Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades upon Posidonius' Περὶ παθῶν

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The fragments of Posidonius' ethical doctrines preserved by Galen contain a polemical attack on Chrysippus' doctrine of the passions.1 Posidonius' motives for this attack are not well understood, and many critics argue that Posidonius simply did not understand Chrysippus or misread him.2 Others interpret Posidonius' work on the passions primarily as a doctrinal reaction to Chrysippean monism:


For nearly a hundred years Posidonius has baffled students of Stoicism. While it is agreed on virtually all hands that his thought differs in many essentials from that of the Old Stoa, there has been little agreement on what these essentials are. While it is generally recognized that his psychological theories are to be contrasted with those of Chrysippus, and differ from those of his unorthodox teacher Panaetius, the extent of Posidonius’ heresy even in this area is disputed. And about other branches of his thought the confusion is almost total.3

I hesitate to attribute serious misunderstandings of the orthodox position to Posidonius, Galen’s source for much of the discussion. But Posidonius did disagree with the early Stoics about these fundamental issues.4

But ancient philosophy is not religion. Such prejudicial labels as ‘orthodox/unorthodox’ and ‘heresy’ discourage an independent assessment of Posidonius’ achievements. Philosophical doctrines in the ancient world were only stable to the extent that they could withstand vigorous debate. To understand Posidonius’ attack on Chrysippus, it is necessary to appreciate the Stoa’s position in debates of the first century B.C. Carneades had earlier shown the dialectical vulnerability of certain of Chrysippus’ monistic formulations. Posidonius’ contemporary, Antiochus of Ascalon had blurred the distinctions between the Peripatos, the Old Academy, and the Stoa. The Stoa had to respond to these attacks if it was to survive and maintain its identity.

The fragments of Posidonius’ ethical doctrines have never been placed properly into the dialectical context of these late Hellenistic debates. His arguments against Chrysippus in Galen’s De placitis are known to be polemical. But it would be profitable to understand how doctrinal disputes in the interval between Chrysippus and Posidonius should shape our reaction to the arguments. To say that Posidonius attacked Chrysippus polemically reveals nothing about the merit of his arguments or the forces that might have persuaded him to adopt a polemical stance. An analysis of the arguments and their contexts will not only show what Posidonius did and did not understand about Chrysippus’ doctrines, but will also clarify his motives. The fun-

4 Inwood 140 n.51 on Chrysippus’ theory of the monistic soul, the passions, and their cure as in Galen PHilo 4–5; Fillion-Lahille (153) also uses “orthodox”/“unorthodox.”
damental question is whether Posidonius chose to attack Chrysippean monism for the reason he gives, namely that he thought it failed in a material way to explain the cause of the passions, or for another unspecified reason. An investigation of this kind is also warranted to explain Posidonius' rather Platonic psychology—a staggering compromise on a cornerstone of Stoicism.

Three preliminary considerations affect analysis of Posidonius' arguments in the *De placitis*: Galen's reliability, the attitude adopted towards Posidonius, and the possibility of evaluating the truth of Posidonius' claims about Chrysippean monism.

1. Certain upper limits for Galen's reliability may certainly be set. Galen, attacking Chrysippus by name, treats his doctrines at length as the most conspicuously monistic, and wishes to prove that Plato's doctrines on the location, composition, and function of the soul are correct (*PHP* 4.234.12–21). He is also quite willing to assimilate Stoicism to Platonism. Galen has reasons for misrepresenting or distorting Chrysippus' doctrines. At *PHP* 4 Galen reports, often out of context, all evidence he can find for the inconsistency of Chrysippus' monism. Conversely, although Galen may tend to over-assimilate Stoics to Platonism, he views himself as an ally of Posidonius. Despite uncertainty on the reproduction of actual quotations, Galen probably has been more trustworthy in his reporting of Posidonius than of Chrysippus. 6

5 *e.g.* *PHP* 5.334.20–336.1: “For I did not promise, in this treatise, to go through whatever each of the philosophers held about the soul, but to examine what truth the doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates have. Accordingly, I made a refutation of Chrysippus to achieve this goal. As for Zeno, if he meant to advocate the same things as Chrysippus, he will be liable to the same charges. If, on the other hand, he meant to follow the principles of Plato, as Cleanthes and Posidonius did, then he would be a fellow in our school of philosophy. But if, as I am persuaded, he thought that the passions supervene on judgments, he would fall between the worst school of thought on these matters—that of Chrysippus, and the best, which Hippocrates and Plato were the very first to expound. Posidonius says, however, that Pythagoras also held this view, but since no writing from Pythagoras himself has survived to our day, he bases this on the writings of some of his students. As I said a little before, my account did not proclaim that it would teach the history of ancient doctrines, but only that it would examine what was said on the part of Hippocrates and Plato.” On the significance of Posidonius' claims about Pythagoras for the transmission of Middle Platonic doctrine on the soul, see P. A. Vander Waerdt, “Peripatetic Soul-Division, Posidonius, and Middle Platonic Moral Psychology,” *GRBS* 26 (1985) 373–94, esp. 384ff.

6 For Galen's use of Posidonius see *EK* 58–64. Kidd asks (*EK* II 51 ad *TT* 61–63) “Was Galen simply following Posidonius in this section [*De Placitis* 4–5, p.336.15], or using him for his own purposes? *TT* 61–63 all suggest the
(2) Posidonius claims an interest in the cause (αἰτία) of the passions, which, he argues, Chrysippian monism cannot adequately explain. This is undeniably a feature of his entire philosophical enterprise, as Kidd has shown. It would be a mistake, however, to extend Posidonius’ demand that both philosophers and scientists must begin from observable facts to the claim that they employ ‘scientific objectivity’ in the modern sense, for if we assume that Posidonius proceeds ‘scientifically’, any ‘dialectical’ manipulation of the argument by him will seem out of character. But it is altogether unreasonable to suppose that any Hellenistic philosopher follows a modern conception of scientific procedure rather than ancient dialectic’s complex modes of argument. An example of how dialectical strategy may overtake an apparently scientific principle may be seen in the following:

καὶ πυθανέται γε τῶν περὶ τῶν Χρύσιππον οὐκ ὀλγήκης ἐν
τῇ Περὶ παθῶν ἐκείνου πραγματείᾳ, τίς ἡ τῆς πλεονεκρότητος
ὅμης ἐστὶν αἰτία, ὃ μὲν γὰρ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δύναιτό γε

latter, however extensive and basic the use.” Galen undeniably reports Posidonius’ fragments within the context of his own goal of demonstrating the truth of Plato’s and Hippocrates’ doctrines. It would be wrongly inferred from Kidd’s assessment, however, that this agenda has tainted the so-called fragments of Posidonius. I take Kidd to mean only that the contexts into which Galen may have inserted otherwise genuine Posidonian fragments cannot be trusted. On Galen’s treatment of Chrysippus and Posidonius see also Fillion-Lahille 124f, 153.

7 For Posidonius’ interest in aetiology see Strab. 2.3.8=EK T 85, Sen Ep. 95.65=EK 176.4, Prisc. Lyd. Solutiones ad Chosroem p.72.2–12 Bywater=EK T 26, and EK II 169f ad 34.12-20; for Posidonius’ application of this argument in Περὶ παθῶν see EK 150b; 158; 161f; 164.100; 165.10; 166.2, 19; 168.1, 187.10, 61. Posidonius claims that his method is based on observable fact and that he uses "deductive proof from first principles" (ἅπαξδεξιζ), for which see Galen PHP 4.258.19–22 (=EK T 83); 5.292.25–94.3 (=T 62), 356.25–58.3 (=156); Procl. In Enc. Elementa 216–18.11=EK 47.30–75; cf. Simpl. in Phys. 2.2 (193b23) p.292.21–31 Diels=EK 18; I. G. KIDD, "Orthos Logos as a Criterion of Truth in the Stoa,” in P. M. Huby and G. C. Neal, edd., The Criterion of Truth (Liverpool 1981: hereafter Kidd, “Criterion”) 147; see especially Kidd (1978) 11ff, where he shows that Posidonius’ conception of ἁπαξδεξιζ is that of pure mathematics.

8 Fillion-Lahille speaks (176) of his “rigueur scientifique.” Kidd argues convincingly that Posidonius places aetiology above science and thus the philosopher above the scientist: the scientist observes the world and gives an aitia for it, but only the philosopher can give the aitia, although he too must begin with the facts. He summarizes Posidonius’ attitude toward Chrysippus: “In ethics, Posidonius’ quarrel with and criticism of Chrysippus’ psychological theory was simply that it did not even square with the facts, and so could hardly give an aitia or explanation, far less the explanation for them” (1978: 13). Posidonius could argue ad hominem: EK II 170.
Posidonius argues (according to Galen) that reason is perfect and therefore incapable of error or excess. If this is the case, he was willing to reduce Chrysippus' intricate model of monistic psychology to tautological absurdities. The Stoa was famous for its doctrine about the transformations of reason in human development from mere seeds in infants to a perfected state found only in the wise man (e.g. Cic. Fin. 3.16–26). In Chrysippus' theory, “the reason which is being disobeyed in a passion is Right Reason, the normative standard of all proper conduct which Chrysippus identified with Zeus” (Inwood 156 with n.126); that is, passion is called ‘excessive’ or ‘irrational’ only in relation to the perfect reason of nature or of the wise man, not with reference to a typical man’s reason as Posidonius has interpreted the argument (for the sage, who alone possesses perfected reason, is immune to the passions). Any false impression about the purity of Posidonius’ procedure must be removed so that his dialectical

9 Galen PHP 4.248.6–11=EK 34.12–18=157.4–10: “and he asks those in the circle of Chrysippus not a few times in his treatise, On the Passions, what is the cause of the excessive impulse. For reason would not be able to ‘exceed’ beyond its own acts and measures. It is perfectly clear then that some other irrational faculty causes the impulse to exceed the measures of reason....” For Posidonius’ frequent charge of self-refutation, see EK II 74 ad τ 85 and ad τ 83, FF 34, 159, 164.87–93, 165.121; see also Kidd, “Criterion” 140.

10 It may be that Posidonius actually wishes to maintain that human reason is perfect, because he posits irrational elements in man’s soul to explain the cause of passion. He also says that orthos logos, i.e., the “perfected reason” possessed only by the wise man, is a criterion (D.L. 7.54=EK 42; see Kidd, “Criterion” 148f, and infra 316). Even Posidonius, however, allows that false suppositions may arise “in the theoretical sphere” (ἐν μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ) from weakness in the rational faculty (Galen PHP 5.320.24=EK 169.79–82). Posidonius’ point may be a mathematical axiom that a thing cannot ‘exceed’ itself, or it may be an attempt to prove self-refutation: “why would reason want to command that an impulse be greater than it commanded?” The sense of οὐχὶ δὲν δύνατον (supra n.9) is not entirely clear. Even if Posidonius regards man’s reason as perfect rather than perfectable, and this seems unlikely, this passage demonstrates that he uses his own premises about reason to criticize Chrysippus’ conclusions. This method of argument is designed to create the appearance of aetiology (as the definition of reason as that which “preserves measure” in its actions, is, he would claim, an ‘evident fact’); but the subtlety of his argument’s shifting premises shows that Posidonius employs as much dialectic as deductive proof in this instance. Kidd (EK II 170) sees the argument as part of an ad hominem attack on Chrysippus.
strategy, his arguments, and the place of his arguments in the late Hellenistic debates may be seen for what they are.

A related problem is how Posidonius may have treated earlier Stoics. According to Galen the assimilation of Cleanthes, and on occasion Zeno, to Platonism comes from Posidonius:

‘Ο μὲν οὖν Ποσειδώνιος, ως ἄν οἴμαι τεθραμμένος ἐν γεω-
μετρίᾳ καὶ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων Στοικῶν ἀποδείξεως ἑπες-
θαι συνειδημένος, ἣδεσθη τὴν τε πρὸς τὰ συφῶς φανόμενα
μάχην καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐναντιολογίαι τοῦ Χρυσί-
ποῦ καὶ πειράται μὴ μόνον ἐαυτῶν τοῖς Πλατονικῶις, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τὸν Κιττίεα Ζήνωνα προσάγειν.11

Posidonius’ adoption of a more Platonic psychology would sug-
ggest that there is no reason to doubt Galen’s claim.12 If a Stoic
argues that Plato’s model of the soul was essentially correct, it
makes perfect sense that any evidence in the works of Zeno and
Cleanthes would be manipulated to indicate their concurrence.
It is likely, although it can never be certain, that Posidonius tried
to make Zeno adopt a Platonic psychology. Moreover, any
assumption that Posidonius differs from his predecessors in that
his philosophical procedures are free from the taint of dialectical
subtleties (as Galen asserts) needs reconsideration.13

(3) A clear understanding of Chrysippian doctrine on human
action now disproves Posidonius’ claim that Chrysippian mon-
ism cannot give an account of the aitia of passion.14 It may be

11 Galen PHP 4.258.19–23 = EK T 93, 99: “Now Posidonius, a man reared in
gometry, as I believe, and trained beyond the other Stoics to follow
demonstrative proofs, was ashamed of Chrysippus’ conflict with evident facts
and of his self-contradictions; and Posidonius tries to bring not only himself
but also Zeno of Citium into the company of the Platonists” (tr. De Lacy 259).
See also EK T 58f.

12 See Kidd, “Criterion” 144. Posidonius, however, could disagree with Zeno
e.g. on the definition of passion: Galen PHP 5.292.17–25 = EK 152 (n.22 infra),
4.246.36–48.6 = EK 34.1–12. On Posidonius’ attempt to create conflict between
Chrysippus and Zeno, “the Chrysippian theory of the passions is in all essen-
tial the same as the theory of Zeno and the other early Stoics” (Inwood 143).

13 De sequela 2.77.17–78.2 = EK T 58: ἐκείνοι μὲν (κ.ο. ἄλλοι Στοῖκοι) γάρ
ἐπεισαν ἐαυτούς τὴν παράβας μᾶλλον ἢ δόγματα προδοῦναι. Ποσειδώνιος δὲ
τὴν τῶν Στοικῶν αἵρεσιν μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἀλήθειαν: cf. PHP 4.258.23ff = EK T
59.

14 Inwood shows (127–81) that Chrysippus’ fragments present a coherent
analysis of the cause of the passions. Inwood’s account is preferable because he
demonstrates the central rôle of “reservation” (nn.47–53 infra) in the monistic
definition of passion as an “excessive impulse” (n.24 infra). Other scholars
rarely discuss this concept, but Inwood shows (esp. 155–73) that this is
precisely how a monist would explain the aitia of passion.
that Posidonius ‘believed’ what he ‘argued’, namely that Chrysippian monism was inadequate in this regard, but this is a naive assumption for a modern critic. Posidonius as a Stoic need not have been any more committed to the truth of his arguments against Chrysippus than other philosophers were to their arguments in refutation, although Stoics are not ordinarily suspected of subtle dialectical strategies. It is equally possible that he knew how Chrysippus might have responded to each of them. Nevertheless, Posidonius’ claim that Chrysippian monism cannot explain the cause of passion need not be regarded as the truth about Chrysippian doctrine, nor even about what Posidonius believed. Rather, an independent modern analysis should, if possible, establish how fairly Posidonius treated Chrysippus, and where and for what purpose he manipulated the argument.

Some evidence suggests that Posidonius had the position of the Stoa in the Hellenistic debates very much in mind. Posidonius claims that his writings on the passions have a direct connection to Stoic doctrine of the telos, the “goal of life” and says more than once that the two topics are bound “as if by a single cord” (ὡς ἐν μίας μηρίθηνος δεδέσθαι).15 His discussion of the history of Stoic formulae for the telos reveals an interest in the vigorous Academic attack on the Stoa on this subject:

15 Galen PHP 4.286.6f=EK 150a.9; cf. PHP 5.326.12–16=EK 30; Fillion-Lahille 154.

16 Galen PHP 5.328.8–18=EK 187.25–37: “But some people, disregarding these things, contract τὸ ὀμολογομένος ζήν [Zeno’s formula for the telos] into ‘doing everything in one’s power for the sake of the primary things in accordance with nature’ [roughly Antipater’s formula] and make it similar to setting up pleasure or freedom from pain as the skopos. But in the expression itself, this creates the appearance of contradiction and contains nothing about virtue and happiness. For these things are necessarily a result of the end, but they are not the end. On the other hand, when this formula is understood in
Posidonius regards Zeno's formula as correct and misunderstood by Zeno's followers (see n.100 infra). His reference to 'sophists' (σοφισταί) is most revealing. Although his intended referent is left unnamed, Hirzel suggests that Posidonius may have had Carneades in mind.17 Hirzel's conclusion, supported by the text, speaks of aporiai put forward by Stoic opponents—a mode of argument that the Academics favored. This passage also gives the telos-formula of Antipater and Chrysippus, Carneades' principal targets. Posidonius shows not only that he was interested in defending Zeno's definition of the telos against Academic attacks, but also, and most importantly, that he was concerned about the poor dialectical response of the Stoics to these attacks: neither Chrysippus' nor Antipater's formulæ could dissolve the aporiai.18

This passage suggests that Posidonius intended his doctrines to respond to both Chrysippus' doctrines and the wider historical debate between Stoics and Academics. Posidonius' real target is not so much Chrysippus as the creators of the aporiai to which the Stoics did not adequately reply. But this fragment also

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18 If ο新农村 in fact alludes to Carneades, then Galen may have accurately reported direct quotations of Posidonius, because his own Academic purposes would justify omitting Posidonius' defense of the Stoa against Academic attacks. Galen may have deleted Posidonius' other references to Academic aporiai if they were frequent, or omitted them through misunderstanding. But this is speculation. If Galen knowingly reported a characterization of Academics as ο新农村, he was capable of impartiality even at the expense of his intellectual forbears. Kidd notes Galen's occasional criticism of Posidonius: "Euemptosia—Proneness to Disease," in W. W. Fortenbaugh, ed., On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Ainus Didymus (=RutgStChHum 1 [New Brunswick 1983]) 110 ad PHP 5.296.18–36=EK 163.30–52.
reveals a more interesting problem: Posidonius’ summary of Antipater’s *telos*-formula seems to use Carneades’ words.

Antipater’s formula in Stobaeus: πάν τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν διηνεκῆς καὶ ἀπαραβάτος πρὸς τὸ τυχάνειν τῶν προ-ηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν.\(^{19}\)

Carneades representation of Antipater’s formula in Plutarch: τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ’ ἑαυτῶν ποιεῖν ἐκαστὸν ἑνεκα τὸ τυχὰνειν τῶν πρῶτων κατὰ φύσιν.\(^{20}\)

Posidonius’ allusion to Antipater’s formula: πάν τὸ ἐνδεχό-μενον ποιεῖν ἑνεκα τῶν πρῶτων κατὰ φύσιν.

Admittedly, knowledge of Carneades, who wrote nothing, depends on Clitomachus’ faithful preservation of what he argued (D.L. 4.65, 67). Although Plutarch’s direct use of Clitomachus is uncertain (*supra* n.20), the assumption that Plutarch reproduces Carneades’ words seems justified: the context is clearly the debate between Carneades and Antipater, and the arguments are entirely consistent with testimonia on Carneades’ mode of argument, i.e., he accepts the premises of his dialectical opponents for the sake of debate (Lactant. *Div. Inst.* 5.14.3ff). Most importantly, these arguments would not be effective if the words were different. The alteration of phrases in these three versions may seem subtle, but (as I shall show) Carneades’ attack on the Stoic *telos* is based on his substitution of ἐνεκα for Antipater’s πρός. Posidonius’ ἑνεκα suggests the possibility that he criticized Antipater for the formula not as he proposed it, but as Carneades represented it.

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\(^{19}\) Stob. *Ecl.* 2.76.13ff=SVF III Ant.57. Clement’s single formula (*Strom.* 2.21, 179 Sylb.=V.2 497 Pott.=SVF III Ant.58) appears to conflate the two: Ἀντιπατρὸς ... τὸ τέλος κείθεται ἐν τῷ διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως ἐκλέγεσθαι μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλέγεσθαι δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπολαμβάνει.

\(^{20}\) *Mor.* 1071A=SVF III 195. Von Arnim argues (SVF I xiv) that Clitomachus was Plutarch’s source, but H. Cherniss (Plutarch’s *Moralia* XIII.2 [Cambridge 1976] 397–406) is sceptical: Plutarch kept notebooks (ὑπομνήματα: *Mor.* 464f.), in which he may have recorded quotations at various stages in his life and from a number of sources. Indeed the only reference to Carneades (1072c) in this portion of the *De comm. not.* (26f) is hardly decisive. After giving the entire argument in a manner to suggest an Academic source, Plutarch mentions Carneades as if reading another source (tr. Cherniss 765): “But there are those who think that his argument is directed against Antipater and not against the Stoic system, for, they say, it is he who under pressure from Carneades takes cover in these verbal ingenuities” (ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν εἰσὶν οἱ πρὸς Ἀντιπατρὸν σιώμενοι λέγεσθαι μὴ πρὸς τὴν ἄφεσιν ἐκείνην γὰρ ὑπὸ Καρνεάδον πιεζόμενον εἰς ταύτας καταδύσθαι τὰς εὐρησιλογίας).
Posidonius employs this dialectical strategy throughout his attack on Chrysippus' doctrine of the passions: he not only attacks Antipater in this instance as Carneades represented his position, but also attacks Chrysippus' doctrines not as written, but as Carneades represented them. Such a sophisticated dialectical procedure, difficult to demonstrate at the very least, requires the following preliminaries: (1) an account of what Chrysippus actually said and meant (I–II below); (2) a reconstruction of Carneades' attacks against his ethical doctrines and of the subtle means by which he manipulated them to show their self-refutation (III); and (3) an analysis of Posidonius' arguments in which quotations of Chrysippus (through Posidonius as preserved by Galen) are separated from arguments loosely attributed to Chrysippus, though actually conceived by Carneades (IV–V).

The documentation of Posidonius' strategy requires a detailed discussion of Chrysippean ethics and an equally detailed examination of Carneades' responses. My first aim, demonstrating the importance of ένεκα in this passage, presupposes knowledge of how Stoic doctrines on the passions, selection, and the telos are interconnected. Then Carneades' attack on the telos and Posidonius' use of his words can be more easily understood and the significance of his use of ένεκα may be seen. This fragment represents the one piece of persuasive prima facie evidence that Posidonius actually put Carneades' words contra Antipater into Antipater's mouth. The implications of this evidence provide the proper context for Posidonius' arguments on the passions, in which Carneadean arguments are given to Chrysippus.

After demonstrating this striking and pervasive dialectical strategy, I shall offer a new account of Posidonius' motivations. He intends to do far more than refute Academic aporiai. Were that his only intention, he might have quoted Chrysippus and Carneades and exposed the dialectical manipulation of the former by the latter. Posidonius must have felt that monism was indefensible, but this does not mean that he endorsed the arguments against it, nor does it mean that he wished to abandon all the ethical doctrines that conform to it. As his strategy was to show that Chrysippus' doctrines as Carneades represented them are self-contradictory, it might be reasonably concluded that one of his primary objections to monism was its verbal vulnerability, e.g. to attacks from common sense. If it is easy to say that Posidonius' own Platonic model of the soul changes Stoic ethics radically, it is far more difficult to determine whether cer-
tain concepts of the earlier Stoa are yet retained within his model. I shall argue that Posidonius designed his own ethical doctrines to revive and preserve precisely those doctrines that Carneades attacked most vigorously. Although his model of the soul certainly leads to some new doctrines, its primary function, I suggest, is to render Stoic ethics invulnerable to Academic attack. He attempts to explain in the language of common sense what the earlier Stoa had explained by paradox. His strategy, in my view, demonstrates an even higher degree of dialectical sophistication than that for which Chrysippus was known.

Certain attractive features of this thesis compensate for its troubling implications. Although earlier critics thought that Posidonius did not understand Chrysippean monism and that he sacrificed important features of its rationalism in favor of certain features of Platonism, it can now be said that he makes such compromises to defend the Stoa against the Academy, and that he is first and foremost a dialectician. Indeed, Posidonius' own formula for the telos, when seen in the context of its dialectical function, preserves the Stoic doctrines on selection and on the good that suffered most at Carneades' hands. Whether this new portrait of Posidonius' philosophical contributions is more positive or persuasive than the existing one, I argue nevertheless that this portrait is of value because it relates his fragments to the most famous of the Hellenistic debates, and because it demonstrates how Posidonian ethics descend from those of Chrysippus and the early Stoa.

I. Stoic Doctrine on the Passions

Galen reports that Zeno, Chrysippus, and Posidonius each had a different definition of the nature of passion. The implications of each formulation should be clarified from the beginning in order to understand the context of Posidonius' arguments.21

Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύει τὴν πρώτας τινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δὲ οὖ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς, ἄλλα τὰς εἴπερομένας αὐτὰς συσ-

21 Inwood discusses the different definitions of Zeno and Chrysippus (129ff with nn.14–17) and correctly defends a monist interpretation of both figures; Glibert-Thirry (402ff) summarizes the debate over monist and dualist interpretations. Although both were monists, I want to suggest a subtle difference between the two positions based on Cleanthes' treatment of the passions at Cic. Tusc. (n.37 infra).
Zeno and Chrysippus base their definitions upon a monistic model of the soul, which possesses reason alone, whereas Posidonius' Platonic model has three powers. Zeno is credited with defining passion as "a violent movement of an irrational impulse." and as a "violent passion." He divides the passions into four categories: desire, fear, pain, and pleasure (D.L. 7.110=SVF I 211), and says that pain, for instance, is "a fresh opinion of evil being present" (Galen PHP 4.281.24=SVF I 212: δόξαν πρόσφατον τού παλύ αὐτῷ παρείναι). The significance of πρόσφατον, whether Zenonian or not, is clear in Cicero: it is an opinion containing the proposition "that it is fitting to submit to grief."
From these definitions it is not easy to discern precisely what a passion is: is it a movement of the soul, an impulse, the result of a judgment, or an opinion? Inwood's explanation of Stoic action theory (129ff) accounts for how it could be all four. Man's impulses to things are not mere movements of the soul in monistic psychology; rather they are "commands to oneself which one obeys"; that is, impulse has one component, a rational act (an imperative), and another component, an action (motion). When a man sees something that might be appropriate for him, like a piece of cake (Inwood's example), he has the power to deliberate whether to allow his impulse to pursue the cake. In addition to his imperatival power of impulse, he also has the ability to exercise assent. An assent is a "judgment" (κρίσις), and erroneous judgments are "opinions" or "beliefs" (δόξα); so δόξα form a subset of κρίσις (Inwood 130 n.11). Assents are made to propositions (λέξεις) that may be theoretical statements (e.g. "There is a piece of cake"), which will not rouse him to action, or "hormetic," i.e., "impulse causing" statements, that will rouse him to action (e.g. "It is appropriate for me to eat the

praesentis in quo demitti contrabique animo rectum esse videatur (Tusc. 4.14). A. BONHOEFFER (Epictet und die Stoa [Stuttgart 1890: hereafter 'Bonhöffer, Epiktet'] 269ff), followed by Inwood (146ff), shows that Zeno and Chrysippus intended própsatoc to mean what Cicero says here; cf. Giusta II 246–50. Arius says (2.89.2f) that πρόσφατος is used in place of stimulative of an irrational contraction (τὸ δὲ πρόσφατος ἀντί τοῦ κινητικοῦ συστολῆς ἀλόγου (ἡ) ἐπάρπαρες) and that an "hormetic impression of something appropriate" must be present for all human impulses to occur (2.86.17f: τὸ δὲ δικαίων τὴν ὀρμήν ὀυδὲν ἔτερον εἶναι λέγομεν ἄλλα ἢ φαντασίαιν ὀρμητικήν τοῦ καθήκοντος σύστοτεν). Proof that Zeno believed that an impression of "the appropriate" is necessary for impulse comes from Arcesilaus' response to the apraxia-argument (which uses Stoic premises) that two things are necessary for action: "an impression of something appropriate, and an impulse to it" (Plut. Mor. 1122c–d: ἢ γὰρ πράξεις δυνάμει δεῖται, φαντασίαις τοῦ συμφερέων καὶ πρὸς τὸ φανέρον συμφερέων ὀρμῆς). See A. A. LONG and D. N. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers I (Cambridge 1987: hereafter 'Long and Sedley') 456. Plausibly, Zeno held that an impulse to passion must result from an assent to the proposition that something appropriate is present; the "something" would be a passion itself—hence ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. At any rate, it certainly holds for Chrysippus—a most important point. In passion the content of the "fresh opinion" (δόξα πρόσφατος) must be that "it is appropriate to submit to passion."

27 Inwood 62; see Plut. Mor. 1037f=SVF III 175 part; contra, Gosling (supra n.22) 183, 199ff.
cake"). The impulse that follows a horismic proposition would be a command (e.g. "Eat the cake!"). The imperative shares a common predicate with the statements (the cake), but each speech act has its own effect on the soul. A passion, therefore, may be defined as a motion (κίνησις), an impulse (όρμη), or an opinion (δόξα). If it is called a movement or an impulse gone to excess, it might also be said to "follow upon the judgment" (Zeno’s formulation); if it is called an erroneous decision, it might be said that the impulse is really caused by the opinion (Chrysippus’ formulation). Inwood argues (130f) that impulse and assent always occur together, and that it is rather pointless to debate which formulation is correct. But it is a question with which Chrysippus seems to have been concerned, so the distinction ought not to be dismissed just yet.

The important consideration in this monistic psychology is that passion is a movement of the rational soul in a manner contrary to reason. For the Stoics this process is of supreme gravity because it means that man is rejecting his own nature. Chrysippus’ etymology of λυπή ("pain" or "grief") is "the dissolution of the whole human being" (Cic. Tusc. 3.61=SVF III 485). The goal of life is to live in accordance with reason. Passion destroys man’s only means to happiness (Stob. Ecl. 2.75.11=SVF I 179).

Posidonius, however, uses a tripartite model of the soul to explain the passions not as judgments but as movements of the soul’s other two parts, which are irrational. In his Platonic model, reason ought to control the irrational powers; when it...
STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek], Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) p.229

does not, they move quite naturally towards an end that is contrary to reason (Galen PHP 5.326.20–27=EK 187.4–13=SVF III 460). Posidonius argues that it is absurd to claim that reason can reject itself or that it will command an impulse exceeding the measure it has set (supra n.9).

Zeno’s definition of passion as a “fluttering of the soul” helps to explain how passion is conceived within a monistic framework. Plutarch records an interpretation of passion in monistic psychology as “a turning-about of reason in alternate directions so quickly that one does not notice.”31 Inwood describes (164) why the wise man is free from passions and why all others are subject to them:

When a man falls away from his own better judgement, through a failure to act with the necessary circumspection and reflection, it is because he has in his soul a set of inconsistent opinions. This would not be the case if the agent had fully assimilated his reason to Right Reason. A sage has done this, and this is why all of his actions are according to Right Reason. When a man has in his soul conflicting opinions, then the over-all condition of his soul is weak. His judgements on practical and ethical matters are liable to be reversed when external circumstances lead him to assent according to one of his incorrect opinions and so to issue to himself incorrect commands.

Stobaeus says that the Stoics call passion an “opinion” in the sense of a “weak supposition” (Ecl. 2.89.1=SVF III 378: παραλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀθέατος ὑπολήψεως). All unwise men have unstable dispositions—inconsistent or “unharmonious” sets of opinions—that make up their reason (logos). When a fool is confronted with a moral dilemma, he may form presentations for himself to which his reason assigns various lekta that conflict with one another. He may assent first to one proposition, then to another that conflicts with it. Such an alternation creates Plutarch’s fluttering effect. When the fool assents in this way, weakly and without circumspection, he puts himself at the mercy of his own presentations. He is still a responsible actor, but he has become passive in a sense.32

31 Plut. Mor. 446f–47A (=SVF III 459 part), 441c–d; Long and Sedley I 422.
32 Inwood 162. This is an oversimplification of the actual processes as the Stoics understood them. They say that man does not assent to the proposition but to the presentation in which the proposition subsists—an important aspect of Stoic epistemology, at the center of which lies the phantasia kataleptike. Although Zeno held that assents are made to presentations, Arcesilaus charged
The Stoics also say, however, that a passion is a single opinion, a "fresh opinion of the presence of good or evil." Zeno and Chrysippus may have had different understandings of this *doxa* for Zeno passion results from the *doxa*, but for Chrysippus passion is the *doxa* itself. As it is not only the belief that these are present but the "fresh" belief that causes passion (δόξα πρόσ-φατος), Cic. *Tusc.* 3.74f (=SVF I 212) merits re-examination:

_Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat._

_Additum habend definitionem a Zeno recte, ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens; hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velit, quod paullo ante acciderit, sed quam dixi in illo opinato mali vis quaedam insit, ut vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam dixi appelletur recens. Ut Artemisia illa, Mawsoni Cariae rex, quae nobile illud Halicarnassii sepolcrium, quam dixit vivit, vivit in luctu, codemque etiam confecta contabuit.

that they are really made to propositions (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.154), and Stobaeus confirms that later Stoics agreed (*Ecl.* 2.88.4ff=SVF III 171: καὶ συγκαταθέσεις μὲν ἀξιώματα τοιαῦτα, ἀρχικὰ δὲ ἐπὶ καταγράμματα, τὰ περιεχόμενα ποὺ ἐν τοῖς ἀξιώματα, ὃς συγκαταθέσεις). Sextus says that a rational presentation is one "in which it is possible for what has been presented to be expressed in language (*Math.* 8.70=SVF II 187: καθ' ἐν τῷ φαντασθήν έστι λόγῳ παραστήσαται). The evidence conflicts with Zeno’s doctrine of the _phantasia kataléptike_ and supports Arcesilaus. Zeno, however, nowhere states that what is "appeprehensible" in the _phantasia kataléptike_ is propositional; on the contrary, he uses an iconic metaphor of "stamping"—as of a coin (*Math.* 7.236=SVF 1 58; Cic. *Acad.* 2.18, 77=SVF 1 59)—and says only that this presentation has the power to reveal its object (Cic. *Acad.* 1.41=SVF I 60) and that it is such that it could not arise from what is not (*Math.* 7.247–56=SVF II 65). Part of the motivation for describing _phantasia_ in non-propositional terms occurs in debates on the rôle of _phantasia_ in passion. Presentations are said to cast a persuasive appearance that "drags" one to assent. Chrysippus describes _phantasia_ as an antecedent cause of evil (nn.45, 154 infra). Carneades accepts for the sake of argument the "pull of the presentations" alone and without assent as a cause of passion (Plut. *Mor.* 1057a–b=SVF III 177). Because of the impact of presentations, "weakness of soul" (ἀθάνατος) is also a critical issue in the cause of passion (n.109 infra); see Frede (supra n.22) 103ff; Long and Sedley I 201ff; F. H. Sandbach, "Phantasia Kataléptike," in Long (supra n.2) 12f; Long (supra n.28) 82ff, 91ff with nn.24f; and Inwood 56–59, 72ff, 86f with nn.212f, 92.
Huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens, quae tum denique non appellantur recens, cum vetustate exaruit. 33

The structure of this passage suggests that Cicero cannot assign the phrase *ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat* to Zeno, 34 who is credited only with adding the word “fresh,” not with its definition, and his followers’ definitions—“thriving” and “having a certain greenness”—are still a step removed from the proposition, “it is fitting to submit to grief.” It is difficult, nevertheless, to construct an argument showing that Chrysippus and Zeno essentially disagreed on the definition of passion. 35 An attempt to account for Galen’s different wordings (*supra n. 22*) would have to rely, somewhat as follows, on the meager evidence available.

The evidence that Chrysippus spelled out the definition of *prosphatos* comes from the Stoic treatments for those in a state of passion. Chrysippus disagreed with Cleanthes about the proper cure for passion (Cic. *Tusc. 3.77 = SVF 1 577*). 36 Cleanthes tried to convince those in pain or grief that they were mistaken in their belief that evil was present, because only virtue is good

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33 “I think that it has been said enough that grief is a belief that evil is present, the content of which includes that ‘it is fitting to submit to grief’. To this definition, it was rightly added by Zeno that the belief that evil is present is ‘fresh’. They interpret this word such that they would have not only that which happened a little before be fresh, but however long a certain force inheres in the supposed evil so that it ‘thrives’ and has a certain ‘greenness’, they would have it be called fresh. The famous Artemisia, the wife of Mausolus, King of Caria, who commissioned that eminent sepulcher at Halicarnassus, lived in grief her entire life, and wasted away consumed with it. For her, the belief was fresh every day, since it is no longer called fresh only when it has withered to dust with age.”

34 The Latin shows that Cicero’s source is, as might be expected, later than Zeno. He begins by saying that *recens* (πρόσφατος) is Zenonian, but his *interpretantur* indicates a later doxography. Perhaps whatever Zeno said about πρόσφατος required clarification and *ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat* was proposed.

35 Except for circumstantial evidence (*supra n.26*), convincing proof is lacking that Zeno understood the definition of πρόσφατος to contain the proposition *ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat*. In the present state of the evidence I do not accept Inwood’s view (147, 153) that Zeno and Chrysippus agreed on the nature of the passions. *Cf.* Bonhöffer 270. I shall argue for a subtle difference in their positions that Posidonius exploits.

36 Inwood (146–54) does not emphasize Cicero’s evidence on Cleanthes in the doxography on πρόσφατος. In my view, Cleanthes’ position can reveal something about Zeno’s position and forms the background of Posidonius’ discussion of moral progressors that Inwood (154) dismisses.
and only vice evil. What they perceive as evil only appears to be so. Cleanthes learned this treatment from Zeno. But Cleanthes could do nothing to relieve the passion of a moral progressor like Aeschines' Alcibiades, who was overcome with grief when Socrates demonstrated his lack of virtue (August. *De civ. D.* 14.8=Aeschin. fr. 5 Dittmar). Cicero (*Tusc.* 3.77) sums up the problem raised by this example (Alcibiades' correct belief that evil was present could not change over time):38 “Cleanthes consoles the wise man who needs no consolation,” i.e., the man who can curb passion by considering what is good and what is evil.

Chrysippus seems to take up the moral progressor's case when he insists that the chief cause of passion is the belief that it is necessary. But it does not follow that passion is necessary or appropriate even from a conclusion that a man is without virtue and thus vicious. If Cicero's reports are taken together, Zeno seems to have understood the *doxa prosphatos* to mean an opinion that is “in full vigor” or “in the prime of youth” (*ut vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem*), and indeed this is the original use of *prosphatos* in Greek: “not yet decomposed” human corpses or “fresh” perishable food items (LSJ s.v.).39 The concept is not necessarily temporal, nor does it denote a specific proposition.

Zeno’s interpreters also say that the force inheres “in the supposed evil” (*opinato malo*).40 This must mean “in the supposi-

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37 Cic. *Tusc.* 2.60=SVF I 607—clearly an historical anecdote from a later doxography and thus of limited reliability (cf. SVF I 422–34), but consistent with Cicero’s general picture: Zeno coined the phrase δόξα πρόσφατος; later interpreters had to spell out its meaning; Chrysippus disagreed with Cleanthes about how to cure the passions (and therefore what the root cause was); and Cleanthes learned his cure for the passions from Zeno.


39 *Il.* 24.757; *Hdt.* 2.89; Zeno in Cic. *Tusc.* 3.75. This interpretation seems consistent with Zeno’s definition of passion and inconsistent with Chrysippus’ position in *Tusc.*

40 Cic. *Tusc.* 3.75; cf. Ps.-Andron. *On Passions* I 12.3=SVF III 391: προσ-δοκομένου δεινοῦ (Giusta II 249). φαινόμενον, modifying “goods” and “evils,” appears in some textbook definitions of the passions: e.g. Stob. *Ecl.* 2.88.16ff=SVF III 378 (*ἐπιθυμίᾳ μὲν ὁν καὶ φόβῳ προηγείσθαι, τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον κακόν*); Aspasius in *Eth. Nic.* p.44.12 Heylb.=SVF III 386. On the connection between “apparent goods” and *phantasia* see nn.107, 109 infra. Bonhoeffer (266ff; cf. Inwood 147 n.86) argues that there is essentially no difference between “fresh” to describe the evil and “fresh” for the opinion. Perhaps not, but Cleanthes’ cure for the pas-
tion,” rather than “in the thing,” but the wording may suggest something between the two such as “in the thing as perceived.” In passion one assents to a presentation with a subsisting lektōn (supra n.32). Interpreters may have taken Zeno to mean, “So long as the presentation that the thing is evil remains, the judgment and the passion will persist,” perhaps because the fool lacks the sufficient disposition to withhold his assent to it. Hence the opinion—the weak assent—will remain fresh until the presentation changes; and in the case of Artemisia, who contemplated her husband’s death daily, the presentation remained forever the same. This explanation can give real meaning to the use of the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus in the exemplum: the nobile sepulchrum created an eternal reminder or presentation of her husband’s death. If Cicero’s opinatō malo is a meaningful rendering of what Zeno had in mind, it may be that Zeno associated the “fresh” element in passion with the presentation to which the assent is given. This position would leave Zeno open to questions about the cause of passion. Presentations cannot ‘cause’ action in any strict sense—one may always withhold assent (Origen De princ. 3.1.3). Yet Zeno might have responded that the wise man always withholds his assent to all but the true presentation, κατάλαβε τήν φαντασία, while the fool assents weakly and rashly to merely persuasive presentations.42 As passion is found only in fools, it might well be said that the ‘freshness’ of the opinion that causes the impulse remains as long as the presentation remains persuasive.

Chrysippus, unlike Zeno, understands passion not as “following upon” an assent, but as an assent itself. He concludes that the cause of passion and the content of its ‘freshness’ is an assent to its “appropriateness” rather than the result of an incorrect decision about the presence of good or evil (Long and Sedley I 421). Chrysippus tried to treat the passions by removing from the

41 Professor Kidd brings to my attention τῆς προσφώτης φαντασίας at [Mag. Mor.] 1203b4f. Inwood (248f) argues that the [Mag. Mor.] shows Stoic influence, which would make it not a precedent but perhaps still a corollary depending on the date of the [Mag. Mor.].

42 Stob. Ecl. 2.111.18–112.8 (=SVF III 548 part), 2.68.18–23 (=III 663).
agent's mind his belief that passion is "just" or "obligatory" (\textit{justo atque debito}; Cic. \textit{Tusc.} 3.76=SVF III 486, 4.62=III 488). A passage in Galen purports to show Chrysippus' inability to explain why the passions cease with the passage of time, \textit{i.e.}, how they cease to be 'fresh'. The passage, probably chosen to imply Chrysippus' confusion, suggests how presentation may have played a central rôle in the Zenonian doctrine of the passions that Chrysippus was possibly attempting to refine:

\begin{quote}
\textit{dòkei dé moī hé mèn tòiówtē dòxa diámevnein, oti kàkòn aúto àn ò dè pàrrestin, ègkrónižoménei dè' ánìesbhai ìì sústolh kai òs oìmài ìì ìì tìn sústolh òrhì, tuxòn dè kai tautùs dià-
menòùsos oûì ùpakoúsetai tà èxèis, diá poiàs àllìn èpì-
gnìmòènì diàståsen dìvsuÌlògìstòn tòútòn gínomènù. òntò
ùàr kai klàioùnteas páùontai kai ìì boulòmènuì klàieìn
klàioùsìn, òntàm ìì òmòia àìs fàntasìas tà ùpokèìmìna
pòìè kai ènìstìtìe ìì ìì mèðèn. ònà tròpòn gàr ìì ðèrìhòm
pàùosìs gínetai kai klàvûmì, tòiàùta wùlògì kai èpì'
ekeìnìw svntuÌxènì wìì tà òtìz àrkhàs màllòn tàw pròg-
màtòn kìvòùntwò, kàthàpèr épì tàw tàw gélòta kìvòùntw
ùìvòìì, kai tà òmòia tòútòs.}
\end{quote}

This passage, taken with Cleanthes' treatment of the passions (\textit{Tusc.} 3.76f) and Zeno's definition of \textit{prosphatos} (\textit{Tusc.} 3.75), suggests a debate. Zeno defines the passions as \textit{épìgìmòènà krisèsi}, that is, as the "contractions" (\textit{sústolài}) themselves. The cause of the contraction is the impulse; the cause of the impulse is the assent. But the presentation cannot be said to be the cause of the assent, because assent is the locus of respon-

\begin{footnote}
\textit{Galen} \textit{PHP} 4.284.7–17=EK 165.59–70: "It seems to me that an opinion of this sort remains, that the very thing which is present is bad, but that as it \textit{(sc. the opinion)} lingers the contraction relaxes and, as I think, the impulse to the contraction. Perhaps even if this \textit{(sc. the opinion)} remains, the things which follow will not obey, as these things occur by some other supervening disposition which is hard to account for. For it is in this way that people cease weeping and weep even when they do not want to weep, whenever underlying circumstances produce dissimilar presentations and something or nothing interferes. For in the same way that the cessation of laments and weepings occurs, it is reasonable that such things should occur in those cases, since things are more stimulative at the beginnings, just as I said occurs in the case of things which stimulate laughter; and also things similar to these." Tr. Inwood 149 with nn.94f on the textual difficulties. Gosling argues \textit{(supra n.22: 192f)} that Chrysippus also attempted to refine Zenonian doctrine on the passions at \textit{PHP} 4.240.18–29.
\end{footnote}
The above passage, purporting to show the confused state of Chrysippean doctrine, may in fact preserve the state of Stoic doctrine after Zeno. If a passion is an impulse rather than an opinion, the passions might appear to come and go merely by a change of presentation without a change of opinion, i.e., assent. For example, one may try to forget about something painful by going to a show or even taking a long vacation, and the passion may subside (thanks to a change of presentation) without one’s having ceased to believe that what had happened was bad. The seeds of Chrysippus’ answer may be seen in Zeno’s claim that all impulses are made to “something appropriate” (supra n.26): the impulse to passion must have been judged ‘appropriate’, and that judgment must be reversed for the impulse to subside, whether consciously or unconsciously.

The thorny point is that there are two parts to the doxa prospatos: the false belief that good or evil is present, and the false belief that “it is appropriate to submit to passion” (ut aegritudinem suspicere oporteat: Cic. Tusc. 3.74; Long and Sedley I 421). The latter clause seems to have been associated especially with the word “fresh,” so that when the ‘appropriateness’ faded, the doxa would cease to be prospatos and the passion would subside. But the fading of the ‘appropriateness’ is a complex matter: passion may also subside merely by a change of presentation. Cicero explains Chrysippus’ position that there are also two causes of any human action, the assent and the presentation:

Quod enim dicantur adsensiones fieri causis antepositionibus, id quale sit, facile a se explicari putat. Nam quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen, cum id visum proximam causam habeat, non principalem, hanc habet rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam dudum diximus, non ut illa quidem fieri possit nulla vi extrinsecus excitata (necesse est enim adsensionem viso commoveri).

44 Cic. Fat. 39–43=SVF II 974; Gell. NA 7.2.6–13=SVF II 1000; see Long and Sedley I 392ff; Inwood 44–50.

45 Fat. 42=SVF II 974.16–24: “He thinks that he can easily explain the statement that acts of assent come about by prior causes. For although assent cannot occur unless it is prompted by an impression, nevertheless, since it has that impression as its proximate, not its primary cause, Chrysippus wants it to have the rationale which I mentioned just now. He does not want assent, at least, to be able to occur without the stimulus of some external force (for assent must be prompted by an impression).” Tr. Long and Sedley I 387f; cf. 393 for commentary.
The Chrysippean theory of causation discussed here shows that presentations are proximate causes of assents. In the case of the fool, Chrysippus argues that passion fades and the *doxa* ceases to be fresh only when the agent ceases to believe that his passion is ‘appropriate’ (rather than when he ceases to believe that good or evil is present, as Cleanthes argues: *supra* n.36). This may happen over time without the conscious knowledge of the agent, and it may result simply from a change in presentation: ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίας τὰς φαντασίας τὰ ὑποκείμενα ποιή (*supra* n.43). Among fools whose assents are weak and easily influenced, a change in presentation, i.e., in the proximate cause of action, may cause passions to begin and end, because the real cause of passion, the controlling cause, is the fool’s inferior state of soul that will yield to any persuasive presentation.46

The evidence suggests that Chrysippus was particularly concerned to explain the cause of passion, the *aitia*, and its abatement. When he says that the false belief in the appropriateness of the passion must change for the passion to subside, he shows that the genuine cause of passion is the prior, the assent to the appropriateness of passion, not the proximate, the impression of the apparent good or evil (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.76= *SVF* III 486). Moreover, he shows that of the two assents involved in the δόξα πρόσφατος, that the thing is good or evil, and that it is appropriate to submit to passion, the latter is more correctly called the ‘cause’.

II. Selection and the End

If passion is a movement of the soul contrary to reason, the goal of life is to have one’s soul always move in accordance with reason. The passions make man live in conflict with nature and unhappily. The cause of passion and the cause of a happy life are both to be found in man’s understanding of what is most important, that is, of what is the good. To see how Posidonius’ arguments on the passions might apply to his view of the end, it is important to understand the Stoic doctrines of good, evil, and the “indifferents,” on which the doctrines on the passions and on the *telos* depend.

The occasion of passion involves a certain belief about good and evil. The special case of Alcibiades (who really was in the presence of evil) notwithstanding, a man ordinarily decides that

46 See Inwood 81; Long and Sedley I 420f.
“it is appropriate to submit to passion” when believing that something other than virtue or vice is good or evil. For the Stoics, all the things that come between are “indifferent” (ἀδιά­φορα). The indifferents that accord with nature have “value” (ἀξία) and are “preferred” (προηγμένα); those contrary to nature have “disvalue” (ἀπαξία) and are to be “dispreferred” (ἀποπροηγμένα: Stob. Eel. 2.84.18–85.11=SVF III 128), and some have neither value nor disvalue (D.L. 7.104=SVF III 119).

As the practice of virtue requires interaction with the world, the rational selection of the indifferents is the practice of virtue. Hence Cicero calls them the “subject matter” of virtue. The wise man will decide whether to commit suicide or remain in life purely on the basis of the availability of this subject matter with which to practice virtue (Cic. Fin. 3.61=SVF III 763).

The wise man who selects properly remains free from passion in the technical sense, but he experiences the rational counterparts of passion—the harmonious motions of the soul acting in accordance with reason, the ευπάθεια. He will experience χαρά (joy), a well-reasoned expansion of the soul based upon the correct belief that he is in the presence of good along with βουλημενία, the motion based upon the correct belief that good is approaching, and εὐλάβεια (precaution), the motion based upon the correct belief that evil is approaching (Cic. Tusc. 4.14=SVF III 438). He never believes that he is in the presence of evil because the wise man will always avoid vice. All definitions of the ευπάθεια include “properly reasoned” (εὐλογος) motions of the soul, whereas passion, an irrational motion, arises from an improperly reasoned belief about good and evil.

The wise man exercises “reservation” in his decisions about the indifferents, a certain restraint by which he acknowledges that their acquisition is of no consequence to his happiness.47 This mental reserve is the wise man’s way of preserving his fundamental belief that what is indifferent cannot be good or evil and, therefore, that its presence or absence should not lead him to passion. The technical term for reservation, ὑπεξιής, is late (e.g. Stobaeus, Seneca, et al.),48 but the concept may date to

48 Stob. Eel. 2.115.5=SVF III 564; Sen. Ben. 4.34=III 565 (exceptio); cf. Arr. Epict. Diss. 2.6.9f (=III 191), 3.24.23f, 85ff; Enchiridion 2f; M. Ant. 4.1, 5.20, 6.50, 11.37.
Zeno, who is quoted that the ultimate source of all the passions is, in a way, intemperance, defined as “the knowledge of what is to be chosen, what avoided, and what is neither” (ἐπιστήμη ἀφετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων), i.e., what is “good,” what is “evil,” and what is neither. Temperance is one of the four Stoic virtues, along with wisdom, justice, and courage. As virtue is perfected only in the wise man, it follows that only the wise man is perfectly temperate and thus free from passion. The definition of virtue also shows the central position in which the Stoics place the knowledge of good, evil, and the indifferents in the realm of action: οὐ συνελθεῖν καὶ οὐ ποιητέων καὶ οὐδετέρον, ἢ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων φύσει πολιτικοῦ (λογικοῦ) ζῶου.

The chief function of temperance is to keep the soul free from excessive delights and distresses (Cic. *Tusc.* 4.37; 3.16ff=SVF III 570). It can accomplish this because it urges the wise man to mark the greatness of the universe and his own ephemeral existence and to keep watch lest anything strike him as “unexpected” or “unforeseen” (nihil improvisum, nihil inopinatum, nihil omnino novum: *Tusc.* 4.37). By Stobaeus’ definition of ὑπεξαίρεσις (Ecl. 2.115.5=SVF III 564) nothing will strike the wise man “unforeseen” (ἀπρόληπτον). Whether Zenonian or not, the “reser-
vation” by which the wise man distinguishes the indifferents from good and evil is what keeps him free from the passions.

The wise man is to have an unrestrained impulse to the good and from evil (Arr. Epict. Diss. 3.24.23f, 85ff), but he must exercise restraint in the realm of the indifferent things. Chrysippus describes the rôle of selection in a life of virtue as follows:

διὰ τούτο καλῶς ὁ Χρύσιππος λέγει ὅτι μέχρις ἂν ἄδηλά μοι ἦ τὰ ἔξης, ἀπὶ τῶν εὐφυεστέρων ἐξομαί πρὸς τὸ τυχαίνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· αὐτὸς γὰρ ο ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν τούτων ἐκλεκτικῶν. εἰ δὲ γε ἦδειν ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθειμαρταί νῦν, καὶ ὄρμων ἂν ἐπὶ αὐτὸ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πούς, εἰ φρένας εἴχεν, ὄρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλώσθαι.53

Chrysippus makes the important point that nature intends man to obey fate—the reason that guides the universe—and to select the things in accordance with nature. Obedience to fate is man’s primary duty. The pursuit of the indifferents is secondary. The wise man does all things with reservation in order to preserve this order commanded by nature. Reservation is indispensable to man’s happiness inasmuch as he must select among the indifferents to live and to practice virtue.

The Stoics observe that the indifferents play a rôle in every phase of man’s life.54 Man’s first impulses are to self-preservation and to things important for self-preservation (Cic. Fin. 3.16). When he attains the age of reason, he learns that what he formerly sought by instinct, he now seeks by reason. The selections of the indifferents by conscious choice are “appropriate actions” (καθήκωντα). In time the habit of performing appropriate acts leads to the observation that the choice of things in accordance with nature creates a harmony with nature that is choice-worthy in itself. This life of harmony with nature comprises a life of virtue that he comes to esteem more highly than the things he chooses. Harmony with nature includes harmony

53 Arr. Epict. Diss. 2.6.9f=SVR III 564: “For this reason Chrysippus speaks properly when he says, “As long as what will happen is unclear to me, I hold fast to those things which are more suited to the attainment of the things in accordance with nature. For God himself made me inclined to select them. But if I knew that it is fated for me to be sick right now, I would direct my impulse to it. Even my foot, if it could reason, would direct its impulse to being muddied.” See Inwood 119–26.

with Zeus' divine reason that directs the fate of the universe (D.L. 7.87ff=SVF I 162). Man therefore directs his efforts at perfecting his own reason and making it conform to the perfect reason of Zeus. When the wise man perfectly performs appropriate acts in accordance with Right Reason, they are virtuous acts (κατορθώματα: Fin. 3.21-24=SVF III 188.18, 497, 11, 186). First impulses lead to the “preferred indifferents” (tà κατά φύσιν or προηγμένα); they are both the “origin” (ἀρχή) and the “material” (ॐη) of appropriate actions (καθηκοντα); lastly, they are the οὐλη of καθηκοντα, the materia sapientiae, the stuff with which virtue and virtuous acts deal, but they are not the origin of virtue, and their acquisition is not the goal of virtue (Plut. Mor. 1069E=SVF III 491). A happy life in accordance with reason and fate depends upon the wise man’s belief that the indifferents are neither good nor the goal of virtue.

In passion one assents not only to the proposition that what is indifferent is good or evil but also to the proposition that passion is in accordance with nature. Part of the definition of the doxa prosphatos is that one “ought” to have a passion (ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat: supra n.26). Chrysippus sees the “ought” as the cause of passion; one treats passion by convincing the subject that passion is not an officium, an “appropriate act”: Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrhere illam opinionem maerenti, si se officio fungi putet iusto atque debito.55 Posidonius also understands Chrysippus to define passion as the belief that “it is appropriate and in accordance with the valuation” of things that are present to be moved to passion (Galen PHP 4.264.23=EK 164.18: καθηκον καὶ κατ’ ύξιαν). On this evidence Chrysippus seems to observe that the agent mistakenly decides passion is “to be preferred”: the doxa prosphatos of passion is identified with the belief that passion is an “appropriate act”; that is, he focuses on what the agent judges about passion, an internal phenomenon, rather than what he may judge about external things or events.

The Stoic formulae for the telos recognize the interdependence of the doctrines on man’s relationship to nature, on the selection of indifferents, and on the subordinate role of the indif-

55 Cic. Tusc. 3.76=SVF III 486: “But Chrysippus judges that the main thing in consolation is to take away this opinion from the one who is grieving, if he should think that he is performing an appropriate act which is just and owed.”
ferents in the practice of virtue. These formulae also tacitly recognize that passion is a threat to the happy life. Zeno defined the end (telos) as τὸ ὁμολογομένῳ ζῆν ("to live harmoniously and consistently"). Zeno’s successors revised the definition with the apparent intention of expressing the content of ὁμολογομένως, i.e., to give concrete definition to "living by rational consistency." Stobaeus says (Ecl. 2.75.1-6) that Cleanthes added "with nature" (τῇ φύσει) to the formula because Zeno’s successors felt that the shorter formula was an incomplete predicate. Diogenes Laertius (7.87) attributes τῇ φύσει to Zeno. Attempts to redefine the predicate, to spell out what should qualify τῷ ζῆν, concentrate on man’s relationship to nature. Chrysippus is also said (Stob. Ecl. 2.76.6ff) to have given the telos as "to live in accordance with the experience of things which happen by nature" (ζῆν κατ’ ἐμπειρίᾳ τῶν φύσει συμβαίνοντων). κατ’ ἐμπειρίᾳ suggests that man should live in accordance with what he can observe about the divine logos. Man’s goal is to make his logos conform perfectly with the divine logos and Chrysippus’ formula focuses on how he should do this. Man cannot observe the universe as it is, but only he can understand it (Inwood 203f). He should make himself a willing follower of fate, the ultimate teacher, and, like the dog tied behind the cart (Hippol. Philos. 21 [Diels Dox. Graec. p.571.11= SVF II 975), he should make his own motions conform with what events demand (D.L. 7.87f=SVF III 4; I 552, 162).

Cicero appends Chrysippus’ formula without attribution: vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint reicientem, id est convenienter congruerenteque naturae vivere. The addition of selection and disselection may or may not belong to Chrysippus, but, in any event, Cicero sees Chrysip-
pus' formula in expanded form as an explanation of *convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere*, i.e., τὸ ὁμολογομένος τῇ φύσει ζήν. Selection is logically added as the natural consequence of living κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν. As seen earlier, man's relationship to nature is expressed in two ways: first, man must make his own *logos* conform to that of nature; and second, he must select among the indifferents in accordance with *logos* (cf. *supra* n.53). Cicero's formula suggests an interconnection of the two relationships.

The assimilation of one's own *logos* to divine *logos* is the final step of οἰκείωσις, the process by which man comes to realize the life that nature intended for him and by which he lives in accordance with nature. Chrysippus describes this process in his *Peri tēlōn* (D.L. 7.85f=SVF III 178): man is constituted so as to be attracted by what will contribute to his own preservation; like the animals, man's impulse (ἀρμή) can only be stimulated by what is "appropriate" (οἰκείον); but because man has reason, he can use *logos* to govern his impulse. Reason performs this supervision as a craftsman (*logos* = τεχνίτης; D.L. 7.86) practices his craft. Stobaeus records that only "an hormetic presentation of something appropriate" (φαντασία ὀρμητική τοῦ καθήκοντος) can stimulate man's impulse; thus Diogenes' οἰκείον also has the sense of καθήκονον. In other contexts Stobaeus says that the preferred indifferents (the ὑλη and ἀρχή of καθήκοντα) are capable of stimulating impulse (*Ecl. 2.82.5–10* = *SVF* III 121; cf. *Ecl. 2.75.1* = III 131). Therefore Diogenes' *logos*, which supervises impulse, would include in its "craft" the selection of which indifferents will be allowed to stimulate man's impulse. Man's goal is to make his reason conform to divine reason; the function of his rational craft is to preside over his impulse. By this line of reasoning two kinds of craftsmen are discerned: those who supervise their impulse imperfectly because their reason does not conform to nature, and those who supervise it perfectly because their reason does conform to nature.

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60 *Ecl. 2.86.17f; Inwood 84f with n.208; cf. *supra* n.26. οἰκείον as a concept predates the Stoics and occurs in Epicureanism: see Brink (*supra* n.57) 139ff; S. G. Pembroke, “Οἰκείοσις,” in Long, ed., (*supra* n.2) 114–49; J. Brunschwig, “The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism,” in Schofield and Striker, edd. (*supra* n.22) 113–44; Vander Waerdt, “Hermarchus” 97 n.40. Its rôle in the *apraxia*-argument (*supra* n.26), however, suggests either that Zeno used the term or that later reporters like Diogenes accepted the more universal οἰκείον as an acceptable substitute for καθήκον.
Diogenes of Babylon defined the telos as “reasoning well in the selection and disselection of things in accordance with nature” (εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ).  

Antipater, his student, is credited with two formulas that also use selection in the definition of the telos: (1) “to live continuously selecting things in accordance with nature and disselecting things contrary to nature (ζην ἐκληγομένους μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκληγομένους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν); (2) “to do everything in one’s power continuously and undeviatingly with a view to obtaining the predominating things which accord with nature” (πάν τὸ καθ’ αὕτων ποιεῖν διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως πρὸς τὸ τυχάνειν τῶν προηγομένων κατὰ φύσιν).  

Both Diogenes and Antipater attempt to incorporate man’s dual relationship (supra 253 with n.53) to nature into a single formula.  

For Diogenes, εὐλογιστεῖν (“to reason properly”) expresses the first duty of making man’s reason conform to divine reason.  

Antipater’s first formula requires selecting and rejecting what ought to be selected and rejected, i.e., τὰ κατὰ φύσιν and τὰ παρὰ φύσιν. In the second formula man’s first duty consists in the effort intended by πὰν τὸ καθ’ αὕτων ποιεῖν διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως, where the adverbs may allude to “consistency” and where “to do everything in one’s power” certainly includes the exercise of reason. But the adverbs may more properly allude to ‘rational impulse’. A generous reading of Antipater’s second formula might interpret it as the obligation to exercise the rational consistency advocated by Zeus in dealing with indifferents. 

Diogenes and Antipater (in his first formula) expressly emphasize man’s second duty to select the indifferents. In Antipater’s second formula, however, man’s efforts towards “acquiring” (τυχάνειν) the indifferents replace his duty of selection. Plu-

61 Stob. Eel. 2.76.9ff=SVF III Diog. 44ff (tr. Long and Sedley I 357); D.L. 7.88; Clem. Al. Strom. 2.21 p.179 Sylb. (I 497 Pott.). Diogenes and Clement omit καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ.  

62 Stob. Eel. 2.76.11–15=SVF III Ant.57; tr. Long and Sedley I 357. Clement’s single formula (Strom. 2.21 p.179 Sylb. [,V.2 497 Pott.=SVF III Ant.58) conflates the two: ‘Ἀντίπατρος ... τὸ τέλος κείσθαι ἐν τῷ διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως ἐκλήγεσθαι μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλήγεσθαι δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπολαμβάνει.  

63 For continuity between the formulae of Chrysippus and Diogenes see Long (supra n.59) 68–73; A. Bonhöffer, “Die Telosformel des Stoikers Diogenes,” Philologus 67 (1908) 582–625.  

64 Long and Sedley I 408; Sen. Ep. 92.11ff; cf. εὐλογοῖς in definitions of εὐπάθειαν: supra 251.
tarch provides the only clue for why he may have chosen to
define rationally consistent selection as a rationally consistent
attempt “to acquire” the indifferents: Antipater was forced to
defend himself against the attacks of Carneades.⁶⁵

III. Carneades and the Stoic Telos

It is especially difficult to discuss the impact of Carneades up­
on Stoic doctrine because he cannot be held accountable for
positions adopted for the sake of argument. As his attacks on the
Stoa are ad hoc (e.g. Cic. Orat. 3.80; Lactant. Div. Instit. 5.14.3ff,
Epit. 50.8), we not only have to sift out from divergent sources
what Carneades may have said, but must also discover the
original context. Scholars have attempted to reconstruct the frag­
ments of his debate with Antipater from Plutarch and Cicero.⁶⁶

Plutarch complicates the task if, as generally assumed, Car­
neades began his criticism with the argument that Plutarch
presents last.⁶⁷ Carneades, a student of Diogenes in dialectic
(Cic. Acad. 2.98) and possibly thirty years his junior (Long
[supra n.59] 75f), served with him in the Athenian embassy to
Rome (155 B.C.). These considerations and Plutarch’s clue (supra
n.65) suggest that Carneades attacked the telos-formula
of Diogenes via Antipater’s first formula (essentially the same as
Diogenes’) and that Antipater attempted to answer the criticism
of Carneades with his second formula.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Plut. Mor. 1072f (=SVF III Ant.59 part), 1071α (=III 195 [supra n.20]); cf. III Ant.4–7.
⁶⁶ Plut. Mor. 1070f–72f=SVF III 195, 26, Ant.59; Cic. Fin. 3.22, 5.16–20 and
Tusc. 5.84=III 18, 497, 44. It is generally inferred from Plutarch’s reference to
Carneades at 1072f that Carneades is the indirect source for the whole passage:
Long and Sedley I 407–10. For the debate between Antipater and Carneades
see also B. Inwood, “Goal and Target in Stoicism,” JPhilos 83 (1986) 547–56;
Irwin (supra n.56) 228–34; Long (supra n.59); H. Reiner, “Die ethische Weis­
Telos der Stoiker,” Hermes 69 (1934) 13–45; Rist (supra n.57) 161–67; M.
Soreth, “Die zweite Telosformula des Antipater von Tarsos,” ArchGeschPhilos
50 (1968) 48–72; G. Striker, “Antipater or the Art of Living,” in Schofield and
Striker (supra n.22; hereafter ‘Striker’) 185–204; and, most importantly, R.
Alpers-Golz, Der Begriff ΣΚΟΠΟΣ in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte (=Spud-
⁶⁷ Long and Sedley I 407f; Striker 189f; Long (supra n.59) 76.
⁶⁸ Striker 189; Long and Sedley I 409.
Against Antipater, Carneades argues that the objects of selection must be valuable only to the extent that they contribute to the end, which is reasoning well in their selection. This produces "the end is reasoning well in the selections of things having value with respect to reasoning well" (τέλος ἐστι τὸ εὐλογιστείν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς τῶν ἁξίων ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστείν). The Stoics, in response, argue that "selective value" is determined not by the contribution of the indifferent to the end, but solely on the basis of their accordance with nature. Carneades then asks why, if they have value, their acquisition is not an end in itself. Plutarch's account of the debate presents first the argument that it is "contrary to common conception" (παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν) that life should have two τέλη and σκοποί: παρὰ τὴν ἐννοιαν ἐστι δύο τέλη καὶ σκοποὺς προκεισθαι τοῦ βίου καὶ μὴ πάντων ὁσα πράττομεν ἐφ’ ἐν τι γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀναφοράν ἐτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐστι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἀλλο μὲν εἶναι τέλος ἐκ ἀλλο δὲ τῶν πραττομενον ἐκαστον ἀναφέρεσθαι. The distinction of telos ("goal") and skopos ("target") derives from the Stoic position that living is an art (τέχνη). Antipater's telos-formula seems to refer to this doctrine. As the Stoic understanding of this art involves many interrelated concepts, it may be useful to consider how this "art of living" differs from other arts before treating Plutarch's technical distinction between telos and skopos.

The so-called Carneadea divisio, in which Carneades claims to represent all the possible goals of life (Cic. Fin. 5.16–20), begins with Carneades' assertion that every art must be distinct from what it is supposed to accomplish: est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod proposition sit arti. The Stoics, on the other hand, suppose a kind of τέχνη (ars) whose purpose is merely its practice, a στοιχαστική τέχνη ("aiming art").

70 Stob. Ecl. 2.80.7–13, 83.10–84.2=SVF III 124; D.L. 7.105=III 126.
71 Plut. Mor. 1070F–71A: "It is contrary to common conception that two goals and targets of life be set up and that there be not one single point of reference for everything we do, but it is even further contrary to common conception that one thing be the goal and that each of the things we do be referred to something else."
72 Fin. 5.16: "for it is evident that no craft is concerned just with itself, but the craft and its object are distinct" (tr. Long and Sedley I 403).
73 Striker 194f; Alex. Aphr. De an. 2.159.34; Cic. Fin. 3.24.
Their understanding of the στοχαστική τέχνη is combined with their definition of the telos: “τέλος ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται καθήκοντως, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται οὐδένος ἕνεκα. κα－
κείνως οὗ χάριν τάλλα, αὐτὸ δ’ οὐδένος ἕνεκα.” Καὶ πάλιν: “ἐφ’
ὅ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πρατόμενα καθήκοντος τὴν ἀναφορὰν
λαμβάνει, αὐτὸ δ’ ἐπʼ οὐδέν.”74 The key word in this definition is ἕ
νεκα (or χάριν: “for the sake of”). The telos is the expression of
life’s purpose. A telos-formula must not contain “for the sake of” or an infinite regress occurs. The telos is the end of the line:
as Stobaeus says, αὐτὸ δ’ οὐδένος ἕνεκα. It follows that the art
that describes it must be the purpose and not have another pur-
pose of its own: the practice of the στοχαστική τέχνη of virtue is
the telos—not an easy concept to grasp. This craft has no other
purpose. Its purpose is its practice, because this “aiming art” is
the practice of virtue that needs no further purpose. The substi-
tution of ἕνεκα for πρὸς in Antipater’s formula serves Carne-
ades’ purposes well. Posidonius’ use of that word, moreover, is
unlikely to have been casual or a simple error, because the most
basic of all principles of Hellenistic philosophy is that the telos
must be the “end” of all activity of life (Long and Sedley I 398).
The Stoics answer the charge in the divisio that no craft may
be concerned solely with itself, i.e., contain its purpose within
itself and depend upon nothing external for its fulfillment:

Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam
esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et
saltationi, ut in ipsa insit, non foris petatur extremum, id
est artis effectio. Et tamen est etiam alia cum his ipsis artibus
sapientiae dissimilium, propterea quod in illis quae recte
facta sunt, non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus con-
stant; quae autem—illi appellant κατορθοματα, omnes nu-
meros virtutis continent. Sola enim sapientia in se tota
conversa.75

74 Stob. Ecl. 2.46.5–10=SVF III 2: “The telos is that for the sake of which all
things are properly done but which is itself done for the sake of nothing,’ and
in the same way as, ‘for the sake of which, everything else; itself for the sake of
nothing.’ And again, ‘that to which everything done in life properly has its
reference; itself referred to nothing’.”

75 Cic. Fin. 3.24=SVF III 11: “For we do not consider that wisdom is similar
to navigation or medicine, but rather to acting, as I just said, and dancing, so
that the telos, i.e., the practice of the craft, is contained within itself and is not
sought outside of it. But there is yet another difference between wisdom and
these other crafts, namely that in the case of other crafts, the products which
have been made correctly do not contain all of the parts of the crafts from
which they come; but those things which the Stoics call κατορθοματα, contain
Cicero undoubtedly attempts to answer the charge that in crafts such as medicine the nature of the *telos* is disputed. From the patient’s viewpoint, the doctor’s *telos* ought to be “to save the patient”; from the doctor’s standpoint, it ought to be “to do everything he can.” In Alexander of Aphrodisias’ discussion of medicine (*Top.* 32.27–33.6), the “external result” (*τὸ προκείμενον*) of the craft of medicine is “to save the patient” (*τὸ σώσατο*); the “function” of the doctor (*ἐργον*) is “to do everything in his power” (*πάντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ποιήσατο*). These last words echo Antipater’s second formula for the end (*supra* n.62), but Alexander’s *προκείμενον* and *ἐργον* come from Aristotle (*Rh.* 1355b8–14, *Top.* 101b5–15).76 Medicine was one of the stock examples of the “aiming art” because of the obvious rôle of factors beyond the practitioner’s control, e.g., fortune. For Aristotelians the external *telos* should be the result. The Stoics rejected this view and placed the *telos* with the practitioner’s function. Thus the Stoics had to sacrifice the position of common sense that the purpose of medicine is to heal for the paradoxical claim that the purpose of a stochastic craft is its practice. The difficulties attendant upon such a position led them to reject medicine as a fitting *exemplum*.

It seems to do some violence to the concept of medicine to say, as Cicero’s last line demands, that the practice of medicine is concerned entirely with itself and that the patient is not an integral part of practicing that art: the patient is not only the subject matter upon which it is practiced but also a participant in the healing process.77 The Stoics must surely have regarded medicine as a stochastic craft, but one insufficiently similar to that of virtue, perhaps because of the ability of τοῦχη to disrupt the craft of medicine but not the craft of virtue.

The central issues in the debate over this art of living, then, were how its products or results differ from those of other

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76 Irwin 229f; Long and Sedley I 409f. Alexander’s *τὸ πάντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ποιήσατο* curiously echoes Posidonius (*supra* n.16)—perhaps from a common source.

77 Alpers-Gölz’s instructive list (67f) of the Academic and Peripatetic uses of the craft of medicine in the doxography of the *stochastike techne* reveals the probable source of Carneades’ inspiration for his approach to the Stoic conception of the *skopos*. It is unclear in what technical language the Stoics described medicine.
crafts, and in what sense it is rightly called an “aiming” art. An important question is at what does one aim while practicing virtue, if virtue is practiced for its own sake. In both Greek and English the image of an archer and target suggests that the target is the goal, and that we succeed or fail in our aim as we hit or miss the target. The concept is embedded deeply in Greek thought, as ἀμφοτέρα ("missing the mark") shows. But the Stoics did not conceive of happiness or virtue in a common sense way, and their use of the image of archery was equally paradoxical: if virtue is practiced for its own sake, and if the practice of virtue is like the art of aiming, either it must not matter whether we hit the target or not, or the target as well as the art of aiming must be virtue in some sense.

Cleanthes and Chrysippus are credited with making the following distinction between telos and skopos ("what one looks at" or uses as a "sight"):

Τέλος δὲ φαίνει εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, όθ ἐνικα πάντα πράττεται, αὐτῶ δὲ πράττεται μὲν οὐδενὸς δὲ ἐνικα· τούτο δὲ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὁμολογουμένῳ ζῆν, ἐτὶ, ταύτου ὄντος, ἐν τῷ κατά φύσιν ζῆν. Τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν ὃ Ζήνων ὄρισε τὸν τρόπον τούτον· εὐδαιμονία δέ ἐστιν εὐφροσύνη. Κέρχηται δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης τῷ ὅρῳ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτω ἑγγράμμασι καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τούτων πάντες, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι λέγοντες οὕτω ἔτερα τοῦ εὐδαίμονος βίου, καθὸι γε λέγοντες τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν σκοπόν ἐκκείσθαι, τέλος δὲ εἶναι τὸ τυчин τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ὅπερ ταύτον εἶναι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν.78

Stoic logic dictates that the telos must stand in relation to the skopos as “predicate” (κατηγορθήμα) to “body” (σῶμα). The skopos is a body like εὐδαιμονία ("happiness”); the telos is a predicate like τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ("to be happy").79 The telos is τὸ...

78 Stob. Ecl. 2.77.16-27=SVF III 16: “The Stoics say that the telos is to be happy, for the sake of which all things are done, but which itself is done for the sake of nothing. They say that happiness subsists in 'living in accordance with virtue', or in 'living by rational consistency', or yet again (it being the same thing) in 'living in accordance with nature'. Zeno defined happiness in this way, 'happiness is a good flow of life'. Cleanthes used this definition in his writings, as did Chrysippus and all those after them. They say that happiness is not different from the happy life, but they do make the distinction that happiness is set out as a skopos, while the telos is to 'acquire' happiness, which is the same thing as being happy.”

79 Supra n.78. A predicate is a verbal idea expressed by the infinitive with no expressed subject: Stob. Ecl. 2.76.19ff=SVF III 3; Origen, in Ps., Migne, PG II 1053. Stoic telos-formulae are all expressed as infinitives, and the idea is that
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τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, where the sense of το ῥυχεῖν seems to be less “to acquire” than “to make predicated of oneself.” To use τυχάνω in this way is technical if not counter-intuitive. Its usual sense with a genitive object is “to happen upon” something, “to get” it, with the recognition that “fortune” (τύχη), has brought it. But the Stoics do not hold that one “happens upon” or “acquires” happiness by chance. Rather one “puts it into practice” by living according to virtue. I read this important logical fragment to suggest that τυχάνω may have signified less “to acquire” than “to predicate” in this precise context. This is justified on the grounds that all Stoic ethics are devoted to the proposition that happiness is within the power of the wise man. He is immune to fortune and has the power to “bring about” (predicate of himself) his own happiness.

These concepts applied to the art of aiming would render virtue the art (technē) in one sense but also the target (skopos) in another sense, and the telos not “to get” virtue so much as “to practice” it. Stobaeus confirms that the Stoics did regard virtue as “an art concerned with the whole of life” (Ecl. 2.66.20–67.1: ἄρετὴν, περὶ ὀλὸν ὀὕσαν τὸν βίον τέχνην). But, paradoxically, if one aims properly, he is practicing virtue and cannot miss the target of virtue. This paradox cannot be avoided by positing that the skopos is not virtue but something else like “happiness.” Virtue is not practiced to acquire happiness; happiness comes about only when virtue is practiced for its own sake.80 A key concept in the Stoic position is ὑπάρχειν (“to belong to,” “subsist in”). For Stobaeus, “to be happy subsists in to live in accor-
dance with virtue” (cf. D.L. 7.89=SVF III 39). Happiness will automatically become predicated of the agent when virtue is practiced. As Chrysippus says, “only predicates that are actual attributes are said to belong; for instance, walking around belongs to me when I am walking around, but it does not belong when I am lying down or sitting” (Stob. Ecl. 1.106.5f=SVF II 509: ὃς κοι κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται μόνα τὰ σύμβεβηκότα, ὅπον τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑπάρχει μοι ὅτε περιπατῶ, ὅτε δὲ κατακέκλυμαι ἢ κόθημαι οὐχ ὑπάρχει). A rough paraphrase might be that predicates such as the telos of being happy (τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν) only “belong or subsist” when we practice them; so in the case of being happy (as we cannot practice happiness directly), the telos “belongs to or consists in” practicing virtue.

It is a formidable muddle: (1) the telos is “to be happy,” which subsists in “to live in accordance with virtue”; (2) the skopos is “happiness,” but this must also subsist in the art (τέχνη) of virtue, because (3) the telos is also τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, which should mean “to hit the target” but comes to mean “to predicate the art of virtue” of oneself or “to practice” it. The reason for this manipulation of a familiar concept may be found in the Stoic dictum that “virtue is sufficient for happiness” (D.L. 7.127=SVF III 49: αὐτάρκη τ’ εἶναι αὐτὴν (sc. ἁρετὴν) πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν). Such preferred indifferents as health and wealth are not necessary for virtue. This is the opposite of the Aristotelian position, which is also the position of common sense. The Stoics use “target” paradoxically to communicate their thesis: “the aim is the thing, not the target.” As in Greek art, e.g. Myron’s Diskobolos, the practice of virtue is a tension. On this view, the virtue of the archer is the aim, not hitting the target. But then if virtue is a goal-oriented craft, the craftsman cannot miss his target when he practices it correctly: the practice of virtue always hits its target—virtue.

When Carneades accuses Antipater of positing two tele and two skopoi, he undoubtedly pits the common-sense image of aiming against the Stoic paradox of the “aim that never fails.” He gives some indication of why he accuses the Stoa of two tele and two skopoi when he discusses the relation of the preferred indifferents (what he calls τὰ πρώτα κατὰ φύσιν) to the telos:

81 Cicero frequently uses the phrase prima naturae as though interchangeable with the Stoic προηγμένα. Inwood (218–33) summarizes the problem of Carneades’ influence on these texts. See also Long (supra n.59) 70 n.32. Inwood (220 with nn.13f) follows Hirzel (supra n.17) III 304f and A. Bonhoff-
Carneades' use of ὑλή τις ὑπόκειται is instructive. Elsewhere Chrysippus uses ὑποκείμενοι in participial form to modify skopos: τὸν ὑποκείμενον σκοπόν (Plut. Mor. 1040f=SVF III 24: “the underlying skopos”). In the passage quoted above, Carneades distinguishes “to select and to take” (τὸ ἐκλέγομενα καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν) from “the things themselves and the acquisition of them” (αὐτά καὶ τὸ τυχαῖνα αὐτών). When he calls the former the telos and says that the latter is “some sort of underlying matter,” he intends for us to conclude that the latter must be skopoi for the Stoics. This is the best way to make sense of his claim that they have two tele and two skopoi. The two tele are “to select” the preferred indifferents and “to take” them; the two skopoi are “the preferred indifferents” and “the acquisition of the preferred indifferents.”

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82 Plut. Mor. 1071b=SVF III 195: “They say that the telos is ‘to select’ and ‘to take’ these things [sc. τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν] prudently, but the things themselves and ‘to acquire’ them are not the telos, but some sort of underlying matter with selective value.”

83 For λαβεῖν as a technical term related to selection see SVF I 191, III 118–22, 131f, 142. Cherniss claims (supra n.20: 748 n.d) skopos as a synonym for telos, thus meaning, if I understand him, that not four but two things are involved. I argue that Carneades allows the distinction, but manipulates the definition of skopos.

84 Carneades’ distinction between λαβεῖν and τυχαῖνα εἰσὶ is that a verbal form of the noun λῆμνας implies the use of reason and must be understood as the product of a rational selection. τυχαῖνα εἰσὶ on the other hand implies only the getting without rational selection. In my view Carneades’ two tele and skopoi form pairs: the telos of “selection” is practiced by applying reason to the subject matter (skopos) of “the indifferents,” whereas the telos of “taking.”
Carneades tries to establish that, by Antipater's own formula, the *skopos* in the aiming art of virtue must be the preferred indifferents. After all, Antipater had said that the *telos* was "to do everything in one's power continuously and undeviatingly with a view to obtaining the predominating things that accord with nature" (*supra* n.62). He takes Antipater to mean that the preferred indifferents are the *skopos*, and the *telos* is "to acquire" them. As the Stoics say that the *telos* is "to acquire" the *skopos*, clearly the preferred indifferents should be the *skopos*, at least for Carneades.

Antipater's *telos*-formula is difficult enough to grasp without the intervention of Carneades and without the problem of stitching together the fragmentary remains of so sophisticated an assault upon so subtle a doctrine. But the only evidence in which Antipater explains himself—a very difficult and misunderstood text with all the Greek concepts represented in Latin—complicates these problems:

*Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi exsit et ut duo sint ultima bonorum. Etenim, si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam—sic nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia quae posse est ut conliniet,—hinc in eiusmodi similitudine omnia sint factenda, ut conliniet; et tamen, ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur, sit hoc quasi ultimum, quæ nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seltigendum, non expetendum.*

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is practiced by applying reason to the subject matter of "acquiring" the indifferents: man aims at the things to select them and aims at acquiring them in order to take them. He may, however, have arranged the terms chiastically.

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85 Cic. Fin. 3.22=SVF III 18: "But from the outset any confusion arising from this must be removed so that no one will think that there are two *tele*. For if it were someone's *propositum* (*skopos* or *prokeimenon*) to aim a spear or an arrow at something—just as we say that there is a *telos*, this would be for him to do everything in his power in order to aim—in an analogy of this kind he must do everything in order to aim; and nevertheless, this, namely that he should do everything by which to attain his *propositum* (*skopos* or *prokeimenon*) would be his *telos* so to speak, the kind of thing we call the highest good in life, but that he should strike would be something 'to be selected' as it were, but not something 'to be chosen'." The text with dashes supplied is of Alpers-Gölz 80, accepted by Long and Sedley II 397f. The translation with Greek inserted is mine. For the history of debate over the text see Alpers-Gölz 75–82; Long and Sedley II 398.
Besides the textual uncertainties of this passage, determining the Greek concepts behind these Latin terms, especially *propositum*, is very problematic. *Skopos* and *prokeimenon* are possible equivalents of *propositum* (“something that has been set up”), but each of these Greek words has more than one definition. The substance of the Carneades-Antipater debate turns upon a precise understanding of this passage.

Irwin claims (230) that in the Stoic view of stochastic crafts “they call the external result the ‘objective’ or ‘work proposed’ (*prokeimenon* *ergon*, Latin *propositum*; Alex. in Top. 33, 15), and the competent practice of the craft the end (*telos*, Alex. in Top. 33.17–22; Quaest. 61.12–23=SVF III 19).” He implies that *prokeimenon* *ergon* is a Stoic technical term translated into Latin as *propositum*, although *prokeimenon* *ergon* occurs only at Alex. in Top. 33.15, a discussion of non-stochastic crafts with Aristotelian terminology.86 Stoic use of this phrase is (to my knowledge) otherwise unattested.

The possibility that the Stoics employed *prokeimenon* (either alone or as shorthand for *prokeimenon* *telos*, *ton* *prokeimenon* *skopon*, or *to* *prokeimenon* *ergon*) depends entirely on Alexander, our only source, and it is unclear whether his usage is Stoic or a description of a Stoic position in Aristotelian language. Irwin certainly errs in associating the *prokeimenon* with *propositum* in the simile of the archer. Striker and Long and Sedley erroneously follow Irwin87 because of the interpretation of a controversial passage from Alexander:

`Ει τὸν στοχαστικῶν τεχνῶν τέλος εἶναι τις λέγοι τὸ πάντα τά παρ’ αὐτάς ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ προκειμένου τυχάνειν, πῶς ὄνω ὦμοιος καὶ αὐταὶ τοῦ οἴκειον τεύχονται τέλους ταῖς οὐ στοχαστικαῖς τῶν τεχνῶν; δοκοῦσι δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο μάλ-

86 The reading of this line is uncertain. Bruns prints ἐν γὰρ ταύταις τέλος τὸ προκειμένον ἔργον τὸ ἔπεσθαι τὸ ἔργον τοὺς χάριν αὐτοῦ γινομένοις (“For in these crafts, the *telos* is ‘the proposed function’, because the function is accompanied by the results for the sake of which it is practiced”), τέλος, however, does not appear in all manuscripts. Without it the line would mean “and in these crafts, the external result is the function, because the function is accompanied by the results for the sake of which it is practiced.” That is to say, what the craft of shoemaking is intended to do does not differ from what the competent practitioner will accomplish by following the craft correctly. Unlike the doctor whose function is to “do everything he can” and whose external result is “to save the patient,” the shoemaker’s function, to make shoes, and his external result are the same. Either he has made shoes or he failed in his *telos*.

87 Striker 195–98; Long and Sedley I 409f, II 398; Irwin 230f.
ιστα διαφερειν των άλλων αι στοχαστικαι [και] τω μη όμοιω το τελους τυχήνειν. καθ’ ους μεν τελος έστιν αύ­
таς το τυχειν του προκειμενου, διαφερειν αν ταυτη: καθ’
ους δε το προκειμενον έστιν αυτας τελος, ου και ταυτου
tελους μη όμοιως τυχάνει, διαφερειν (αλ) αυτων κατα το
mη όμοιον αυτας το τελος έχειν. εκειναι μεν γαρ τοις
κατα τη τεχνην γινομενοις έπεσαι το ου χαριν γίνονται,
και την αποτυχιαν αυταις του προκειμενου κατα την διαμαρ­
tιαι των γινομενων, ου τεχνικως γινομενων, έπεσαι, τελος
έχουσι το τυχειν του προκειμενου. ίσον γαρ εν εκειναις τω
παντα τα παρ’ αυτας ποιησαι προς το τυχειν του προκει­
μενου και τυχειν αυτου· ταυτα γαρ πουουντων τα παρ’ αυ­
tας γίνεται. επι δε των στοχαστικων τω μη παντος τως
γινομενοις κατα τη τεχνην έπονται το ου χαριν, δια το δει­
thαι προς το τυχειν εκειου παλλον, η μη εστιν επι μονη τη
τεχνην, επι δε και αυτα τα κατα την τεχνην γινομενα μη
όρισθαι, μηδε των αυτων ειναι ποιητικα το μη παντη όμοι­
ως έχουσιν προσφερεθαι, άλλα παντα η γε τινα και άλλως
εν αυταις ουχ ως προσεδουκατο έποπεαι, ου το τυχειν του προκει­
mενου τελος έστιν, άλλα το άποπληρωσαι τα της τεχνης. η
tελος μεν και ταυτας το τυχειν τουτου ου χαριν παντα τα
παρ’ αυτας ποιησαι, δια του παντα τα παρ’ αυτας ποιησαι,
έργων δε ίδιων αυτων τα παντα τα παρ’ αυτας προς το τυχει
του προκειμενου ποησαι το μη μονον τουτο άρκειν προς το το
προκειμενου τυχειν, άλλα δειν και άλλων τινων, α ουχ
έστιν επι τη τεχνην.88

88 Quaest. 2.16=SVF III 19: “If someone should say that the telos of the sto­
chastikai technai (STs) is ‘to do everything in one’s power with a view to
acquiring the prokeimenon’, how will they achieve their proper telos dif­
erently from the non-stochastikai technai (NSTs)? STs seem to differ from
other technai especially in this, namely that they acquire their telos differently.
According to some (sc. the Stoics), to acquire the prokeimenon is the telos in
STs, so they would differ in this way (sc. having different prokeimenon or
acquiring them differently). According to others (sc. the Peripatetics), the
prokeimenon is the telos in STs, and STs do not acquire the same telos
differently; rather they would differ from NSTs in having a different telos. For
NSTs achieve that for the sake of which they are practiced by following the
rules of the techne, and in NSTs the failure to achieve the prokeimenon is a
result of failing to follow the rules of the craft, i.e., the craft is not being
practiced as it should be, and so these have as their telos the acquisition of the
prokeimenon. For in NSTs that would be equivalent to doing everything in
one’s power with a view to the acquisition of the prokeimenon and the acquisi­
tion of it. That is because these results are in the power of the craftsmen. But
STs achieve that for the sake of which they are practiced not entirely by
following the rules of the techne, because it lacks many things with reference
to the acquisition of the prokeimenon not contained in the techne itself; moreover
the same results in accordance with the techne are not assured, nor are
the things productive of the same results because they cannot be applied in
Von Arnim’s inclusion of this text as a Stoic fragment is questionable. Although Alexander begins with a paraphrase of Antipater’s second telos-formula, it does not necessarily follow that Alexander used exclusively technical Stoic language to treat a Stoic problem. In Aristotle prokeimenon means “the proposed” (Top. 101b12ff), where it should stand for to prokeimenon telos (“the intended goal”), i.e., the “external result.” When Alexander uses the term freely (e.g. in Top. 101b5), he is probably following Aristotle rather than Antipater, for whom we have no independent evidence at all. Alexander’s return to the problem of stochastic crafts at Quaest. 2.16 possibly resumes where his commentary on the Topica left off, i.e., he continues in Aristotelian language to discuss a Stoic objection to Aristotle. Antipater’s use of to prokeimenon as “external result” cannot be disproved and Irwin may yet be correct, but one should begin with more reliable evidence if possible.

Use of κείμαι and its compounds in both the Carneades-Antipater debate and fragments on the Stoic conception of stochastic crafts is instructive. Alpers-Götz’s collection of fragments on skopos and telos readily shows that the Stoics never spoke of to prokeimenon as a separate technical idea for the “external result” of a stochastic craft; rather they used various forms of κείμαι together with skopos to describe it as something that is “set up or out” (like a target) or “corresponding to/associated with” the telos. She cites the following fragments with the exception of the fifth example, which I add:

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exactly the same way, rather all or at least some of the results in STs will turn out otherwise than was expected; so the telos is not the acquisition of the prokeimenon, but the fulfillment of the rules of the techne. Or the telos, also in STs is to acquire that for the sake of which one does everything in one’s power with a view to the acquisition of the prokeimenon, although this alone (sc. doing everything in one’s power or following the rules of the craft) is not sufficient for the attainment of the prokeimenon; rather other things not contained in the techne are needed." Cf. in Top. 33.17f. The text is that of I. Bruns, ed., Supplementum Aristotelicum 11.2 (Berlin 1892) 61. Von Arnim’s emendations and omissions (e.g. Bruns lines 23–28) do not really solve the manifest difficulties of sense. I offer this translation, despite some uncertainty about text and sense, because (to my knowledge) it has never been translated fully. I follow von Arnim in omitting οὗ before διαφέροντα at p.7 line 5 (Bruns line 10). Von Arnim’s apparatus does not show the omission, nor does Bruns’ in adding it. But it is manifestly the right reading, and I emend Bruns accordingly. I further emend τα τοῦ (Bruns line 10; von Arnim p.7 line 5) to ταύτω, thus avoiding τοίχανεν with the accusative.
1. They also say that happiness is 'set out' as a target, but that the *telos* is to acquire happiness, which is the same thing as being happy.

2. They hold that the *telos* and the *skopos* are different. The *skopos*, they say, is the target which has been 'set out', and those aiming at happiness strive to acquire it.

3. They also say that the *skopos* is the *telos*, in the same way that they speak of the harmonious life, referring to its 'corresponding' predicate.

4. For this reason, it must be said that neither are any of the virtues choiceworthy for their own sake, nor are any of the vices worthy of avoidance; rather one must refer all of them to the 'underlying' *skopos*.

5. It is contrary to common conception that two *tele* and two *skopoi* of life be 'set up', and that the reference for everything we do be not one thing; but it is more contrary still that the *telos* be one thing and that each thing we do be referred to yet another.

89 The text is fairly corrupt: the manuscripts read *swma* not *sima* and *skxpto­ménous* not Wytenbach's *sotoxo­ménous*; Wachsmuth proposes a lacuna before *tòs*. I give Alpers-Gcilz's text (62). None of these problems affect the coincidence of *skopó* with to ekkei­ménov.
that what happens in the case of the virtues is similar to if a single target \( \text{skopos} \) is ‘set up’ for many archers, with different colored bands on it. Then each archer would aim at acquiring the target, but one would acquire his, if he should acquire it, by striking in the white band, another by striking in the black, and another by striking in another band”).

In the first three examples the Stoics speak of the \( \text{skopos} \) as something “set up or out”; Plutarch claims to quote Chrysippus verbatim in the fourth (\textit{Mor.} 1040E: τὸς ἐκείνου λέξεως), where τὸν ὑποκείμενον σκοπὸν occurs; and Plutarch’s own polemic usage in the fifth confirms the concurrence of \( \text{skopos} \) and προκείμεναι. Finally, Panaceius, who takes up the simile from Antipater, uses κείμαι in the same sense. All this suggests that \( \text{to prokeimenon} \) taken as “external result” was not Stoic at all, and if the Stoics used it, it meant \( \text{skopos} \). Thus Alexander’s \( \text{to prokeimenon} \) either derives from Arist. \textit{Top.} 101b12ff (\textit{to prokeimenon telos}) or he tries to represent the Stoic \( \tauον \text{prokeimenon skopon} \). To prove the correctness of the first alternative, we must consider whether “external result” (Aristotelian \textit{telos}) or \( \text{skopos} \) makes more sense at Quaest. 2.16.

The problem is how Alexander’s adaptation of Antipater’s second formula for the \textit{telos} affects interpretation of \( \text{to prokeimenon} \) and \( \text{skopos} \). First, Antipater’s definition of \( \text{skopos} \) is uncertain, if he used this word where Cicero records \textit{propositum} in the archer simile. Rieth and Long argued from Quaest. 2.16 that Antipater used \( \text{skopos} \) to mean “external result.” Alexander clearly substitutes τοῦ προκειμένου for Antipater’s τῶν προηγομένων κατά φύσιν. This should mean that Alexander defines \( \text{to prokeimenon} \) in the formula as the “preferred indifferents” or the “external result” of a stochastic craft. Irwin, Striker, and Long and Sedley rightly argue (\textit{supra} n.87) that Antipater cannot have intended \( \text{skopos} \) for τῶν προηγομένων κατά φύσιν or “external result.” As Irwin puts it (228 n.25), “For virtue is not sufficient for its preferred external results; and if these constitute happiness, virtue will turn out to be insufficient for

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\(^{90}\) Cf. Stob. \textit{Ecl.} 2.47.8ff, which occurs just before Arius’ eclectic discussion of Aristotelian doctrine on the passions using Stoic terminology: Καὶ ἐστι σκοπός μὲν τὸ προκείμενον εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν, ὅλον ἀστίς τοξότατος τέλος δ’ (ἡ) τοῦ προκείμενου τεδίς (“The \( \text{skopos} \) is what is set out for acquisition, like a shield to archers; but the \( \text{telos} \) is the acquisition of what is set out.”). On Arius’ eclecticism see n.196 \textit{infra}.

\(^{91}\) Rieth (\textit{supra} n.66) 28f, 32ff; Long (\textit{supra} n.59) 78f.
happiness, but sufficient for getting happiness. These odd results suggest that Rieth and Long misuse the Stoic doctrine.” To avoid the contradiction, it must be argued either that Antipater deviated from the Chrysippean definition of skopos (supra n.79), or that he did not understand it as “external result.” In the Chrysippean doctrine the telos is described as an art of living; the skopos would be this art conceived as a body and the telos the “acquisition” or “practice” of this art. Does Antipater observe this Chrysippean distinction?

From the problems inherent in Rieth and Long’s position, it is possible to see Alexander in the proper light: Stoics used phrases like σκόπον ἐκκείθαι or προκείσθαι (as Alpers-Götz’s survey shows); skopos should not mean “external result”; and skopos and to prokeimenon in Stoic usage should refer to the same thing, namely the telos conceived as a body like εὐδαιμονία. It is obvious from Quaest. 2.16 (quoted supra 267f) that Alexander’s to prokeimenon must mean “external result.” When Alexander says that the craft is not sufficient for the acquisition of the prokeimenon, he clearly means “external result.” All other evidence suggests that the Stoics used forms of κείμαι to modify skopos and that to prokeimenon ought to mean skopos. Either Alexander stands alone in his testimony on Stoic usage, or he uses Aristotelian terminology. In response to Irwin (230), if to prokeimenon ergon is a Stoic technical term, it is a hapax legomenon. Further, at Quaest. 2.16 Alexander uses Aristotelian language to describe the Stoic conception of stochastic crafts—and with good reason, for as Irwin shows (229f), the Stoics were answering Aristotle. Alexander merely frames their response in Aristotelian terminology. Thus the Stoics never used prokeimenon in the way that recent critics suggest: either they did not use it all or it stood for skopos.

It is now possible to translate Cicero’s propositum. At Fin. 5.16 (supra n.72) it serves as Carneades’ word for “the external object of a craft” in the divisio (supra 259). Carneades probably used the Aristotelian conception of crafts in his argument against the Stoa; so he may have called it, like Aristotle, a telos, or a skopos if he attempted to manipulate the Stoic position on telos and skopos. In Carneades’ response to Antipater’s simile of the archer, βαλείν τὸν σκοπόν (“to hit the target”) replaces τὸ τυχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν (Plut. Mor. 1071c). As Carneades usually takes Stoic premises and definitions, it is very likely that he chose to attack the Stoic concept of stochastic crafts by manipulating the common-sense definition of skopos as “tar-
get.” He could then appeal to the Stoa’s doctrine that the telos is τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ and argue that by Stoic premises the preferred indifferents ought to be the skopos and their acquisition, the telos.

Antipater also probably used skopos in the archer-simile (Fin. 3.22=SVF III 18): propositum first occurs in the context si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam (“if it were someone’s propositum to aim a spear or an arrow at something”). If propositum were translated as prokeimenon in Alexander’s sense as “external result,” the passage would read: “if it were someone’s external result to aim.” To make sense of this patent absurdity, most critics choose to interpret conliniare as “to succeed in aiming,” i.e., “to aim at and acquire the external result”; Alpers-Gölz, on the other hand, chooses to take propositum not as a technical term but as a verbal form of propono.92 Both alternatives are unpersuasive. The current understanding of the archer-simile is based upon an untenable definition of conliniare. The only remaining choices, skopos and prokeimenon=skopos, cause difficulties with the second occurrence of propositum: ut omnia faciat quod propositum assequatur (“that he should do everything by which to attain his propositum”), which seems close to a direct translation of Alexander’s πάντα τὰ παρ᾽ αὐτός ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ προκειμένου τυχόνειν (Quaest. 2.16=SVF III 19: “to do everything in one’s power with a view to acquiring the prokeimenon). This apparent similarity has misled everyone into following Alexander for interpretation of the archer-simile in Cicero.

A more probable parallel for Cicero’s ut omnia faciat quod propositum assequatur occurs at Stob. Ecl. 2.77.1ff: skopon μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐκκειμένον σήμα οὐ τυχεῖν ἐφέσθαι τοῦ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας στοχοζομένους (“the skopos is the target which has been set out, and those aiming at happiness strive to acquire it”). Despite the textual problems (supra n.89), the Stoics could speak of “striving to acquire the skopos.” Panaetius’ archer-simile confirms this: εἰδὼ ἐκποτοῦ μὲν στοχάζοιτο τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ (Stob. Ecl. 2.63.25–64.6=Panaetius fr. 109: “if each one should

92 See supra nn.87, 91. Alpers-Gölz (132–35 with n.515) concludes that conliniare cannot mean “to hit.” Moreover τὸ στοχάζοιτο, which will not admit of this significance, most likely lies behind it. Panaetius’ archer-simile (Stob. Ecl. 2.63.25–66.12) clearly distinguishes between “aiming” and “acquiring the target” or “striking it.” The latter two, τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ and τὸ πατάξαι respectively, are in no way confused with τὸ στοχάζοιτο.
aim at acquiring the skopos"). I would translate Cicero's quo propositum assequatur as ἐνέκα τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, where ἐνέκα would indicate the "purpose" of the archer's effort. The meaning of the entire phrase from ut omnia faciat would be "that he should do everything to attain (=for the purpose of attaining) his target." This reading can accommodate the Chrysippean doctrine in which "to attain" means "to make predicated of oneself" and "target" signifies "the craft of virtue" (or here of "aiming"). The whole then becomes "that he should do everything to make the craft of aiming predicated of himself.

Indeed the structure of the passage in Cicero reinforces this reading: four ut-clauses, two purpose and two substantive, and one relative clause of purpose. 93 The two ut-purpose clauses explain the purpose of the archer's activity. In both the archer's purpose—a strange claim at first face—is "to aim" (conliniet). The archer's telos should be "to do everything to acquire his propositum" (ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur). If propositum still means "to aim a spear or an arrow at something" (conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam), we must somehow make sense of "to acquire to aim." Alpers-Gölz rejects (134) this possibility out of hand: "es wäre sinnlos, wenn der Schütze alles tun würde, um zu zielen; und er kann nicht ein propositum erreichen, das im Zielen besteht." But the Chrysippean skopos and τυχεῖν explain why this paradoxical turn of phrase is what Antipater intended: conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam describes the propositum as the στοχαστικὴ τέχνη, a noun idea that it is the telos to "put into practice," "to predicate of oneself."

This approach to the passage also resolves a more acute difficulty, namely that Antipater uses purpose clauses in his description of the archer's telos. The telos is supposed to be the

93 Alpers-Gölz (173 n.352a) takes ut omnia faciat as concessive: as hoc follows this ut-clause, it cannot stand in apposition to it. But this is a needless objection if Cicero uses chiasmus with the last two ut-clauses and hoc-illud. Long and Sedley (II 398) take this ut-clause as a substantival clause in apposition to hoc. The text should read: Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet ut duo sint ultima bonorum. Etenim, si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam—sic nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia quae possit ut conliniet (Purpose)—hoc in eiusmodi similitudine omnia sint facienda, ut conliniet (Purpose); et tamen, ut omnia faciat (Substantival clause anticipating hoc=ultimum) quo propositum assequatur (Purpose), sic hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat (Substantival clause in apposition to illud="acquisition of the indifferenters"), quasi seligendum, non expetendum.
end of the line, as in the pithy dictum οὐ χάριν τὸλλα, αὕτῳ δ᾽ οὖδενος ἔνεκα (Stob. Ecl. 2.46.5–10 = SVF III 2). But Cicero expressly says that the archer’s ultimum is facere omnia quae posit ut conliniet and omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur. In both cases the telos has a purpose clause embedded within it. If quo propositum assequatur should be translated as ἔνεκα τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, the Greek for ut conliniet would probably be ἔνεκα τοῦ στοχάζεσθαι. How would infinite regress be avoided in both instances? The answer must be that the skopus is the telos conceived as a noun, as Herophilus (apud Origen) suggests: τέλος δ᾽ εἶναι λέγοναι κατηγόρια οὐ ἔνεκεν τὰ λοιπὰ πραττόμενα, αὐτῷ δὲ οὕδενος ἔνεκεν· τὸ δὲ συζυγοῦν τοῦτο, καθάπερ ἢ εὐδαιμονία τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, σκοπόν.⁹⁴ Origen neatly shows that οὐ ἔνεκεν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττομενα may apply to the skopus as well as the telos and retain a distinction between the two: body and predicate e.g. “happiness” and “being happy.” It is possible to give the telos as “to do everything for the sake of aiming,” or “for the sake of making the skopus predicated of oneself.” As the skopus is the stochastike techne conceived as a noun, that would mean “to do everything for the sake of practicing virtue” or here, “the art of aiming.” In the language of Antipater’s telos-formula, πᾶν τὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοπου ἐνὶ τοῦ τελοῦς. The purpose of Cicero’s simile is to distinguish κατορθώματα from καθήκοντα of his translation of Antipater gives the agent’s propositum as “to aim a spear or an arrow at something” (conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam). This translation of propositum helps to reveal the true effect of the simile. The ordinary meaning of skopus is “target.” Antipater begins with “For if it were someone’s target to aim a spear or an arrow at something.... ” This sounds absurd because the “target” should be the “something.” Antipater wants to distinguish between propositum and the “something” because he uses aliquo to stand for what the “target” ought to be. To answer Carneades, he must demonstrate the distinction between the purpose and the external result of a stochastic craft, identify the purpose of the craft with its practice, and reduce the external result to a reference

⁹⁴ Origen, In Psalm., Migne, PG II 1053: “They say that the telos is a predicate for the sake of which everything else is done, but itself for the sake of nothing; and what is joined to this, just like ‘happiness’ to ‘being happy’, the skopus. For the telos is the end of the things to be chosen.”
point inconsequential to the successful performance of the craftsman. He must take this paradoxical position in order to call the craft of virtue a “goal-oriented” craft and his simile is entirely paradoxical. Any other interpretation will do violence to his opening phrase, *si cui propositum sit conliniare*. Antipater’s fidelity to the Chrysippean position makes the archer’s target the activity itself and reduces what we think of as the target to the inconsequential *aliquo*. He reinforces this distinction throughout the simile with purpose-clauses that refer to aiming. Moreover, he concludes with the balanced *hoc-illud*, where *hoc*, representing the *telos*, refers to *ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur* and *illud*, what is “to be selected” (*seligendum*), denotes *ut feriat* (sc. *aliquid*: “to strike something”), i.e., “to acquire the indifferentials,” which is not the purpose of this activity but only the external result. If *assequor* translates as *τυχανεῖν* = “to predicate,” then all three uses of *propositum* in Cicero’s debate between Carneades and Antipater could be translations of *skopos*: Carneades employs it polemically in the *divisio* for external result and Antipater responds with the Chrysippean usage throughout the archer-simile.

To summarize, Antipater’s use of *πρός* in his second *telos*-formula differs sharply from *ένεκα* in Carneades’ formula. Antipater possibly used *ένεκα*, but only when its object was the *telos*, i.e., the practice or ‘predication’ of the *skopos*; for saying “one does everything for the sake of the *telos*” was not controversial. Carneades gives *τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν* as the object of *ένεκα* in his attempt to argue: (1) that the external result of the rational selection of the indifferentials is the acquisition of the indifferentials; (2) that the external result of a craft should be its purpose; (3) that the purpose of the craft of virtue would then be the acquisition of the indifferentials; (4) that the purpose of a craft is its end; and therefore the Stoics should call the acquisition of the indifferentials the *telos*. Antipater tries to demonstrate that the Stoics do not accept the second premise, from which the equally unacceptable third premise and the conclusion follow. Carneades’ claim that the Stoics have two *tele* and two *skopoi* reveals his strategy: the claim only makes sense if *το τυχεῖν* is translated as “to acquire,” so that “the things themselves” and “the acquisition of the things” become separate *skopoi* (though the Stoics would call neither the *skopos*). The two most counter-intuitive terms on the Stoic side are their uses of *τυχανα* and *skopos*. Antipater’s most difficult job was to show that the practice of the craft
of virtue is its purpose. The debate may be reconstructed as follows:

Carneades: When the archer aims, at what does he aim?
Antipater: At the preferred indifferents.
Carneades: And when he aims at these, is his purpose not to get them?
Antipater: No. His purpose is merely to aim, that is, to do everything in his power to aim.

Plutarch records a response of Carneades to an argument of this sort, in which mockery of skopos, telos, and a verb for effort (ἐφίημι) is suggested by the alliteration of the opening clause:

Σκόπει δὲ ὁ τεχνὸς παράχωτος τῷ τὴν σκοινὰ ὑπεράλληλαι 
τὴν ἕαυτῶν ἐφεὐμένης· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολείπουσιν ἄλλα συμμετα-
φέρουσι τὴν ἀτοπίαν τῷ λόγῳ, πορροτάτῳ τῶν ἐνοικῶν 
ἀφισταμένην. ὡς γὰρ εἰ τοξεύοντα φαίη τις ὑμῖ πάντα 
ποιεῖν τὰ παρὰ αὐτῶν ἐνέκα τοῦ βαλεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν ἄλλα 
ἐνεκά τοὺ πάντα ποιῆσαι τὰ παρὰ αὐτῶν, αἰνίγμασιν ὁμοία 
καὶ τεράσται δοξείερ ἄν περαινεῖν.95

Carneades may not have introduced ἐνέκα into the debate. Antipater probably said something like “the archer does everything for the sake of the telos.” Then Carneades could revert to Antipater’s telos-formula and import the phrase about effort: “the archer does everything in his power for the sake of doing everything in his power.” Antipater argued that the practice, not the result, was the purpose, but he did not argue that the practice involved merely effort. Carneades’ substitutions within the formulae err by omitting the skopos from the formula: the archer makes effort for the sake of predicating aiming of himself, and the practicioner of virtue makes effort for the sake of predicating virtue of himself.

One consideration remains, namely how the indifferents actually did fit into Antipater’s conception of the telos and what he

95 Plut. Mor. 1071b-c: “Observe that the same thing happens to them as to those who strive to outleap their own shadow. Their reason does not leave behind, but drags along with it the absurdity furthest removed from the common conceptions. For if one were to say that an archer does everything in his power not for the sake of hitting the target, but for the sake of doing everything in his power, he would be thought to be telling tall tales and speaking in riddles.” On the use of ἐφίημι cf. Stob. Eel. 2.77.1ff: σκοπὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐξελέμενον σῆμα, οὐ τυχεῦν ἐφίησαι τοὺς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας σοφάζομένους. Carneades also mocks τυγχάνω at Mor. 1072ε (οὐ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἔστιν αἴνιγμα) and τυγχάνω and ἐνέκατα 1071ε (πάντα ποιοῦσης ἐνέκα τοῦ τυχεῦν οὗ τυχεῦν οὗ σεμινον οὗδὲ μακάριον ἔστιν).
may have meant by πρός. At Plut. Mor. 1071α Carneades says
that it is contrary to common conception that the end of our
actions and the “reference” (ἀναφορά) should be different
things. By this argument he seems to claim that “reference”
must be connected with the purpose of an activity, just as he
linked the external result with the purpose in his argument that
the Stoics have two ends. Antipater would be willing to grant
that we do everything in our power “with reference to” (πρός)
acquiring the preferred indifferents (Striker 203). As this is his
second formula for the telos, he means that this formula is the
purpose of all one’s actions; there is no other purpose. He
claims that purpose and reference can be separated. Indeed this
seems the entire point of Antipater’s telos-formula. Cicero’s
discussion of the difference between κατορθώματα and καθήκον-
tα, however, adds a complication. As καθήκοντα have the indif-
ferents as their ὀφελη and ἀρχή, they can be said “to take their
reference from” the indifferents. On the other hand, κατορθώ-
ματα take their ἀρχή from virtue, and Cicero says that they are
to be judged in relation to the virtuous or unvirtuous disposition
of the one who performed them (Fin. 3.22 [=SVF III 18], 32
[=III 504]). They also take their ὀφελη from, and “have reference
to,” the indifferents. So κατορθώματα have reference to two
things: the indifferents and virtue. The question remains how
purpose and reference are related if we do everything in our
power “with reference to” but not “for the sake of” acquiring
the indifferents, and if κατορθώματα are done both “with refer-
cence to” and “for the sake of” virtue. The answer seems to be
that κατορθώματα, as conceived in Antipater’s telos-formula,
“refer” both to virtue (their ἀρχή) and to the indifferents (their
ὀφελη), but “that for the sake of which” they are done is only their
ἀρχή not their ὀφελη. This duality of relation properly expresses
the status of κατορθώματα, but it is not necessarily contrary to
common conception that the telos should be one thing and that
each action should also have reference to something else. Carne-
ades blurs the distinction between “take reference from” and
“have reference to” by his use of the phrase “the reference is to.”

96 Cf. the Stoic position (Stob. Ecl. 2.46.8f=SVF III 2): (τέλος) ἐρ' ὁ πάντα τά ἐν τῷ βίῳ πραττόμενα τὴν ἀναφοράν λαμβάνει with Carneades’ καὶ μὴ πάν-
tων όσα πράττομεν ἐρ' ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἀναφοράν (Plut. Mor. 1071α). In-
wood’s discussion (supra n.66: 547–57) of ξισις and διάθεσις is an interesting
parallel to the dual referentiality of the sage’s action. The objections of Mitsis
 appended to Inwood’s paper, however, are worth noting. Inwood wrongly
follows Long (supra n.59) in identifying skopos with το προκείμενον (551,
As suggested above, Carneades probably chose to attack Antipater through the Stoic definition of *skopos* because it allowed him to attack the *telos*. Chrysippus’ doctrine that the *telos* is *τοῦ τυχείν τοῦ σκοποῦ* and Antipater’s *τὸ τυχάνειν* in his *telos*-formula permits Carneades to undermine the *telos*. Striker (198) even argues that Carneades may have introduced the archer-simile first and that what survives is only Antipater’s response. The considerable confusion created by Carneades and the unusual response of Antipater make this idea attractive. Possibly Carneades set up Antipater just to watch him try to defend the Stoic idea of predication: Antipater is forced to use *τυχάνον* in his *telos*-formula for “to acquire,” with the preferred indifferents as its object (*cf. supra* n.94). The most persuasive evidence that Carneades used ἔνεκα against Antipater is the infinite regress that it produces. From comparison with the circular argument against Antipater’s first *telos*-argument (*supra* n.69), it is easy to see that Academic attack consistently exploited a common Stoic vulnerability of terminology.

Carneades certainly capitalized on the confusion that he created. He proposed two *telos*-formulae of his own for use solely against the Stoa, but committed himself to neither (Cic. *Fin.* 2.42, *Acad.* 2.131). The first formula is a logical consequence of his argument against the Stoic conception of stochastic crafts: as we do everything in our power “for the sake of” acquiring the primary natural things, the end should be to acquire them (*naturae primis bonis aut omnibus aut maximis frui,* “to enjoy the primary natural goods, either all or the greatest ones”: Cic. *Tusc.* 5.84f, *Fin.* 5.20). By this formula Carneades even means to exclude *virtue* (Cic. *Fin.* 2.35; 5.20, 22). His argument is obviously designed to refute the one Stoic who addressed the acquisition of the preferred indifferents. His adaptation of Antipater’s πρὸς to his own ἔνεκα makes it appear that Antipater 555), for in *katorthomata* the sage’s purpose resides with his virtue. Inwood also argues that the end, happiness, is not what we consciously aim at. True, but as the sage’s purpose will be judged in relation to his virtue, he will consciously do things both with reference to and for the sake of his virtue, which, if not identical with his happiness, is what he knows will produce his happiness, for his happiness “subsists” in virtue (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.77.18=*SVF* III 16: τῶν δὲ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν). *Cf.* Rist (*supra* n.57: 163ff): “virtue is sufficient for happiness” (D.L. 7.127=*SVF* III 49: αὐτάρκης τ’ εἶναι αὐτήν [sc. ἀρετὴν] πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν), the virtues “complete” happiness (D.L. 7.96=III 107: ἀποτελοῦσι) and “produce and compose” it (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.72.4ff=III 106: ἄπογεννώσι καὶ συμπληροῦσι).
cared nothing for virtue and that man’s purpose in life should be to strive for “the integrity of body parts, health, properly functioning senses, freedom from pain, strength, and beauty,” the \textit{prima naturae} as Carneades defines them (Cic. \textit{Fin.} 5.18). Carneades then suggests that the possession of them ought to be preferable to the mere effort to possess them. Cicero, referring to \textit{desertus ille Carneades}, confirms that this argument would untenable in any other context except debate with Antipater (\textit{Tusc.} 5.87; \textit{Fin.} 2.38, 4.49). Striker shows, moreover, that the entire structure of the \textit{divisio} in which both the craft argument and this formula for the \textit{telos} occur is comprehensible only as an argument against the Stoics.\footnote{Striker 200f with n.16. She suggests that inconsistencies in the \textit{divisio} may result from the existence of more than one \textit{divisio}. For an analysis of the sources and problem of the various \textit{divisiones} see J. Glucker, \textit{Antiochus and the Late Academy (=hymnemata} 56 [Göttingen 1978: hereafter ‘Glucker’]) 52–63, 391–423.}

We have only one other Carneadean argument for the \textit{telos}: he once defended Callipho’s view of the \textit{telos} as virtue plus pleasure (Cic. \textit{Acad.} 2.139). The context of this attribution also suggests that Chrysippus saw only three views of the \textit{sumnum bonum} as defensible: virtue, pleasure, or both (Cic. \textit{Acad.} 2.138, \textit{Fin.} 2.44). Chrysippus apparently regarded freedom from pain and enjoyment of the primary natural things as euphemisms for pleasure. It might be deduced that Carneades, the probable source of this quotation,\footnote{Glucker (54 n.143, 56 n.151, 60 n.164) argues that this passage describes a Chrysippean \textit{divisio} to which Carneades may be acknowledging a debt before developing his own \textit{divisio} for purposes of argument; see also Giusta II 244.} accepted in another debate the Chrysippean premise that to enjoy the primary natural things is pleasure and that virtue plus these things, under whatever name, should be the \textit{telos}. Indeed he argued in a debate on goods and evils that to be true to their ethical doctrines, the Stoics need to claim these things as necessary if not sufficient for happiness (\textit{Fin.} 3.41).\footnote{Glucker 395; Giusta I 156–59.}

The full significance of Posidonius’ passage on Stoic \textit{formulae} for the \textit{telos} can now be seen (quoted \textit{supra} 235 with n.16).\footnote{With Kidd (EK II 679–82), I take \textit{τοῦτον} and \textit{αὐτῷ} (30) to refer to \textit{τὸ ὀμολογομένως ζῆν}. Zeno’s formula. Rieth \textit{supra} n.66: 34–38), Long \textit{supra} n.59: 84f), and Long and Sedley (I 408ff) take them to refer to Antipater’s formula. The subject of \textit{παρεπεμπώ} is also unclear: Delacy’s translation (329) supplies “those things,” which suggests that the understood subject is pleasure and freedom from pain; Kidd (EK II 679) supplies “it” and seems to agree with Long,
Like Carneades (supra n.20), Posidonius translates Antipater’s formula for the telos not by πρὸς but by ἔνεκα. Even though Carneades wrote nothing and Plutarch is the primary source for his views, the arguments are so devastating to Antipater’s positions and so consistent in design that Plutarch must reproduce faithfully Carneades’ language. Posidonius also translates Antipater’s τῶν προχειμένων κατὰ φύσιν as τῶν πρῶτων κατὰ φύσιν like Carneades (supra nn.20, 81). When he goes on to say that this formula is “similar to setting up pleasure or freedom from pain as the skopos” and that it “contains nothing about virtue or happiness,” his argument clearly presupposes Carneades’ position that τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν do not include virtue (supra 279f). Finally, his claim that the expression appears to contradict itself (ἔστι δὲ μάχην ἐμφαίνον κατὰ ἀυτὴν τὴν ἐκφοράν) reveals that his own method of argument is identical to the strategy of the Academics: he accepts a Stoic premise for the sake of argument and tries to demonstrate that the argument “refutes itself.”

Posidonius’ method might be summarized as follows. He clearly criticizes the telos-formulae of Antipater and Chrysippus and represents Antipater’s formula in the words that Carneades used to attack it. His strategy signifies that Carneades effectively refuted Antipater and the debate was lost. He dismisses Antipater’s formula by accepting Carneades’ premises and conclusions. Moreover, the results of the debate must have been more important to Posidonius than whatever flaws existed in Antipater’s position, because Posidonius undertakes neither an independent refutation nor a sympathetic defense of Antipater’s actual words (or meaning).

who supplies the miraculous “Attainment of or efforts to obtain τὰ κατὰ φύσιν and assumes that the entire phrase beginning πᾶν τὸ ἔνεκχόμενον is the understood subject. The problem is a quotation out of context. Clearly enough, Posidonius tries to explain the harmony between his Platonic model of the soul and Zeno’s telos-formula in what preceeds this passage and criticizes all telos-formulae against which Carneades could use his attacks on the Stoic definition of the skopos. Thus he seems to understand skopos as “external result” like Carneades, i.e., the acquisition of the indifferents or here τῶν πρῶτων κατὰ φύσιν. Consequently I understand “those things,” i.e., pleasure and freedom from pain, with De Lacy. The translation of ἔστι δὲ μάχην ἐμφαίνον as “this creates the appearance of contradiction” is difficult, but comparison with expressions like τὴν τε πρὸς τὰ σαφῶς φαινόμενα μάχην (ΕΚ τ 83) clearly suggests that Posidonius’ frequent strategy of “self-refutation” lies behind the phrase. See Kidd supra n.9 and ΕΚ ΙΙ 74 ad τὰ ἐναργῶς φαινόμενα.
The preceding supports a thesis that Posidonius attacks his Stoic forbearers by a striking and deliberate dialectical strategy. He accepts Academic representations of Stoic doctrines and the conclusions that derive from them. His claim that Antipater’s formula is liable to Academic *aporiai* is most revealing, as he employs only Carneades’ representation of what Antipater said and meant. If he was aware of not quoting Antipater properly, as I think certain, his strategy was deliberate and circular: by accepting subtly altered Academic accounts of Stoic premises and the aporetic conclusions following from them, he meant to show that his Stoic forbearers could not cut through Academic *aporiai*.

### IV. Posidonius’ Attack on Chrysippus’ Doctrine of the Passions

If this were the only example of such argumentation, it might be dismissed or attributed to Galen’s editing, but Posidonius proceeds in this fashion throughout the ethical fragments. To demonstrate that Posidonius actually employs a consistent and subtle dialectical strategy, it will be necessary to consider his arguments against Chrysippus and three corresponding arguments of Carneades against the Stoics.

Posidonius seeks to show that Chrysippus cannot account for the cause (*aitia*) of passion. He attacks the doctrine that passion is simultaneously an “excessive impulse” (*πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή*), a “fresh opinion” (*doxa prosphatos*) of good and evil, and a “decision” (*krisis*). To prove that there must be irrational elements in man’s soul, he treats the concept of excess at great length. First, how could reason command an impulse that would “exceed” (*πλεονάζειν*) its own measures (*supra* n.9)? Posidonius cites a Chrysippean *exemplum* on running: when walking it is possible to stop when desired or change speed, but when running this is not the case (Galen *PHP* 4.240.33–42.11). It is a difficult *exemplum* from which to understand passion, because Chrysippus’ point seems to be that an excessive impulse is inevitable when running (the runner commands his legs to go quickly and somehow they get out of control). Chrysippus says that “For the proper measure of natural impulse is in accordance with reason, and only as much as reason deems appropriate (*PHP* 4.242.8f: *συμμετρία γάρ ἐστι φυσικῆς ὀρμῆς ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ ἕως τοσοῦτον, [καὶ] ἕως αὐτοῦ ἄξιοι*). The implication is that, in pas-
sion, reason must command the impulse in such a way (sc. with insufficiently specified limits) that the impulse automatically exceeds reason's capacity to regulate it. The "specified limit" should have been appended to the command in the form "but only as much as is proper" (ἐὼς τοσοῦτον). Posidonius, however, shows no interest in reading between the lines to find a rationalist explanation. On the contrary, he takes Chrysippus' exemplum as proof of irrational faculties: πρόδηλον οὖν ὡς ἐτέρα τις ἀλογός ἐστὶ δύναμις αἰτία τοῦ πλεονάζουσθι τὴν ὀρμήν ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρα τῆς προσιρέσεως ἀλογος ἢ αἰτία τὸ βάρος τοῦ σώματος. By Posidonius' method of argumentation, if reason commanded the impulse and the impulse exceeded the measures set by reason, then something else must be the cause of the excess in "the excessive impulse," for reason cannot command anything immoderate, unmeasured, or excessive (supra n.9). This is not the monistic view of reason and how it operates, and it suits Posidonius' polemic well. But this is not the only flaw in his argument. Chrysippus' exemplum is an analogy in which reason is compared to the runner's impulse and impulse is compared to the runner's legs. The definitions of the larger system must be applied to the more limited system, as in the comparison of human behavior to animal behavior or in Plato's comparison of the operation of a city to the operation of the soul:

101 Galen PHP 4.242.2-8=SVF III 462: "In the case of runners, this sort of thing (sc. the motion of the legs) is no longer in accordance with the impulse; rather the motion of the legs exceeds the impulse so that they are carried away and do not change speed obediently (thus initiating the change right away). I think that something similar to these (sc. movements) happens in the case of the impulses by their overstepping the symmetry in accordance with reason, so that whenever one uses impulse, one is not obedient to it (sc. reason); in the case of running, the excess is said to be beyond the impulse, but in the case of impulse, it is said to be beyond reason."
The last line shows the complication of the analogy: impulse occurs in both parts—as what obeys reason in the functioning of the soul, and as what commands the legs in the functioning of the whole person. Posidonius ignores Chrysippus’ design in the analogy entirely and concludes that if the cause of the excess in running is irrational (i.e., not caused by reason, occurring apart from reason—the weight of the body), the cause of the excess in the operation of the soul must also be irrational. Chrysippus’ use of analogy (αὶς ὀλίμαι τι παραπλήσιον) from the whole person (=reason + the “irrational” body) to the soul (=reason alone), makes the verbatim application of results from one level to the other level improper and illogical. Posidonius is able to make his conclusion sound reasonable because Chrysippus’ analogy is so complicated. These passages demonstrate Posidonius’ dialectical strategy neatly: to take up the psychological problems most difficult for monism to explain; to treat monism with hostility, refusing to entertain sympathetic explanations; to deny subtlety to monistic definitions and to attack them with arguments cast in the guise of common sense; and to construct all arguments with a view to demonstrating the existence of irrational faculties. This last, a significant purpose of the polemic against Chrysippus, directs the structure of many of his arguments. As Posidonius considers each approach to the topic of the aitia of passion, he tries to demonstrate that rational processes cannot be the cause of irrational action. Rather, something else must be the ‘mover’, and reason must expressly not be the ‘mover’ but the ‘moved’. To this end, Posidonius uses extensively the active and passive of κυνείν (Plut. Mor. 449c=SVF III 384).

Posidonius asks whether the excess lies in the act of assent, and if so, what causes the element of “excess” (τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον) in the doxa or krisis. He offers a possible interpretation of the source of the excess when he discusses ἄρρωστηματα, the sickly dispositions of the soul that render it more prone to passion. Galen introduces this approach to the aitia by quoting Chrysippus:

“οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κρίνειν ἄγαθα ἐκκατά τούτων λέγεται ἄρρωστηματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐκπεποκέναι πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν.” ἵσος δ’ ἃν τινος “ἐν τῇ τῇ ῥήσει” λέγοντος “οὐκ ἀπεστέρηκε μὲν τοῦ κρίσιν εἶναι τὸ ἄρρωστημα, οὐ μὴν ἐν αὐτῇ γε μόνη τῇ γενέθη κρίσει τὴν γένεσιν αὐτοῦ τίθεται, ἀλλὰ προσέρχεσθαι φησι τὸ ἐπὶ

103 Galen PHP 4.248.25ff (=EK 34.33ff), 264.10 (=164.2).
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"Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) p.229

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πλέον, ἡ γνώμη τοῦ Χρυσίππου κατα- 
φανήσεται "ὀθὲν οὐκ ἀλόγως γνωσικόμενες τινὲς λέγονται 
καὶ ὄρνιθομενεῖς."104

Kidd (EK II 587) rightly recognizes κατά τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐκπεπ-
tωκέναι πρὸς ταύτα τοῦ κατά φύσιν as the key phrase in the 
supposed quotation. This phrase interests Posidonius (whom 
Galen clearly follows: EK II 589), because it suggests an irra-
tional longing for which reason alone cannot account—a longing 
that carries the excess with it. In his view, the "being drawn too 
much" should be the cause of the passion, because errors about 
good and evil alone do not constitute passions, as Chrysippus 
says. Galen reports an anonymous objection (πς) that attempts 
to explain how this "being drawn too much" may yet have a 
rationalist explanation:

'Αλλὰ νὴ Δίeus ᾧ τις φήσει τὸ μανικόδες οὐ διὰ τὴν ἄλο-
γον γίνεσθαι δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον ἡ προσήκειν 
ἐξιχθαὶ τὴν τε κρίσιν καὶ τὴν δύζεν, ὡς εἰ καὶ οὕτως ἔλε-
γεν, ἀρροστήματα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οὕχ ἀπλός τὸ 
ψευδός ὑπεληφθέναι περὶ τινῶν ὡς ἄγαθον ἡ κακῶν, ἀλλὰ 
tὸ μέγιστα νομίζειν αὐτὰ· μηδέποτε γὰρ ἀρρόστημα τὴν περὶ 
tῶν χρημάτων εἶναί δέξαν ὡς ἄγαθον, ἄλλα ἐπείδαι τις 
αὐτὰ μέγιστον ἄγαθον εἶναι νομίζῃ καὶ μὴ δὲ τῆς ἄξον ὑπο-
λαμβάνῃ τὸ στερῆθεν χρημάτων· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ συνιστάσα-
θαι τὴς τε φιλοχρηματίαν καὶ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν ἀρροστή-
ματα οὕσας.105

104 Galen PHP 4.262.34–264.6=SVF III 480: "For these are not called 
infirmities because one judges each of these things to be goods, but because of 
being drawn to them in excess of what is natural'. If someone should say, 'in 
this passage Chrysippus has not deprived infirmity of its being a judgment, 
however he does not place the origin of the infirmity in the false judgment 
alone; rather he says that excess is present too,' the opinion of Chrysippus will 
become plain from the words that follow, 'whence certain people are not 
illogically referred to as woman-mad and bird-mad'."

105 Galen PHP 4.264.9–17=EK 164.1–10=SVF III 480: "But someone might 
well protest that madness does not arise through an irrational faculty, but 
because one's judgment and opinion have been aroused beyond what was 
fitting, as if he said as follows, that 'infirmities' arise in the soul not simply by 
supposing falsely that various things are good or evil, but by supposing that the 
same things are the greatest [goods or evils]. The opinion that wealth is a good 
is not yet an 'infirmity', but whenever one considers that it is the greatest good 
and supposes that life has no value for one deprived of wealth, [the opinion is 
an 'infirmity']. For 'love of money' and 'love of wealth', which are infirmities, 
are comprised in this [supposition]." Kidd (EK II 589) comments that it would 
be dangerous to regard this as a "fragment" of Chrysippus, but offers no 
further comment on the implications of Posidonius' dialectical procedure. De
Although Galen paraphrases this part of the argument without attribution to either Posidonius or Chrysippus, in what follows Posidonius shows that he regards the anonymous objection as consistent with Chrysippus’ views:

''If Chrysippus should make such an argument, one would inquire first why wise men who consider that all honorable things are superlative and unsurpassable goods, are not moved to passion by them, desiring what they seek, and feeling excessive joy over these same things whenever they acquire them. For if the magnitude of things which appear as good and evil moves one to believe that it is appropriate and in accordance with the value of the things which are present or approaching to be moved to passion and to accept no reason to the contrary that one ought to be moved otherwise by them, then those who think that the goods before them are unsurpassed would have to suffer this passion, but one does not see this happen.''

\[\text{Lacy (1.263) does not translate εξήκθαι as a passive: “the judgement and the opinion have gone beyond what is fitting.” It seems clearly an aorist passive from εξάγω, in which case it should not admit of middle significance. Moreover, as I shall show, it is entirely in keeping with Posidonius’ strategy to argue that doxa and krisis are not the cause, so something must have moved them. The difficulty of translation has to do with the attribution of the passage. If the anonymous objector is Chrysippus (sic v. Arnim ad loc.: “ultima verba evincunt antecedentia Chrysippea esse”), one will want to make the verb’s sense active to avoid the implication that something other than reason could cause a passion. But if Posidonius imparts a fictitious objection to Chrysippus, there is no difficulty with the passive: Posidonius’ strategy makes Chrysippus seem to entertain causes external to reason. For a general sense of how Posidonius wishes to manipulate Chrysippus’ occasional use of the passive to justify his own doctrine positing irrational faculties, cf. PHP 4. 276.34–278.9; cf also the passive έκφρεσθαι at 4.242.4, 244.25, 256.8, 27.}

106 Galen PHP 4.264.17–27=EK 164.11–22: “But Posidonius answers this objection in the following manner: ‘If Chrysippus should make such an argument, one would inquire first why wise men who consider that all honorable things are superlative and unsurpassable goods, are not moved to passion by them, desiring what they seek, and feeling excessive joy over these same things whenever they acquire them. For if the magnitude of things which appear as good and evil moves one to believe that it is appropriate and in accordance with the value of the things which are present or approaching to be moved to passion and to accept no reason to the contrary that one ought to be moved otherwise by them, then those who think that the goods before them are unsurpassed would have to suffer this passion, but one does not see this happen.’”
nius uses τοιςύτων and an optative governing verb), as is its attribution to Chrysippus (his name in a genitive absolute dependent on the optative verb). Posidonius' dialectical stance throughout the passage is that he is not making such an objection, nor is he claiming that Chrysippus actually made it. He says only that Chrysippus would make some such response to explain the origin of the "excess" in an agent's soul. The implications of Posidonius' response to this 'hypothetical' argument merit close scrutiny.

The key phrase, τὸ μέγεθος τῶν φανομένων ἁγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, is vague enough that four radically different interpretations might be entertained, depending upon how this argument fits with those around it.

(1) "The magnitude of apparent goods," construed not as real goods and evils but those imagined by the fool (φανομένα). Posidonius would not suggest that the good has magnitude or 'incremental value', only that fools may think so in error. This argument would fit well with the preceding passage, in which passion seemed to result from excessive "suppositions" (ὑπολοίπησις), i.e., opinions that are by definition false.

(2) "The magnitude of apparent goods," construed as all goods, both true and false. This argument would fit well with Posidonius' exemplum of the wise man in what follows. For this exemplum to be appropriate, it must be that he discusses simultaneously what fools and the wise man respectively call good.

(3) "The magnitude of good things as they are presented," construed as a magnitude of good residing in the presentation. This argument would neatly complete Posidonius' larger strategy of searching for excess in each of the powers of the rational soul. Posidonius had earlier eliminated impulse, reason and assent as possible sources of excess (PHP 4.248.25ff=EK 34.33ff). Presentation remains the lone possibility, which Carneades had already exploited in his attack on Stoic determinism (supra nn.32, 45).

(4) "The magnitude of good things as they are presented," construed as a magnitude of good residing in the thing. This argument would, like (1), fit well with the preceding argument, by which passion results "from supposing that money is the greatest good" (τῷ μέγιστα νομίζειν αὐτῷ). This definition would nearly be "the magnitude of goods that are presented."
Definitions (2) and (4) contradict the doctrines of Chrysippus, Posidonius, or any Stoic. The good of the wise man cannot be compared to indifferents like money as in the anonymous objection, and the good does not have magnitude. It differs in kind from the indifferents and does not admit of increase or decrease (Cic. *Fin.* 3.46f). Definition (1), very close to (4), violates the Stoic doctrine of the good. There is a confusing nexus of issues at work here: the good, presentation, and supposition (or weak assent), which is passion. The hypothetical objection and response with no dogmatic implications for either Chrysippus or Posidonius does not help. Kidd (EK II 587–90) chooses definition (3), evident from his repeated references to the “magnitude of presentations,” but both he and De Lacy (265) translate by “the magnitude of apparent goods and evils,” without stating how these issues should be resolved. The striking ambiguity of this phrase, however, compels us to entertain all four of the definitions despite their obvious conflict with doctrines of the Old and Middle Stoa. It is not necessary to choose one definition over the others. The anonymous objection is intentionally hypothetical and undogmatic. It is important, nevertheless, to understand how all four are interrelated and why they might all be intended.

To be consistent with the objection imputed to Chrysippus (illnesses do not arise when money is falsely supposed a good but only as the greatest good), it may seem that τό μέγεθος τῶν φανομένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν should involve an error in the estimation of its value. But this is not the case, as Kidd argues (EK II 589):

The objection stresses that emotion does not arise simply from error of judgement, but from some kind of excess in the process of judgement (κρίσις involves decision as well as judgement: Arist. *Pol.* 1275a23), and this is interpreted in terms of magnitude (μέγιστον) of the presentation comprising the δόξα. This cannot refer to over-valuation, for that would be mere error of judgement, but to the effect on one's δόξα from the magnitude of the external presentation. πάθος (πάσχειν) is affection, being acted upon by an external force.

Kidd is quite right to preclude “over-valuation.” Galen had earlier praised Chrysippus for observing the distinction between error and passion (*PHP* 4.242.29–36: διορίζει τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων τὰ πάθη). The objection makes it appear that passion does not occur when one considers something ‘good’, but it
does when a degree of perceived magnitude is attached to that
good, “the greatest good.” Kidd is right: for this objection to
make sense within the context of the entire argument by which
reason cannot cause passion, this perceived magnitude must be
due to an extra-rational source of excess.
A subtle shift in language from “excess” or “too much” (τὸ ἐπὶ
πλέον) to “the greatest” (τὸ μέγιστον), an apparently insignificant
shift from the comparative to the superlative degree, also
changes from adverbial modification to adjectival modification.
Chrysippus had said that the cause of passion is “being drawn to
things too much” (ΕΚ ΠΙ 587: κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐκπεπτοκέναι).
The anonymous objection uses μέγιστον to modify the external
good or evil. This move is entirely unnecessary to account for
passion within Chrysippean monism, because man may enter-
tain any number of hormetic propositions about external things
of such a form that assent to them (suppositions or opinions)
results in an impulse excessive by the standard of right reason.
But Posidonius’ refusal to acknowledge this conception of “ex-
cess” leads him to reify it as τὸ μέγιστον, to place it outside
man’s rational processes (suppositions, opinions), and to attach it
to the external thing. Attention no longer focuses on how or
why the rational processes behave ‘excessively’ but on the
magnitude of the subject matter of the supposition as it appears.
The problem still remains whether Posidonius means to attrib-
ute this excess to the presentation or the thing. If the source of
the excess is extra-rational, it seems necessary to place it with
the thing. But Kidd correctly speaks of “external presentation”
(“πάθος [πάσχειν] is affection, being acted upon by an external
force”), at least to the extent that it is “external” to reason, be-
cause (as I shall show) Posidonius understood presentation
differently from Chrysippus. The anonymous objection im-
puted to Chrysippus betrays many premises more consistent
with the doctrines of Posidonius. This is but one. As often with
anonymous objections, neither party could espouse this objec-
tion, which represents the doctrines of neither. Rather, Posido-
nius places in his opponent’s mouth an argument close to one of
his positions that is easily refuted through certain subtle modifi-
cations to its premises (supra n.105). To see that presentation is
indeed at the heart of the problem, it is necessary to consider
Posidonius’ response to the objection.
He responds in three parts. In the first (quoted above) he
accepts the premise that the magnitude of things as they appear
could “move one to consider” (κινεῖ τὸ νομίζειν) that it is appro-
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Priapate to suffer passion, in effect, that the cause of passion must be external to reason. Posidonius transfers the locus of causation from the supposition or opinion (i.e., the agent’s reason) to something else: μέγεθος τῶν φαινομένων ἁγαθών ἢ κακῶν. The second part of his argument again states that the “cause” of passion must “move” the soul. Recognizing that sages and fools may react differently to the same thing’s appearance, he considers whether “weakness of soul” (ασθένεια) might be the cause of passion:

εἰ τε πρὸς τῷ μεγέθει τῶν φαινομένων καὶ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς ψυχῆς αιτίάζονται καὶ διὰ τούτου τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς τὸ παράπαν ἐρωτούν ἀπιλλάχθαι τῶν παθῶν, τοὺς δὲ φάολους, όταν ἀσθενεῖς ὦσιν μὴ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἀσθενείαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ πλείον ἐρρημοκἀν, (οὐ), οὔδε οὕτως λέγεται τὸ χτισμένον, ὃτι γὰρ διὰ τὴν νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται, πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν· πῶς μέντοι γε κινηθείσης καὶ πῶς κινοῦσης, ζητεῖται μὲν, οὐχ ὑποδείκνυται δὲ. 107

In the last sentence Posidonius clarifies the goal of his inquiry: what is “moving” the soul. Only this will meet his definition of the aitia.

Posidonius denies a correlation between the weakness of the agent’s soul and the severity of the passions he suffers: all ignorant men suffer passions both great and small and in such men great passions may arise from small causes, and vice versa. 108

The last part of Posidonius’ argument, however, displays clearly that the concept of presentation (φαντασία) underlies his participle φαινομένων:

δυοίν τε τὴν αὐτῆς ἀσθένειαν ἐξόντων καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν λαμβανόντων φαντασίαν ἁγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ ὁ μὲν ἐν πάθει γίνεται, ὁ δὲ οὕ, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔττον, ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὁ ἀσθεν-

107 Galen PHIP 4.266.30–268.7=EK 164.26–34: “And if they blame, in addition to the magnitude of the things as they appear, weakness of the soul also, and claim that for this reason wise men are entirely free from the passions, but that fools, whenever they are weak, not with an ordinary kind of weakness, but with one that has become excessive, [are] not free from the passions, even so, the question is not resolved. For all agree that men fall into the passions through sickness of soul; but the question of how the soul has been moved and how it moves, this is not yet explained.” See Kidd (supra n.18) 111; Origen De princ. 3.1.4=SVF II 988; Inwood 78f.

108 Galen PHIP 4.268.7–13=E 164.34–41; 5.294.38–296.1=EK 163.8–12. Kidd (supra n.18: 109) suggests that in Posidonius’ his own system he replaces causes great and small with his conception of euemptosia.
Posidonius’ third argument considers two hypothetical monistic alternatives to his own doctrine—phantasia and astheneia. It is now clear that τὸ μέγεθος τῶν φαινομένων ἁγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν refers not only to “things seeming to be good or evil” but also to the technical concept of phantasia. From the context, moreover, Posidonius clearly does not conceive phantasia in the Chrysippean sense as inseparable from its interpretative lekton added by logos (supra n.32). The following passages illustrate the link between the two in Zeno’s and Chrysippus’ doctrines.

109 Galen PHP 4.268.14–19=EK 164.42–48: “Assume that two people have the same weakness and that they perceive the same presentation of good and evil: one falls into passion, the other does not, and one is moved more, the other less; and sometimes the weaker man who supposes that what has befallen him is greater is not moved, and the same person sometimes falls into passion over these same presentations and sometimes he does not, and sometimes more, sometimes less.”

110 D.L. 7.51: “Some phantasiari are rational, and others non-rational. Those of rational beings are rational, while those of non-rational animals are non-rational.”

111 Cic. Acad. 1.40=SVF II 187: “[Zeno] first made new statements about sense-perceptions themselves, which he considered to be compounds of a certain blow, as it were, struck from without (which he called a phantasia)... but to these things which are presented and, as it were, received by the senses, he adds an assent of the soul, which he would claim is placed within us and is voluntary.”

It would be a mistake to take the last passage as evidence that phastasiai can be separated from their subsisting lekta, as the first passage demonstrates that all presentations of rational beings are "rational" (logikai). Posidonius removes entirely the rational or propositional component from the presentation. His argument throughout addresses "things as they appear," using the participle φαινομένων, and when he finally substitutes the noun φαντασία, there seems little or no difference between "things as they appear" and "presentations." In his usage, phantasia does not denote a "rational product" of the percipient; otherwise Posidonius would have to consider the content of the lekton, produced by the agent's logos, as a cause of passion. His discussion of astheneia passes over this problem quickly without considering the propositional component of phantasiai as a cause. His conception of the term, more Aristotelian than Chrysippean, may be uniquely his own. Posidonius clearly dissociates phantasia from lekton in the following:

οἰμαὶ γὰρ ὅτι πάλαι βλέπετε πῶς διὰ λόγου μὲν πειθόντες κακῶν ἑκτὸς παρεῖναι ἢ ἐπιφέρεσθαι οὔτε ὑπὸν ὑποῦνται οὔτε λυποῦνται φαντασίας δὲ ἐκεῖνων αὐτῶν λαμβάνοντες, πῶς γὰρ ἂν τῆς λογίας κινήσει τὸ ἄλογον, ἐὰν μὴ τινα ἀναζωγραφήσαι προσβάλληται αἰσθήτη παραπλησία; οὕτως γὰρ ἐκ διηγησίας τινες εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκπίπτουσι καὶ ἐναργῶς ἐγκεκελευσμένου φεύγειν τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον λέοντα οὐκ ἱδώτες φοβοῦνται.116

113 D.L. 7.49=SVF II 52: "For phantasia comes first; then thought which has the power of expressing itself, renders in rational language that which it receives from the phantasia."
114 In the current debate over the status of phantasia and lekton (supra n.32), it is often asserted that a phantasia is more than its propositional content, and that it should in no way be thought as identical to its subsisting lekton. Without disputing these points and with allowance for the distinguishability of the two, I wish to maintain only their necessary concurrence in rational animals according to D.L. 7.51.
115 See Arist. De An. 3.3; Inwood 11-17. Kidd’s remarks seem to confirm the difference between Posidonius’ definition and that of Chrysippus: EK II 590; cf. (supra n.18) 112.
116 Galen PLIP 5.330.25-31=EK 162.4-11: “For I am sure that you have long observed how those who have been rationally persuaded that they are in the presence of evil or that it is approaching suffer neither fear nor grief, but [they do suffer these passions] when they receive phantasiai of these same things. For how would one move the irrational by means of reason, unless one places
Here Posidonius uses his own psychology of a tripartite soul with certain aspects of bipartition (supra n.29). In this model phantasiae do not partake of logos; on the contrary, they are associated with the irrational faculties: they contrast with "persuasion by reason" (διὰ λόγου μὲν πεισθέντες); and only they can stimulate the irrational (τὸ ἀλόγον).

Against Chrysippus' hypothetical objection, Posidonius attempts through his own conception of phantasia to pre-empt any demonstration that passion as a πλεονάζομαι ὀρμή could be caused by a 'rational' soul, and maintains the dictum that "reason would not be able to exceed its own acts and measures" (ὅ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ὄωκ ἄν δύναιτό γε πλεονάζειν πάρα τὰ ἑαυτὸν πράγματα τὲ καὶ μέτρα: supra n.9). His premise that something external to reason causes the soul to move to excess attacks the central truth of Chrysippean monism, that the soul of a man moves itself by assent to rational presentations (Origen De princ. 3.1.3=SVF II 988 p.). If an imperfect logos produces the lekta assigned to these presentations, they will necessarily be imperfect and may conflict with one another (supra 243 with n.31). The soul may then produce an impulse excessive by the standard of Right Reason (supra n.10).

The scope of what Posidonius imputes to Chrysippus is striking. The grammatical structure of the objection attributed to Chrysippus occurs in a condition unlikely of fulfillment. With this minimal cover he entertains hypotheses that no Stoic could accept and creates a sophistic muddle of appearance and reality by forming his entire response around the "magnitude of things which appear as good or evil." Under this rubric he compares real with apparent goods and rational with irrational agents, puts indifferents like money and the Stoic good of virtue side by side, and places the reactions of fools beside those of wise men. The translation of τῶν φανταμένων ἄγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν should properly refer to the concept of phantasia, but it also conveys its customary significance of "apparent goods and evils." Posidonius

a representational image, as it were, before the percipient? So it is that some men fall into desire from a narrative and others become afraid, without their having seen, when someone has told them vividly to flee a charging lion." At PHP 5.320.18f (=EK 169.72f) Posidonius asks "why pleasure projects the persuasive appearance that it is good, and pain that it is evil" (διὰ ἡν ἡδονὴ μὲν ὡς ἄγαθον, ἥγησιν δὲ ὡς κακῶν πιθανῆν προβάλλοιον φαντασιάν). As he associates pleasure and pain with the irrational faculties, they must clearly be the source of the phantasia: cf. n.154 infra.
can convey both senses under the same participle because he divorces *phantasiai* from *lekta*. Without reason a presentation is no more than the way something ‘appears’ in the mind, the ‘appearance’ an object gives of itself. Reality and truth are not considered. There are only appearances of external objects.

Posidonius tries to ascertain what causes the belief that it is “appropriate and in accordance with the value” of the things present (καθήκον καὶ κατὰ ἄξιαν) to suffer passion (*supra* 254 and n.106). Through his own conception of *phantasiai* he prohibits consideration of Chrysippus’ actual doctrines. Posidonius accepts the anonymous objection as signifying that “things as they appear” may have an amount—a magnitude—of good and evil in them: money is great, greater, or the greatest good. He attributes to Chrysippus (albeit in such a condition) the premise that both real and apparent goods and evils have “magnitude,” *i.e.*, that the value of indifferents and the value of the good can be compared. Without claiming this or saying that Chrysippus claimed it, he attacks this position as if Chrysippus would take it. The point at issue is not what Posidonius holds as dogma, nor what Chrysippus holds (for the argument is hypothetical), but how Posidonius proceeds dialectically against a member of his own school. We shall see below that Carneades is the ultimate source of Posidonius’ objection and response, but he also influences Posidonius’ other two arguments against Chrysippus.

Posidonius subsequently attacks the *doxa prosphatos* as the vital element of Chrysippus’ doctrine of the passions. After attempting to show that an opinion (*doxa*) gone to excess must itself have another cause, he turns to the word *prosphatos*.

Γίναι μὲν δὴ τὸ πρόσφατον φησί τὸ ὑπόγρυον κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, ἄξιον δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτῷ ῥηθήναι, διὰ ἣν ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ δόξα πρόσφατος μὲν οὐσα συστέλλει τῇ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λύπην ἐργάζεται, χρονισθείσα δὲ ἡ οὐδὲ ὅλως ἡ οὐκ ἐθ’ ὁμοίως συστέλλει. καίτοι οὐδὲ τὸ πρόσφατον ἐχρῆν ἐγκείσθαι κατὰ τὸν όρον, εἰπερ ἁλθῆ τὰ Χρυσίςπου, κατὰ γὰρ τὴν γνώμην αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον ἢν μεγάλου κακοῦ ἢ ἰνυπομονήτου ἢ ἀκαρτερῆτου, καθάπερ αὐτὸς εἰσέθεν ὄνομάζειν, τὴν λύπην εἰρήθειν δόξαν, οὐ πρόσφατον.

117 Galen *PHP* 4.280.26–33=EK 165.9–17: “Now he [Posidonius] says that what is ‘fresh’ is ‘recent in time’ and he thinks he deserves to be told the reason why the belief of the evil being fresh contracts the soul and causes grief, but when it grows older it does not contract it entirely or no longer in the same way. And yet ‘fresh’ ought not to be in the definition if what Chrysippus said were true. For it would be more in accordance with his view to call grief
Galen does not indicate in what context Posidonius defined *prosphatos* as “recent in time.” Whether he defined the word in that way himself or imputed the definition to Zeno or Chrysippus is of no importance to his own position, as he rejects the entire doctrine of the *doxa prosphatos* and the monistic psychology to which it pertains. As for his allegation that Chrysippus usually called the evil “great,” “unendurable,” or “intolerable,” Cicero suggests (Tusc. 3.61) that Chrysippus might have used this turn of phrase: *opinio et iudicium magni praesentis atque urguentis mali*, where *urguentis* might be suitable Latin for ἀνυπομονήτου and ἀκαρτερητοῦ (cf. EK II 600). It is more interesting that in the last sentence Posidonius transfers the adjective *prosphatos* from the opinion to the thing about which the opinion is formed, a “fresh evil” (οὐ προσφάτου [sc. κακοῦ]).

Once again, Posidonius does not say that this was Chrysippus’ view; rather the force of the contrary to fact condition (Smyth §2313) seems to carry over from the preceding sentence. Posidonius again criticizes what Chrysippus “might have said” to make his premises appear contradictory, whereas in reality his doctrines contradict themselves only in Posidonius’ paraphrases. Like Posidonius’ interchangeable use of “things presented” and “presentations,” here “fresh” applies to both things and opinions. Posidonius most eagerly shifts the line between internal psychic and external material events in a constant effort to prove that the excess in passion cannot arise through rational processes (Chrysippus’ actual position). There are only two other probable extra-rational causes: internal irrational processes (Posidonius’ actual position) or an external material event. Posidonius does not consider Chrysippus’ actual position; rather he presents Chrysippus’ views as if he meant that passion has an extra-rational cause, then demonstrates that this hypothetical position is self-contradictory. It is never clear whether Posidonius accuses Chrysippus of considering external material events as the cause, but he need not accuse Chrysippus of anything more specific than considering some extra-rational cause.

Finally, if Zeno (as suggested earlier) had the concept of *phantasia* in mind when he used the phrase *opinato malo* (Cic. Tusc. 3.61; cf. supra n.40), Posidonius had a precedent for his move. Zeno’s followers interpreted his definition of *prosphatos* to

*an opinion of a great or unendurable or intolerable evil as he usually named it, not of a ‘fresh’ one.*
mean that the passion will remain “so long as a certain force inheres in the supposed evil” *(quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit).* In this passage Zeno blurs the line both between the opinion and the thing and between the presentation and the thing, just as Posidonius tries to do. Nothing suggests that Zeno understood phantasoi as separable from lekta, i.e., as separable from the rational activity of the soul. But Posidonius, who did make such a separation, might rely on such passages to justify his argument that Chrysippus spoke of extra-rational causes like “presented things” and “fresh evils.”

Posidonius does not mention the subtle implications of Chrysippus’ *prosphatos.* Rather, using his own definition of the word, he suggests that a familiar philosophical issue is at stake—the problem of “fresh” or “unfamiliar” events that surprise an agent *(cf. [Mag. Mor.]* 1203b4f: ἦ πρόσφατος φαντασία). Posidonius addresses the issue as follows:

κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον ἐρωτᾷ τὴν αἰτίαν, διὰ ἢν οὐκ ἢ τῆς τοῦ κακοῦ παρουσίας δόξα τὴν λύπην, ἀλλὰ ἦ πρόσφατος ἐργά-ζεται μόνη∙ καὶ φησὶ· διότι πᾶν τὸ ἀμελήτητον καὶ ξένων ἄθροώπος προσπήτων ἐκπλήττει τε καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἐξίστησι κρίσεων, ἀσκηθέν δὲ καὶ συνεθισθέν καὶ χρονίσαν ή οὐδὲ όλως ἐξίστησιν, ὡς κατὰ πάθος κινεῖν, ἡ ἐπὶ μικρὸν κομίδη, διὸ καὶ προενδήμειν φησί τοῖς πράγμασι μήπω τε παρούσιν ὦν παροῦσι χρήσθαι.118

Just as Posidonius coherently attacked the Chrysippian doctrine of the passions, Carneades also interpreted the Stoic *doxa prosphatos* as “an opinion formed about a recent event” and formulated defenses against an “unforeseen and strange” event (ἀμελήτητον καὶ ξένων). In brief, he had already devised a coherent series of arguments against the Stoa along the same lines as those later employed by Posidonius.

118 Galen *Phil.* 4.282.5–11=EK 165.22–29: “First he asks the reason why not the belief of the presence of evil but only the fresh belief causes grief; and he asks, ‘why everything which is unforeseen and strange falling upon us in a rush strikes us senseless and unseats us from our former judgments and why things which are rehearsed and familiar and prolonged either do not unseat us entirely and cause passionate motion or do so to a very limited extent’. For this reason he says that we ought to make ourselves at home with future events and to treat things which are not yet present as though they were.”
V. Carneades on the Good, the Passions, and the Criterion

We are unaccustomed to consider the passions as a subject on which Carneades attacked the Stoa. But a collection of his arguments on goods and evils and on the criterion (which treats phantasia) shows how the sum provides an argument against the passions. To see how Carneades' arguments underlie the discussion of the "magnitude of things that appear as goods and evils," two implications of Posidonius' hypothetical argument must be considered: (1) that apparent goods such as money may be compared to the real good, virtue; and (2) that the magnitude of presentations or 'appearances' may cause passion. For the first problem we must return to Carneades' attacks on the Stoic doctrine concerning good and evil (supra n.99).

Carneades never ceased to argue that the Stoic-Peripatetic debate over the definition of good(s) and evil(s) was a difference of words not facts: non rerum controversia sed nominum (Cic. Fin. 3.41); he acted as an arbiter, as if the dispute were only between Peripatetics and Stoics (Tusc. 5.120). The real dispute, however, involved Carneades and the Stoa, as Carneades used the Peripatetic conception of goods to reveal weaknesses in the Stoic doctrine. When Cicero's character Cato reports Carneades' vehemence in the matter (Fin. 3.41), he says that the principal point was whether everything that has value contributes to happiness. Carneades seems to have argued that as the wise man prefers wealth, we should say that he will be happier with it than without it. The value of wealth ought to be assessed by its contribution to the end of happiness, however little it may contribute. On this reading the Stoics and Peripatetics would agree that wealth has value. Carneades wants to dismiss the Stoic claim that value and happiness are not necessarily related. The argument that Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines on the good are essentially the same is closely allied to Carneades' argument against the selection-formulae of Diogenes and Antipater, in which he held that the value of the indifferents must be measured by their contribution to the telos (supra n.69).

Carneades' argument, however, has further ramifications: as Cato says, if wisdom and health are "to be chosen" (expetendum), both must be more "to be chosen" than wisdom alone (Fin. 3.44=SVF III 60). This conclusion is the foundation for the Peripatetic formula for the telos, which is to have virtue and the primary things of nature (Fin. 5.21). If Carneades maintains a
Peripatetic conception of the good against the Stoa, he might very easily use the Peripatetic telos. The only evidence that he did so lies in his vigorous defense of Callipho on the telos (supra n.98) and his habitual attacks on the Stoic doctrine that virtue is sufficient for happiness (Tusc. 5.83).

Despite uncertainties about Carneades' precise language and thought (supra 237), his arguments against the Stoa have some consistency,\(^{119}\) which may derive not from his own dogmatic agenda but, on the contrary, from the consistency and interdependence of Stoic doctrine across various ethical topics. Carneades' argument against the selection-formulae concentrate on the Stoa's attempts to judge the value of the indifferentes independently of the end of happiness (supra n.70). His argument against the Stoic conception of virtue as a stochastic craft attacks the Stoa's dissociation of the purpose of prudent activity from the achievement of the external result of the activity (Fin. 3.24=SVF III 11). Finally, in his argument against the Stoic conception of the good, he blurs the Stoa's distinction between the value of indifferentes and the value of virtue (Cic. Fin. 3.41–44). These three arguments concern different aspects of the Stoa's unitary project of placing happiness with the wise man's reach.

If the wise man will always be happy, he must adopt a a pose of indifference towards things that are not in his power and direct his purposeful activity to what will unerringly produce his happiness. The only activity that could produce happiness without fail does not depend on anything outside himself for its success. To the extent that activity produces happiness, it must be related only to the wise man's rôle in that activity, \textit{i.e.}, the rational expenditure of effort towards the results outside this control. The results of his activity are not absolutely indifferent to him: indifferent for his happiness but not indifferent for their accordance with nature. Things that contribute to happiness, \textit{i.e.}, a life of virtue and purposeful rational activity, have an absolute value. But things, which do not contribute to virtuous activity

\(^{119}\) It is very difficult to trace the history of Carneades' argument because Cicero, the primary source, draws on multiple sources (Glucker 52 n.135): Carneades' defense of Callipho's telos comes from Clitomachus (54 n.143); evidence of the Carneadean \textit{divisio} from Antiochus (Fin. 5.16ff) and another source (Tusc. 5.83ff; Glucker 55 n.150); and the argument that the difference between Stoic and Peripatetic ethics is \textit{non rerum sed verborum discordia} is attributed to Carneades through both Antiochus (Leg. 1.38, 53ff) and another source (Fin. 3.41, Tusc. 5.120). Glucker concludes (394f) that both Carneades and Antiochus may have advanced these divergent arguments in different subjects of debate.
but are merely in accordance with nature, have a relative value. As the wise man’s happiness derives from his rational activity, things with absolute value must affect him differently from those with relative value. When he is presented with things pertaining to virtue, he must be affected in a way that is morally significant, in that things with absolute value affect the possibility of his happiness, whereas things of relative value must not affect him in this way because they do not affect his happiness.¹²⁰

Cato summarizes the significance of Carneades’ argument (Fin. 3.44=SVF III 60): if Stoic and Peripatetic conceptions of the good were substantially the same, wisdom and health together would be more “to be chosen” than wisdom alone. The Stoics cannot accept this conclusion because it suggests that wisdom and health are comparable and should affect man in the same way when he is presented with them. Likewise Antipater says that acquiring the indifferents is “something to be selected” but not “something to be chosen” (supra n.85). The Stoics make this distinction between the value of virtue and that of the indifferents in several ways. The good, which cannot be added to, increased, or compared with other things, has its own proper quality (Fin. 3.34=SVF III 72): the good is compared to the sweetness of honey, which is uniquely sweet; the good differs by kind, not by amount, from other things of value; things with value in the latter sense can be increased in value, but virtue cannot. Some examples allude to a comparative evaluation of the two kinds of value (Fin. 3.45=SVF III 60): sunlight obscures and inundates lamplight; a drop of honey is lost in the magnitudine of the Aegean Sea; Croesus’ riches obscure the addition of a penny. These comparisons blur the general distinction in favor of a direct comparison of magnitude. But at the end of his similes Cato reiterates that opportunitas ([optima]ρία) is the standard by which virtue must be judged. His view may be paraphrased: if a shoe is evaluated by how well it fits the foot, many shoes would not be preferred to few, nor bigger to smaller ones. So virtuous action is not measured by number or greatness but how the action fits with nature (Fin. 3.46=SVF III 524).

A rational agent’s deliberation, however, assesses something’s value. Although it may appear from Cato’s examples that mistakes about the difference between virtue and the indifferents could never occur, it is not difficult to imagine the circumstance

¹²⁰ Inwood 114f, 121, 205–15, 224–37.
of an improper evaluation. Inwood (166) uses this exemplum (based on Sen. Tranq. 13.2): a moral progressor runs for public office because he knows that public service, an appropriate activity, gives him an opportunity to practice the virtue that he has learned. He is defeated at the polls. If he regards his defeat as an indifferent, it will not affect his happiness; but if he regards the purpose of his action to be fulfilled only if he is elected, he will have failed and will be unhappy (Inwood 166; Sen. Tranq. 13.2). These two reactions show the difference between a sage's right actions and a non-sage's appropriate actions (κατορθώματα and καθήκοντα). The agent's disposition must evaluate events properly and in accordance with the distinction between the good and the indifferent in a thing. The good in his action consists in the virtuous disposition with which he conducts it, whereas the result, over which he has no control, is an indifferent. The problems inherent in 'evaluating' events connect the doctrine of the good to the problem of passion. When the moral progressor decides that his happiness depends on winning, he has in effect decided that an indifferent is a good. When he fails to obtain his desire (a false belief that something good approaches), he may decide that it is appropriate to feel pain (the false belief that something evil has happened or is present): these are passions.

For the Stoics the moral progressor errs in assigning not too much value to victory but the wrong kind of value. An indifferent has value if it accords with nature and disvalue if it does not (supra 251). An indifferent may even have a “magnitude” of value (e.g. prolonged health has more value than its brief enjoyment: Cic. Fin. 3.47). But virtue has what Cicero's Cato calls opportunitas (Fin. 3.46=SVF III 524), a unique, perfect, and timeless quality that cannot be increased by the addition of anything. When Carneades argues that Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines of the good agree in substance if not terminology, he demands not only (1) that virtue is not sufficient for happiness; (2) that the indifferents, although not sufficient for happiness, are nevertheless necessary; but also (3) that virtue and the indifferents must have a value that can be compared; and therefore (4) that virtue has a value that can be measured, in short, a magnitude.

Three bits of evidence suggest that Carneades applied his arguments on the evaluation of goods to an attack against the Stoic doctrine of the passions. Two of the three come from Clitomachus and Antiochus through Cicero's Tusculans, and the third derives from Plutarch's De tranquilitate animi. These arguments, in turn, involve Carneades' arguments on the criterion,
preserved by Sextus. The argument begins at Tusc. 3, where Cicero tries to discover the cause of passion and surveys the views of Cyrenaics, Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics.

Despite considerable controversy on the organization of the book, it is clear from 3.28–51 that Cicero is summarizing the position of the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans. He argues that the Epicureans wrongly criticize the Cyrenaic position that unexpected evils cause passion, and that passion can be avoided by bearing in mind that evil may befall man at any time. The Cyrenaics employ three well-worn exempla: (1) Telemon, from Eur. Andr.; (2) Theseus (from a lost play), preparing himself for whatever sufferings and calamities might befall him in life; and (3) Anaxagoras, who, on learning of the death of his son, replied, “I knew that I had begotten a mortal” (sciebam me genuisse mortalem: Tusc. 3.29). All are designed to show that if life’s misfortunes do not come unanticipated, they will not cause passion. The structure thereafter seems as follows: Cicero, having dismissed the Epicureans, turns to a comparison of Stoic and Cyrenaic views at 3.52–61 and shows the limitations of the Cyrenaic view before launching a comparison of the Stoics and Peripatetics (Giusta II 320ff). A final reference to the Cyrenaics comes at 3.59. Two quotations from Carneades, embedded in this discussion, occur at 3.54, 60 in two very different contexts.

The reference at 3.54 comes from Clitomachus’ book on a Stoic topos, whether the wise man will feel grief at the loss of his fatherland. The wise man’s endurance even of this misfortune was a dogma, which Cicero (Acad. 2.135) calls dura sed Zenoni necessarium. Ioppolo argues that Carneades actually defends the proposition but undogmatically and on the basis of epistemological arguments. Cicero offers some indication of how Carneades argued: Sensim enim et pedeemptim progrediens extenuatur dolor, non quo ipsa res immutari soleat aut possit, sed id, quod ratio debuerat, usus docet minora esse ea, quae sint

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122 Glucker 393f; Ioppolo 80f, 88, 91, who also suggests (82f with n.22) that the passage from Plutarch comes from the same treatise of Clitomachus as Tusc. 3.54. Her argument rests on the exempla of King Perseus and the fall of Macedon in both texts (Tusc. 3.53; Plut. Mor. 474f–75a).
visa maiora. The wise man presumably avails himself of ratio, the fool of usus, with the result that the fool falls into passion.

Two factors in this explanation derive from Carneades’ argument on the criterion: (1) to arrive at the proper evaluation of something sufficient time is needed; and (2) when the object to be evaluated is great, an instant evaluation may be incorrect. It is useful to consider Carneades’ arguments in more detail before returning to the Tusculans and the problem of passions.

Debate on the criterion developed, broadly, as follows. Zeno proposed that presentations may be divided into three categories according to their reliability: knowledge, a presentation that can be “grasped” firmly like a clenched fist covered over by the hand; ignorance (the source of opinion), one that cannot be so grasped or comprehended (Cic. Acad. 2.145 [=SVF I 66], 1.41f [=I 60]); and καταληπτική φαντασία, one between knowledge and ignorance, the merely graspable presentation. The kataluptic presentation, clear and distinct, cannot be false, as it arises from what is and is stamped exactly in accordance with what is. The Stoic concept of the kataluptic presentation asserts the existence of “cognition” (katalepsis), assent to a cognitive impression. Nature provides this criterion as a measuring stick of how things really are. From these cognitions man develops conceptions of things and from these are revealed not only the “beginnings” but the “roads” to the discovery of reason (Acad. 1.42=SVF I 60).

Arcesilaus argued against the Stoics, particularly Zeno (Sext. Emp. Math. 7.150–58), that (1) whatever the wise man apprehends will be knowledge and whatever the fool apprehends will be ignorance; nothing lies between the two; (2) assent is made...
not to a presentation but to the proposition that accompanies the presentation (supra n.32); and (3) there is no presentation of such a kind that it could not be false. These arguments show that the kataleptike phantasia does not exist and therefore that the wise man cannot give assent. He must suspend his judgment and this suspension (ἐποχή) is the logical stance (but not a dogmatic telos) for the wise man (Math. 7.156ff). The Stoics responded that such a man would be completely inactive and therefore unwise.126 To the charge of inactivity (apraxia), Arcesilaus replied by adopting the standard of the reasonable (τὸ εὐλογον), by which the wise man could withhold dogmatic assent yet allow himself to be moved to impulse by the appearance of things as it seems reasonable to him.

Carneades argued (1) that there is no criterion because reason, apprehension, and presentations can deceive (Math. 7.159) and (2) that if the criterion does exist, it cannot be separated from sensation that is “irrational”: μηδεμιᾶς δὲ οὕσης φαντασίας κριτικῆς οὐδὲ λόγου ἢ εἰ ἑκτῆριον ἀπὸ φαντασίας γὰρ οὕτως ἀνάγεται. καὶ εἰκότως: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ φανεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ κρινόμενον, φανεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν δύναται Χωρίς τῆς ἑλεόσεως, οὔτε ἢ ἑλεος αισθήσις οὔτε ὁ λόγος ἢ κρινήριον.127 Carneades also defended the proposition that a wise man, though lacking a criterion, might assent undogmatically to presentations and therefore “opine” (Cic. Acad. 2.67, 78).128

Sextus claims (Math. 7.166) that Carneades was compelled to propose his own criterion by the same argument from inactivity. Carneades’ redefinition of the Arcesilean εὐλογον provides three criteria for the conduct of life that may be employed as circumstances demand. Carneades distinguishes truth from falsehood, on the one hand, in relation to what creates the impres-

126 Plut. Mor. 1035a=SVF III 177. Long and Sedley (I 455–60; cf. supra n.26) show that the Epicureans made the argument of inactivity (Mor. 1122a–b) but that Arcesilaus’ response adapts Stoic terminology; see also Vander Waerdt, "Colotes" 244–47, 260f, who argues that Colotes took over the apraxia argument from the Stoics.

127 Math. 7.165: “And if there is no presentment capable of serving as a criterion, neither would reason be a criterion; for it is derived from presentation. And obviously so; for that which is judged must first be presented, and nothing can be presented apart from our irrational sensation. Therefore neither irrational sensation nor reason would be a criterion.”

128 Although Arcesilaus seems to have argued that because the wise man never opines he must not assent—the reverse of Carneades’ argument—both men only try to refute Stoic premises. As Long and Sedley show (I 456), it is only a difference of dialectical strategy; cf. Cic. Acad. 2.77f, 1.41f with 2.67.
tion, the external object (πρός τὸ φανταστόν), and, on the other, in relation to the percipient of the impression (πρός τὸ φαντασιούμενον; Math. 7.168). These correspond to the difference between the object as it really is and the object as it appears. A presentation πρός τὸ φανταστόν is either true or false in so far as it “is or is not in harmony with” the external object (σύμφωνος or διάφωνος; Math. 7.168); but as judgment requires the medium of irrational perception, a presentation πρός τὸ φανταστόν cannot be the criterion. A presentation πρός τὸ φαντασιούμενον, on the other hand, is “apparently true or not” (φανομένη ἀληθῆς, οὐ φανομένη ἠληθῆς: Math. 7.169). What is apparently true may be either intensely or dimly apparent, and the dimly apparent cannot be a criterion (Math. 7.171ff). Some things that seem intensely true may turn out to be true, others false, and some both true and false (Math. 7.174f). Therefore even this criterion can only be called generally reliable. This “probable” (πιθανόν) criterion leaves open the matter of truth and falsehood (Long and Sedley I 458). When time allows, the probable may be confirmed more securely by examining the particular qualities of the object as it appears. If none of them appears to conflict with the appearance that the presentation is true, the presentation can be called both probable and undiverted (πιθανή καὶ ἀπερίσκομενη; Math. 7.176–81). The third criterion is probable, undiverted, and tested (πιθανή καὶ ἀπερίσκομενη καὶ διεξευδεμένη): a presentation is tested like a judge’s examination of testimony. The judge must be competent, just as the senses must not be impaired. What is judged must be of a magnitude that can be judged and, finally, the medium through which the judgment is made must not hinder the decision. There must be no cause for suspicion or doubt created by darkness, excessive distance, too little time for evaluation, etc. (Math. 7.182f). Carneades concludes that in trivial matters the probable presentation is a sufficient criterion; in greater matters the undiverted; and in “matters pertaining to happiness” (τοῖς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συνείσεισι) the tested is required (Math. 7.184). When time does not permit the latter, the probable must be employed (Math. 7.185f).

Plutarch shows the importance of this procedure for the avoidance of passion when Carneades says that “in matters of great importance, unexpectedness is the whole and entire cause of grief and dejection” (Mor. 474E–F: ἐπὶ πραγμάτων μεγάλων ... πάν καὶ ὦλον ἔστιν εἰς λύπην ἄγων καὶ ἀθυμίαν τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον). This is nearly the Cyrenaic thesis, but Cicero hints that
Carneades probably upheld this thesis against the Stoics for dialectical purposes in a specific debate. 129

129 My primary intention in this section, a demonstration that Posidonius used Carneades' arguments, requires reconstructing the context of Carneades' arguments on the passions. A possible reconstruction would be as follows. The two occurrences of Carneades' name at Tusc. 3.54, 60 come from different sources (Clitomachus and Antiochus) and report his attacks on Chrysippus in different debates: 3.54 on whether the wise man will suffer passion concerns the aitia of the passions; 3.60 on the utility of consolatio treats the cure of the passions (ὑποτεταίρεια). But Cicero also discusses the Cyrenaics. Plut. Mor. 474 E–F, where Carneades defends the Cyrenaic thesis on the cause of the passions, explains Carneades' rôle in this discussion. Epicurean evidence (Tusc. 3.28–51) accounts for Carneades at 3.60 on the "cure." In the Epicurean view, if a man thinks that he is in the presence of evil, he must necessarily feel grief (to the extent that nature demands it: Ep. ad Men. 127; KD 29; Cic. Tusc. 3.28).

This grief will not diminish in time, nor will it be lightened (after the fact) by the Cyrenaic motto "let nothing happen unexpected" (Tusc. 3.32). If he dwells on this evil or considers that some misfortune may strike at any time, his evil will be perpetual. Only a "recall" to the contemplation of pleasures can cure his distress: Tusc. 3.32f; J. Annas, "Epicurean Emotions," GRBS 30 (1989) 145–64; M. Nussbaum, "Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle," in Schofield and Striker (supra n.22) 31–74; see also Galen PHP 4.282.1–284.17=EK 165.17–70 on the doxa prosphatos; cf. supra n.118.

After Posidonius asks why the fresh belief causes passion and why unexpected events cause it but familiar ones do not, he advocates the Cyrenaic position to "let nothing happen unexpected" by proposing that we "dwell in the future" (προενδομένω). Then he quotes, after the Cyrenaics, the same passages from Anaxagoras and Eur. Andr. (Tusc. 3.29f); a quotation follows in which Chrysippus ponders why the passions may cease in time although the opinion has not changed (supra n.43). This evidence may originally derive from a debate between the Epicureans and Cyrenaics on the cause of the passions, in which Chrysippus became involved (Tusc. 3.32; Giusta II 317; Fillion-Lahille 168), as we know that the Epicurean Colotes attacked the Cyrenaics for rejecting sense-impressions and living according to the pathe (Plut. Mor. 1120c–f; cf. Sext. Emp. Math. 7.190–200)—a debate that also involved Stoic arguments to some degree (Vander Waerdt, "Colotes" 230ff). Chrysippus, I presume, rejected outright the Epicurean position that passion is necessary: a Chrysippian divisio shows (Cic. Fin. 2.44; supra n.98) his concern to refute the Epicurean telos—a subject closely allied with the pathe. He would have accepted the Cyrenaic position as a correct observation from nature that unexpected events do affect us more (and he may even have conceded that the passages from Anaxagoras and Eur. Andr. are useful: cf. Tusc. 3.55, 58, 60; supra nn.122f), but he would have disputed the causal link between the unexpected and passion (cf. supra n.43). We might deduce that Carneades upheld the Cyrenaic thesis against Chrysippus on the cause of the passions, but reinforced it by his own arguments on the criterion about the necessary conditions (esp. time) for assent (Tusc. 3.54); he espoused the Epicurean thesis against Chrysippus' cure of the passions and strengthened it with an argument "on goods and evils" (cf. Tusc. 3.60: a connection between a "natural" evil and an "amount" of evil). Posidonius then, aware that Carneades had effectively
How would these arguments on the criterion be applied to the Stoic topos of a wise man’s reaction to the fall of his city (supra n.122)? Carneades proposes that a wise man might use a scientific method to test his presentations. As I argue, Carneades’ arguments describe a rational process, a ratio, which only a wise man could use because it is based on the presumption of undogmatic assent. The wise man might either withhold his assent entirely or assent only to the proposition that his presentation is probable, until he could test it. A fool, with only the hard teacher of experience to rely on, cannot use this method and can hardly be expected to utilize the various kinds of undogmatic assent. An average man may, on occasion, instinctively reason things out in a calm and scientific manner, but Carneades claims only two ways of dealing with disaster: ratio and usus.

Carneades concludes that the problem is not whether the fall of the wise man’s city is a great evil; rather, matters of importance demand time to evaluate the appearance. The ‘magnitude’ of the thing and its ‘immediacy’ artificially magnify its significance: what reason ought to have taught, experience teaches, namely that things that seem very great are really very small (Cic. Tusc. 3.54: quod ratio debuerat, usus docet minora esse ea, quae sint visa maiora; cf. supra n.123). For Carneades to say (as in Plutarch) that unexpectedness causes grief in great matters, he must be arguing that unexpectedness distorts the magnitude of appearances and causes the percipient to evaluate their importance too highly. The wise man (but not the fool), aware that sudden phantasai appear greater than they are, corrects for the effects of distortion. More importantly, however, the force of unexpectedness must reside in temporal proximity, or the passage of time would not remove it in the fool.

Indeed, an objector (Cic. Tusc. 3.55) immediately asks “what need is there at all for reason or for that consolation we always use when we wish to alleviate the suffering of those in grief?” (quid ergo opus est, dicet aliquis, ratione aut omnino consolacione illa, qua solemus uti, cum levare dolorem maerentium volu­mus?). The Cyrenaic dictum “let nothing happen unexpected”

used the Cyrenaic position to refute the doctrine of doxa prosphatos, would have defended the Cyrenaic thesis against Chrysippus with Cyrenaic passages of which Chrysippus had approved.

Even if Carneades suggests a ratio here, it need not commit him to any dogmatic stance. See Vander Waerdt, “Colotes” 265f for an account of how the sceptic might proceed.
cannot, the objector continues, relieve suffering after one has submitted to passion, for “this kind of talk subtracts nothing from the actual amount of the evil” (haec enim oratio de ipsa summam mali nihil detrabit). Although Cicero upholds the Stoic view that “unexpectedness” cannot be the entire cause of evil, this dictum reminds him that misfortune is natural and not something that ought to cause grief. Cicero distinguishes recens in the Stoic sense of prosphatos (“fresh”) from repentina (“sudden”) and argues that “things seem greater because they are fresh, not because they are sudden” (Tusc. 3.55: maiora videntur quia recentia sunt, non quia repentina). The Stoics define the freshness of an opinion by the ability of the opinion to cause an impulse of the soul (supra n.26). Freshness, measured psychologically rather than temporally, has no relationship to the passage of time.

The objection corresponds completely to Carneades’ other arguments: presentations (visa) have an amount—a perceived “magnitude” of good and evil; the point at issue, as Cicero’s response suggests, is whether the unexpectedness causes grief and reason is useless to remove it, i.e., temporal newness, and time will heal the wound. The citation of Carneades at Tusc. 3.60 confirms him as the anonymous objector at 3.55. Antiochus reports how Carneades constantly chastised Chrysippus’ praise of a passage from Euripides’ Hypsipyle (Tusc. 3.60=SVF III 487; Eur. fr. 757 Dindorf), where man’s lot in life is described in grim terms: death and pain come to all according to the law of necessity. If Chrysippus liked the passage for its demonstration that misfortune is natural and therefore bearable for human beings, Carneades criticizes it because “to be victim to such a cruel necessity is itself something to be grieved” (id enim ipsum dolore esse dicebat quod in tam crudelem necessitatem incidissemus). In his view these lines only add to the “amount” of grief with which the mourner must contend, as if to say “if things seem bad now, just wait; more misfortune is on the way.” The subject at 3.60, as at 3.55, is whether the dictum “let nothing
happen unexpected” will do any good after the fact, i.e., whether *consolatio* is beneficial. The anonymous objection, in all likelihood, derives from Carneades’ arguments against Chrysippus.

These various arguments reveal much. Carneades argued not only against the Stoic doctrine of the passions and their cure but against Chrysippus in particular. He probably attacked the *doxa prosphatos* by defending the Cyrenaic thesis that the “unexpectedness of an event” causes passion; he would also have argued both that the temporal proximity of the event increases artificially the magnitude of presentations, and that *consolatio* cannot alleviate passion unless the actual ‘amount’ of evil present can be diminished.

Further, these arguments anticipate all the positions that Posidonius imputes to Chrysippus. In fact every description of Chrysippus’ doctrines repeats an argument that Carneades made against him. The curious τὸ μέγεθος τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν ἡ κακῶν, imputed to Chrysippus (*supra* n.106), actually derives from Carneades’ view on the magnitude of *visa* (*supra* n.123). Carneades’ arguments on the criterion (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.159–86) explain very clearly Posidonius’ muddle of appearance and reality in discussing the “magnitude of things that appear good or evil.” There is no criterion in relation to the thing as it exists in reality (πρὸς τὸ φανταστόν); the only means of judging how to react to an external evil is by its appearance to the subject (πρὸς τὸ φανταστούμενον). As Carneades considers only appearances, Posidonius imputes the argument to Chrysippus. Carneades’ own claim that *phantasiai* cannot exist apart from irrational sense-perception (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.165, *supra* n.127) finds an echo in Posidonius’ association of *phantasiai* with the irrational faculties (*supra* n.116). Posidonius’ definition of “fresh” (Galen *PHP* 4.280.26–33=EΚ 165.9–17: τὸ ὑπόγιον κατὰ τὸν χρόνον) and his claim that unexpected and strange events cause passion (*supra* n.118) are all earlier arguments of Carneades (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.54f, 60).

Despite the lack of evidence that Posidonius quoted Carneades’ arguments, it is sufficiently clear how and why Carneades used these arguments against Chrysippus (*cf.* *supra* n.129). All the very un-Stoic arguments attributed to Chrysippus appear to be consistent with Academic dialectical strategy in general and with arguments actually attributed to Carneades by Cicero. Even with due caution regarding *Tusc.* 3 as a source, the symmetry of argument inspires confidence in a relationship between Posidonius and Carneades.
VI. The Impact of Posidonius’ Dialectical Strategy upon his Ethics

This analysis of Posidonius’ strategy against Chrysippus raises important questions about his motives. His deliberate attribution to Stoic forbears of Academic positions is in one case difficult to dispute (supra nn.16, 20) and credible in many others (supra sections IV–V). Further, his support of certain Aristotelian positions on the passions used by Carneades against the Stoa (supra nn.115f; [Mag. Mor.] 1203b4f) and his model of the soul (supra nn.29f) add to suspicions about his allegiance to the Stoa and his reputation as an “Aristotelizer.” His motive for misrepresenting other Stoics’ views merits an explanation.

Posidonius’ primary concern, as he suggests (supra n.16), is that Stoic formulations for the telos were vulnerable to apparent aporiai. Moreover, as doctrines on the telos, the pathe, and the good are “bound as if by a single cord” (supra n.15), all Stoic ethics were dialectically vulnerable. I argue that Posidonius’ doctrines on the good and the telos attempt to recast the most important Stoic positions in simpler language. All his formulations appeal to common sense (τά ἔναργως φαινόμενα: supra nn.8, 100, 116).

The Stoa’s most potent didactic tool both before and after Posidonius was paradox. Indeed its best-known doctrines, “that only virtue is good” (ὅτι μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν) and “that virtue is sufficient for happiness” (ὅτι ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν) begin Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum (6–19). These paradoxes defy common sense and experience, which would count health, wealth, and comfort necessary for happiness. Zeno says that the wise man, though afflicted by countless misfortunes and tortured on the rack, is “perfectly happy” (beatus: Cic. Fin. 5.84). His argument that some addition or the subtraction of any misfortune cannot increase man’s happiness expose the Stoa’s vulnerability to attacks from common sense. Posidonius’ model of the soul, not strictly Platonic or Peripatetic, does not admit that these external things are ‘goods’. Using roughly their model of the soul, nevertheless, he shows that these counter-intuitive Stoic doctrines need not be paradoxical. By replacing Stoic paradoxes with his own arguments from com-

133 On τὸ ἀριστοτελέιον see EK τ85 (=Strab. 2.3.8), 93a, τ100 (=Simpl. in Cael. 4.3, 310b1), 18, τ73 (=Simpl. in Phys. 2.2, 193b23) with Kidd, EK II ad locc.
mon sense, he demonstrates, as we shall see, a degree of dialec­
tical sophistication surpassing even that used against Chrysippus.
Carneades attacks most successfully the positions that Posido­
nius addresses. Carneades’ attempt to blur the line between the
value of the indifferents and the value of the good (Cic. Fin.
3.41–44) allows him to attack (1) Chrysippus’ doctrine that the
passions arise by supposition that an indifferent is a good (supra
nn.47–53; Cic. Fin. 3.24=SVF III 11) and (2) the doctrine that the
telos of life should involve the practice of a stochastike techne,
in which one aims at the acquisition of the preferred indifferent but
achieves one’s purpose in the virtuous effort of aiming
(supra n.85). All Carneades’ arguments relate to his attack on the
good, the doctrine on which Posidonius is unquestionably
Stoic. The doctrine of the good is in Kidd’s words the “distingui­
shing stamp” of the Stoa and what makes a Stoic a Stoic. 134
Posidonius regards his model of the soul as the starting point
for his ethical doctrines and grounds his doctrines on the telos
and the good (i.e., virtue) in his psychology: σωματικοὶ δὲ καὶ
tὴν περὶ τῶν ἄρετων διδασκαλίαν τούτως σχετί καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ
tέλους καὶ ὅλως πάντα τὰ δόματα τῆς ἱδίκης φιλοσοφίας ὃς-
περ ἐκ μᾶς μηρίθου δεδεόμενη τῆς γνώσεως τῶν κατὰ τὴν ψυ­
χὴν δυνάμεων. 135 Posidonius’ model of the soul portrays
vididly the difference between man’s attraction to virtue and his
attraction to the indifferents. He clarifies how a proper under­
standing of the soul’s chief good explains not only man’s attrac­
tion to external things and the cause of the passions but also
man’s goal of becoming a sage.
The aspects of Stoic thought most difficult to explain in monis­
tic psychology are selection (supra nn.54, 58–62), reservation
(supra nn.47–53), and the status of the indifferents in κατορθω­
ματα and καθήκοντα (supra 254, 278 with n.96). Doctrines on
the telos teach how a correct understanding of these issues leads
to happiness; those on the pathe explain how an incorrect under­
standing causes unhappiness. As monistic psychology can ex­
plain all these doctrines, Posidonius has no justification for adop­

134 I. G. Kidd, “Posidonian Methodology and the Self-Sufficiency of Virtue,”
in H. Flashar and O. Gigon, eds., Aspects de la philosophie hellénistique
(=Entretiens Hardt 23 [Vandoeuvres-Geneva 1986]) 8, and (supra n.54) 184.
135 Galen PHP 4.286.4–7=EK 150a.6–10: “[Posidonius says] that education
about the virtues and the end are fitted together with these things (sc. the
dogmas on the passions and the faculties of the soul), and that in their entirety all
the dogmas of ethical philosophy are bound as if by a single cord to the recog­
nition of the faculties of the soul.” Cf. 5.326.12–16=EK 30; supra n.15.
ting a new psychology on the grounds that monism cannot account for the aitia of passion. But Posidonius' psychology explains all these issues with a certain graphic clarity; and his doctrine on the soul's relationship to the good and the indifferents answers all Carneades' objections against Chrysippus. Despite the lack of a definitive statement that this was his goal, Posidonius' doctrines do answer Carneades. When Posidonius inserts Carneades' arguments into Chrysippus' mouth, this curious procedure demonstrates not so much flaws in Chrysippus' doctrines (for he rarely considers them in context and as they were written) as their vulnerability to Academic attack. So too in his ethics, Posidonius' sophisticated dialectical scheme has the defense of the Stoa against the Academy as its ultimate objective.

Seneca's lengthy discussion of Posidonius' view of the good begins with Posidonius' view that riches can be an "antecedent cause" of evil (causa praeecedens) because they puff up the spirit and tempt it to vice, although they are not evil because they lack an "efficient cause" of evil (causa efficiens). Nor does it follow that they are not "preferred indifferents" (commoda), because riches contain more benefit than harm. As indifferents that can be used well or badly, riches are not "goods" in Stoic terms.

Posidonius specifically designs his model of the soul to uphold the Stoic doctrine of the good within a Platonic, tripartite framework (cf. supra n.29). Each power of the soul has its own desires (ὄρεκτα: Galen PHP 5.330.5=EK 161.5)—a part of his model similar to Plato's (Resp. 4.441E–42A). The desiderative faculty (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) is drawn to pleasure (ἡ θλησθή), the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδὲς) to victory (ἡ νίκη), and the rational (τὸ λογιστικόν) to virtue (τὸ καλόν). These desires are oikeiōn ("natural and appropriate") to their respective faculties (Galen PHP 5.318.12–24=EK 160). Thus Posidonius connects his Platonic model to the fundamental Stoic doctrine of oikeiōσις, the process by which man recognizes his bond with his own nature and with the nature and order governing the universe. By this process man learns to "habituate" himself to the world in which he lives and by which he is drawn to virtue.137 Posidonius shows that his explanation of human motivation is to be understood by


137 D.L. 7.85f=SVF III 178; Cic. Fin. 3.16, 62–68; cf. SVF III 340ff. For the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōσις see Inwood 182–201; supra n.60.
the concept of οἰκεῖον, a term used by the Stoics and others (supra nn.26, 60).

Posidonius further qualifies his model: what is appropriate to the rational faculty is appropriate in a special way. What is oikeia to the rational faculty is "simply appropriate" (ἀπλῶς ο Snackbar; whereas what is "appropriate" to the irrational faculties is not simply so (οὐκ ἀπλῶς οἰκεῖα: Kidd [1978] 207f; EK II 576f). This distinction corresponds to the relationship of the rational faculty with a divine nature (θείον) to the irrational faculties having that of an animal (ζωόδοι: Galen PHP 5.330.2–6=EK 161.2–7). Posidonius compares the rational faculty to a charioteer and the irrational faculties to his team of horses.138 The virtue of the rational faculty is to acquire knowledge of the nature of the universe (ἐπιστήμη τῆς τῶν ὀντων φύσεως), whereas the virtues of the irrational faculties are to become accustomed to obeying the commands of reason (ἐπεστηθεί τε καὶ πείθεσθαι τῷ λογισμῷ).139 This model of the soul is intimately bound up with Posidonius' doctrine of good and evil.

Virtue alone is ἀπλῶς οἰκεῖα; all other things desired by the irrational faculties are either evil or appropriate only with qualification. The irrational faculties are drawn to things that differ in kind, not in magnitude, from those to which reason is drawn. Posidonius' ἀπλῶς indicates that the distinction is between the 'qualified' and the 'unqualified'. To be led by the irrational faculty is to be drawn to something other than virtue and to mistake what is indifferent or evil for what is appropriate without qualification, i.e., good.140

In Posidonius' system man can fall into passion whenever he allows the irrational powers in his soul to have their way. All

138 See Vander Waerdt (supra n.5: 386f) on the doxographical tradition of this image from Pl. Phdr. 253c–54a; Kidd (supra n.18) 111ff.
139 Galen PHP 5.324.9–23=EK 31.14–30. The irrational faculties seem to accomplish this task by being neither too strong nor too weak, but by assuming the state of an Aristotelian mean: Eth. Nic. 2.5f, 1106a–07a. The virtue of the rational faculty does not seem to be a mean.
140 Cf. Galen PHP 5.326.20–24=EK 187.4–9: τὸ δὲ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιων, τοιε-έστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαιμονίου βίου, τὸ μὴ κατὰ πάν ἐπεσθαί τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ διάμοι τυγχανὺ το τῶν ὀντων κόσμων ποτὲ διακομοῖν, τῷ δὲ χείρι καὶ ζωοδεί ποτὲ συνεκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι ("The cause of passion, that is, of discord and the unhappy life, is that people do not follow in everything the divinity in themselves which, in origin and in being, has the same nature as that which rules the universe, and sometimes, inclining towards the worse, animal-like faculty, they are carried away."). Cf. D.L. 7.88 on the use of δοίμων.
three faculties are drawn to what is appropriate (οἰκεῖον). 141 These things contribute to the natural life; but it is not appropriate that every natural thing without qualification should be sought by a complete human being, whose soul moves him with three different generic desires (ὄρεκτά). The τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, appropriate to the several faculties of the soul, are appropriate for the entire man only when reason judges that their pursuit contributes to its own practice of virtue, always appropriate without qualification. This model identifies the entire man, in a limited sense, with his rational faculty because what is appropriate to it is appropriate to the entire man. 142 The irrational faculties must serve the rational faculty for the soul to be harmonious and free from passion.

Thus the irrational faculties may seek the preferred indifferents (προηγμένα) for their own sake, while the rational faculty pursues them only as a means to the telos of virtue. Posidonius’ model could explain the appearance of two ends—virtue and attainment of the preferred indifferents—and refute Carneades’ aporia (Plut. Mor. 1070 f). The preferred indifferents would be both the ὑλή and the ἀρχή of acts as the irrational faculties perform them, but only the ὑλή as the rational faculty performs them (supra 254, 278 with n.96). Posidonius does not mean that the irrational faculties perform καθήκοντα, for he says that being led by the irrational faculties constitutes passion (supra n.140). But so long as the rational faculty controls the irrational faculties, the whole soul pursues προηγμένα harmoniously to practice καθήκοντα (the acts appropriate for both the moral

141 Kidd says (in Long [supra n.2] 207) that for Posidonius “οἰκεῖον is not necessarily related to the term good, however relative. Posidonius is not concerned here with ‘the preferred’ (proegmena), with what has relative worth (αξία) in a moral context, but with native drives which upset the moral balance.” Although oikeion does not mean “good,” I do not entirely follow Kidd’s contention that Posidonius is not thinking of proegmena when he says oikeion. Posidonius explicitly associates pleasure (one of his τὰ οἰκεῖα) with τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν (Galen PHP 5.328.11f=EK 187.27f), an Academic use for the Stoic τὰ κατὰ φύσιν (supra n.81). Moreover, Kidd says (supra n.134: 17; EK II 635f) that the irrational faculties are drawn to τὰ κατὰ φύσιν. The psychological importance of man’s “native drives” is that man is drawn to the unhappy life by ‘desiring’ what he should only ‘select’, which is a doctrine common to all Stoics.

142 Cf. Glibert-Thirry 398, citing Sen. Ep. 121.14=SVF III 184: Ea enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo. This general point, though acceptable to Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, and others, is clearly one of the inspirations for the entire Stoic enterprise.
progressor and the sage) and, when this control is perfected, κατορθώματα (the virtuous acts of the sage).

This model explains not only the rôle of the indifferents in κατορθώματα and the appearance of two tele, but also the cause of passion, which the monist would call a “fresh belief” (doxa prosphtatos) from the lack of “reservation” (supra nn.14, 47–53). When reason controls the soul, the proper attitude towards the good is preserved and with it man’s relationship to nature, divine reason, and fate. In Chrysippus’ model, the false belief that something indifferent is good or evil and, more importantly, the “fresh belief” that passion is “appropriate” (oportet/καθήκον: supra 254f) cause passion. Posidonius views the latter part of this doctrine as absurd and cites a comic fragment: ἡμ' ἀπολέσθαι τούτο μον νῦν συμφέρει (CAF III 350=Galen PHP 4.270.1=EK 164.99). He replaces the paradoxical doctrine of Chrysippus with his own common-sense explanation that if one is led by reason, he practices reservation. If not, he is liable to the passions at any time.

But how is a man to know if he is led by the rational or the irrational faculties? The monistic model suggests two possibilities: one may assent to the proposition that passion is ‘appropriate’ either consciously or unconsciously. Posidonius mocks Chrysippus as if he held the former, although he certainly intended the latter (cf. supra n.43; Inwood 81–85, 161). Posidonius’ solution omits the problem of unconscious assent. He recommends that the rational faculty train the irrational to obey through an irrational education of “rhythms, harmonics, and practices” (Galen PHP 5.330.7f=EK 168.2f: ρύθμι καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ ἐπιτηδεύμας). Apparently, just as Chrysippus held man accountable for his unconscious assents, Posidonius holds him accountable for training his irrational faculties. Interesting, however, is Posidonius’ treatment of reason’s responsibility in passion, i.e., the problem of weak will, made famous in Euripides’ Medea (1019–80). The tripartite model has its own paradoxes, which Posidonius fails to admit. He actually inverts the Socratic dictum “no one does wrong willingly” (μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν) into a common-sense indictment of Chrysippus, as in the comic fragment cited above.

143 On the problems of weak will for monists and dualists, see Inwood 132–39.

144 Pl. Grg. 509i; cf. Meno 77d–e, Ph. 345e, 352a–57e, Ap. 25c–26a.
Posidonius’ model of the soul and his doctrines on the passions and the good are the foundation for his telos-formula. His language, differing from earlier Stoic formulae (supra nn.57–64), requires elucidation. In its proper context his telos, like his other doctrines, resolves apparent aporiai: τό ζήν θεωροῦντα τήν τῶν ὀλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν καὶ συγκατασκευάζοντα αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, κατὰ μηδὲν ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τὸν ἀλόγον μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς. The formula initially describes man’s relationship to the order of the universe, i.e., the divine logos: the first part of his telos is τὸ ζήν θεωροῦντα (cf. supra n.140; Galen PHP 5.326.22f=EK 187.6ff). Kidd observes (EK II 672) that “it is difficult to find any passage in the earlier Stoa where θεωρία is given such a fundamental role”—correctly if he means that θεωρία is not found in other telos-formulae. Comparison with Chrysippus’ views of θεωρία may explain Posidonius’ usage.

For Chrysippus, an understanding of justice must begin with Zeus and universal nature (Plut. Mor. 1035c–d: ἡ κοινὴ φύσις), as must an account (logos) of goods and evils: δεῖ γὰρ τούτῳς συνάσχει τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὕσης ἄλλης ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἀμείνονος οὐδ’ ἀναφοράς, οὐδ’ ἀλλού τινος ἐνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραλληλῆς οὕσης ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διάστασιν. This passage demonstrates the basic Stoic premise that man’s logos is akin to the divine logos of nature, identical to the mind of Zeus (D.L. 7.87ff). As virtue is only possible when the wise man assimilates his reason to that of nature, the starting point of virtue becomes contemplation (θεωρία) of nature (man’s own, universal nature, and the relationship of the two). Cicero clarifies this even more:

145 Clem. Al. Strom. 2.21.129.5=EK 186.13ff: “To live by rational contemplation of the truth and order of the universe, and by taking part in ordering it to the best of one’s ability, while never being led by the irrational part of the soul.”

146 Kidd rightly observes that Diogenes (7.130) lists three lives: the “theoretical” (ὁ θεωρητικός), the “practical” (ὁ πρακτικός), and the “rational” (ὁ λογικός), but does not consider that the same information at Plut. Mor. 1035a shows that Chrysippus used θεωρία to describe the rational activity of which οἰκείωσις partially consists. Cf. Aret. Epict. Diss. 1.20.1f, 5, 14ff.

147 Plut. Mor. 1035b: “For the doctrine on good and evil must be fitted together with these, since these [sc. good and evil] have no better beginning or reference, and physical speculation must not be undertaken for any other purpose than for the discernment of good and evil.”
Physicae quoque non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propertea quod qui convenienser naturae victurus sit ei proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. Nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere indicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa.148

To become a sage, one must contemplate the divine *logos* and accommodate himself to the world in order to complete his *oikeōsis*.

Kidd compares τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν with Posidonius' distinction between the philosopher's and the astronomer's observations on the universe (Simpl. in Phys. 2.2, 193b23 [pp.291.21–92.31 Diels]=EK 18). The philosopher looks to "the creative force" of the universe (εἴς τὴν ποιητικὴν δύναμιν ἀποβλέπων), which Kidd takes as the *logos*: "the philosopher argues deductively from his fundamental universal principles or axioms; the scientist proceeds in his proofs from the observation and calculation of the properties of particular phenomena which form his field of study."149 Further, "τάξις not only covers the order of the οὐρανὸς, which is part of the proper study of ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρία (F18.8), but the order of everything imposed by λόγος, providence and Zeus" (EK II 672). Kidd's treatment ("Criterion" 148) of ἀλήθεια in Posidonius' doctrine that *orthos logos* should be the criterion (D.L. 7.54=EK 42) argues that in the period between Chrysippus and Posidonius attacks on the Stoa's criterion, the *phantasia kataleptike*, included a distinction between a criterion of action and a criterion of "underlying existence" (Sext. Emp. Math. 7.29f: περὶ τῆς ύπάρξεως). Earlier Stoics like Chrysippus claimed that both wise and fools may grasp τὸ ἀληθὲς through *katalepsis*, but only the wise man

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148 Fin. 3.73=SVF III 282: "To physics, and not without good reason, the same distinction is given, because whoever will live in accordance with nature must make the entire world and its governance his point of departure. Nor indeed can anyone judge truly about goods and evils without first recognizing the entire *logos* of nature and especially of the life of the gods, and whether or not the nature of man conforms with that of the universe." Cf. Nat. D. 2.37, 39 =SVF II 1153, 641: *Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum... Est autem mundo nihil perfectius, nihil virtute meiuis: igitur mundi est propria virtus* ("But as for himself, man was born to contemplate and imitate the universe.... For nothing is more perfect than the universe, and nothing finer than virtue: therefore virtue is a characteristic of the universe").

149 EK II 131f; on the implications of this fragment see esp. Kidd (1978) 10–15.
may grasp ἡ ἀλήθεια, because only he possesses knowledge (Cic. Acad. 2.144f; Sext. Emp. Math. 7.42). In Kidd’s view, Posidonius proposed his own criterion of action based on the natural attractions of the faculties of the soul, and orthos logos is intended as a criterion of “underlying existence” for the wise man: “As in the moral sphere ‘appropriate action’ (καθήκον) becomes in the wise man κατόρθωμα (‘perfect moral action’) through his possession of orthos logos, so in the logic of truth, katalepsis becomes knowledge (episteme) through orthos logos” (“Criterion” 149). Posidonius’ “the truth of everything that exists” probably means that part of the telos is to perceive, with the firm grasp of the sage’s episteme, the universe as it is in reality. In other words, the specific implications of this phrase for Posidonius agree completely with Chrysippus’ general principles: οἰκείωσις and progress towards virtue require man to observe and understand the divine logos and to make his own reason conform to it. Posidonius alludes not only to the process of οἰκείωσις, but also to its end in which man becomes a sage.

The first part of this formula refers exclusively to the rational faculty. Posidonius has good reason to spell out its particular activity, because elsewhere he describes its weakness as a cause of passion:

καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταύτ’ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος μέμφεται καὶ δεικνύει περιέργη τῶν νευρῶν ὑπολήγει τὰς αἰτίας ἐν μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ (διὰ τῆς ἀμαθίας γινομένων, ἐν δὲ τῷ παθητικῷ) διὰ τῆς παθητικῆς ὀλίκης, προηγεῖται δὲ αὐτῆς τάς νευρῶν ὁδός ὑπενθυμίσαντος περὶ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ· γεννᾶσθαι γὰρ τῷ ζῷῳ τὴν ὀρμήν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ κρίσει, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ κυνήσει τοῦ παθητικοῦ.\[150\]

150 Galen PHP 5.320.23-28=EK 169.77-84: “Indeed Posidonius finds fault with him [sc. Chrysippus] on this matter too [sc. the source of error about good and evil], and attempts to show that the causes of all false suppositions arise in the faculty which contemplates <through ignorance, and in the faculty which acts> through the pull of the affections; but that false opinions are the antecedent causes of it [sc. the pull] when the rational faculty has become weak in judgment. For impulse is produced in a living being sometimes as a result of the rational faculty, but often as a result of the movement of the faculty subject to the passions.” I give Kidd’s text, defended at EK II 620-23. Fillion-Lahille (156f) uses this text to argue that Posidonius associates passions with “judgments” (δόξαι) and “suppositions” (ὑπολήψεις). This reading cannot be defended: cf. supra nn.9, 106, 140, and Posidonius’ formula for the telos (EK 186), where it is quite clear that in Posidonius’ view reason cannot cause passion, that he does not accept the Chrysippean doctrine of the doxa prosphatos, and that passion consists in “being led by the irrational faculties.” Given Posidonius’ association of phantasiai with the irrational faculties, is this
One assumes that the activity of the rational faculty described in his telos-formula averts the weakness described here. False opinions may be avoided by constant contemplation of, and assimilation to, the divine logos.

The second part of the formula, καὶ συγκατασκευάζοντα σὺ- 

την κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, admonishes man to play a part in the or­

dering of the universe and to act in concert with what nature 

demands. Kidd notes (EK II 673) the parallel structure of θεω-

ροῦντα ... συγκατασκευάζοντα, contemplation and action, and 

suggests that Plato's ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν (Thet. 176b: 

"a likeness to the divine in so far as possible") anticipates the 

sense of κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. More importantly, he claims certain 

ethical implications for "to promote the truth and order of all 

things": "human beings have their part to play both in the mac-

rocosm and in the microcosm of themselves,"151 and concludes 

(EK II 674) that this telos-formula embraces all three branches 

of philosophy: physics, logic, and ethics.

In addition to Kidd's numerous insights on the formula and 

Posidonius' wider philosophy, the formula also reflects a 

specific concern to resolve Academic aporiai. κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, 

for instance, could allude to the στοχαστική τέχνη, where the 

goal is effort, not success. Antipater's formula πᾶν τὸ καθ' σὺ-

τῶν ποιεῖν (supra n.19) tries to account for the rôle of the indif-

ferents in the craft of virtue by a highly specific use of πρός: 

man must do everything "with reference to but not for the sake 
of" the preferred indifferents. Posidonius' κατὰ μηδὲν ἀγόμεν-

ον ύπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς preserves the suggestion 

of "effort" and resolves the ambiguity inherent in πρός: man is 

to participate in the ordering of all that exists "while never being 

led by the irrational part of the soul" (cf. Kidd ad μέρος: EK II 

674).

Posidonius appeals to his model of the soul to explain that this 

effort must be rational. To be led by the irrational faculties 

would constitute passion. In Antipater's formula passion also 

plays a rôle, because "to do everything in one's power for the 

fragment not his answer to the Chrysippian doctrine about the persuasiveness 
of presentations (supra nn.32, 45, 116; nn.153f infra)?

151 EK 85=Sext. Emp. Math. 7.9.3; cf. Galen De sequela 819f=EK 35.22-27, in 

which Posidonius says that we need not shun the company of inferior men for 

fear that evil be increased in our souls, because the source of evil is not exterior 

but interior. In other words, man may be a more social being under 

Posidonius' account of the cause of evil (based on his model of the soul).
sake of acquiring the preferred indifferents" would be a tacit claim that they were ‘good’, and to pursue the indifferents as goods constitutes the excessive impulse of passion. Antipater’s use of πρός rather than ἐνεκά to govern τὰ κατὰ φύσιν is intended to represent reservation: man must make his efforts only “with reference to” the indifferents because the archē of his action must be virtue (supra 279). Posidonius’ model of the soul permits him to express the necessity for, and the meaning of, reservation in a much simpler fashion. To be led by reason is to preserve it, to be led by the irrational faculties is to abandon it.

Posidonius’ formula for the telos, is ideally suited to explain the problem of selection to which these other issues are directly related. It gives a rôle to the rational faculty qua rational in the first part: by observing the divine logos man not only progresses in virtue, but becomes aware of what is good and evil. Posidonius’ second part clearly suggests that man must not only contemplate the universe but interact productively with it. The means of this interaction is selection and rejection of the indifferents. As noted, the Stoic’s growing recognition of this fact led Diogenes and Antipater to include selection in their telos-formulae (supra nn.61–64). The second and third parts of Posidonius’ formula give the rational faculty positive and negative duties in selection: it must expend effort to interact with the world (possible only through selections of indifferents), but it also has a negative duty to rule the irrational faculties, which would, if allowed, pervert rational action into passion by pursuing the indifferents as goods. Posidonius completely interconnected his telos-formula, his doctrine of the good, and his model of the soul (supra n.15) and designed them to combat aporiai that Carneades raised.

A final way of reading this formula lies within the context of action. Posidonius’ formula based on tripartition accounts for the four primary functions of the monistic soul (φαντασία, λόγος, συγκατάθεσις, ὀρμή). The first part of the formula clearly alludes to logos and, as Kidd shows (supra 318), ἀλήθεια tacitly refers to the criterion, i.e., how one deals with phantasiai. Whether Posidonius explained the power of logos to create lekta and how his association of phantasiai with the irrational faculties (supra n.116) may be reconciled with his demand to observe the “truth” of the universe might be resolved through

152 Cf. Cic. Fin. 3.33f=SVF III 72; Sen. Ep. 120.3ff, 8–11; Long and Sedley I 374f.
his argument that passion sometimes arises "when the rational faculty becomes weak in judgment" (*supra* n.150).

If continuous contemplation of the divine *logos* prevents weak judgments, it would also prevent the creation of false propositions (ἀξιώματα), about which a judgment might be made. But this is thorny ground: if Posidonius retains the theory of *lekta*, at some point it becomes difficult to distinguish his theory from Chrysippus'. Posidonius' model, clearly intended to divide *phantasias* from their corresponding *lekta*, has the *phantasias* par-take of the irrational. Perhaps he retains *lekta* and places them under the control of a different faculty, τὸ λογιστικὸν, thus permitting his claim of two causes of passion: the weakness of the rational faculty in judgment and the disobedience of the irrational faculties (*supra* n.150). As Posidonius associated the effects of *phantasias* on a weak rational faculty with the effects of disobedient irrational faculties, he probably claimed that *phantasias*, like the irrational faculties, exert a "pull" (παθητικὴ ὀλκή), which attempts to compel assent.153 In discussing Chrysippus' claim that "the persuasiveness of *phantasias*" is one cause of evil, Posidonius associates attraction to impressions with the attraction of the irrational faculties to the indifferents:

καὶ γὰρ διὰ τὶ θεασάμενα καὶ ἀκούσαντα παράδειγμα κα-κίσις οὐχὶ μισεῖ τούτο καὶ φεύγει τῷ μηδεμίαν οἰκείωσιν ἔχειν πρὸς αὐτό, ἡθομάζειν ἐπέρχεταί μοι.... τὰς γὰρ ἁνάκης τὸς παῖδας ὑπὸ μὲν τῆς ἡδονῆς ὡς ἄγαθου δελεάζεσθαι μη-δεμίαν οἰκείωσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀποστρέφεσθαι δὲ καὶ φεύγειν τὸν πόνον, εἴπερ μὴ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἡλλοτριόντα φύ-σει; ... ἐρωτητέον αὐτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν, διὰ ἣν ἡδονή μὲν ὡς ἄγαθον, ἄλγηδων δὲ ὡς κακὸν πιθανήν προβάλλοντι φαντασίαν.154

Posidonius' response indicates that *phantasias* derive their effect

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154 Galen *Phip* 5.320.4ff, 7-10, 18f=EK 169.55ff, 59–63, 71ff: "It occurs to me to wonder why it is that when they have seen and heard an example of vice, they do not hate it and flee from it, since they feel no kinship with it... What necessity is there that children be enticed by pleasure as a good thing, when they feel no kinship with it, or that they avoid and flee from pain if they are not by nature also alienated from it?... We must ask him why it is that pleasure projects the persuasive appearance that it is good, and pain that it is evil." The Chrysippean phrase is ἡ πιθανότης τῶν φαντασίων at *Phip* 5.320.17=EK 169.70f.
from man’s “natural attraction” (οἰκείωσις) to the indifferents.\(^{155}\) His telos-formula implies that all impressions about the indifferents must be submitted to the rational faculty, which tests them against the episteme acquired through contemplation (Θεωρία) of the divine logos. His formula might mean: “all phantasiai must be tested by the criterion of truth.” In this process certain propositions would have to be formed for assent to be given. As the word lekton does not occur in Posidonius’ fragments, he may have suppressed the concept to avoid explaining how a weak rational faculty might produce conflicting lekta and thus becoming liable to his own arguments against Chrysippus.

Posidonius’ formula also accounts for impulse and assent. The third part, κατά μηδὲν ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, suggests that impulse (ὀρμή) must never result from the irrational faculty (cf. supra n.140). Possibly he would identify impulse with the irrational faculties, in which case he might say that “man must never live according to impulse.” His positive account of impulse, embodied in συγκατάσκευασενα, may involve a verbal pun: συγκατάθεσις, the technical term for assent, and σκευάζω, the proper activity of man’s impulse, may combine as “making impulse conform to assent.” Proper impulse would follow from proper assent, i.e., the rational faculty’s ‘leadership’ of the irrational faculties. Improper assent and impulse would be synonymous with the rational “being led by” the irrational.

If the preceding represents an over-interpretation of Posidonius’ intentions, it nevertheless shows the sophistication of his response to Chrysippus. Posidonius’ telos-formula embraces all branches of philosophy and preserves the central features of telos-formulae of Chrysippus, Antipater, and Diogenes; it accounts for rational action in terms of the soul’s activities and can show how man should interact with the indifferents. His formula even preserves under κατά τὸ δυνατόν the central Stoic image of virtue as a tension, which Antipater rendered in the efforts of an archer, the stochastike techne. Moreover it accomplishes all these through language that is rich and layered yet simple.

\(^{155}\) His model of the soul makes this clear (supra 311). Chrysippus too had said that man has a natural attraction to the indifferents in that “God himself made me inclined to select them” (supra n.53), but Posidonius might argue that it does not follow that this natural attraction can account for the corresponding lekton that such things are good, the assent to which would cause passion.
In sum, Posidonius did not undertake a refutation of Chrysippean monism through Chrysippus' expression of these doctrines, but attributes to Chrysippus subtly altered representations of Carneades' views. It was quite simple to show that these arguments refute themselves because Carneades designed them for that purpose. Although this complex dialectical strategy probably cannot be explained with complete satisfaction, I have tried to show that Posidonius' own doctrines display an even greater dialectical sophistication in that they can account for complex and even paradoxical early Stoic doctrines in the language of common sense.

Posidonius' motive may be summarized as follows: the most important aspects of Stoicism had to be explained through paradox; Carneades and others manipulated these doctrines slightly to make paradox synonymous with absurdity and argued contra through appeals to common sense; Posidonius portrayed the problem of Academic misrepresentations through his curious treatment of Chrysippus; and finally, he brought the Stoa into the camp of common sense by adopting tripartition. Posidonius' ability to explain the very phenomena that Carneades attacked so successfully suggests that his principal goal was to respond to Carneades and to render the Stoa invulnerable to future attacks. He respects Chrysippus far more than his fragments indicate because he preserves so many Chrysippean doctrines in his own model, and he omits entirely any mention of Carneades, whom he certainly read carefully (through Clitomachus and others). Posidonius' claim to conduct his inquiries from aetiology conceals, for the most part, his dialectical enterprise. Finally, his claim to begin his investigations from "what is plainly evident" (τὰ σαφῶς φαινόμενα: supra nn.8, 100, 116) more properly characterizes his 'end' to produce "plainly evident" arguments.

In the final analysis, Posidonius wrote in the age of Antiochus of Ascalon who, strongly influenced by Carneades, attempted to harmonize Stoicism with Platonism. It would be most interesting to compare their enterprises, as well as those of Eudorus and Arius Didymus. The result might advance considerably our knowledge of the philosophical environment of the first century B.C.; others might wish to investigate Posidonius' rela-

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156 On the eclecticism of Eudorus and Arius see Stob. Ecl. 2.38f, 47f, 89f; Inwood 140–43, 189 n.34; A. A. Long, "Arius Didymus and the Exposition of Stoic Ethics," in Fortenbaugh (supra n.18) 41–65.
tionship not only to the Stoa but to the arguments of Academics, Epicureans, and Cyrenaics, of which he was probably aware (supra n.129), and to the Peripatos that he clearly admired (supra n.133). The most intriguing, perhaps the most productive, area of investigation would be the extent to which Posidonius' doctrines actually reproduce the most important aspects of monism within a tripartite psychology, for this would provide insights into the works of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, where elements of monism and dualism exist side by side, seemingly without a loss to doctrine.\textsuperscript{157}

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\footnote{157 This paper, first presented to a colloquium of the Duke University Department of Classical Studies and later to a panel of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy in 1989, benefited in early stages from the criticism of Professors Phillip Mitsis and Roger Hornsby, and in later stages from the detailed comments of Professors Ian Kidd and David Sedley, to whom I am most grateful. My project has been aided throughout by the constructive criticism and scepticism of my friend and teacher, Dr Paul Vander Waerdt. Many errors and problems of presentation have been avoided through their efforts. The final version owes much to the detailed comments and most helpful suggestions of Professor Brad Inwood. To all these must be attributed much of what is convincing in this paper, but none of these may be construed to have endorsed by their kindness the radical thesis.}