus’ story lacks. The extreme caution and secrecy with which the king and his friends proceeded and their fear of the Lyncestian’s ability to cause a revolt confirm the supposition that the son of Aeropus was a very important man indeed. The implication seems strong that the son of Aeropus, now arguably the most plausible available pretender, was at least considering Darius’ offer.

Diodorus’ version is most notable for its vagueness. He too stresses the high status and the position of trust the Lyncestian enjoyed. Olympias’ well known enmity to Antipater and his family makes the story plausible. Finding Olympias and Parmenio on the same side of a quarrel is surprising, but this may testify more to the Lyncestian’s importance than to any cooperation between the two. And Parmenio always had reason to be wary of any friend of Antipater.

28 Green 112 n.4 and 220 suggests that either the Persians or Parmenio could have fabricated the whole incident. He imagines that Parmenio resented the appointment of Lyncestian Alexander to the command of his favorite Thessalian cavalry and that he trumped up charges to remove this son-in-law of Antipater. His suggestion is possible but not likely, and would certainly have involved considerable risk to Parmenio. We do not know that the Lyncestian was not his choice.

29 17.32.1, where φρόνημα may refer to his arrogance or presumption.
Just as Alexander son of Aeropus had earlier managed to survive the executions of his brothers, in some curious manner he managed to survive the ruin of his career, killed only years after his arrest (no matter which date is preferred). He was executed in 330, in the midst of the crisis over the fall of Philotas. Arrian omits mention of his execution, and Justin (12.14.1–2) refers to it only in passing. Diodorus (17.80.2) and Curtius (7.1.5–9) give similar accounts, although Curtius' is more elaborate. Lyncestian Alexander is brought forward just after the death of Philotas, proves all but speechless, and is immediately killed by nearby soldiers. Diodorus attributes the long delay between arrest and execution to the influence of Antipater; Curtius (7.1.7) says vaguely that resentment against him had been growing and that the present danger revived memory of the past danger; and Justin (11.7.2) mentions fear of revolt as the deterrent for execution.

Why did Alexander's death not happen four or three years before, and why did it finally come in the midst of the purge of Parmenio's faction? The need for Lyncestian support and only secondarily the influence of Antipater had saved the Lyncestian's life in 336; the same factors, but in reverse order of importance, prolonged his life until 330, when the declining significance of both factors made his execution possible. By 330 the king, far away in Asia, could end the calculated risk he had taken in preserving the Lyncestian's life: no special necessity required Lyncestian support. The king did continue to require the cooperation of Antipater, but much less than in 336. Darius was dead, and Agis too; the great victories were won. The king still needed the reinforcements Antipater could provide, but fear of Greek and Macedonian revolt no longer loomed large. Just as it has been argued that the king felt strong enough in 330 to do without Parmenio, so it can be said that Alexander no longer had special cause to do favors for Antipater. Nor is there reason to think that this particular son-in-law would have had any further usefulness for the old man. Yet the death of Lyncestian Alexander

30 An interesting omission: Brunt 520f is unconvincing in denying that this is suppression by Ptolemy or Aristobulus.
31 He actually gives the name Antigonus, but this is almost certainly a mistake for Antipater: cf. Welles 350 n.1.
32 See Badian, “Parmenio” 328ff, for Parmenio. Ellis (supra n.19) 23f underestimates the importance of Antipater in the years 334–330, but may be correct in surmising that the king feared to exacerbate the existing tensions in Upper Macedonia.
must have troubled Antipater in much the same way as the death of Parmenio doubtless did, not out of affection for either man but because of what their deaths implied about the changing order and particularly about Antipater’s deteriorating relations with the king (Diod. 17.118.1; Just. 12.14.1–2).

The connection of the death of Lyncestian Alexander to the ‘conspiracy’ of Philotas is only indirect. The son of Aeropus is unlikely to have been the chosen figurehead of Parmenio’s faction, for it is unlikely that Parmenio was planning anything which required a figurehead. The king took the occasion of the trial of Philotas, and the general alienation in the ranks of the aristocracy which it attempted to check, to remove the most obvious candidate of any group wishing to vent its anger against the king. The Lyncestian may have been eliminated as a preventive measure, a measure now taken with little risk. The removal of the Lyncestian ought to be seen in the context of the more general change in relations between the king and his nobles signaled by the trial of Philotas and the murder of Parmenio.

Alexander son of Aeropus remains a shadowy figure. We do not have enough information to be sure of his motivation and intentions. He seems to have eluded dishonor and destruction by very quick and clever action; he may have flirted with the idea of taking the throne himself, and that possibility proved his downfall. It was years, however, before the king deemed his death unlikely to produce serious repercussions. Even after years in chains, the Lyncestian apparently was judged safer dead. By then he was either too bitter or too demoralized to defend himself; he knew it would not have mattered. We may not know enough about him to solve with certainty the problem of his improbably long survival, but once it is not taken for granted, his importance and influence seem unquestionable.

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33 Berve II 19, Hamilton (n.23) 138, Welles 350 n.1, Habicht 513–14, all agree about Alexander’s dangerous eligibility for the rôle of figurehead; see in contrast W. Heckel, “The Conspiracy against Philotas,” Phoenix 31 (1977) 21, and Badian, “Parmenio” 336. Despite Green 349, the use of the Lyncestian in this manner by Parmenio is unlikely; cf. Badian, “Parmenio” passim, and Heckel 9–21. On the Atarrhias whom Curtius (6.8.19; 7.1.5) names as a party in the arrest of Philotas and as the man who requested the ‘trial’ of Lyncestian Alexander, see Berve II 90.