Phthonos and Parphasis:
The Argument of Nemean 8.19–34

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In the second triad of Pindar’s Eighth Nemean Ode, composed to celebrate a victory in the double-stade race won by Deinis of Aegina, the poet announces a rhetorical pause (19–22):

ισταμαι δή ποσσὶ κούφως, ἀμπνέων τε πρὶν τι φάμεν.
πολλὰ γὰρ πολλὰ λέλεκται, νεαρὰ δ’ ἐξεν-
ρόντα δόμεν βασάνῳ
ἐς ἔλεγχον, ἃπας κίνδυνος· ὄψιν δὲ λόγοι φθονεροῦσιν,
άπτεται δ’ ἐσθὼν ἀεὶ, χειρόνεσσι δ’ οὐκ ἐρίζει.

Of these lines and the account of Ajax’s suicide that follows E. L. Bundy offers, in passing, this interpretation:

In N. 8.19–22, thought of the criticism (φθόνος) which his praise may evoke among the enemies of Deinis induces him to pause (19–22), even to illustrate the dangers of praising a man among his peers (23–34), before he can confidently return to his task.¹

On this view the “something” (τι) that the poet is drawing breath to say, the “new things” (νεαρά) that he is hesitating to submit to his audience for judgement, pertain neither to Ajax nor to Cinyras² but

¹ E. L. Bundy, Studia Pindarica I (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1962) 40. The text of Pindar used throughout is that of H. Maehler (Leipzig 1971).
² According to the great majority of commentators, from the scholia onward, Pindar is concerned here with the introduction into traditional stories of original elements that, precisely because they depart from the standard account, are likely to be seized upon by the ill-disposed as a pretext for captious criticism. Those who take νεαρά as looking forward to the Ajax story are notably unable to agree on what can safely be labeled ‘new’ in Pindar’s version; cf. F. Mezger, Pindar Signeslieder (Leipzig 1880) 328; J. B. Bury, The Nemean Odes of Pindar (London/New York 1890) 147; A. M. Fennell, Pindar: The Nemean and Isthmian Odes² (Cambridge 1899) 103; C. Gaspar, Essai de chronologie pindarique (Brussels 1900) 43; L. R. Farnell, The Works of Pindar I (London 1932) 215–16; N. O. Brown, “Pindar, Sophocles, and the Thirty Years’ Peace,” TAPA 82 (1951) 15; J. Finley, Pindar and Aeschylus (Cambridge [Mass.] 1955) 155. C. M. Bowra, Pindar (Oxford 1962) 344, even concludes, as it were in desperation, that Pindar in fact has nothing new to say and is merely “making excuses for telling an old story again.” Others follow the scholia (32a [III 143 Drachmann]) in referring νεαρά backward to Cinyras: L. Dissen in A. Boeckh, Pindari Carmina II (Leipzig 1821) 445; W. Christ, Pindari Carmina (Leipzig 1896) 295; F. Arnaldi, Strut-
to the victor himself; the λόγοι upon which the envious feast with such relish are neither mythographically innovative stories nor malicious slander but words of praise; and the relation of the ἀψευδον clause to what precedes is, logically if not formally, explicative, defining wherein the “danger” faced by the poet consists. Although Bundy’s reading preserves continuity of thought throughout the passage and accounts for the introduction of phthonos as a topic of discourse without resorting to conjectures about politics or literary intrigue, it requires elaboration and clarification on several points. If W. J. Slater is right (and I believe he is) in saying that Pindar’s epinicians “proceed step by step building argument on argument as impressions accrue from preceding lines” and that “the establishing of the argument throughout the ode is the minimum prerequisite for an interpretation of an ode,” then the minimum work required for Nemean 8, at least as regards its second triad, has not been completed. Our present task is threefold: to show that νεαρά can allude, in context, to Deinis’ victory as a poetic subject; to define the ‘danger’ inherent in the treatment of such subjects; and to determine the precise rhetorical function or functions of the Ajax exemplum.

3 According to A. Köhnken, Die Funktion des Mythos bei Pindar (Berlin/New York 1971: hereafter ‘Köhnken’) 30–33, lines 19–21 (through ἀπεις κύδωνος) are an entirely self-contained variant of the ‘εἰρήνηες-Μοτίφ’, in which the poet summons up the energy and courage required for the production of a new song (thus νεαρά= “jedes neue Lied”), and the ἐκ of line 21, far from signaling any connection with what precedes, announces the introduction of a completely independent thought (“Neider ergötzen sich an missgünstigen Worten”), in which the ‘envy’ at issue is that evoked in others by the athlete’s success and the ‘words’ in which the envious take greedy delight are their own malicious attacks on his character and achievement. Köhnken himself admits (30, 33), however, that the identification of the λογί as the “missgünstigen Worten” of the envious becomes clear only retrospectively, with the reflections on ἔχθρα πάρθενος in 32–34. Pindar’s hearers were indubitably sophisticated in the conventions of epinician argument, but he can scarcely have expected them to suspend their interpretation of ἀψευδον ἐκ λόγοι φθονεροῖς for eleven lines when an eminently reasonable hypothesis—that λόγοι refers, like λέλεκται in the preceding line, to poetic activity and its products—lies immediately to hand.

4 The sharp break in thought involved in Köhnken’s interpretation is veiled in his paraphrase (31–32) by ten lines of intercalated ratiocination in small type. The steps he expects Pindar’s listeners to work out for themselves in the interval of several seconds seem too many and too complex to be credited: (1) Every new song involves danger. (2) Why? Because it is always difficult to achieve the proper matching of word and deed. (3) What in fact should the poet’s attitude toward his subject be? (4) Not that of the phthetairoi, certainly, who . . .

5 On the traditional historicistic interpretations see Köhnken 19–23.

As regards the meaning of *νεαρά*, the first fact to be observed is that the rhetorical and logical structure of lines 20–21 not only sets up a contrast between two categories of poetic subject matter but also implies that these categories are mutually exclusive; in other words, the “new things that it is dangerous to submit to the touchstone for testing” evidently have not, like the *πολλά*, been previously treated in a variety of modes, while the “many things that have been said in many ways” are evidently not *νεαρά* but *πολλά*. Once these logical implications are grasped it becomes obvious that Pindar is here concerned, as so often, with the contrast between ancient and contemporary themes of song. The general human preference for the contemporary as a subject of discourse (formulated as early as *Od.* 1.351–52, τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπικλέονος ἀνθρώποι, ἦ τις ἀκούντεσσι νεωτάτη ἄμφιβελται) is found as a *topos* throughout the odes. In *Isthmian* 7.16ff, for example, it motivates the transition from the “ancient grace” (*πολλά* χάρις) of Thebes’ “earlier native glories” (1–2, τῶν πάροσ ... καλῶν ἐπιχωρίων) to the occasion of Strepsiades’ present victory in the pancratium. In *Nemean* 6.53ff the poet concludes a brief eulogy of the Aeacids in general and of Achilles in particular by remarking that although the deeds of the Aeginetan heroes provided ancient poets (*πολλοί τεροι*) with ample material for song, material in which he himself takes zealous interest, at the moment his attention is and must be claimed by “the wave that rolls nearest to the mainsheet of my ship”—the victory, in other words, of Alcimidas at Nemea. In *Pythian* 8.21–34 lack of time and the threat of tedium dictate that the “whole long tale” of Aegina’s heroic and historical past (cf. 25, δοξᾶς ἀπ’ ἀρχαῖς) be set aside in favor of what lies to hand as “the most recent of glories” (33, νέωτατον καλῶν), Aristomenes’ success in wrestling. This last passage is of particular relevance to *Nemean* 8.20, not only because it provides in *νέωτατον* an unambiguous gloss on *νεαρά* but because in 25–28 (πολλοῖσι μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶδεται κτλ.) it presents fully developed the *praeteritio* that is merely implicit in *πολλά* γὰρ πολλά λέεκται.

As regards the association of *neara* with *phthonos*, the passages just cited all suggest in their different ways that contemporary themes offer a poet at least one distinct advantage over ancient: they produce a far more immediate and intense response in his audience. Inextricably linked with this heightened interest and emotional involvement, however, is a correspondingly heightened risk of touching people too nearly and giving offense. So Penelope, grieving for a loss that she feels peculiarly her own (*Od.* 1.342, ἐπεί μὲ μάλιστα καθίκε-
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to σένθος ἄλαστον), attempts to divert Phemius from the tale of the Achaean Returns to other less painful themes in the bardic repertoire; in doing so, as Telemachus points out, she is “begrudging” (346, φθονεῖς) the poet his freedom of choice and feeling “indignation” (350, νέμεσις) when such a response is inappropriate. And when the treatment of contemporary themes is explicitly laudatory in intent, the danger of arousing dissatisfaction and disapproval is, given human nature, even greater than in the situation imagined by Homer. Aristotle remarks (Rh. 2.10.5) that “people envy those who are near them in time, place, age, and reputation” (τοὺς γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν), and it is a commonplace of encomiastic rhetoric that earlier generations are free from the grudging malice that plagues the living. Pindar himself provides an example in Paeon 2.56, ὁ δὲ ἐχθρὰ νοήσας ἡδη φθόνος οἴχεται τῶν πάλαι προβανόντων, with which one may compare Thucydides 2.45, φθόνοις γὰρ τοὺς ἐωσι πρὸς τὸ ἀντίπαλον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐμποδῶν ἀνανταγωνιστῶν εὐνοία τετίμηται.⁷

neapá refers, then, neither to originality in mythic narrative nor to ‘new song’ in general but to a specific category of subject matter.⁸ Unlike legendary or historical material, which is emotionally neutral, as it were, and thus susceptible of great variety of treatment, contemporary themes require in their presentation considerable circumspection and tact if they are to “pass the test” with an audience. In light of the conventional (and, one might add, psychologically accurate) association between the praise of contemporaries and the evocation of phthonos, the logical function of the δψφν clause is now confirmed as unambiguously explicative of what precedes;⁹ the handling of nea is dangerous because such discourse is a “tasty tidbit for the envious,” to be seized upon eagerly and torn apart. Since Pindar’s concern is less with any particular set of phthoneroi than with the emotion itself as a general human constant, however, he leaves his listeners to supply the abstract noun as the grammatical subject of the following

⁷ Cf. Dem. 18.315, 19.313. In his dedicatory preface to The Faerie Queene Spenser writes: “I chose the historye of king Arthure, as most fitte for the excellency of his person, being made famous by many mens former works [cf. πολλά γὰρ πολλά λέλεκται], and also furthest from the danger of enuy, and suspition of present time.”

⁸ Rhetorical context is the determinative factor here; elsewhere ‘newness’ can have different connotations. Mythographical innovation may be at issue in Ol. 9.48–49 (cf. schol. 86c), musical innovation in Ol. 3.4. For ἐξευρόντα denoting the ‘discovery’ of material for song (εὑρέσεις, inventio) cf. Nem. 6.54, Pyth. 1.60, fr. 122.14, on which see B. A. van Groningen, Pindare au banquet (Leiden 1960) 37.

⁹ On ὁ δὲ ἀντί τού γὰρ see W. J. Slater, Lexicon to Pindar (Berlin 1969) s.v. δὲ 2.h, and J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (Oxford 1954) 169–70.
gnomē, that which “always attacks the noble but has no quarrel with the man who is inferior.” A compliment is of course intended toward Deinis, who by implication is included among the esloi so vulnerable to hostility and malice.

Thus far Bundy’s assertion that in Nemean 8.19–34 “the hesitation is prompted by fear of detraction aimed against the victor” is borne out by the evidence. But what of the account (23–27) of Ajax’s suicide?

κέινος καὶ Τελαμώνος δάψευ νιόν,
φασιγνώ αμφικυλίσταις.
η' τιν' ἀγλωσσον μέν, ἠτορ δ' ἀλκιμον, λάθα κατέχει
ἐν λυγρῷ νείκει' μέγιστον δ' αἴόλω ψεύ-
δει γέρας ἀντέταται.
κρυφέαι γάρ ἐν ψάφοις Ὀδυσσῆ Θαναοί θεράπευσαν:
χρυσόν δ' Ἀἴας στερθεῖς ὑπελών φόνῳ πάλαισεν.

The fact that κέινος points—and presumably can only point—to the unexpressed singular subject (φθόνος) of ἀπτεται and ἐριζει establishes at the outset one function of the exemplum at least: to illustrate Pindar’s claim that the superior man rather than the inferior is envy’s chosen victim. The category of eslos alone is overtly represented in line 23, but an audience familiar with the story of Ajax’s death will instantly identify Odysseus as the second (and as yet unspecified) member of the antithesis, the cheiron with whom envy has no quarrel. That such is Pindar’s intention is, given Odysseus’ notoriety as a master of lies, immediately confirmed by the terms in which the antithesis is reformulated in 24–25, which emphatically assert as a general truth (note the asseverative ἦ and the indefinite τινά) that when excellence of character is coupled, as often it is, with inarticulateness, it finds itself helpless to ward off envy’s attack or to press its claim to recognition, with the result that the “greatest prize” is given not to genuine worth but to specious plausibility, αἰόλω ψευδείς.

In 26–27 general statement is once again clarified by specific example and the eslos/cheiron antithesis is reformulated yet again, in reversed order and with the substitution of proper names. I stress the reiteration of the antithesis because it establishes an important point that has been generally overlooked: the phthonos at issue in the first part of the exemplum is the Danaans’ envy and not that of Odysseus, whose implied or overt syntactical rôle in 25–26 (indirect object of ἀντέταται, direct object of θεράπευσαν) portrays him rather as the benefi-

10 Cf. schol. 37, ἀπὸ τῶν φθονοῦντων ἐπὶ τῶν φθόνον μετήγαγε τὸν λόγον.
11 Bundy (supra n.1) 31 n.75.
ciary than as the architect or instigator of Ajax’s disgrace, though of course αἰώλῳ ἴεΰδει hints at his contribution. The point of κρύφαισι is not that Οδυσσέα falsified the votes but simply that the Danaans reached their decision by secret ballot—with the additional implication that it was the very secrecy of the process, the freedom from the restraint of public opinion, that encouraged them to indulge their envious spite against Ajax’s patent excellence. 12

At this juncture the poet, no longer able to contain his indignation, bursts out (28–34):

hydrate ἑτᾶν ἀνόμωι α γε δάουσιν ἐν θερμῷ χρῷ
ἐλκεα ρήξαι πελεμῳμένοι
ὑπ’ ἀλέξμιβρότων
λόγχα, τα μὲν ἄμφ᾽ Ἀχιλεῖ νεοκτόνῳ,
ἄλκω ει τε μόχθων ἐν πολυθόροις
ἀμέραις. ἐχθραὶ δ᾽ ἄρα πάρφασις ἤν καὶ πάλαι,
ἀμύλων μύθων ὀμόφοι-
tος, δολοφραδῆς, κακοποιοῦν ὄνειδος,
α τὸ μὲν λαμπρὸν βιάται,
τῶν δ᾽ ἀφάντων κύδος ἀντείνει σαθρόν.

How is it possible that in awarding Achilles’ armor as they did the Danaans could overlook or willfully ignore Ajax’s intrinsic superiority as a warrior, a superiority reflected in the manifestly unequal effect (ἀνόμωια γε . . . ἐλκεα) that the two men had on the Trojan adversary? The poet announces, with an ἄρα in which inference and ‘enlightenment’ 13 seem to be combined, that only one conclusion is possible: in the heroic age too (καὶ πάλαι), not merely nowadays, a malicious power above and beyond man’s innate, untutored phthonos must have been at work—a power that he calls πάρφασις.

The verb παράφημι from which πάρφασις is derived seems to have two distinct meanings depending on the force of the prepositional prefix. In Homeric usage the παρά clearly retains its original spatiality (‘alongside’); both noun and verb denote, in morally neutral fashion, a process of ‘bringing over to one’s side through speech’ whereby a person is induced to change his state of mind or course of action. 14 A more specialized sense of ‘erotic persuasion’ or ‘seduc-

13 Denniston (supra n.9) 35–36; and cf. Carey (supra n.12) 32.
14 Cf. ll. 1.555 and 577, 11.793, 15.404, 24.771, Od. 2.189; not coincidentally associated with forms of τρέπω in ll. 6.61–62, 12.249, Hes. Theog. 89–90. Only in Od. 16.287 (=19.6) does παρφάσθαι have (in context) connotations of deceit.
tion' is apparent in *Iliad* 14.217, where "parphasis that cozens the minds even of the wise" is listed as one of the θελκτήρια in Aphrodite's girdle; and this presumably is the meaning of the participle as applied to Hippolyta's solicitation of Peleus in *Nemean* 5.31–32, πολλὰ γὰρ νῦν παντὶ θυμῷ παρφάμενα λιτάνευεν. In the other two Pindaric uses, however, *Olympian* 7.65–66 (θεῶν δ' ὥρκον μέγαν μὴ παρφάμεν) and *Pythian* 9.43 (παρφάμεν τούτων λόγους), the prefix quite clearly has the metaphorical sense of 'amiss' or 'wrongly' that is apparent in verbs like παράγω or παρακούω, and the compound must be rendered ‘misspeak’ or ‘utter insincerely’.

How then are we to translate πάρφασις in *Nemean* 8.32? ‘Perversion of truth’, ‘deformation’, ‘misrepresentation’ and the like do justice to one aspect of the word and are apparently confirmed by the characterization of *parphasis* as δολοφραδής (‘contriver of guile’), as well as by αἰώλῳ ἡσύχει eight lines earlier. ‘Persuasion’, on the other hand, is strongly suggested by the phrase αἰμύλων μύθων ἀμόφωτος, in which the “flattering words” recall, prejudicially, the “soft words” (μαλακοῦσι ἐπέσεσί) so closely associated with *parphasis* in epic diction. A plausible inference is that Pindar intends both senses to be understood in a single notion of ‘persuasion through the misrepresentation of facts’. Since Odysseus is no less famous for his consummate effectiveness as an orator than he is for his skill at telling lies, the audience will have no difficulty in discerning that here at last he emerges with an active rôle in the drama. Despite the temptations of the secret ballot it is possible that, left to themselves, the Danaans might have controlled their phthonos out of some vestigial sense of shame or self-respect; but Odysseus so worked upon them with artful argument and innuendo that they were eventually persuaded to cast public norms aside and give free vent to private grievance. Though *parphasis* is like *phthonos* in reversing the true hierarchy of value, “doing violence to the illustrious and lifting up the rotten glory of the obscure,” this similarity should not lead us to identify or conflate the two; they are conceptually

15 Bury *(supra n.2) 155; J. Duchemin, *Pindare, poète et prophète* (Paris 1955) 162 n.3; Slater *(supra n.9) s.v. πάρφασις.


17 As does Köhnken 30: "φθόνος und πάρφασις gehören zusammen; die Verben [in 22 and 34] deutlich machen, setzt Pindar die beiden Begriffe praktisch gleich.” Later he suggests that the subject to be supplied in 22 is “ein Begriff wie φθονερά πάρφασις” (33). Of course *parphasis* may well be motivated by *phthonos*, as no doubt it was in the case of Odysseus; but that does not justify us in regarding them as synonymous. Cf. E. L. Bundy, “The ‘Quarrel Between Kallimachos and Apollonios’.” *CSCA* 5 (1972) 90 n.111: “In the judgment of distinction in meaning and not in the dissolving of near resemblances into one homogeneous appearance lies the critic’s task.”
distinct, though no doubt allied psychologically, and it is their interaction that issued in tragedy for Ajax and that rouses the poet to such impassioned denunciation.\textsuperscript{18}

In the end, then, the Ajax passage has a double function. As introduced, it is designed to demonstrate the fearsome power of envy and thus indirectly to "illustrate the dangers of praising a man among his peers"—not because such praise plays any rôle in the story\textsuperscript{19} but because according to encomiastic convention (and the laws of human nature) people are particularly prone to envy "those who are near them in time, place, age, and reputation." In the course of the exemplum, however, the focus of attention shifts from \textit{phthonos}, the instinctive hostility of the ordinary toward the exceptional, to \textit{parphasis}, the deliberate abuse of language for malicious and destructive ends.\textsuperscript{20} Correlative with this shift is a transformation in the paradigmatic significance of Odysseus. Introduced as an example of the undeserving \textit{laudandus}, the cheiron who receives the recognition due to his betters, he stands revealed at the end as an example of the corrupt or perverse rhetorician who uses his intellectual and verbal skills not to praise and defend virtue but to legitimize man's basest impulses and so subvert and undermine established social and ethical standards.

The duality of function in the Ajax exemplum proves pivotal, moreover, in the unfolding of Pindar's argument through the ode as a whole. Having moved by gradual stages from general reflections on the power of Hora to the particular facts that specify the epinician occasion (1–18), the poet hesitates to speak further on the subject of Deinis' victory because he fears the envy that \textit{arete} all too often arouses in human hearts (19–22). Subjecting that psychological phenomenon to ethical analysis through the medium of traditional paradigms (23–34), he discovers another and perhaps even more dangerous enemy of excellence in \textit{parphasis}, the exploitation and manipulation of human weakness by unprincipled rhetorical skill. While the

\textsuperscript{18} On \textit{σαθρόν} and the effect of its position in line 34 see Carey (supra n.12) 33. I follow Bury (supra n.2) 155, Finley (supra n.2) 154, G. Méautis, \textit{Pindare le dorian} (Neuchatel 1962) 340, in taking \textit{διείσδος} as a concrete 'matter of reproach', 'disgrace', 'shame' rather than as an active 'reproach', 'blame', 'censure'; see, however, G. Nagy, \textit{The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry} (Baltimore/London 1979) 226–28. The common rendering 'slander', 'calumny' (e.g. Fennell [supra n.2] 104; E. Myers, \textit{The Odes of Pindar} [London 1892] 132; C. M. Bowra, \textit{The Odes of Pindar} [London 1969] 216) is perhaps à propos to the context but misrepresents the ordinary meaning of the word.

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. Köhnken 31.

\textsuperscript{20} The shift is noted by E. Thummer, \textit{Die isthmischen Gedichte} I (Heidelberg 1968) 99.
first danger pertains chiefly to the audience and their emotional re-
sponse, the second inheres in the poet’s own capacity for effective
speech; thus it is above all Odysseus’ character as exponent and ex-
emplar of parphasis that he abjures in 35 (εἰς ὑπὸ ποτέ μοι τουοῦτον ἡθος) and Odysseus’ “reputation of ill sound” that he deprecates in
36 (θανῶν ὦς παυμί κλέος μη το δύσφαμον προσάψω).21 Only when
the spirit of malice and guile conjured up by the tale of Ajax has been
exorcised by an extended meditation on the social and educative func-
tions of poetry (35–44) does the poet at last return to the particu-
larities of the occasion and deliver himself of the “something” an-
nounced so many lines before (44–48). As it happens, however, this
“second praise” adds little to the data reported in line 16; indeed,
aside from recording the fact of Megas’ death and mentioning the
name of the clan to which Deinis’ family belongs, it simply reiterates
the duplication of achievement by father and son (cf. 48, δις δὴ δυ-
οῦ). The material seems innocuous enough, and one might wonder
why the poet should profess such doubt about its advisability or spend
fully one half of the ode preparing for (and thus postponing) its intro-
duction; but we must never lose sight of the fictionality inherent in
Pindar’s handling of the epinician. If from one perspective Nemean 8
is a “structure of poetic argument for the end of glorifying the vic-
tor,”22 from another it is a kind of dramatic monologue marked by
moments of great excitement and strong feeling: the speaker’s sudden
access of uncertainty and fear, his outburst of indignation at the cor-
rupution to which the arts of language are subject, his fervent apologia
pro vita et arte sua, his final modulation to a tone of intimate sympathy
with the victor’s joys and sorrows. Whether or not Deinis and his
family in reality had dangerous enemies in Aegina23 is in an important
sense entirely irrelevant to the ode, for its fiction is self-sustaining.

21 τουοῦτον is the third in a series of adjectives of quality, each appearing in the first
line of a stanza, that serve to articulate important stages of the argument; the others
are οἶδα (6), which defines per exemplum what the poet means by ‘superior desires’,
and ἀνάμμοια (28), which contrasts the effectiveness of Ajax and Odysseus as warriors.
According to Carey (supra n.12) 33–34 and 40 n.41, the ‘I’ of 35–39 must be an
instance of the ‘first person indefinite’, with particular applicability to the victor, because
“none of the qualities praised is especially relevant to the encomiast.” In fact ethical
ἀπλότης and the desire to win acceptance from fellow-citizens are as appropriate to an
encomiast as to anyone else, while Carey himself recognizes that line 39 “suggests the
role of poet and chorus as remembrancers of great deeds.” It makes little sense, more-
over, that an exhortation to eschew phthonos and parphasis should be even implicitly
directed toward the victor when he has just been designated (by analogy) as their
potential victim.

22 Slater (supra n.6) 195.
23 Cf. Bury (supra n.2) 148.
Pindar was a master craftsman of encomiastic argument, adept at spinning general truth and particular fact into a single thread of rational discourse; and when he came to construct the particular encomiastic argument that we know as *Nemean* 8, he saw how the universally observable phenomenon of envy, brought into relation with a young Aeginetan's victory in the double-stade race, could convincingly motivate a long, powerful, and serious meditation on issues of the utmost importance to human life in community.

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