THE SPRING of 427 B.C. a Peloponnesian fleet under the nauarch Alcidas lumbered across the Aegean to raise the Athenian siege of Mytilene. At Embaton in the Erythraea the fleet received confirmation of the report that Mytilene had already fallen; the Spartan mission had failed. But the Elean Teutiaplus, a figure otherwise unknown, proposed to salvage the situation through stratagem: a surprise attack by night would catch the Athenians unprepared, dispersed, and negligent in victory (Thuc. 3.30.1–3).

Teutiaplus justifies his plan by reference to το κενόν τοῦ πολέμου (3.30.4), an obscure phrase, which then appears (always in the plural and always in a military context) in other authors down to Cicero, before eventually entering the collection of proverbs attributed to Diogenianus. Metaphorical use of the phrase (i.e., in a non-military context) is first seen in Philo of Alexandria (Ebr. 76) and Plutarch (Mor. 41B). Neither Thucydides nor Aristotle, however, recognized the phrase as a proverb, of which Polybius gives the first explicit attestation. The history of the phrase κενόν/κενά τοῦ πολέμου provides a rare glimpse of how a Greek proverb originated, and allows us to probe its relationship to ancient military thought and psychological theory.

Although proverbs are often regarded as colloquial aphorisms of ‘folk wisdom’ originating at indeterminable points in the past, some
do arise from datable historical events, and it is only an assumption that proverbs must derive from oral tradition. In fact, as I hope to show, the proverb \( \text{πολλά κενά τοῦ πολέμου} \) developed over time in both its form and its associations. Speculation about the frequency of this phrase in popular speech would be fruitless, since scholars can work only from written sources. The most we can say with any certainty is that the initial form of the phrase occurs in Thucydides; it is first called a proverb by Polybius; and its metaphorical use appears only in the first century (Philo and Plutarch). To claim it as a proverb before Thucydides would be an *argumentum e silentio*, especially as our first testimony to this effect comes almost three centuries later. \( \text{πολλά κενά τοῦ πολέμου} \) thus offers an instance of a proverb deriving from the literary tradition, and it is an exaggeration to think that all proverbs collected in the *Corpus paroemiographorum graecorum* originated exclusively in colloquial use.

The study of proverbs presents numerous difficulties, not the least of which is determining a proverb’s correct meaning. \( \text{πολλά κενά τοῦ πολέμου} \) is no exception. Throughout its history the phrase was associated sometimes with stratagem, the concept of trickery and deception in war (its initial context in Thucydides), sometimes with panic, the sudden terror seizing armies without rational cause, and sometimes with both. Yet \( \text{κενόν/κενά τοῦ πολέμου} \) is synonymous with neither *strategema* nor *panika*. Indeed both the meaning of the phrase and its text are at issue: its association with stratagem, especially as found in Thucydides, has prompted arguments for accepting \( \text{καυνόν/καυνά} \), the reading in some manuscripts, or even \( \text{κοινόν/κοινά} \) rather than \( \text{κενόν/κενά} \). Does a textual problem really exist? In contrast, Cicero equates the phrase with \( \text{πανικά} \), an interpretation unsuitable for its original Thucydidean context. How did these two apparently unrelated concepts, stratagem and panic, gain association with \( \text{κενόν/κενά τοῦ πολέμου} \)?

Previous scholarship has not addressed this question. Gomme, although aware of the phrase in other authors, declined to draw upon this material to explain Thuc. 3.30.4. His interpretation of the phrase, as an error to be avoided yet exploited when seen in others, only
partially grasps its meaning, and he failed to understand the universal truism of war that Thucydides attempted to signify. Shackleton Bailey in his commentary on Cic. Att. 5.20.3 offers an excellent brief discussion; but his treatment is by no means exhaustive, omitting references to the phrase in Polybius and Diodorus, and offering no explanation of its association with both stratagem and panic. A more extensive treatment is therefore justified.

First, I shall argue that κενόν/κενά is the correct reading. Next, I shall demonstrate that the original Thucydidean meaning of the phrase is a truism signifying a general's problem in perceiving a situation and deriving correct information in war, where the dilemma of discerning reality from illusion has practical significance: illusions and misperceptions are opportunities for stratagem. Thucydides' phrase can be seen as an ancient version of what Clausewitz would later call the 'fog of war'. Finally, I shall discuss how the phrase became a proverb and account for its association with panic—a new aspect of the phrase that began with its appropriation by Aristotle from Thucydides. In the fourth century B.C. the practical problem of army panics became a topic of both military theory and Peripatetic psychological speculation. The key to the later history of the phrase lies with the Peripatetic Clearchus of Soli, who perpetuated the school's practice of collecting proverbs and combined the military and psychological interests in panic in a treatise on the subject. Clearchus, I believe, is the source of the proverb in the collection of the Ps.-Diogenianus, and his association with Duris of Samos, another Peripatetic, suggests that Duris may be Diodorus' (and perhaps Cicero's) source for the proverb.

I

Although κενόν/κενά has been the preferred reading in recent editions of Thucydides, Aristotle, Polybius, Diodorus, and Cicero, Greeks from about the second century B.C., as Gomme noted (ad Thuc. 3.30.4), did not distinguish κενος from καινος in pronunciation, and thus Gomme concluded that the manuscript tradition of both Thucydides and other sources of the proverb had no value. Even the scholiast (of unknown date) on Thuc. 3.30.4 did not know wheth-

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8 Buettner-Wobst records no manuscript variants for κενά at Polyb. 29.16.3 (Teubner ed., Leipzig 1904), but Adler, Suidae Lexicon IV (Leipzig 1935) 156, has καινά. The Suda is the only source for this fragment of Polybius.
κένα όρ καυνόν was correct and could not offer a single interpretation of the phrase. The variant reading καυνόν/καυνά, however, is not found for all occurrences of the phrase: it is lacking for Diod. 20.30.1 and 64.7. Modern translations often skirt the textual issue. Some scholars either prefer the readings of inferior manuscripts or reject the manuscript tradition completely in suggesting τὸ καυνόν (the impartiality of war) or καιρὸς (the opportunity of war).

Clarence Bill has argued for reading καυνά, although he considers the proverb only in Thucydides, Aristotle, and Cicero. In his view κένα τοῦ πολέμου to an ancient Greek could only mean the “empty fears of war” or the “futilities of war,” neither of which, he thinks, suits the contexts of the proverb in his three authors. Diogenes Laer­tius 5.41 is alleged to prove this: τὸ δὲ κενὸν τοῦ βίου πλέον τοῦ συμφέρουσα. Bill, favoring the reading καυνά, translates the proverb as the “shifting nature of war” or the “contingencies of war.” Further

9 Σ ad Thuc. 3.30.4 Hude: τὸ καυνόν τοῦ πολέμου τὸ καυνά οί μὲν διὰ διφθόγγον γράμματες οὕτως εἴνοσαν, τὸ παρ’ ἐλπίδα καὶ παρὰ δόξαι ποιοῦν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις μνᾶν, τούταιτι τὸ ἐπισπευσθῆναι ἀφολάκτοι τοῖς ἔχθροις οἱ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἐ ψυλοῦ γράφαντες οὕτως ἐξεχόνταται, τὸ διάκενον καὶ ἄργον τοῦ πολέμου. Of the two hands that contributed scholia to Laurentianus gr. 69.2 (saec. X), Hude follows the more recent (C2) in printing καυνά.

10 See C. Th. Fischer’s Teubner edition (Leipzig 1906). At Diod. 17.86.1 the variant καυνός appears only in R (Paris gr. 1665, saec. XII) by a late hand.


12 καυνόν/καυνά: Steup argues for καυνόν in Thuc. 3.30.4 on the basis of Hom. II 18.309, Arist. Rh. 2.21.11, and Thuc. 5.102, but takes the untenable position that καυνά should be read in the phrase in other authors. Classen prefers καυνό, as do Poppo and Stahl: J. Steup, Bemerkungen zu Thukydidès (Freiberg n.d.) 259–62; J. Classen and J. Steup, Thukydides III (Berlin 1892) 54, 253f; J. Classen, Thukydides III (Berlin 1867) 188f; E. F. Poppo and J. M. Stahl, Thucydidis De bello Peloponnesiaco I (Leipzig 1875) 46f. R. Y. Tyrell and L. C. Purser, The Correspondence of Cicero III (Dublin 1890) 116 suggest καυνα at Cic. Att. 5.20, but fail to support their suggestion with the reading καυνά found in the very poor digamma class of manuscripts, as noted in Shackleton Bailey’s edition. καιρός: Hans-Jörg Schulz, “Zu Thucydides 3,30,4,” Hermes 85 (1957) 255f, written in ignorance of Bill’s article (n.13 infra) and citing Thuc. 1.142.1 as a parallel: τὸ δὲ πολέμου ὦ καιροὶ οὐ μενετοί.
proof is adduced from an *adscriptum* to *Att. 5.20.3* in the *delta* class of manuscripts, where the proverb is given as *nova belli.*\(^\text{13}\)

There is less room to fault Bill’s translation than his arguments. The passage from Diogenes proves nothing, and the *adscripta* in the *delta* manuscripts of Cicero’s letters are generally unreliable, as Bill also recognizes. Furthermore, the only variant reading in the manuscripts for *Att. 5.20.3* is *κωνά* not *καωνά.*\(^\text{14}\) Seeking a Latin solution for the proper reading of the Greek proverb, however, has merit, since the proverb also appears in Latin sources in contexts where the Roman author has most probably either directly or through a *Zwischenquelle* consulted a Greek text.

Curtius’ account of Alexander’s stratagem to capture the Sogdian Rock offers the best example. When the local king refused to surrender, Alexander sent a band of Macedonian mountaineers to seize the summit above the king’s camp and then dispatched the king’s son to urge surrender. When the king saw Macedonians waving white flags from the peak and the Macedonian camp below raised a shout, he yielded:

\begin{quote}
*iamque e Macedonum castris signorum concentus et totius exercitus clamor audiebatur. ea res, sicut pleraque belli, vana et inanis barbaros ad deditionem traxit: quippe occupati metu paucitatem eorum, qui a tergo erant, aestimare non poterant* (Curt. 7.11.25)
\end{quote}

Certainly Curtius is drawing on a Greek source, and Alexander’s stratagem of creating an illusion to induce his opponent to draw a false conclusion in a state of panic fits a pattern of behavior repeatedly associated with the proverb, as we shall see.\(^\text{15}\) Curtius’ phrase, *sicut pleraque belli, vana et inanis,* can be a paraphrase only of *κενά τοῦ πολέμου.* However much *καωνά* may appear in some cases a more logical reading of the proverb, *κενά τοῦ πολέμου* must be correct. Curtius did not write *nova* in 7.11.25 or elsewhere.

In 4.13.5, part of Parmenio’s speech urging a surprise attack by night on the Persians at Gaugamela (the same kind of military action that occasions the proverb in Teutiaplus’ speech at Thuc. 3.30), Curtius has Parmenio note the advantage not only of creating a noc-

\(^\text{13}\) Clarence P. Bill, “ΤΑ ΚΑΙΝΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ,” *CP* 32 (1937) 160f.

\(^\text{14}\) Cf. *supra* n.12. Shackleton Bailey (*supra* n.7) 227 also rejects Bill’s arguments but without refuting all of them.

\(^\text{15}\) Although names of the Sogdians differ in Curtius, Plutarch, and Arrian (Diodorus’ account is lost), Plutarch’s abridged account (*Alex.* 58.4) seems to follow the same source as Curtius, i.e., Alexander intimidated the king into surrender: *ταύτην* (the Sogdian Rock) *μὲν ὁδὲ ἐκφοβήσας τὸν Σισυφίδην ἔλαβεν. Arrian (*Anab,* 4.21) omits the stratagem and has Alexander induce surrender solely through negotiation.
turnal panic but also of Macedonians avoiding the horrifying sight of Scythians and Bactrians: *vanis et inanibus militem magis quam iustis formidinis causis moveri*. Although the passage is a less obvious and less literal version of the proverb, the contrast is again between real fear (*iustis formidinis causis*) and imagined fear or false alarm (*vanis et inanibus*). *Novakaxva* will not do.

Use of the Greek proverb in Latin, however, is not limited to Curtius: Cato also knew it. When as consul in 195 B.C. Cato governed Hispania Citerior during a major frontier crisis, the chieftain of the Ilergetes, a Roman ally, demanded protection for his people. With too few troops under his command to permit division of his forces in event of an attack, Cato created an elaborate illusion of sending aid, and actually embarked some troops, only to recall them.16 His deliberation of the stratagem reveals not only a paraphrase of the Greek proverb but also a theoretical perspective on the rôle of deceit in war (Liv. 34.12.3f):

> stat sententia non minuere copias, ne quid interim hostes inferant ignominiae; sociis spem pro re ostentandam censet; saepe vana pro veris, maxime in bello, valuisse, et credentem se aliqui auxilii habere, perinde atque haberet, ipsa fiducia et sperando atque audendo servatum.

Cato’s stratagem against an ally conforms to a Greek view that a general’s deception of his own forces can be just (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.15–17), and the very use of stratagem by the arch-advocate of Roman conservatism points up the hypocrisy of Roman propaganda (e.g., Liv. 42.47.4–9) that Romans never resorted to stratagem (Cato was a skilled practitioner of military ruses—a theme that must be pursued elsewhere).

The phrase *saepe vana pro veris, maxime in bello, valuisse* paraphrases the substance of the Greek proverb. The immediate source is Livy, but it is generally agreed that Livy draws upon Cato’s extensive account of his Spanish campaign in the *Origines*, although whether directly or indirectly cannot be determined.17

Furthermore, Cato’s source for the proverb can even be posited. Among extant sources in which the proverb appears only Thucydides

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and Aristotle antedate Cato.\textsuperscript{18} Knowledge of Aristotle finds no trace in Cato’s own writings or biographies of him, but a connection with Thucydides is openly asserted. Cicero twice couples Cato and Thucydides as writers, but Plutarch offers more conclusive evidence. Plutarch asserts that despite learning Greek late in life, Cato in his oratory benefited from a knowledge of Thucydides and Demosthenes, that he moderately embellished his writings with Greek \textit{sententiae} and stories, and that many of his aphorisms were literal translations from Greek sources.\textsuperscript{19} Cato’s quotation of Themistocles and echoes of Demosthenes confirm this testimony,\textsuperscript{20} just as Livy’s \textit{saepe vana pro veris, maxime in bello, valuisse} is, I believe, a Catonian interpretation of Thucydides’ \textit{τὸ κεφὸν τοῦ πολέμου}. The proverb does not occur in Demosthenes. Nor does Cato’s allegedly late knowledge of Greek pose a problem. Cato’s memoirs of the Spanish campaign need not be a work of 195 B.C., and the \textit{Origines} were still being composed close to the time of Cato’s death in 149. In fact Cato probably learned Greek early in his career.\textsuperscript{21}

Two other possible Latin occurrences of the proverb may be mentioned. Shackleton Bailey cites Tac. \textit{Hist.} 2.69, Vitellius’ dismissal of troublesome Gallic auxilia in A.D. 69: \textit{reddita civitatibus Gallorum auxilia, ingens numerus et prima statim defectione inter inania belli adsumptus}. Of course \textit{inania belli} could be equated with \textit{κεφὰ τοῦ πολέμου}, implying a Thucydidean echo in Tacitus. Yet Tacitus’ phrase, which does not recur in his works, is obscure, and recent scholarship is skeptical of any direct or significant influence of Thucydides on Tacitus.\textsuperscript{22} Wellesley translates the phrase: “as a form of military window-dressing.”\textsuperscript{23} In Shackleton Bailey’s view the Gallic

\textsuperscript{18} As I shall argue below, the proverb was popular in Peripatetic writers such as Clearchus of Soli and Duris of Samos, both of whom antedate Cato, but Cato's familiarity with these writers cannot be demonstrated. Polybius, Cato’s contemporary, also seems unlikely: Cato might have been a source for Polybius on some matters, but no instance of the converse is known.


\textsuperscript{21} Nep. \textit{Cat.} 3.3: \textit{senex historiae scribere instituit}; \textit{Origines} fr.49 (Book 2 written ca 168 B.C.), frs.106–09 (Sulpicius Galba affair of 149), \textit{HRR} I\textsuperscript{2} 68, 89–91; Astin (\textit{supra} n.17) 147, 149, 212f. Astin strongly doubts a Catonian interest in Greek rhetorical theory.


auxilia constituted a useless addition except for their value “in ter-
rorem.” This phrase, however, is not Tacitus’, as Shackleton Bailey
implies, nor does Tacitus use inania belli when he does record mili-
tary panics: e.g. Ann. 1.66, Hist. 1.63.1. Certainly it could be argued
that the Gallic auxilia were a rabble unfit for combat and accepted for
service only to create the illusion that Vitellius’ army was larger than
it really was—hence inania belli—a form of stratagem to induce con-
sternation in Vitellius’ opponents. If this is really what Tacitus meant
to imply, then the association of the phrase with terror or panic is
most obscure. As a historian famous for the theme of dissimulatio,
Tacitus is of course concerned with the problem of appearance vs.
reality. Inanis, nevertheless, is a frequent adjective in Tacitus,24 and a
Greek source does not come into question for the passage. Tacitus’
inania belli need not be a Latin rendering of the Greek proverb, but
rather could be Tacitus’ own abstract phrase. The apparent correla-
tion in meaning between the two phrases may be entirely accidental.
Finally, for the sake of completeness we should note the Latin
translation of Byzantine scholia on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics by
Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253). For Eth.Nic. 3.8.6 (1116b) κεβά τοῦ
πολέμου, Grosseteste has inania belli.25 Grosseteste translates from an
anonymous continuation of the commentary on the Eth.Nic. by Eu-
stratius, metropolitan of Nicaea. Although G. Heylbut, editor of the
continuator, notes the κεβά/καυβά problem in his apparatus criticus
of the scholiast, the text used by Grosseteste obviously read κεβά, since
καυβά cannot be translated inania. Two earlier commentators on Eth.
Nic. 3.8.6, Aspasius and Heliodorus, have only κεβά without the vari-
ant καυβά in their manuscripts.26

This survey of occurrences of the Greek proverb in Latin confirms
the correctness of recent editors’ preference for reading κεβά/κεβά. In
addition, Latin usage confirms the ambiguity of the proverb: in Curti-
s and Cato (Tac. Hist. 2.69.1, I have argued, is not an occurrence)
the proverb appears in the context of stratagem involving the manipu-
lation of illusion, and both of Curtius’ examples associate it with
panic. Examination of the proverb in its various Greek contexts can
bring the problem of its precise meaning into sharper focus.

24 Cf. A. Gerber and A. Greef, Lexicon Taciteum (Leipzig 1903) 610f s.v. Classen
(supra n.12: III 189) suggests emending inania to semina.
25 H. P. F. Mercken, The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of
Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (=Corpus
latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum VI.) [Leiden 1973]) 284, 287.
26 Κ in Eth.Nic. 3.11, Comm.Arist.gr. XX 165.18-20; Aspasius in Eth.Nic. 3.11,
Comm.Arist.gr. XIX.1 84.31-33; Heliodorus, Paraphr. in Eth.Nic. 3.8, Comm.Arist.
gr. XIX.2 56.21-28.
Thucydides offers the initial and most obscure occurrence of the phrase as part of Teutiaplus' speech (3.30):

*Ἀλκίδα καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρεσμεν ἀρχοντες τῆς στρατιᾶς, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πλεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Μυτιλήνην πρὶν ἐκπύστοις γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔχομεν. κατὰ γὰρ τὸ εἰκὸς ἄνθρωπον νεοστὶ πόλιν ἐχόντων πολὺ τὸ ἀφύλακτον εἰρήσομεν, κατὰ μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ πάνω, ἣ ἔκεινοι τε ἀνέπλησιοι ἐπιγενέσθαι ἂν τια φιάσε σολέμων καὶ ἡμῶν ἡ ἄλκη τυγχάνει μάλιστα σύσσα εἰκὸς ὡς καὶ τὸ πεζὸν αὐτῶν κατ᾽ οἰκίας ἀμελέστερον ὡς κεκρατηκότων διεσπάρθαι. εἰ ὅντος προσπέσομεν ἄφνω τε καὶ υπέκτος, ἐλπίζω μετὰ τῶν ἐνδον, εἰ τις ἀρὰ ἡμῶν ἔστω ὑπόλοιποι εὔνους, καταληψθῇ τὸ τὰ πράγματα. καὶ μὴ ἄποκρήσομεν τὸν κίνδυνον, νομίζομεν οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ κενὸν τοῦ σολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ ἔτι τὰ στρατηγὸν ἐν ταύτῳ φυλάσσοντο καὶ τόσος πολεμίως ἐνορφῶν ἐπιχειροῖ, πλείστον ἄν ὅρθοῖτο.*

Gomme interprets the phrase solely on the basis of Thuc. 3.30, although he mentions the verbal parallels elsewhere in Thucydides and use of the proverb in other authors. The meaning of τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου, in Gomme’s view, depends on that of τὸ τοιοῦτον, which he, like Classen and Poppo/Stahl, takes as a forward reference to the following subordinate clause. He concludes that the proverb, which he translates “the empty, or the fruitless thing in war,” signifies an error to be avoided in ourselves and to be exploited when discerned in others. Yet τὸ τοιοῦτον provides an antecedent only for the relative pronoun ὃ, not for the entire clause. The concluding subordinate clause serves only as a didactic flourish to end the speech and does not define the proverb. τὸ τοιοῦτον actually summarizes preceding material.

Teutiaplus’ speech advocates a surprise attack by night, but Gomme correctly saw that τὸ κενὸν is not surprise attack, which merely takes advantage of the error to be avoided. On the other hand, Gomme rejected equation of τὸ κενὸν with τὸ ἀφύλακτον, thinking that this limited the meaning of the phrase too much. Certainly lack of precaution is not the exclusive meaning of τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου, but it

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27 For commentary see D. Lateiner, “The Speech of Teutiaplus,” *GRBS* 16 (1975) 175–84. Lateiner essentially follows Gomme’s interpretation of the proverb. Note that τάδε is unique here in introducing a speech in Thucydides, who elsewhere uses τοιοῦτον or τοιοῦτα, implying invention, whereas to introduce documents he uses a definite pronoun, signifying quotation. Hence Gomme argues that Teutiaplus’ speech is historical, i.e. not a Thucydidean invention: *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford 1937) 166f, *Commentary II* 292f; disputed by S. Hornblower, *Thucydides* (Baltimore 1987) 53. Conceivably τάδε at 3.29.2 is a scribal error for τοιοῦτα.

28 Gomme (supra n.7) 292; Classen and Poppo-Stahl (supra n.12).

does represent one of its components. Thucydides’ language is obscure because his idea is abstract. τὸ κενόν represents not a single idea, but the abstraction of a group of ideas emphasized in 3.30: undiscovered (πρὶν ἐκπυστοῦ), lack of precaution (τὸ ἀφέλακτον), unexpected (ἀνέξποστοι), negligence (ἀμέλεστερον), and finally the consequence of these—nocturnal surprise attack (προσπέσομεν ἄφυς τε καὶ νυκτὸς).

Teutiaplus’ speech should be compared with two other passages. First, Brasidas’ battle plan against Cleon at Amphipolis: the situation is again a surprise attack on an unsuspecting opponent, and Thucydides explicitly characterizes the plan as a stratagem.30 The Spartans intend to strike without prior exposure to the enemy (5.8.3, ἀξιεὶ προ-όψεως), and the attack will be sudden (5.8.4, ἐπισειρεὶν αἰφυδίως) on an unsuspecting enemy in disorder and taking no precautions (5.9.3, οὐκ ἀν ἐπίσωστε, ἀτάκτως, ὀλυγορεῖν). Furthermore, the language and idea of 3.30.4 are strongly echoed in 5.9.4f:

It would thus appear that τὸ κενόν is closely associated but not identical with κλέματα and could be equated with ἀμαρτία. Certainly error, like stratagem, is involved in the idea of τὸ κενόν τοῦ πολέμου, but ἀμαρτία does not convey the proper nuance, as another Thucydidean passage suggests.

When King Archidamas of Sparta addresses his army before the first invasion of Attica, he warns against negligence and overconfidence based on numbers, fearing the possibility of surprise attack (2.11.3f):

The themes of negligence, lack of preparation (a variation on the ideas of lack of precaution and unexpectedness at 3.30, 5.8f), and suddenness of attack are common to the speeches of Teutiaplus and Brasidas. The key phrase, however, is ἁδηλα τὰ τῶν πολέμων.\textsuperscript{31} The “unseen elements of wars” induce error (cf. ἀρματία, 5.9.4) and can be exploited for stratagem, when avoided in one’s own conduct and seen in the enemy’s.

Thucydides’ τὸ κενὸν τοῖς πολέμοις thus represents the void of correct information in war, produced by unseen, obscure, or poorly perceived factors. Teutiaplus’ appeal to the κενὸν of war summarizes his earlier arguments: the Spartan fleet is yet an unseen element; the Athenians revel in the false security of a victory, contributing to their lack of precaution and their negligence; and the Spartans can pounce upon them under cover of night.

Contrary to those who would emend the text, κενὸν is appropriate here. Thucydides’ “void of information” may be compared to Democritus’ τὸ κενὸν for the void of space. “Idle boasts” (κενὰ εὐγματα) appears in Homer, and fifth-century Greeks used κενὸς with ἔλπις, γνῶμη, φροντίδες, and φόβοι.\textsuperscript{32} Xenophon describes panic as κενὸς φόβος (Anab. 2.2.21). Most probably, Thucydides’ τὸ κενὸν is not an ellipsis that requires a noun to be understood with κενὸν, but rather simply an abstraction from substantive use of the adjective, summarizing the thought of the preceding three sentences of the speech.

Thucydides’ concept of τὸ κενὸν τοῖς πολέμοις can be better understood through comparison with the ideas of a modern classic on the art and philosophy of war, Carl von Clausewitz’s \textit{Vom Kriege}. Although it cannot be proved that Clausewitz ever read Thucydides, both, as profound thinkers on the phenomenon of war, made chance and the unexpected a motif of their works.\textsuperscript{33} In Clausewitz’s view a general can fully know only his own situation. Real knowledge about

\textsuperscript{31} Lateiner (\textit{supra} n.27: 177 n.7) cites 2.11.4 as a parallel to 3.30.4 but does not expound on its significance for understanding the proverb.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{LSJ} s.v. κενὸς I.1f. Cf. the proverb κενὰ κενὰ λογίζονται: \textit{Suda} s.v.

the enemy must be carefully derived by a sensitive and discriminating judgment, skillful intelligence, determination, and presence of mind, from an overwhelming mass of false information and rumors exaggerated by fear in an environment uncontrollably governed by chance and the unexpected.34 In brief, a general must operate in a constant fog of uncertainty, in which illusion and reality can scarcely be discerned:

Der Krieg ist das Gebeit der Ungewissheit; drei Viertheile derjenigen Dinge, auf welche das Handeln im Kriege gebaut wird, liegen im Nebel einer mehr oder weniger grossen Ungewissheit. . . . Endlich ist die grosse Ungewissheit aller Daten im Kriege eine eigenthümliche Schwierigkeit, weil alles Handeln gewissermassen in einem grossen Dämmerlicht verrichtet wird, das noch dazu nicht selten wie eine Nebel- oder Mondsinnebelbeleuchtung den Dingen einen übertriebenen Umfang, ein groteskes Ansehen gibt.35

This “fog of war” constitutes a major source of the “friction of war,” Clausewitz’s metaphor for those factors complicating and interfering with the execution of plans—the difference between war on paper and in reality.36

Thucydides’ κενόν τοῦ πολέμου and Clausewitz’s “fog of war” represent essentially the same idea, portraying the problem of a general’s uncertainty of information in war as a sort of existential dilemma. The proverb, however, conceptually at least where error due to negligence and the unexpected is involved, is also related to an exemplum met with some frequency in Stoic writings and attributed variously to Iphicrates, Fabius Maximus, and Scipio Aemilianus. The version of Valerius Maximus (7.2.2) offers a point of departure:

Scipio vero Africanus turpe esse aiebat in re militari dicere “non putarem,” videlicet quia explorato et excusso consilio quae ferro aguntur administrari oportere arbitrabatur. summa ratione: inemendabilis est enim error, qui violentiae Martis committitur.37

The exemplum emphasizes foresight and expecting the unexpected, in other words, giving heed to the κενόν τοῦ πολέμου. Scipio Aemili-

34 Clausewitz 84, 101, 103.
anus probably learned the aphorism from his father Aemilius Paulus (cf. Gell. 13.3.6), who may in turn have heard it from Cato. As argued above, Cato knew the proverb ὃ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου, and this exemplum, eventually attributed to several famous generals, could indicate Cato’s further elaboration of Thucydides’ idea.

 그리스도ν τοῦ πολέμου originally signified the void of accurate information in war, the problem of discerning reality from illusion and expecting the unexpected. A connection of the phrase with panic finds no trace in Thuc. 3.30, except for the logical inference that a nocturnal surprise attack would produce panic in the enemy. If it is correct to connect the phrase with the exemplum of “I didn’t think,” Cicero’s association of this exemplum with courage and foresight (Off. 1.8.1) provides a hint of what direction use of the phrase would take after Thucydides.

### III

The subsequent history of the phrase begins with Aristotle. After defining courage as the mean between boldness and fear (Eth.Nic. 3.7.13), Aristotle discusses different kinds of courage, first distinguishing the true courage of citizen soldiers from the courage of soldiers compelled by fear of their commanders to be brave (3.8.1–5). Next he discusses courage based on experience, exemplified in the courage of mercenaries (3.8.6–8 [1116b]):

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περί ἕκαστα ἄνδρεια [τις] εἶναι· θεῖν καὶ ὁ Ἀικατάρτης ὥθησεν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἄνδρειαν. τοιούτου δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ’ οἱ στρατιώται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλά κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεφέρακας οὗτοι· φαίνεται δὴ ἄνδρεῖοι ὅτι οὐκ ἱσασίν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. εἶτα ποιήσας καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνασται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρήσαται τοῖς ὁπλίσι καὶ τοιαύτα ἔχοντες ὅσοι ἂν εἰς καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα, ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλους ὀπλισμένους μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγώσιν οὐχ οἱ ἄνδρειότατοι μαχιμῶτατοι εἰσίν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μάλιστα ἐχύνοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἀριστα ἔχοντες.

Does Aristotle’s understanding of the phrase differ from Thucydides’?

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38 Cato in Veget. 1.13: deinde in aliis rebus, sicut ait Cato, si quid erratum est, potest postmodum corrigi; proeliorum delicta emendationem non recipiunt, cum poena statim sequatur errorem; nam aut confestim peruelt qui ignare imperiteque pugnaverint aut in fugam versi victoribus ultra pares esse non audent. It could also be argued that Cato heard it from Fabius (Sen. De ira 2.31.4) or that the aphorism originated with Iphicrates (cf. supra n.37), but I would judge both these attributions as inventions common in the literature of exempla.
If allowance is made for Aristotle’s transfer of the phrase from an historical to a philosophical context, no difference in meaning occurs. Aristotle says that mercenaries are experienced soldiers who understand the many κενά of war while others, presumably non-professional citizen-soldiers, do not. Experience is the key element. All three passages in Thucydides (2.11.4, 3.30.4, 5.9.4f) are speeches of experienced commanders who understand the fog of war and seek to exploit it to advantage (Teutiaplus, Brasidas) or to avoid defeat because of it (Archidamas). Certainly the element of experience is implied in Thucydides’ κενόν τοῦ πολέμου, and Aristotle uses the same contrast between the knowledgeable and the ignorant. Furthermore, Aristotle’s elaboration on this experience of the κενά (εἰτα taken consequentially, ‘therefore’, ‘accordingly’), which he says facilitates offensive and defensive operations, is his own reworking of the final subordinate clause in Teutiaplus’ speech (3.30.4, cf. 5.9.4). Aristotle used Thucydides for his Athenian Constitution and probably for his Συνάγωγη τεχνών. Eth.Nic. 3.8.6–8 now offers another instance of Thucydides as a source for Aristotle.

Moreover, Aristotle contributes new elements significant in the later history of the phrase. Thucydides’ abstract κενόν is changed to the plural (πολλά κενά), and all occurrences of the phrase after Aristotle will also be plural. In addition, Aristotle associates the κενά with fear: experience of the κενά promotes courage, but ignorance of the κενά brings terror. Aristotle establishes the connection of the proverb with panic found later in Diodorus, Cicero, and Diogenianus.

Polybius (29.16), the next writer to employ the phrase, also associates it with an effect on morale. An eclipse of the moon before the battle of Pydna in 168 B.C. prompted a rumor (φημή) that the eclipse portended the eclipse of a king. The rumor encouraged the Romans and damaged Macedonian morale. Polybius comments οὕτως ἀληθές ἦστι τὸ περιφέρομενον ὅτι πολλά κενά τοῦ πολέμου (29.16.3). The rationalist Polybius scoffs at this interpretation of a natural phenomenon, although realizing the significance of the fog of war on the two armies. His source for the phrase defies even speculation, but two facts should be noted: first, Polybius specifically applies the κενά to a rumor, a strictly aural and unseen phenomenon, and rumor as a cause of panic

39 Scholiasts on the passage (supra n.26) merely paraphrase Aristotle without adding anything of significance.
40 See Luschnat (supra n.22) 1284f, 1287.
41 Cf. Aspasius in Eth.Nic. 3.11, Comm.Arist.gr. XIX.1 84.29–33. Rackham’s translation of Eth.Nic. 3.8.6 (supra n.11) treating the phrase as a proverb is misleading, as Aristotle does not recognize it as such.
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will be encountered again below; second, Polybius is the first author to call πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου a proverb (τὸ περιφερόμενον). Polybius’ use of the phrase does not conflict with the meaning in Thucydides or Aristotle and indicates that the phrase had acquired a wider currency by the second century B.C.

The proverb occurs four times in Diodorus—more than in any other author, but still hardly a frequent phrase considering the vast corpus of his work preserved, nor likely to be his own addition, as I shall argue below. Our first concern is the meaning of the proverb in Diodorus.

When Alexander’s persistence in the siege of Aornus alarmed the Indians, he removed his guard from a path down the rock, permitting the Indians to escape by night. Diodorus adds (17.85.7-86.1):

τὸ μὲν ὅν τῷ πρῶτον οἱ βάρβαροι διὰ τὰς τῶν τόπων ὑπεροχὰς προτέρουν καὶ πολλοὺς ἀνήρουν τῶν προτετῶν βιασμένων τοῦ δὲ χώρατος συντε-
σθέντως καὶ τῶν ὁδυβολῶν καταπελτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑράγων ἐπι-
σταθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτους τοῦ βασιλέως φανερῷ καβαστότως ὡς οὐκ
ἀποτυχήσει τῇ πολιορκίᾳ οἱ μὲν Ἰνδοὶ καταπλάγησαν, ὁ δὲ Ἀλεξαν-
δρος ἑκάστους προφόροις μέλλον ἐξελίπειν τὴν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ κατα-
λεμμένην φυλακήν, ἰδοὺς ἔξουν τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐκ τῆς πέτρας ἀνα-
χωρεῖν, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι φοβηθέντες τὰς τέ τῶν Μακεδονῶν ἀρετὰς καὶ
τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως φιλοτιμίαν νυκτὸς ἐξελίπον τὴν πέτραν.

οἱ δὲ Ἀλεξανδρος τοῖς κενοῖς τοῦ πολέμου καταστρατηγήσας τοὺς
Ἰνδοὺς χωρίς κυδόνου ἐκρίσειν τῇ πέτρας. καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀδηγήσατι τὰς
ὑμολογημένας δωρεάς ἀπέδωκεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀνέσευμεν μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως.

The context is Alexander’s use of the well-known stratagem of leaving the enemy a way of escape, and further signalled by καταστρατηγήσας, a verb meaning to ‘out-general through stratagem’. The κενά in this case, however, is Alexander’s psychological ploy of demonstrating his perseverance and determination, which in conjunction with Macedonian feats of military engineering already displayed at the siege causes the Indians to fear. The Indians failed to see through the fog of Alexander’s illusion.

42 τὸ περιφερόμενον is certainly a more obscure and periphrastic way to quote a proverb than κατὰ κοινὴν παρομίαν as at Polyb. 23.14.4, but whether this periphrasis means that πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου has not yet reached the state of a κοινὴ παρομία is open to debate. Stylistic variatio cannot be ruled out.

43 Way of escape: e.g. Thuc. 1.82.4; Xen. Hell. 6.4.33; Diod. 30.12; Onasander 38.2–6; Joseph. BJ 3.208–10; Plut. Lyce. 22.5; cf. Frontin. Str. 2.6. The verb: see Wheeler (supra n.30) 9f with n.33.

44 Parallel accounts omit the proverb, but contain similar elements. In Arrian (Anab. 4.30.2–4) the Indians, alarmed by Macedonian progress in the siege, arrange a truce for negotiations which they intentionally prolong to cover their escape. When Alexander realizes this, he permits their escape, seizes the deserted rock, and then
The next three occurrences in Diodorus all concern Agathocles. In 309 B.C. the Carthaginian Hamilcar decided to make an attempt on Syracuse, which was defended by a relatively small garrison as the bulk of the Syracusan forces were in Africa with Agathocles. He initially camped near the Olympicum and intended to occupy Euryalus on the Epipolae after traversing the Anapus River valley by night. The Syracusans meanwhile divined the plan and occupied Euryalus with a small force. Ignorant of the rough terrain and narrow roads, the Carthaginian army stumbled on its way in the dark of night, constantly thrown into disorder by its baggage train. When the Syracusans at Euryalus perceived the Carthaginians in difficulty, they immediately attacked from their superior position. Already in disorder and hampered by the darkness, the Carthaginians supposed that a major Syracusan force had arrived, and panic added to their rout (Diod. 20.29.2–11). Diodorus, in comparing this Syracusan victory to Agathocles’ defeat at the Himera River in 311 B.C., marvels at how a small force can defeat a larger (20.30.1):

καὶ το θανασιώτατον, δώδεκα μυριάδας πεζῶν καὶ πεντακισχίλιοι ἵπποι, δύσιν ἄριστος πολεμίων, προσλαβόμενος ἀπάτην καὶ τόπον, κατὰ κράτος ἣττησε, ὡστ’ ἄληθες εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον ὅτι πολλὰ τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου.

Once again the context of the proverb is a nocturnal surprise attack, but in this case the attackers are surprised. Moreover, defeat of a superior by an inferior force also figures here, just as in Thucydides’ three passages discussed above. Diodorus attributes the victory to terrain (τόπος) and deceit (ἀπάτη), more aptly understood as self-deception, since the ἀπάτη of 20.30.1 is the equivalent of the Carthaginians’ ἐγνώρια in 20.29.9. Thus self-deception and ignorance constitute the κενά of this incident and produce the panic.

Two years later in Africa after Agathocles had suffered a defeat, five thousand Libyan mercenaries attempted to desert the Syracusan army by night. As they approached the Carthaginian camp, which was ablaze from an accidental fire, the Carthaginian sentries supposed the Libyans to be a surprise attack by Agathocles. The Carthaginian forces, already in an uproar from the fire, fell into panic. The Libyan mercenaries decided to return to Agathocles’ attacks the retreating Indians, creating a panic. In Curtius (8.11.19–24) Alexander’s illusion of perseverance is countered by the Indians’ illusion of remaining, and Alexander is deceived. When the Indians’ departure is discovered, the shout in unison of the Macedonian army causes panic in the Indians.

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46 Thuc. 2.11.4, 5.9.2 (cf. 5.8.2f); implied in 3.30.2.
camp, where their approach was mistaken as a surprise attack by the Carthaginians. Here panic likewise ensued (Diod. 20.65–67.3). Diodorus summarizes the incident (20.67.4):

ελήνη δὲ τὴν νύκτα πανταχῆ διασπειρομένων αὐτῶν καὶ πανικῷ θορύβῳ συνεχομένων συνέβη πλεῖον τῶν τετρακοσιχλίων ἀναφεβήναι. ἐπιγνώσεις δὲ μόρις τῆς ἀλήθειας οἱ διασωθέντες ἐπανηλθοῦν εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν δυνάμεις ἀμφότεραι τὸν εἰρημένου τρόπον ἡτέχθησαν, ἐξαπατηθέντας κατὰ τὴν παρομοίαν τοῖς κενοῖς τοῦ πολέμου.

The passage requires no commentary: the κενά are self-deception and false expectation (cf. 30.67.1, δὴ απάτην καὶ προσδοκίαν ψευδή), and the panics were the effects of the κενά.

In 299/8 Agathocles sailed to the aid of Corcyra, which was besieged by Cassander. The incident is only partially preserved in Byzantine excerpts of Diodorus. Agathocles apparently surprised the Macedonians and burned their fleet, but in ignorance of the panic created he missed his chance for a more complete victory (Diod. 21.2.3):

ὁτ' Ἀγαθοκλῆς εἰ μὲν ἀποβιβάσας τὴν δύναμιν ἐπικειμένως τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐπέθετο, κατέκοψεν ἑαυτὸς τοὺς Μακεδόνας· ἀγνοήσας δὲ τὴν γεγονότων προσαγγελίαι καὶ τὴν ἐκπλήξιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἤρκεσθαι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποβιβάσας καὶ τρόπαιον στήσας διαλαβέως ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον εἶναι ὅτι πολλά κενά τοῦ πολέμου. ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἀπάτη πολλάκις οὐκ ἑλάττω κατεργάζεται τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐνεργεῖαι.

Just as in 20.29.9, 30.1, ἀπάτη and ἀγνοεῖ are the κενά. This passage, however, represents the only case in which the κενά worked negatively on a potentially major victory. Clausewitz realized that the fog of war could also produce ill-timed inaction.47

Cicero’s fall campaign of 51 B.C. as proconsul of Cilicia48 provides the context for the next occurrence of the proverb. In the aftermath of Carrhae two years earlier, Parthian attacks on Syria and Cappadocia were feared, and in October 51 a Parthian force actually approached Antioch. Writing to Atticus on 19 December and describing his campaign, Cicero attributes the Parthian withdrawal from Syria to the fame of his military success in Cilicia (Att. 5.20.3):

ibi (at Issus) dies quinque morati direpto et vastato Amano inde discessimus. interim (scis enim dici quaedam παλικά, dici item τὰ κενά τοῦ πολέμου) rumore adventus nostri et Cassio, qui Antiochia tenebatur, animus accessit et Parthis timor iniectus est; itaque eos cedentis ab oppido Cassius insecutus rem bene gessit. . . .

47 Clausewitz 84.
48 For a recent treatment see Elizabeth Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait (Ithaca 1983) 164–82.
As should by now be clear from our examination of the proverb, the proper equation should be κενά with rumore (cf. Polyb. 29.16.2f), not κενά with πανικά. Cicero boastfully attributes the Parthian withdrawal to his own fame and presence on the Cilician-Syrian border,49 the latter of which perhaps had some influence on the Parthians, although the occurrence of a true panic seems most doubtful. Cicero’s apparent equation of the proverb with panic, which has misled scholars to emend the text of the proverb, is a false interpretation of the proverb’s original meaning. Nevertheless, the association of the proverb with panic, first seen in Aristotle and most prominent in Diodorus, perhaps reaches its culmination in Cicero’s apparent equation of the two ideas. The association occurs also in the proverb’s latest appearance.

In the collection of proverbs attributed to the Hadrianic grammarian Diogenianus the following entry occurs, later reproduced in the collection by Michael Apostolius (d. ca 1480):50

\[ \text{πολλά κενά τοῦ πολέμου: ἦτοι διὰ τὸ πολλά καθ’ ὑπόνοιαν φέρειν ἢ ὡτι Λακεδαιμόνιον κεναὶς σφενδόναις καὶ νευραῖς ἔψοφουν πρὸς ἐκπλήξιων τῶν πολεμῶν.} \]

The first definition does not conflict with the original Thucydidean meaning of the phrase: to be suspicious about everything is apt to the general’s dilemma in the void of true information in war. Furthermore, this definition also recalls the point of the “I didn’t think” exemplum—expecting the unexpected.

The second explanation of the proverb, however, perplexingly adds a totally new element: a Spartan stratagem to panic the enemy. Association of the proverb with stratagem and panic had become traditional, and noise to terrify an enemy suggests nocturnal activity—another traditional trait of the proverb. But identification of the proverb as particularly Spartan is new. Two interpretations of this

49 Cf. Att. 5.20.3: erat in Syria nostrum nomen in gratia.
second explanation seem possible: either this explanation preserves the original occasion of the proverb, or it is a later invention to account for the proverb's association with panic. The latter is more probable.

Certainly, from one perspective, Thucydides' singular κενὸν could be seen as an anomaly, since all other occurrences of the proverb have κενᾶ. The context of the proverb in Thucydides is Spartan, just as it is in Diogenianus, and this could indicate a pre-Thucydidean Spartan origin. Strictly speaking, however, the speech of Thuc. 3.30 comes from the mouth of Teutiaplus, an Elean. Furthermore, although Spartans are usually seen as hoplites, Spartan stonethrowers appear in Tyrtaeus, and these could correspond to the slingers in Diogenianus—thus another argument for a pre-Thucydidean origin.\(^5\) Nor is the use of stratagem implied in Diogenianus alien to the Spartan character or the Spartan art of war: the Spartans had a reputation for trickery and deceit.\(^5\)

Yet despite these possible arguments, a 'Spartan explanation' of the proverb cannot be substantiated by other sources.\(^5\) The proverb is not identified as Spartan and does not occur in a Spartan context in Aristotle, Polybius, Diodorus, and scholia, nor in its Latin use in Cato, Cicero, and Curtius. In fact neither Thucydides nor Aristotle recognizes the phrase as a proverb, of which the first attestation occurs in Polybius, although the phrase may, as I argue below, have achieved the status of a proverb by the late fourth or early third century B.C. It is preferable to see the Spartan explanation of the proverb as a later interpretation, which belongs to the same category of legends as the myth of the Spartan drillmasters.\(^5\)

I have argued that κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου first occurs in Thucydides as an abstraction for the idea of the void of accurate information in war—

\(^5\) Tyrtaeus 11.35f West, P. Oxy. XLVII 3316.14.
\(^5\) No trace of the Spartan sling players appears in Polyainus, Pausanius, Athenaeus, Plutarch, or the fragments of Attic comedy—sources likely to tell such a story. Unfortunately Plutarch’s Ἐν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἱστορία μάχησθαι (Lamp. Cat. 213) is lost.
the dilemma of every general. The κέβοι signifies the problem of discerning reality from illusion and finds a modern counterpart in Clausewitz's notion of the fog of war. Aristotle borrowed the phrase from Thucydides, but changed it to the plural, thereby emphasizing the multiplicity of forms which the κέβα could take. The initial context of the phrase, the stratagem of nocturnal surprise attack, often reappears in later authors. Likewise, the association of the proverb with panic, first seen in Aristotle, was frequently repeated, although panic is a result of the effects of the κέβα and does not constitute the κέβα per se—the error of Cicero's apparent equation of the two. In the fourth century B.C., however, panic as a military and psychological phenomenon began to interest both military writers and philosophers. A brief study of panic will highlight another aspect of the proverb's history.

IV

Panic, a phenomenon of mass psychology, particularly affected armies. In fact, the concept, as expressed by πάνεια, παύκος, etc., initially has an exclusively military connotation, although based on analogy with a natural phenomenon (see below). Thucydides notes that large armies were especially susceptible to panic at night and when in hostile territory or in proximity to the enemy. Aeneas Tacticus adds that panics could occur in a camp or in a city, after a defeat, by day, or especially by night. Fleets could also suffer panic, in Polybius' view. Panic, to be distinguished from fear in general, is a sudden and irrational terror, which could turn an organized army into a frenzied armed rabble, capable of killing its own members in its madness. Panic was recognized as a real problem, and the connection of sudden terror without actual cause made for the easy association with the κέβα of war, the manipulation of illusions.

The phenomenon of panic was by no means new in the fourth century B.C., nor was its association with a god. But πάνεια, παύκος, etc., attributing the phenomenon to Pan, constituted an innovation. In Homer the concept of panic is connected with Phobos (a real god,
not a personification), the son of Ares, who often contributes to the flight of a demoralized army. By the fifth century Dionysus could also cause panic, although neither Herodotus nor Thucydides attributes the phenomenon of panic to a god.\(^{56}\)

Toward the middle of the fourth century, if not earlier, Pan emerged as the chief divinity of the phenomenon that bears his name: Aeneas Tacticus notes that πάνεια was a Peloponnesian and especially an Arcadian word; Ephorus apparently spoke of πανικός θορυβός; and Epimenides' Cretica contained the word πανικόν.\(^{57}\) Pan, the god of herders and hunters, was thought responsible for the sudden, unexplained stampedes of domestic herds or of wild animals and the mysterious echoes of mountains, glens, and caverns—Pan's flute playing to the nymphs.\(^{58}\) An echo, like the κενόν of a false rumor, is unseen, and a state or an army could be viewed as a flock under the rule of its shepherd (cf. Xen. Cyr. 1.1.2). Furthermore, Pan was the son of Hermes, a god who could cause fright and surprise, and well known for his stealthy activity. Pan, however, differed sharply from Phobos, who participates in battle, causes flight, and symbolizes the combatant's fear. Pan acts from a distance and, like the rusé general, can achieve his goal of rendering the enemy hors de combat without fighting.\(^{59}\)

The militarization of Pan in the fifth century is seen in both artistic and literary sources. Vase paintings represent Pan as a warrior.\(^{60}\) He figures prominently in Herodotus' account of Marathon (6.105) and possibly also has a rôle at Salamis, although in both cases his alleged activity is most obscure, and his responsibility for Persian panic cannot be proved.\(^{61}\) With the possible exception of a passage from Rhesus

\(^{56}\) Eur. Bacch. 302–05 (military context); Hdt. 7.43.2; Thuc. 4.125.1, 7.80.3. On Phobos see Ernst Bernet, "Phobos (I)," RE 20 (1941) 309–17; Pritchett III, 45, 162f, cf. Epps (supra n.52) 1–29; H. Mitchell, Sparta (Cambridge 1952) 270–73.

\(^{57}\) Aen. Tact. 27.1; Ephorus FGrHist 70f208 (Diod. 14.32.3) with Jacoby's notes, and E. Schwartz, "Diodorus (38)," RE 5 (1903) 679; Epimenides FGrHist 457f18= b 24 D.-K.=Ps.-Eratos. Cat. 27. Harrison's attempt to derive πάνεια from πανός (fire signal, alarm) has been refuted: see J. E. Harrison, "Pan, Paneion, Panikon," CR 40 (1926) 68; Borgeaud 138 n.6. Greek expressions for panic are listed in Borgeaud 139 n.7.

\(^{58}\) Apollod. FGrHist 294ff135, 136a–b, cf. Σ ad Theoc. 5.16.1; K. Wernicke, "Pan," Roscher Lex. 3.1 (1901) 1388–90.

\(^{59}\) Borgeaud 142, 153, cf. Ammonius' distinction of φόβος from δέος: φόβος is immediate terror, but δέος is a long-term suspicion of evil: cited in Bernet (supra n.56) 309; on Hermes see N. O. Brown, Hermes the Thief (Madison 1947) 3–83.


\(^{61}\) Borgeaud 146f; Brommer (supra n.60) 969; Harrison (supra n.57) 6f correctly rejects finding a Pan/panic connection in Herodotus and Aeschylus. Borgeaud's attempt (146–49) to connect nearly all military panics in Greek sources down to Plutarch with a local sanctuary or cult of Pan at the scene of the panic is not convincing.
(34–37), attributed to Euripides but whose authenticity and date have long been debated, the association of Pan with the irrational fear of armies dates from the fourth century B.C.\textsuperscript{62}

The real origins of the Pan/panic connection lie in Arcadia, where Pan, widely thought of as Arcadian in origin, was zealously worshipped. Aeneas Tacticus implies (27.1) that πάνεια was an Arcadian word. It would thus seem that propagation of the association of Pan with military panic corresponds to the proliferation of Arcadian mercenaries in the fifth and fourth centuries.\textsuperscript{63} Perhaps Arcadian mercenaries were less sophisticated than their Athenian or Spartan counterparts and were more susceptible to panic.\textsuperscript{64}

The eventual significance of Pan’s military function appears in Polyaeus (1.2), who credits Pan with the invention of military deployment, the term phalanx, and the use of panic fear as a stratagem. The last is attributed to Pan as a general of Dionysus, presumably during his Indian campaign, when Dionysus’ army, camped in a hollow glen and facing superior hostile forces, was ordered to raise its war-cry by night, so that the echo would create the impression that the army was larger than in reality. The echo aroused the enemy’s fear and caused their flight.

Although some believe that Polyaeus derives this account of Pan from a source dating after Alexander the Great, possibly Megasthenes, it has long been recognized that Ephorus was Polyaeus’ main source for his first book,\textsuperscript{65} and some elements of Polyaeus’ anecdote appear in another fourth-century source. Epimenides, who transfers the seat of action to Crete, has Pan aid Zeus in his war against the Titans. Pan both armed Zeus’ forces and routed the Titans by the

\textsuperscript{62} Borgeaud 137. On Rhesus see W. Ritchie, The Authenticity of the Rhesus of Euripides (Cambridge 1964), who argues for authenticity and a date of composition 445–440 B.C. Pritchett III 45 cites Diod. 14.32.3 (panic of the besiegers of Phyle in 401) as proof for the Pan/panic connection in the fifth century, but Diodorus’ source is Ephorus (\textit{supra} n.57), and panic is not mentioned in parallel accounts: Xen. \textit{Hell.} 2.4.1–4, Nep. \textit{Thrasyb.} 2.1–5.

\textsuperscript{63} On the military influence of Arcadians in this period, see Wheeler (\textit{supra} n.54) 6–9.

\textsuperscript{64} It is easy to overestimate the degree of training and discipline in Greek armies of the fifth and fourth centuries, but as late as Chaeronea in 338, one tradition holds, the Athenian army was still untrained: Frontin. Str. 2.1.9; Polyaeus. 4.2.7, \textit{cf.} Ps.-Xen. \textit{Ath.Pol.} 2.1.

\textsuperscript{65} Borgeaud 154; J. Melber, \textit{Ueber die Quellen und den Wert der Strategemensamm­lung Polyäns} (\textit{NJbb} Suppl. 14 [1885]) 421–23; R. J. Phillips, \textit{The Sources and Methods of Polyaeus} (diss. Harvard 1970) 120–38. My sincere thanks to Dr Phillips for permitting me to see a chapter from her unpublished work.

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echo of a blast from his conch shell.66 Serious concern for panic as a military problem begins with Thucydides. His two brief asides, 4.125.1 and 7.80.3 (summarized at the beginning of this section), constitute the first theoretical observations on panic in Western military thought. In both cases the panics are nocturnal, and in 4.125.1 a false rumor occasions the panic. Thucydides does not connect these passages with the kevóv of war, although in his plan for the surprise attack on Cleon at Amphipolis, Brasidas hopes his attack will cause panic in the Athenians (5.9.7f).

Aeneas Tacticus, composing his Strategika between 360 and 346 B.C., knew Thucydides and apparently treated panic in some detail.67 In the surviving long fragment on defense of cities, Aeneas promises a discussion of panic in conjunction with guards, patrols, watchwords, and counter-watchwords in his book on encampments (21.2, cf. 25.1). He later devotes an entire chapter (27) to panic, the lengthiest extant discussion of the topic in ancient military theory. There is no need to paraphrase this chapter, but it is significant that Aeneas, like subsequent historians and military writers, is more concerned with stopping or preventing panic than with creating it in the enemy.68

Two of his exempla find echoes in the actions of other commanders of the fourth and third centuries B.C. Aeneas records that Euphrates, a Spartan harmost in Thrace (otherwise unknown), to stop frequent panics in his forces, ordered his men when one occurred to sit up in their beds with arms in hand, but anyone standing up would be regarded as an enemy. Similar instructions are attributed to Clearchus, the mercenary commander in Xenophon's Anabasis; to Dercylidas, the Spartan general in Asia Minor in the 390's; and to Theodorus of Rhodes, prominent in Antiochus I's victory over the Gauls ca 270


68 Preventing panic: Aen. Tact. 27.2–13; creating panic: 27.14, cf. Polyb. 3.93f, Liv. 22.16.4–18.4; and see Onasander 41.2.
Another means to stop panic involved having a herald command silence and promising a gift of silver to whoever would report the man responsible for turning his horse loose in the camp. In Xenophon these are the orders of Clearchus to stop a nocturnal panic after Cunaxa. A similar tale is told of Iphicrates, who trained his men in how to expect panics and how to manage them.

This discussion, though by no means exhaustive, will suffice to demonstrate that panic was a real problem to Greek armies of the fourth century, and that military thinkers and commanders sought means to prevent it. Panics would continue to be a problem in Hellenistic times, for the Romans, and for the Byzantines, as it does for modern armies. The complexity of the problem further emerges from analysis of the causes of panic in the examples cited here. Inexplicable or multiple causes characterize nine examples while false rumor or report appears only three times as an independent cause. Yet perhaps most interesting is that despite the close association of Pan and panic with echo, i.e., the aural sense, visual causes, the misperception of something seen, account for six cases.

If generals and military thinkers sought practical solutions to the problem of panic, the topic also aroused philosophical interest. Aristotle’s student Clearchus of Soli composed a _Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ_, of which only a fragment survives:

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69 Aen. Tact. 27.7–10; Clearchus: Polyaen. 2.2.10, cf. Exc. Polyaen. 27; Dercylidas: Jul. Afric. Cest. 7.1.11; Theodorus: see Wheeler (supra n.54) 15 n.77. Cf Aen. Tact. 27.2f, Polyaen. 4.3.26 (Alexander the Great).

70 Aen. Tact. 27.11; Xen. Anab. 2.2.21; Polyaen. 3.9.4, 10, 32. Cf. Tac. Ann. 1.66.3


72 Inexplicable/multiple causes: Thuc. 7.80.3; Xen. Anab. 2.2.19–21; Polyb. 5.96.3; Diod. 20.29f, 21.2.3; Onas. 41.2; Plut. Pomp. 68.3 and Caes. 43.6 (the same occurrence); Tac. Hist. 1.63.1; Paus. 10.23.7; false rumor: Thuc. 4.125.1; Polyb. 5.110, 20.6.12; visual: Diod. 14.32.3, 17.85.7–86.1; Curt. 7.11.25; Onasander 6.5; Joseph. BJ 5.91–93.

73 Ath. 9.389f = fr.36 Wehrli. Kroll, “Klearchos (11),” RE 11 (1921) 582, sees a possible occasion for the work in Antigonus Gonatas’ victory over the Gauls at Lysimacheia, but a panic in this battle cannot be proved: see supra n.71. If the work
This amusing passage on the libido of birds is not as irrelevant to military panic as it may initially appear (and its biological accuracy is not pertinent to my argument). It is unwise to draw from a single fragment conclusions about the tone and content of a work, especially when the excerptor is Athenaeus.

Besides various Platonic interests, unusual for a Peripatetic, Clearchus specialized in psychology. His Περὶ ὑπνοῦ in at least two books treated sleep as a Sonderexistenz associated with the soul’s immortality. His Erotica, perhaps influenced by Theophrastus’ Eroticùs, concerned the phenomenology of love, especially in its pathological forms in both men and animals (e.g. fr.27: a goose’s love for a boy), and the power of mirrors over quails is also alluded to in Clearchus’ commentary on Plato’s Republic, a work that cannot have been so silly as Ath. 389F might be taken to imply of the Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ.74

Clearchus fr.36 must be placed in its proper context of Aristotelian psychology. Clearchus states that during the mating season the male birds’ desire for copulation is so strong that both the sight and the call of females causes the emission of semen, and even the bird’s own reflection in a mirror can produce this result. In his theory of sensation in De anima (2.12 [424a 25–34]), Aristotle distinguishes between a sense organ and its capacity:

From this difference it is also clear why excess of objects perceived destroy the sense organs; for if the movement imparted to the sense

was occasioned by a battle, the more likely candidate is the defeat of the Gauls at Delphi in 279, although only Pausanias (10.23.1–8 and not in 1.4.3f) mentions a panic. Cf. Diod. 22.9; Just. 24.8. Timaeus, Hieronymus of Cardia, Menodotus of Perinthus, and Agatharchides of Cnidus have all been proposed as Pausanias’ source in 10.23, but Hieronymus at least can now be eliminated: J. G. Frazer, Pausanias’ Description of Greece V (London 1898) 341, cf. J. Hornblower, Hieronymus of Cardia (Oxford 1981) 73; C. Habicht, Untersuchungen zur politischen Geschichte Athens im 3. Jahrhundert v.Chr. (=Vestigia 30 [Munich 1979]) 87–94, esp. 89 nn.8f; Nachtergael (supra n.71) 15–99. Clearchus was probably born in the 340’s, and his authorship of a monograph on the Academic Arcesilaus attests a long life into the third century B.C.: Kroll 580f; Wehrli 45.

74 Clearchus frs.3f, 27; Wehrli 47, 54–56; Borgeaud 137 n.4.
organ is too strong, the form is destroyed; and this form is the sensation; just as the harmony and musical note is destroyed when the strings are struck hard.\footnote{W. S. Hett tr. (Loeb ed., London 1935) 137, cf. Wehrli 58.}

If the pupil followed the master’s teaching on this point, Clearchus’ argument can be reconstructed: during mating season the sight and sound of females so overloads the males’ sensory system that they “panic,” \textit{i.e.}, ejaculate prematurely. In all probability Clearchus draws upon this example from nature as an analogy to the panic of armies: at night or in enemy territory a strange noise or false rumor can produce such fear as to overload the rational faculties and produce panic. This view is paralleled somewhat in a modern theory of military incompetence, in which generalship is seen in terms of information theory and processing: ‘noise’ in the system and/or overloading the system’s capacity causes a breakdown and failure.\footnote{See N. Dixon, \textit{On the Psychology of Military Incompetence} (New York 1976) 27–35.} Another Aristotelian comment relevant to panic appears in the \textit{Parva naturalia}, where he states that the impulse of a thought cannot be deterred from its object, and that the impulse created by an outburst of fear will produce its own reactions against movements to stop it.\footnote{\textit{Par.Nat.} 453a23–26=\textit{Mem.} 2. Cf. Clausewitz 117: “In short, most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies. As a rule most men would rather believe bad news than good, and rather tend to exaggerate the bad news. The dangers that are reported may soon like waves subside; but like waves they keep recurring, without apparent reason.”}

Hence a psychological explanation why panics were so difficult to stop—they resisted reason.

Wehrli (58) sees the Πεζ τοῦ πανικοῦ as an anecdotal-educational work with emphasis on panic as a reaction to the stimuli of the senses and with reference to animal psychology, as in the \textit{Erotica}. This view is safely conservative, given the content of the single extant fragment, although probably overemphasizing a supposed similarity between the \textit{Erotica} and the Πεζ τοῦ πανικοῦ. The use of one example drawn from nature need not indicate that the work contained many such examples, especially since the fragment derives from Athenaeus, who was prone to excerpt sensational and exotic anecdotes. Wehrli ignores panic as a contemporary practical problem of Greek armies, and use of πάνεια, πανικός, \textit{etc.}, in extant sources of the fourth century occurs only in military contexts. The apparent natural phenomena, to which by analogy military panic was compared, are echo and the unexplained sudden stampedes of animal herds, neither of which has the least to do with the sexual behavior of birds. The extension of the term ‘panic’ to describe such fowl conduct may result from Aristotle's
research in natural science or may be Clearchus' own contribution. However this may be, an interpretation different from Wehrli's can be offered.

Aelianus Tacticus in his list of military writers notes a Clearchus who authored a Tactica, and Arrian adds that this is not the Clearchus of Xenophon's Anabasis. Since Aelian and Arrian give these writers in chronological order (so far as it can be determined), Clearchus tacticus must be the contemporary of Pyrrhus of Epirus and his son Alexander in the first half of the third century B.C. Köchly and Rüstaw, followed by Jahns, identified this Clearchus with the Peripatetic from Soli, and nothing contradicts that a Peripatetic for whom the titles of fifteen works are known, of which one treats military panic (as I argue), could have written a Tactica. Peripatetics were interested in military affairs: Aristotle devoted sections of the Politics and the Rhetoric to this topic; Demetrius of Phalerum wrote a Strategika; and Phormio, who attempted to instruct Hannibal on the art of generalship at the court of Antiochus III, was a Peripatetic. Some philosophers considered tactics a branch of mathematics, and Clearchus' commentary on Plato's Republic was a Περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Πλάτωνος πολιτείας μαθηματικῶς εἰρημένων. Since neither Aelian nor Arrian added a city of origin to the name of his Clearchus, doubt can always intervene, but compelling evidence supports the probability of Köchly's and Rüstaw's identification. The burden of the argument really lies with denial of the attribution, essentially based on a modern prejudice that ancient philosophers were too concerned with lofty esoteric matters to consider the practical problems of war in their society.

Clearchus' authorship of a Tactica adds further strength to the probable military nature of the Περὶ τῶν πανικῶν, but nothing suggests

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78 Ael. Tact. 1.2; Arr. Tact. 1.1; H. Köchly and W. Rüstaw, Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller II.1 (Leipzig 1889) 29f; M. Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften I (Munich 1889) 47. Köchly and Rüstaw also considered the possibility of Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea in Pontus and a student of Plato and Isocrates, but he is not known to have written anything, nor does he fit chronologically; see Lenschau, "Klearchos (4)," RE 11 (1921) 577-79. Wehrli rejects the identification without citing Köchly and Rüstaw or Jähns and in his fr.113 gives only Arrian's text, thereby ignoring Aelian. Unaware of the chronological order of Aelian's and Arrian's lists, he considers Arrian's reference too vague for a famous figure like Clearchus of Soli. Kroll (supra n.73) 583 denies the identification without argument.

79 Arist. Pol. 1.8.12; 2.9.7f; 3.4.14f; 7.3f; 4.3.1-3; 13.7-11; 6.7.1-3, 8.14f; 7.2.9-17, 5.3-6.8, 8.7, 9.4-6, 14.13, 19-22; Rh. 1.3f; Demetrius: Diog. Laert. 5.80; Phormio: Cic. De Or. 2.75f.

that the two works are identical: Arrian in particular would not have been so lax about a title. Köchly and Rüstow also believe that Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ belongs to the genre of Homeric tactica, which saw Homer as the father of military science and used excerpts from the Iliad and Odyssey to instruct in the military art. Conceivably panic was a frequent theme of such works. If this view is correct, Clearchus’ treatise would conform to a Peripatetic interest in Homeric commentary. Aristotle wrote a Homeric Problems, and Demetrius of Phalerum wrote commentaries on both the Iliad and the Odyssey, curiously listed in Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue immediately after his Strategika. More significantly, however, some fragments of Aristotle’s Homeric work treat military affairs, and one (fr.159 Rose) explicitly refers to the problem of nocturnal fears in armies.

Clearchus’ Περὶ τοῦ πανικοῦ thus appears a thoroughly Peripatetic work, drawing on Aristotelian psychology and analogy from natural science, concerned with exegesis of Homer, and bringing this knowledge to bear on a contemporary practical problem, the panic of armies. But what has all this to do with the history of the proverb πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου? It is now possible to suggest (although not conclusively prove) that Clearchus is the source of the proverb as found in the collection attributed to Diogenianus.

Certainly the phenomenon of panic fascinated Clearchus, and his interest has deep Aristotelian roots. The connection of the proverb with panic, as already noted, begins with Aristotle, although he does not explicitly call the phrase a proverb. Aristotle, however, founded the genre of the collection of proverbs, which he considered a form of pre-literary philosophy, and with which he embellished his later writing on politics and rhetoric. His Paroimiai in one book prompted Theophrastus to compose a collection in one book, but Clearchus excelled his predecessors with a collection in two books.
If, as argued above, Aristotle borrowed the phrase κενόν τοῦ πολέμου from Thucydides and changed it to the plural, it is unlikely that Aristotle designated the phrase a proverb, and the first evidence for its proverbial use is Polyb. 29.16.3. Since the phrase in its proverbial form postdates Eth.Nic. 3.8.6, and so appears in Diogenian. 7.80, Aristotle and Polybius offer respective termini post quem and ante quem for when the phrase became a proverb. Both Clearchus and Theophrastus fit these termini, but no connection of Theophrastus with panic can be established, and too little is known of Theophrastus' proverbs to consider his candidacy seriously. Conceivably either Theophrastus or Clearchus as the third generation to use the phrase κενόν/κενά τοῦ πολέμου could have recognized it as a proverb.

But apart from the common interests of Clearchus and Aristotle in panic and proverbs, the new element of the proverb as found in Diogenianus, the 'Spartan explanation' connecting the proverb with panic, can also point to Clearchus, whose work Bioi (lifestyles, not biographies) included Spartans and stressed a preference for a moral life over luxuriousness. In fact two proverbs of Clearchus deal with Spartans: both appear in Diogenianus, but one only in a variant version. In all, six of Clearchus’ twenty-one extant proverbs are found in Diogenianus either wholly or in variants, and Diogenianus’ seventh book contains two variants of Clearchus’ proverbs (7.13, 23) besides the κενά τοῦ πολέμου (7.80). The case for Clearchus as the Urquelle of Diogenianus is not unquestionable, but the arguments of Quellenforschung rarely are. Nevertheless, all things considered, Clearchus remains a most likely candidate—perhaps the only one for whom a case can be made at all.

V

As a final note on πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, its repeated use in Diodorus permits a suggestion about his source. The proverb occurs

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84 Clearchus frr.37–62 Wehrli, esp. fr.39; Kroll (supra n.73) 581. The Spartan element permits elimination of the Atthisgrapher Demon (fl. ca 300 B.C.), whose collection of proverbs contained forty books. No references to Sparta or Spartans appear in Demon’s extant fragments, and none of his proverbs is found in Diogenianus. It is also unlikely that Demon was a Peripatetic: see Felix Jacoby, Athis (Oxford 1949) 78, and ad FGrHist 327 (pp.201f); Schwartz, “Demon (6),” RE 5 (1903) 142f.

here four times, more than in any other author, though it hardly qualifies as a standard motif given the vast extent of Diodorus’ extant work. Three of the four occurrences concern events during Agathocles’ tyranny, and one is associated with Alexander’s stratagem to capture Aornus.86 This distribution suggests a source who treated both Alexander and Agathocles. Duris of Samos has long been recognized as either the Haupt- or Nebenquelle of Diodorus for Agathocles, and Duris also devoted three books of his Macedonica to Alexander.87 A plausible case for Duris as Diodorus’ source for the proverb can be constructed.

First, Duris was a Peripatetic: he studied with Theophrastus in Athens ca 304 B.C. and wrote a Homeric Problems besides his various histories and other works.88 Like Clearchus of Soli, with his tale of a goose and a youth, Duris could tell a love story about a dolphin and a boy, and his work was moralizing, preaching rejection of luxury. Indeed Kebric has catalogued so many parallels between the fragments of Duris and Clearchus that a direct relationship seems most probable.89 Furthermore, Duris liked proverbs, of which many survive in Zenobius but none in Diogenianus.90

Second, the proverb πολλά κενα του πολεμου in Diodorus suggests a criterion for determining his source. Meister for other reasons assigns Diodorus 20.60–67 (the proverb in 20.67.4) to Duris, but 20.29f (the proverb in 20.30.1) to Timaeus, and he denies a discernible source to 21.2 (the proverb in 21.2.3).91 Since Aristotle, however, all occurrences of the proverb are associated with panic, and this holds true for Diodorus, although only in 20.67.4 is the proverb associated with the word πανικός. Other instances of panic in Diodorus explicitly indicated by πανικός derive from Ephorus and Timaeus, but knowledge of the proverb cannot be demonstrated for either of these authors.92 Timaeus certainly did not treat Alexander. It is not in dispute that Duris was a source for Diodorus’ account of Agathocles. His Peripa-
tetic background, his apparent relationship to the scholar of panic Clearchus of Soli, and occurrence of three of Diodorus’ four instances of the proverb in the account of Agathocles all speak for Duris as Diodorus’ source.

If this argument is correct, then Duris must also be the source of the proverb in Diod. 17.86.1. Duris treated Alexander in Books 6-9 of his Macedonica. Recent views on the problem prefer Cleitarchus as Diodorus’ source, but Cleitarchus was also a source for Duris and both reflected an anti-Macedonian attitude. Use of Duris at Diod. 17.86.1 need not indicate that Diodorus used Cleitarchus exclusively through Duris. In fact Diodorus’ account differs slightly from both that of Arrian and that of Curtius, with whom Diodorus is alleged always to agree. If Cleitarchus is the sole source of Diod. 17.86.1, then the proverb should also appear in Curt. 8.11.19–24. But it is lacking. Perhaps Duris deserves better treatment by students of Alexander.

Furthermore, Duris with some probability can also be posited as Cicero’s source for the proverb. Cicero had read Duris and considered him homo in historia diligens (Att. 6.1.18). When Cicero set out to assume his Cilician command, he tried to compensate for his lack of military experience by studying Pyrrhus’ Tactica and Cineas’ epitome of Aeneas Tacticus. Perhaps Cicero chose Duris as his vade mecum for Alexander’s campaigns. Cicero’s use of the proverb (Att. 5.20.3) occurs just after he reports his activity while camped at Issus—an account embellished with a reference to Alexander’s battle there with Darius. Indeed Cicero’s praise of Duris in Att. 6.1.18 (20 Feb. 50) comes only two months after his use of the proverb in 5.20.3 (19 Dec. 51). Cicero’s citation of a proverb prominent in Duris and used in the latter’s account of Alexander, when juxtaposed with Att. 6.1.18, suggests more than a passing familiarity with the historian on Cicero’s part during his governorship in Cilicia.

Originally a Thucydidean abstraction for a universal truism of war, the phrase πολλά κενά τοῦ πολέμου thus became a Peripatetic proverb


94 See supra n.44. Duris could also be responsible for the proverb in Curt. 7.11.25 and its possible occurrence in 4.13.5. Atkinson (supra n.93) rejects use of Duris in Curtius Books 3 and 4.

95 See Wheeler (supra n.30) 13f.
through its association with panic, and passed to the Romans in both its Thucydidean (Cato) and its Aristotelian forms (Cicero, Curtius). Few Greek proverbs have such a traceable history.96

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