Atticism, Homer, Neoplatonism, and Fürstenspiegel: Julian's Second Panegyric on Constantius

Florin Curta

Many historians of the reign of the Emperor Julian—a personality "fraught with more contradictions, tensions and inconsistencies than the average man"—have attempted to answer a long-standing concern of Julianic historiography: was Julian's policy, particularly his anti-Christian reaction, the result of explicitly declared intentions? was it a carefully planned or an unpremeditated response adopted to unique historical circumstances? The issue of Julian's 'political program' has found two different solutions. Koch, who first drew on Julian's works (Ep. 14, Ep. ad Ath.) for interpreting the pronunciamento of Paris, doubted that Julian's imperial aspirations before his accession were anything other than mere dreams, like that described in one of his letters. Herzog, in a thorough comparison of the inscription at Trier with Julian's writings from his period in Gaul, noticed the peculiarly coded nature of the letters sent to his friends in the East and concluded that Julian was more interested in his addressee's ability to decipher metaphors than in any explicit political project. Rosen, analyzing Julian's accession ceremony in Paris and the judicial and ideological foundation of his imperial power, emphasized Julian's ambiguous attitude in the pronunciamento. But Julian's fears and doubts as described by Ammianus

Marcellinus (22.2.3) may be a consequence of the historian’s failure to combine successfully contrasting sources or to dissimulate his own concern with the obviously illegal character of the pronunciamiento. Ammianus might have used the description of the events in Paris to express his own opinion, namely that Julian had aimed from the very beginning at reuptum imperium. Julian had apparently learned from his brother Gallus’ sad experience. According to Blockley, what separates the two particularly is Julian’s prudent approach and “the careful planning” that led to his final rupture with Constantius. Caltabiano also observed that Julian conscientiously prepared his proclamation by appointing his co-religionists to administrative offices.

A second group of scholars has preferred a long-term approach. Negri first emphasized Julian’s ‘doctrine’, and drew on the particular “norme direttive” in Julian’s works to understand his attempt to restore paganism. In his balanced biography, Bidez finds three phases of Julian’s political activity: restoration, reform, and anti-Christian policy. He thinks that Julian did not follow a single political platform, but many programs, one after the other, continually adjusting his ideas to social circumstances and influenced not only by his experience and political thinking, but also by his entourage. De Labriolle considers Julian’s pastoral letters (Epp. 84a, 86, 88, 89a–b) to be a genuine program of religious policy. Webb believes that Julian’s monetary policy as emperor followed the program divulged in Ep. ad Ath. 5.287a, and Condurachi thinks that the principles of financial policy were already promulgated in Julian’s first panegyric on Constantius. Similarly, Dvornik

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argued that “not only did Julian have theories, but he tested them.”

Julian’s three panegyrics on the Emperor Constantius and his wife Eusebia have generally been regarded as mere rhetorical exercises without value and therefore irrelevant to the study of Julian’s political program. There is still no special examination of Julian’s Second Panegyric on Constantius (Or. 3 Bidez) from the viewpoint of political philosophy, as a Fürstenspiegel devised for propagandistic use.

In attempting to clarify the nature of the speech, I shall first examine two critical concepts: Atticism and its rhetoric. As a cultural phenomenon, Atticism emerged in the second century as a general tendency to reassess the Classical heritage, especially within and under the influence of the Second Sophistic. To define Atticism accurately is difficult because of the equivocal ancient terminology and the exclusively linguistic modern approach to the phenomenon. Atticism could thus be opposed to koine or to Asianism (cf. Norden’s polemics against Rohde) or as a literary and linguistic norm (Wilamowitz). Therefore, as Frösén noticed, “investigators have not distinguished performance from competence.” The revival of the ‘purity’ of the Attic dialect was a reaction against Hellenistic koine and its “creole literature” as an expression of the interests and tastes of the lower classes. Atticism re-introduced older linguistic forms, particularly the syntax of the optative mood and the dual number. It could therefore be detected easily in specific stylistic markers, for literary works were now pro-


10 Frösén (supra n.9) 28.
duced for a specific audience. As all potential producers or readers of literature must have possessed a 'standard level' of rhetorical education, the opposite of 'Atticist language' was non-normative language, which corresponded in practice to freedom of choice, style, and the variation inherent in it. A Greek speaker of the first Christian centuries had at least three basic options or independent linguistic repertoires from which to choose: (1) the 'in-group language' for face-to-face relationships (within primary groups); (2) the 'out-group language' in both spoken and written form (commercial, administrative, and official documents); (3) the language of specialized communication (literature, high education). To that extent, one could consider Atticism as a koine of the Greek-speaking, highly cultured members of Late Roman society, from Constantinople and the eastern provinces to Italy. Standardization of language produced an extremely regulated communication system. Within the third repertory, particularly in the case of rhetorical literature, there were further options that eventually defined what is known as 'style'.

Rhetoric, seen here in its post-Ciceronian guise, is a particular form of communication in which persuasion is a possible but not mandatory goal, thus emphasizing the methods of achieving aesthetic perfection. This definition is based on a semiological model in which rhetoric is a complex production of signs, "involving the choice of given probable premises, the disputation of rhetorical syllogisms (or other forms of many-valued logic) and the necessary 'clothing' of expressions with rhetorical figures." Because this kind of rhetoric always had a large and rather diverse audience, it usually aimed at persuasion by appealing to the imagination and emotions, and sometimes

11 Frösén (supra n.9) 105: "In contrast with this, Atticistic style may be associated with the principle of imitation; it is not connected with Atticistic linguistic structure."


deliberately left room for ambiguity. Prose encomia of the Imperial age represent this kind of rhetoric, in which ornamentation is first applied to ideas, then to words. In C. Heraclium 13–14 Julian argues that all speeches are comprised of thought (διάνοια) and its expression (λέξις); figured thoughts (τὰ ἐσχηματισμένα) involve such rhetorical devices as τὰ σημνὰ or τὰ ἁπεμφαίνα. In the Second Panegyric on Constantius (Or. 3.78d) he explains that the ingenious sophists ... do but report to you your own opinions (διανοηματα) and depict them in fine phrases (τοῖς ονόμασι) like a dress of many colors, and cast them into the mould of agreeable rhythms and forms (ῥυθμοῖς καὶ σχήμασιν), and bring them forth for you as though they had invented something new.

Consequently, we are concerned here with rhetorical figures as deviant linguistic-aesthetic structures, whose mechanism Eco has described.

The semiological approach also postulates an area of competence common to both sender and addressee produced by the speech itself as an information and communication system. My analysis is based on two main considerations: the speech as signifier (analyzing the production procedures of rhetorical effects) and the speech as signified, either as plot (the system of events in an artificial-artistic order) or as fabula (the system of events in their temporal and causal order that the author uses as his material: Segre [supra n.19] 5).

The present analysis of Julian’s Second Panegyric is also based on a descriptive model that takes into consideration not only rhetorical deviation but also homogeneity, and emphasizes both the profusion and the frequency and distribution of rhetorical figures. It is accordingly a semiological and (neo-)rhetorical

15 V. Florescu, Retorica și neoretorica: geneza, evoluție, perspective (Bucharest 1973) 43.
17 Bouffartigue 515: Julian invokes here an abbreviated version of Hermogenes’ rhetoric.
18 Eco (supra n.14) 284f; cf. Plett (supra n.13) 142: “deviant-ästhetische Sprachstruktur.”
model, based on five aesthetic-linguistic categories: phonological (prosodical), morphological (within words), syntactical (within sentences), semantic (meaning-figures), and pragmatic (situational) figures. My analysis of Atticism in the Second Panegyric is based on seventy-one stylistic markers, in comparison with the four orations Περὶ βασιλείας of Dio Chrysostom and Julian's First Panegyric on Constantius (Or. 1). Dio's orations are often considered to have been Julian's model for the Second Panegyric. Certainly Julian had read Dio (cf. Or. 7.212c), but his oration was not a simple imitation of Dio, for a third source seems to have inspired both.

At first glance, Julian's Second Panegyric involves a very simple idea: the use of Homeric parallels to praise Constantius. From the very beginning, Agamemnon and Achilles are compared to Constantius and Julian (Or. 3.1), and a Homeric counterpart is found for every major event of Constantius' life and career (3.2-22). A long digression (3.23-32) describes Julian's true king (as if he were now concerned with proving his point); a clumsy application of this royal model to Constantius (3.32-39) concludes the panegyric.

To clarify the political meaning hidden behind this structure, I shall first address the question of Julian's specific use of Atticism and Homeric citations as stylistic strategies for contrasting the portrait of the true king and the rest of the encomium. I shall then examine the narrative structure in comparison with the traditional list of topics, illustrated in the third-century rhetorical treatises of Menander Rhetor, and focus on the extended central section describing Julian's ideal king, inspired by Neoplatonist elements. Finally, I shall argue that the Second Panegyric may be seen as a veritable political program of the future emperor, especially when considered in an historical context and compared with other contemporary views, such as Themistius'.


22 L. François, "Julien et Dion Chrysostome, Les Περὶ βασιλείας et le second panégyrique de Constance," *RÉG* 28 (1915) 417-39; for the most recent opinion see Bouffartigue 294.
I. Atticism and Homeric Citations

To understand how morphological figures could produce Atticistic effects, we may begin with the relationship between the negations ou and μή. By the late first century ou was already the preferred form, although Dio Chrysostom used both forms, with μή especially near infinitives depending on *verba dicendi* or *sentiendi* or near ὅτι after the same classes of verbs (Schmid 99f). In his First Panegyric on Constantius, Julian uses ou more frequently (174 cases)—along with such ‘strong’ Atticist forms as οὔχι—than μή (50 cases). The Atticist negative ou, however, is smoothly distributed through the First Panegyric. The ratio remains the same in the Second Panegyric: 163 cases of ou and 41 of μή. Like Dio, Julian employs μή particularly in enunciative sentences depending on *verba dicendi* or *sentiendi*, a clear indication of Atticism, mostly outside chapters 23–32, where he describes the true king. Using the reflexive pronouns ἐαυτοῦ, ἐαυτῶν for all three persons is also Atticist (Schmid 83). The Second Panegyric shows an interesting case of this morphological figure: in discussing a fragment from Pl. *Menex.*, Julian replaces a reflexive pronoun of the third person with one of the second person. This modification signals, despite the oration’s two addressees (Constantius and the larger audience), that the author now speaks to Constantius. But the entire construction demonstrates that Plato’s words do not refer to mundane aspects of the individual’s exterior life, but to the soul as the main source of virtue (*Or.* 3.68d).23 The result is an admonition that the emperor should prefer moral rectitude to imperial insignia.

Julian frequently utilizes Atticist forms (dual number, ‘Attic agreement’) in the first part of the Second Panegyric and more recent forms of the language tend to congregate in 23–32 (future and aorist tenses of αἰρέω, the standard form of οἶδα for the first-person plural ἵσμεν instead of οἶδαμεν, or the plural present participle of αἰρέω as ἑλόντες).24 Totally absent from the

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23 Bouffartigue (351f) believes that τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ οὐ δῆπον should be read for τὸ γὰρ σεαυτοῦ or σεαυτοῦ, because Julian’s entire argument from Pl. *Menex.* is based on the contrast between αὐτός and αὐτοῦ, modelled after *Aρ.*, 131a. On the other hand, σεαυτό or σεαυτοῦ could be seen as a dim recollection of γνώθι σεαυτόν, which according to Proclus was viewed by Neo­platonists as the essence of Iamblichus’ interpretation of Pl. *Aρ.*

First Panegyric and rather uncommon in Dio’s orations on kingship is the ironical metaphor, an important semantic figure. In the Second Panegyric 31 of 26 cases of irony occur outside chapters 23-32, suggesting that an increasing Atticist tendency is coextensive with the distribution of irony in comparisons of Constantius to Homeric heroes. The invocation of the gods, a pragmatic Atticistic figure, appears only once in Dio’s orations On Kingship but five times in Julian’s Second Panegyric. References to the gods, e.g. ναὶ μὰ Δία or πρὸς φιλίου Δόκ, signal a Neoplatonist context, for three of the five occurrences appear within the ‘neutral’ zone of 23 and 32. The study of rhetorical figures thus suggests that Atticism for Julian was not merely a ‘fashionable’ style, but a strategy employed according to criteria other than stylistic ones.

Though rare in Dio’s orations On Kingship, the term ἀρετὴ appears with some frequency in both Julian’s panegyrics on Constantius. Notwithstanding his concept of the true king based on a Neoplatonist theory of virtue, Julian persistently uses ἀρετὴ in the Second Panegyric in the context of a vocabulary also enriched with koine phrases and even usage found in the New Testament. With few exceptions, these words indicate a strong Christian contamination of Julian’s ‘technical’ vocabulary, already observed in his pastoral letters.

25 Dio Chrys. 4.58f; see Plett (supra n.13) 262ff. A metaphor of ironical simulation is based on the contrast between an exterior rhetorical structure simulating an affirmative attitude and its signalizing context, which could mark it as negative. In contrast, a metaphor of ironical dissimulation disguises a positive under a presumably negative attitude. There are thirty-one cases of irony in the Second Panegyric: 49d, 50b-c, 52c, 52d, 54b, 54c, 55d, 58c, 59a, 59b, 60c, 61a-b, 64b, 64c, 65d (bis), 66d, 71b (bis), 75a, 76a-b, 76c, 77d-78a, 78b, 78c-d, 79c, 79d, 85d, 93c, 94a, 98d, and 101b. Twenty of these cases are metaphors of ironical simulation, nine metaphors of ironical dissimulation, one of mycterism (sneering derision), and one ironical comparison.

26 For irony in reference to Constantius in the Ep. ad Ath. see Caltabiano, “Propaganda” (supra n.5) 126.

27 E.g. ἀδελφός as “relative,” ἐμπίπτωμα, ἐπίκαιρος, εὐχή as “pray/prayer,” ζηλωτής as “disciple,” and χαρίζωμαι as “to give charity.” The Second Panegyric also includes such genuine, highly non-rhetorical expressions as κρασπαλῆ.

28 W. Koch, “Comment l’empereur Julien tâcha de fonder une église païenne,” RBPhil 7 (1928) 511-17.
bantering and undercutting his own discourse with language borrowed from those apparently accused of depicting opinions in fine phrases and casting them into agreeable rhythms and forms (Or.3.78d).²⁹ Although citations from Themistius (Or. 1–2, 4) predominate in the First Panegyric, the second shows considerable Platonic influence (20 citations, compared with only six in the First Panegyric).³⁰

It follows that the First Panegyric and the first part of the Second (up to ch. 23) display a similar influence from Themistius. But the first part of the Second Panegyric also shows an intense Atticistic influence, in which irony and borrowings from poetic language play a quantitatively important rôle here. This distribution suggests that in the Second Panegyric Themistius’ model for praising Constantius is turned into derision.

A brief look at Homeric citations aids in testing these observations. Julian cites Homer more than any of his contemporaries and indicates, moreover, either directly or indirectly, the source of his citation.³¹ Homeric citations in a rhetorical text entail three questions: (1) what the author uses from the Homeric poems; (2) how he uses the Homeric citations; (3) why does he use them? In analyzing these citations in the Second Panegyric, I refer to Kindstrand’s classification into metrical (word by word) and non-metrical citations (paraphrases, references, allusions).³² Of all Julian’s works, the Second Panegyric is the richest in Homeric citations, with thirteen references to

²⁹ Poetic words or phrases may be borrowed from Homer (άετός, 72a; αἰχμή, 49c, 76d; άρπακτήρ, 87a; γεφυρώ, 60c; ἱγέμον, 68c; λόθρων, 71a, etc.), Aeschylus (ἐκπλάσιος, 74c), Sophocles (μεθισμὶ χεροίν τινά, 49c, 59d; οἴκοθεν, 53d, 92a), Euripides (Κάρ, referring to a disposable individual, 56c; συμφέρω, 55b; χρυσοκόλλητος, 51d), and Aristophanes (ἀκαμήρ χρόνον), 66b; ἀρχιός, meaning “simple,” “naive,” 74a; κηρύκον, with reference to an envoy, 56a).

³⁰ Outside the ‘neutral zone’ Julian refers much more often to Themistius (56d, 59d, 68c, 73c, 77a–c, 78d, 101c) than to Dio Chrysostom, but the latter is ‘cited’ more than Themistius in the interval between chapters 23 and 32 (79a, 79c, 81c, 82a, 83c–d, 84c, 85c, 86a, 86c–d, 88a, 89d, 90a, 92b).

³¹ Wright 71. For a revision of Wright’s statistical analysis of Homeric citations in Julian’s works, see Bouffartigue 143. Julian knew perfectly the Homeric poems, e.g. Mis. 351d–52b; cf. R. Lamberton, Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition (Berkeley 1986) 135.

Homer’s name, an uncommon practice in the Atticistic tradition. In contrast with other works or Dion’s four orations On Kingship, the Second Panegyric never distinguishes the Iliad and the Odyssey, thus suggesting that he addresses connoisseurs. The number of metrical Homeric citations in the Second Panegyric (22) is almost as large as in Dio’s four orations On Kingship combined (24; cf. Kindstrand 28), and none occur in the First Panegyric. Julian tends to cite the Iliad more than the Odyssey. Books 2 and 21 are cited most frequently, the former probably because of the famous Catalogue of Ships (naming the heroes that Julian compares to Constantius), the latter because it deals with the assistance that Achilles (with whom Julian compares himself) received from the gods.

Julian regularly employs ‘authoritative’ Homeric citations (cf. Kindstrand 32), usually linked in chains. In an interesting case of Hilfszitat Julian manipulates Od. 8.209f to demonstrate that Odysseus appears to have been unable to resist Laodamas’ provocative challenge to the games organized by Alcinous (Or. 3.96b). In fact the original citation shows the opposite. But Julian pretends to compare Constantius with Odysseus and by emphasizing the emperor’s superiority he obtains the contrary effect: for those connoisseurs whom Julian addressed, Constantius was clearly not superior to Odysseus. Likewise, while repudiating Homer’s poetic artifices, Julian praises Constantius for his Homeric paideia (Or. 3.50c, 61a–b).

Julian’s Homeric citations usually compare Constantius with Agamemnon, Alcinous, Achilles, and Odysseus. Although Dio prefers Odysseus as an example of austerity and virtue (as well as a prototype for his own peregrinations), Julian chooses Achilles as his rôle-model, particularly because of the parallel he builds between the strife between Achilles and Agamemnon

33 Lamberton (supra n.31) 135; Kindstrand 14.
34 Bouffartigue 142, 152: even when there is no special citation marker, a Homeric citation is signaled by the language used or by the nature and morphology of the words. The cultural significance of this practice could only be grasped if we remember that Julian expected the audience to have at least the same level of ‘Homeric competence’ as he.
35 Il.: 65 citations, Od.: 8; see Bouffartigue 143, for Julian’s entire work: Il.: 114, Od. 54.
36 Cf. Kindstrand 30; see also Bouffartigue 143.
and that between himself and Constantius.\textsuperscript{37} Procedures of rhetorical citation thus shift towards real political concern: if Agamemnon was guilty of abuse of power in his treatment of Achilles, so was Constantius towards Julian; and as Achilles had decided to stop waging war for the king of the Achaeans, so Julian intended to do likewise.\textsuperscript{38}

Beyond decorative citations—a good example of the so-called “mixed style” (prosimetrum), of which Julian is considered to be one of the most representative authors\textsuperscript{39}—there is little concern with interpreting Homer. Julian nevertheless came to understand Homer so well that even when faced with the possibility of death, his mind instinctively had recourse to Homer in order to realize and express the situation.\textsuperscript{40} And although Homer is a rich source of \textit{exempla} and \textit{comparanda}, Julian goes beyond using the Homeric poems for mere ornamentation.\textsuperscript{41} Citations from the poems are often transformed and adapted to context, where Julian proves himself not only an expert in Homeric poetry, but also a witty polemicist. Julian’s insertion of \textit{Il.} 404 and 403 in his introduction to the portrait of the true king (\textit{Or.} 3.80b) changes the tense of \textit{εἰργάω} from present to past and reverses the order of the verses, thus alluding to the devastation of Apollo’s temple at Delphi during the reign of Constantine the Great.\textsuperscript{42} It is worth

\textsuperscript{37} Already noticed by E. Talbot, \textit{Oeuvres complètes de l’empereur Julien} (Paris 1863) 42 n.2: “une allusion fine et ironique ... qui n’écchapperà point à la sagacité du lecteur.”

\textsuperscript{38} The strife between Agamemnon and Achilles was a favorite theme at the time, to judge from Late Roman silverware; see C. Delvoye, “Éléments classiques et innovations dans l’illustration de la légende d’Achille au Bas-Empire,” \textit{AntCl} 53 (1984) 184, 195–99.

\textsuperscript{39} D. Bartovkona, “Prosimetrum, the Mixed Style in Ancient Literature,” \textit{Eirene} 14 (1976) 83.

\textsuperscript{40} Amm. Marc. 15.8.17; Athanassiadi 17.

\textsuperscript{41} Although Plato’s works are for Julian \textit{ιπόν ἀρχαιον} (\textit{Or.} 3.68d), the \textit{Iliad} might have been written to glorify Constantius’ deeds (3.75a). See Lambertom (\textit{supra} n.31) 134f. \textit{Exempla} are substantially more consistent in the Second Panegyric than in the First, but mythological figures outnumber such historical personalities as Cyrus or Alexander the Great. See J.-M. Demarolle, “L’empereur Julien, défenseur de l’hellénisme: la fonction de la mythologie et de l’histoire dans les éloges de Constance,” in P. M. Martin and C. M. Ternes, edd., \textit{La mythologie, clé de lecture du monde classique. Hommage à R. Chevallier} (Tours 1986) 90f.

\textsuperscript{42} For the devastation of Delphi during Constantine’s reign see also Zos. 2.31.1; Euseb. \textit{VC} 3.54; cf. C. M. Bowra, “Εἰκαστή το βασιλεί,” \textit{Hermes} 87 (1959) 428; C. Vatin, “Les empereurs du IVe siècle à Delphes,” \textit{BCH} 86 (1962) 231.
noting that no Homeric citation and almost no citation marker associated with Homer occur within chapters 23 and 32. (I shall return below to the significance of this peculiarity.)

Stylistic analysis thus reveals that almost all Atticistic markers cluster outside chapters 23 and 32, with the exception of *paronomasia* (the agglomeration of unitary expressions to make a concept clearer), *epiphoneme*, and the rhetorical question in negative form—all widely used in philosophical rather than rhetorical demonstration. Although the ‘neutral’ zone appears to be enriched by vocabulary from everyday language or Christian usage, along with citations from Dio Chrysostom, the first part (chapters 1–22) is characterized by various Atticistic markers, including a considerable presence of ironical metaphors and a massive concentration of Homeric citations. To discern the rationale for this polarity, we should now concentrate on upper levels of analysis.

II. Topics and the Structure of the Encomium

It is not difficult to see that, compared with the First Panegyric, the Second is ‘abnormal’, particularly because the description of Constantius’ military deeds is constantly interrupted by comments on the Homeric parallels or Plato’s works. Between the descriptions of Constantius’ military deeds and his cardinal virtues, the Second Panegyric includes a long digression on the true king. The political significance of this ‘abnormally’ structured panegyric is only revealed when contrasted with the rhetorical treatises of Menander Rhetor, a major source for Late Roman epideictic oratory and theory.\(^4^3\) The first chapter of Menander’s second treatise (pp. 77–95) describes the structure of the imperial oration. Menander advises panegyrists to begin with the topic of the emperor’s πατρίς, then to consider his family (γένος), including his parents and ancestors. After dis-

posing of these two introductory topics, the oration should investigate the circumstances of the emperor's birth (γένεσις), e.g. divine signs, his mother's dreams before the delivery, and any other remarkable events. Then the panegyric should say something about the emperor's nature (φύσις) and beauty. Next come nurture (ἀνατροφή), which treats all precociously manifested qualities; education (παιδεία); then intellectual skills. Under the topic of accomplishments (ἐπιτηδεύματα) the orator should focus on the emperor's character. The most important topics of the imperial panegyric are the actions (πράξεις).

Menander strongly recommends (2.373.5–8, p.85) classifying the πράξεις by the four cardinal virtues (courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom). The panegyric should end with Fortune (τύχη), a topic that aims to demonstrate that the emperor has been vouchsafed the gift of children and that all his friends wish him well (2.272.28–31, p.93).

One could hardly fail to notice striking differences when comparing the structure of Julian's two panegyrics on Constantius with Menander's rules. The First Panegyric combines Menander's third through the sixth topics in only three chapters (8–10 [Or. 1.4d]), but remains close to the list. The Second Panegyric, however, shows a divergent structure: the topics of πατρίς, γένεσις, παιδεία, and ἐπιτηδεύματα completely disappear. Julian moves from φύσις (ch. 3) directly to πράξεις (chapters 4–5), laying particular emphasis on virtues in time of war. The topic of πράξεις is divided into two parts by the extensive digression (23–32) on the true king. At the end of the encomium (chapter 34), Julian returns to the topics of γένος and πράξεις, completely unsuitable in this part of the panegyric, and ostensibly ignores τύχη. Although he carefully announces this project in the First Panegyric, Julian now states explicitly that he is not going to pay too much attention to rhetorical rules (Or. 3.64a): “For I declare that I make no claim to be an expert in their art (οὐτε ἐγώ τῶν τεχνῶν μεταποιούμαι: literally, ‘I do

44 Menander also recommends that rhetors insert in the prooemium an introductory idea to the main heading, “in the form of the speaker's uncertainty about the point with which to begin the encomium” (2.369.13–17, p.79). Libanius also used the rhetorical technique of presenting the contents of the oration in the prooemium: Bouffartigue 516.
not accept the rules"), and one who has not agreed to abide by certain rules has the right to neglect them."

It is possible that the way in which Julian insists on the 'rules' might suggest that he refers to rules other than those regulating topics in the imperial encomium. In any case, by ignoring the topic of *epitedeumata*, Julian avoids referring to Constantius' character and repeatedly interrupts the description of Constantius' military deeds with Homeric comparisons that are not always to the emperor's advantage. He thus separates the military deeds from the four cardinal virtues and deflects the course of his encomium to purely 'theoretical' aspects of the true king.

Adapting the structure of the encomium to social or political circumstances was a common practice in the fourth century. Claudius Mamertinus' panegyric on Julian deliberately avoids the topic of *genos*, because of its inappropriateness to Constantine the Great and his sons, along with the issue of dynastic legitimacy—a principle that Julian would later distrust, if not completely reject. The novelty in the Second Panegyric is Julian's concern with the difference between his eulogy and the 'clever rhetoricians', who only "admire the fact that a man is born of ancestors who had power or were kings" (Or. 3.93c). But those wooers of the rich and noble emperor are Julian's models in the First Panegyric, namely Themistius and Libanius. Recently, at the peak of his political career, Themistius had been admitted to the senate of Constantinople, his

45 Julian's play with 'rhetorical rules' in his *Misopogon* indicates a paradoxical rhetorical strategy: normally an encomium to the emperor should belong to Menander's genre of the *βασιλικός λόγος*. Julian, however, entirely changes the structure of his panegyric and slanders his citizens by joining them in what should have been their slandering panegyric of *him*. See M. W. Gleason, "Festive Satire: Julian's *Misopogon* and the New Year at Antioch," JRS 76 (1986) 106.

46 At *Ep. ad Ath.* (5.282a–b) Julian explicitly states that the most difficult problem he faced in Gaul as Constantius' Caesar was that his areas of competence were not clearly enough defined. He had finally asked the emperor to provide him with written rules (γραπτοὺς ὡμίν δὸς ὦστερ νόμον).  


48 Julian had studied for his First Panegyric Themist. *Or.* 1 and 2 (written in 350 and 355 respectively) and Liban. *Or.* 59 (written in 348/349): see Bidez (*supra* n.1) 5.
oration providing an opportunity for his expression of gratitude toward Constantius. The emperor awarded him a statue and a verse inscription, and Themistius became a very rich man precisely at this time. Libanius was awarded a large estate for his eulogy (Liban. Or. 1.80; PLRE I 505).

All deviations from Menander’s ‘normal’ structure of the encomium prepare the audience for the long digression—the portrait of the true king—between chapters 23 and 32. Julian employs an extraordinarily subtle technique for ‘decelerating’ the logical sequence of topics. He inserts digressions, first of two (4–5), then of one (10), and eventually of four chapters (14–17), following four (6–9), then three (11–13), and finally two chapters (18–19) respectively. The nine chapters on the true king function as an ‘anti-encomium’. After chapter 32, Menander’s scheme is abandoned and the panegyric follows a completely ‘aberrant’ course.

Digressions, as the Russian Formalists and particularly Shklovsky, have shown, “fulfill three different functions ... to permit the author to insert new material into his work ... to slow up the course of the action ... to create contrasts.” Digressions in the Second Panegyric may be short comments, like that considered by Bidez to be the encomium’s terminus a quo. Describing the composition of Magnentius’ army that was to fight against Constantius, Julian refers to his campaign against the Franks in the spring of 358 (Or. 3.56b): “I only know that its coasts [the Ocean’s] are peopled by tribes of barbarians who are not easy to subdue and are far more energetic than any other race, and I know it not merely from hearsay, on which it is never safe to rely, but I have it from personal experience.” Julian creates contrasts by simply introducing a few words as a short comment on a Homeric citation (Or. 3.80b):

And virtue they say is implanted in the soul and makes it happy, and kingly, yes, by Zeus, and statesmanlike and

49 Themist. Or. 4.54b; Liban. Ep. 66; G. Dagron, “L’empire romain d’Orient au IVe siècle et les traditions politiques de l’hellénisme. Le témoignage de Thémistius,” TravMém 3 (1968) 56 n.128.
50 Jul. Or. 1.22a–b; Themist. Or. 23.288d, 291c; PLRE I 890.
51 Cf. Men. Rhet. 2.374.6–18, p.87; see Bouffartigue 533.
52 V. B. Shklovsky, Una teoria della prosa (Bari 1966) 184f, quoted by Segre (supra n.19) 16.
53 E. von Borries, “Iulianos (Apostata),” RE 10 (1919) 37; Bidez (supra n.6) 156–59.
gifted with true generalship, and generous and truly wealthy, not because it possesses the Colophonian treasures of gold,

nor all the stone threshold of the Far-Darter contained within in the old days, in times of peace,

when the fortunes of Greece had not yet fallen (ὅτε ἤν ὅρθα τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πράγματα).

The ‘Hellenes’ of the Second Panegyric could only refer to those in his *Ep.* 26 to Eutherius, where he summoned the addressee to sacrifice not only for a single man (the new emperor), but for the whole community of the Hellenes as well (οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων). The phrase refers to the pagans in contrast with Christians and already announces to the addressee Julian’s sympathy for the world and culture represented by the “stone threshold of the Far-Darter.” The role of this allusion is crucial for understanding the Second Panegyric as Julian’s first political program.

One of the longest digressions outside the interval of chapters 23 to 32 concerns the religious duties of the true king. Comparing Constantius with Homeric heroes, Julian alludes to Hektor’s withdrawal from battle at *II.* 6.102ff to urge the Trojan women to offer sacrifice to Athena (*Or.* 3.68b–c):

And yet if in person he had besought the goddess before the temple, with the elders, he would have received an oracular answer, for it is only proper, in my opinion, that a general or king should always serve the god with the appointed ritual, like a priest or interpreter of oracles, and not neglect this duty or think it more fitting for another, and depute it as though he thought such a service beneath his own dignity.55


55 The idea that the emperor or his priests should not abandon their religious duty to others appears in one of Julian’s pastoral letters (*Ep.* 84.431b). The association between priest and prophet also occurs in a letter for the governor of Caria (*Ep.* 88.451b–c): ἐγὼ τοῖς, ἐπείδη δὲ ἔμι κατὰ μὲ τὰ πάτρια μέγας ἄρχερος, ἐλαχὸν δὲ νῦν καὶ τοῦ διδυμάιου προφητεύοι.
Julian refers to the duties of the emperor as pontifex maximus: taking care of divine law, preserving the ancient cults and eliminating forbidden ones (i.e., those dangerous for the state), controlling sacrifices and all elements of religious service, supervising other such cultic elements as divination, and controlling the sacerdotal hierarchy. After giving his interpretation of Plato’s Laws, Julian returns to the emperor’s religious duties (Or. 3.70d):

Again, no man must neglect the traditional form of worship or lightly regard this method of paying honor to the higher power (τοῦ κρατήρος), but rather consider that to be virtuous is to be scrupulously devout. For Piety is the child of Justice, and that Justice is a characteristic of the more divine type of soul is obvious to all who discuss such matters.

Beyond Homeric parallels, Julian’s language is Neoplatonic: the supreme god becomes τοῦ κρατήρος (cf. Porph. Abst. 3), and Julian’s concept of the emperor’s religious duties appears to be more political than sacerdotal; for not only is Piety the child of Justice but also “law is the child of justice, the sacred and truly divine adjunct of the most mighty god” (τοῦ μεγίστου θεοῦ, Or. 3.89a). Performing the religious duties of the ideal king makes the emperor θεοφιλής (“a favorite of the gods”), a recurrent epithet in the Second Panegyric (Or. 3.80b, 84a, 90c) and, significantly, associated with ἀνανεωτής τῶν ιερῶν (templorum restaurator) in the inscription from Thessaloniki. Plato may seem, like Homer, to be used for decorating the encomium, but there is a note of particular esteem at Or. 3.68c:


57 Oikonomides (supra n.56) 40; see also A. Negev, “The Inscription of the Emperor Julian at Ma‘ayan Barukh,” IEJ 19 (1960) 170–73.

58 Or. 3.69b-c: “But it may be that I am wearying you with these doctrines of his with which I sprinkle by own utterances in small quantities, as with salt or gold dust. For salt makes our food more agreeable, and gold enhances an effect to the eye. But Plato’s doctrines (Πλάτωνος λόγοι) produce both effects. For as we listen to them they give more pleasure than salt to the sense, and they have a wonderful power of sweetly nourishing and cleansing the soul.” Rhetorical use of Plato’s works was, however, not incompatible with Neoplatonism, because (following Plotinus) all Neoplatonists used Plato not only as a philosopher, but also as a source of literary images. See Bouffartigue 562.
For there I think I may without offence adapt slightly Plato's language where he says that the man, and especially the king, best equipped for this life is he who depends on God for all that relates to happiness (τὸν θεὸν ἀνήρτητα πάντα τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν) and does not depend on other men, whose actions, whether good or bad, are liable to force him and his affairs out of the straight path.

The idea that the ἄγαθος ἀνήρ should abandon himself to God played a crucial rôle in Julian's objection to dynastic legitimacy on the basis of the charismatic nature of the imperial person, a key element of Julian's propaganda. 59 But there is an important digression on the ἄγαθος ἀνήρ in his comparison with the sun (Or. 3.80c–d):

Indeed it seems to me that this possession [the virtue of an ἄγαθος ἀνήρ] bears the same relation to the soul as its light to the sun. For often men have stolen the votive offerings of the Sun and destroyed his temples and gone their way, and some have been punished, and others let alone as not worthy of the punishment that leads to amendment. But his light no one ever takes from the sun, not even the moon when in their conjunctions she oversteps his disk, or when she takes his rays to herself, and often, as the saying is, turns midday into night. Nor is he deprived of his light when he illuminates the moon in her station opposite to himself and shares with her his own nature, nor when he fills with light and day this great and wonderful universe.

The idea that the emperor, participating in God's nature, is ἄγαθος and radiates ὀρετή is a fundamental element of Julian's concept of theocratic power. 60 Neoplatonists were dedicated to the worship of the Sun: Porphyry had already composed a treatise on the subject and Iamblichus regularly celebrated the


60 Labriola (supra n.59) 63, and “In margine al Secondo Panegirico a Costanzo,” in Gentili (supra n.43) 126: this idea originates in both Plato's political thinking and in late Hellenistic political theories, for which the sun is an image of the god and an analogy for the philosopher-king's Logos. Cf. Iamb. Myst. 6.6.
feast of the god. Solar theocracy is the key element of Julian's religious thinking. But unlike his Neoplatonist predecessors, who paid little attention to its political implications, solar theocracy became the unifying principle of Julian's political ideology. The solar disk in the Second Panegyric is neither the central deity of Iamblichus' theological system, the transcendent Helios who rules the κόσμος νοτίος, nor its lower emanation, which Julian calls νοῦς, the center of the intelligible (νοηπὸ) gods' realm, but the visible sun, through which Helios could operate in the material world. What Julian, evidently influenced by Iamblichean doctrines, emphasizes in the Second Panegyric is the heartening and vigorous solar ray's extension to the limits of what Plotinus had called τὸ μὴ ὄν or τὸ ἀνεπιρον ("the unlimited"), a critical point where it jeopardizes its own existence if it continues towards the unlimited. But Julian also sees Helios as the divine origin of his family: at C. Heracleum (Or. 7) 234c, Hermes introduces Julian to his ancestor Helios (τοῦτο, ἐφι, σὸν ἑστὶν ἐγχυνον). Constantine the Great, a man "let alone as not worthy of the punishment that leads to amendment," is denounced precisely for abandoning the solar cult and embracing Christianity (Or. 7.228d, 229a-b). That

61 Athanassiadi 153; Bouffartigue 359: Julian might have used an unknown treatise on the sun written by Iamblichus.
62 E. Corsini, "L'imperatore Giuliano tra cristianesimo e neoplatonismo," in Lana (supra n.59) 51: "vero chiave di volta di tutto il sistema di pensiero."
Julian's own experience underlies references to the partial hid­
ing or darkening of the sun is suggested in his use of "eclipse" in
allusions to the period before his 'conversion' to Neoplatonism
(Or. 11.131a). It could hardly escape notice, however, that
Julian alludes to recent events, probably the eclipse of 15 March
359. If, as suggested, he had interpreted these omens in con­
nection with the rise and fall of a Roman emperor, then we
should date the Second Panegyric between March and October
359, later than Bidez thought.

Julian's second encomium on Constantius thus includes at
least two series of elements signifying content. One (with
almost no indicative value) is Menander's scheme of rhetorical
topics; but the other, ensuing from a sequence of superficially
articulated comments and digressions, interacts with it. The key
notions here make up a subsidiary, asyntactical oration based on
isolated concepts rather than on their relationships or develop­
ments, forming the 'anti-oration' mentioned above, which

66 See M. Papthanassiou, "Astronomie, Astrologie und Physik in der Rede
rapidity of his own campaign against Constantius with Helios: Or. 5.269d,
11.146c; cf. Labriola (supra n.59) 63 n.16.

67 O. Seeck, Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste für die Jahre 311 bis 476 n. Chr.
Vorarbeit zu einer Prosopographie der christlichen Kaiserzeit (Stuttgart 1919)
153; cf. 201: πολλάκις may also refer to the eclipse of 28 May 355, when "the
evil demon who had devised [Julian's] previous troubles" (Or. 2.118c) inter­
fered, and Julian ran the risk of death (Or. 6.260a). Only after "a dea ex
machina appeared in the person of the empress Eusebia" (Athanassiadi 46)
could Julian sail for Athens. See also Bidez (supra n.6) 108-11.

68 Bidez (supra n.48) 109. The terminus post quem is Amida's fall on 6 Oc­
tober 359, if the Persian king's θρόνος και ἀπόνοια at Or. 3.67a refer to the terms
of Shapur II's embassy to Constantius in 358 (Amm. Marc. 17.5.5). When
writing the Second Panegyric, Julian certainly did not know of the Persians' preparations for war in spring 359, which preceded the siege and fall of
Amida (Amm. Marc. 17.4.2). See Demarolle (supra n.41) 98 n.16. The events
preceding the pronunciamento of Paris in Ammianus 20.3 exhibit a report of
an unexpected astral phenomenon, a solar eclipse, which augured the divine
will. For Julian's attitude toward omens in general see Ep. 12: Εἰ δὲ μὴ
σφάλλομεν, καὶ σημείον τί μοι, ἥνικα τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἔγγραφον, ἐγένετο
θαυμάσιον. Cf. Nässström (supra n.63) 104.
permanently undermines the ‘explicit oration’ (cf. Segre [supra n.19] 13.). Whom does this ‘anti-oration’ address? In the first chapters of the Second Panegyric, the rhetor speaks directly to the emperor, using the second person singular of the personal pronoun, along with such rhetorical formulas as “my beloved Emperor” (Or. 3.50c). The audience (“my hearers,” Or. 3.54a) appears in chapters 4 to 11, where Julian uses the second person plural of the personal pronoun. The second person singular is temporarily reintroduced in chapter 11; but through seven other chapters (11–18) narration is neutral, impersonal. The “hearers” reappear in chapter 18 and remain preeminent until the end. This further suggests that the ‘audience’, and not Constantius, is Julian’s main addressee in more than two-thirds of his encomium. Moreover, Julian orates to his “hearers,” not to Constantius, when describing the true king.

III. Neoplatonism and ‘Political Theology’

Julian, like Socrates, sees virtue as the supreme criterion for testing the true king (Or. 80a–b); under the influence of Dio Chrysostom (Or. 3.32ff, 38ff) he was led to the belief that only virtue constitutes kingship. For this reason he rejected dynastic legitimacy (Or. 81a–82c) and thus the old Roman principle of congruence between virtue and noble lineage. Themistius also believed that a true king is not acclaimed by the army, but needs ἀρρενί, for he is in fact proclaimed by the divine will.69 In contrast with Themistius, Julian drew directly on Neoplatonic philosophy as the only solid theoretical basis for political power.70 Neoplatonism offered Julian both a theoretical basis for the salvation of the Empire and also an opportunity for unifying philosophy and religion.71 Frequent citation of Plato


indicates Julian’s Neoplatonic education, though Julian does not share the general Neoplatonist enthusiasm for the *Parmenides*.\footnote{Bouffartigue 173; Foussard (supra n.63) 203: as there is no apophatic system and no reference to *Parmenides*—the basis of henology and the foundation of Neoplatonism—in Julian’s writings, he could hardly be included among members of the Neoplatonist school.} In Julian’s writings Plato’s work is represented almost exclusively in its religious, political, and moral aspects.\footnote{Bouffartigue 197: had Julian been the only evidence for Platonic writings, Plato would have appeared as “l’auteur d’une vaste somme sur l’*salut individuel et collectif de l’homme obtenu selon le plan de Dieu. Une Bible, en quelque sorte*”; Athanassiadi 170: Julian is the only exception in the history of the Neoplatonist school who imbibed the spirit of Plato’s political works.} So also Iamblichus: his name, frequently cited, is usually accompanied by the epithet θεοκός that later Neoplatonists constantly applied to him.\footnote{Bouffartigue 76. In contrast, Plotinus is cited only once by name, and his influence on Julian does not seem to have been substantial: see Witt (supra n.63) 48; Bouffartigue 77; contra, J. Puiggali, “La démonologie de l’empereur Julien étudiée en elle-même et dans ses rapports avec celle de Saloustios,” *EtCIL* 50 (1982: hereafter ‘Puiggali’) 307.} Julian views the Apamean as his main source of philosophical knowledge and ranks him first among all philosophers (Plato included).\footnote{Jul. *Ep.* 12: καὶ ἀντός δὲ περὶ μὲν Ίαμβλίχου ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, περὶ δὲ τῶν οὐσίων (Julian the Theurgist) ἐν θεοσοφίᾳ μεμηκνα, καὶ νομίζοι τοὺς ἀλλούς, κατὰ τὸν Ἀπολλόδορον, μηθεὶς εἶναι πρὸς τούτους; cf. Bidez (supra n.6) 74. Julian cites Iamblichus directly in his *Against the Uneducated Cynics* (Or. 9.188b) and *Hymn to King Helios* (Or. 11.146b, 150d); see Bouffartigue 277.} But Julian’s philosophy is not, as

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*Su significación fundamental dentro el movimiento neoplatónico reside en la conexión de neoplatonismo y política.* See also Labriolle (supra n.7) 431, following A. von Gutschmied in considering Neoplatonism a counter-religion to Christianity. For the relationship between philosophy and religion in Julian’s Neoplatonic thought, see more recently J. M. Hidalgo de la Vega, “Teología política de Juliano como expresión de la controversia paganismo-cristianismo en el siglo IV,” in A. G. Blanco and J. M. Blázquez Martínez, eds., *Antigüedad y cristianismo VII: Cristianismo y aculturación en tiempos del Imperio Romano* (Murcia 1990) 181. For R. T. Wallis (*Neo-Platonism* [London 1972] 96) Julian’s basis for re-establishing the ancient pagan religion was nothing more than Iamblichean Neoplatonism; in contrast, J. Anton (*Theurgia demiourgia: A Controversial Issue in Hellenistic Thought and Religion,* in R. T. Wallis and J. Bregman, eds., *Neoplatonism and Gnosticism* [Albany 1992] 22) does not believe that Julian’s political philosophy was indebted to Plato’s thought.

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Wallis has it, “largely a popularization of Iamblichus’ teaching.” Though Julian sees himself as Iamblichus’ disciple, he is not interested in all his master’s works. As in the case of Plato, he concerns himself almost exclusively with Iamblichus’ theological and ‘mystagogical’ works: more with the Chaldaic Theology, for example, than the Life of Pythagoras. Iamblichus’ influence is also stronger in Julian’s dogmatic works (Hymn to King Helios) than in his anti-Christian polemics.

The influence of Iamblichus’ works on the Second Panegyric is noticeable in a digression on Julian’s theory of demons (Or. 3.90.a–b):

However it is not to bees that we must look for our analogy, but in my opinion to the king of the gods himself, whose prophet and vice-regent the genuine ruler ought to be. For wherever good exists wholly untainted by its opposite, and for the benefit of mankind in common and the whole universe, of which God was and is the only creator. But evil he neither created nor ordered to be, but he banished it from heaven and as it moves upon earth and has chosen for its abode our souls, that colony which was sent down from heaven, he has enjoined on his sons and descendants to judge and cleanse men from it. Now of these some are the friends and protectors of the human race, but others are inexorable judges who inflict on men harsh and terrible punishment for their misdeeds, both while they are alive and after they are set free from their bodies, and others again are as it were executioners and avengers who carry out the sentence, a different race of inferior and unintelligent demons.

According to Neoplatonist doctrines, Dike, as leader of the four cardinal virtues, always accompanies man and punishes him for the prenatal staining of the soul through its association

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76 Wallis (supra n.71) 96. The idea of Julian’s strict dependence on Iamblichus derives from earlier attempts to recover parts of Iamblichus’ lost works from Julian: see R. Asmus, Der Alkibiades-Kommentar des Jamblichos als Hauptquelle für Kaiser Julian (Heidelberg 1917), later rejected by B. D. Larsen, Jamblique de Chalcis, exégète et philosophe (Aarhus 1972) 15, 23ff; cf. Foussard (supra n.63) 189.

with the material world (Plot. *Enn.* 4.3.15). Saturninus Salutius Secundus develops the same theory in his *On the Gods and the Cosmos*, considered by scholars the ‘pagan catechism’ of Julian’s policy of restoration of the ancient cults. 78 Although demons as purifiers of the souls are known to Iamblichus (*Protrep.* 3, p.15 Pistelli; Puiggali 297 n.31), Julian sees Zeus as the main purifying agent, though not the creator of evil. The “executioners” frequently occur in Salutius’ treatise (12.6, 14.2, 19.1f), though Salutius also believes that the human soul can punish itself through remorse, an idea to which Julian does not subscribe (Puiggali 309). It is interesting that the “protectors of the human race” are only mentioned in another political work of Julian, the *Letter to Themistius* (6.258b–c), where he draws on Plato’s *Laws* (4.713b–c). The particular connection between ‘protectors’ and imperial power is also suggested by Libanius’ account of an episode at Pessinus in June 362. While performing the usual sacrifices in the temple of Cybele, “protective demons” warned Julian about a conspiracy set against him. 79

The close similarities between Salutius’ treatise and the Second Panegyric indicate not only common beliefs, but also common projects of religious reform that both authors must have discussed previously. Both address the same audience and manipulate the same concepts; they could be seen as heralds of the same establishment. 80 In fact, prior to his appointment as *quaestor sacri palatii*, Salutius was Julian’s closest friend in Gaul, his true “Phoenix” in Libanius’ view. 81

Iamblichus’ influence is also recognizable in another digression on the common interpretation of myths (*Or.* 3.82d):

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78 *Or.* 12.1k. See Wallis (*supra* n.71) 96; Ehrhardt (*supra* n.70) 462.
79 Liban. *Or.* 17.17, 18.162; Bidez (*supra* n.6) 274.
80 J. M. Alonso-Nuñez, “El César Juliano y el filósofo Salustio,” *Helmantica* 20 (1978) 402: “Constituyen con sus adherentes un grupo de renovación neopagana con base neoplatónica por ser el neoplatonismo la ideología que aglutinaba el pensamiento de la Antiguedad que más convenía a la renovación pagana.”
For even if in the use of other gods and deities it was natural that they [the ancients] should be so deceived when they clothed them in human forms and human shapes, though those deities possess a nature not to be perceived or attained by the senses, but barely recognizable by means of pure intelligence, by reason of their kinship with it; nevertheless in the case of the visible gods it is not probable that they were deceived, for instance, when they entitled Aeetes "son of Helios" and another [Daidalion] "son of the Dawn," and so on with others.

By considering myths to be 'figures' of non-figurative forms, as a means of approaching the invisible and immaterial deities, Julian drew on the same theory as Salutius (2Δ: Θεοδ ἐκ σωμάτων εἰσιν καὶ γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων αἱ δύναμες ἁσώματος). Julian does not have in mind Plotinus' trinitary system, but rather Iamblichus' νοῦς, subdivided into the intelligible (νοητός) and intellectual (νοερός) worlds. Visible gods (e.g. Aeetes or Daidalion) link the material world and inferior human souls with noetic, invisible gods. Initiation myths, according to Julian, are therefore "mixed" (μικτοί), for they are the necessary epistemological connection between gods and the world. Attainable by the senses, visible gods are an emanation of noetic gods to which access is possible only through pure intelligence.

Pure intelligence ties the individual soul to god in Julian's interpretation of Plato's Menexenus inspired by Iamblichus' teaching (Or. 3.69a; cf. Pl. Ti 90a):

For when he [Plato] says "depends on himself," assuredly he does not refer to a man's body or his property, or long descent, or distinguished ancestors. For these are indeed his belongings, but they are not the man himself; his real self is his mind, his intelligence, and, in a word, the god that is in us (τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν θεόν). As to which, Plato elsewhere calls it "the supreme form of the soul that is within us" and says that "God has given it to each one of us a guiding genius,

82 Cf. Puiggali 303: Julian's ἄφαντος for invisible gods and demons is particularly recurrent in Porphyry and Iamblichus.

83 Cf. Finamore (supra n.77) 401. Julian will further develop this theory in Contra Heraclium and in his pastoral letters, esp. Ep. 89b. See also Koch (supra n.28) 71; Dostalová (supra n.54) 8.

84 Y. Vernière, "L'empereur Julien et l'exégèse des mythes," in Problèmes du mythe et de son interprétation (=Actes du colloque de Chantilly [Paris 1978]) 117; Lamberton (137) believes Julian's attitude toward myths is "aristocratic," because myths are necessary only to those who are unable to grasp the truth.
even that which we say dwells in the summit of our body and raises us from earth towards our celestial affinity."

Julian derives his theory from Plato's discrimination between αὐτός and αὐτοῦ. If individual mind and intelligence should be considered the divine part of each individual, then by emancipating them from any connection to the body, man can become one and the same as God. The individual element of divine origin is thus the only eternal part in a human's life.

But this alone cannot be hindered or harmed because "Heaven does not permit the bad to injure what is better than itself" (Or. 3.69b; cf. Pl. Ap. 30D). Like all Neoplatonists, Julian believes that the soul, as part of the One, could free itself of its material prison through dispassionate contemplation of god, through virtue and knowledge (Or. 70a).85

Well, I was saying a moment ago that Plato declares that a man's real self is his mind and soul, whereas his body and his estate are but his possessions. This is the distinction made in that marvelous work, the Laws. And so, if one were to go back to the beginning and say "That man is best equipped for life who makes everything that relates to happiness depend on his mind and intelligence and not on those outside himself who, by doing or faring well or ill force him out of the straight path."

For Themistius, a true king is under God's power, his mere representative on earth. Hence the image, taken from the literature of the "Assyrians" (i.e., Christians), of the "king's heart in god's hand" (ὁ νοῦς τοῦ βασιλέας ἐν τοῦ θεοῦ πολάμη).86 A true king, for Julian, is only the one who knows that he is akin to God through his intelligence (Or. 3.70c–d).

And if for Plato's word "genius" (δαίμων) he substitutes the word "God" (θεόν), he has a perfect right to do so. For if Plato gives the control of our whole life to the presiding "genius" within us which is by nature unaffected by sensation and death, and if he says that this is his opinion about pure intelligence unmixed with earthly substance, which is indeed synonymous with God? To this I say every man, whether he be a private citizen or a king, ought to entrust the reins of his life, and by a king I mean one who is really

86 Themist. Or. 1.4b–6b, 11.146c–47b; Valdenberg 564.
worthy of the name, and not a counterfeit or falsely so-called but one who is aware of God and discerns his nature because of his affinity with him, and being truly wise bows to the divine authority and yields the supremacy to God.

In contrast withThemistius, Julian opts for a reversed image: not God enclosing man, but man embodying in his earthly substance a piece of the divine, ἐν ἡμῖν θεός. Nevertheless, the soul as daimon within us, invulnerable by nature and akin to god, endures and suffers because of its associations with the body, whose powers may torment and corrupt it. Only the mind, the pure intelligence, as true God within us, could be the guide of the perfect king. This is the key element for understanding Julian’s philosophical speculations as political reflection. Separating soul from mind/intelligence, and opposing them to body/earthly substance, Julian emphasizes the rôle of the king as philosopher. His theory is in fact a variant of Iamblichus’ portrait of the ἐπιστήμων θεουργός in De Mysteriis. According to Iamblichus, the power of the philosopher-priest lies in his capacity to participate as theurgist in a hierarchically extended life chain. This power is only given to those souls chosen by the gods to coalesce with their divine essence. The meaning of Julian’s conjecture is very close to Iamblichus’ theory, although Julian moves the emphasis from philosopher to king, from an epistemological to a political context. A true

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87 Or. 3.68d. An identical phrase occurs at Or. 9196d (Against the Uneducated Cynics).


89 The Ep. ad Themist. deals with similar problems: the meaning of the Platonic allegory in the Laws (713с–14а) is, Julian argues, that the ruler should endeavor to govern and legislate according to the divine part of his nature, banishing any mortal and bestial element from his soul (6.259а–b). The wise ruler will concentrate all his efforts on purging almost the whole earth and sea of the evil spread over their surface. Cf. Athanassiadi 91, 158. What Julian understands by “divine part” of the ruler’s nature is, just as in the Second Panegyric, the man’s νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν, “the supreme form of the soul.” In contrast, the idea that the “soul” (ψυχή) should abandon herself entirely to the gods, thus being illuminated with the divine light, clearly appears in Julian’s Discourse to the Mother of the Gods (8.178b); see Athanassiadi 146. It appears that Julian is much more concerned with φρόνησις in his political writings than in his religious hymns. In any case, Athanassiadi’s argument, that “in light of what precedes and follows, the Letter to Themistius appears as a momentary aberration,” is mistaken and demon-
king considers himself a "priest and prophet"; he knows that he is akin to God and therefore abandons all connections with the mundane (wealth, noble lineage, imperial insignia, military victories, etc.), and concerns himself only with the "appointed ritual", which is so very pleasant to the gods: the sacrifices. Julian's concept of sacrifice, on which he will dwell in his *Letter to Themistius*, is thus influenced not only by Iamblichus' teachings, but also by his own political aspirations. For Iamblichus, the sacrifice was not merely an opportunity to express gratitude to God, but a special method to avoid evil and to banish demons (Leadbeater 91). According to Julian, if the true king could separate his νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν from their earthly connections, he could then purge the earth of its evil. A political and 'philanthropical', rather than philosophical profile thus characterizes the true king in his hypostasis as "priest and prophet."  

A short survey of the four cardinal virtues supports the argument. The Neoplatonic ethical system was based on several spheres of spiritual ascent, in each of which the cardinal virtues functioned differently. Porphyry's four cardinal virtues (*Aphorm. 32*) are wisdom (φιλόσοφος), courage (ἀνδρεία), temperance (σωφροσύνη), and justice (δικαιοσύνη). In the lowest sphere, the four virtues augment an individual's health and physical strength; in the middle one, which represents social life, they participate in his social integration; and in the third sphere they contribute to his spiritual purification (cf. Ehrhardt 464). To Dio Chrysostom, Julian's alleged model for his Second Panegyric, the emperor appeared as φιλόσοφος, φιλότιμος, πολεμικός, and εἰρηνικός, but φιλανθρωπία was the true king's most valuable attribute.  

Themistius, Julian's model in the First Panegyric, replaced the four Neoplatonic virtues with προφήτης,
κατά τη διαδικασία του θεού, ευσεβεία, και φιλανθρωπία. Ο μόνος μετά του επιτρέπει το βασιλείον να αντιληφθείται τον θεό (δικαιοσύνης τρός θεον).93 Ευσεβεία αποδεικνύεται στο κοινό; δεν παράγει στον πρόεδρο τον αρχηγό του θρησκευτικού ρόλου. Δικαιοσύνης είναι το ποιότητα που κάνει εντατικόν το βασιλείο ως κοινό για έναν καλό δικαστή, και προφορία ζητάει αυτήν την ποιότητα όταν η αντιπαραγωγή είναι μεγαλύτερη από τον αρχηγό, στον προσδοκητή τον αμέτρητο εκτάσεως. Ο μόνος μετά του αναφέρεται στην πρόσφατης εποχής, όταν η αποκάλυψη του θρησκευτικού ρόλου και του προφορία ζητάει αυτήν την ποιότητα όταν η αμέτρητη εκτάσεως και η αποκάλυψη του θρησκευτικού ρόλου και του προφορία ζητά. Ο μόνος μετά του αναφέρεται στην πρόσφατης εποχής, όταν η αμέτρητη εκτάσεως και η αποκάλυψη του θρησκευτικού ρόλου και του προφορία ζητά. 

93 Θεμιστ. Ορ. 19.226d–27b, 18.225a–b; Valdenberg 569.
94 Θεμιστ. Ορ. 11.147a–b; L. J. Daly, "Themistius' Concept of Philanthropia," Byzantion 45 (1975) 38ff.
95 Ath. Apol. ad Constantium 2, 22; see G. Downey, "Philanthropia in Religion and Statecraft in the Fourth Century," Historia 4 (1955) 202ff.
96 François (supra n.22) 436f and (supra n.92) 198.
97 P. Huart, "Julien et l'hellénisme. Idées morales et politiques," in Braun and Richer (supra n.8) 113.
98 σωφροσύνη, ranked second, also appears in the four cardinal virtues of a letter to Alypius, vicarius Britanniarum, written in the same period (Ep. 14.404a). Temperantia is also ranked second in Claudius Mamertinus' panegyric to Julian: see Blockley (supra n.47) 44. The crown in the mosaic from Apamea is interpreted in the light of the Second Panegyric as representing the imperial virtue σωφροσύνη: J. Balty and J.-C. Balty, "Un programme philosophique sous la cathédrale d'Apamée: l'ensemble néo-platonicien de l'empereur Julien," in Texte et image (=Actes du colloque international de Chantilly, 13 au 15 octobre 1982 [Paris 1984]) 175.
seems to bear those qualities that Julian believed he had himself or desired to have.

The ranking of δικαίωσύνη in last place may be misleading. In fact, Julian believes that Dike is the source of both religion and law (Or. 3.70d, 89a). He thus implies that politics and religion cannot be separated, for laws are divine by origin, and justice is "the sacred and truly divine adjunct of the most mighty god" (Or. 3.89a). Consequently, to respect laws is a religious as well as a political responsibility. A true king, according to Julian, reveres the divine law and would never act against it. His rôle is to temper the harshness of punishments without, however, altering the verdicts pronounced by "a court of staid and sober men." "But in his own hand no sword should lie ready to slay a citizen, even though he has committed the blackest crimes, nor should a sting lurk in his soul" (Or. 3.89d). The problem of the relationship between ruler and law is one of the most important issues of political thinking in the ancient world, for which political theorists devised two solutions. First, for the king's power to be legitimate, it must be based on laws. Laws should restrict the king's authority, because he is only their guardian, a mere magistrate—the theory embraced by Stoics and by Julian. Second, the king, invested with full, unlimited authority, should rather be considered as the source of legislation, as a truly living law (νόμος ἐμπύγης: Dagon 127ff). This is the concept found in Dio Chrysostom's orations on kingship, which inspired Themistius' political thinking, and it also occurs in Christian authors.

According to Themistius (Or. 6.73a), the ruler has no other obligation than to respect his own laws. But the laws are not the image of a civilized society; on the contrary, their purpose is only social coercion, and consequently they are very badly adapted to human complexity (cf. Themist. Or. 1.14d–15a). Hence the king, whose major virtue is φιλανθρωπία, is obliged to subdue the law, to temper it where it becomes ruthless. Φιλανθρωπία is the quality that gives the king the right to modify the law, to ameliorate it, a principle that is clearly embodied

99 Cf. Ep. 98a.453b; Athanassiadi 175, who compares Julian's definition of the law with Manuel I Comnenus' chrysobul of 1159.

100 Cf. Or. 5.270a: disrespect for laws is ἄσέβημα; cf. Amm. Marc. 22.10.6f, 15.4.19f.

101 Themist. Or. 5.64b–c; L. J. Daly, "Themistius' Plea for Religious Tolerance," GRBS 12 (1971) 69.
in Justinian’s decrees.\textsuperscript{102} Themistius explicitly asserts (Or. 8.118d–19a) the emperor’s right to legislate as a counterpart of the existing legislation, an idea first voiced by Constantine’s laws (Cod. Theod. 1.2.2f; cf. 1.2.7 [Constantius II]).

Quite another concept of law ensues from Julian’s Second Panegyric: the law is the child of Dike and not the “law inanimate,” as official propaganda had it (Athanassiadi 64). Because the true king, according to Neoplatonist doctrine, should be able to create an earthly order resembling the divine by introducing εὐνομία—the identity between νόμος and λόγος—Julian views the ruler as the only human able to ameliorate the mundane political order by shaping it after its divine model.\textsuperscript{103} Julian’s concept of law will later be expressed in his legislation: \textit{quae diu servata sunt permanebunt} (Cod. Theod. 5.20.1). As Dagron (127) noticed, Julian’s views are not simply a reaction against Eusebius’ or Themistius’ “political theology” (Mazza’s phrase: 92), but reflect the fundamental political change of the Late Roman Empire: the notion of \textit{legitimacy} gradually replaces the already dying idea of \textit{legality}.

Permanently contemplating God, the true king is therefore always μεγαλόψυχος, for he strives to imitate the divine archetype. This theory of the relations between ruler and god inspired all fourth-century authors, both pagans and Christians.\textsuperscript{104} For nearly all of them, there is no question of kinship between God and ruler, as in the Second Panegyric, but only of likeness, for God always remains an intangible archetype. Themistius believes (Or. 6.78d–79b) that God has three fundamental aspects: eternal life, unlimited power, and permanent φιλανθρωπία towards mankind. Only the latter could be imitated by the perfect king, who would thus become similar to God.

In contrast, Julian always considered himself God’s agent on earth. He justified his rebellion against Constantius by means of divine will and viewed himself as legally proclaimed by the gods (Or. 5.275b–77a, 285d; cf. Ep. 28; Or. 6.266c–67a.). The image is again reversed: a true king knows he is \textit{akin} (not \textit{similar}) to God.

\textsuperscript{102} Dagron 132; Daly (\textit{supra} n.94) 25f.
\textsuperscript{103} Ehrhardt 480; Morisi (\textit{supra} n.69) 123; J. M. Candau Morón, “Teocracia y Ley: la imagen de la realeza en Juliano el Apostata,” in J. C. Candau Morón, G. Fernando, and R. de Verger Antonio, eds., \textit{La imagen de la realeza en la Antigüedad} (Madrid 1988) 186.
\textsuperscript{104} Themist. Or. 15.188a–b; Euseb. \textit{Laud. Const.} 1; cf. Dagron 135: the same idea inspired Constantine’s iconography after 325.
and yields supremacy to Him (Or. 3.70d); in Neoplatonic terms, God exerts power in the political field through his *son* (not *delegate*) on earth. Only then can the true king have the possibility of using his *φιλανθρωπία* to moderate punishments. For Themistius, however, in order to be a perfect king, the ruler can only *imitate* God in practicing *φιλανθρωπία*. Julian’s solution from a theoretical viewpoint is profoundly original: as supreme magistrate, the king is nevertheless of divine origin. Knowing that he is akin to god, he accepts being limited by Law, which is His emanation, and to rule as God’s “son and descendant.” This interpretation is also the basis of Julian’s refutation in his *Letter to Themistius*: the king should rule in accordance with the divine part of his being and eliminate any mundane limitations.\(^\text{105}\) Julian does not consider himself an image, a copy of the deity, but rather a part of the divine principle, a *βλάστημα* of God Helios (Or. 7.232d; cf. 98).

This opposition of attitudes appears also in the debate over the king’s religious functions. Without ever explicitly referring to the religious duties of the emperor, Themistius attempts to relocate them in a more general field. Because philosophy in his view provides the only degree of resemblance with God allowed to human beings (Or. 2.32d), emperors should be praised as champions of the *paideia* (Or. 4.54a–b). When alluding to the organization of a new cult, Themistius employs πολιτεύεσθαι (Dagron 180). Religion is thus ranked among the citizen’s responsibilities—the city, as politically opposed to the Empire, is the basic religious unit. Hence Themistius’ argument (Or. 5) that Julian had precisely mistaken the Empire for a πολιτεία. Julian believes in contrast that as “priest and prophet” the king should serve the god with the appointed ritual and not neglect his duty or depute it to another. In other words, the king should be first of all a *pontifex maximus*, a function that gives him the right to control all the religious life of the Empire (Leipoldt 26). The Second Panegyric opposes the model of the king-priest to Themistius’ king-philosopher. Julian is thus the first emperor to provide an articulate justification for a theocratic conception of kingship (Athanassiadi 75).

In emphasizing sender-receiver relationships in the Second Panegyric, we have to admit that analyzing its fabula has clearly shown very few, if any, parallels between Constantius and the portrait of the true king. Except military qualities (Or. 3.95a–d), none of the ideal ruler’s attributes returns in the last part of the encomium: neither “priest and prophet,” good administrator, or “soldier’s friend,” nor Law’s guardian or highest magistrate. The portrayal of Constantius seems divorced from any theoretical basis. In fact, the Second Panegyric contrasts two imperial portraits: Constantius’ is permanently parodied and the quasi-impersonal portrait of the true king corresponds to Julian’s political aspirations. The Second Panegyric, however, is not a mere lampoon, for the special importance of some of the attributes of the ideal ruler can hardly deceive: Julian is clearly concerned with the problems of imperial authority. His second encomium for Constantius is therefore a genuine political manifesto veiled in rhetoric.

Did the Second Panegyric have the consequences Julian might have hoped? His attempt to style himself an enthroned philosopher did not escape unobserved. The inhabitants of the little-known city Iasos in Asia Minor praised him in a dedication: τὸν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας βασιλεύοντα καὶ δικαιομοσύνη τε καὶ ταῖς ἄλλας ἀρεταῖς πᾶσαν διευλεφότα τὴν ψ’ ἡλίῳ ... τὸν μέγιστον καὶ θειότατον αὐτοκράτορα. But Julian’s encomium is addressed in fact neither to the emperor nor to common people, but to a particular audience including highly cultured individuals, able to decipher both the elegant manipulation of Atticist procedures and the concepts of Neoplatonic philosophy. Perhaps one of the most important witnesses of the effect of Julian’s oration is Themistius. He was already pro-consul of Constantinople in 358/359 and actively concerned

106 Cf. Athanassiadi 64: the Second Panegyric has “a definite auto-panegyrical flavor, which Constantius can hardly have failed to notice.”
107 Bidez (supra n.48: 113) first used “political manifesto” for the Second Panegyric.
108 OGIS 520; Oikonomides (supra n.56) 42; cf. Mazza 75.
109 Athanassiadi 154: the cultured public that Salutius addresses consists of men who, through the acquisition of the right paideia, have developed the innate good qualities of the soul, the cardinal virtues.
with the enrollment of new senators there.\footnote{Liban. \textit{Ep.} 40, 68; Themist. \textit{Or.} 24.13; cf. \textit{PLRE I} 890.} It seems likely that Themistius would have participated in the ceremony of the speech at the end of 359,\footnote{Themistius was in Constantinople at the end of 359 when he was replaced by Honoratus, the first city-prefect (\textit{PLRE I} 890). In 360 he re-married a Phrygian woman and spent some time in Phrygia, but Libanius' letters of 360 to Themistius describe him as a senator of Constantinople and resident there.} when Julian's oration, written between March and October of the same year, might have reached Constantius\footnote{Both Wright and Dvornik believe that the Second Panegyric was never declaimed or published: W. C. Wright, \textit{The Works of the Emperor Julian I} (LCL: London 1913) 131; Dvornik 662. Their theory is based on an argument \textit{ex silente}: Eutherius, the \textit{praepositus sacri cubiculi}, probably carried and also read Julian's First Panegyric in 356 (\textit{Bidez [supra n.48] 3}), but there is no evidence of the circumstances in which the Second Panegyric was delivered—a fact usually interpreted as an indication that it was not published. To publish in the fourth century meant that the rhetor distributed a limited number of copies among his friends, \textit{after} delivering the speech (Petit [\textit{supra n.47} 486). As the original title of the Second Panegyric did not include Constantius' name, it is most probable that Julian inserted it in the \textit{editio princeps} reflected by the thirteenth-century Ms. \textit{Vossianus gr. 77}: see C. F. Russo, \textit{“L'editore principe di Giuliano,” Belfagor} 21 (1966) 298f. The Second Panegyric was therefore published, along with Julian's other works, prior to its author's death. There is consequently no indication that this encomium received a different treatment than other pieces of Julian's writings.} in either Sirmium or, more probably, Constantinople.\footnote{Amm. Marc. 19.11.8. Constantius arrived in Constantinople in October or November and remained there long enough to inaugurate the St Sophia cathedral on 15 February 360. Cf. A. Piganiol, \textit{L'empire chrétien} (325–395) (Paris 1947) 103. Julian's encomium might have been delivered for the anniversary of Constantius' ninth and Julian's third consulate on 1 January 360.} But in 359 Themistius was involved in a public scandal. At issue were his political ambitions. Themistius had accepted from the emperor the offer of a position that was highly incongruous with philosophy. It was precisely the fierce opposition of the 'Hellenes' that probably forced Themistius to renounce his office of proconsul under the serious imputation that he had tried, like Constantius, his political champion, to 'innovate'.\footnote{Themist. \textit{Or.} 27.314d, 315b, 320b, etc.; cf. Dagron 45ff.} When later he was offered the city prefecture (eventually taken by Honoratus), Themistius became the target of Palladas' epigrams (\textit{Anth. Pal.} 11.292; cf. Athanassiadi 128 n.23). The main charge against Themistius was that he had
received an imperial position not an ancient city office, a λειτουργία, when he accepted appointment as senator and proconsul in a city under the emperor’s rule (Dagron 61). Julian’s *Letter to Themistius* (262d) implies this and suggests that, like the Neoplatonists, he should prefer a few disciples to a large audience. Further, ideas and phrases used in Julian’s writings are paralleled in works written by Themistius after the emperor’s death. Arab sources preserve a translation of one of Themistius’ lost orations, dedicated to the Emperor Julian. Dvornik believes that the *Risalat* clearly shows Themistius’ *volte-face* during Julian’s reign. It includes elements that are not common to Themistius’ other works but are clearly paralleled to some of the ideas expressed in the Second Panegyric.

In conclusion, it is mistaken to regard the Second Panegyric simply as an excessively laudatory piece of fourth-century epideictic, ‘decadent’ rhetoric. On the contrary, it is one of the best examples of the way in which rhetoric can combine issues of political struggle and cultural identity. Of all Julian’s works, the Second Panegyric is the most pertinent for Gregory of Nazianzus’ violent outburst of anger against Julian (Or. 4.101f):

σὸν τὸ Ἑλληνίζειν; σὸν τὸ Ἀττικίζειν; σὰ τὰ ποιήματα;

Kalazoo
December, 1995

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115 Bouffartigue 297; contra, Wright 24; Dagron 235.

116 Dvornik 667; see *Risalat Thamistiyus ila Yuliyan al-malik fi al-siyasah wa-tadbir al mamlakah* (Cairo 1970).

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