Alexander’s Veterans After His Death

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The infantrymen who had served with Alexander in the conquest of Asia were justly famous. Hieronymus of Cardia, whose views we may deduce from Diodorus and Plutarch, gave a special accolade to the élite corps of that infantry, the Silvershields. “At this time [in 317 B.C.],” wrote Diodorus, “the youngest of the Silvershields was about sixty, most of the others about seventy and some even older, but all were irresistible through their experience and strength. So great in their case was their deftness of hand and their courage; for they had been trained continually in the school of danger.” “The Silvershields were indeed the oldest of the men who had served with Philip and Alexander,” wrote Plutarch of the same occasion, “masters of war without a defeat or a reverse during that span of time, many being already seventy and none younger than sixty.”

As the truth of these passages has been doubted, let us consider the implications of these and analogous statements. Men born respectively ca 377 and ca 387, if recruited into the Hypaspists (as the Silvershields were then called) at the age of 25, had begun their


4 The honorific title ‘Silvershields’, associated with a silvering of their shields, was awarded probably in 327 (Just. 12.7.5, giving the title but applying it erroneously to “his army”) and certainly before 324 (Arr. 7.11.3). See E. M. Anson, “Alexander’s
ALEXANDER’S VETERANS AFTER HIS DEATH

service ca 352 and 362 respectively. By 317, the date of the occasion described, they had served for 35 and 45 years. Similar length of service was expected of those whom Alexander chose to select for overseas service in Asia in 334, “men who had served with his father and his uncles” (Just. 11.6.4), i.e. since 370; for it was these men who were to continue serving through the Asian campaign. That a large part of the Macedonians with Alexander had served throughout Philip’s reign is to be inferred from the speeches attributed to Alexander. The difference in age between these men and the younger Macedonians was emphasised in the description of the siege of Halicarnassus in 334 (Diod. 17.27.1–2). The gap between the Silver-shields and their younger opponents in 317 was a full generation (Plut. Eum. 16.4, ἐπὶ τῶν πατέρας ἀμαρτάνετε). And we find “the descendants of the Hypaspists” in action in 317 and probably earlier, in 322, exceeding 3000 in number.

The success of the Macedonian infantryman was due to his physical toughness and his rigorous training in the use of a specialist weapon, the sarissa, and in the drill which was essential for phalanx-fighting. The best fighters were those in the upper age group; that is why Alexander chose for his infantry in 334 “not strong young men nor men in the first flower of their maturity, but veterans, mostly men who had served their full time already . . . masters of the military art” (Just. 11.6.4). These were the men who showed that precision in movement on the battlefield which British troops show on the pa-


5 Arr. 7.9.2; Curt. 3.10.4, Macedones tot bellorum in Europa victores; Diod. 17.27.1 and 19.41.1.

6 The sources behind these passages are probably Ptolemy for Arr. 7.9.2; Cleitarchus for Just. 11.6.4, Curt. 3.10.4, and Diod. 17.27.1–2; and Hieronymus for Diod. 19.41.1 and Plut. Eum. 16.4 (as I argued in Three Historians of Alexander the Great [Cambridge 1983] 96, 128, and 39f for Just., Curt., and Diod.). Thus the belief in the advanced age of these soldiers is not peculiar to any single source.

7 Diod. 19.28.1. If so, these men were in their thirties by 317, and one would expect their fathers to have been then in their sixties. For this interpretation of oὐ ἐκ τῶν νασοματῶν see my article in CQ N.S. 28 (1978) 133 and 135.

8 Good health in the soldiers of both Lower and Upper Macedonia was a sine qua non for their military achievements. The suggestion that Macedonia was then malaria-ridden, as proposed e.g. by E. N. Borza in Philip II. Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage, edd. W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza (Washington 1982) 17ff, is little short of absurd to anyone who lived in the malarial regions of Greece before the war, suffered from malaria, and saw its debilitating effect on the population, as I did intermittently in 1930–39 and 1943–44.

9 Such strength in veterans of 60 to 70 years of age may seem incredible in some modern societies; but it is not in modern Greece, among shepherd communities especially. P. Leigh Fermor noted this in an account of the Sarakatsani shepherds (Roumeli
rade-ground in the Trooping of the Colour. When Alexander decided to train young men—Asiatics—in the use of Macedonian weapons, six years passed before they joined the field-army. The superiority of veterans in phalanx fighting was demonstrated beyond dispute in 317, when the 3000 Silvershields charged the opposing phalanx of some 11,000 men of less experience and killed 5000 of them without losing a man.\(^{10}\)

Another part of Alexander’s Grande armée was formed by the veteran Greek mercenaries. Many were inherited from Philip (e.g. Arr. 3.12.2, as cavalrymen in 331, \(\text{o}i \ \dot{\alpha}ρχαίοι \ \kappaαλούμενοι \ \xiένοι\)); and many thousands crossed with Alexander to Asia in 334 (Diod. 17.17.3). In his latter years Alexander placed many of them in his new cities, and during his absence in the Indus valley the satraps employed many of them. Immediately after his death 23,000 left the cities, and 8000 who had been discharged by the satraps reached Greece and were recruited by Leosthenes for the Lamian War. The former were described as “having gained experience often in warfare’s engagements and being distinguished for deeds of prowess” (Diod. 18.7.2, \(\deltaιαφόρους \ \tauαύς \ \dot{α}νδραγάθαις\)). The latter “having campaigned throughout Asia for a long time and having participated in many great actions had proved themselves masters of warfare” (18.9.3, \(\alphaδηταί \ των \ \kατά \ \πόλεμον \ \εργον\)). The first group were massacred by the Macedonians in 323, and after the Lamian War no more is heard of the other group. But the descriptions of Diodorus (Hieronymus) label them firmly as Alexander-veterans.

The largest group of Macedonian infantrymen who fought with Alexander throughout Asia were the men of the six and later seven phalanx brigades, numbering perhaps some 10,000 men in early 324. If we add the old Hypaspists and the new Hypaspists at 3000 men each and a company of 1000 “Macedonian archers,”\(^{11}\) we can put the number of Macedonian first-line infantrymen at that time at approximately 17,000.\(^{12}\) Other Macedonians were serving on lines of com-


\(^{11}\) At Gaugamela (Arr. 3.12.2). Thereafter Alexander made much use of archers both on foot and mounted (e.g. at the battle of the Hydaspes). The ‘archers’ who fought regularly alongside the Agrianians are likely to have been the same unit as that which fought at Gaugamela. The Persian unit of 1000 archers (Ath. 539E, Ael. *VH* 9.3) may well have been equivalent in size to the Macedonian unit.

\(^{12}\) See now P. A. Brunt in his Loeb edition of Arrian, II (1983) 489f, where his arguments seem to lead to much the same conclusion for the infantry.
ALEXANDER'S VETERANS AFTER HIS DEATH

munition and with some satraps, but these were relatively few. All these men were esteemed for their prowess. As we shall see, the history of them was written by Hieronymus, and some scraps of that history have survived in Diodorus and Plutarch’s *Eumenes*. The men are recognisable, because they were described in similar terms to those used for the Silvershields and for the veteran Greek mercenaries. This seems to have been overlooked by those who have written about this period.

We begin with two passages, covering the years 321–320, in which some infantrymen are described as being remarkable for their prowess:

Diod. 18.30.4: εἰς ἐς σύμπαντας πεζοὺς μὲν διαμυρίοις, δὲν ἦσαν οἱ πλείους Μακεδόνων διαβεβημένων ταῖς ἀνδραγαθίαις, ἐν οἷς εἰς μάλωτα τὰς ἐπίδιας τῆς νίκης.

(Craterus) had in all 20,000 infantrymen, among whom were the majority of Macedonians celebrated for their deeds of valour, and it was in these that he had especially his hopes of victory.

Diod. 18.40.7: εἰς ὁ μὲν Ἀντίγονος . . . πεζοὺς μὲν πλείω τῶν μυρίων, δὲν ἦσαν οἱ ἡμεσέως Μακεδόνες θαυμαστοί κατὰ τὰς ἀνδραγαθίας.

Antigonus had more than 10,000 infantrymen, of whom the half were Macedonians admired for their deeds of valour.

At the time of the first passage, in 321 B.C., the Silvershields were with Perdiccas, and at the time of the second, in 320, the Silvershields were engaged in bringing the treasure from Susa to Cilicia. Their number in any case was only 3000. It is thus certain that these two passages refer to groups of Alexander’s famous phalangites. How had they come to be with these particular commanders?

After Alexander’s death in June 323 the Macedonians of the royal army, which was then in Babylonia, served under the command of Perdiccas until he was assassinated in Egypt in 321. There was, however, a separate army, that of the 10,000 Macedonian soldiers whom Alexander had sent in 324 on their homeward journey under the command of Craterus, who was himself to take military command in Macedonia. The rising by the Greek states in the Lamian War found them still in Cilicia. When the Macedonian fleet established its supremacy at sea in 322, Craterus crossed into Europe with “6000 of those who had crossed with Alexander into Asia.” These were a part of the 10,000. The other 4000 stayed in or near Cilicia, and we

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13 Diod. 18.16.4. J. G. Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* II.1 (Gotha 1878) 71, made the mistake of saying that Craterus took the 10,000 veterans (“er hatte die 10,000 Veteranen aus dem grossen makedonischen Heere”); this mistake was repeated by others, *e.g.* Tarn in *CAH* VI 458. It led to a further error in Droysen II.1 119.
shall resume them later. Craterus took his 6000 veterans and some other troops straight into Thessaly to join the forces of Antipater and fight the battle of Crannon in September 322.

It will be recalled that in 324 Alexander had originally planned to repatriate “those who for reasons of age or injury were unfit for battle.” Then no number was mentioned (Arr. 7.8.1). Later, after the mutiny, men in this category who chose to go numbered up to 10,000 (7.12.1). Antipater was to bring out as a replacement for these men “Macedonians of those who were in their prime” (7.12.4). It is, I think, clear that Alexander intended the 10,000 veterans—or the bulk of them—to continue in military service under Craterus in Macedonia; for otherwise the forces in Macedonia would have been reduced to a very low level. In other words Alexander sent home not 10,000 casualties but 10,000 men still able to serve but not in the condition which his form of campaigning required of first-line troops.

In 321 Craterus and Antipater crossed from Europe to Asia with an army of perhaps 30,000 infantry. That Craterus brought his famous veterans with him is to be expected. The two generals went different ways, each with his own army, and the task of Craterus was to defeat Eumenes, a general of Perdiccas, who was now their enemy. It was to this occasion that Diodorus 18.30.4, cited above, was directed: among Craterus’ 20,000 infantrymen were “the majority of Macedonians celebrated for their deeds of valour”—that was the majority of the original 10,000 veterans. It was on their expertise in phalanx-fighting that he relied for victory. Thus Craterus still had some 6000 veterans under his command.

We may consider here the sense of the emendation of Μακεδόνων διαβεβοημέων to Μακεδόνες διαβεβοημένου as proposed by Bekker and as printed in the standard texts of Diod. 18.30.4. The translation then becomes: “Craterus had in all 20,000 infantrymen, of whom the majority were Macedonians celebrated for their deeds of valour.” This would require Craterus to have had now in his army

14 Antipater and Craterus had 48,000 men at the battle of Crannon; but they had to leave a “considerable army” with Polyperchon in Macedonia, as they must have expected a further rising in Greece, as indeed happened (Diod. 18.38.6). So I suggest that they left 18,000 men in Macedonia and took 30,000 to Asia.

15 This is not to deny that there may have been among them some Macedonians who had seen service only in Europe; but their record of two defeats and one victory in the Lamian War would not have qualified them for such a reputation for valour.

16 All mss. have Μακεδόνων; there is no justification for emending it to a nominative. Only X has διαβεβοημένων; the others have διαβεβοημένου, a natural corruption after ησαν.
ALEXANDER'S VETERANS AFTER HIS DEATH

considerably more than 10,000 Alexander-veterans. But that is not possible, as he took only 6000 of them to Macedonia.

Let us turn now to the fortunes of the 4000 Alexander-veterans who did not accompany Craterus to Europe in the summer of 322. We find a trace of them early in the following year, before Craterus and Antipater crossed from Europe to Asia. Since Perdiccas intended to invade Egypt with the royal army, he appointed Eumenes as his commander-in-chief in Asia Minor and ordered him to prevent such a crossing by Craterus and Antipater. He placed several notable officers under the command of Eumenes (Diod. 18.29.2); but Alcetas, who had been in command of a phalanx brigade at the battle of the Hydaspes river, and Neoptolemus, a famous commander and fighter under Alexander, refused to become his subordinates. Alcetas said that his Macedonians wanted Craterus "as their king" and were ashamed to fight against Antipater" (Plut. Eum. 5.2). This suggests that they had served under Craterus, e.g. in Cilicia; and their respect for Antipater suggests that they had served with Antipater before they crossed to Asia in 334. Neoptolemus said he had followed Alexander with shield and spear, whereas Eumenes had done so with pen and writing-pad (Plut. Eum. 1.3). He had "a considerable force of Macedonians" (Diod. 18.29.4), opened secret negotiations with Antipater, and was then brought to battle by Eumenes. On his defeat the phalanx-troops of Neoptolemus were compelled to surrender and enter the service of Eumenes. Thus Eumenes "acquired a large number of Macedonians, men of valour" (Diod. 18.29.5, προσλαβόμενος Μακεδόνων ἀναχθῶν ἀνδρῶν πλῆθος). These men were a part and probably the larger part of the 4000 veterans left in Cilicia.

The critical moment came later in 321, when the army of Craterus was advancing to engage the army of Eumenes. As we have seen, Craterus had in his phalanx "the majority" of the original 10,000 veterans, and now Eumenes had forcibly incorporated the bulk of the other 4000 veterans in his phalanx. Neoptolemus, who had escaped to join Craterus, advised Craterus to reveal himself to the Macedonians in Eumenes' army, who were longing for him. As soon as they saw or heard Craterus, they would (said Neoptolemus) desert with their weapons and join Craterus (Plut. Eum. 6.1–2).

17 For the extraordinary popularity of Craterus and the Macedonians' regard for him, almost as if he were royalty, see Suda s.v. Κράτερος (K 2335): κατὰ βασιλέα.

18 Plut. Eum. 5.3. This is probably the action described in PSI XII 1284; cf. A. B. Bosworth, GRBS 19 (1978) 227–37.
side and also as themselves superb fighters in a battle of phalanx-formations.

Eumenes had no intention of engaging in a battle of phalanges; for he was stronger in cavalry. He informed his army that the enemy were led by Neoptolemus and Pigres, and that Alexander himself had appeared to Eumenes and in effect promised him victory over the enemy. He then arranged his forces so that his non-Macedonian cavalry rode well ahead of his phalanx and charged the enemy cavalry at first sight. When Craterus saw them coming at him, he cursed Neoptolemus for having deceived him into supposing that the Macedonians of Eumenes would desert (Plut. Eum. 7.2). The charge resulted in the death of Craterus. On the other wing Eumenes killed Neoptolemus in another engagement of cavalry. With his own cavalry supreme Eumenes invited the enemy phalanx to surrender and enter his own service. They accepted and took the required oaths. Eumenes let them withdraw to any villages of their choice to obtain food; and during the night they made off and joined Antipater. Eumenes tried to intercept them; but he was deterred by his own wounds and "by the valorous deeds of the retreating men" (Diod. 18.32.4, διὰ τε τὰς ἄρετὰς τῶν ἄποχωροῦντων). Thus in two battles—only ten days apart according to Plutarch—Eumenes outsmarted and humiliated two large groups of Alexander’s veterans, hitherto "undefeated." They hated him for it, both those who fought on his side and those who fought against him, on the grounds that he, a naturalized foreigner, had used the armed might of the Macedonians to kill the leading Macedonian Craterus, the most glorious of men (Plut. Eum. 8.1).

Meanwhile the veterans of Alexander who were serving in the royal army became mutinous. In Egypt “the entire phalanx of the infantrymen showed their estrangement (from Perdiccas) by uttering threatening shouts” (Diod. 18.36.4). They welcomed the assassination of Perdiccas. Immediately thereafter the news arrived that Craterus and Neoptolemus had been killed, and an assembly of Macedones sentenced Eumenes and others to death as public enemies (Diod. 18.37.2, Arr. FGrHist 156F11.39). The Alexander-veterans generally were devoted to the royal house. When Alcetas arranged the murder of Cynane, a daughter of Philip, the veterans with Alcetas mutinied. They were appeased only when Perdiccas agreed that

19 Eumenes wisely kept them apart from his own Macedonians by sending them to separate villages. He fed his own men from his own supplies.

20 Diod. 18.53.3, “Eumenes conquered in set battle Craterus and Neoptolemus, famous officers, who were in command of the undefeated forces of the Macedonians” (τὰς ἀνιχνητικὰς τῶν Μακεδών... δυνάμεις).
ALEXANDER’S VETERANS AFTER HIS DEATH

her daughter Eurydice would marry the king, Philip Arrhidaeus (Arr. f11.23).

The royal army elected two generals to serve as ‘managers of the kings’ in succession to Perdiccas. But they soon resigned; for the army became mutinous at the instigation of Eurydice (Diod. 18.36.6–7, 39.1–2). Antipater was elected in absentia in their place. But when he arrived with his army he found the royal army in a mutinous state. On this occasion, at Triparadeisus in Syria, there was a larger concourse of Alexander-veterans and of fresh Macedonians from Macedonia than ever occurred again: more than 5000 of Craterus’ group of veterans, the royal army veterans including the Silvershields (probably more than 10,000 in all),21 and the Macedonians brought from Macedonia by Antipater, perhaps some 5000.22 As the two kings were present, the decisions of the assembly of these Makedones were to be acts of state. After some rioting Antipater restored order, reduced Eurydice to silence, and arranged the various posts of command.23 He detached the 3000 Silvershields from the royal army and sent them to Susiane, where they were to take over the treasure at Susa and bring it to Cilicia. Even without their unruly presence Antipater met with further trouble from the royal army. The special

21 The number of Macedonians whom Alexander retained in Babylonia in 323 is uncertain. He needed 6700 for the new mixed phalanx (see my book Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman [Park Ridge 1980] 240, 245). It is probable that he kept both the old Hypaspists, known as ‘the Silvershields’, and the new Hypaspists, known as ‘the descendants of the Hypaspists’, as separate units, totalling 6000 men. Thus the minimum figure for Macedonian infantrymen was around 13,000. In fact Curtius alone gives figures for those to be retained in Asia: “13,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry” (10.2.8), i.e. after sending the older Macedonians home (senioribus militum in patriam remissis). In these and the following sections Curtius was writing of the Macedonian soldiers proper. It is therefore most probable that the figures he gave were for Makedones. How dependable are the figures? I have argued (supra n.6: 157f) that the probable source of this chapter was Diyllus, an accurate writer who was apt to give detailed numbers. We do not know whether Curtius had in mind 10,000 as the number of the seniores (his text breaks off before he comes to their departure); but if he did, Alexander had in 324 some 25,000 Macedonians of all kinds (infantry, cavalry, archers, garrison-troops, and sick).

22 This figure is very uncertain. As a renewal of war in Greece was all too likely, Antipater must have left a strong Macedonian army in Macedonia. It is probable that he took to Asia a relatively small number of Macedonian soldiers; perhaps 3000 is nearer the mark, because that figure added to 5000 veterans of Craterus (Diod. 18.40.7, discussed above) brings us towards the figure of 10,000 which was given for the infantry in Antigonus’ army on this occasion (Diod.).

23 Diod. 18.39.5 and Arr. f11.34 attribute the arrangement to Antipater. In 323 Perdiccas made the arrangements but ὡς Ἀρρίδαιον πελευνοῦσας, and the involvement of the king implied the participation of the assembly, as in Diod. 19.15.3, τοῖς προεκκριμένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους στρατῶν καὶ στρατηγικῶν. This is shown to have been so by the description of a satrap being appointed by “the king and Antipater and the other Makedones” (IG II2 401.7–10).
N. G. L. HAMMOND

grievance of the veterans who made up the royal army was that, whereas the 10,000 veterans of Craterus had been given a special bounty of a talent each (Arr. 7.12.2), they had been promised but not paid a bounty for their long service with Alexander.24

The army of Antipater and the royal army,25 now commanded by Antigonus, campaigned against the supporters of Perdiccas—namely Eumenes, Alcetas, and Attalus—but not for long. Late in 321 Antipater decided to escort the kings home to Macedonia. He took this opportunity to redistribute the Macedonian infantrymen into two new armies. He gave to Antigonus, as ‘general in Asia’, “8000 Macedonian phalangites from the force which had crossed over with him to Asia”;26 among these, as we shall see, was the group of veterans which had joined him after the death of Craterus. He took to Europe the veterans of the royal army, who were persisting in their demand for the bounty but were outwitted by the wily Antipater (Arr. F11.44–45). When they reached Macedonia, they formed an influential nucleus within the royal army there.

After his defeat of Craterus Eumenes had a respite during which he won the hearts of the Macedonians in his army; important among them were those of Craterus’ veterans who had been serving with Neoptolemus. He let them pillage a number of villages, and in return they honoured him, Greek though he was by birth, as if he were a Macedonian prince; indeed a thousand of them waited on him day and night as his bodyguard (Plut. Eum. 8.5–7). He encouraged them to see in him a second Alexander or at least a commander favoured by the ghost of Alexander. Then, in 320, Antigonus arrived, hoping to destroy his rival. Antigonus had “more than 10,000 infantrymen, of whom the half were Macedonians admired for their deeds of valour” (Diod. 18.40.7, cited supra 54), this half being the veterans of Craterus whom Antipater had allocated to Antigonus. The hope of

24 Arr. F11.32. The words ἐπὶ τῇ συντρατείᾳ mean “for the campaign with” (sc. Alexander). The proposal of Errington (supra n.1) 67 n.132 that the text is wrong seems to be purely subjective. He does not suggest any emendation which would give him the meaning which he wants, namely that Perdiccas owed arrears of pay to his troops.

25 αἱ βασιλεῖαι δύναμες or ἡ βασιλεία δύναμις (e.g. at Diod. 18.16.1, 23.2, 39.7) were ‘the royal forces’ in that they were accompanying the king or kings (e.g. Arr. F11.38 τοῦ βασιλέα φρονεῖν τε καὶ θεραπεύειν). When the kings moved to Europe, the army with them was the royal army. For other views see the summary in Errington (supra n.1) 69 n.138.

26 Arr. F11.43. The text reads Μακεδόνας ὀκτακασχίλιοι καὶ πεντακοσίοις καὶ ἰππείς τῶν ἑταῖρων ἱππίως. A noun has apparently dropped out after πεντακοσίοις, because the number 8000 appears for the Macedonian infantrymen given by Antipater to Antigonus in Diod. 19.29.3. See my remarks in CQ (supra n.7) 134.
ALEXANDER'S VETERANS AFTER HIS DEATH

Antigonus was that the troops of Eumenes would desert. In the battle a cavalry force did so desert; but Eumenes’ veterans stayed loyal to him. Eumenes retrieved his reverse by doubling back, returning to the battlefield, and honouring the dead in true Macedonian style with separate large tumuli over the ashes of the officers and over those of the other ranks. He could have captured, but preferred not to, the baggage of the army of Antigonus. That baggage, we are told, included the riches “accumulated from so many wars and so many acts of pillaging” (Plut. Eum. 9.3 and 6). That description can apply only to the veterans who had fought with Alexander.

In the winter of 320/319, when his army was scattered into winter quarters, Antigonus had trouble with some Macedonians who were probably veterans (Polyaen. 4.6.6). A group of 3000 “Macedonian hoplites,” i.e. of the phalanx, mutinied and pillaged far and wide under the command of Holcias, a distinguished officer of Alexander. Antigonus was afraid they would desert to Alcetas (who had some of their fellow-veterans). He therefore sent an officer of the older generation, Leonidas, who posed as a mutineer and persuaded them not to go to Alcetas. When Antigonus finally got them into his power, he sent Leonidas and the 3000 men to Macedonia. There they became part of the royal army.

If those 3000 were veterans, Antigonus still had some 2000 of Craterus’ veterans. During this winter their number was increased by desertions from the army of Eumenes, which broke up (Diod. 18.41.1). He brought some more into his army, when he defeated Alcetas (18.45.4 and 50.1). But Eumenes made a spectacular recovery. He escaped to Cyinda in Cilicia, won over the commanders of the Silvershields; and incorporated these famous 3000 veterans into his growing army (Plut. Eum. 13.1–4; Diod. 18.58.1 and 59.3). Off the battlefield they proved to be undisciplined and corrupt (Plut. Eum. 13.5–14.2). But on the battlefield, as “masters of war,” they fought brilliantly in 317 and 316 (Diod. 19.30.5, 19.43.1 and 5; Plut. Eum. 16.4). But when Antigonus captured the baggage-train, which included their families, attendants, and possessions, they turned on Eumenes, handed him over to Antigonus in exchange for their

27 Plut. Eum. 9.2; cf. Diod. 18.40.8. For other instances of the use of tumuli see my article “‘Philip’s Tomb’ in Historical Context,” GRBS 19 (1978) 332.
28 See H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich II (Munich 1926) nos. 580 and 470. If, as I maintain, the 3000 were veterans, they wanted to go home; and being mutinous, like those who had returned home late in 321, they were of no use to Antigonus in Asia. In Europe they would serve under Antipater.
29 See Polyaen. 4.6.13, “wives, children, girls, menservants, gold, silver, and everything else they had acquired from their campaigning with Alexander.”
families, and insisted on having him put to death (Diod. 19.44.2, Plut. *Eum.* 18.1). They regarded Eumenes now as a false Alexander; for the great Alexander had not only brought them victory but had safe-guarded their possessions.

Antigonus was forewarned. He split this famous unit into two parts. He sent the most unruly of the veteran Silvershields to Arachosia, where the satrap, Sibyrtius, had secret orders to send them piecemeal on missions from which they would not return (Diod. 19.48.3, Plut. *Eum.* 19.2). He allocated the others to his phalanx brigades. Thus only a few splinter-groups of Alexander’s famous army were left in Asia to fade away. The great bulk of that army was now in Macedonia itself. There their part in Macedonian politics was to be of paramount importance, but that is another story.

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30 Eumenes had tricked the Silvershields into believing that Alexander was present at the deliberations of Eumenes and his staff and guided their decisions: Plut. *Eum.* 13.3–4; Diod. 18.60.4–61.3; Polyaen. 4.8.2; Nep. *Eum.* 7.2–3.

31 Just. 14.4.20, *Antigonus domitores illos orbis exercitui suo dividit*, which means that he broke up the unit of 3000 and distributed them over his phalanx brigades, probably as file leaders. For such distribution see my article in *JHS* 103 (1983) 141–42. Antigonus had probably distributed in the same way the veterans he acquired on defeating Eumenes.

32 This article owes much to the shrewd comments of G. T. Griffith, to whom I am most grateful.