DOUBTS ABOUT THE AUTHENTICITY of the thirteenth speech of the Demosthenic corpus, Περὶ συντάξεως (On Organization), have been repeatedly entertained since the nineteenth century.¹ The trend this century has been towards accepting it as genuine, but the most recent discussion of the problem argues forcibly against this view.² One hesitates to add to what has already been written on the subject, but the view that it is spurious should not be left holding the field. The objections that have been raised are far from cogent; moreover, it is essential to look at the speech as a whole, rather than concentrate on one or two passages that are thought to present difficulties.³ The question is important, as we need to know whether the speech can be used as evidence of Demosthenes’ thought and the development of his political views. Absolute proof is unattainable, but in what follows I argue that the speech is almost certainly genuine.

Testimonia. As the speaker identifies himself as Demosthenes (13.12), the speech must be either genuine or a deliberate fake; it cannot be a work of the fourth century wrongly attributed to him. No ancient scholar expresses any doubt about its authen-


² Sealey II resuming Sealey I.

³ Seventy-five years ago Levy complained (13) that “omnes viri docti, quamcumque sententiam de oratione protulerunt, singillatim tantum partibus orationis vel argumentis selectis de totius orationis fide iudicaverunt.”
ticity. Libanius, Harpocration, and the scholiasts all refer to it as Demosthenic. Didymus (coll. 13.14–15.10) treats it as authentic, unlike the spurious Reply to the Letter of Philip (Dem. 11). This argument from silence should not be lightly dismissed, because Demosthenes’ political speeches were closely studied in antiquity, and the three evidently spurious works were identified as such. Moreover, if the work is a forgery and written after the middle of the third century B.C., its absence from Callimachus’ catalogue ought to have led the scholars of later antiquity at least to question its authenticity. But as Goldstein notes, there is in fact “no evidence that any work not listed by Callimachus has found its way into the Demosthenic corpus.” The absence of other late forgeries makes it harder to accept that Dem. 13 is uniquely spurious.

The only indication that the speech might have been thought spurious is the failure of Dionysius of Halicarnassus to mention it in his first Letter to Ammaeus (1.4, 10), where he gives dates for Demosthenes’ major speeches. His silence is taken to suggest that he doubted that it was genuine; but as he refers to individual speeches only in order to prove that they were anterior to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, he probably omitted this speech because he did not know its date, which was (and is) unclear. Further, the list of Demosthenes’ speeches that he used was clearly eccentric, as he thought that 4.30–51 was a separate speech, and accepted 7 and 11 as genuine. There is no evidence that any other scholars thought that 4 was really two speeches; and Didymus, his contemporary, rightly suspected that 11 was spurious (col. 11.7–17). Thus, even if Dionysius represents a tradition that 13 is spurious, it has little authority.


5 Dem. 7: Liban. Hyp. 2ff; Dem. 11: Didymus col. 11.7–17; Dem. 17: Dion. Hal. Dem. 57; Harp. s.v. πρόβολας; Liban. Hyp.

6 J. A. Goldstein, The Letters of Demosthenes (New York 1968) 18 n.63, who also argues that the marginal stichometric numeration of the speech shows that it belongs to a “corpusculum” of public speeches with “15-syllable stichoi” that was probably compiled at the time of Callimachus, if not earlier. His discussion of the problems involved (6–25) is difficult but rewarding.

7 See Σ 13.1 (I 163 Dilts): ὁ περὶ συντάξεως λόγος οὗ ἔχει μὲν προφανῆ τὸν χρόνον. It is clear that Didymus also did not know when it was delivered, for he tried to use Philochorus to date it and came up with a solution that is probably too late (col. 13.40–62). Thus Weil 438; see further 188f below.
Doublets. The main arguments against the speech are based on several passages that appear in a very similar form in other speeches of undoubted authenticity. The most substantial doublets are: (1) 13.21–24 and 23.196–200. These passages contrast the modest rewards that the Athenians once gave to successful generals and to deserving foreigners with the inflated rewards that are now handed out. Most of the factual content is the same in both passages, but the sections dealing with Menon and Perdiccas differ. At 23.199f it is claimed of each of them that the Athenians “did not pass a decree that whoever killed him should be liable to arrest, but gave him citizenship and thought that this honor was sufficient,” but at 13.23f that they gave them “not citizenship but immunity from taxes.”

We may start with the version in 23, which is certainly the work of Demosthenes. First, an historical error common to both versions must be noted. It is generally accepted that when the text refers to “Perdiccas,” this is a mistake for the Alexander who was king of Macedonia at the time of the Persian Wars. This error has no bearing on the relationship between the two passages. The claim that “Perdiccas” and Menon were each awarded citizenship is almost certainly true of Menon, whose name very probably appears on ostraca for an ostracism. Whether Alexander was given the same award is less certain, but in view of his rank and non-residence in Athens it is likely that, if he was given either honor, it was citizenship rather than ateleia (which was only of use to a resident in Athens: Osborne III 108f). Thus the version in 23 seems the more plausible.

Detailed comparison of the two passages suggests that 23 is earlier than 13 (Fossey). It might seem puzzling that Demosthenes deliberately altered the correct version, but a plausible reason in not hard to find. The purpose of 23 is to challenge the proposal that Charidemus’ person be regarded as inviolable. The argument in this passage is that the Athenians did not make such awards to Menon and “Perdiccas,” but limited themselves to the citizenship, and that therefore Charidemus’ friends should be content with the same award for him. If Demosthenes wished to reuse the passage, he would have found that the reference to inviolability, which made sense when talking about Charidemus, was inappropriate in any other context. Rather than rewrite the whole passage, he simply altered “in-

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violability” to “citizenship,” and “citizenship” to “immunity,” in order to preserve a contrast, albeit now an incorrect one. Such a falsification is no doubt reprehensible, but Athenian orators and their audiences were singularly careless about getting historical details right. As he did not trouble to give the name of the Macedonian king correctly, he can hardly be represented as a paragon of historical accuracy.

The other difference of fact between the two passages is trivial: at 23.199 Menon contributes 300 cavalrymen to the Athenian force at Eion, but at 13.23 the figure is 200. This discrepancy is most likely the result of a copying error.

It is further claimed that *energesia* at 13.24 (μεγάλην καὶ τιμίαν, οἴμαι, καὶ σεμνὴν τὴν αὐτῶν πατρίδ’ ἡγούμενοι καὶ πάσης μείζον’ ἐνέργεσίας) may be an anachronism introduced by someone thinking of the later association of the term with grants of *proxenia* (Fossey 78). But ἐνέργεσία and its cognates are common in Demosthenes’ speeches (over eighty instances are listed in Preuss’ *Index*), and the argument has no force.

(2) 13.25–31 and 3.23–32. These passages contrast the conduct of present-day Athenians with that of their fifth-century ancestors. One particular difference is taken to be significant. Both passages refer to the modest houses of great men of the fifth century, but different men are named: Aristides and Miltiades at 3.26, and Themistocles, Aristides, and Cimon at 13.29. As Theopompus (*FGrHist* 115 F 89) records that Cimon owned a house large enough to entertain many poor men at dinner, and as at 23.207 Demosthenes refers to the modest houses of Miltiades and Themistocles (but not Cimon), it is argued that his appearance at 13.29 is an intrusion introduced by someone who did not know that he had a large house (that is, by someone other than Demosthenes). This argument is weak: one might as well ask why Miltiades is paired with Aristides at 3.26 but with Themistocles at 23.207. In any case, one can argue that a man can be hospitable without possessing a large house,

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9 Weil 451: “Ici cet honneur est, pour le besoin de l’antithèse, remplacé par l’immunité, contrairement à la verité historique, on ne saurait en douter.”


11 Fossey 78, although his suggestion that it belongs to a miniscule stage of the textual transmission seems to assume that the tradition was still unified in the ninth century.
or that a house that was large by early fifth-century standards may have seemed unimpressive a century later.\textsuperscript{12} The truth is surely that Demosthenes regarded the great names of the early fifth century as interchangeable for the purpose of criticizing the degeneracy of the present day.

It is also claimed that two ‘common’ passages are appropriate in their original contexts but inappropriate in 13. The first such pair is 3.27\textsuperscript{f} and 13.27, both describing the state of ἔρημία in which Athens finds herself. The meaning of the word is not wholly clear, but it is generally translated at 3.27 as “power vacuum,” on the ground that it is followed by a series of genitive absolutes referring to the weakness of the Spartans, Thebans, and others, which are taken as explanatory. It is then argued that its use in the same sense in 13, where no explanation is provided, renders its meaning in context obscure.

I suggest that the translation “power vacuum” is wrong, and that in any case the word need not have an identical force in both contexts.\textsuperscript{13} The text of 13.27 reads:

\begin{verbatim}
ἐκεῖνοι μὲν δὴ ταῦτα· ἡμεῖς δ', ὡσπερ ἄπαντες ὁρᾶτ' ἔρημίας ἐπειλημμένοι, σκέψασθ' εἰ παραπλῆσια. οὐ πλεῖο μὲν ἡ χώρα καὶ πεντακόσια τάλαντ' ἀνήλωται μάτην εἰς τοὺς τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἀπόρους, ἐξανήλωται δ' οὐ τ' ἰδιοί πάντες οἴκοι καὶ τὰ κοίνα τῇ πόλει καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων, οὕς δ' ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ συμμάχους ἔκτησάμεθα, οὕτωι νῦν ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἀπολύσισιν;
\end{verbatim}

Sealey offers the following translation:

Those men did those deeds. But consider whether we, who have had the opportunity of a power vacuum, which you can all see, do similar things. Have not more than fifteen hundred talents been spent in vain among the Greeks? Have not all the private estates and the common resources of the city and those derived from the allies been used up? Have not these men lost in the peace the allies whom we had gained in the war?

Whatever its meaning at 3.28 (see below), it is not obvious that

\textsuperscript{12} Weil \textit{ad loc.}; Levy 57.

\textsuperscript{13} Levy 56\textit{f} noted that ἔρημία seems to be something advantageous in 3 but disadvantageous in 13.
Ερημία should be glossed as “power vacuum.”14 If the passage had to be interpreted on its own, the word would most naturally be translated “isolation” or “destitution” (LSJ s.v. II). Moreover, to translate επιειλημένοι as “who have had the opportunity of” is only justified if Ερημία is regarded as something beneficial to Athens—the verb has no necessary connotation of advantage.15 It would be as valid, and in my view more natural, to render the passage: “Those men did those deeds. But consider whether we, who have reached such a state of destitution as you can all see, do similar things. Have not more than fifteen hundred talents been spent...?”

As already noted, the translation of Ερημία as “power vacuum” derives from 3.27, where it is suggested by the references to the weakness of the rest of Greece:

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα σιωπὸ, πόλλ’ ἄν ἔχων εἰπεῖν, ἄλλ’ ὡσὶς ἀπαντεῖς ὄρατ’ Ερημίας ἐπιειλημένοι, Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἀπολωλότων, Θηβαίων δ’ ἀσχόλων οἴνων, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων σοῦδενός οἴνος ἀξιόχρεω περὶ τῶν πρωτείων ἡμῖν ἀντιτάξασθαι, ἔξον δ’ ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ’ αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς ἔχειν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων δίκαια βραβεύειν, ἀπεστερήμεθα....

Sealey translates:

I pass over many things I could state, but since the Lakedaimonians have perished and the Thebans have their hands full and none of the others is of sufficient weight to compete with us for the first place, we have had the opportunity of a power vacuum, which you can all see, but although we might possess our own property in safety and administer justice to others, we have been deprived....

I suggest that here too it is wrong to understand Ερημία in this sense, and that a different interpretation is preferable: that the genitive and accusative absolutes form a single unit (as implied by the articulation through μὲν and δέ), and that all have a concessive force. The statement that the Athenians are destitute (Ερημίας) is then picked up at ἀπεστερήμεθα (an appropriate verb to explain such a condition). The point being made is that in spite of the weakness of their opponents, they are destitute, and

14 This is the sense offered by LSJ (s.v. ἐπιλαμβάνω III.5 “having found an empty field, i.e. an absence of competitors”) and repeated by the Loeb translator (“who have gained ... a clear field”).

15 See LSJ s.v. ἐπιλαμβάνω III.5 for the metaphorical sense of “reach” (a state or condition).
that their destitution is exemplified by all that they have lost. They are destitute not of potential opponents, but of land, money, and allies. I would thus translate the passage as follows (adapting Sealey):

You all see the extent of our destitution: although the Lake-daimonians have perished and the Thebans have their hands full and none of the others is of sufficient weight to compete with us for the first place, and although we might possess our own property in safety and administer justice to others, we have been deprived....

Even if this interpretation of 3.27f is not accepted, we are still not required to assume that the word must have the same meaning in both passages. Unless there is further evidence that ἐπημία was commonly used in the sense of "power vacuum," I see no reason to translate it as such in 13.

Second, the claim that the Athenians conduct their politics by symmories appears (with trivial variations) at 13.20 and at 2.29. Sealey argues that, because in 2 the simile is introduced by a sentence criticizing the Athenians for being divided among themselves, it is well integrated into the speech; conversely, that the absence of such an introduction in 13 weakens its impact.

Again, this argument lacks force. The point of the simile is not just that the Athenians are divided among themselves, but also that a few politicians are monopolizing public life in their own interest. The Athenians conduct their politics by symmories not only because they are split into groups, but also because individual politicians and generals have too much power at the head of their 'symmory'. As the preceding sections in 13 criticize the selfishness of politicians (18ff), the introduction of the simile at 20 can hardly be regarded as seriously awkward. Moreover, its relevance is reinforced by the sentence that follows:

Hence all that you gain is that So-and-so has a public statue and So-and-so makes his fortune—just one or two men profiting at the expense of the State. The rest of you are idle witnesses of their prosperity, surrendering to them, for the sake of an easy life from day to day, the great and glorious prosperity which is yours by inheritance. (tr. Loeb)

16 See too L. Pearson, The Art of Demosthenes (=Beitr.z.kl.Phil. 68 [Meisenheim am Glan 1976]) 136: "Rather than ask which is the better arrangement, it is more useful to notice the different logical contexts in the two speeches."
Thus none of the doublets can be taken as evidence that the speech is not the work of Demosthenes. Sealey claims that in the places discussed above the speech is atypically careless; this is a curious judgement on a politician who could be cavalier with the truth when it suited his purpose.

Further, Demosthenes reused earlier material in at least one speech whose genuineness is undoubted. It has been maintained that the reuse of material from 13 in 3 make it unlikely that the former speech was delivered, but this involves the implausible assumption that orators were reluctant to use an argument more than once when addressing the people.

**General Style.** In discussing the speech’s authorship, attention has been focused on the doublets at the expense of a more general consideration of its style. Although it is impossible to prove on such grounds that the speech is authentic, there is nothing in its style or vocabulary that suggests otherwise. Stylometric analysis has shown that it conforms to Demosthenic practice in its avoidance of tribrachs (Blass’ Law) and of hiatus. A full study (published in 1919) of every word or construction with which opponents of the speech’s authenticity had found fault proves beyond reasonable doubt that the style is wholly Demosthenic (Levy 15–32). The same conclusion was reached by Ronnet, and by Weil and Blass (although on other grounds they were reluctant to accept the speech as genuine).

Two features of the speech’s style may be isolated as typically Demosthenic. First, the use of full asyndeton between sentences, which is particularly common in his work. Second, a taste for striking metaphors that is wholly typical of Demos-

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17 Cf. 22.47–56, 65–78 with 24.160–86. Dem. 10 is also rich in doublets.

18 The same argument cannot be applied to the doublet in 23 and 13, because the former speech was spoken before a much smaller audience in court, rather than the assembly, and by someone other than Demosthenes: M. Croiset, *Démosthène: Harangues I* (Paris 1946) 72.


21 πρώτον μὲν οἱ σώματοι (6); παρελθόν υμών (12); οίνον ὡς δὲ μὴ θυρυβήσει (14); πάλιν κόψας τις ὕψειτο (14); ῥήτωρ ἡγεμόν (20=2.29); οίνον ἀ πρός τοὺς καταράτους Μεγαρέας (32); ἄπαντα καλά (33). See J. D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford 1952) 99–123, esp. 112: “In Demosthenes, particularly, fine examples [of full asyndeton] are to be found in great profusion.”
thenes’ practice in all but his earliest speeches. Similarly, the pungently vulgar description of the men to whom the Athenians make grants of citizenship as φθόρους ἀνθρώπους οἰκοτριβὰς οἰκότριβος (24) foreshadows the outburst against Philip at 9.31, ὁλέθρου Μακεδόνος, ὁθέν οὐδ’ ἀνδραπόδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον πρίσαθαι, and the use of similar ‘low’ language to attack Aeschines.

More generally, there are many expressions in this speech that resemble those found in speeches of Demosthenes whose authenticity is not in doubt. It would be otiose to provide a full list; what follows is a representative selection of some of the more striking examples:

δυσχεραινοῦσαι τὸ πράγμα (1=10.42); εἰς οὐδὲν δέον (4), εἰς δέον (4.14); ἄλλος ἂν ἦν λόγος (7), ἄλλος ἂν εἰς λόγος οὕτως (9.16); οὗ δὲ μοι πλείστην ἀθυμίαν παρέσχεν ἀπάντων (10), πολλὴν ἀθυμίαν αὐτῷ παρέχει (1.21); ἐρώ πρὸς ύμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἀκοκρύψομαι (10=6.31; with variants λέξῳ πρὸς ύμᾶς at 8.73 and φράσῳ πρὸς ύμᾶς at 19.3); ἐντεῦθεν ἀρξάσθαι τοῦ πράγματος (11), ἵν’ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρξόμαι (9.8); καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἦ τὰ βέλτιστα ἀκούειν εἰθίσθε (13), καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἦ τὰ βέλτιστα τοῖς πράγμασιν συνειδῆσαι μοι δοκεῖτ’ ἀκοῦειν (Proem 15.1); ἐγὼ δὲ φράσῳ (15), ἐγὼ φράσῳ (4.20); τὰς ἐλπίδας ύμῖν ὑποτείνουν (19), τῶν ἐλπίδων ὡς ὑπέτειν’ ὦ Ἀριστόμαχος (23.14); πρὸς τοὺς καταράτους Μεγαρέας (32), Μεγαρέας τοῦτους τοὺς καταράτους (23.212); ἔστι δ’, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, κεφάλαιον ἀπάντων τῶν εἰρημένων (36), λέγω δὴ κεφάλαιον (2.31).

It is particularly notable that the majority of these parallels are with Demosthenes’ early speeches and with the Proooemia, most of which are themselves early compositions. The speeches with which it has passages in common (2, 3, 23) are also all early.

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22 πολλὰ τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν ὑμετέραν ποθεὶ παρουσίαν (7); τὰ ὀτρὰ πρῶτον ύμῶν ιάσασθαι (13); πεπολιτευθεὶς γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Ἐλλησιν (35). See Ronnet (supra n.20: 149–76) for the claim that the speech is “le plus imagé de tous” (151).

23 φθόρος: Ar. Eq. 1151; Thes. 535; οἰκότριψ: Ar. Thes. 426. For ‘comic’ language directed at Aeschines see esp. 18.127.

24 Blass 403: “Endlich muß hervorgehoben werden, daß die Berührungen mit andern Demosthenischen Werken sich fast durchweg auf die älteren, einschließlich der Olynthischen Reden, beschränken, ähnlich wie das bei der Prooemiansammlung der Fall ist.” On the dating of the Prooemia see R. Clavaud, Demosthène: Prologues (Paris 1974) 13–25, who assigns only two to the period after the fall of Olynthus.
A lexical feature points in the same direction: the verb παρανομάζει is common here and in Demosthenes’ early speeches and Proemia, but it is not used in his later political speeches.25 This is a clear case of changing usage (whatever the reason); 13 conforms exactly with Demonsthenes’ practice in the early speeches. Thus, if the speech is not authentic, it was written by someone who could reproduce Demosthenes’ style perfectly, and also distinguish between his earlier and later styles. Even the former possibility seems unlikely.

**Date and Context.** Much has been written on the dating of the speech, and a number of different possibilities has been canvassed.26 My purpose here is not to argue for a particular date, which the evidence hardly allows, but to show that the allusions in the speech are all consistent with a date in the late 350s. At 13.8 the speaker refers to the destruction of the Mytilenean and Rhodian democracies. The latter is familiar from Dem. 15; the former is mentioned in the same speech (15.19), where it is said that Mytilene, Rhodes, and Chios are all under oligarchies; moreover, the thirty-seventh Proemium advocates that the Athenians send help to the people of Mytilene. As our passage does not indicate how long ago these democracies fell, it gives us only a rough indication of the speech’s date.

At 13.14 reference is made to the Opisthodomos having recently (πρωθην) been broken into. Some commentators identify this episode with the scandal in which the Treasurers of Athena and of the Other Gods borrowed sacred money and lent it to the bankers in the hope of enriching themselves; when the banks went bust, they set fire to the building in a vain

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25 παραινώ: 13.2, 34=14.5, 10, 26; 15.20; 16.32; Pr. 12.2; 17; 31.1; 56.2; παραιν-έσσαμαι: 13.34=14.3; 15.7, 25; παραινέσαμα: 13.1. Cf. παραινείς: Pr. 35.4; παραινοῦσα: Pr. 6.1; παραινή: Pr. 35.4; παραινεῖν: Pr. 10.2; 17; 26.1; 35.2; 44.1; παραινοῦντες: Pr. 10.2; παραινοῦντων: 16.9; παρήνουν: Pr. 41.1; παρήνεσα: 15.6, 14; παραινέσα: 15.28.

attempt to hide their crime. But scepticism is perhaps wiser, not least because the most striking feature of the scandal, the fire, is not mentioned in 13.

At 13.32f the speaker mentions the Athenian's failure to act on the decree that they should march out and prevent the "accursed Megarians" from cultivating the hiera orgas. Friction with Megara over the sacred land is confirmed by fragments of Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 155 [=Didymus col. 13.40–58], dated 350/349) and Androtion (FGrHist 324 F 30=Didymus coll. 14.35–49). In addition, IG II 2 204 of 352/351 fixes the appointment of an Athenian board to determine the boundaries of the land. Although Megara is not named in the text of the decree, it clearly relates to the same dispute. These data are combined by Cawkwell to produce a plausible reconstruction, according to which the speech refers to an early stage of the dispute, before Athens acted forcibly (an expedition is mentioned by Philochorus and at Dem. 3.20). Its precise chronological relationship to the decree cannot be determined.

In the same paragraph reference is made to another decree, recently passed in favor of those exiled from Phlius, that the Athenians should help them and call on volunteers from the Peloponnese. This episode is otherwise unattested. Phlius had been affected by internal strife earlier in the century, and it is not unlikely that there was a fresh outbreak in the late 350s. Demosthenes' speech advocating acceptance of a Megalopolitan appeal in 353/352 (Dem. 16) shows that Athens could contemplate intervention in the Peloponnese in support of states that were being threatened by Sparta, and it is possible that Sparta was also involved in Phliasian affairs.

The events alluded to in the speech can thus all be assigned with either certainty or great plausibility to the late 350s. If it is spurious, its author had a minute knowledge of the history of the period. Moreover, the fact tells against the hypothesis (discussed below) that all the allusions belong to the same period, it seems unlikely that the speech was put together from scattered fragments by a later editor.

27 Dem. 24.136 with Σ. The date of this episode is unclear, and the issues involved are complex: see D. M. Lewis, "Notes on Attic Inscriptions," BSA 49 (1954) 17–50 at 39–49, esp. 47ff. Weil ad loc. refers the two accounts to the same event.

As these allusions cannot be exactly dated, the date of the speech must remain somewhat unclear. It is generally agreed that the view of Didymus, that it belongs to 349/348, has little to commend it. Cawkwell urges that its silence about Philip ought to place it before his march to Heraion Teichos in November 352, perhaps even before Athens’ blockade of Thermopylae in the summer of that year. This may be so, although it is perhaps wrong to think that Philip monopolized Demosthenes’ attention in these years. On the other hand, the speech is probably later than 23, which (for what it is worth) is dated 352/351 by Dionysius. Moreover, the reference to trouble with Megara, securely dated to 350/349 by Philochorus, suggests that 353/352 may be too early. Certainty, however, is impossible.

The Policy of the Speech. It remains to examine the speech as a whole, and in particular to consider whether it is sufficiently coherent to be considered a unity. Some scholars have accepted that the individual parts are largely or wholly Demosthenic, but believe that it was put together by an editor. Others detect an absence of structure or point (Sealey I 252). The theory that an editor worked on Demosthenes’ speeches (so convenient as an explanation for puzzling or difficult features in them) is unproven and in my judgement unfounded. The speech is in fact quite consistent, both with itself and with the views that Demosthenes developed in his other speeches of this period.

The speech is to be delivered before a meeting of the Assembly at which the subject under discussion is the use to which a certain sum of money is to be put (13.1). At issue is

29 Dates from 353/352 to 349/348 have been suggested. For bibliography see supra n.26.
30 Col. 13.40–62. Didymus simply assumes that the speech is later than the invasion assigned by Philochorus to 350/349.
31 The view that it postdates the First Philippic, and that it says nothing about Philip because he was absent in Thrace, is based on the unfounded assumption that the earlier speech referred to at 13.9 is the First Philippic.
32 Ad Amm. 1.4. His general reliability is defended by R. Sealey, “Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Some Demosthenic Dates,” REG 68 (1955) 77–120, who nevertheless admits that he made some errors. I see no reason to believe that he had access to reliable dates. On the relationship of 13 and 23 see Fossey and supra 182f.
33 Blass 402: “Also die Rede als solche ist das Werk eines andern, den man auch nur in dem Sinne noch Redactor nennen kann.”
whether or not to distribute the money to the citizens (only the poor are specified). Demosthenes neither opposes nor supports the distribution, for in his view both sides are motivated by selfish considerations; rather, the Athenians should link the receipt of money to the performance of duties, military or otherwise, depending on age.

The source of the money under discussion is never made clear; but Libanius’ confident statement in his *hypothesis* to the speech that it is Theoric is unlikely to be wrong. Almost every aspect of the Theoric Fund is controversial, and what follows is put forward as no more than a speculative suggestion. If Hansen is correct to distinguish between two sources of Theoric payments—an annual allocation from the city’s budget and the much smaller and more variable surplus of that budget—it seems likely that the latter is here at issue, for two reasons. First, Demosthenes says that the sum of money is small (13.2). Second, as we are told that a vote is to be taken about the destination of the money, it is tempting to see a connection with the reference at [Dem.] 59.4 to Apollodorus’ proposal (in 349/348) that the assembly should decide whether the budget surplus (τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως) should be used for military or for Theoric purposes. This passage is difficult, not least because it is internally inconsistent. But it does represent the assembly voting on whether money should be used for Theoric distributions or for another purpose, and can hardly be wholly fictitious.

If this is correct, the question before the Assembly in 13 may also have been whether the money should be used for Theoric or military expenditure. The opponents of distribution are characterized as being rich (13.1, περιουσίας ἔχοντες). As the burden of military expenditure fell largely on the rich, through payment of *eisphorai*, it was in their interest that it be met as far as possible from the city’s revenues.

It might be objected that Demosthenes would not have declined to support the transfer of surplus money to the military fund, when in the *Olynthiaca* he wished (but refused to propose) that Theoric money be used to pay for his military plans (3.10–13). But his attitude towards Theoric distributions in 13 is

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34 See esp. M. H. Hansen, “The Theoric Fund and the *graphe paranomon* against Apollodorus,” *GRBS* 17 (1976) 235–46, with full references to earlier discussions.

not truly neutral, because he explicitly and repeatedly criticizes the mentality of those Athenians who expect to get something for nothing. Although he refuses to oppose distributions, he thinks that they are a bad habit, which may come to be seen as seriously mistaken (13.2); money should only be distributed as pay (13.4, 9); the Athenians are obsessed with the two-obol dole (13.10); they give themselves up to a life of hedonism (13.20); they depend on whatever distributions their political masters permit them (13.31). He advocates a sea change in the nature of Athenian public life, in relation to which the sum of money being debated is trivial. His target is not this particular distribution, but the entire political culture of hand-outs, reluctance to serve in person, and apathetic tolerance of self-serving politicians.36

The criticism (Sealey I 252) that we are led to expect specific proposals, which are not forthcoming, should therefore be rejected. On the contrary, Demosthenes makes it clear that what is needed, and what he proposes, is a further meeting of the Assembly to discuss Athens' organization and military preparation (13.3). Again, I see no truth in the claim (Sealey I 252) that "the conclusion, that responsibility for success or failure rests with all the Athenians and not with their speakers, is feeble and has little to do with what has preceded." This is precisely the thesis of the whole speech.

More generally, the main themes of the speech are the same as those that dominate the First Philippic (4) and the Olynthiacs (1–3): the Athenians must shake off their apathy and be willing to serve in person; they are the dupes of self-serving politicians, who squander money on doles and public works; they must regain the spirit that made the city great. It also shares with the early speech On Symmories (14) an interest in Athens' military organization.37 There are still further points of correspondence between the subject-matter of this speech and that of other

36 Interestingly, he takes a similarly detached view of theoric distributions in the much later Fourth Philippic, where he argues that both the rich who oppose them and the poor who support them have a case, but that their disagreements are detrimental to the state (10.35–45).

37 Note how often σύνταξις and its cognates are found in Or. 13 and 14: σύνταξις: 14.23; συντάξεως: 14.17; συνταξίν: 13.9 (also almost identically at 1.20, and similarly at 3.34); συνταξείτε: 13.9; συνταξθήναι: 13.3, 11; συνταχθῆναι: 13.9, 10; 14.17; συνταχθῆναι: 14.19. Otherwise it appears only at 5.13; 8.21, 23 in the sense of "tribute."
early works: cf. 13.25 and 3.32 on pride (φρόνημα), and 13.8 and 15.17f on oligarchy and democracy.

In all these cases, however, he does not slavishly copy earlier passages. Even in the doublets discussed above numerous small alterations have been made. To my mind this method of working smacks of the perfectionist orator, which we know Demosthenes to have been, rather than of a writer of pastiche, however clever. 38

In sum: the speech was accepted by all ancient critics as genuine, and was probably included in Callimachus' catalogue. In language and style it is not only wholly Demosthenic, but also closely resembles his other early public speeches. The presence of 'doublets' is not alien to Demosthenes' practice, and the discrepancies in them are either explicable or trivial. The speech can be located securely if not precisely in the late 350s. It is coherent, and its ideas conform with those found in his other speeches of this period. The belief that it was put together posthumously is wholly gratuitous. 39

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38 On his working methods see Plut. Dem. 8.
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