The Athenian ‘Politicians’, 403–322 B.C.

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I

The title of this paper may seem innocent and straightforward. It presents a historical problem, but does not seem to raise a semantic question. We believe we know what a politician is and we are used to reading about Athenian politicians. Two outstanding examples will suffice. Twenty years ago S. Perlman published an excellent article entitled “The Politicians in the Athenian Democracy of the Fourth Century B.C.” (Athenaeum 41 [1963] 327–55), and in 1971 W. R. Connor published his seminal study The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens. It is characteristic of these and similar studies that they are based on two tacit assumptions: (a) that the term politician/Politiker/politicien covers a sufficiently clear and well-defined concept; and (b) that this concept can be applied in descriptions of ancient societies. I will open my account of the problem by questioning both these assumptions.

It is surprisingly difficult to find out what a politician is and to come up with a definition that can be generally accepted. This word, which is used every day in parliaments, in the newspapers, and in broadcasting, is largely disregarded by students of political science. For example, in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences there is no entry “politician,” and in the article “Political recruitment and career,” the author seems cunningly to avoid it. Similar works of reference in German and French are equally unhelpful. There are scores of books and articles about political parties, and the definition of ‘party’ is a battle that has been fought among scholars for almost three generations. But it is impossible to find a book or an article defining the concept ‘politician’ or asking the simple question, Who

2 The article is by Dwaine Marvick. The same observation applies to the entry “Political Participation” by Herbert McClosky.
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are ‘politicians’? Nevertheless the word is very important in political debates. The ‘politicians’ are regularly made responsible for a decision or a disaster, and they are often opposed e.g. to civil servants, to trade-union leaders, or to the people. So at least students of political terminology in the manner of Weldon⁴ ought to pay some attention to the problem and to discuss, if not the meaning, then the uses of the word ‘politician’. One exception is the article “Politician” by G. C. Moodie in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York 1964): “The term ‘politician’ is most commonly used to refer to a person actively engaged in the struggle for governmental power and/or office, whose success largely depends upon the favour of others and who, to achieve success, must therefore be skilled in the arts of persuasion, negotiation and compromise. In any given society ... ‘politician’ will or will not be generally used in a pejorative sense.” Developing this definition, Moodie states, i.a., the following modifications: “(a) the term does not normally apply to professional full-time administrators; (b) it does not apply to those who, for all their concern with political power, are neither members of a governing body nor openly aspiring to such office.” This is the only definition of ‘politician’ I have seen,⁵ and one swallow does not make a summer. If we turn to the general lexica and dictionaries, we are confronted with much vaguer and broader definitions of the word. A typical definition is “person taking part in politics or much interested in politics; (in a bad sense) person who follows politics as a career, regardless of principle.”⁶ In 1982 I conducted a poll of the 179 members of the Danish parliament, asking two questions: (a) What is a politician? (b) Who are politicians? I had 62 replies and the definitions ranged from “a person who takes part in politics, i.e. all politically active citizens,” to “representatives of the people elected by the

⁵ A sociological approach to the problem can be found in Max Weber’s paper of 1918 “Politik als Beruf”: Gesammelte politische Schriften (Tübingen 1958) 493–548. Weber distinguishes between ‘Gelegenheitspolitiker’ (all politically active citizens) and ‘Berufspolitiker’ (sometimes living for politics but in contemporary societies mostly by politics). As Berufspolitiker living ‘von der Politik’ Weber singles out politische Beamte, Journalisten, Parteibeamte, and Parlamentarier, who however may be Gelegenheitspolitiker or rather ‘nebenberufliche’ Politiker.
⁶ Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (1974); The Oxford English Dictionary (1933), “2b One keenly interested in politics; one who engages in party politics, or in political strife, or who makes politics his profession or business; also (esp. in US) in a sinister sense, one who lives by politics as a trade”; Webster’s New International Dictionary (1937), “(2) one versed or experienced in the science of government; one devoted to politics, a statesman. (3) one addicted to, or actively engaged in, politics as managed by parties ... In modern usage politician commonly implies activity in party politics, esp. with a suggestion of artifice or intrigue (versus statesman).”
people, comprising ministers, members of the parliament, and (in local government) mayors and councilmen."

The present status of the concept ‘politician’ seems to be that no one, apart from Moodie, has made a serious attempt to define it, and that there is no agreement about what a politician is and who the politicians are, not even when we strip the word of its pejorative nuance and its metaphorical uses. But this is not in itself a sufficient reason for avoiding it in descriptions of ancient societies. Our word soul, for example, as opposed to body, is even vaguer and more difficult to grasp; nevertheless it is an obvious and irreproachable word to use in discussions of Greek philosophy and in translations of Plato and Aristotle. With this in mind, we must ask whether the word ‘politician’ can be used in descriptions of fourth-century Athens, either in the vaguer or in the narrower sense.

In the wider sense, ‘politician’ denotes all politically active citizens, i.e., in Athens all citizens who attended the ecclesia, who took the heliastic oath in order to serve as nomothetai or dicastai, and who volunteered as candidates in the election or sortition of magistrates. ‘Politician’ in this sense would be a good translation of ho politeuomenos in its wider meaning, and it squares well with the Greek concept of the active citizen. But when scholars speak of the Athenian politicians, it is certainly not this meaning they have in mind. They envisage invariably a much smaller group of ‘political leaders’ explicitly to be set off against the larger group of active citizens.

So we must turn to the narrower and more technical use according to which politicians are (or aspire to be) members of a governing body elected by the people. But when we transfer this concept to the ancient world we are faced with four problems. (a) A distinguishing mark of the modern politician is that he is elected or at least is a candidate at elections. In Athens election was a condition only for becoming a strategos, whereas political leadership was open to any citizen who would address and could persuade the people. (b) In a modern society the (elected) politicians are essentially decision-makers, whereas in Athens the group of citizens called politicians by modern historians never made decisions. On the contrary, they initiated policy by making proposals but left all decisions to the bodies of active citizens. (c) Today the politicians are professionals who make a living by politics, whereas in Athens to be paid for politics was a

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7 Lys. 16.18, Isoc. 8.76, Andoc. 2.1, etc.
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criminal offence. Admittedly, the Athenians often turned a blind eye to perquisites and ‘gifts’ to a ‘political leader’, but as soon as he fell from favour with the people, the profit he had made might result in a death-sentence.9 (d) To be a politician today almost necessarily entails party affiliation. Most historians tend to believe that there were no ‘parties’ in Athens with which a ‘politician’ could be affiliated.10

These four problems, of course, only reflect the essential difference between direct and representative democracy. But the inference seems to be that the modern concept ‘politician’ is too closely connected with representative government to be transferred to ancient societies. It is worth noting that Finley in his study “Athenian Demagogues” tends to avoid the word ‘politician’. Instead he uses the (rare) Greek word ‘demagogue’ (in a neutral sense) or simply refers to (political) ‘leaders’;11 a term often used by students of political theory. Since political leaders do not have to be politicians, Finley’s terminology points to a different formulation of the historical problem.

Etymologically, of course, ‘politician’ is, via the Latin politicus, derived from the Greek adjective πολιτικός. It is worth noting, however, that the meaning of πολιτικός is ‘statesman’ and not ‘politician’. It is used by philosophers in a complimentary sense about a true political leader. It never occurs as a legal term, and in the orators it is a hapax. The neuter τὰ πολιτικά may be used about ‘politics’, but the masculine πολιτικός occurs only once in some 3000 Teubner pages of Attic rhetoric (Aeschin. 2.184) in a flattering reference to the ‘statesman’ Euboulos. Another reason for avoiding the word ‘politician’ for Athenian political leaders: by contrast with ‘statesman’, which is invariably a complimentary term, ‘politician’ is at best neutral and regularly pejorative in meaning. In 1968, for example, a Norwegian editor suggested the following definition: “a politician is a man who is so thick-skinned that he can stand up although he is spineless.” In accounts of Athenian history, ‘politician’ is often used as a rendering of the Greek words ρήτωρ, πολιτευόμενος, or σύμ-

9 Cf. Hyp. 3.7–8 (public action against paid political leaders), 1.24–25 (perquisites and gifts to political leaders are tolerated by the Athenians); for political trials cf. Hansen, Eisangelia (supra n.1) 58–65.
11 Finley (supra n.10), esp. 12–23; only on 14, 18, and 22 is the word ‘politician’ (cautiously) used. In selecting ‘demagogue’ as his preferred term for political leader, Finley may have been influenced by Weber, who states (supra n.5): “Der ‘Demagoge’ ist seit dem Verfassungsstaat und vollends seit der Demokratie der Typus des führenden Politikers im Okzident” (513).
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bouλος, all of which may be used pejoratively but far more frequently occur in a neutral sense and sometimes even as a compliment. In the United States no member of the Congress would boast, “I am a politician,” but in the speech On the Crown Demosthenes states with outspoken pride, ὁ σύμβουλος καὶ ῥήτωρ ἦγὼ (18.212), and earlier in the same speech he says μόνος τῶν λεγόντων καὶ πολιτευμένων ἦγὼ (173).

Summing up: nowadays most historians agree that the term ‘political party’ is bound up with representative government and is better avoided in accounts of politics in ancient Greece. I suggest that precisely the same warning applies to the word ‘politician’, and I shall avoid it hereafter. So both questions posed above must be answered in the negative: (a) ‘politician’ is a vague concept with no clear meaning and several uses; (b) in its narrower sense, referring to a group of ‘political leaders’, it cannot be applied to ancient Greek society, unless one explicitly acknowledges ‘politician’ as an artificial historical term (i.e. a convenient translation of politeuomenos, symboulos, rhetor, strategos, etc.) which bears little or no relation to the meanings and uses of the word ‘politician’ in contemporary societies.

II

What language is used by the Athenians themselves when they refer to their political leaders? The most comprehensive expression found in the sources is not a word but a phrase, ῥήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί. This point is best substantiated by quoting some passages from the orators:

Dem. 2.29 = 13.20: πρότερον μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατὰ συμμορίας εἰσεφέρετε, νυνὶ δὲ πολιτεύεσθε κατὰ συμμορίας. ῥήτωρ ἤγεμὼν ἐκατέρων καὶ στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ ὁ βοηθόμενος τριακόσιον οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι προσνεμέμεθα οἱ μὲν ὡς τούτους, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐκείνους.

Dem. 18.170: πολλάκας δὲ τοῦ κήρυκος ἐρωτῶντος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀνύστατον οὐδείς, ἀπαντῶν μὲν τῶν στρατηγῶν παρόντων, ἀπαντῶν δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων, καλούσις δὲ τῆς πατρίδος τὸν ἐρωτήθη ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας.

Dem. 18.205: οὐ γὰρ ἐξήτοιν οἱ τότε Ἀθηναῖοι οὔτε ῥήτοροι οὔτε στρατηγῶν διὰ ὅτι δουλεύσουσιν εὔνυχως . . .

13 All three terms are used in a positive sense in Dem. 18.94: καὶ μὴν ὅτι μὲν πολλοὺς ἐστεφάνωσκατ᾽ ἡδὴ τῶν πολιτευμένων ἀπαντῆς ἤπατεν δι᾽ ὅτι δὲ ἄλλοι πᾶς ἀτάσκεται, σύμβουλον λέγω καὶ ῥήτορα, πλῆθος δὲ ἐμέ, οὐδὲ ἀν εἰς εἰσπεῖν ἔχει.
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Dem. 22.66: πολλῶν μὲν στρατηγῶν ἢδικηκότων τὴν πόλιν, πολλῶν δὲ ρήτορῶν ... οὐδὲνος πῶςτον ἐξητάθησθας κατήγορος (sc. Androtion; in 24.173 the reference is to both Androtion and Timokrates).

Dem. 23.184: οὐ γὰρ ... χάριν ἐστὶ δίκαιον ὅθελεν ... ἄν μίκρ’, ἀναλογίας ἱδία καὶ τὸς στρατηγὸς καὶ τὸς ρήτοραν διαφέρεται πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐπαίνοις αὐτοῦ γράφεσθαι. 

Dem. Ἐρ. 1.8: φημί δὴ χρῆναι μήτε στρατηγὸς μήτε ρήτορος μήτ’ ἰδιότητι μηδὲν τῶν πρὸ τοῦ γε δοκοῦντων συνηγονισθαί τοῖς καθεστηκότοι μήτε μέμφεσθαι μητ’ ἐπιτιμᾶν μηδένα μηδὲν ὄνος, ἀλλὰ συγκωρῆσαι πᾶσιν τούς ἐν τῇ πόλει πεπολεμευταί τὰ δεόντα . . .

Din. 1.90: καὶ πότερα κάλλιον ἐστὶ πρὸς δὲ δικαίωτερον, ἀπαντ’ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ φυλάττεσθαι ἕως ἣν τὰ δίκαια ὁ δῆμος βουλεύσηται, ἢ τοὺς ρήτορας καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐνίον διηρακάκτατος ἔσχεν;

Din. 1.112: εἰ δὲ ρήτωρ ἢ στρατηγὸς (ἀναβαίνει συνηγονησίῳ) . . . οὐ προσεκτέοιν ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τοὺς τούτων λόγους.

Din. 2.26: καίτοι, ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, τί ἕνεος’ ἠκέινοις τοὺς ἀνδρας (our ancestors) ποιηθείς λαβόντας ἢ στρατηγὸν ἢ ρήτορα πολέμη ἑαυτῶν δόρα δεχόμενον ἐπὶ τοὺς τῆς πατρίδος συμφέροντον, οἱ τῶν ἀλλότριων (Arthmios of Zelieia) . . . οὕτω δικαίως καὶ σωφρονίως ἔξηλασαν;

Din. 3.19: οὐ γυνικεθαρτά τὸ τοῦ δήμου πλῆθος τῶν ρήτορῶν καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν τινῶν . . .


Hyp. 3.27: καίτοι σε ἑρχήν, ἐπείτερ προήρησαι πολεμεύνεσθαι, . . . μὴ τοὺς ἱδίωτας κρίνειν μὴ δ’ εἰς τούτως νεανιεύσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ρήτορῶν, ἑὰν τις ἀδελφός, τούτων κρίνειν, στρατηγὸς εἰάς τις μὴ τὰ δίκαια πράττῃ τοῦτον εἰσαγγέλειν.

Other passages could be added to this list, both from the orators and from other fourth-century authors,14 and the inference seems to be that the two words formed a pair denoting one group. Moreover, the frequent juxtaposition of ρήτορες and στρατηγοί is attested not only in political speeches; the Athenian law code also included at least one νόμος explicitly referring to ρήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί and binding on them only. The law is paraphrased by Dinarchus (1.71):

καὶ τοὺς μὲν νόμους προλέγειν τῷ ρήτορι καὶ τῷ στρατηγῷ, <τῶν> τὴν παρὰ τοῦ δήμου πίστιν ἀξιοῦντι λαμβάνειν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, γῆν ἐντὸς ὄρων κεκτήσθαι, πάσας τὰς δικαίας

14 Isoc. 5.81, 15.30; Dem. 9.38 (οἱ λέγοντες = ρήτορες), 24.135 (πολιτευόμενος = ρήτωρ); Aeschin. 2.184 (πολιτικός = ρήτορες), 3.7, 3.146; Din. 1.76 (σύμβουλοι = ρήτορες); Ar. Eccl. 244–47; Xen. Mem. 2.6.15; Pl. Euthyd. 290c–d (πολιτικός = ρήτορες); Aris. Rh. 1388b18, Probl. 916b36.
We do not know whether this *nomos* was strictly enforced. I tend to doubt it. But it shows that the combined group of *ρήτορες* and *στρατηγοί* was not only acknowledged as a political fact but also endorsed in the laws so as to form a part of the democratic constitution.

Thus, in fourth-century Athens the phrase *ρήτορες* καὶ *στρατηγοί* is the nearest equivalent of what we with a much vaguer and less formal term call ‘politicians’ or ‘political leaders’. The Athenians of course had other less comprehensive and less technical words for political leaders; these will be discussed after a closer examination of the two terms *ρήτωρ* and *στρατηγός*.

The board of ten annually elected *strategoi* has been studied frequently and needs no further presentation; but what does *ρήτωρ* mean in a political context? An examination of all preserved speeches shows that *rhetor* denotes a citizen who moves a *psephisma* in the *ecclesia* or in the *boule* or a *nomos* before the *nomothetai* or brings a public action before the *dicasteria*. In a wider sense a *rhetor* is a speaker addressing the *ecclesia* or the *boule* (either supporting

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15 In the sections leading up to the paraphrase Deinarchos is attacking Demosthenes, who was a *rhetor* but never a *strategos*. So *strategos* was probably juxtaposed with *rhetor* in the paraphrase because the two words appeared together in the law. If the requirement for *rhetores* had been mentioned in one part of the law code and the requirement for *strategoi* in another, Deinarchos’ paraphrase is inexplicable. Admittedly, he refers to τοῦ νόμου and not τοῦ νόμον, but it is well known that the orators made no distinction here between singular and plural, often using them indiscriminately in references to one law, sometimes running for a few lines only: cf. e.g. Dem. 24.20 and 24, 41–43, 105 and 114; 43.50–51. The requirement to own land and to have legitimate children is also mentioned in the spurious Draconian constitution as binding on *strategoi* and *hipparchoi* (Arist. *Ath.Pol.* 4.2) and in the much-disputed decree of Themistocles as binding on trierarchs (Meiggs/Lewis 23.20–22). So the paraphrase by Deinarchos is the only reliable source we have for the requirement.

16 Aeschin. 3.55 ὃς αὐτὸς ὅς τὸν τόλμησε έγραψε τὸν πόλεμον. Cf. Lys. 13.72; Dem. 3.22; 18.219; 22.70; 23.201; 59.43, 105; Aeschin. 1.188; 3.16, 31, 203–04.

17 Lys. 22.2 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οἱ πρινταίνεις ἀπέδοται εἰς τὴν βουλήν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅτι φυγάστησαν αὐτοῖς, ὡστε ἐλέγω τινὶς τῶν ρήτωρῶν ὡς ἀκρίτως αὐτοῖς χρή τοῖς ἐνδεκά παραδοῦναι θανάτῳ ἐγκύμωσιν.


19 Din. 1.100 τί γάρ ἐστιν ρήτορος δημοτικοῦ καὶ μισοῦσων τοῖς κατὰ τῆς πόλεως λέγοντας καὶ γράφοντας; . . . οὐ κρίνων ἀλλήλως; οὐκ εἰσαγ γέλλειν; οὐ γράφεσθαι παρανόμως; Dem. 58.62, 59.43; Aeschin. 1.34; Lycurg. 1.31; Isoc. 8.129.

20 Aeschin. 2.74 ἀνυποτάμων δὲ οἱ συντεταγμένοι ρήτορες, περὶ μὲν τῆς σωτηρίας τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲ ἐνεχείρων λέγειν . . . ; Lys. 12.72; Dem. 12.14; 18.170; 19.23; Procon. 53.1; Ep. 2.10; Aeschin. 1.28, 30, 186; 2.161; 3.2, 4; Hyp. 3.1, 4, 8, 9, 29; Isoc. 14.4; 15.138.

21 Lys. 30.22 η βουλή ἦ ἀεὶ βουλεύοντα . . . ἀναγκάζεται . . . τῶν ρήτωρῶν τοῖς <τά> που ῥότατα λέγοντι πείθεσθαι; Dem. 22.37, 24.147, 51.2.
or opposing a *psephisma* moved by another *rhetor* or a *synegoros* addressing the court (either for the prosecution or for the defence).\(^{22}\)

Moreover, in opposition to the modern terms ‘politician’ or ‘political leader’, *rhetor* was a legal technical term occurring not only in the law on *rhetores* and *strateigoi* quoted above but also in several others explicitly aimed at *rhetores*:

(a) Most important is the law regulating the *dokimasia* of *rhetores*, quoted by Aischines (1.28–32): ὑπάρχον, ἵπποι, [ὁ νομοθέτης] ῥήτορον· ἕνα τις λέγει ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸν πατέρα τίπτων ή τὴν μητέρα, ἢ μὴ τρέφων, ἢ μὴ παρέχων οὐκήσαν ἢ τὰς στρατείας ἢ μὴ ἐστρατευμένος, ὅσιον ἄν αὐτῷ προστάχθωσιν, ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀποβεβληκός ἢ πεπορνευμένος ἢ ἡταρηκός ἢ τὰ πατρίδα κατεθηκός, ἢ ὃν ἄν κληρονόμος γένηται, ... δοκιμασίαι ... μὲν ἐπαγγελέατώ Αθηναίων ὁ βουλόμενος οἶς ἔξεστιν.\(^{23}\)

(b) Next comes ἐἰσαγγελτικός νόμος, quoted by Hypereides (3.7–8): an ἐἰσαγγελία has to take place ἕνα τις ... ῥήτωρ ὃν μὴ λέγει τὰ ἀριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Αθηναίων χρήσατα λαμβάνω.

(c) Third, we have two important lexicographical notes referring to a ρήτορική γραφή. The first is in Harpokration: ῥήτορική γραφή. Ἰσαίας ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἐυκλείδην. ἐσκε ῥήτορική γραφή καλείσθαι ἢ κατὰ ῥήτορα γραφάντος τι ἢ ἑπόντος ἢ πραξάντος παράνομον, ὧσπερ λέγεται καὶ πραταπείκα ἢ κατὰ πράξανως καὶ ἐπιστάτη καὶ κατ’ ἐπιστάτου. The second note comes from the Lexicon Rhetoricum Cantabrigiense: ρήτορική. Ἰσαίας ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἐυκλείδην περὶ χωρίον, τὰς γνώμας ἀκείμενον εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον μετὰ ψηφίσματος. καὶ Ἰππέρειδης ἐν τῷ κατὰ Αὐτοκλέους προδοσίας, ῥήτορικής ἐκ δήμου. ἦστι γὰρ καὶ ἐκ βουλῆς, οἷον εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐδοξε τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τῇ βουλῇ. Harpokration, quoting Isaeus, obviously refers to the law regulating the graphe paranomōn, and so does the Lex. Cant., in which I follow Sauppe in emending γνώμας to γραφάς. And I take the obscure phrase μετὰ ψηφίσματος to be a reflection of the fact that, in a graphe paranomōn, the psephisma was quoted verbatim in the indictment (cf. Aeschin. 3.199–200).

(d) Finally, Aischines (1.34–35) quotes τοὺς νόμους τοὺς περὶ τὴν ἐκσκόμμισις κειμένους τῶν ρήτωρόν. The document inserted in the speech may be spurious,\(^{24}\) but Aischines’ reference to the law indicates that the word *rhetor* was used.

In (a) and (b) *rhetor* denotes any citizen who addresses the *ecclesia* and so, *a fortiori*, any citizen who moves a decree (cf. infra). In (c)
the defendant in a graphe paranomon is per definitionem a rhetor moving a psephisma, and that is undoubtedly the reason why the graphe paranomon was also called a ῥητορικὴ γραφή. It is worth noting that the reference in the preserved laws is primarily to the rhetores in the ecclesia, and not to rhetores addressing the boule, the nomothetai, or the dicasteria. In the third law, however, the implication is that rhetores comprise speakers in the boule, since a graphe paranomon could be brought not only against decrees of the people, but also against decrees of the boule. So I have little doubt that, if more laws were preserved, we would also have evidence of rhetor as a legal term denoting a speaker addressing one of the other bodies of government.

If we turn from laws to decrees, a first impression is that we have disappointingly little evidence of ῥήτωρ as the official designation of the citizen who addresses the ecclesia or the boule. The one example I can cite is an entrenchment clause in the Brea decree of ca 445: ἐ]ὰν δὲ τις ἐπιφοσεῖζει παρὰ τὲ[ν στέλεν ἐ ῥᾶτωρ ἄγορεύει . . . [ἀτμον] ξναὶ . . . (IG II² 46.24ff). But it is idiomatic in Attic decrees to use verbs rather than nouns. ἔγγαμάτευε, ἐπρανάνευ, ἐπεστάτει are obvious examples. Now the verb corresponding to ῥήτωρ is λέγειν/ἐπείν/ῥηθήναι. The obligatory reference, in the preamble, to the proposer of a decree is ὁ δεῖνα ἐπε, where, in my opinion, the aorist ἐπέ is the verbal equivalent of the noun ῥήτωρ. The present tense λέγειν is also used about a ῥήτωρ, for example in IG II² 223A.4 κρίσιν ποιήσαι τῶν λεγόντων ἐν τῇ βουλῇ.

So the rhetores formed an integral and constitutionally recognized part of the Athenian democracy. Admittedly, a rhetor was neither elected nor selected by lot, but was volunteering: but he was officially invited to do so. All decisions were made by the large political bodies—the ecclesia (assisted by the boule), the nomothetai, and the dicasteria. But all initiatives were left to ὁ βουλόμενος ἀθηναίων ὥς ἔξεστιν. A rhetor was a citizen who took it upon himself to address the ecclesia, the boule, the nomothetai, or the dicasteria, and consequently to perform the rôle of ὁ βουλόμενος. Like being an ἐκκλησιαστής or a νομοθέτης or a δικαστής, to be a ῥήτωρ was essentially a one-day business. A citizen was rhetor insofar as he mounted the bema and addressed his fellow citizens and insofar as he was responsible for the speech he made. Beyond that he was, constitutionally

26 Dem. 47.34 γεομείνου τούν τοῦ ῥήθηματος τούτου ἐν τῇ βουλῇ, καὶ ὀδυνόν γραφομένου παρανόμων, ἀλλὰ κυρίον εἴτες . . .
27 The rôle of ὁ βουλόμενος is discussed and the sources are collected in Hansen (supra n.8) 359–60.
speaking, no longer a rhetor when he had descended from the bema. In recognition of his official position he, like the archai, had to wear a crown while addressing the assembly. Admittedly, he was subjected neither to an initial dokimasia nor to euthynai in consequence of his speech. But he was certainly not irresponsible, as maintained by some historians. On the contrary, the Athenians had forged much more dangerous weapons against the rhetores than against archai or presbeis. Apart from the δοκιμασία ὑπάρχουν, which was rarely used, the Athenians had created a whole series of public actions directly and often exclusively applying to rhetores. As a proposer of a psephisma (of the demos or of the boule), a rhetor was liable to be prosecuted by a γραφή παρανόμων. As the proposer of a nomos he might be put on trial by a γραφή νόμον μη ἐπιτήδειον θείαν. As a prosecutor in a public action he risked a fine of 1000 drachmas plus partial atimia if he withdrew his action before the hearing or if he obtained less than 1/5 of the votes of the jurors. It was less dangerous to support or oppose a proposal made by another citizen, but a rhetor who made a profit from addressing his fellow citizens could be indicted by an εἰςαγγελία εἰς τὸν δήμον ορ a προβολή ορ a γραφή to the thesmothetai. We know of more than one hundred applications of these public actions against the relatively small group of rhetores, whereas the sources provide us with only some ten examples of the euthynai resulting in a public action, although every year some 1200 Athenian archai, in addition to an unknown number of presbeis, had to submit to euthynai.

28 Ar. Eccl. 131, Eq. 1227, Av. 463.
29 E.g. C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford 1952) 263. For further references see Roberts (supra n.1) 355–56.
30 For the graphe paranomon and the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai cf. Hansen (supra n.1: 1974); for the fine of 1000 drachmas and partial atimia, Hansen (1975) 29–30.
31 Eisangelia, Hyp. 3.7–8; probole, Arist. Ath. Pol. 43.5; graphe to the thesmothetai, Dem. 46.26.
32 Known applications of euthynai are: Kallias in 449 (Dem. 19.273); Phormion in 428 (schol. Ar. Pax 347); Paches in 427 (Plut. Nic. 6); Polystratos in 410 (Lys. 20); Eratothenes in 403 (Lys. 12); Epikrates in 394–392 (Lys. 27.1); Pamphilos in 388 (Xen. Hell. 5.1.2; schol. Ar. Plut. 174; Dem. 40.20, 22); Melanopos before 361 (Arist. Rh. 1374b 25f); Melanopos before 353 (Dem. 24.127); Timarchos in 348 (Aeschin. 1.113); Theodoros in 347 (Din. fr.xxx Conomis); Aischines in 343 (Dem. 19, Aeschin. 2); Lykourgos in 336–324 (Din. fr.viii); Demosthenes ca 330 (Plut. Mor. 845r); Hermias ca 325 (Din. fr.xliii). In several cases we have no precise information about the type of action applied, and some of the trials listed above may not be euthynai, but e.g. an application of a graphe klones. Roberts (supra n.1) argues that the politicians were responsible qua being archai and accordingly subjected to euthynai. She is right in stressing the responsibility of the political leaders, but she overrates the euthynai and does not discuss the far more important types of public action aimed directly at rhetores and strategoi.
Thus far I have concentrated on the constitutional aspect of the term rhetor. By law, any citizen is a rhetor in so far as he acts as ho boulomenos and addresses the ecclesia, the boule, the nomothetai, or the dicasteria. Since democracy in principle involved the participation of all citizens, the inference is that, in an ideal democracy, all rhetores combined would constitute the entire demos. But in Athens citizenship did not entail an obligation to act as ho boulomenos and to become a rhetor. There was a considerable gap between the ideal and the real democracy, and according to their political participation, Athenian citizens may be divided into four groups:

(a) Citizens who never attended the ecclesia and never joined the panel of 6000 jurors (from which nomothetai and dicastai were appointed) and never presented themselves as candidates at the annual sortition of bouleutai and other archai. They are the passive citizens censured by Perikles in the funeral speech (Thuc. 2.40.2), but praised by Plato, if they are philosophers: λέγωμεν δὴ ... περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων (τι γὰρ ἂν τις γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγω;) οὕτω δὲ ποι ἐνεών πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἄγοραν οὐκ ἱσασί τὴν ὁδὸν, οὐδὲ ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνεδρίων. νόμοις δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὀρθῶν οὔτε ἄκουον φιλότεχνοι δὲ ἐταυρωμένοι ἐπὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δείπνα καὶ συνήθεις κόμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. It is surprising, however, even in the forensic speeches to find prosecutors and defendants who almost take a pride in telling the jurors that they have never (before) visited the agora and never been to the bouleuterion or the dicasteria:


33 Dem. 19.99 οὔδενα γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν ἢμεῖς κελεύετε οὐδὲ ἀναγκάζετε· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν τις ἐαυτὸν πείσας δυνάσθαι προσέλθῃ... εὐνοικὸς δέχεσθε καὶ οὐ φθονεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ χειροποιεῖτε καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐγχειρίζετε.

34 Th. 176C=D; cf. Ap. 17D, 32A.
In a court, to admit frankly to political inactivity would, in my opinion, amount to an insult of the jurors who were performing their civic duties. On the contrary, the topos is found in passages where the intended effect is captatio benevolentiae. It is of no consequence whether or not the speaker is telling the truth. The citizen who professes his passivity to the active citizens is a topos which shows that to be an apragmon was certainly a respectable attitude even among active Athenian citizens. It is only natural that we have no similar evidence for the citizens who never or hardly ever visited the ecclesia. A passive citizen could be forced to go to court either as a defendant or as a plaintiff, and then the topos is appropriate. But no citizen could be forced to go to the ecclesia, and logographers hardly ever wrote symboulc speeches. Therefore we do not have and probably shall never find an orator stating, “Regularly I never attend the ecclesia, but in this case . . . ” So we must look for other types of evidence. Plato’s description of the passive citizen (quoted supra) includes the ecclesia (psephismata), but Plato is not a good source for the ideology of the Athenian democratic citizens. A much better source is Euripides, who in Orestes 917ff describes the honest farmer whose trustworthiness is only increased by the fact that he hardly ever comes to the city and attends the assembly. The setting is Argos, but the audience was Athenian and the play probably reflects a view accepted by many Athenian democrats. The ideology must of course be connected with the fact that the assembly-place on the Pnyx could accommodate only a fraction of the adult male population.

(b) Citizens who attended the ecclesia, who served as bouleutai, and who manned the panel of 6000 jurors, but who restricted themselves to listening and voting without ever addressing the assemblies. There is ample evidence that this was a very common type of citizen. Commenting on the ‘Solonian’ dokimasia of male prostitutes, Demosthenes imputes to Solon the following reason for restricting the

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35 In all four cases the speaker’s purpose is of course to persuade the jurors that he is not a sycophant. For this purpose, however, it would have been sufficient to deny any prior appearance in court as a prosecutor or defendant. All four speakers take the further step of denying any involvement in the administration of justice. The clients of Lysias and Isaeus are probably too young to have served as jurors; so they emphasize that they have never listened to a trial in a dicasterion. The two old men, Socrates and Isocrates, emphasize that they have never even been jurors. So in all four cases the alleged total ignorance of the lawcourts is intended as an argument in favour of the speaker.

law to those who make proposals or address the ecclesia (22.30): πολλαχόθεν μὲν οὖν ἂν τις ἰδοι τούτο, οὐχ ἢκιστα δὲ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ νόμου, μὴτε λέγειν μὴτε γράφειν ἐξείναι τοῖς ἡταρηκόσιν. ἑώρα γὰρ ἐκείνῳ, ὅτι τοῖς πολλοῖς ύμῶν ἐξὸν λέγειν οὐ λέγετε. A few sections later (36) he makes a similar statement about the councilors: τῷ γὰρ [sc. τῶν βουλευτῶν] ἔστιν ὑνείδος, εἰ σωπώντος αὐτοῦ καὶ μηδὲν γράφοντος, ἵσως δ’ οὔθε τὰ πόλλα εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον εἰσιόντος, μὴ λάβοι η βουλή τὸν στέφανον; And Aischines has the following statement to make about the ordinary juror (3.233): ἐπείτ’ ἐξείσων ἐκ τοῦ δικαστηρίου ὁ τοιοῦτος κριτὴς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἄσθενῆ πεποιηκός, ἵσχυρόν δὲ τὸν ρήτορα. ἀνήρ γὰρ ἱδιώτης ἐν πόλει δημοκρατουμένη νόμω καὶ ψήφῳ βασιλεύει ὅταν δ’ ἑτέρῳ ταύτα παραδῶ, καταλέλυκε τὴν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ δυναστείαν. Aischines’ portrait of the ordinary juror is confirmed by the preserved dicastic pinakia. In Athenian Bronze Allotment Plates (1972) John Kroll collected 82 dicastic pinakia of the fourth century with 161 attested uses. The names of 65 citizens are either preserved or can be restored. But not a single one of these 65 citizens is known as a rhetor, a strategos, or an ambassador.

(c) Citizens who conform to the democratic ideal. They took it upon themselves occasionally to act as ho boulomenos, but they avoided any regular or ‘professional’ involvement in politics. They were emphatic in stating that they were idiotai, and they did not like to be grouped with those rhetores who took the platform incessantly. This type of citizen is regularly praised by the orators, as can be seen from the following four quotations, one referring to each of the four major assemblies—the ecclesia, the boule, the nomothetai, and the dicasteria:

Aeschin. 3.220: ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλγαρχίαις οὐκ ὁ βουλόμενος, ἀλλ’ ὁ δυναστεύων δημηγορεῖ, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ὁ βουλόμενος καὶ ὅταν αὐτοῦ δοκή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ χρόνον λέγειν σημεῖον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀνδρὸς πολιτευμένου, τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν παραλείπειν ἴμεραν ἐργασμένου καὶ μισθαρινόντος.

Dem. 22.37: εἰ μὲν ἀπογνωσθεὶ, ἐπὶ τοὺς λέγουσί τοῦ βουλευτήριον ἔσται, εὰν δὲ καταγωγῆ, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδιωταῖς: ἐόρακότες γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν λεγόντων πονηρίαν τὴν ἀφομοίωσιν τὴν βουλήν τὸν στέφανον, οὐχὶ προσῆχοντο τούτοις τὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ τὰ βέλτιστα ἔρουσιν αὐτοῖς, εἰ δὲ γενηθῇ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἤθεδών καὶ συνεστηκότων ρητόρων ἀπαλλαγήσεται, ὧδε ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναίοι, πάντως ἀ προστηκε γεγονόμενα.

Dem. 24.66: οὔτε γὰρ ὡς οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσθ’ ὁ νόμος τοὺς ἄλλους δεικνύειν ἐξεί, οὔθ’ ὡς δ’ ἀπειρίαν ἰδιωτὴν αὐτὸν ἄνοιγτο τούτ’ ἕλαθεν δύνατ’ ἄν πείται πάλαι γάρ μιθοῦ καὶ γράφων καὶ νόμους εἰσφέρων ὕπαται.

Dem. 23.4: ἐπειδή γὰρ, οὐχὶ τῶν ἐνοχλούντων ύμᾶς οὔθε τῶν πολιτευμένων καὶ πιστευομένων παρ’ Ἵμων ὦν, πράγμα τηλυκοῦτον φημι δείξεως πεπραγμένον, ἐὰν, ὡςον ἐστὶν ἐν ἴμαι, συναγωνίσησθε μοι καὶ προθύμως
It is worth noting that *idiotes*, in these and similar passages, does not denote the passive citizen, but the active ordinary citizen in a true democracy. This almost technical use of the word is to be found not only in the speeches but also in inscriptions.37

(d) Finally, the orators refer with the greatest frequency to a small group of citizens who regularly addressed the *ecclesia*, proposed laws and decrees, and frequented the courts as prosecutors or *synegoroi*. *Rhetor* is by far the most common designation attested for this group of citizens, but we also find them called *politeuomenoi*,38 sometimes *sympoulos*,39 occasionally *dēmagaγγοι* (in a neutral sense),40 and only

37 Apart from the passages just quoted, *idiotes* is applied to a proposer of a decree (Aeschin. 3.214) and of a *nomos* (Dem. 23.62, Andoc. 1.83), to a speaker in the *ecclesia* (Dem. *Prooem.* 13, Hyp. 3.13), and to a prosecutor in a public action (Dem. 53.2, Lys. 5.3). Furthermore, *idiota* is sometimes appointed *presbeis* (IG II* 16.19, 204.82) or *archai* (Dem. 24.112, Hyp. 1.25). So, in a political context, *idiotes* has a whole range of denotations: (a) a citizen who avoids all involvement in the affairs of the city (Aesch. 3.252), (b) a citizen who, as a listener, attends a public meeting (Ant. 6.24, Dem. 19.17, Aeschin. 3.125), (c) a citizen who is a voting member of one of the political assemblies (Aeschin. 3.233), (d) a citizen who occasionally acts as *ho boulomenos*, cf. the references supra 45f.

38 *Politeuomenos* is a common term but vaguer than *rhetor*. In its broader sense it means ‘one who acts as a citizen’ and may refer to any politically active citizen or to the entire body of citizens (supra n.7). Most occurrences, however, indicate the meaning ‘political leader’, regularly without reference to any specific form of political initiative (Lys. 25.27; Dem. 3.29–31; 8.68; 10.46; 70; 13.35; 15.33; 17.23; 19.12; 285; 22.52; 23.209; 24.155; 164; 192–93; 26.1–6; 18; 39.3; 52.28; 58.83; *Prooem.* 12.2; Ep. 2.9; 3.15, 27, 33, 45; Aeschin. 3.8, 235–36; Din. 1.96; 2.15; Isoc. 7.55; 15.132). If *politeuomenos* is connected with a body of government, it denotes in most cases a proposer or speaker in the *ecclesia* (Dem. 8.32–33; 18.173, 301; 20.132; Aeschin. 1.195; 2.64; Isoc. 15.231) and only rarely a citizen addressing the *boule* (Dem. 22.36), the *nomotheita* (Dem. 20.91), or the *dicasteria* (Dem. 23.4, 24.157). *Politeuomenos* is sometimes juxtaposed with *rhetor* (Dem. 13.20, 18.94, 278; Isoc. 15.231) and once with *strategos* (Dem. 24.135). These references are fairly exhaustive but not complete. I have concentrated on the participle, although other forms of the verb have the same uses.

39 As one would expect from the rhetorical term *συμβουλευτικός λόγος*, *sympoulos* is used exclusively as proposers and speakers in the *ecclesia*: Dem. 18.66 γι τον *συμβουλον* έδει λέγειν ἡ γραφή τον Αχίλλην ... δ ζυγνδην μεν ἐκ παινός του χρό­

υον μέχρι τος ἡμέρας αφ ἃς αὐτός ἐπ ο το βῆμα ἀνέβην; Aeschin. 1.120 δ το δήμον *συμβουλον* (cf. Dem. 1.16; 7.1; 18.66, 94, 189; 22.77; 58.62; Aeschin. 1.26; Hyp. 1.28; Din. 1.38–40; etc.). *Sympoulos* and *rhetor* are juxtaposed in Dem. 18.94, 212; 58.62; Din. 1.38–40. *Sympoloi* and *strategoi* are juxtaposed in Din. 1.76. The verb *συμβουλευ­

ειν* has the same meaning (e.g. Dem. 9.3–4) but may occasionally be applied to somebody who advises a *dicasterion* (Dem. 20.167).

40 *Demagogos* means ‘leader of the people’ sometimes in a positive sense (Lys. 27.10; Aeschin. 3.78, 226; Hyp. 1.16; Din. 1.31, 53), sometimes in a neutral sense (Dem.
one time πολιτικοί.41 By contrast with rhetor, neither politeuomenos nor symbolos nor demagogos is used in documents as a technical term. Furthermore, an examination of all occurrences of the word rhetor in the orators shows that, in most cases, it denotes specifically the citizen who habitually took political initiatives.42 And when ῥήτορες καὶ στρατηγοὶ are juxtaposed, the reference is invariably to this smaller group of 'political leaders', to the exclusion of active citizens who only at intervals acted as hoi boulomenoi. Apart from all the general references, the term rhetor is applied to the following fourth-century 'political leaders':43

Aischines (Dem. 18.130, 308, 318; 19.23)
Androtion (Dem. 22.37, 70)
Aristogeiton (Dem. 25.62)
Aristophon (Dem. 18.219, Hyp. 3.28)
Autokles (Hyp. fr.97 Jensen)
Demades (Din. 1.100-01)
Demosthenes (Dem. 18.94, 212, 246, 319; 21.189; 25.38; 32.31; Ep. 2.10; Aeschin. 3.55, 73, 148; Din. 1.86, 100–02; Hyp. 1.12, 21)
Diopithes of Sphettos (Hyp. 3.29)

26.4, Aeschin. 3.134, Hyp. 1.22, Din. 1.99), and only twice in a pejorative sense (Lys. 25.9, Din. 1.10, cf. δημαρχοὺς in Dem. 8.34). In most cases there is no reference to a specific body of government; if any, then to the ecclesia (Din. 1.31). Demagogoi and strategoi are juxtaposed in Hyp. 1.22. Demagogos occurs in Andoc. 4.27, which is however a late composition. Cf. furthermore Pythes fr.4 (Baiter/Sauppe 311).

41 The only occurrence of politikos is Aeschin. 2.184 (cf. supra 36), and the orators never use the word demegoros, which may occur in other texts (e.g. Xen. Mem. 2.6.15; Hell. 6.2.39, 6.3.3).

42 Cf. supra 39f with nn.16–22. In the orators the word rhetor is used in its legal sense in references to nomoi (Aeschin. 1.28, 34, 186; 3.2; Din. 1.71; Lycurg. fr.18 Conomis; Hyp. 3.1, 4, 8). In some cases it applies to a proposer of a specific decree (Lys. 13.72; Dem. 22.70; 59.105; Aeschin. 3.31, 203), and once it is used about a citizen who at intervals addresses the ecclesia (Dem. 18.308). In all other cases the reference is to the rhetores in the political sense.

43 Some historians suggest a different grouping of the politically active citizens, distinguishing between (a) citizens who attend the meetings, (b) minor politicians, and (c) the true political leaders, cf. Jones (supra n.1) 128–33 and Perlman (supra n.1) 328–30. Jones gives the following description of (b): "There was throughout Athenian history a class of semi-professional politicians, at first consisting of the gentry, later partly of the gentry and partly of poor men of rhetorical talent. These were the people who held the elective offices, were chosen as envoys to foreign states, proposed motions in the council and in the assembly, and prosecuted (and defended) in political trials" (130). There was indeed some kind of 'hierarchy' within the group of rhetores (cf. e.g. Dem. 2.29, Hyp. 1.12), but Jones' description of the minor politician fits Demosthenes, Demades, and Lykourgos better than Aristogeiton or Theokrines, and the distinction between major and minor politicians tends to obliterate the distinction between groups (c) and (d) above, which is, however, well attested in the sources. Consequently I will in this paper treat the group of rhetores as a whole and reserve a discussion of the hierarchy within the group for a future study.

48 THE ATHENIAN ‘POLITICIANS’, 403–322 B.C.

Kallistratos (Dem. 18.219, Hyp. 3.1)
Kephalos (Dem. 18.219, Din. 1.38)
Ktesiphon (Aesch. 3.31, 203–04)
Lykourgos (Lyc. 1.31)
Philokrates (Hyp. 3.29)
Philostратos (Dem. 42.21)
Polyeuktos of Sphettos (Din. 1.100)
Stephanos (Dem. 59.43)
Theokrines (Dem. 58.62ff)
Thrasyboulos (of Kollytos?) (Dem. 18.219)
Timarchos (Aesch. 1.112, 188)
Timokrates (Dem. 24.124)

Summing up: in the Athenian democracy of the fourth century, we are faced with two different uses of the important political term *rhetor*. As a legal term it occurs in *nomoi* and signifies any citizen who addresses his fellow citizens in the assemblies—groups (c) and (d) above. But in the speeches *rhetor* is almost invariably used as a political term in the much narrower sense of a citizen who addresses his fellow-citizens habitually, sometimes even professionally—group (d) above to the exclusion of (c)—and the citizen who only once or at intervals performs the part of *ho boulomenos* is described as an *idio­tes*, to be distinguished from the *rhetores* proper.

The clash between these two uses of the term *rhetor* is best illustrated by Hypereides in the speech *For Euxenippos*, who had been elected by the people to sleep in the Amphiaraiion and then to tell in the following *ecclesia* what the god had revealed to him. He performed his task; but when he had reported his dream to the people in the *ec­clesia*, Polyeuktos (of Kydantidai?) suspected foul play and indicted Euxenippos by an *eisangelia* εἰς τὸν δῆμον, based on the third section of the eisangelic law: ἕαν τις ῥήτωρ ὅν μὴ λέγη τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δῆμῳ τῷ άθναίων χρήματα λαμβάνων.44 Euxenippos was defended by Hypereides, and one of the basic arguments put forward by the defence is that Euxenippos is not a *rhetor* but a private citizen (*idio­tes*), and so he is not liable to be prosecuted by an *eisangelia* which is reserved for *rhetores*, i.e. citizens who regularly take a political initiative (Hyp. 3.3, 9, 11, 27–30). In his *graphe paranomon* against Ktesiphon, Aischines anticipates that his opponent will rely on precisely the same line of defence: Ktesiphon has admittedly proposed and carried the *psephisma*, but he is an *idio­tes* and not a *rhetor* (Aesch. 3.214). Now apart from the *eisangelia*, Euxenippos cannot be connected with

any other political activity, but since he has addressed the *ecclesia*, he must have been a *rhetor* in the legal sense. The two different uses of *rhetor* in Athens illustrate a common phenomenon in societies of all periods: a gap between the constitution and how it works.

IV

I have argued that *rhetores* and *strategoi* are regularly grouped together when the reference is to ‘political leaders’ in general. Having discussed the *rhetores*, I turn to the distinction between *rhetores* and *strategoi*. It is well known that in the fifth century the two different tasks of being a *rhetor* and a *strategos* were regularly performed by the same men, whereas in the fourth the two functions tended to become more and more separated.\(^45\) In the *Ath. Pol.* 28.2–3 Aristotle enumerates thirteen Athenian *προστάται* after Kleisthenes down to the end of the Peloponnesian War. Eleven were *strategoi*, the twelfth may have been a *strategos*; only the thirteenth, Kallikrates of Paiania, was certainly a *prostates* without being a *strategos*.\(^46\) After the restoration of the democracy, however, a sharp division developed, so that policymaking was left to a group of *rhetores* who were no longer elected *strategoi*, whereas the wars were conducted by a group of professional *strategoi* who tended to keep away from the *bema* on the Pnyx. Of the 77 known *strategoi* of the period 403–322, only 11 or 12 are recorded as proposers of decrees or speakers in the *ecclesia*. In the first half of the fourth century at least some political leaders were still elected *strategoi*, but after the Social War, Phokion was the only man of any importance to combine the *strategia* with addressing the *ecclesia*.\(^47\)


\(^{46}\) Xanthippos (480/479), Miltiades (490/489), Themistokles (481/0), Aristeides (479/8), Ephialtes (?), Kimon (478/7), Perikles (454/3), Thoukydides (444/3), Nikias (427/6), Kleon (424/3), Theramenes (411/0), Kleophon (?), Kallikrates. The year is that of the first attested *strategia*; cf. C. W. Fornara, *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404* (*Historia* Einzelschr. 16 [1971]). Concerning Ephialtes see Fornara 46 n.24, concerning Kleophon 70 with n.126. Connor (supra p.33) has argued convincingly that a new type of ‘politician’ appeared after the death of Perikles. The ‘new politicians’, however, were regularly *strategoi*, and in this respect there is no difference between the new and the old politicians. The first source mentioning a separation of civilian and military political leaders is Lys. 13.7: τοὺς τοῦ δήμου προστηρίκτας καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς καὶ ταξιαρχούς. But the splitting up of *rhetores* and *strategoi* is basically a fourth-century phenomenon, and most marked after 355.

\(^{47}\) For the period 403–355: Rhinon of Paiania, Thrasyboulos of Steiria, Archinos of Koile, Anytos, Aristophon of Azenia, Kallistratos of Aphidna, Timotheos of Ana-
And the prosopographical statistics support the general comments on the change in leadership which can be found in the orators and in later sources:

Isoc. 8.54–55: τοσούτον δὲ διαφέρομεν τῶν προγόνων, ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τοὺς αὐτοὺς προστάτας τε τῆς πόλεως ἐπουρώντο καὶ στρατηγοὺς ἱροῦντο νομίζοντες τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύσαται δυνάμενον, τὸν αὐτὸν τούτον ἀριστ’ αὐτὸν βουλεύσαται καὶ καθ’ αὐτὸν γενόμενον, ἥμεις δὲ τοῦναντίον τούτων ποιοῦμεν’ ὦς μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων συμβουλῶν χρώμεθα, τούτως μὲν οὐκ ἀξίωμεν στρατηγοὺς χειροτονεῖν ὡς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας, οἷς δ’ οὐδεὶς ἐν οὗτῳ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων οὔτε περὶ τῶν κοινῶν συμβουλεύσατο, τούτως δ’ αὐτοκράτορας ἐπετέμομεν ὡς ἐκεῖ σοφοτέρους ἐσομένους καὶ ῥαον βουλευσόμενοι περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πραγμάτων ἢ περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε προσβεμένων.

Aeschin. 3.146: εἰ δὲ τό αὐτῷ (Demosthenes) τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀντεῖποι, καταδουλούμενοι τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ συνεθέζοις μηδὲν αὐτὸν ἀντιλέγειν διαιδυκασιάν ἔθη γράψει τῷ βήματι πρὸς τὸ στρατήγημα: πλεῖστ ὑμᾶς ἀγαθὰ ὡς ἐκατὸν ἔθη ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος πεποιθεῖναι, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐκ τοῦ στρατηγήματος.

Plut. Phoc. 7.5: ὅρων δὲ (Phokion) τοῖς τά κοινὰ πράσσομεν τότε διηρήμενοι ὁσπερ ἀπὸ κλήρου τὸ στρατήγημα καὶ τὸ βήμα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν λέγοντας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ γράφοντας μόνον, ἦν ἐδυσμενὴ καὶ Ἀριστοφόρων καὶ Δημοσθένης καὶ Λυκούργος καὶ Ὑπερείς, Διοπείδη δὲ καὶ Μενεσθέα καὶ Λεωσθένη τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ πολεμεῖν αὐξησαν ἐαυτούς, ἐβούλετο τὴν Περικλέους καὶ Ἀρατείδου καὶ Σόλωνος πολειτείαν ὡσπερ ὀλόκληρον καὶ δημοσίους ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδοῦναι. 48

The reason for the separation of the strategoi from the rhetores is lucidly stated by Aristotle at Politics 1305a7–15: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγωγός καὶ στρατηγός, εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλλον σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων ἐκ δημαγωγῶν γεγονόσιν, αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γίγνεσθαι νῦν δὲ μὴ, ὅτι τότε μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἦσαν ἐκ τῶν στρατηγοῦντων (οὐ γὰρ τὸν δε δεινὸν ἦσαν λέγεν), νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἡδησημένης οἱ δυνάμειν λέγεν δημαγωγοῦσι μὲν, δὲ ἀπερίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται,

48 The rhetorical juxtaposition of βήμα and στρατηγός both in Aischines and in Plutarch indicates that Plutarch had the Aischines passage in mind here. The separation of rhetores and strategoi is also emphasized in Isoc. 15.136; Dem. 12.19; 18.212, 246; Din. 1.76; Plut. Mor. 486D, 812F.
a growing professionalism (both in rhetoric and in warfare) produced its regular effect: a division of labour. To the account given by Aristotle we must add that in the fourth century citizen armies tended to be replaced by mercenary forces commanded by condottieri, some of whom were not even native Athenians but only naturalized in order to be elected strategoi. The outstanding example is Charidemos of Oreos. A naturalized condottiere or an Athenian mercenary leader, who for years might be in the service of a tyrant or a barbarian prince, is not the obvious type of person to persuade the Athenians in the ecclesia, and the result was that the leading rhetores had to fight the battles in the ranks, whereas the strategoi attended the ecclesiai and voted without ever addressing the people.

On the basis of the undeniable and important distinction between rhetores and strategoi, modern historians sometimes identify the rhetores with the politicians, as opposed to the strategoi who are no longer to be regarded as proper ‘political leaders’. There may be some truth in this, but I emphasize a caution stated by Raphael Sealey: “it is well known that in fourth-century Athens the profession of general and politician tended to diverge. The tendency should not be overestimated.” As argued above, when the sources refer to ‘political leaders’ in general they regularly mention both rhetores and strategoi. One can think of several good reasons for this common practice.

Like other Greek poleis, Athens was regularly at war. After a period of peace (403–395) the Athenians joined the Corinthian War (395–386), and then the war against Sparta in alliance with Thebes (379–371). In the 360’s the Athenians fought regularly in the Aegean, i.a. to recover Amphipolis, and sometimes in Hellas as well, now in alliance with Sparta against Thebes. The Social War was fought and lost in 357–355, and the first war against Philip dragged on for eleven years (357–346). The more formidable second war against Philip was over in two years (340–338), and after the defeat at Chaironeia Athens experienced her only long period of peace and prosperity until Antipater put an end to the democracy after the Lamian War (323–

49 For a short biography see J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families (Oxford 1971) 570–71. Other examples are Philiskos (PA 14430), Polystratos (12070), and Strabax (12911).
50 Both Demades (Diod. 16.87.1) and Demosthenes (Plut. Dem. 20.2, Mor. 845F) fought in the battle of Chaironeia as ordinary hoplites.
51 Jones (supra n.1) 128, Perlman (supra n.1) 347; Davies (supra n.45) 124ff.
52 Sealey (supra n.1) 178–79.
Admittedly, warfare was not continuous and battles were fought only occasionally, but Athens nearly always had a squadron operating somewhere in the Aegean or Ionian Sea and sometimes an army operating somewhere in Hellas. When peace is the exception and war the rule, political leaders tend to include generals, and the Athenians can certainly testify to the principle stated by Clausewitz: war is politics carried on by other means.

Second, the splitting up of the 'political leaders' into a group of *rhetores* and a group of *strategoi* resulted in close collaboration between members of the two groups. This is perhaps best illustrated by Demosthenes in his description of Athenian political behaviour in the *Second Olynthiac* (2.29, quoted supra 37), but many other sources can be adduced: Aischines describes Chares' collaboration with citizens who dominated the *ecclesia* (2.71), and collaboration between *rhetores* and *strategoi* is also discussed in Isocrates’ defence of Timotheos (15.136ff), in Philip’s letter to the Athenians (Dem. 12.19), and in Plato’s *Euthydemus* (290c–d).

Third, tradition is always an important factor, especially for the Athenians who cherished the idea of an ancestral constitution and tended to believe that reaction was the only true form of progress. For almost a century the Athenians had been used to political leaders who both commanded the armed forces and addressed the *ecclesia* and the *dicasteria*. In the fourth century, when the *strategoi* tended to become professional generals and left the political initiatives to citizens acting as *hoi boulomenoi*, the Athenians’ first reaction, in my opinion, would be to believe that the group of leaders now comprised both generals and orators. And so they coined the phrase ῥήτορες καὶ στρατηγοὶ. The juxtaposition of *rhetores* and *strategoi* does not occur in the sources before the 350’s. It may of course be accidental, but it may also reflect the Athenians’ adaptation to a change in political leadership during the first half of the fourth century.

Fourth, one of the important political activities in Athens was to serve on an embassy. The *presbeis* were elected by the *ecclesia*, and of the 94 envoys known in our period 32 are attested also as *rhetores* in the *ecclesia* and 11 also as *strategoi*. The *rhetores* outweigh the *strategoi*, but, on the other hand, to be an envoy was an activity that tended to bind together the *rhetores* and the *strategoi*, especially since the *strategoi* who served as envoys would have to make a report on

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53 Konon of Anaphylstos (*PA* 8707), Eunomos (*PA* 5861), Thrasyboulos of Kollytos, Kallistratos of Aphidna, Kallias of Alopeke, Autokles of Euonymon, Aristophon of Azenia, Melanopos of Aixone, Nausikles of Oe, Phokion (of Potamos?), Ephialtes (*PA* 6156).
their mission to the boule and the ecclesia and would become rhetores, at least in the technical legal sense of the word.

Finally, the distinction between rhetores and strategoi is most marked if we focus on the rhetores in the ecclesia. But some strategoi are also known as rhetores addressing the boule or the nomothetai, and more appeared before the dicasteria as prosecutors or synegoroi. Many political battles were fought not in the ecclesia but in the people’s court. Political trials were still brought by strategoi, and it was quite common, for both prosecutor and defendant, to call on a strategos to be his synegoros. If we take into account that rhetor denotes not only policy-makers in the ecclesia but also the citizens appearing before the boule, the nomothetai, and the dicasteria, the number of strategoi who were also rhetores rises from 11 or 12 to 17 or 18 with several more activities attested. Including ambassadors, the figure rises to 22–23. In conclusion, rhetores and strategoi were diverging groups throughout the fourth century, which is probably the reason why the Athenians had to use two words instead of one when referring to their ‘political leaders’; but there was still a considerable overlap which must not be underrated.

V

In conclusion, the comprehensive term for political leaders in fourth-century Athens was ῥήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί, not rhetores to the exclusion of strategoi, and the juxtaposition of rhetores and strategoi was not only a political fact but also acknowledged in the law code. There was indeed an increasing separation of rhetores and strategoi due to a growing professionalism both in rhetoric and in warfare.

54 Aesch. 3.7 μήτε τῶν στρατηγῶν συνήγορος, οί ἐπὶ πολὺν ἡδὴ χρόνων συνεργοῦντες τοῖς τῶν ῥήτωροι κυριαίον τὴν πολιτείαν, 196 οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ στρατηγοὶ ἦμεν καὶ τῶν τὰς στηθέοις τινάς εὐρημένων ἐξαίτονται τὰς γραφάς τῶν παρανόμων. The following strategoi are known also as synegoroi: Iphikrates of Rhamnous, Aristophon of Azenia, Phokion (of Potamos?), Nausikles of Oe, Philochares of Kothokidai. The following strategoi are known as public prosecutors: Archinos of Koile, Konon of Anaphlystos (PA 8707), Kallistratos of Aphidna, Iphikrates of Rhamnous, Melanopos of Aixone, Aristophon of Azenia, Chares of Angele.

55 Three, perhaps four, strategoi are also known as proposers of nomoi: Agyrhios of Kollytos, Archinos of Koile, Aristophon of Azenia, and perhaps Kephisophon of Aphidna, whose name however is only restored in IG II2 244.2.

56 Several strategoi, for whom no activity as rhetor is attested, are nevertheless described in our sources as outstanding rhetores: Autokles of Euonymon (Xen. Hell. 6.3.7), Eunomos (PA 5861: Isoc. 15.93), Leosthenes of Kephale (PA 9141: Aeschin. 2.124), and Thrasyboulos of Kollytos (?) (Dem. 18.219).
Political leadership tended to be split up between the rhetores who dominated the ecclesia and the strategoi who commanded the armies in the constant wars. But there were some strategoi who were still active in the ecclesia; both rhetores and strategoi influenced foreign policy by being elected ambassadors, and in the dicasteria it was still common to see a strategos as a prosecutor or as a synegoros in a political action. Rhetor was a technical legal term denoting the citizen who performed the task of ho boulomenos in the decision-making assemblies. A rhetor was the proposer of decrees of the demos or the boule, of laws passed by the nomothetai, or he was a prosecutor in a political public action. Furthermore, a rhetor addressed the ecclesia, the boule, or the nomothetai supporting or opposing a proposal made by another rhetor or he was a synegoros for the prosecutor or the defendant in a political action. By contrast with the modern ‘politician’ a rhetor was not elected—he volunteered; he was never entrusted with making decisions but only expected to take initiatives; he might collaborate with other rhetores or with a strategos, but he was not affiliated with any party or any broader group among the voters in the decision-making bodies. To be a rhetor was essentially a one-day business, and ideally the political initiatives should have been distributed among all citizens so that a citizen only occasionally would assume the responsibility of being a rhetor. In fact a small group of active citizens dominated the decision-making assemblies by taking initiatives habitually, sometimes almost professionally. And as a result the word rhetor developed a new meaning different from the legal use of the term. As a legal term rhetor denoted any citizen who addressed the decision-making bodies, no matter whether he did it occasionally or frequently. As a political term rhetor tended to denote only those who habitually addressed the assemblies to the exclusion of the occasional rhetor, who was called idiotes and often contrasted with the rhetores in the political sense. Consequently, the Athenian citizens can be divided into four groups according to their political participation: (a) passive citizens, (b) active citizens who attended the assemblies and voted but never addressed the people or the jurors, (c) the idiotai who occasionally acted as hoi boulomenoi, being rhetores in the legal sense, and (d) the rhetores in the political sense who regularly addressed the assemblies and assumed the responsibility for most of the initiatives. Modern scholarship tends to overlook the difference between (c) and (d), emphasizing instead a subdivision of (d) into major and minor rhetores. A kind of hierarchy within (d) can indeed be traced in the sources, but must not obliterate the existence of (c). There was of course no sharp distinction between (c) and (d),
and the group of *rhetores* in the political meaning seems also to have been much larger than often assumed. But this problem will be reserved for a future study. Finally, the accountability of the *rhetores* and the *strategoi* was more far-reaching than the accountability of all the *archai* selected by lot. Especially the *graphe paranomon* (against *rhetores*) and the *eisangelia* (frequently used against *strategoi*) were dangerous weapons against the ‘political leaders’, whereas the obligatory *euthynai* against *archai*, as far as the sources go, only infrequently resulted in a public action.57

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