B. L. Gildersleeve on
Pindar Nemean 3.74–75

Ward W. Briggs, Jr

In 1898 Charles Eliot Norton, the nation’s foremost champion of
Dante and a leading Northern literary critic who influenced a host
of literary figures from Henry James to T. S. Eliot,¹ wrote to Basil
Lanneau Gildersleeve, the nation’s most visible representative of
German philological training and a man of considerable critical ability.
Named emeritus at Harvard in November 1897, with his duties
confined to teaching a small class in Dante, Norton was depressed at
the thought of retirement,² and sought the advice of his Southern
near-contemporary on the Greek view of the ages of man and its
accompanying virtues, as described in Pindar Nemean 3.70–75. Gil-
dersleeve’s answer, one of his rare letters on purely philological
matters, gives considerable insight into his critical method.

The poem in question is a hymn on the victory in the pancration
by Aristocleides, an Aeginetan. It opens with a picture of the youths
standing on the banks of the Asopus waiting for the Muse to arrive
with their victory song (1–8). The Muse is to sing of Aegina, which
the victor has ennobled by a triumph worthy of the Myrmidons, and
he has thus figuratively passed the pillars of Heracles (9–26). The
mention of Heracles leads Pindar to digress on the Aeacids, Peleus,
Telamon (31–42), and the young Achilles (43–63). The song of these
exploits beseems Aristocleides, for testing one’s mettle proves one’s
abilities at all stages of life and Aristocleides has the four virtues
necessary for victory (64–76). Though Pindar sends his poem late
(76–79), the eagle nevertheless can strike upon his prey from afar
(80–82) and the victor’s glory ranges from Nemea to Epidaurus to
Megara (83–84).

¹ On Norton’s life (1827–1908) see Letters of Charles Eliot Norton with a Biographical
Comment by His Daughter Sara Norton and M. A. DeWolfe Howe (Boston/New York
1913); K. Vanderbilt, Charles Eliot Norton: Apostle of Culture in a Democracy (Cam-
² Vanderbilt (supra n.1) 140–41; 218–19, “In the last decade [of his life] he was de-
spondent and reflective on old age.”
The portion in question is this (74–75):3

έλα δέ καὶ τέσσαρα ἄρετας
<Δ> θνατὸς αἰῶν, φρονείν δ’ ἐνέπει το παρκείμενον.

Gildersleeve was, as he remains today, one of the world’s leading Pindarists.4 What other authorities on this poem might he have had to hand in 1898? Perhaps he had an old Heyne, possibly Beck; certainly Boeckh’s various editions, if not Dissen’s edition of 1830 or his old teacher Schneidewin’s revision of that. T. Bergk’s edition of the lyric poets would certainly have been available, as might two English editions based on Boeckh, Donaldson and Cookesley. He would consult J. A. Hartung’s Leipzig edition of 1855–1856 and the texts of Tycho Mommsen and certainly W. Christ, whom he mentions.5 Gildersleeve had reviewed Mezger’s important work, as well as Fennell’s Cambridge edition, Fraccaroli’s translation and commentary, and Bury’s edition of the Nemeans and Isthmians.6

Let us look at his response to Norton.7

3 References to the text of Pindar come from B. Snell and H. Maehler, Pindari Carmina cum fragmentis I (Leipzig 1971).
4 He had published Pindar, The Olympian and Pythian Odes (New York 1885, 18903). In the words of David C. Young, “Gildersleeve was certainly the most independent of Pindar’s scholars and in many ways the best . . . the small school text of the Olympians and Pythians . . . is one of the major works not only of exegetical value for individual passages but also for general interpretation, for the short introductions to the individual odes often contain a few observations about the meaning and art of the poem which indicate more understanding than almost all the pages of other scholars”: “Pindaric Criticism,” The Minnesota Review 4 (1964) 596 (= Pindaros und Bakchylides, edd. W. M. Calder III and J. Stern, Wege der Forschung 134 [Darmstadt 1970] 28). See now R. L. Fowler, “Gildersleeve’s Pindaric Criticism,” Greek Poetry and Philosophy: Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury (Chico 1984) 111–23.
5 C. G. Heyne, Pindari carmina et fragmenta (Göttingen 1773), enlarged ed. 1797–1799, repr. Oxford 1807–1809; rev. and enlarged ed. by G. H. Shaefer (Leipzig 1817, repr. London 1824); C. D. Beck, Pindari carmina et fragmenta Graece (Leipzig 1792–1795); A. Boeckh, Pindari opera quae supersunt (Leipzig 1811–1821); F. G. Schneidewin, Pindari Carmina quae supersunt (Göttingen 1843); T. Bergk, Poetae Lyrici Graeci I (Leipzig 1843, 18533, 18664, 18784); J. W. Donaldson, Pindar’s Epinician or Triumphal Odes (London 1841, 18683); W. G. Cookesley, Pindari carmina II (Eton 1851); J. A. Hartung, Pindars Werke (Leipzig 1855–1856); T. Mommsen, Pindari Carmina (Berlin 1866); W. Christ, Pindari carmina (Leipzig 1869, repr. 1891).
7 This letter is in the Houghton Library, Harvard University no. 1Ms Am 1088 (2684), and is reprinted by permission.
Dear Mr. Norton:

As the greatest of Pindar's editors has declared that the dark saying of N. 3.74 became darker to him the more he studied it, the least of Pindar's worshippers might decline the problem without dishonour. But you are more than welcome to my view.

The first trouble is with the text. Are we to read \( \delta \theta νατο ς \alpha \iota \omega \nu \) or \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \alpha \iota \omega \nu \)? The weighty authority of Aristarchus is in favour of \( \delta \theta νατο ς \alpha \iota \omega \nu \) but \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \alpha \iota \omega \nu \) is so seductive that the latest editor of Pindar, Christ, a sensible man, has yielded to it. The article of \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \alpha \iota \omega \nu \) to which an English editor of some note objects is just what we ought to find. \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \beta ιο ς \) is used of that extreme old age, so longed for before it comes, so hateful after it comes and \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \alpha \iota \omega \nu \) would give quite in Pindar's implicit manner the fourth stage.

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8 The explicationes to the \( \text{Nemeans} \) (and \( \text{Isthmians} \)) in Boeckh's edition are by L. Dissen. In II 378 he says, "Et haec quidem Boeckhius, qui ultro fatetur sibi hunc locum, quo eum diuitius consideret, eo obscuriorum fieri: nunc his accuratius expositis certe hoc effectum est, ut status controversiae ligueat." Gildersleeve called Boeckh "the greatest living master of Hellenic studies [of his time]": \( \text{Hellas and Hesperia} \) (New York 1909) 42. See also "Professorial Types," \( \text{The Hopkinsian} \) 1 (1893) 4–5.

9 The B (\( \text{Vaticanus} \)) tradition has \( \theta νατο ς \epsilon ω \nu \), \( \text{D V X Z} \) \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \alpha \iota \omega \nu \), Mosch. (called diorth.1) by Mommsen \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \tau \iota \gamma \alpha \iota \omega \nu \), Tric. (Mommsen's diorth.2) \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \alpha \iota \omega \nu \). According to Turyn, Triclinius supplies the \( \delta \). E. Schmid first restored the line from Aristarchus via the scholia: Πινδάρου περίοδος; hoc est Pindari lyricorum principis (Wittenberg 1616). Beck was the first (1795) to print \( \theta νατο ς \), and most editors since, including G. Hermann, Bergk, L. Schmidt, Mommsen, Mezger, Fennell, Bury, E. Hümmerich ("Die Pindar-Handschriften B und D," \( \text{Commentationes Philologicae} \) [Monaco 1891] 115–28), and Fraccaroli, have done so.

10 "There is a balance of evidence in favour of \( \theta νατο ς \) against \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \) which would hardly need the article" (Fennell 29). When G. Hermann added notes to Heyne's editions of 1798 and 1817, he said of this passage, "Etiam schol. legerat in suo \( \theta νατο ς \alpha \iota \omega \nu \) et video nunc hoc magis lyricum decere."

11 Gildersleeve prefers the old reading of Heyne, Boeckh/Dissen/Schneidewin, Donaldson, Cookesley, Hartung, and K. Kleanthes (Πινδάρου τα σωκράτεια ΙΙΙ [Trieste 1886]; reviewed by him in \( \text{AJP} \) 11 [1890] 529), last printed by an editor (Christ) in 1896. For Gildersleeve on Christ see \( \text{AJP} \) 17 (1896) 517–18.

12 He means Bury, who reports (60) R. Y. Tyrrell's view "that \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \) was introduced by some one who thought that the fourth virtue corresponded to a fourth age, attained only by those who lived long." For Gildersleeve pejoratively on Bury see \( \text{AJP} \) 11 (1890) 528; 13 (1892) 385; 15 (1894) 398.

13 \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \beta ιο ς \) has this sense at Aesch. \( \text{PV} \) 449 (mankind's length of days in ignorance before Prometheus visited them) and Soph. \( \text{Aj} \). 473, Eur. \( \text{Al} \). 715, \( \text{Heracl.} \) 447, \( \text{Ar. Lys.} \) 257, \( \text{Anth. Gr.} \) 7.650.3 (Phileaeus), 8.89.4, Pl. \( \text{Resp.} \) 407d4; cf. Eur. \( \text{Hipp.} \) 375 (echoed in parody by Ar. \( \text{Ran.} \) 931).

14 \( \beta ' \alpha \iota \omega \nu ς \) \( \mu \alpha κρο ς \) at Aesch. \( \text{Supp.} \) 582 is translated "throughout his long lifetime" by Friis Johansen and E. W. Whittle, \( \text{Aeschylus, The Suppliants} \) II (Copenhagen 1980) 467, and Eur. \( \text{fr.} \) 575.3 N. has a similar meaning. L. Bornemann, "Jahresbericht über
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‘drives’ as one one drives a team or ‘drives’ as one drives a furrow? Are we to think of the four virtues abreast in the tebrpotaup with φρόνησις as the dominant mare (ἀρετάς) or are we to think of the four virtues in succession, with φρόνησις as the last in the tetrapaup of life? I incline to the latter view—to the interpretation that makes φρόνησις the culminating, not the controlling element. Plato’s four virtues are tempting—all the more so because they doubtless go back to Pythagoras and

Pindar 1888–1890,” JAW 67 (1891) 16–17, suggests ἐκλοι... ὀς ἀκρος αἰών, which he says “= aetas ejus extrema.”

16 ἐλαenia = φέρει (scol.), cf. Isthm. 5.38 and schol. J. Rumpel says it means ‘adigo, adducere’ both here and at Nem. 10.70 and lists no meaning close to ‘ploughing’: Lexicon Pindaricum (Leipzig 1883). W. J. Slater, Lexicon to Pindar (Berlin 1969) 163, translates ‘bring’. Heyne follows the scholia and translates (129) ‘admovet, adducit’ and says it means the same as ἐπάγει. Bury: “The metaphor... I think, is from driving, not from planting; so Isthm. V.38 ἐλα πεδόθεν.” Mezger: “es bringt aber noch... hervor... und (= indem es) gebietet das Vorliegende zu beachten” (390).

17 Fennell thinks the four divisions of life comprise two groups of two virtues apiece. Bury: “But life drives a team of four excellences, for it biddeth man to be wise in that which he findeth to do.”

18 Thus Donaldson, “that he assigns one virtue to each of the four ages of human life (on the same principle as that which Shakespeare has followed in his description of the seven ages)... That he is speaking of the virtues proper to each age is clear from v.71: ὁ τος ἐξοχώτερος γενήται” (30).

19 Odysseus answers the mocking offer of Eurymachus to work on a farm with the wish that they might compete with one another in ploughing the four-acre spread.

20 The scholion is actually a combination of these views. It draws from Aristarchus this interpretation, in the words of Bury: “each of the three ages of man, childhood, early manhood, and elder age, has a proper excellence of its own; and besides these there is another excellence not confined to a particular time of life, namely wisdom” (42). This was generally the view of Heyne; Mezger, following Hermann, thinks the same (390) and that “eine allen Lebensaltern gemeinsame nennt: es ist die richtige Erkenntniss des Zeitgemassen.” Similarly Fraccaroli says the fourth virtue is “conveniente a tutte.” W. H. D. Rouse thinks the fourth virtue is the climax and that these parallel the division of the games according to age, with the fourth division being open to all andres: “Notes on the Nemeans of Pindar,” PChS 28–30 (1891) 16–18. Only Bury identifies the fourth virtue with wisdom. Christ calls it a “moderatio” which is the “cardo et medulla omnium quattuor virtutum.”

21 “It is doubtful whether Pindar’s τέσσαρες ἀρετάι (Nem. III 74) are to be interpreted as the cardinal virtues”: J. Adam, The Republic of Plato 2 (Cambridge 1963) 224. The three virtues mentioned by Gildersleeve plus φρόνησις appear together at PI. Phd. 69c and Leg. 631c. Less specific are the mentions of four virtues (with the possible addition of ὀσωτης) in Pr. 329c, Lach. 199d, Menex. 78d, and Grg. 507b. Most complete is Resp. 427e, where the four virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice are mentioned. Justice is not the virtue of every part but must belong to every part. At 433b it is the virtue that lets the other virtues “take root” in the state.
Pindar was under Pythagorean influences. But we need not follow Plato closely. Pindar gives us the popular Dorism, Plato an idealized Dorism. σωφροσύνη is the virtue of boyhood—especially Doric boyhood beset as it was by lovers—ἀνδρεία the virtue of manhood—δικαιοσύνη for which Aegina was famous, Aeacus being a great judge—belongs to maturer years, the age of Shakespeare’s justice and ὁ μαχρὸς αἰών with its old experience brings φρόνησις brings σοφία brings resignation and Goethe’s philosophy

Adam feels that in this passage of the Republic, from the “ready assent” of Adimantus “we may reasonably infer that the doctrine of four cardinal virtues was already a familiar tenet of the Platonic school.” Plato took the five ‘popular’ virtues and divided his ideal society into classes based on age and sex corresponding to the virtues. See F. M. Cornford, “Psychology and Social Structure in the Republic of Plato,” CQ 6 (1912) 246–57.

22 So Donaldson (210), “Pindar is speaking with reference to the Pythagorean division of virtue into four species.” On the Pythagorean origin of the four virtues see W. D. Geddes, Platonis Phaedo (London 1885) 254–62.

23 In the popular Dorism, sophrosyne would be the virtue of women and children, andreia of warriors, as may be assumed from Aesch. Sept. 610, Eur. fr.284 N., Anon. Iambl. 13–15. See Helen North, Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature (Ithaca 1966) 25 (cf. 240 infra).

24 In the early dialogues, εύσεβεια οὐσίωτης occurs in place of σοφία οἱ φρόνισιν.

25 “Whatever else it may become, sophrosyne throughout Greek literature is always the virtue proper to the young, and of course to women—i.e., to all those members of society of whom obedience is required” (North [supra n.23] 131 n.24). So Isoc. 9.22, where Evagoras lists sophrosyne (here “nothing more than obedience and orderly conduct.”) along with physical strength and beauty as the virtues of Evagoras’ childhood. Cf. Arist. Eth.Nic. 1095a, Diog. Laert. 2.32. Clearly the old-style education of Just Logic in Ar. Nub. shows the sophrosyne of youth (962, 1006, 1029), as Xen. Mem. 1.2.26 (Socrates taught Alcibiades and Critias sophrosyne in their youth when they otherwise might have been unrestrained) and Cyn. 1.2.8 (young boys learn sophrosyne from imitating their elders). But in Plato, it is first seen as necessary to all aspects of life (see North 173), taking the rôle of the fourth virtue in the present passage. sophrosyne is first linked to older men in Theognis 1325–26 and Democritus 68B294 D.-K. (“strength and beauty are the good things of youth, but sophrosyne is the flower of age”). Later it is a feature of Plato’s Laws; see North 120, 191, 209.

26 Particularly adult warriors (ἄνδρας — warrior in Homer; cf. also Pind. Ol. 6.10 “in battles”), Pl. Lach. 190ε, Arist. Eth.Nic. 1114a34ff, 1129b9ff. For courage as the virtue of early manhood and boulai of old age see Pind. Pyth. 2.63–65 (Fennell 29) and fr.199.

27 On the justice of the Aeacidae see Pind. Ol. 8, Pyth. 8, Nem. 8, Isthm. 5, fr.1, but particularly Nem. 8.7–12 (χείρι καὶ βουλαίς ἀρσενικὰς). At Isthm. 8.124 he is named as arbiter of the gods. Socrates lists Aeacus (along with Minos and Rhadamantus, as at Dem. 18.127) as a judge in the Underworld (an Orphic, not a common, idea, see Burnet ad loc.) at Pl. Ap. 41α, cf. Grg. 523ε (see also Isoc. 9.15, Hor. Carm. 2.13.22).

28 The fifth age of seven, following the soldier’s, “And then the justice, in fair round belly with good capon lin’d, with eyes severe and beard of formal cut, full of wise saws and modern instances”: As You Like It II.vii.153–56.

29 Phronesis is ‘practical wisdom’ at Pl. Resp. 428b.

30 According to Xenophon (Mem. 3.9.4), Socrates held sophia (indistinguishable to him from sophrosyne) to be common to all the virtues (North [supra n.23] 128).
Gildersleeve’s reading is certainly not that of the majority of Pindaric commentators before or since, either as regards (1) the reading ὁ μακρός αἰῶν or (2) the notion that Pindar is describing a series of four virtues. To what extent should a modern editor be guided by Gildersleeve’s view of the passage?

(1) His reading, that of his old teacher Boeckh, μακρός, is read by only two commentators after 1855 (Kleanthes and Christ), while θνατός is read by seven editors from 1862 to 1896 and by the major editors (Sandys, Farnell, Puech, Schroeder, Bowra, Turyn, Snell) from 1898 to our day. The conflicting interpretations may be restated thus: either man’s awareness of his mortality (θνατός) makes him aware from childhood that he must use his other virtues wisely (i.e. “four virtues make up the tetraγωνον αὐτῆς38 and each is brought to the test by trial διάσπερα τῶν βροτῶν ἔλεγχοι.] (O 4.18)34 Aristokleides has the potentialities of them all and by the grace of god he may like Damophilus show them all—P 4.281: κεῖνος γὰρ ἐν παισίν νέους/ἐν δὲ βουλαῖς πρέσβεις ἐγκύρωσαι ἐκατονταετεὶ βιωτὰ. Surely ἐκατονταετεὶ βιωτὰ will satisfy the conditions of ὁ μακρός αἰῶν. As for the correspondence to the other fourfold state I am not certain that I can satisfy either of us. The genealogy is mixed as I have noted on O 13.1035 to which add the remark in Herodotus 8.77: διὰ Δίκης σβέσει κρατερῶν Κόρον, "Ὑβρις νῦν. But it might be said that ὅλβος demands σωφροσύνη lest it beget κόρος—ἀνδρεία checks κόρος—δικαιοσύνη quells ὑβρις.36 and φρονήσις is the truest guard against ἀτη.

This is the way the passage looks to me now. Perhaps more reflection will make it seem still darker.

[The letter ends with personal regards to Norton.]

31 “Was aber ist deine Pflicht? Die Forderung des Tages”: Maximen und Reflexionen, 443.
32 “From this passage we get a clear definition of φρονεῖν ὁ παρκείμενον, the fourth virtue characteristic of advanced age (proved to be so by the use of the verb ἑλα), and have no mention of justice”: Fennell 29. See Pind. Pyth. 2.65.
33 For the ἀνήρ τετράγωνον see Simonides PMG 542.3.
34 In his note on Ol. 4.18 Gildersleeve (supra n.4: 162) refers to Nem. 3.71. Somewhat later (AJP 28 [1907] 480–81) he retracts the interpretation he gave in his commentary and which is clearly informing his view here. This was pointed out to me by Prof. Robert Fowler.
35 At Ol. 13.6–10 Law, Justice, and Peace, the daughters of Themis, repel ἡμβρις, the κόρον ματέρα θρασύμμθην. "Theognis reverses the genealogy, v. 153: τίκτει τοι κόρος ὑβριν ὅταν κακῶν ὅλβος ἔπηται, but that makes little difference as, according to Greek custom, grandmother and granddaughter often bore the same name. It is a mere matter of "Ὑβρις—Κόρος—"Ὑβρις" (Gildersleeve [supra n.4] 229–30).
virtues abreast . . . with ἀρετής as the dominant mare"), or if one lives a long enough life (μακρός) then wisdom will come to him as a fourth and final virtue. The latter clearly appealed to the 67-year-old Gildersleeve, and we may examine some philological reasons why.

ἀίων is a word specifically used of one’s allotted span of life. E. Fraenkel quotes Wilamowitz that, “χρόνος is absolute, ἀίων relative, defined by the person or thing whose ἀίων it is,”37 and says of the occurrence at Aeschylus Ag. 107, “it gives us an idea which occurs several times in Aeschylus and Sophocles—the idea that a man’s lifetime is born, grows up, and ages with him.”38

But can one say ὁ μακρός αἰῶν in the sense required, that is, to indicate the fourth and oldest age of mortal man? The phrase is used of long life at Aesch. Supp. 582 (supra n.14) and Eur. fr.575.3 N.; and at Theoc. Id. 16.43 the phrase refers to the generations of mortal life during which the shades lie in the Underworld. Soph. OC 152 (μακραιῶν), Aesch. Pers. 262 (μακροβιότος αἰῶν), Soph. OT 518, Pl. Resp. 383b, quoting Aesch. fr.350 N., and Epin. 982α2 (τρια μακραίων βίων) and the occurrences of μακρὸς βίος in n.13 above all refer to long human life. But μακρός αἰῶν probably refers to the lifetime of the Muses at Eur. Med. 429 and to the remote ages of history in Plut. Mor. 93ε. The adjective μακραιῶν is used of nymphs in Soph. OT 1099, of the Fates in Ant. 987, and the δαιμόνες in Empedocles 31β115.5 D.-K. and Plut. Mor. 420α.

No instance of μακρὸς αἰῶν employs the definite article, and indeed the mss. have none; it was supplied by Triclinius (supra n.9). On the other hand, θνατός αἰῶν is unexampled elsewhere,39 and on balance Gildersleeve seems right to be “seduced” along with Christ by the analogy with ὁ μακρὸς βίος and not to heed “the weighty authority of Aristarchus.”

(2) Although Gildersleeve says “we need not follow Plato closely,” he overlooks Pindar’s four virtues of the Aeacids in Isthm. 8.24–28 and Aesch. Sept. 610, which contain nearly the same virtues, in favor of the four virtues from Plato Phd. 69c and Leg. 631c.40 We should first find the source of Gildersleeve’s interpretation.

Geddes’s Note K on Plato’s Phaedo deals with “The Platonic Division of the Virtues”41 and begins thus:

37 Aischylos Interpretationen (Berlin 1914) 170 n.3.
39 Eur. IT 1122 τὸ δὲ μετ᾽ εὐτυχίας κακούσθαι θνατοὶς βαῖνεις αἰῶν is not apposite.
40 For other mentions of the virtues in Plato see supra n.21.
41 Geddes (supra n.22).
The ancient division of Virtue into four leading forms, known in modern times as the 'cardinal virtues', was probably of Pythagorean origin. Among the earliest traces of such a division is that which we find in the Pythagorean Pindar (Nem. III.76), who speaks of 'Virtues Four' in such a connection as to indicate their correspondence with the four ages or marked seasons of the life of Man. In this case they may be supposed to have been successively evolved in the life of the individual in the following order:—

- **Virtue of Youth**
  - Self-control or Temperance
  - (Σωφροσύνη).
- **Virtue of Early Manhood**
  - Bravery
  - (Αμφία).
- **Virtue of Mature Manhood**
  - Justice
  - (Δικαιοσύνη).
- **Virtue of Old Age**
  - Prudence
  - (Φρόνησις).

Here is the contemporary source that agrees with Gildersleeve’s text, his belief that the virtues are a series based on age, and his application of the Platonic virtues to Pindar’s ‘Ages of Man’. Despite Gildersleeve’s warm review of the second edition of this commentary, it is still curious that he, having ostensibly eschewed the Platonic canon, should defer so completely to it in this case. However valuable Geddes’ work may be, few today would readily assign to Pindar the strictly canonized virtues of Plato, and Gildersleeve’s interpretation of Φρόνησις as “the culminating, not the controlling element,” *i.e.* as the last in a series of four, goes against the scholia and most commentators who see it as a virtue common to the other three (*supra* n.20).

Helen North persuasively shows that in sixth-century elegy and fifth-century lyric the old heroic ideal was replaced with a new code of excellence that had four components, *arete, sophrosyne, agathos,* and *sophron,* and that

- for Pindar, as for Theognis and Bacchylides, sophrosyne in the *polis* is allied with the other excellences—*arete or anorea, eunomia,* and *dike*—which by now have a well-established ‘class’ meaning in the old-fashioned Dorian world.  

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42 *AJP* 6 (1885) 495: “His range of illustrative reading is great, the conception of the dialogue is admirable, the appended notes are full of interest and suggestiveness, and he who reads the dialogue simply for its literary charm or philosophical meaning cannot fail to be grateful for Professor Geddes’ companionship.”

43 North (*supra* n.23) 25, *cf.* 13 and n.47.
This tradition of four continued from Pindar through Isocrates:44

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It thus appears to have been an ongoing tradition, rather than his “implicit manner,” that led Pindar to speak of four virtues (as at Isthm. 8.24–28) and to associate them with certain stages of a man’s life, as Gildersleeve (and Geddes) suggests. The pre-Platonic parallels that Gildersleeve does not adduce support his view that φρονεῖν τὸ παρκείμενον concludes a series.

No one should be held accountable for a letter that was never intended to be published, even one written on his special field to a colleague of Norton’s stature. Yet we know that Gildersleeve took great care in the composition of his letters, often writing several drafts of especially important ones. Gildersleeve’s informal discussion of this vexed passage not only gives us insight into his critical method, but makes us wish the more that he could have written a com-

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Aesch. Sept. 610; produced in 467. In this passage εὐσεβεῖα is substituted for the φρονείσε that the seer Amphiaraus lacks. Wilamowitz once thought the line a later interpolation to introduce the Platonic virtues (Aeschyli Tragoediae [Berlin 1914] 105) but recanted in Der Glaube der Hellenen I (Berlin 1931) 15 n.1. For important discussions of this verse and its testimony for the cardinal virtues, see E. Wolff, Plato’s Apologie (NeuPhilUnters 6 [Berlin 1929]) 77; W. Jaeger, Humanistische Reden und Vorträge (Berlin 1960) 145. I am grateful to Professor Friedrich Solmsen for these references.

Eur. fr. 284.23–28. In this fragment of the satyr-play Autolykos Satyrikos, Euripides adds skill in speech (μισθοῦ) to the other four virtues; see North (supra n.23) 72.

Gorgias 828b6 D-K.: the virtues held by dead heroes, from the Ἐπιτάφια; see North (supra n.23) 94.

Xen. Mem. 1.1.16; dated ca 385. Xenophon lists the virtues espoused by Socrates. He includes piety (εὐσεβῆς) but omits σοφία; see also the Agesilaus, where he adds to the canon patriotism and “something akin to affability” (τὸ εὔχαρις, 8.1); North (supra n.23) 130. Adam considers Mem. 3.9.1–5 the “nearest approach to the doctrine before Plato” (supra n.21).

Isoc. Evag. 22f; dated 370–365. Isocrates here excludes Xenophon’s piety, which he had included in similar lists in Helen 31 and On the Peace 63.
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panion commentary on the Isthmians and Nemeans to match his work on the Olympians and the Pythians.

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45 "On account of the commercial failure of the Olympians and Pythians, the Harpers declined to undertake a companion volume containing the Nemeans and Isthmians, which indeed might have helped to precipitate the sad exit of the firm from the enterprise of publishing school books": "Pindaric Notes," Johns Hopkins University Circulars, July 1916, 35.

46 Professors William M. Calder III, Robert Fowler, and Friedrich Solmsen read earlier versions of this paper and made many helpful suggestions for which I am grateful. William M. Calder IV corrected two mistranscriptions of the original.