Achaemenid Grants of Cities and Lands to Greeks: The Case of Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes

Maxim M. Kholod

The grants of cities and lands to foreigners, including Greeks, who had provided and/or would in the future provide important services to the Persian kings and satraps were a fairly common practice in the Achaemenid Empire.¹ A portion of evidence for such grants concerns Asia Minor. For example, Cyrus the Great is said to have granted seven cities in Asia Minor to his friend Pytharchus of Cyzicus.² The Spartan king Demaratus, after he had been allowed to dwell in Persia, received from Darius I and probably then from Xerxes lands and cities, among them Teuthrania and Halisarna, where his descendants, the Demarati, still were in power at the beginning of the fourth century.³ Gongylus of Eretria, who had been expelled from his home city as an adherent of the Persians, received from Xerxes the cities Gambrium, Palaegambrium,


² Agath. FGrHist 472 F 6, ap. Ath. 30A.

³ Hdt. 6.70, Xen. Hell. 3.1.6.
Myrina, and Gryneium, which were also controlled by his descendants, the Gongylides, at the beginning of the fourth century. The refugee Themistocles was granted Lampsacus, Magnesia on the Meander, Myus, Percote, and Palaescepsis by the Persian king (Xerxes or already Artaxerxes I), and these cities had to provide him respectively with wine, bread, seasonings, and bedding and clothing.

Among the holdings granted in Asia Minor were also those of Mentor and Memnon, Rhodian brothers, famous commanders of Greek mercenaries, who managed to enter and occupy a prominent place in the military-political elite of the Persian Empire in the last decades of its existence.

This article aims to consider the holdings of Mentor and Memnon and thereby to contribute, to a certain extent, not only to a better understanding of the broader problem of granting cities and lands to individuals in the Achaemenid Empire but also to our knowledge of the life and activities of these two undoubtedly outstanding persons. Although the issue involved has been touched on by modern scholars more than once, there is no study, so far as I know, that specially deals with it and gives it

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4 Xen. _Hell._ 3.1.6, cf. _Anab._ 7.8.8.
5 Thuc. 1.138.5; Nep. _Them._ 10.2–3; Diod. 11.57.7; Plut. _Them._ 29; Strab. 14.1.10; Ath. 29F–30A, 533E.
There are grounds for thinking that Mentor and Memnon acquired their first holdings already at the very end of 360s/very beginning of 350s, when they managed to make a successful career at the court of Artabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who had married their sister (Dem. 23.154, 157; Diod. 16.52.4). Demosthenes, describing the actions of Charidemus with his mercenary troops in Asia Minor (the late 360s) makes clear that Mentor and Memnon desired to hold Ilium, Scepsis, and Cebren in the Troad, which had been treacherously captured by Charidemus, and so persuaded Artabazus to conclude a truce with the general and not prevent him from leaving those cities (23.154, 157). It is not known whether Artabazus satisfied that desire of his brothers-in-law; but taking into consideration their strong influence on him, this seems highly probable. If so, they hardly became tyrants in these cities (at least there is not even a hint of such in our sources) but most likely acquired the right to derive for themselves some portion of income from the communities.

At the same time, it is not excluded that Mentor and Memnon received, by then or soon after, some other holdings as well, first of all lands given to them in the territory under Artabazus’ control. In such a case it is quite possible that these lands (at least in part) lay in the vicinity of the cities granted to the brothers.

Whether all the holdings were initially the royal grants to

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7 The short essay by W. Heckel can be regarded as an exception in this case: “Kalas son of Harpalos and Memnon’s Country,” Mnemosyne 47 (1994) 93–95. Nevertheless, he discusses only part of the issue under consideration here.


9 That such a grant took place is supported by scholars almost unanimously: see in works cited below in connection with the problem of the location of Memnon’s chorōn.
Artabazus and he gave them to Mentor and Memnon, or whether the brothers received them directly from the Persian king, is unclear.\(^{10}\) However, it is certain that Mentor and Memnon as holders of these cities and lands were under the immediate authority of Artabazus.\(^{11}\) At any rate, the brothers no doubt lost their holdings when the revolt of Artabazus against Artaxerxes III Ochus, who had ascended the throne several years earlier (358), failed and its leaders were forced to flee (ca. 352);\(^{12}\) Artabazus and Memnon with their relatives found refuge at the court of Philip II of Macedon (Diod. 16.52.3; Curt. 5.9.1, 6.5.2), while Mentor took up service with Nectanebo II, the ruler of Egypt (Diod. 16.42.2, 45.1).

In all likelihood, the further acquisition of holdings in Asia Minor by the brothers was connected with the decisive changes that happened in Mentor’s life several years later. After the reconquest of Egypt by Artaxerxes III, Mentor—who had joined the Persian side already at the time of the suppression of the Sidonian revolt (345) (Diod. 16.45.1, 3; 47.4) and then played an important role in the Egyptian campaign (343/2)\(^{13}\) and simultaneously formed a close alliance with the eunuch Bagoas who


\(^{11}\) Like Zenis, Mania, and Meidias, the local dynasts who ruled (successively) in just this area (Ilium, Cebren, Scopis, Gergis, etc.) from the late fifth century to 399, who were under the immediate authority of Pharabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.10–28). On these rulers and the borders of their principality in the Troad see in particular H. Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* (Munich 1967) I 310–311, II 678; Briant, *REA* 87 (1985) 63–64; Debord, *L’Asie Mineure* 173, 240–242.


was very influential at the Achaemenid court (Diod. 16.47.4, 49.7–50.8, 52.1)—became one of the key persons in the military-political circle of the Persian king. Diodorus writes that Artaxerxes made Mentor “supreme commander in the coastal districts of Asia” (16.50.7, ἐν τοῖς παραθαλασσίοις μέρεσι τῆς Ἀσίας ἡγεμόν μέγιστος; cf. 16.52.2, σατράπης τῆς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν παραλίας, “satrap of the coast of Asia”), i.e. most probably the Rhodian was entrusted with the highest military and administrative authority in western Asia Minor. Furthermore, Mentor was assigned as a general with supreme powers (αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός) in the “war against the rebels” (Diod. 16.52.2), including Hermias of Atarneus,14 and finished it soon with success, fully restoring imperial control over western/
north-western Asia Minor (ca. 340) (16.52.5–8). 15

One of the consequences of such an elevation of the Rhodian was the pardon of Artabazus and Memnon with their relatives by the Persian king and their return from Macedonia (Diod. 16.52.3–4). Another was the achievement of material prosperity by Mentor, not only the riches in the form of money and jewelry received from Artaxerxes (16.52.2) but also, in all probability, the land-holdings granted to him in Asia Minor. Although there is no direct evidence about any lands given to Mentor at this time, it would hardly be daring to suggest that these were just those that were in the hands of Memnon a little later. It is credible that Memnon inherited these land-holdings (either all or most of them), with the permission of Artaxerxes, after the

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15 For this war also see Dem. 10.32 with scholia (Dilts); [Arist.] Oec. 2.28; 1351a; Didym. Ad Dem. Col. 4–6 Harding; Strab. 13.1.57 (where Memnon is erroneously named instead of Mentor); Polyaen. 6.48. Our sources, unfortunately, do not allow us to define precisely the borders of Hermias’ principality. Ruzicka holds that it included the coastal lands opposite Lesbos and much of the Troad, possibly as far north as Lampsacus: Politics of a Persian Dynasty 121, cf. AJAH 10 (1985) 86. I am in partial agreement: it seems problematic that Hermias controlled areas north of the southern Troad, because we have no relevant information. In all likelihood, his principality comprised the coastal region approximately from Assus in the north to Atarneus and perhaps even to Erythrae in the south. On Hermias and his principality see in particular Berve, Die Tyrannis I 332–335, II 688–689; Hofstetter, Die Griechen 79–81, no. 143; Weiskopf, Achaemenid Systems 514–521; K. Trampedach, Platon, die Akademie und die Zeitgenössische Politik (Stuttgart 1994) 66–79; Debord, L’Asie Mineure 417–420; P. Green, “Politics, Philosophy, and Propaganda: Hermias of Atarneus and his Friendship with Aristotle,” in W. Heckel and L. A. Tittle (eds.), Crossroads of History. The Age of Alexander (Claremont 2003) 29–46; Ph. Harding, Didymos on Demosthenes (Oxford 2006) 124–162. As to the territories controlled by other ‘rebels’, it is impossible to say more than that they lay most probably in western/north-western Asia Minor. Among these ‘rebels’ may have been local dynasts and mercenary commanders who had managed to take control of a number of cities and areas during the turbulent period of the satraps’ last revolts in Asia Minor. See Ruzicka, AJAH 10 (1985) 86, and Politics of a Persian Dynasty 120; cf. Briant, From Cyrus 688. 

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death of the elder brother (ca. 340).16

Two ancient authors directly mention Memnon’s holdings in 334, at the time of Alexander’s campaign in Asia Minor. Polyaenus writes: “After crossing to Asia, Alexander made the Persians suspicious of the general Memnon by ordering the Macedonians who went out to forage to keep away from Memnon’s landed estates” (τῶν τοῦ Μέμνωνος χωρίων, 4.3.15).17 In turn, Arrian reports: “Calas and Alexander son of Aeropus were sent to Memnon’s country (τὴν χώραν τὴν Μέμνωνος), with the Peloponnesians and the greater part of the allies except the Argives who were left in Sardis to garrison the citadel” (Anab. 1.17.8).18 Furthermore, I believe, we have one indirect testimony: Diodorus says that in the battle of Granicus Memnon, like Arsames/Arsames, satrap of Cilicia, fought together with “his own horsemen” (τοὺς ἵππεῖς ἰδίους, 17.19.4): this implies that at least a part of these cavalrymen—in conformity with the Persian practice of creating a satrapal force on the regional level (in this case either of Arsites, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, or of Spithridates, satrap of Lydia)19—were levied by him within his

16 Cf. Kahrstedt, RE 15 (1931) 652; Hofstetter, Die Griechen 125, no. 215; McCoy, AJP 110 (1989) 423; Debord, L’Asie Mineure 435; Briant, From Cyrus 698. The exact date of Mentor’s death and its circumstances are unknown: after Diodorus’ notice on the victory of Mentor over Hermias and other ‘rebels’ (16.52.5–8) the Rhodian disappears from our literary tradition. However, as Mentor is not mentioned in connection with the order of Artaxerxes III to the satraps of western Asia Minor to provide support to Perinthus besieged by Philip II in 340 ([Dem.] 11.5–6; Diod. 16.75.1–2; Arr. Anab. 2.14.5; Paus. 1.29.10), we can conclude that the Rhodian was now no longer alive. Otherwise, given his official position and influence, Mentor and not (as in Pausanias) Arsites, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, would have played a key role in this undertaking. On the date of Mentor’s death cf. Kahrstedt, RE 15 (1931) 965; Hofstetter 130, no. 220; Ruzicka, AJAH 10 (1985) 84–83, and Politics of a Persian Dynasty 122, 204 n.32; McCoy, AJP 110 (1989) 426; Cawkwell, The Greek Wars 204–205; Rung, Mnemon 14 (2014) 157.

17 Transl. by P. Krentz and E. L. Wheeler, with one change.

18 Transl. by P. A. Brunt.

19 On the military functions of Persian satraps see Dandamayev and Lukonin, Kul’tura 112–114, and now especially Klinkott, Der Satrap 281–305.
territory (see below).

It should be assumed that Memnon’s land-holdings were situated in north-western Asia Minor: both Polyaeus and Arrian in the cited passages are describing the beginning of Alexander’s campaign, when he established control over this part of the peninsula. In addition, it is noteworthy that Calas was one of the commanders, the person who had been appointed satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia by Alexander a little earlier (Arr. Anab. 1.17.1). Since Calas, insofar as we are able to judge, no longer appeared in the headquarters of Alexander, it is plausible that the implementation of the order to establish control over Memnon’s country coincided with Calas’ return to his satrapy, and so it is logical to suppose that this country had to lie either on the way to the satrapy or within its borders.

There is no doubt that Memnon was a major landowner. Moreover, the passage of Arrian makes clear that the bulk of the Rhodian’s lands was compact, forming a distinct country—Memnon’s *chora* (however, it does not follow from this that he could not have also some other holdings outside his country). It is credible that in addition to his landed estates, evidenced by Polyaeus—which in all probability were immediately in the hands of Memnon—a number of small landed estates of “his own horsemens” attested by Diodorus had to be situated within

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20 For the exact date of the events recorded in Polyaeus’ stratagem see below. Note that Bosworth does not exclude the possibility that this account of Polyaeus is apocryphal, as it bears a resemblance to the well-known story about Pericles’ estates in Attica (Thuc. 2.13.1, Plut. Per. 33, Polyaen. 1.36.2). Despite such an observation, however, Bosworth appears more inclined to believe that the information given in the stratagem is true (see below): A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander* I (Oxford 1980) 131; cf. Briant, *From Cyrus* 1045. In my view, even if the remark of Bosworth is of a certain value (although I do not doubt the historicity of Polyaeus’ account, as it is perfectly consistent with the passage of Arrian), it is quite obvious that the location of Memnon’s lands just in north-western Asia Minor was deeply rooted in historical memory, and this seems hardly accidental.

21 At least the next event chronologically in which Calas is attested is his actions as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia: Alexander’s decision to subject Paphlagonia to Calas in 333 (Arr. Anab. 2.4.2, Curt. 3.1.24).

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Memnon’s chora too: although the cavalry unit fighting at Grani-
cicus under Memnon apparently included a group of his adult
relatives,\(^\text{22}\) a certain—perhaps even greater—part of this unit
comprised most likely the holders of small estates (each about the
size of one or two villages), for whom Memnon as a local mag-
nate was a sort of suzerain and who had a range of obligations
to him, among them the obligation to perform under his ‘flag’
when needed, military service in a satrapal force.\(^\text{23}\) (In all

\(^\text{22}\) Arrian mentions in this case only Memnon’s sons (\textit{Anab}. 1.15.2). Never-
theless, it seems safe to assume that, in addition to these, he was accompanied
by some of his other numerous relatives. For example, it may be that among the
cavalrymen of his unit was his nephew Pharnabazus son of Artabazus, who
would take an active part in the military operations against the Macedonians
a little later (333–332), serving initially under command of Memnon and after
his death becoming in his place commander-in-chief of the Persian fleet and
troops in the eastern Aegean (Arr. \textit{Anab}. 2.1.3; 2.1; Curt. 3.3.1, 13.14). On
Artabazus’ eleven sons, a number of whom began to develop their military care-
ers already with support from Mentor, see Diod. 16.52.3–4; cf. Curt.
6.5.4.

\(^\text{23}\) Cf. McCoy, \textit{AJP} 110 (1989) 420 n.14; Briant, \textit{From Cyrus} 796, 821; K.
Nawotka, \textit{Alexander the Great} (Cambridge 2010) 119; Panovski and Sarakinski,
\textit{Macedonian Historical Review} 2 (2011) 12 n.23. On the relations between the
Persian magnates of Hellespontine Phrygia and Lydia and the holders of
small estates lying within the territories controlled by the former see especially
“Persian Settlement in Hellespontine Phrygia,” in \textit{Achaemenid History III}
(Leiden 1988) 178–188; and “Achaemenid Settlement in Caria, Lycia and
Greater Phrygia,” in \textit{Achaemenid History VI} (Leiden 1991) 83–84. Note that
Sekunda proposes, in my view, rather suitable terms for designating both
these strata of Persian local nobility: “dukes” and “knights”; on the grounds
for using in this context such terms deriving from the later feudal system see
Sekunda, \textit{Achaemenid History III} 184. At the same time, it seems strange to me
that he has declined to consider the case of Mentor’s and Memnon’s land-
holdings: they “do not conform to the traditional pattern of land-holding,”
because these grants belong to the last years of the Achaemenid Empire,
“when the old patterns of administration, settlement etc. were vanishing”
\textit{(Achaemenid History III} 182). I agree that by that time a number of changes,
some considerable, had happened in this sphere. However, I find no valid
reasons to believe that the main principles of relations between “dukes” and
“knights” on the local level had to change much as well. If both of them still

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likelihood, the same should be said about Arsamenes/Arsames’ cavalrymen at Granicus as well: Diodorus’ expression “his own horsemen” can hardly be applied to Arsamenes/Arsames’ satrapal force but rather to his estate-produced cavalry brought by him, perhaps together with a number of his relatives, from Cilicia.) Likewise, the fact that Alexander sent a strong military contingent to deal with Memnon’s _chora_ seems to imply the existence of some potential hindrances not only on the way there but also within the country (inasmuch as its seizure was indicated as the main goal of the operation)—probably cities and other fortified sites still under Persian control, the quick capture of which would have been difficult for weaker troops. And if so, it is possible that these cities and other communities situated within Memnon’s _chora_ were also dependent on him: it appears that they were obliged to pay a portion of their income to him which along with income derived from his landed estates would have formed the basis of his material well-being.

25 As in the case of Alcimachus’ mission, dispatched by Alexander a little later from Ephesus at the head of another strong military contingent to capture those cities of Aeolis and Ionia that were still under Persian control (Arr. _Anab._ 1.18.1–2). On this mission also see below.

26 An analogue to Memnon’s _chora_ can be seen in the description of events in Asia Minor in 356/5: Tithraustes’ _chora_ in Greater Phrygia, we are informed, was ravaged by the Athenian general Chares acting, with his

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At the same time, it is impossible to equate Memnon’s *chora* with the territory which, Ruzicka holds, was the “satrapy of the coast of Asia,” inherited by Memnon from Mentor (on that view, such a satrapy included much or all of the Troad north of Hermias’ former principality, plus the principality itself).\(^{27}\) First, it is necessary to distinguish a territory of any satrapy and those lands that were granted to a person by the Persian monarchy as a source of income,\(^ {28}\) in our case to Mentor, by whom, as suggested above, they were given to his younger brother. Second, apart from one mention in Diodorus (16.52.2), there are no more traces of Mentor’s “satrapy of the coast of Asia.” This appears to indicate either that Diodorus was not quite correct, mercenaries, in the pay of Artabazus at the time of the latter’s revolt against Artaxerxes III (*FGHist* 105 f 4 = P. Erzherzog Rainer). On this revolt see above. Indeed, irrespective of whether Tithraustes was satrap of Greater Phrygia or a local magnate who commanded (together with some other Persian nobles?) the imperial troops fighting against Artabazus (and Chares), it is better to consider this *chora* his land-holding than the satrapy of Greater Phrygia: otherwise the author of the fragment would have used the relevant designation and not the term of *chora*, in such a case too vague. And one can assume that Tithraustes’ *chora* was rather extensive, as it deserved special mention as the object of attack of Chares’ (and Artabazus’) forces. However, this is not to say that this territory was the main source for recruiting an army of “20,000 Persians made up largely of cavalry troops” under command of Tithraustes which was then defeated by Chares (and probably Artabazus) in the battle the Athenian general boastfully called “the sister of Marathon” (schol. Dem. 4.19 Dilts; cf. Plut. *Aret. 16.3*); the figure is no doubt too high for that. So although most likely a number of cavalarymen of this army were levied within Tithraustes’ *chora* (as holders of small estates lying there), the overwhelming majority of its soldiers probably originated from other sources (like the army of 70,000 which represented presumably all forces collected, on the Persian king’s order, to fight against Artabazus: Diod. 16.22.1). On Tithraustes’ *chora* in the context of these events cf. Moysey, *Greek Relations* 180–186, 295–307; Weiskopf, *Achaemenid Systems* 473–480; S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford 1982) 144, 146, 157, 165, 213; Debord, *L’Asie Mineure* 156–157, 394–395; Briant, *From Cyrus 681, 785, 795.\(^ {27}\) Ruzicka, *AJAH* 10 (1985) 85–87, cf. *Politics of a Persian Dynasty* 121–123, 130.\(^ {28}\) Cf. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship* 107.
perhaps repeating inexactly his earlier description of Mentor’s official position in western Asia Minor (16.50.7), or (much less likely) that Mentor was indeed appointed satrap of a newly-created satrapy which comprised part of either Hellespontine Phrygia or Lydia (or certain parts of both) as well as the territories reconquered by him in the course of the “war against the rebels,” and which very soon—right after the victory of Mentor or his death—was abolished.  

At any rate, we have no information that Memnon inherited any official position of the elder brother along with his “satrapy of the coast of Asia,” and this seems hardly accidental given that Memnon soon became one of the most active participants of the events in western Asia Minor and the eastern Aegean (336/5–333), recorded in our literary tradition, including Diodorus himself, in sufficient detail. However, it does not follow that the country known to us from Arrian as Memnon’s chora could not have been formed from a portion of those territories that Mentor had captured from Hermias and other ‘rebels’; on the contrary, it is quite possible.

Where exactly in north-western Asia Minor did Memnon’s country lie? Historians usually locate Memnon’s chora in the Troad as a rule, in the Scamander valley (the territories around Scepsis, Cebren, etc.). Such an opinion, as will be shown,

29 Cf. Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty 121–122, who suggests the creation of Mentor’s satrapy at the expense of Ionia (which previously was part of the satrapy Lydia) and the coastal areas north of it.

seems attractive.

Hornblower and Hammond also take Memnon’s *chora* to have been situated in the Troad; but the first finds it probable that it included part of the old Tenedian *peraia*, and the second places it near Abydus. The grounds of the idea of Hornblower are unclear, as no argument is advanced, thus making it a pure speculation. At any rate, it can be rejected on the grounds that it is not in conformity with the account of Polyaeus: insofar as we are able to judge, the former Tenedian *peraia* lay apart from those territories that were occupied by Alexander’s army soon after it crossed the Hellespont and, consequently, could not be an area where the soldiers foraged in the immediate vicinity of Memnon’s estates. As to the idea of Hammond, one can only conjecture, as it too is unargued, that Polyaeus’ *Ἀλέξανδρος διαβὰς ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν…*, given at the very beginning of the stratagem described, suggested to Hammond that the events occurred right after Alexander’s appearance in Asia Minor, and hence near Abydus, where most of the Macedonian army landed (Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.6). Debord holds, however, that Polyaeus’ expression cannot be considered a reliable indicator of time. I agree that this phrase is imprecise. Yet, in my view, Alexander’s order to spare Memnon’s estates would have made the most sense at the very start of the campaign, before the battle of Gra-

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33 The idea of B. Jacobs, who places Memnon’s *chora* in Mysia (without explanation), seems a pure speculation as well: *Die Satrapienverwaltung im Perserreich zur Zeit Darius’ III* (Wiesbaden 1994) 52, 135.
nicus. It is plausible that Alexander found it advantageous, especially on the eve of the battle, to sow discord among the Persian satraps and commanders of the army assembled in north-western Asia Minor. And among them it was easiest to cast aspersions on Memnon, arousing (or more likely strengthening) the Persians’ mistrust of him: he was Greek and, moreover, had spent about ten years at the court of Philip II. Besides, a sense of envy surely was felt by the Persian noblemen toward Mentor’s career, and this in turn would have adversely affected their attitude towards his younger brother. Therefore Alexander, in giving orders not to touch Memnon’s estates, could well have hoped to neutralize this enemy who had already shown a high level of generalship in the fight against the Macedonian expeditionary corps in Asia Minor. So it appears to be no accident that Memnon played a very modest role at Granicus, commanding only a unit of his own horsemen (and not, as would seem logical, a contingent of Greek mercenaries): it is quite possible that this was a result of the Persian commanders’ distrust of him, caused at least partly, if not exclusively, by the order of Alexander concerning his estates. Thus I think, as Hammond probably did as well, that this order belongs to the very beginning of the expedition. Nevertheless, Hammond’s location for Memnon’s chora seems to me highly doubtful: since the whole area near Abydus—even if one excludes from it Mem-

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35 Cf. McCoy, *AJP* 110 (1989) 428–431. At the same time, I do not agree with Bosworth who notes that this order would have been especially suitable after Memnon’s advocacy of a scorched-earth policy at the Persian war-council in Zeleia (*A Historical Commentary* I 131). Not only is it improbable that Alexander immediately learned what had happened at the war-council, but there is reason to think that the plan of fighting presented there by Memnon is, at least in the terms recorded by Diodorus and Arrian (Diod. 17.18.2–3, Arr. *Anab.* 1.12.9–10), a later invention borrowed by both authors from the tradition (perhaps from the same source) that was favourable to the Rhodian. On this see especially Briant, *From Cyrus* 820–823; Panovski and Sarakinski, *Macedonian Historical Review* 2 (2011) 11–18.
non’s estates—fell under the control of Alexander immediately after crossing the Hellespont (Arr. Anab. 1.12.6). It is evident that he did not need to send there from Sardis so strong a military contingent as he dispatched under command of Calas and Alexander the Lyncestian; likewise, it is hard to find near Abydus a suitable place to identify as Memnon’s country.

Baumbach located Memnon’s *chora* in the coastal districts of the former principality of Hermias, south of Adramyttium; for Debord (who has refined this view), it comprised the old *peraia* of Chios and that of Mytilene and/or the lands of this principality itself. This can be regarded also as possible, but in part: in this case one should take into account only those lands that lay along the bay of Adramyttium, north of the River Caicus. Indeed, it is plausible that the conquest of the more southerly coastal areas, including some of the old mainland possessions of Mytilene and Chios, was the responsibility of another Macedonian contingent, the troops under Alcimachus, dispatched by Alexander a little later from Ephesus to the areas of Aeolis and Ionia that were still held by the Persians (Arr. Anab. 1.18.1–2). And if

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36 On the establishment of Macedonian control over the territories in north-western Asia Minor before and a little after Granicus, see below.


39 It is difficult to define precisely the borders of the old *peraia* of Mytilene and that of Chios (which, despite presumably their loss after the King’s Peace, continued to be the objects of the cities’ claims). However, it appears that some part of these areas had to lie south of the Caicus. On their location cf. Debord, *L’Asie Mineure* 265–267; Carusi, *Isole* 21–86, 93–124; Harding, *Didyma* 132–133; in addition, cf. Hornblower, *CAH* 2 VI (1994) 94. On the loss of mainland possessions by the island communities of the eastern Aegean after the King’s Peace see Hornblower, *Mausolus* 128–129; cf. Carusi 65–69, 116–119, 246–249.

40 Seibert, *Die Eroberung* 39–40, Map 18. Bosworth’s view that the sphere of Alcimachus’ activities may have been the coastal lands as far north as Adramyttium, thus including the coastal districts situated beyond the Caicus, seems to me less preferable: *A Historical Commentary* I 134, cf. Conquest 45.
Memnon’s *chora* lay somewhere there, then there would have been no reason for the earlier mission for dealing with it.

Heckel also expressed his view on the location of Memnon’s land-holdings. Relying on Polyaeus, he held they were in the Troad, but argued that Memnon’s *chora* referred to by Arrian should be associated with the legendary hero Memnon son of Tithonus and not with Memnon of Rhodes, and that this country lay north of Mt. Ida, stretching towards Parion.\(^41\) I do not agree. Strabo, whom Heckel cites, writes only about the “village of Memnon” son of Tithonus (ἡ Μέμνονος κώμη), located near his tomb (13.1.11), and it is highly unlikely that this village is suitable to be identified with Memnon’s *chora*, a territory.\(^42\) Furthermore, in my opinion, in the military-political situation at the moment of Alexander’s capture of Sardis it seems much more logical that he sought to establish control over the lands of the historical Memnon, who now became one of his most dangerous enemies, and not over a country whose name was (suspiciously) similar to that of the Rhodian. After Granicus Memnon remained not merely one of the few surviving Persian commanders in western Asia Minor but apparently the most capable. And insofar as we are able to judge, he was resolutely determined to continue the struggle against the Macedonians: having escaped from the battle of Granicus, he came first to Miletus (Diod. 17.22.1) and then to well-fortified Halicarnassus in order to properly prepare its defense (Diod. 17.23.4–6, Arr. *Anab.* 1.20.3). In all likelihood, Alexander was informed that Memnon started active hostilities against the Macedonians, surely not without the endorsement of Darius III, just when the Macedonian king arrived in Sardis, and it appears quite natural for him now to take measures to bring under his control the

\(^{41}\) Heckel, *Mnemosyne* 47 (1994) 93–95. Cf. Tuplin, in *Coinage* 136 n.101, who notes that Memnon’s *chora* could have been situated either in the Troad or in the Aesepus valley, i.e. also in the far north-west of Asia Minor. In the latter case, Tuplin refers to the same passage of Strabo (13.1.11) used by Heckel to support his hypothesis. On the location of the “village of Memnon” see Sekunda, in *Achaemenid History* III 186–187.

\(^{42}\) Cf. Debord, *L’Asie Mineure* 434.
Rhodian’s land, still not touched owing to Alexander’s special order. It is obvious that sending troops under Calas and Alexander the Lyncestian for this purpose rescinded that order, and Memnon’s holdings after their seizure had to become property of the Macedonian monarch.

Lastly, it is appropriate to touch on one more issue. On the basis of a passage in Ps.-Aristotle’s *Economics* (1351b), a number of scholars believe that Lampsacus was also among Memnon’s holdings.\(^4^3\) This seems to me problematic. On the one hand, it is impossible to date exactly the events described in the passage: they could be related both to the late 360s–late 350s (when Mentor and Memnon acted at the court of their son-in-law Artabazus) and the late 340s–335 (when, on his return from exile, Memnon would have served under his elder brother waging war against Hermias and other ‘rebels’, and then himself, on the order of Darius III, conducted operations against the Macedonian force).\(^4^4\) On the other hand, there is nothing in Ps.-Aristotle to show that Memnon treated Lampsacus not merely as a city captured by him (in favour of either Artabazus or the Persian crown) but as a grant given to him by the Great King.

From these considerations, two regions appear to be best suited for the location of Memnon’s *chora*: first, the central Troad, including the Scamander valley; second, the coastal territories approximately from Adramyttium to the Caicus. Indeed, insofar as we are able to judge, both these regions remained untouched by Alexander’s campaign before his capture of Sardis, as the route he used to reach the capital of Lydia after Granicus ran, we can be fairly sure, some distance from them—through the interior.\(^4^5\) Likewise, because until the last moment Alex-

\(^{4^3}\) For example Berve, *Das Alexanderreich II* 251, no. 497; Seibert, *Die Eroberung* 37; Klinkott, *Der Satrap* 190, 205 n.232.


\(^{4^5}\) For the route Alexander’s army followed see particularly Seibert, *Die Eroberung* 35–36 and Map 18; Bosworth, *Conquest* 44. Both scholars have
Alexander did not know whether highly-fortified Sardis would resist him (Arr. Anab. 1.17.3), it is difficult to imagine that before this he dispersed his troops, sending them to conquer certain lands which were not close to or directly on his way. In addition, it is evident that both these regions lay not too far from Sardis (at any rate, closer than the country suggested by Heckel) and therefore establishing control over one or another of them and then the return of the sent troops to the headquarters of Alexander would have taken a relatively short time: it seems that at this point he had to bear this in mind (at least in part), as it was certainly undesirable for him to be deprived of any strong military contingent that could be useful in the forthcoming fight for the western coast of Asia Minor (for he of course did not know what position would be taken by the Greek cities there). In turn, if my supposition is correct that sending Calas as one of the commanders coincided with his return to his satrapy Hellespontine Phrygia, it is quite possible that this military contingent marched along the coast north of the Caicus towards Adramyttium and

rightly criticized the idea of Engels, who held that after the battle Alexander returned to Ilium, marched to Antandrus, then to Adramyttium or even to Myrina and hence advanced to Sardis, i.e. chose the route that partly ran along the coast: D. W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley 1978) 30–32; cf. Hammond, Alexander the Great 78, who also states unconvincingly that after the victory the Macedonian king returned to Ilium. At the same time, it is credible that Alexander headed to Sardis not right after Granicus but a little later: he seems to have taken the time—acting both personally and through his emissaries—to establish control over cities and territories nearby, including those the Macedonian army, hurrying to meet the Persians, had left in its rear. On Alexander’s order Parmenio captured Dascylium, the main city of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. Anab. 1.17.2); besides, if the literary tradition on Lampscus’ surrender is correct (Paus. 6.18.2–4, Val. Max. 7.3. ext. 4, Suda α 1989), then this should be also shortly after Granicus, because according to Arrian, Alexander’s army had passed by the city earlier (Anab. 1.12.6).

Unfortunately, we do not know exactly when the military contingent rejoined the Macedonian army. This should have happened by the time of the siege of Halicarnassus at the latest (Arr. Anab. 1.24.3), but it is not excluded that the return of the troops was earlier. Cf. Seibert, Die Eroberung 37.
then through the southern and central Troad which was already part of Hellespontine Phrygia.\footnote{For the route that Calas and Alexander the Lyncestian may have followed cf. Seibert, \textit{Die Eroberung} 37 n.31 and Map 18.}

At the same time, it should be admitted that in the present state of our sources it is very difficult to localize Memnon’s \textit{chora} more precisely, opting for one of the two regions in question. But if one must choose, the central Troad seems preferable. Indeed, the mission of Calas and Alexander the Lyncestian appears better suited to the view that Memnon’s \textit{chora} lay not merely on the way to Calas’ satrapy but just within its borders, i.e. in the sphere of his direct responsibility\footnote{However, see Debord, \textit{L’Asie Mineure} 434.} (but of course this is not to say that in the course of its march the force could not conquer also the coastal lands approximately from the Caicus to Adramyttium). Likewise, Polyaeusus definitely indicates that Memnon’s estates were in or very close to the territories that the Macedonian army took in the period between crossing the Hellespont and Granicus (see above). However, there is no clear information that would allow us to localize Memnon’s \textit{chora} in the areas through which the army of Alexander marched after it left Abydus.\footnote{On the case of Lampsacus see above.} Furthermore, the return of his strong military contingent to these territories would hardly have been logical: by that time they—even supposedly without Memnon’s \textit{chora}—were already under Macedonian control (Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1.11.6, 12.1 and 6–7). On the contrary, this cannot be said about the region south-east of Ilium, a city that was occupied by Alexander’s army, in the presence of the Macedonian king himself, right after landing on the coast of Asia Minor,\footnote{Diod. 17.17.3, 17.6–18.1; Plut. \textit{Alex.} 15; Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1.11.7–12.1; Ael. \textit{VH} 12.7; Just. 11.5.12; cf. Strab. 13.1.2. According to Strabo (13.1.26) Alexander visited Ilium after the battle of Granicus. However, this is hardly correct given that other literary sources say that this event took place right after the landing of Alexander’s army in Asia Minor. That he visited Ilium for a second time seems very doubtful. On the Macedonian army’s route to Sardis soon after the victory at Granicus see above.} i.e. about the central

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Troad: as has been pointed out, insofar as we are able to judge, the central Troad was not yet touched by the Macedonian campaign. Moreover, it is appropriate to recall that, in all likelihood, Mentor’s and Memnon’s former holdings (Ilium, Cebren, and Scepsis, possibly also part of nearby lands), received by the brothers when Artabazus was satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, were situated just in this region. And if Ilium became part of Mentor’s and Memnon’s holdings again, then it is possible to suppose that the very friendly attitude of Alexander towards the city originated not only from his reverence for its heroic past (and for reasons of propaganda) but was also a consequence of his order about Memnon’s lands. In that case this order had to concern both the city and its countryside where the Macedonian soldiers would have foraged and where (and/or nearby) they may have come upon some of the estates of Memnon. All this, I believe, gives reason to think that Mentor’s and Memnon’s former holdings and along with them probably certain additional lands nearby were granted/partly restored to Mentor by Artaxerxes III after the Rhodian had managed to win the Persian king’s special favour, and when Mentor passed away, most likely were given to his younger brother and thus became Memnon’s chora.

To sum up, there probably were two periods of Mentor’s and Memnon’s ownership of cities and lands in north-western Asia Minor. The first time, the brothers were granted holdings under Artabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. In all likelihood, at this period these consisted of Ilium, Cebren, and Scepsis in the Troad and perhaps some neighboring lands. However, after the failure of Artabazus’ revolt against Artaxerxes III, all these holdings were undoubtedly lost by Mentor and Memnon. It is most probable that for the second time the brothers managed to receive holdings because of Mentor’s rapid elevation in the service of Artaxerxes III. Now they were granted to Mentor by the Persian king either in the areas that remained under direct royal control or in those that were taken by the Rhodian from the ‘rebels’, including Hermias (or in both). While it is difficult to localize these holdings precisely, there are reasons to think that they lay either in the coastal territories approximately between

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Adramyttium and the Caicus or (as seems to me preferable) in the Troad as being Mentor’s and Memnon’s former holdings restored to the elder brother by Artaxerxes III, and in part probably the new ones received in the neighborhood. At any rate, it is credible that after Mentor’s death this land was inherited by Memnon and therefore at the time of Alexander’s campaign bore the relevant name, Memnon’s chora. At the same time, it is possible that apart from these holdings, Mentor and Memnon, in both periods of their activities in Asia Minor, also had some other holdings situated apart from the bulk of the lands they controlled; if so, however, it is impossible to settle exactly where they lay.

The case of Mentor and Memnon is chronologically the last of the attested examples of holdings given to Greeks by the Persian monarchy. However, although the Achaemenid Empire soon vanished, the practice of grants of cities and lands to individuals by one or another ruler of the states created on its former territory continued to exist—in Alexander’s empire and then in the Hellenistic states that replaced it.51

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St. Petersburg State University
St. Petersburg, Russia
mmkholod@yandex.ru
m.holod@spbu.ru

51 The practice in the Hellenistic period lies outside of the scope of this article. Here I limit myself to referring to the useful collection of examples (with indication of sources and some literature) given in Herman, Ritualised Friendship 106–115, esp. 110–111; and, of recent publications, to P. Thönenmann, “Estates and the Land in Early Hellenistic Asia Minor: The Estate of Krateuas,” Chiron 39 (2009) 363–393.

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