Iphikrates, Timotheos, and Athens, 371–360 B.C.

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Iphikrates, the competent and innovative general prominent in Athens from the late 390's onward, accomplished little of note in his generalship in Macedonia in the years 368–365. After he was relieved of his command by his enemy Timotheos because of his ineffectiveness, he betrayed his country and acted against Athens in the service of the Odrysian king Kotys. His disgrace was all the more conspicuous by comparison with the success of Timotheos, who made numerous gains for Athens in his campaigns in Samos, Macedonia, and the Chersonese. In 362 Timotheos and Iphikrates settled their differences and concluded a marriage alliance; Iphikrates, however, remained in Thrace probably until 360/359. This general account of Iphikrates, first proposed by Rehdantz in 1845, has in most particulars been accepted by all scholars since. It entails, however, serious difficulties: motivations are obscure, the sequence of events often lacks logical coherence, and there is some factual contradiction. Furthermore, it relies on Demosthenes' questionable rendering of the facts. The present study will re-examine the evidence for Iphikrates’ career in the 360’s in the hope of a more adequate explanation.

From [Dem.] 49.66 we learn that Timotheos threatened to prosecute Iphikrates on a charge of ξενία. Shortly thereafter (οὐ πολλῶ χρονῶ ὑστερον) they arranged a marriage alliance and thereby ended their enmity. Scholars, almost without exception, have placed the date of this alliance in 362, seemingly for no other reason than that the traditional date for speech 49 is 362. But that Timotheos’ threat


2 The exception: K. Klee, RE 6A (1937) 1327–28 s.v. “Timotheos 3” (though without stating his reasons). The date of the speech was established by Schaefer (supra n. 1) 137.
of prosecution and the subsequent marriage alliance occurred in this year is an unwarranted assumption that is contradicted by the facts. There are indeed considerable objections to the date 362 for the speech, although it appears the most likely,³ but mention of Timotheos’ threat and the marriage alliance in the speech in no way implies that these events occurred in the same year as the speech: on the contrary, the speaker alludes to an event which took place at some indefinite time in the past. However, the most substantial objection to the year 362 for these events is the fact that, although Timotheos was in Athens sometime in 362, Iphikrates was still in Thrace.⁴ Since their reconciliation and the marriage alliance would strongly suggest, if not require, Iphikrates’ presence in Athens, a date of 362 for these events is impossible.

We cannot ascertain a secure terminus post quem for the alliance. It must have been made after Timotheos’ return from Egypt, where he had gone after his prosecution by Iphikrates and Kallistratos late in 373, from which time we may date the hostility between Timotheos and Iphikrates.⁵ We do not know how long Timotheos remained in Egypt, but he had returned most probably by 370/369, when he is named on a list of trierarchs together with Kallistratos and Chabrias.⁶ A terminus ante quem of 368 for the alliance can be established, since

³ Schaefer (supra n.1) 137–43 invoked remarks about Iphikrates and Kallistratos (at 9 and 47), who he contended are mentioned with honor and respect, to exclude a date later than 361, as Kallistratos was exiled in that year, while Iphikrates was out of favor in 359. The context of the passages, however, leaves no doubt that Apollodoros is merely trying to show that his father Pasion knew someone highly important in the past, and his remarks about them allude only to their influential position in the past. The strongest case for retaining a date of 362 lies in Apollodoros’ relationship with Phormion, which, while never good, appears to have grown worse with each year; as Phormion was a chief witness for Apollodoros one might expect a relatively early date for the speech. Also, in 362 the financial arrangements of Apollodoros and his younger brother Pasikles changed, since in that year Pasikles came of age, and the terms of Pasion’s will called for the transfer of property from Phormion’s guardianship to Pasikles. Apollodoros chose control of a shield factory and his brother received the bank (Dem. 36.11). Since, however, there was no capital in the factory, and Apollodoros seems to have had none in the bank (which is likely the reason he chose the factory), he would have wanted to obtain as much money as he could; apparently he took upon himself the diligent prosecution of his father’s debtors, insuring that he himself received the better part of the collected debts. This would suggest a date of 362 for speech 49.

⁴ From the combined evidence of Dem. 23.132 and 153–67. Kephisodotos’ command was in 360/359. Even though there are some chronological difficulties in determining precisely when some of Iphikrates’ activities listed by Demosthenes occurred (see infra 248), there is no evidence that he returned to Athens until 360/359.

⁵ For Timotheos’ departure for Egypt: [Dem.] 49.25. For the trial: 49.22.

⁶ IG II² 1609,100; I accept the date advocated by G. Cawkwell, “The Date of IG II² 1609 Again,” Historia 22 (1973) 759–61.
in that year Iphikrates left as general for the northwest Aegean.\(^7\) In the early part of 370/369 Iphikrates was sent to Lakedaimonia to aid the Spartans against Thebes, on the motion of Kallistratos, but the campaign did not last long (Xen. Hell. 6.5.49–51); therefore we cannot rule out this entire year from consideration. All that we can safely say is that sometime between Timotheos’ return to Athens (371?) and Iphikrates’ departure for Macedonia in 368 the alliance was contracted. This has important implications, for it demonstrates not only that Timotheos and Iphikrates were not the bitter enemies they are assumed to have been from 373 to 362, but also that Timotheos recovered from the setback of 373 much sooner than has been believed.

Let us consider the circumstances. Timotheos, although acquitted in the trial in which Kallistratos and Iphikrates stood as prosecutors, must nonetheless have suffered a substantial loss of power; shortly afterwards he left Athens. He doubtless acquired much wealth from his service to the Persian king in Egypt, and presumably maintained political connections in Athens which enabled him upon his return to retaliate with a charge of *ξεφιά* against Iphikrates for his rôle in the trial of 373.\(^8\) We can assume that Timotheos launched his counter-attack as soon as he was able: Iphikrates had been significantly aided in his career by Konon, Timotheos’ father, a fact that must have added insult to the injury Timotheos had suffered in 373; no doubt vengeance was a high priority for Timotheos on his return.

Significantly, the threat never materialized. Instead, Timotheos’ daughter was betrothed to Menestheus, the son of Iphikrates. An explanation for this apparent paradox can be found in a reassessment of Timotheos’ position upon his return from Egypt along the lines suggested above. It is likely that his return to power was quicker and a less radical change than has been thought. His appearance on the list of trierarchs for a foreign expedition is suggestive; the traditional view that Timotheos remained in relative obscurity outside the political sphere on his return from Egypt until his successes at Samos and in the north is very likely incorrect. That the alliance was probably

\(^7\) Nep. *Iph.* 3.2; Aeschin. 2.27–29; schol. Aeschin. 2.29–32; Dem. 23.149.

\(^8\) The foundation of this charge may rest on Amyntas’ adoption of Iphikrates (Aeschin. 2.28): R. Sealey, “Callistratos of Aphidna and His Contemporaries,” *Historia* 5 (1956) 199 n.164; cf. J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford 1971) 250. Some have attributed the charge to Iphikrates’ relationship by marriage to Kotys, but this seems less likely, especially since Kotys had been made an Athenian citizen. But cf. [Dem.] 50. It is not clear how flexible the charge was in general practice. For a discussion of the γραφὴ *ξεφιάς* see A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* II (Oxford 1971) 23–24.
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made on a much more equal basis than has previously been assumed is suggested by [Dem.] 49.66: ἐνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος; Iphikrates must have seen some benefit as well, beyond that of ridding himself of the threat of prosecution.⁹

Furthermore, there is evidence of strong mutual interests between Iphikrates and Timotheos. Iphikrates had well-known connections in Macedonia and Thrace: his relation by marriage to Kotys, his adoption by Amyntas, and his colonial settlement (κατοίκησις) at Drys (Harp. s.v. Δρύς). Timotheos, in turn, had received a gift of timber from Amyntas ([Dem.] 49.26), was a friend of Alketas, the king of the Molossians (Diod. 15.36.5), and concluded alliances for Athens with the Epirotes, Athamanes, and Chaones (Nep. Tim. 2.1). Elaious appears on the left face of the ‘stele of Aristoteles’, and it is likely that Timotheos won over this city, among others, on his northern cruise.¹⁰ The interests of Timotheos and Iphikrates in northern Greece, Macedonia, and Thrace complemented each other to a great extent in the 380’s and were to coincide in the 360’s. Cooperation would yield the best results for both and for Athens. Indeed, their relationship through Konon and their mutual interests make it more surprising that they were ever enemies than that they now renewed their friendship.

The focus of Athenian foreign policy shifts to the northern theater significantly in tandem with the conclusion of the new alliance between Timotheos and Iphikrates. Iphikrates was elected general for 368/7 and was sent to Macedonia, specifically ἐπὶ Ἀμφιπόλην (Aeschin. 2.27), although we may assume his commission was broader in scope. Macedonia was in a state of crisis over the succession to the throne following the assassination of Alexander by Ptolemaios. Ptolemaios, in concert with Eurydike, claimed the throne as a regent for the young Perdikkas, a claim threatened by Pausanias.¹¹ At this point Iphikrates arrived with a few ships ἐπὶ κατασκοπὴν μᾶλλον τῶν πραγμάτων ἡ πολιορκία τῆς πόλεως and subsequently succeeded in driving Pausanias from Macedonia (Aeschin. 2.28).

Our knowledge of his commission is meager, but presumably it involved diplomacy as well as military intervention. Athens was doubtless anxious to see Macedonian affairs resolved in a way favorable to her interests, which were at that time involved with Amphipolis. The

⁹ The alliance of the families seems to have lasted into the next generation: cf. R. Sealey, “Who was Aristogeiton?” BICS 7 (1960) 33–43 [Essays in Greek Politics (New York 1965) 186–99].
¹⁰ Tod II 123.49; Diod. 15.47.2–3.
¹¹ Aeschin. 2.26–29 with schol. to 2.27; Diod. 16.2.6.
outcome of the internal disputes over the throne could directly affect her success in the north.

There was, however, more at stake than simply the outcome of these disputes. In 369, while Epaminondas was in the Peloponnese, Pelopidas made an expedition to Macedonia from Thessaly. He had received a request for intervention from Alexander, king of Macedonia, followed by one from his rival Ptolemaios; upon arrival he contracted an alliance with Alexander. It is unclear to what extent Theban interests lay directly in Macedonia itself; the alliance appears to have been at least a safeguard against Macedonian interference in Thessalian affairs. Nevertheless, the Theban presence in Macedonia, coupled with the fact that (for whatever reason) she was taking sides in the internal affairs of Macedonia, must have caused no little apprehension in Athens about the future of that area. The expedition of Iphikrates, therefore, was timely in several respects.

Pelopidas made another expedition to Thessaly in the following year, 368, and while there received word of Pausanias' claim to the throne and Iphikrates' support of Perdikkas. Pelopidas returned to Macedonia, with the surprising result that an alliance was made with Ptolemaios, an event that was undoubtedly a blow to Iphikrates. This development not only aided Thebes insofar as Thessalian affairs were concerned but also hindered Athenian gains in Macedonia, specifically with respect to Amphipolis (cf. Aeschin. 2.29). Thus matters worsened for Athens because of the intervention of Thebes, and Iphikrates must have had a far more difficult time achieving success than he might otherwise have had were he dealing with Macedonia alone. It is clear, however, that he was vigorously occupied during his command attempting to regain the support that had been lost to Thebes. Rather than condemn Iphikrates for inaction in Macedonia, we must recognize the complexity of the diplomatic struggle between Athens and Thebes in the north, not only in Macedonia but in Thessaly as well.

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13 Plut. *Pel.* 27.2, Diod. 15.71, Aeschin. 2.28.

14 To what extent Iphikrates himself had a direct interest in the succession to the throne through his relationship with Amyntas is unclear.

15 An indication of the intricacies of this contest is the swift alternation of the alliances of Macedonia and Thessaly with Thebes and Athens: 369, between Boiotia and Alexander II of Macedonia (Diod. 15.67.4, Plut. *Pel.* 26.4); 368, between Athens and Alexander of Pherai (Diod. 15.71.3, Dem. 23.120, Plut. 31.6); 368, between Boiotia and Ptolemaios of Macedonia (Aeschin. 2.29, Plut. 27.3); 367, truce between Boiotia and Alexander of Pherai (Plut. 29, Paus. 9.15.2, Diod. 15.75.2).
In 365/4 Iphikrates’ command in the north ended. Timotheos replaced him, and Iphikrates himself joined Kotys in Thrace. The episode is mentioned by Demosthenes (23.149): ἐπειδή τὸν μὲν Ἰφικράτην ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεου δ’ ἐπὶ Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ Χερρόνησον ἔξετέμψατε στρατηγὸν. It is the communis opinio that Iphikrates was dismissed from his command for negligence and left in disgrace, taking refuge in the service of Kotys, with whom he proceeded to make war on Athens. This view requires examination.

The word ἀποστράτηγος is unusual. It occurs only here in classical Greek; in later authors it appears once in Plutarch and once in Pollux. In LSJ ἀποστράτηγον ποιεῖν τινά is defined, “to remove [a general] from the command, supersede him,” and the example given is the passage from Demosthenes. ἀποστράτηγος as a “general who has completed his term of office” is however given for the passage in Plutarch. Pollux, under military terms, uses the word predicatively of οἱ ἀποχειροτονηθέντες, a technical term denoting those who had been voted out of office before the end of their term. Thus in Pollux ἀποστράτηγος denotes one who has been impeached (if indeed we are to assume that Pollux uses ἀποχειροτονηθέντες in the technical Athenian sense), whereas in Plutarch impeachment is not at all at issue. Indeed the two late uses of the word indicate that its meaning at that late stage was flexible or had changed from classical usage. Given the widely disparate meanings of ἀποστράτηγος, we cannot interpret Demosthenes in the light of usage five centuries later. Nevertheless, it does appear that a broader meaning of the word could fit all three passages, that is, “One who has laid down his generalship” for whatever reason—a “retired general,” in LSJ’s words. The verb ἐποιήσατε at Dem. 23.149, however, does imply that Iphikrates’ command ended because of a vote of the assembly, rather than of his own accord. The choice of the word ἀποστράτηγος in the context of the passage, in which Demosthenes is attempting to malign Iphikrates, is significant: the appearance of a rather colorless and (seemingly) general or vague word, instead of a term unequivocally denoting a procedure for maladministration, casts serious doubt on the inference that Iphikrates was dismissed for wrongdoing. Further, if the word were synonymous with ἀποχειροτονηθείς, it is odd not to find it used

16 Plut. Marc. 22.5, θύει γὰρ ἐν Σπάρτῃ τῶν ἀποστρατήγων ὁ μὲν δὲ ἀπάτης ἢ πειθὸς δ’ ἐποιήται διαταγαζόμενος βοῶν, ὁ δὲ διὰ μάχης ἀλεξανδρών. Poll. 1.128, καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες, οἱ μὲν τοῦ παντὸς στρατηγοῦ, καὶ συνστρατηγοῦ, καὶ υποστράτηγοι, ὡστερ καὶ οἱ ἀποχειροτονηθέντες, ἀποστράτηγοι.
more often in reference to such a common procedure.\textsuperscript{18} There is positive evidence that impeachment was not involved in Iphikrates' case. The procedure of \textit{ἀποσχειροτονία} was regularly followed by trial of the dismissed magistrate for a major offense against the state.\textsuperscript{19} We know that Iphikrates never faced such a trial, and Demosthenes, by no means a kindly witness, would surely have mentioned any evasion of such a trial since it would have been very much to his purpose, as we shall see. We may conclude that Demosthenes' use of \textit{ἀποστράτηγος ποιεῖν} does not imply the formal procedure of \textit{ἀποσχειροτονία} and need not suggest more than that Timotheos succeeded Iphikrates and that Iphikrates was replaced with the consent of the Athenians.

After he was succeeded by Timotheos, Iphikrates went to Kotys. It is clear that eventually Kotys' relations with Athens worsened. The decisive question in judging Iphikrates' conduct in 365 is whether Kotys was already an enemy, as Demosthenes claimed (23.149).

There is no evidence of hostilities between Kotys and Athens in the early 360's; assuredly both had interests in the Chersonese, yet the potential for conflict over the area did not arise until \textit{ca} 365, and, as we shall see, actual conflict not until much later. Iphikrates had been in command in the Hellespont in the early 380's and had come to terms with Kotys probably in 386; he certainly gained by this association, through a marriage alliance and the acquisition of territory.\textsuperscript{20} We can reasonably suppose that relations between Athens and Kotys were good at this time and continued so, as this was in the interest of both parties, and the consequences of enmity were potentially great. The need to insure safe passage for the grain ships sailing from the Black Sea would dictate foreign policy to a fair degree in Athens, and interest in the north was already present in the 370's: in 373, Timotheos cruised the northern Aegean in quest of allies, and possibly in the same year Elaious was brought into the league.\textsuperscript{21} In the early 360's Athenian policy regarding the Chersonese can best be described as interested but cautious. It is reasonable to suppose that Athens asserted her claims to it in 369, as she did to Amphipolis, but took no direct action at the time. She desired recognition from Persia.

\textsuperscript{18} The extant corpus of Demosthenes includes eleven examples of the verb and one of the noun. Of generals: 23.167 (Kephisodotos), 49.9 (Timotheos).

\textsuperscript{19} See \textit{supra} n.17.


\textsuperscript{21} Diod. 15.47.2–3, Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.2.12, Tod II 123.49.
of her claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese, but pursued a hesitant course. Illustrative of this tension are the orders given Timotheos on his expedition to Asia Minor in 366: to do what he could, but not to break the truce. Another major concern was Theban relations with Persia, which were growing stronger in the 360's. In this climate, relations with Kotys were important to maintain, and, if necessary, to strengthen.

There is no record of any movement by Kotys into the area until 367/6, when he appears to have taken advantage of the disturbances caused by the satraps Autophradates and Mausolos against Ariobarzanes. Thus the impetus for friction and conflict in the Chersonese came from neither Athens nor Kotys, but from the Persian satraps. In response to Ariobarzanes' request for assistance, Athens dispatched Timotheos and Sparta sent Agesilaos. Timotheos went not to the Hellespont, as did Agesilaos, but to Samos, where he engaged in a protracted siege lasting ten months (Isoc. 15.111–112). In the Hellespont Agesilaos reportedly succeeded in driving off Kotys and Autophradates (Xen. Ages. 2.26–27). For their respective services Agesilaos received a pecuniary reward and returned home, while Timotheos was given Sestos and Krithote by Ariobarzanes (Nep. Ages. 7.2.6, Tim. 1.3). It is unlikely, however, that Timotheos went on to the Hellespont after completing the siege of Samos.

22 Xen. Ages. 2.26–27; Dem. 15.9; Diod. 15.90.3; Nep. Ages. 6; Just. Epit. 10; Polyain. 2.1.16, 7.21.6. Cf. A. T. Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire (Chicago 1948) 411–16.

23 Nepos synchronizes the departure of Timotheos and Agesilaos (Tim. 1.3): [Timotheus] Ariobarzani simul cum Agesilaou auxilio projectus est.

24 Isoc. 15.112 to this effect need not be taken in a strict chronological sense: the remark is made in a context recounting Timotheos' victories; Isokrates is not recording his complete itinerary. After Samos, Timotheos went directly to Macedonia, and was then occupied with the sieges of Amphipolis, Methone, and Pydna (at least). Buckler (supra n.12) 167–69, 256–57, assumes that Timotheos must have been engaged in the Hellespont in order to receive the reward of Sestos and Krithote. He suggests that in 365 Timotheos, after the siege of Samos, went to Amphipolis, relieved Iphikrates, and, after besieging Methone, Pydna, and Amphipolis, continued to the Hellespont along with Agesilaos. This chronology is unlikely. First, it would be odd for Ariobarzanes to wait two years before sending for help. We hear of only one request, and that must have been in 366, or even 367, immediately after which Timotheos left for Samos. Agesilaos must have left Sparta then as well. Second, Buckler's chronology is too congested. Timotheos cannot have left Samos before late winter/early spring of 365. Then, according to Buckler, all the following events occurred in the same year. Timotheos sailed for Amphipolis, where he replaced Iphikrates, won over at least Methone and Torone, and made an unsuccessful attempt on Amphipolis. In addition, Chalandemos left Timotheos, sailed to Thrace, where he must have stayed for some time (though not necessarily very long), and then returned to the northwest, where he joined Timotheos and helped him in the assaults upon towns in the Chalkidike and at Amphipolis. Then, still in 365, Timotheos went to the Chersonese. This timetable requires too much activity over a large area in too brief a time.
Thus Kotys, in attacking Sestos, was reacting not to Athenian claims but to the quarrels of the satraps. He sought only to gain control of the city, which was then under Ariobarzanes' control. Timotheos, moreover, did not sail to the Hellespont at this time, but at a later date. Therefore, Timotheos and Agesilaos are reported to have left simultaneously to help Ariobarzanes, only Agesilaos is mentioned in connection with Autophradates, Mausolos, and Kotys. We may conclude, therefore, that contrary to Demosthenes' claim, Kotys was not at war with Athens in 365.

However, the further question arises whether, when Kotys' relations with Athens became openly hostile, Iphikrates' allegiance to his native city changed as well. We have seen that Dem. 23.149 is probably of no use for judging whether Iphikrates was a traitor to Athens; one sentence in the speech remains to be examined. At 23.130 Demosthenes says that Iphikrates fought a sea battle against Athenian commanders: ἐτὸλμησεν ὑπὲρ τῶν Κότυνος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τῶν ύμετέρως στρατηγῶν ναυμαχεῖν. The chronology in this section of the speech is unclear, to the extent that it is not even certain that the battle alluded to actually belongs in the 360's. But if one assumes a date in the 360's, two considerations militate very strongly against the notion that Iphikrates acted in overt opposition to Athens. First, he was never called to account for his allegedly treasonous activities. The Athenians during this period did not treat kindly generals who failed or were remiss in their duties in the north; treason would have been an even greater offense. Second, Demosthenes himself concedes that Iphikrates was never won over by Kotys against the interests of Athens, and further that he refused to attack Athenian strongholds when he was with Kotys; this was why he left Kotys

It is difficult to arrive at a precise chronology from the sources (Diod. 15.81.6; Isoc. 15.108, 112; Nep. Tim. 1), but given the events we know to have occurred before Timotheos went to the Hellespont, I suggest, the difficulties notwithstanding, that Timotheos remained in Macedonia longer than Buckler argues—perhaps until 363. According to Buckler (supra n.12) 257, Timotheos had returned from the Chersonese a year before Epaminondas' naval expedition in 364, in which, among other places, Epaminondas sailed to Byzantion and attempted to lure the Byzantines from the Athenian alliance. There is no response from Timotheos to this expedition. This seems highly unlikely. Not only was Byzantion important, but the Theban expedition constituted a serious threat which would surely warrant response from Timotheos. His eventual move to the Chersonese was, it is likely, just such a response.


Generals prosecuted for their conduct following Timotheos' command: Ergophilos, Kalisthenes, Leosthenes, Autokles, Menon, Timomachos (Dem. 36.53, 19.180; Diod. 15.95.2–3; Polyaen. 5.2.1). Cf./ Grote (supra n.1) 369–74, and Pritchett (supra n.1) 4–33, who devotes a chapter to trials of generals.
when he withdrew to Antissa and Drys in 360. Why, if he had turned against Athens, should he have been reluctant to attack Athenian possessions? Thus Demosthenes’ statement about Iphikrates’ refusal to aid Kotys offensively and consequent departure in 360 implies that up to then there had been no serious attacks.

For these reasons we should not accept Demosthenes’ portrayal of Iphikrates as a traitor to Athens during his stay with Kotys. It is however quite likely that, as Kotys’ hostility toward Athens grew, Iphikrates found himself in compromising situations while in Thrace, situations indeed which eventually led to his break with Kotys. Doubtless there was a certain amount of material available for Demosthenes to exploit in his attack on Iphikrates in speech 23. Furthermore, once Kotys had become an enemy of Athens, mere association with him would be a ready means of maligning Iphikrates; it was a simple matter to push back the date of Kotys’ open breach with Athens to a point at which Iphikrates would be implicated as well.

Thus Kotys was not an enemy of Athens in 365 when Iphikrates joined him, and the evidence does not warrant the claim that Iphikrates was a traitor to Athens in his activities in Thrace in 365–360/359. A new explanation of his conduct at this time must then be proposed. I suggest the following. As a result of the events in the Chersonese of 367/6–366/5 Athens saw the need to deal with Kotys, to confirm their friendship, and to understand his intentions. It was at this point that Timotheos sailed to the Macedonian coast to take over Iphikrates’ command, and that Iphikrates joined Kotys. I believe that Iphikrates went to Thrace not as a deserter who had fallen from favor at Athens, but with the express purpose of pursuing Athenian interests in the Chersonese in cooperation with Timotheos, with whom he had resumed friendship at the beginning of the decade, and that this was done by the authority of the Athenians. Demosthenes himself never says that Iphikrates entered the service of Kotys as a mer-

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28 Dem. 23.131–32. The chronology is based on the combined evidence of 132 and 153–67. Demosthenes implies that Charidemos entered Kotys’ service right after Iphikrates left, but this need not be correct. We should not discount the possibility that Iphikrates in fact left for Antissa and Drys earlier than 360/359, which would then make better sense of the tradition that he resided there. If this is true, then the argument that Iphikrates was not a traitor to Athens is strengthened accordingly. As for Iphikrates’ residence on Lesbos, it is suggestive that Timotheos spent time there as well: Nep. Chab. 3.4, Theopomp. FGrHist 115F105.

29 We should note the possibility that Timotheos may have returned to Athens first. If he did, one wonders what part he might have played in the prosecution of Kallistratos and Chabrias over Oropos.
cenary; indeed, he makes it clear that his position was that of friend and adviser. Furthermore, in one passage he seems to imply that Iphikrates continued to be a representative of Athens while he was with Kotys. He was, after all, the most natural and obvious candidate for the mission because of his personal ties with Kotys.

Finally, Timotheos, when he replaced Iphikrates, did not go directly to the Chersonese but remained in the northwest, where he won over Methone and Pydna and made an unsuccessful attempt on Amphipolis. If Iphikrates had left to help Kotys against Athens, it would indeed be surprising for Timotheos not to sail immediately for the Chersonese but remain instead in Macedonia. The situation in the Chersonese would have been somewhat volatile then even without the part played by Iphikrates. If, on the other hand, Iphikrates acted as he did in concert with Timotheos and in the interests of Athens, Timotheos’ decision to remain in Macedonia was reasonable. When he finally did move to the Chersonese ca 363, it was for a reason other than the threat of Kotys and Iphikrates in the area—the appearance of a Theban squadron under Epaminondas.

To complete the picture of Athenian activities in the north at this time we must consider Demosthenes’ portrayal of Charidemos. Charidemos, he says, had been in Iphikrates’ service for more than three years (23.144), and he refused to take Timotheos’ service when the latter took over the Macedonian command. Instead he went to join Kotys, although he knew well, says Demosthenes, that Kotys was a bitter enemy of Athens. When he ascertained, however, that Timotheos was not moving first against the Chersonese but against Amphipolis, he left Kardia to join the Olynthians in their resistance to Timotheos. Captured on the way by the Athenian fleet, he took service with Timotheos, since mercenaries were needed for the campaigns (23.149–51). Demosthenes’ account is suspect. It portrays Charidemos as having only one object, to harm Athens. On this

30 According to Demosthenes, Iphikrates acted ύπερ Κότυς (23.129) or ύπερ τῶν Κότυς πραγμάτων (130). His relation to Kotys was one of friendship, λαβὼν ἔργῳ τῆς ἐκείνου Κότυς φαλάς πειράν (131). He collected troops for Kotys (132) and gave advice on raising revenue (Arist. Oec. 1351a18).

31 Kotys οὖν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀποδοθέου χάριν ἐσπούδασεν αὐτῷ, καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς δι’ ἐκείνου Κότυστος τι φαλανθρωπὸν ἐπράβεν, ἡνα συγγενικῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς πεπραγμένους τίχη (23.131). Cf. also 136, which would be nonsensical if Iphikrates had already been dissociated from Athens. Iphikrates’ position may have been similar to that in 386/5, when he appears to have been in Thrace in an official capacity, a view conjectured rightly, I believe, by Höck (supra n.1) 458. Cf. also Rehdantz (supra n.1) 24–25 and Pritchett (supra n.1) 64–65.

32 See supra n.24.
account he traveled back and forth between Macedonia and the Chersonese in search of nothing more than a campaign in which he could oppose Athenians. But if this were his object, why did he finally take service with Timotheos, serving with such distinction that he received honors from Athens? Certainly a dispatch from Timotheos revealing Charidemos’ original hostile intentions would have canceled these honors. Furthermore, if Timotheos wanted Charidemos’ service when he assumed the command in the north, as Demosthenes claims, it is reasonable to suppose that he apprised Charidemos of his plans, at least those for the immediate future. Yet we find Charidemos refusing Timotheos’ offer, moving on to Thrace allegedly to await an Athenian attack, only to discover (to his surprise!) that Timotheos intended to move not against the Chersonese but against Amphipolis and the Chalkidike; confounded in his plans, Charidemos returns to Macedonia and falls into the hands of his arch-enemies, the Athenians. Given his rhetorical purposes, Demosthenes is an untrustworthy guide for these events. It is more likely that Timotheos, with the agreement of Iphikrates, sent Charidemos to Thrace; when the situation there was found to be stable, he returned to Timotheos and joined him for the campaigns in Macedonia.

Thus there are many reasons for suspecting Demosthenes’ portrayal of Iphikrates and Charidemos in speech 23. This is no surprise. Demosthenes wrote the speech for Euthykles with the intention of presenting Charidemos as an outright villain. In the course of maligning Charidemos, Demosthenes introduced Iphikrates to further his case, using him by way of example—again by distortion and misrepresentation—to show how unreliable were those who acted in concert with Thracian kings. Iphikrates was an easy butt: Kotys eventually did become hostile to Athens, jeopardizing the Athenian hold on the Chersonese, and by 352, when the speech was composed, Iphikrates had himself fallen from favor. Therefore, whatever may have been Demosthenes’ personal view of Iphikrates, as slanderous a portrait as possible of him was an essential part of the case against Charidemos.

There are reasons beyond the rhetorical for Demosthenes’ bias against Iphikrates. When Timotheos and Iphikrates formed their alliance Iphikrates was probably no longer an ally of Kallistratos, Timotheos’ consistent enemy. From Plutarch we learn that Demosthenes was a great admirer of Kallistratos (Dem. 5). During the 360’s Kal-

33 Dem. 23.151; Theopomp. f143; Theodectes in Arist. Rh. 1399bl.
listratos, perhaps because of the corresponding rise of Timotheos' influence, appears to have gradually diminished in power. Demosthenes' bias may then in large part be due to his regard for Kallistratos, who had been responsible for a radical shift in Athenian foreign policy: he played a major rôle in the peace with Sparta in 371, and in 370/369 he proposed the Athenian expedition under Iphikrates into the Peloponnese to aid Sparta against Thebes (Xen. Hell. 6.3.3). These actions were novel. But in 366 the Athenians were forced to recognize the unreliability of their Peloponnesian allies who had failed to respond to an Athenian request for assistance in the dispute over Oropos. Athenian concerns about Thebes, while increasing, found urgent expression beyond border disputes and intervention in the Peloponnese. The northern situation required immediate attention; perhaps the campaigns of Timotheos and Iphikrates eclipsed those closer to home. Thebes still figured prominently, and Athens' policy had not changed. But Pelopidas' actions in Macedonia, Epaminondas' in the Hellespont, Rhodes, and Chios, and close Theban relations with Persia combined to necessitate a constant Athenian presence in the Chersonese in search of secure allies and the safe transport of the grain, not to mention the incentive of possible cleruchies. Although these activities, prompted by such concerns, escalated in the 360's, they do not signify a dramatic change of foreign policy, only a change in emphasis.

This re-examination of the northern activities of the 360's reveals the positive rôle Iphikrates played in Athenian foreign policy in these years. He was not ineffective in his command in Macedonia in 368-365, nor was he a traitor to Athens or destructive of her interests during his subsequent stay with Kotys; furthermore, throughout this time he acted in cooperation with Timotheos, beginning from the date of their marriage alliance, which cannot have been made in 362 and must be dated between 371 and 368. Kotys was not an enemy of Athens when Iphikrates joined him, and for at least two years thereafter; and it is likely that Iphikrates broke with him when his continued stay in Thrace could only signal a change of his position toward his native city. Demosthenes cannot be taken at face value in his portrayal of Iphikrates, not only because of his usual rhetorical embellishments, but also because of outright factual distortion, if not falsification. He thus perpetrated the tradition about Kotys and Iphikrates that has guided scholars, by deliberately misrepresenting and maligning the two. Finally, Athenian foreign policy in the north in the 360's was to a great extent determined by Theban activities in the
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region, and therefore the former cannot be fully understood without a proper realization of the influence of the latter.\textsuperscript{34}

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