The Pisistratids and the Mines of Thrace

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It is generally maintained that Pisistratus of Athens and his successors enjoyed significant income from the mines that he is presumed to have worked in western Thrace during his sojourn there in the mid-sixth century, and that the Pisistratids continued to receive these revenues until their control of the mines was disrupted by the Persian invasion of Thrace ca 513.¹ For example: “It is clear and certain that during

his exile after 556 Pisistratus secured control of the gold and silver mines of Pangaion in Thrace, and that the diversion of their revenues to pay for a mercenary army both helped to secure a favorable outcome at Pallene and subsequently acted as one of the sheet-anchors of his regime.² It is further assumed that, while they lasted, these mine revenues provided the Pisistratids the means by which to embellish the city handsomely with public works and liberally to ply its citizens with subsidies.³ Indeed, the Athenian tyrants are thought to have possessed “immense wealth” largely on account of their Thracian holdings.⁴

Unfortunately, the construction and maintenance of this orthodoxy have involved overlooking or sidestepping some rather serious problems. If appreciable amounts of Thracian gold or silver were continually flowing down to the tyrants at Athens from 546, we should expect some commensurate signs of prosperity, especially in the coinage of the times. But the signs we have are rather to the contrary: the Wappenmüzen, the so-called ‘heraldic’ coins of Pisistratus’ final tyranny are relatively few in number, small in denomination, and apparently designed for local use and circulation only; they do not bespeak abundance or prosperity, but rather a limited economy and restricted resources of silver even compared with the tyranny after Pisistratus.⁵ The archaeological record at Athens for the


³ Public works: cf. Bengston and Bloedow (supra n.1); H. A. Shapiro, Art and Cult under the Tyrants at Athens (Mainz 1989) 5–8; Burn (supra n.1) 308f; see also Stahl (supra n.2) 233–43; subsidies: cf. Andrewes (supra n.2) 111 and (supra n.1) 407.

⁴ Cf. e.g. Shapiro (supra n.3) 3: “[Pisistratus’] sons ... had grown into middle age amid immense wealth and privilege.”

older tyranny supports the same estimation: buildings assigned to Pisistratus or dated to the period of his rule are, for the most part, meager in number, modest in plan and appointments. Thus, even the obvious material remains of the early tyranny make it difficult to accept that Pisistratus at least had amassed or continued to receive a significant supply of Thracian silver or gold, that he could have distributed largesse on any appreciable scale, or that he could have sustained an ‘army’ of even three hundred mercenaries, the enumeration most often given in ancient sources for his doryphoroi.8

Foraboschi, “Monetazione arcaica e constituzione di Atene,” *AIIN* 36 (1986) 67–82. This is, of course, only a partial bibliography on the Athenian Wappenmünzen.

6 Cf. J. S. Boersma, *Athenian Building Policy from 561/0–405/4 B.C.* (Groningen 1970) 11–18; T. L. Shear, Jr., “Tyrants and Buildings in Archaic Athens,” in W. A. P. Childs, ed., *Athens Comes of Age: From Solon to Salamis* (Princeton 1978) 8; Shapiro (supra n.3) 71 (contra Shapiro 8: although Pisistratus may not have differed from his successors in aspiration, he certainly differed from them in the use of wealth as a means to achieve such aspirations: see infra).

7 I do not know what real bearing pottery trade can have on the estimation of Athens’ general prosperity especially during Pisistratus’ final period of tyranny, even if black- and red-figured wares are valued as luxury items (cf. Shapiro [supra n.3] 5): after all, do luxury goods manufactured in, say, Mexico, and then shipped abroad attest to general Mexican prosperity? Could they even in proliferation be useful as an indicator of Mexico’s overall economy? Cf. S. Isager and M. H. Hansen, *Aspects of Athenian Society in the Fourth Century B.C.*, tr. J. H. Rosenmeier (Odense 1975) 41. For recent criticism of the “ceramo-centric view of trade and the ancient economy” see D. W. J. Gill, “Pots and Trade: Spacefillers or Objets d’Art?” *JHS* 111 (1991) 29ff (I thank the anonymous referee for these two references). Cf. Lewis (supra n.1) 291.

8 Polyaeus 1.121.3; Σ Pl. Resp. 566b; cf. Nic. Dam. FGrHist 90 F58 (on Periander). But cf. Plut. Sol. 30.3 where the number is given as fifty. On the doryphoroi of the Pisistratids see Lavelle (supra n.1), which rejects the common assumption that the Pisistratids like other Archaic Greek tyrants employed foreign mercenaries (epikouroi) as bodyguards (doryphoroi) to support their regimes. The assumption rests largely on (1) Hdt. 1.64.1 (see text infra) and (2) the appearance of Thracians and Scythians in Attic vase-paintings of the mid-sixth century (see n.11 infra). But Herodotus is misconstrued, for the original meaning of epikouros was ‘ally’, a connotation that fits Herodotus’ context much better than ‘mercenary’, as we shall see. Again, the appearance of barbarians on Attic vases connotes only that and can hardly be taken as positive proof for the conformation of the Pisistratids’ doryphoroi. Finally and most significantly, there is positive proof to indicate that the Athenians, not foreigners, served as the doryphoroi. In fact, em-
Questions about the nature of Pisistratid wealth actually go to the heart of this orthodoxy. No one to my knowledge has ever explained how the Pisistratids first exploited, then continued to exploit the mines of Thrace as absentee landlords. Actually no one has elaborated upon the nature of Pisistratus’ Thracian enterprise at all. Today’s orthodoxy has evolved instead rather gratuitously from assumptions based on two very slender reeds of testimony.

I

According to Herodotus (1.64.1), πειθομένων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, οὕτω δὴ Πεισιστράτως τὸ τρίτον σχῶν Ἀθηναίας ἐρρίζωσε τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπικούροισι τε πολλοῖς καὶ χρημάτων συνόδοις, τῶν μὲν αὐτοθέν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρυμόνος πτωτικοῦ συνιότων, κτλ. This passage is usually construed as a formula for how the tyranny was maintained and hence to mean that Pisistratus’ control of revenue-producing Thracian mines was ongoing. The testimony of the Ath. Pol. (15.2) is assumed to supplement it: ἐκείθεν δὲ παρῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς περὶ Πάγγαιον τόπους, οἶνον χρηματισάμενος καὶ στρατιώτας μισθοσάμενος, ἐλθὼν εἰς Ἐρέτριαν ἐνδεκάτῳ πάλιν ἔτει κτλ. στρατιώτας μισθοσάμενος here and ἐπικούροισι in Herodotus are usually taken together as proof for Pisistratus’ employment of a foreign

ployment of natives, not foreigners, appears to have been the rule among Archaic Greek tyrants.

9 Recognized to some degree by D. Viviers, “Pisistratus’ Settlement on the Thermaic Gulf: A Connection with the Eretrian Colonization,” JHS 107 (1987) 194 n.10; Isaac; and Borza

10 “The Athenians obeying, Pisistratus thus obtained Athens for a third time and (thus) rooted his tyranny by means of many epikouroi and confluences of money, coming together partly from the place itself, partly from the river Strymon.... ”


12 “from there (sc. Rhaecelus), he (Pisistratus) arrived at the region around Mt Pangaean, from which having enriched himself and having hired soldiers, he came back to Eretria in the eleventh year.... ”
There is, it should be noted, no sense whatsoever of ongoing exploitation of Thracian holdings in the *Ath. Pol.*, which has borne on this subject really only as a supplement to Herodotus.¹⁴

*Epikouroi* in Herodotus is almost invariably translated ‘mercenaries’, because it is presumed to mean that almost invariably.¹⁵

But it can also mean ‘ally’ or rather ‘fighter alongside’, and this meaning actually predominates Herodotus’ usage (cf. Lavelle [supra n.15]). If έπικουροι is translated ‘mercenaries’ here, there is no real context for it, and the passage becomes temporally fragmented: an imperfect sense must be wrung from ἔρριξε to make it describe maintaining the tyranny,¹⁶ although its tense and that of every other verb indicating action taken by Pisistratus (hostage-taking, purification of Delos) is aorist. If έπικουροι is translated as ‘allies’, however, the word


¹⁴ That the author of the *Ath. Pol.* followed Herodotus for the tyranny has long been established (cf. F. Jacoby, *Atthis* [Oxford 1949] 153; Rhodes [supra n.13] 189ff). That the former can have had valid information that exceeded Herodotus’ account is, I think, indicated by his correction of Herodotus on the Argives (see n.19 infra). In this instance, however, he seems merely to be embellishing Herodotus based on anachronism of (1) later Greeks’ enrichment from the Thraceward area, and (2) Thrace’s later renown as a supplier of mercenaries. In combination with these, he may well have also misunderstood Herodotus: see text infra. I could not posit a source for *Ath. Pol.* that might provide valid information about Pisistratus’ Thracian sojourn exceeding Herodotus’ meager testimony.


both finds and enhances its context, and there is temporal and logical consistency within the passage.

Herodotus' *logos* recounting Pisistratus' final rise to power (1.59–64) culminates in the battle of Pallene and its immediate aftermath: the narrative context is Croesus' enquiry into Greek affairs before his fall ca 546.\(^{17}\) Herodotus repeatedly stresses that Pisistratus earned his victory and his return to Athens through money (five references in two short chapters: 61.3 \([\times 3]\); 61.4; 62.2, four of which are forms of χρήματα) and men (four times: 61.4 \([\times 2]\); 62.1 \([\times 2]\)). The men are not mercenaries but allies: allies from Thebes, from Naxos, and very probably from Eretria (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 15.2); partisans from the Attic countryside; and city fighters who answered Pisistratus' call to arms.

The Athenians were certainly not mercenaries, for they were fighting for or against their own country *in* their own country, after all. Nor were the majority of foreign contingencies mercenary: Thebes and Naxos contributed χρήματα; Eretria served as base for the whole operation, while Pisistratus continued to ask for and receive contributions from cities "whichever owed him."\(^ {18}\) Herodotus does call the Argives μισθωτοί ("hirelings"), but we note that the author of the *Ath. Pol.* contradicts Herodotus, stating that Argives served from φιλία and that is undoubtedly correct if they were led by Pisistratus' son (17.4). Herodotus had his own fifth-century reasons for calling the Argives μισθωτοί.\(^ {19}\) There may have been some mercenaries, but their numbers were quite small by comparison. Where they came from is not clear: Herodotus, we observe, says nothing about Thracian or Scythian mercenaries.

Because the cooperating contingents were overwhelmingly allied and not mercenary, the translation of ἕπικουροι as 'allies' not only better fits Herodotus' context, but further serves to underscore Herodotus' repeated emphasis in the *logos*. The passage is not a formula without context for how the tyranny was maintained, but a last emphatic reminder of how the tyranny was anchored once for all: money and allies brought

\[^{17}\] Cf. Stahl (*supra* n.2) 56f; Rhodes (*supra* n.13) 199: "Herodotus' account of Pisistratus' rise to power implies that Pallene preceded the fall of Sardis."


about the debacle of Pallene that caused resistance to Pisistratus to collapse. The demonstrative οὕτω and the aorist ἐρρίζωσε close the ring Herodotus began at 1.60.3: Pisistratus ‘rooted’ his tyranny immovably by means of ‘allies’ and ‘assemblies of money’.20 Hostages were taken, Delos purified—all aorists—and Pisistratus then ruled (ἐτυράννευ: imperfect), by what means we are not told.

Thus χρήμασιν at 1.64 refers to income on hand rather than to ongoing revenues from the Strymon (or elsewhere) that helped Pisistratus to establish his tyranny. This is further signalled by Herodotus’ use in the passage not of πρόσωδος, the usual word in Herodotus for ‘revenue’, but of the rather unusual σύνωδος, ‘confluence’.21 money kept coming together (ςυνιόντον, the so-called ‘imperfect’ participle) partly from the “place itself,” or, as some translators have had it, “from native sources,” and partly “from the Strymon.”22 Surely the antithesis Herodotus intends is ‘from here’, that is, within Greece, and ‘from there’, outside it: Pisistratus’ resources when the final tyranny began were precisely what he had on hand at the time of the battle, no more.

We cannot in any case infer from the Greek at 1.64.1 that Pisistratus’ revenues from the Strymon continued and certainly not that he possessed or worked any Thracian mines. Rather, without any interpretation at all of the logos, we should more reasonably conclude that his resources on arrival at Eretria were much circumscribed: why else would Pisistratus have been compelled to call in contributions of money from cities that owed him if his Thracian assets were robust and continually increasing?23


21 For Herodotus’ use of σύνωδος and πρόσωδος see Lavelle (supra n.1) 85 n.36.

22 αὐτόθεν is most often taken to refer to a continuous domestic source of ‘revenue’, either the mines at Laurium or taxes levied at Athens; but see Lavelle (supra n.1) 85 n.36.

23 Viviers’ suggestion (supra n.9: 193f) that Pisistratus collected funds on his way to the north is not at all creditable: the order of events in Herodotus and, therefore, his chronology clearly indicates that Pisistratus collected funds from
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Pisistratus, we note, was never marked out as a particularly rich Athenian in any ancient source—as say, Callias was—and yet he would have been very wealthy indeed if he controlled Thracian mines: Alexander I of Macedon received a talent of silver a day from a single mine on Mount Dysorum. Contributions of money and men made Pisistratus temporarily wealthy and enabled him to overwhelm his relatively impoverished Athenian opponents; but they were also vital to his war efforts: Herodotus’ implication is that they were in fact requisite to his success. That Pisistratus’ finances were limited after Pallene and not primarily or even largely derived from Thrace accords also with the numismatic evidence.

II

Limited testing has demonstrated conclusively that the alloy of extant Wappenmünzen is quite inconsistent, varying rather substantially in content of impurities even from coin to coin. A few examples will suffice to show the variation:

Wallace:  
Wheel didrachm (22): 5.8% Cu, 9% Au  
Wheel drachm (23): 3.5% Cu, 2.6% Au  
Wheel obol (37): 17.0% Cu, 9% Au  

Nicolet-Pierre:  
Wheel didrachm (234): 0.62% Cu, 1.09% Au  
Wheel didrachm (235): 2.88% Cu, 42% Au  
Wheel didrachm (236): 0.81% Cu, 11% Au

24 Hdt. 5.17. Cf. Borza 119f; cf. also Hammond 45ff on Alexander’s coins and wealth. Callias’ wealth altogether was only 200 talents (cf. Davies [supra n.2] 260f), under a year’s revenue from one Thracian mine on the scale provided by Alexander.

25 Wallace 26ff; Nicolet-Pierre 26ff; cf. also M. Jessop Price, “The Uses of Metal Analysis in the Study of Archaic Greek Coinage: Some Comments,” Metallurgy in Numismatics 13 (1980) 50–54. The variation seems especially pronounced in copper content. I do not think copper mixing intentional (cf. Jessop Price 52) in the case of the Wappenmünzen, since the “owls” that follow show no such signs of dilution. After all, why disrupt the very lucrative practice of dilution if it were already employed?

26 Wallace 27; Nicolet-Pierre 33f. These I take to be representative of the general variance in the content of the Wappenmünzen.
The silver used in the 'Wheel'-stamped coins, for instance, may have derived partly but cannot reasonably have derived wholly from any single source. One type or even limited types of impure silver demonstrating slight rather than substantial variations in impurities should predominate—or at least be quite conspicuous—if the metal came from fewer rather than many mines located, we should imagine, in one area of Pangaeum. As the table given above demonstrates, the content of the coins is, in fact, quite inconsistent. Thracian mines must be ruled out as the sole or even predominant supplier of bullion for the Wappenmünzen: there was, quite obviously, no single or majority supplier of silver for the coins. Actually, the metal’s place of origin is entirely unknown: Kraay pointed out some time ago that we do not know that any of the bullion used for the Wappenmünzen came from Thrace.

The coins of the early tyranny sharply contrast with the Attic "owls," which first appeared around 525 (cf. Kraay supra n.1 60ff). The silver of the "owls" is much purer and almost certainly derived from the mines at Laurium in Attica. The fact that the coins were minted in higher denominations (tetradrachms) and en masse surely indicates that an abundant supply of silver had been located and was being exploited by the Athenians, a supply that was obviously unavailable before. Significantly, the majority of 'heraldic' coins demonstrates no affinity of content.

27 Cf. Wallace 28, who compares Wappenmünzen to Eretrian coins: "Or perhaps her (Eretria's) silver merely comes from miscellaneous sources—about half of her coins contain a good deal of copper while about a third of them have less than half of 1 per cent." The logic I employ here is that of Kraay for differentiating the content of the Wappenmünzen from that of the "owls" (cf. "Gold and Copper in Early Greek Silver," Archaeometry 1 [1958] 1; cf. also Jessop Price supra n.25 50ff) simply in reverse: the latter show less variance coin to coin, which indicates the likelihood of a common derivation (i.e., from Laurium).

28 Kraay (supra n.5 [1962]) 421; cf. Wallace 28. Kraay (supra n.1) 59 n.1: "The level of gold in the Wappenmünzen tends to be higher than in the fifth-century owls, which suggests that a different source may have supplied the silver for each of them...." I have stated elsewhere (Lavelle supra n.8) that the pronounced variances in fabric might best be explained if the coins were minted from silver that came to Pisistratus in Eretria from the contributions he was forced to call in from quite diverse sources. He then simply minted the silver as he required coin.
with the "owls" and almost certainly did not derive from Laurium.\(^{29}\)

The modest denominations of the Wappenmünzen, their absence in hoards abroad, and that they are unmarked as to place of origin have implied to scholars limited local use and circulation, not international trade.\(^{30}\) The economy these attest is circumscribed, not expansive or greatly prosperous: clearly, these 'modest' coins were the ones permitted by the silver available to the Pisistratids before 525, whatever its source. They demonstrate that the tyrants' treasury was not at all as well off early on as it was later, a fact that caused at least one scholar to speculate that Pisistratus' main contribution to the Athenian economy was the attention he paid to Athenian agriculture (Andrewes 409), but which, in any case, will not support a picture of ongoing revenues from Thracian mines. It is in fact quite unreasonable to assume that Attica or Athens was extraordinarily or even uniformly prosperous beginning with Pisistratus' final accession to power due to such revenues, for these revenues simply did not exist (cf. supra n.7).

### III

We turn now to the north and the nature of Pisistratus' enrichment "from the Strymon." Put simply, we do not know from any source whether the Pisistratids owned or leased mines or obtained their Thracian wealth in some other way: there is no explicit information about the precise nature of their enrichment in the north. In lieu of specific testimonia about the Pisistratids, it seems reasonable to adduce pertinent historical facts about the Strymon/Pangaeum region in the sixth and early fifth centuries to approximate some basis for judgment about their presence and the nature of their enrichment in those parts.

The history of the Strymon region indicates that the key to controlling and exploiting it—indeed the only real means to its exploitation by the Greeks—was a substantial permanent presence. That is presumably why the Parians settled Thasos first and then moved on to colonize Neapolis on the mainland, and why they founded other cities in the Pangaeum area. That is why Histiaeus and then Aristagoras desired to settle Myrcinus

\(^{29}\) Cf. Kraay (supra n.5 [1962]) 420f, (supra n.1) 59; Wallace 25f.

\(^{30}\) Cf. Kraay (supra n.1) 58f; Andrewes 409.
on or near the Strymon, and finally, why the Athenians first colonized Ennea Hodoi near the river, then pushed on in their thousands to annihilation at Drabescus. It has been forgotten that there is no continuous Pisistratid colonial presence on the Strymon attested in the literary record as there is for Sigeum in the Troad and Elaeus in the Thracian Chersonnese: there is only Rhaecelus on the Thermaic Gulf, which seems to have been but a temporary settlement. 31 Neither Herodotus nor the author of the Ath. Pol. mention any Pisistratid settlement on the Strymon.

To complement their silence, no archaeological trace of an Archaic Athenian settlement has been found in the area of the lower Strymon. Yet there is abundant evidence of occupation by others, and so explanation for that absence. Except for what may have been Argilos, an Andrian foundation to the west of Amphipolis, the archaeological record suggests that at the end of the sixth century the Parians settled at Eion and perhaps Ennea Hodoi. 32 Thracians were everywhere else then and before: the Pieres and Odomanti blocking up the Pangaeum-Symbolum valley; the Satrae on the mountain itself; the Edoni up the Strymon to the north and northeast. 33 If Hammond is correct, the Paeonians were in control of much of the rest of the Strymon basin from ca 550 until they were deported to Asia by Megabazus ca 512. 34

Megabazus' invasion occasioned a general contraction of Thracian power in the Strymon region, which is evidenced by Darius' surrender of the wall-less Edonian Myrcinus, a few kilometers northeast of Ennea Hodoi, to Histiaeus: the Edoni

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31 Sigeum: Hdt. 5.65.3, 91.1, 94f; Thuc. 6.59.4; Ktes. Epit. 18 (=Just. 2.9.1); Cic. Att. 9.10.3; Suda s.v. 'Ιππίας; cf. J. M. Cook, The Troad (Oxford 1973) 178ff; Stahl (supra n.2) 220–26; Isaac 162ff; Elaeus: Hdt. 6.140; Ps.-Scymnus 707ff; cf. Isaac 192f, who notes great quantities of Attic pottery at both Sigeum and Elaeus; Rhaecelus: Dusing (supra n.1) 57; N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia II (Oxford 1979) 68; Viviers (supra n.9) 193ff.

32 Cf. Isaac 4–8, 15 on the inconsiderable size of the Thasian/Parian settlements of the lower Strymon.

33 Pieres and Odomanti: Hdt. 7.112; Thuc. 2.99.3; Satrae: Hdt. 7.112; Edoni: Hdt. 7.113f; Thuc. 1.100.3; 4.107.3. Cf. Borza 85ff.

34 Hdt. 5.13.2, 15.3, 23.1; cf. Hammond 41f, (supra n.31) 55–58.
had obviously been forced from the site. Yet, even at that, the Satrae who lived on Mt Pangaeum and controlled its mines were never brought to heel by the Persians or by anybody else according to Herodotus. They and their neighbors the Edoni, who dwelt between the Satrae and the river, were still formidable and certainly capable of sustained resistance up to the time of Drabescus (465), when they annihilated a force of 10,000 Athenian settlers. They are hardly likely to have done other than protect their interests earlier on when they were in a far stronger position to do so.

Now the Thracians of the Strymon region appear to have been unanimously and unrelentingly hostile to all Greek settlers attempting to make inroads into their domains. From the arrival of the Parians at Thasos (ca 680) to Drabescus, the Thracians forcibly opposed Greeks who would settle there, especially along the Strymon it would appear. And why not? The Thracians comprehended the wealth of their lands and their mines, worked the latter, and even sought to acquire others: the Paeonians and Siriopaeonians were minting their own very

35 Cf. Hdt. 5.23.1, 124.2. On its proximity to Εννεα Ηδοι/Amphipolis see Thuc. 4.102.3, 107.3; cf. Isaac 16ff. The site of Myrcinus is likelier to have been at modern Myrinous rather than modern Myrkinos. The former is a defensible site nearer to Pangaeum and away from the flooding and attendant problems (malaria?) of the Strymon: it could conceivably control movement around the northwestern flank of the mountain. The latter is in a flat, nearer the river and relatively indefensible: cf. Dusing (supra n.1) 94 n.11.

36 7.111: ἕκτεροι δὲ οὐδὲνος καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑπήκοοι ἐγένοντο, δυσὶν ἡμεῖς ἠκέμεν, ἀλλὰ διατελεύτῃ τὸ μέχρι εμύσι αἰτίς ἐλεύθεροι μοῦνοι θρησκον: οἰκεύουσι τε γάρ δρεα ὑψιλά, ὡθεῖ τε παντοίησι καὶ χιόνι συνηρεφέα, καὶ εἰσὶ τὰ πολέμων άκραι.

37 On Drabescus: Hdt. 9.75; Thuc. 1.100.3. The blow inflicted on the Thracians by Megabazus was only glancing: their formidability was re-established with the death of Aristagoras (see n.38 infra). Cf. also Isaac 6f on fighting between Greeks and Thracians in the lower Strymon at the end of the sixth century.

38 Myrcinus may have reverted to the Edoni immediately upon the death of Aristagoras and the destruction of his forces (Hdt. 5.126.2), but in any case before the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 4.107.3). Hammond (supra n.1 [1980]: 59) states that Myrcinus reverted when Histiaeus was recalled (Hdt. 5.24.2f), but there is no evidence that the walled town was held by Edoni, let alone that they resisted Aristagoras when he took possession of it (Hdt. 5.126.1).

heavy silver coins in the mid-sixth century. Surely mining rights in Thrace were invariably wrung or won from the Thracians by force of arms.

The strength of the mine-owning Thracians of Pangaeum is amply attested by their resistance to the Persians. Megabazus, undoubtedly hoping to acquire for Darius the wealth of the Strymon region, including its mines, had overwhelming force with him and was able to defeat and deport the Paeonians to Asia; but he was unable to dislodge the Thracians on Pangaeum, apparently the toughest of this very powerful race. In fact, the mines were still in Thracian hands when Xerxes came through the Pierian gap in 480. The Thracians were universally renowned as fierce fighters, and the failure of the Persians to dislodge them from the mountain is testimony to the stubborn resistance of the Pangaeum tribes. What inroads can a relatively small party of Athenians settled some distance from the mines of Pangaeum have possibly made?

The Thracians were substantially aided in any struggle for the mines with the Strymon Greeks by the mines' very positions. In a recent article, Dr Koukouli-Chrysanthaki has shown that by far the greatest number of Pangaeum silver mines were on the eastern side of the mountain near Nikisiani and Palaichori.

40 Hammond 41ff; Viviers (supra n.9) considers that the mines of Mt Pangaeum were in Edonian hands. Contra Boardman (supra n.1) 230: we do not know when, if ever, the mines were "owned by the Greeks."

41 Cf. supra n.36. One must agree with Isaac (17) that the importance of the area to the Persians is illustrated by their deportation of the Paeonians: Darius may have wanted to resettle the region with more loyal Asians permanently to absorb it into the Persian commonwealth. A further index of its importance to the Persians may be found in the resistance, extravagant gallantry, and suicide of Boges, the garrison commander of Eion (Hdt. 7.107), who so acted in anticipation of his disgrace and in consideration of his surviving sons' peril for his losing this valuable property. On the other hand, we may disagree with Isaac's unsubstantiated assertion (18) that "Megabazos ... came to a satisfactory understanding with the Edonians": it is neither supported by evidence nor likely in view of Mardonius' follow-up operation (Hdt. 6.44ff).

42 Hdt. 7.112; cf. Castritius [supra n.1] 13f.

The preponderant number of gold-bearing mines in the area are further east still, beyond Krenides-Philippi. Settlements such as Eion, Ennea Hodoi, and Amphipolis were more than thirty kilometers distant and separated from the mines by hostile Thracians. How could the mines then ever have been controlled and directly exploited by mere bands of Strymon Greeks, especially in the sixth century, when considerable Persian forces could not obtain their control?

The impediments affecting Greek exploitation of the area (Thracian hostility, relatively small numbers of Greek settlers, strategic disadvantages of settlements with respect to the mines, etc.) are hardly likely to have been overcome by the Pisistratids, whose presence in the area, notable neither historically nor archaeologically, was apparently ephemeral in any case. Pisistratid numbers could not have been many, their capabilities were quite limited by that and their environment. Circumstantially, Pisistratus’ wealth “from the Strymon” must have been based on other than direct exploitation of the mines of Mt Pangaeum. That is not an unreasonable conclusion if other Greek ventures in the Strymon area are, once again, kept fully in view.

Actually, these offer the most pertinent evidence in determining how the Pisistratids were enriched in the region. That the Parians mounted something like a grand strategy of settlement and exploitation has already been mentioned. In the case of Histiaeus who with Aristagoras attempted to settle Myrcinus, hard by Ennea Hodoi/Amphipolis and Drabescus, Megabazus’ foreboding words to Darius (Hdt. 5.23.2) describe the possibilities of the region, the objects of the Milesians’ efforts:

44 Surely ‘Pangaeum’ gold can be ruled out of court in relation to the Pisistratids: traces only are found in the Wappenmünzen, and these were surely not consciously admixed (see supra n.25).

45 Cf. supra n.326 If it were argued that the Pisistratids were intent upon exploiting the mines of Mt Dysorum, they would have been blocked in the mid-550’s by the Paeonians or other inland tribes, just as the Athenians were at Drabescus.

46 Drabescus is much more likely to have been away from the Strymon (rather than on it), perhaps on the northwestern or northern flanks of Pangaeum, but in any case toward the gold mines of Daton (=Krenides-Philippi): Hdt. 9.75. Cf. Davies (supra n.43) 156; Dusing 96f n.11; cf. also Isaac 25-30, who places Drabescus nearer Ennea Hodoi, which either preceded or was proximate to Amphipolis. I take it that Ennea Hodoi was superseded by Amphipolis and so is identical to it. Isaac’s placement, however, does not conform to the testimony of Herodotus.
Of course Herodotus has Megabazus exaggerating for Darius' benefit the inducements to war, but it is clear that the power he envisions is linked to Histiaeus' permanent settlement and exploitation of Myrcinus and its environs.48

In fact the Strymon region had several attractions for settlers. The soil of the area was remarkably fertile, in fact the "best land" in Thrace.49 It would provide its own rich agricultural basis, a source of wealth in its own right. In addition, Amphipolis' position on the Strymon, as that of Eion, Ennea Hodoi, and perhaps Myrcinus, was well-situated for the converging trade of several regions, but especially for trade with the miners of the mountains. Amphipolis, a highly prized settlement of the Athenians, was a great entrepreneurial center that unlocked the region's wealth for them (Isaac 20f); its loss in 424 shut it off, and well they understood and lamented it. From that point, through the fourth century B.C., the Athenians moved heaven and earth to have it back (Thuc. 4.108). A multiplicity of favorable factors, not just the mines, encouraged such as Histiaeus and Aristagoras, and later the

47 "O King, what thing have you done to allow a Greek man, both deinos and sophos, to found a city in Thrace, where there are abundant timbers for ships and oars, silver mines, and many Greeks dwelling about, and many barbarians, who accepting him as leader will accomplish what he says by night and by day?"

48 Contra Davies (supra n.43: 155), Herodotus does not say that the mines were "at Myrcinus," but in Thrace. The mines that Histiaeus and Aristagoras were attempting to acquire may have been on Mt Dysorum, then freed from Paeonian control but not yet under Alexander of Macedon's. Megabazus' deportation of the Paeonians created a power vacuum and new (but temporary) possibilities for Greeks and other enemies of the Thracians (cf. Hammond and Griffith [supra n.31] 57f): that is perhaps why Alexander was able to seize the mine on Dysorum, why the Parians were attempting to colonize (or recolonize) the lower Strymon at the end of the sixth century or the beginning of the fifth, and perhaps why the Athenians, beginning with the leads of Miltiades and then of Cimon, were so interested and active in the area in the first part of the fifth century.

49 Strab. 7 fr. 33; Plut. Cim. 7.3; Isaac 1 on the richness of the Strymon plain.
Athenians to settle the Strymon region. This is not to say that the proximity of silver was not a prime attraction, simply that it served to enhance an already vivid picture of opportunity and prosperity there. Surely the same factors, not just the one, encouraged Pisistratus’ course of action.

A speculation: in lieu of further evidence, it is perhaps best to conceive of the Pisistratid settlement on the Strymon in roughly the same terms as the Milesians’ at Myrcinus. The latter must have been a frontier pyrgos-town that combined a number of advantages for its proprietors. It should have been an emporion and stronghold for trade, for extortion and expansion (if possible), and certainly for protecting one’s gains. Force and violence are implicit in the history of the region, and we recall that one of Pisistratus’ salient skills was military command, a skill that he had honed in Athens’ successful struggle with Megara over Salamis. He was capable of exploiting the area militarily; and he will certainly have been called upon to use his skill against the Thracians, especially in view of what must have been his limited numbers. It is most reasonable to assume that Pisistratus too conceived a similar, albeit more modest strategy for exploiting the Strymon region as best he could and, getting out, for using its

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50 I think that Perdrizet’s assumption (“Scaptesyle,” Klio 10 [1910] 5) that Pisistratus showed the way north for the Athenians is undoubtedly correct, albeit not solely with the possession of the mines in view: see supra n.49. Pisistratus’ limited success there and the wealth of the lower Strymon basin inspired Miltiades to make his famous promise of “immeasurable gold” to the Athenians after Marathon (cf. Hdt. 6.132; Perdrizet 6ff; Borza 118 n.46) and to route his expedition through Paros: surely he was intent upon absorbing the Thasian and Parian colonies on the Thracian mainland. Contra T. J. Figueira, Athens and Aegina in the Age of Imperial Colonization (Baltimore 1991) 159, who believes that Miltiades was hinting to the Athenians of “a colonial expedition [against Paros?] in the grand manner of the Peisistratids”: detaching Paros from her colonies of Thasos, Neapolis, in the lower Strymon basin, and from any concessions that Paros and her colonies possessed in Thrace made excellent strategic sense, especially since Paros was influential in the area (cf. Isaac 6ff) but already weakened and made ripe for the taking by the withdrawal of the Persians from the mid-Aegean. Figueira seems to miss completely the purport of the promised χρυσός εὐθονος, which Paros can hardly have supplied on its own. On the excitement caused by Cimon’s taking of Eion see Isaac 20f.

51 Isaac (15) suggests that Pisistratus became wealthy as a middle man doing business with the Thracian miners. Alcibiades’ Thracian stronghold (Xen. Hell. 2.1.25) may have been similar in character to Histiaeus’ and Aristagoras’ at Myrcinus, though doubtless much reduced in size and possibilities. The former perhaps desired isolation more than enrichment.

52 Hdt. 1.59.4; Ath. Pol. 14.1; cf. Rhodes (supra n.13). 199f
proceeds to effect return to Athens and tyranny, ever the object of his ambitions.

His foundation should not have been far from the sea or much farther up the Strymon than Amphipolis/Ennea Hodoi, for he was hemmed in by such Thracian settlements as Edonian Myrcinus, only a few kilometers from the “Nine Ways,” and by other Thracian tribes in settlements to the north and east. Of course, all Greek colonies in the Strymon/Pangaeum region were close to the sea, and Pisistratus’ cooperation with the Eretrians makes it certain that communication by sea was crucial to his enterprise “on the Strymon.”

IV

We must revise our estimate of Pisistratid finances, especially for the period of Pisistratus’ final tyranny. Originally these were limited to Pisistratus’ war-chest and then to revenues he could obtain from Attica. These limitations explain (1) Pisistratus’ obvious need for contributions of money from city-states in his debt; (2) the fact that the coinage of the early tyranny was meagerly produced and small in denomination relative to what Pisistratid coinage became; (3) variation in the alloy of the Wappenmünzen: the bullion derived came from varied sources; (4) why, as Andrewes states, Thucydides “leaves out the account of resources from the Strymon”: there were none ongoing or considerable; and (5) why, according to Kroll, the Pisistratids troubled to search out new resources not long after their return to Athens.\footnote{Andrewes 408; Kroll (supra n.5) 10f.}

It was taxation after all, Thucydides assures us (6.54.5), that undergirded the tyranny. The taxes imposed were moderate because the needs of the Pisistratids were modest to begin with: the old tyrant had effectively extirpated opposition at Pallene and wanted to maintain the goodwill of the Athenians. Pallene dispensed with the need for further foreign military help: a mercenary bodyguard, expensive and ineffectual at best, was not required; resources on hand, among them family and retainers, were
sufficient for sustaining the tyranny amidst a people who were not generally ill-disposed toward it anyway (cf. Lavelle [supra n.8]).

The economic watershed signalled by the “owls” occurred ca 525. A new and rich source of silver was discovered almost surely at Laurium, enabling the Pisistratids to mint the first “owls” in higher denominations and in far greater numbers than the Wappenmünzen had ever been produced. Their newfound wealth helps to account for such extravagances as the Temple of Zeus Olympius and other adornments for the city, as well as Hipparchus’ dazzling coterie of court poets;54 it may well have contributed to the general picture of wealth at Athens in the last quarter of the sixth century. The “owls” of Laurium stand in stark contrast to the Wappenmünzen of the earlier tyranny, as do the buildings of the younger tyrants to the modest edifices datable to their father’s reign.

The Pisistratids were evidently never sustained appreciably by Thracian revenues, and it is very doubtful that the tyrants ever had direct access to the mines of Pangaeum or anywhere else in Thrace. Pisistratus’ exploitation of the Strymon area was, as his settlement at Rhaecelus, temporary and only moderately successful. A first-generation monarch, he owed the tyranny primarily to his ambition, his enterprise, and his intelligence—apparently his greatest asset; he built upon his successes, taking what he could get from Thrace and then resorting to subscriptions. What he finally amassed was enough to effect his return, renew his tyranny, and found it once for all.

Pisistratus’ circumscribed wealth may well have influenced him to have been more conciliatory towards the aristocracy and to become a careful cultivator of public good will as long as he reigned, setting a pattern of rule for his heirs to follow and making thereby a reputation for mildness. The main financial props of the early tyranny were a relatively rich war-chest secured from his enterprise and his allies, moderate taxes imposed on a largely won-over populace, and the increasing prosperity that maintained the

54 Simonides, for example, was renowned as the first poet to take pay (Σ Pind. Isthm. 2.9a), and Hipparchus is alleged to have plied him with his munificence ([Pl.] Hipparch. 228c; cf. Arist. Rhet. 1405b14; Ar. Pax 697f with Σ; cf. also M. Lefkowitz, The Lives of the Greek Poets [Baltimore 1981] 50ff). Hipparchus is also reputed to have sent a trireme to fetch Anacreon from Samos to Athens: [Pl.] Hipparch. 228c; Ael. VH 8.2.
contentment of the Athenians through to the tyranny’s end. These were supplemented by a new strike at Laurium just after Pisistratus’ death.

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July, 1992