The Ancient Tradition on the Identity of Antiphon

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Among many Antiphons known from antiquity, two fifth-century figures are sometimes thought to be the same person: Antiphon of Rhamnus, an orator and a leader of the oligarchic coup in 411, and ‘Antiphon the Sophist’, one of Socrates’ interlocutors in Xenophon (Mem. 1.6) to whom are often attributed the works On Truth, On Concord, and Politicus.¹ The separatist case has usually been based on the papyrus fragments of On Truth, but the most recent separatist argument, by Gerard Pendrick,² deals almost entirely with the ancient tradition. He concedes that “the majority of ancient opinion is unitarian” (59), but he accords this fact little weight and presents instead a selective discussion of ancient authors who, in his view, support a separatist position.

The purpose of this paper is to offer a more comprehensive assessment of the ancient tradition and to show that ancient opinion was more strongly unitarian than Pendrick implies.³ As far as we can tell, the only separatist views expressed in antiquity were based on stylistic criteria alone, the inadequacy of which is evident, and a unitarian position is taken for granted.

¹ The partial listing in RE 1 (1894) 2526–30 (cf. Suppl. 1 [1903] 93f on the orator and Suppl. 4 [1924] 33–43 on the papyrus fragments from On Truth) gives 18 Antiphons, some of whom may be the same person. The orator is no. 14, the sophist no. 15. The name is best known at Athens (33 at PA 87–90 with four more in the Addenda), but was also common in other cities: cf. P. M. Fraser and E. Matthews, A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names I (Oxford 1987) 48.


³ This survey was made possible by the CD ROM #C produced by the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. I am particularly grateful to Ted Brunner, who made an additional search of all the authors available at Irvine in September 1989. I have also searched the Latin authors on the Packard Humanities Institute’s Demonstration CD ROM #1, but they provide no useful information.
by those ancient scholars who were among the best informed about their past. Some of the evidence has been treated by others, but in addition to refuting Pendrick's claims I hope by this comprehensive survey to reveal the weight of the whole tradition, which has not been fully appreciated.

The ancient evidence for Antiphon of Rhamnus begins with two contemporary witnesses, Aristophanes and Thucydides. In *Wasps* 1301f (422 B.C.) Antiphon (without demotic or patronymic) is mentioned with Lycon, Lysistratus, and others as one of "those around Phrynichus." If, as generally supposed, this is a reference to the orator, it indicates that Antiphon was at this time associated with a group of socially prominent men. The political tendencies of these men were mixed: Phrynichus and Antiphon were leaders of the oligarchic coup in 411 and Lysistratus was apparently involved in the mutilation of the Herms in 415 (Andoc. 1.52f, 67f), but Lycon, a prosecutor of Socrates, must have been a good democrat and Phrynichus apparently held office under the democratic régime at an earlier period. The composition of this group should caution against classifying Antiphon rigidly as a conservative oligarch despite his later activity. As a logographer he associated with political figures without being directly involved in government. His tendency to remain in the background may explain why his name occurs

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6 Cf. *Wasps* 1270, where Amynias is said to be "hungry like Antiphon."

7 The Antiphon in a list of those accused of revealing the mysteries in 415 (Andoc. 1.15) is probably a different person: see D. M. MacDowell, ed., *Andocides, On the Mysteries* (Oxford 1962) ad loc.

so seldom in the remains of Old Comedy, though this may be partly the result of chance.9

A decade later Antiphon rose to prominence as a leader of the short-lived revolution in 411. Thucydides gives him an unusually long and favorable notice (8.68): “Of all the Athenians of his day Antiphon was second to none in arete and had the greatest power both to think and to express his thoughts (κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθηναι γενόμενος καὶ ἀ γνώτῃ εἰπεῖν). He did not come forward in public or willingly enter any dispute, being regarded with the multitude because of his reputation for cleverness (διὰ δόξαιν δεινότητος). Nevertheless, for those involved in a dispute, whether legal or political, he alone was most able to help whoever consulted him for advice.” After the fall of the 400 Antiphon was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death, but (Thucydides continues) “of all the men up to my time who were accused on this charge of subversion he seems to me to have made the best defense in a capital case.” Thucydides here presents Antiphon not so much as a politician but as a leading intellectual of his day, whose special talent was advising and writing speeches for others and who had a reputation for δεινότης, a word suggesting cleverness and technical skill.10 Indeed, δεινός λέγειν was one of the key expressions designating a sophist at this time,11 and Thucydides’ description of Antiphon’s ability and the popular suspicion he aroused could apply to a number of contemporary sophists.

Fourth-century sources for Antiphon are Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon. In Menexenus (236A) Socrates praises Aspasia as a teacher of rhetoric (she can make one δεινός λέγειν) and adds that one would not do badly being taught rhetoric by Antiphon of Rhamnus. Despite his ironic tone, Plato’s choice of Antiphon rather than, say, Gorgias as an exemplary teacher of

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9 Philostratus (VS 499) says that “comedy attacks Antiphon for being clever (δεινός) in forensic cases and for selling for a high price speeches that run counter to justice, especially to those who are in the greatest danger of conviction,” and Plato Comicus is said to have satirized Antiphon’s φιλαργυρία in his Pisander of 421 (Plut. Mor. 833c). Edmonds’ restoration (fr.141) of the name Antiphon in P.Flor. 112 is rejected by Austin (fr.63.44).

10 Cf. Antiphon as δεινός in Philostratus (supra n.9).

11 See e.g. Pl. Prt. 312D–E. I would not go so far as H. Gomperz (Sophistik und Rhetorik [Leipzig 1912]) or Ostwald (supra n.8: 242–45), who see rhetoric as the single most essential characteristic of the sophists.
rhetoric surely implies that Antiphon was considered a teacher by many.

The question of teaching looms large in Pendrick’s discussion of Xenophon, who in *Mem.* 1.6 records three conversations between Socrates and “Antiphon the sophist,” the only character in this work to receive this epithet. Xenophon’s Antiphon argues (1) that Socrates’ poverty makes him a bad model for his students to imitate; (2) that his teaching must be worthless because he charges no fee; and (3) that he should not teach about political life without engaging in it himself. Pendrick maintains (49–52) that the discussions recorded (almost certainly invented) by Xenophon are not appropriate to the Rhamnusian, since Xenophon’s Antiphon is a rival teacher to Socrates whose purpose is to attract Socrates’ pupils to his own school, but “there is no reliable evidence that the Rhamnusian taught” (49). Moreover, we cannot infer from the subjects discussed that Xenophon’s Antiphon either loved money (as the orator is said to have done: Pl. Com. [*supra* n.9]) or “practiced politics” (as the orator certainly did). Pendrick concludes that *ο σοφιστής* must have been used here in order to avoid confusing two men, a sophist and an orator.

These arguments are unconvincing. Pendrick uses broad, flexible terms as if they were precisely definable. For instance, he not only dismisses unfairly the evidence for Antiphon’s being a teacher, he fails to consider what it might mean to be a ‘teacher’ in fifth-century Athens. The sophists who gave lessons for money were certainly considered teachers, but so was Socrates, who apparently had no formal relationship with his pupils. Anyone with the intellectual interests and wide influence of the Rhamnusian could surely be considered a teacher in some sense. And the ancient evidence that the orator was in fact a teacher, if not conclusive, is substantial. Similarly, al-

12 Pendrick slides with no justification from “there is no reliable evidence” (49) to “there is no evidence” that the orator was a teacher (51), and implies that therefore he did not teach.

13 *Menex.* 236A cannot be easily dismissed: see *supra.* Pendrick (49 n.11) rejects as unreliable the later tradition that Thucydides was a pupil of Antiphon, but Hermogenes’ statement (see *infra*) that many have given him this information carries more weight than Pendrick allows. Pendrick also dismisses the *Tetralogies* as “positive proof” (though he accepts them as Antiphon’s), since they “need not have been written for the use of students.” But surely one
though Pendrick may be right that Xenophon does not necessarily imply that Antiphon is money-loving, or a practicing politician, he pushes these points too far in denying any similarity between Xenophon’s Antiphon and the orator. Both were intellectuals in Athens, who were interested in many of the significant issues of the second half of the fifth century. Xenophon’s portrait provides no clear means for distinguishing his Antiphon from the orator.

The crucial question, however, concerns the term σοφιστής. Why, if this is the orator, does Xenophon call him “the sophist” and not “Antiphon of Rhamnus?” On the other hand, if this is not the orator, why is he identified as “the sophist” rather than by his demotic, patronymic, or ethnic? Plato was apparently the first to restrict the word σοφιστής to its pejorative sense and to apply it narrowly to the group of itinerant fifth-century teachers he so vigorously contrasts with Socrates.14 One characteristic of these sophists is an interest in rhetoric.15 But others in the fourth century apply the term more widely to Socrates (Aeschin. 1.173), to Lysias (Dem. 59.21), and to other intellectual figures of the time, though the sense remains primarily pejorative. In Xenophon the only individual besides Antiphon who is called a sophist is Antisthenes (Symp. 4.4), whose intellectual concerns included rhetoric as well as more philosophical matters.16

In the fourth century, then, one could certainly apply the term σοφιστής to an intellectual logographer known for δεινότης, and someone hearing the name “Antiphon the sophist” would surely think it at least possible that this was the famous orator. Thus the epithet could not serve to differentiate another Antiphon from the orator unless this other Antiphon

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14 See G. B. Kerferd, “The First Greek Sophists,” CR 64 (1950) 8ff for a full picture of the diversity of men to whom the term σοφιστής applied.
15 See supra n.11. Whether a rhetorician like Gorgias could legitimately be called a sophist has been disputed, but it seems clear that he sometimes was; see E. L. Harrison, “Was Gorgias a Sophist?” Phoenix 18 (1964) 183–92.
was already distinct from the orator and well known as “the sophist.” Not only is this unlikely in itself (since a second figure would probably be distinguished by a more normal and precise label), but since the next reference to “Antiphon the sophist” occurs some ten centuries later (in Simplicius: see infra), it seems very unlikely that an “Antiphon the sophist” was well known in the fourth century. If Xenophon wished to distinguish a different Antiphon from the orator, we would expect him to mention his city of origin, if he were not an Athenian, and an Athenian would be known by demotic or patronymic or both.

Pendrick and others seem to assume that a label designating an activity can replace an ethnic, demotic, or patronymic; but an activity cannot be a mark of identification unless the person is well known for that activity and it is clearly distinguishable from the activities of other persons of the same name. Thus Aristophanes ὁ κωμικός can be distinguished from ὁ γραμματικός because the epithets are sufficiently specific and clearly differentiated from each other. But σοφιστής and ἰτωρ (which in any case is not a common epithet of the Rhamnusian) are scarcely distinct. If another intellectual named Antiphon made a name for himself in Athens during the period when the logographer and intellectual of the same name was well known, he would surely have been distinguished by one of the usual means.

Thus the expression “Antiphon the sophist” is much more likely to designate the well-known orator than anyone else, even if he were not the author of the sophistic works attributed to him. The reason that Xenophon calls him “the sophist” and not “Antiphon of Rhamnus” or simply “Antiphon” may be that he uses the simple name elsewhere (Hell. 2.3.40) of a trierarch

17 Cf. “Gorgias of Leontini” (Anab. 2.6.17), “Hippias of Elis” (Mem. 4.4.5, Symp. 4.62), etc. E. R. Dodds’ arguments that Xenophon’s text implies that his Antiphon (“the sophist”) is not an Athenian (CR N.S. 4 [1954] 94f) are answered by J. S. Morrison (CR N.S. 5 [1955] 8-12). Their arguments seem to me inconclusive. Neither scholar asks why Xenophon does not use an ethnic or demotic. Pendrick (59 n.55) argues that the absence of an ethnic is evidence that Xenophon’s Antiphon is an Athenian, but he is apparently untroubled by the absence of a demotic or patronymic.

18 Contrast the use of ὁ ποιητής by Aristotle and others for the tragic poet (see infra). Later references to Antiphoon as ὁ ἀνεμοκρίτης, etc., seem to be used faute de mieux when no other means of identification is available.
who was killed by the Thirty in an incident Xenophon sees as a
turning point in the popular image of the Thirty, on whose side
he counts himself. Xenophon, who may have known this
trierarch personally, may have sought to distinguish the earlier
revolutionary from this later figure by a term that added a
pejorative touch to the identification of the orator rather than
the more common demotic. 19

Aristotle refers to the orator three times (Ath.Pol. 32.2; Eth.
Eud. 1232b6; fr.624 Rose) always as simply “Antiphon.” He also
reports in the Physics that “Antiphon” attempted to square the
circle (185a17; cf Soph.El. 172a7) and argued that if you bury a
bedstead and it puts out a shoot, the shoot will be wood not
bedstead (193a12). This Antiphon is usually taken to be the
sophist, but the lack of explicit designation is not easily
explained if he is not also the well-known orator. Elsewhere
Aristotle twice refers to “Antiphon the poet,”20 even though
the context in both cases makes it clear that this is not the ora­
tor. These passages suggest that Aristotle has just two Anti­
phons in mind, the famous orator and intellectual whom he
designates “Antiphon,” and a lesser-known poet who is clearly
identified as such. For Plato and Aristotle, then, “Antiphon” is
the orator and intellectual, whereas for Xenophon “Antiphon”
is the trierarch whose death was an important event in his early
political career, whereas the intellectual Antiphon needs further
specification.

After the fourth century there is a gap in the tradition. Several
Alexandrian scholars studied the orators,21 but no texts referring
to Antiphon survive until Dionysius of Halicarnassus22 and
Philodemus in the first century B.C. A fragment of Philodemus
implies a unitarian view by mentioning “Antiphon, whether he
wished to be [called] orator or philosopher.”23 More significant

19 Cf. Mem. 2.1.2, where Prodicus is called ὁσοφός.
20 Mech. 847a20, Rh. 1385a10; cf. Eth.Eud. 1239a38; Rh. 1379b15, 1399b26,
where specific plays of Antiphon are mentioned and there is no need to
specify further that their author is the poet. The poet Antiphon lived at the
court of Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse ca 400–367.
22 Dionysius refers to the orator eleven times, twice labeling him “the
Rhamnusian”: Isaeus 20, Comp. 10.17.
23 On Poetry 187.3 (=D.-K. fr.93); see Th. Gomperz, SBWien 123.6 (1891)
49f n.3; cf. On Rhetoric 1.187; 2.111, 201 Sudhaus.
than these are two other first-century authors whose work is known only from others, Caecilius of Caleacte and Didymus.

Caecilius' work on Antiphon was used by authors of two later Lives, in [Plutarch] and Photius (Bibl. 485b9–486b2). [Plutarch] cites Caecilius for the information that Antiphon was Thucydides' pupil, and also mentions that 60 works of Antiphon are extant, 25 of which Caecilius declared spurious. And he quotes from Caecilius the entire text of the decree providing for the trial of Antiphon and the appendix noting his conviction. Photius' Life begins with a discussion of Antiphon's style, most of which is explicitly taken from Caecilius (485b14–40). Photius also cites Caecilius for Antiphon's relation to Thucydides and the number of his speeches but omits the text of the decree. Both Lives also include information about the poet and the trierarch together with a statement that Antiphon argued with Socrates in the Memorabilia, but neither indicates whether this information is also derived from Caecilius, who evidently studied the works of Antiphon with care. There is no indication that he distinguished between rhetorical and sophistic works or that the latter were among the 25 he branded as spurious. Indeed, if Harpocration reflects Caecilius' judgment on authenticity, then Caecilius must have thought the orator was the author of the sophistic works, since the only two works Harpocration questions are rhetorical (frr.48, 65 Th.)

Didymus' work on Antiphon is known only from a passage in the second-century treatise of Hermogenes, Peri ideon (399f Rabe=D.-K. 87A2), which is sometimes the starting point for discussion of Antiphon's identity. Hermogenes prefaces his study of Antiphon's style by considering whether one author wrote all his works:

24 The Lives of Ten Orators attributed to Plutarch (Mor. 832b–34 b) is clearly a later compilation; see M. Cuvigny, ed., Plutarque, Œuvres morales XII.1 (Paris 1981) 25–34.

25 See A. E. Douglas, Mnemosyne ser. 4 9 (1956) 30–40, suggesting that Caecilius' work on Antiphon was a separate treatise.

26 Harpocration cites Caecilius by name once (s.v. ἐξούλης) but not in connection with a question of authenticity.

27 περὶ δὲ Ἀντιφώντως λέγοντας ἀνάγκη προειπεῖν, ὅτι, καθάπερ ἄλλοι τε φασίν ὧν άλλοι καὶ Διδύμος ὁ γραμματικός, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἱστορίας φαίνεται, πλείους μὲν γεγόνασιν Ἀντιφώντες, δύο δὲ οἱ σοφιστεύοντες, ὃν καὶ λόγον ἀνάγκη ποιήσασθαι. ὃν εἰς μὲν ἔστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ, οὕτε ὁ φονικὸ
Discussion of Antiphon must be prefaced by the reminder that, as Didymus the grammarian and several others have remarked, and as inquiry has revealed, there lived a number of Antiphons and two professional teachers\(^{28}\) whom we must consider. One of these two is the rhetorician to whom are attributed the homicide\(^{29}\) speeches and public addresses and others of this type. The other is the so-called diviner and interpreter of dreams to whom are said to belong the books *On the Truth* and the book *On Concord* and the *Politikos*. I myself am in two minds. The difference of genre among these works convinces me that there were two Antiphons. For really there is a great discrepancy between the books of the *Truth* and the others, but the remarks of Plato\(^{30}\) and other authors remove this conviction. For I am told by many that Thucydides was the pupil of Antiphon of Rhamnus; and while I know that it is to the Rhamnusian that the homicide speeches belong, I am also aware that Thucydides is very different from him and does employ a kind of literary composition which is common to the books of the *Truth*. And so I am not convinced. At the same time, whether there was one Antiphon employing two such different styles or two in fact, each

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\(^{28}\) Precisely what Hermogenes understood by *σοφιστεύσαντες* is not clear (*cf.* Pendrick 55 n.39). Elsewhere he uses "sophist" and "sophistic" in a broad sense to include the usual sophists but also others (*e.g.* *Peri ideon* 377 Rabe, where "sophists" includes Polus, Gorgias, Meno, and "several in our own day"). For use of the terms 'sophist' and 'philosopher' at this time see G. R. Stanton, "Sophists and Philosophers: Problems of Classification," *AJP* 94 (1973) 350-64; *cf.* G. W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1969) 10-15.

\(^{29}\) Not "forensic" as Morrison translates.

\(^{30}\) Hermogenes must be thinking of *Menex*. 236\(a\) (*see supra*), with its implication that Antiphon was a teacher.
practicing a different style, we must consider each separately. For there is, as I have said, a great gap separating them.\footnote{Tr. Morrison \textit{(supra} n.4) 114f. The more recent translation of Cecil Wooten \textit{(Hermogenes’ On Types of Style} [Chapel Hill 1987]) is wrong at several points (such as translating \textit{ιστορία} as “history”) and is especially misleading in implying that Hermogenes totally rejects the unitarian position. Morrison correctly conveys Hermogenes’ uncertainty.}

Clearly Hermogenes had read a good many works of Antiphon including speeches and sophistic treatises. In his own investigation \textit{(ἀπὸ ἱστορίας)} and in Didymus and others\footnote{Pendrick (56 and n.41) argues that everything that precedes \textit{ἐγὼ δὲ ἐνεκέα} is “the opinion of Didymus (and others),” but he overlooks the element of \textit{ἵστορία}. Hermogenes’ wording \textit{(πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἱστορίας)} implies that his own investigation was independent of the work of Didymus and others.} he found mention of many Antiphons, two of whom, the orator and a diviner/dream-interpreter, were “intellectuals” \textit{(σοφιστεύ- σαντες)}. He is inclined to assign the sophistic works to the latter because, he reasons, their style is so different that the same man cannot have written them. Hermogenes’ primary concern is style, but he has evidently investigated carefully the matter of identity. He cites the evidence of Plato and others favoring the unitarian position. Surely he would mention any specific evidence to the contrary in Didymus or others. In the discussion of styles that follows he gives biographical details about the orator but confines his remarks on the sophistic works to stylistic analysis. Evidently he has no information about the life of a fifth-century “sophist,” and he apparently has found no good evidence other than stylistic for the separatist position.\footnote{Pendrick (56ff) argues that since we do not know Didymus’ reasons for his view, we cannot dismiss their importance. Had these reasons provided significant evidence for the life of a sophist, however, Hermogenes would surely have cited it.} There is thus no reason to suppose that Didymus and others did anything more than produce evidence for the existence of many other Antiphons, one of whom was a diviner and dream-interpreter.

Hermogenes thus had no biographical information about the author of \textit{On Truth}, \textit{On Concord}, and \textit{Politicus}. Didymus cannot have specified their author by an ethnic, demotic, patronymic, or profession \textit{(e.g. σοφιστής)}, for Hermogenes would surely have recorded this, and if Didymus had called the author
of these works ὁ σοφιστὴς, whatever sense the term might have, Hermogenes would certainly not have used σοφιστεύσιντς of both figures. The sophistic works were included among Antiphon's works probably as early as Callimachus,34 whose work must have been well known to Didymus,35 but this tradition contained no biographical information about a “sophist” per se.

In the later tradition the vast majority of references to Antiphon give no further specification, and modern scholars assign fragments variously to the orator or the sophist on the basis of content.36 Sometimes a specific work is cited and occasionally, especially in a historical context, Antiphon is identified by his demotic. Very rarely he is called ὁ ἡττωρ.37

Similarly, in the philosophical tradition after Aristotle Antiphon is almost always identified by his name alone,38 presumably because Aristotle, as we have seen, refers simply to “Antiphon” when discussing his philosophical views. The one exception is Simplicius: of the nine times he names Antiphon in his commentary on the Physics, he once (9.273.36) calls him “Antiphon the sophist,” otherwise simply “Antiphon.”39 For Pendrick (58) the epithet is evidence for the separatist position; he does not ask what it means or why it is used only once. But comparison with Simplicius’ citations of Protagoras is illuminating: he refers to Protagoras in four places; in three he is simply “Protagoras” (in Cael. 7.293.2; in Phys. 10.1098.11; in

34 One of the known subdivisions of the Pinakes was ὁ ἡττωρικά (fr.430ff); see Pfeiffer (supra n.21) 128. Callimachus' ascriptions of speeches were not especially reliable: see K. J. Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiakum (Berkeley 1968) 260, 23-27.
35 Didymus probably did most of his work in Alexandria: Pfeiffer (supra n.21) 274.
36 Diels-Kranz list 37 fragments (82–118) as “zwischen dem Redner und dem Sophisten strittige,” and several others (e.g. 60ff) would not be out of place in certain rhetorical contexts.
37 Clem. Al. Strom. 6.19; Eust. Il. 1.542.
38 This holds even where others are specifically identified: for example, both Eudemus (fr.139 Wehrli) and Themistius (In Ph. I. 3.33) give as examples of those who have tried to square the circle “Hippocrates the Chian and Antiphon.”
39 Simplicius’ first five references to Antiphon (in Phys. 9.54f) concern the squaring of the circle; the last four (9.273–84), beginning with the one I cite, concern the essential nature of a thing.
Epict. 131.14); once he is “Protagoras the sophist” (in Phys. 10.1108.19). It is not clear why Simplicius uses the epithet only once, but since he cannot be distinguishing this Protagoras from another of the same name, we may perhaps doubt that he is using the epithet σοφιστής to distinguish one Antiphon from another.

Also illuminating is comparison with references in Simplicius and others to Critias, who like Antiphon was an intellectual with a political career. Aristotle (De An. 405b) had attributed to Critias the theory that the psyche is blood. In commenting on the passage (in De An. 11.32.22f) Simplicius says it does not matter whether this Critias is “the one who was a member of the Thirty or some sophist.” Philoponus (in De An. 89.8–12 = D.-K. 88A22) also questions whether the politician and the intellectual were the same person and reports that Alexander said that the Critias who was a member of the Thirty wrote only a work on government. The likely reason for this confusion among the commentators is that they “did not believe a man capable of the versatility shown by Critias. Thus they separated the politician from the Sophist, attributing to the former only such works as have a political flavor. Now we know from Plato (who certainly knew the truth!) that the politician and sophist were one.” If Simplicius’ inclination were similarly to regard Antiphon the political figure as an unlikely author of “sophistic” works, he may have been inclined to consider the possibility of another Antiphon, “the sophist,” whether he devised this epithet himself or took it from Xenophon or some other predecessor. Unfortunately, in Antiphon’s case we have no early source like Plato to set the record straight.

As we have seen, the biographical tradition tended to confuse several Antiphons. The three longer versions of his life (Philostratus, [Plutarch], Photius) contain information about the orator, Socrates’ interlocutor, the sophistic works, the trierarch, and the poet. The shorter anonymous Life is more restrictive. It says nothing about the trierarch or the poet, except to note (6) that for a time Antiphon wrote tragedies, until an appendix

40 ἐὰν ὁ τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενος εἶς ἐκεῖ σοφιστής τις.
41 D. Stephens, Critias: Life and Literary Remains (Cincinnati 1939) 86.
42 Prefaced to our manuscripts of Antiphon: Thalheim (supra n.4) xvi–xvii; tr. Morrison (supra n.4) 121.
(10ff) with some brief remarks about the poet, which is introduced by φασὶ δὲ (τινεῖς). It seems that this author, at any rate, has attempted to distinguish between the orator and the poet, while at the same time identifying Xenophon’s Antiphon as the orator.\footnote{The author’s careful selectivity suggests that Thalheim is wrong (in his app. crit.) to see this Life as entirely dependent on [Plutarch] and thus worthless.}

Of much greater significance is the second-century lexicographer Harpocration, whose special interest was the Attic orators and who takes for granted the identity of orator and sophist. Harpocration’s Lexicon includes about 1,500 citations of the orators; 99 are from Antiphon, of which 26 cite either On Truth (always specifying either the first or second book), On Concord, or Politicus; most of the others cite a speech by name; a few cite no work. Citations from sophistic works of Antiphon take exactly the same form as those from rhetorical works; in fact, the entry for διάθεσις explicitly identifies both as the work of “the same man” (‘Ἀντιφών ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ τῆς Καλλίου ἔνδειξιν καὶ ... ὁ ὀνόμα τοῦ περὶ ὁμονοίας). The entry under “Antiphon” says only εἰς τῶν ἵπτῶν, Ἀφήλου μὲν νῷς, ἀπὸ τοῦ δῆμου δὲ Ἀριστοφάνος. Clearly Harpocration knew the rhetorical and sophistic writings as the work of a single man. He knows nothing of a sophist distinct from the orator and gives no indication of such a view in his sources.

Harpocration’s evidence is extremely important. He had read all the works of Antiphon and the other orators, many of which are now lost. He questions the authenticity of two of Antiphon’s rhetorical works (frr.48, 65 Th.) and many works of the others (especially Lysias and Demosthenes). We are also told that he devoted a whole work to Antiphon’s figures of speech.\footnote{Suda s.v. Harpocration: έγραψε Περὶ τῶν Ἀντιφώντος σχημάτων, Περὶ τῶν Ὑπέριδου καὶ Λυσίου λόγων, καὶ ἄλλα.} Moreover, he was well versed in the prose works of the fifth and fourth centuries, citing Plato, Thucydides, and Aristotle (often from the Ath.Pol.). He never cites a fifth-century sophist, however, other than Antiphon.\footnote{Specifically, Harpocration never cites Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicos, or Thrasymachus, except that the character Thrasymachus from Plato’s Republic is cited once (s.v. χροσωκοείν).} It is hard to imagine that, if he knew of any significant scholarly view that
assigned the rhetorical and sophistic works to different authors, he would not mention this.

Harpocration's evidence is particularly significant because he knew well the work of Didymus, whom he cites 36 times. Although he probably had not read all 3,000–4,000 volumes Didymus allegedly wrote, he must surely have read his works on the orators and must, therefore, have dismissed whatever separatist arguments (if any) he may have found there. Indeed, it is very unlikely that any significant scholarly opinion favoring a separatist view could have existed at this time without leaving some trace in Harpocration.

Like Harpocration, two other widely read scholars from the same period, Galen and Athenaeus, refer to Antiphon's rhetorical and sophistic works without distinction as to authorship. Galen twice refers to Antiphon's work *On Truth* (17A.681.3, 18B.656.13 Kühn) and once (19.66.14) to an Antiphon who, as one of "those concerned with words" (τῶν περὶ λόγους ἔχοντων), taught how new words should be used. The latter is presumably the orator, and the fact that Galen nowhere adds information about Antiphon's identity indicates that he knows only one intellectual named Antiphon. By contrast, he twice refers to a patient in the Hippocratic *Epidemics* as "Antiphon the son of Critobulus" (9.862.9f, 17A.170.15) obviously to distinguish him from his more famous namesake.

Athenaeus' references to Antiphon are more varied. He describes a famous speech by "Antiphon the orator" (397C; cf. fr.57ff Th.), refers to "the Rhamnusian Antiphon" (506F), and identifies Plexippus as a character in a play by "Antiphon the tragic poet" (673F). He also quotes from "Antiphon in the *Politicus*" (423A) and from "Antiphon in the *Invective against Alcibiades*" (525B). The absence of greater specificity in these last two references suggests that Athenaeus took for granted that both these works were by one man.

One passage requires closer consideration: in 673F Athenaeus reports that after Adrastus, a second-century peripatetic, in a

46 Fr.76 Th.; cf. J. S. Morrison, "Antiphon," *PCPS* 187 (1961) 49–58. The same conclusion holds if Galen is referring to the writer of sophistic works, since we would expect him to comment if this were a separate figure from the orator.

47 I exclude 544D, a direct quotation from Hegisander in which "Antiphon" is the poet.
book on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, had set forth at length his views "on Plexipus in the work of Antiphon the poet and had also said a great deal about Antiphon himself, [Hephaestion, perhaps the famous metrican] appropriated this too and also wrote a book *On the Antiphon in Xenophon’s Memorabilia*, though he had discovered nothing new." Adrastus’ work on Plexipus and Antiphon the poet probably discussed their characters (various stories were current concerning the poet’s behavior at the court of Dionysius). We know nothing about Hephaestion’s work on Xenophon’s Antiphon. Pendrick (53) considers this passage evidence that the identity of Xenophon’s Antiphon was problematic at this time, but the title does not suggest that the work concerned the question of identity. Since the work Hephaestion plagiarized probably concerned character, it seems more likely that he wrote about Antiphon’s manner of argument with Socrates, a topic we know was discussed by other ancient authors. Aristotle is reported to have said that “Antilochus the Lemnian and Antiphon the diviner (ὁ τερατοσκόπος) argued contentiously (ἐφιλονείκει) with [Socrates],” and [Plutarch], or more likely his source, seems to be objecting specifically to this view when he states that Antiphon argued with Socrates ὤ φιλονείκως ἀλλʼ ἐλεγκτικῶς (832c).

If Antiphon’s manner of argument with Socrates was a topic of discussion in antiquity, as these sources suggest, Hephaestion could easily have written about it without saying anything new. It is more difficult, however, to imagine an unoriginal book on the question of the identity of Xenophon’s Antiphon when we


49 For Plexipus and the play *Meleager* see Arist. *Rb.* 1379b15.

50 Arist. fr.75 Rose=D.L. 2.46. Pendrick (53f) takes this fragment as further evidence of ancient disagreement over the identity of Antiphon in Xenophon, but since we do not know whether the epithet τερατοσκόπος goes back to Aristotle, nor what the purpose of adding it was, we cannot conclude anything from it.

51 The language of Photius (*Bibl.* 486a) is similar (οὐ πρὸς φιλονείκιαν ἀλλʼ πρὸς ἐλέγχον); cf. the anonymous *Life* 7.
have no evidence that this identity was ever discussed in antiquity. Hermogenes does not mention Xenophon and if Hephaestion wrote a book about the question that did interest Hermogenes, namely the identity of the author of the sophistic works, he would not necessarily mention Xenophon and would surely have given the book a different title.

Finally, much of the information of the latter lexica is derivative. A large majority of citations in the *Suda* come from Harpocration; the rest are similarly introduced simply by “Antiphon,” occasionally with the title of a specific work. One title, *Proems*, is not mentioned by Harpocration and may be the source of some of the other new citations. Also new is the *Suda’s* biographical notice, curiously neglected by Pendrick though it contains the third ancient use of the term σοφιστής for Antiphon. There are three entries for Antiphon (D.-K. 87A1 omits the second): (1) Ἀθηναίος, τερατοσκόπος καὶ ἐποποιῶς καὶ σοφιστής, (2) Ἀθηναίος, ὀνειροκρίτης, (3) the orator. There is clearly confusion here and we cannot know what source supplied σοφιστής or what the term may have meant (see *supra* n.28), but confusion in these biographical entries provides no good evidence for the existence of a sophist Antiphon distinct from the orator (who in any case could not be the poet).

Many of the other later lexica, such as the *Etymologicum Magnum* and the *Lexica Segueriana*, also draw heavily on Harpocration and provide nothing significantly new. Stobaeus, however, draws on a different tradition in keeping with his more philosophical interests. Most of his 18 citations, all introduced simply by “Antiphon,” are listed as philosophical fragments in Diels-Kranz, but two are quotations from Antiphon 5. The grammarian Pollux cites Antiphon 48 times, always simply as “Antiphon.” Most of these citations are not duplicated in our other sources. Only three times does Pollux cite a specific work; two of these come in the same passage (6.143, cf. 2.61), where in immediate succession he cites a word from *On Truth* and then another from the *Rhetorikai technai*, “but they appear to be spurious.”52 Once more we seem to have independent testimony to the nearly unanimous ancient

52 ἀπαρασκεύω γνώμη ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀληθείας Ἀντιφῶν εἶπεν, ἀπαρασκεύαστον δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἰτεροποιεῖς τέχναις, δοκῶς δ’ οὐ γνήσια. The passage is cited (with other testimony for the *Rhetorikai technai*) in L. Radermacher, *Artium Scriptorum* (Vienna 1951) 79 no.6; cf. frs.71–76 Th.
tradition that the sophistic and rhetorical works of Antiphon were written by one and the same author.

In conclusion, I hope to have shown, first, that Xenophon's label ὁ σοφιστής would not have served to identify an Antiphon other than the orator but it could have differentiated the orator from another, almost contemporary public figure of the same name, Antiphon the triarch. Second, Hermogenes' suspicions are based entirely on stylistic considerations, and his apparent inability to find any biographical evidence for the author of the sophistic works suggests strongly that no such evidence existed and that Didymus' doubts were also based on stylistic considerations alone. Hermogenes' use of the description σοφιστῆς ὑσσωντες (whatever it may mean) for two Antiphons, moreover, makes it very unlikely that one Antiphon had previously been singled out as ὁ σοφιστής. Third, Simplicius' motive in designating Antiphon ὁ σοφιστής in one passage is unknowable, but it may stem from a doubt, evident in his treatment of Critias, that a political figure would have written on philosophical matters. Fourth, the overwhelming weight of the ancient tradition is unitarian. In particular the evidence of scholars like Harpocration strongly supports the conclusion that there was only one fifth-century Athenian intellectual named Antiphon, who wrote both forensic speeches and sophistic treatises. The isolated suggestion that the forensic and sophistic works might be by different authors provides no evidence at all for the life of a separate "Antiphon the sophist."

Is it then possible that a significant fifth-century thinker named Antiphon, author of On Truth and other sophistic treatises,53 could have lived in the last few decades of the fifth century and spent at least some time in Athens without leaving a single trace of his life in the later tradition, except perhaps in Xenophon? The possibility is remote at best. It is certainly much more likely that a fifth-century intellectual and logographer, who also wrote theoretical works on various subjects, would leave a corpus that would later occasion some doubt as to whether one person could have written on such diverse

53 For the interpretation and significance of Antiphon's thought see most recently M. Ostwald, "Nomos and Physis in Antiphon's Περὶ Ἀλήθειας," in M. Griffith and D. J. Mastronarde, edd., Cabinet of the Muses: Essays on Classical and Comparative Literature in Honor of Thomas G. Rosenmayer (Atlanta 1990) 293–306, with full references to earlier scholarship.
topics in different styles. These doubts occasionally troubled a scholar like Hermogenes. Others like Simplicius may have doubted whether a leading political figure could also have been a philosopher. But these few widely scattered exceptions provide no good reason for modern scholarship to create a new historical figure, "Antiphon the sophist." Rather we should follow the overwhelmingly unitarian guidance of the ancient tradition.54

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54 I might note the unitarian trend in recent scholarship on the philosophical significance of the sophistic works: in addition to Ostwald (supra n.53) see, for example, Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers 2 (London 1979) 207–10; B. Cassin, "Histoire d'une identité: Les Antiphons," L'écrit du temps 10 (1985) 65–77. I hope to consider this aspect of the question at a later date.